The Peninsula Foundation

Blog

  • What Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny is, and what he is not

    What Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny is, and what he is not

    Anatol Lieven highlights America’s blundering tendency to view world personalities in typically American lens, ignoring the realities of them being citizens of their countries and focusing on their national interests . He uses the examples of Russia’s Navalny and Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi to make his point emphatically. His analysis is relevant to other countries as well. 

    This article was published earlier in Responsible Statecraft. 

    It is very human and natural to admire courage and resolution — these are qualities that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny possesses to a quite remarkable degree. It is also natural to sympathize with suffering — and Navalny has suffered and very nearly died for his beliefs and goals. And of course it is natural to feel disgust with the increasingly criminal behavior of the Putin administration in Russia.

    However, admiration, sympathy and disgust are emotions, not arguments or analysis, and should be employed with great caution in the formulation of state policy.

    In his confirmation hearings, now-Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pledged Biden administration support for Navalny and called him “a voice for millions and millions of Russians.” Statements by the U.S. embassy in Moscow on the Navalny movement have come very close to calling for the end of the present Russian government.

    Recent weeks have seen a tremendous outpouring of American sympathy for Navalny and his movement against the Putin administration. In his confirmation hearings, now-Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pledged Biden administration support for Navalny and called him “a voice for millions and millions of Russians.” Statements by the U.S. embassy in Moscow on the Navalny movement have come very close to calling for the end of the present Russian government. The semi-official American Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is openly and passionately supportive of Navalny’s movement. Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, proposed that Navalny be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

    Such overt U.S. support is not wise. In the first place, it may actually hurt the cause of progressive reform in Russia. The Russian government, like those of Iran and China, has relentlessly propagated the idea that the opposition is being backed if not bankrolled by Washington in order to weaken their countries; and indeed, Russian liberals have done themselves terrible damage by allowing themselves to be cast as representatives of the West, not of the Russian people.

    The second, very familiar problem is the hypocrisy involved. In the latest volume of President Obama’s memoirs, “A Promised Land,” he describes how Hillary Clinton — who relentlessly presented herself in public as an advocate of spreading democracy — argued that Washington should support Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s brutal 2011 crackdown on Arab Spring opposition protests on the grounds that he was a U.S. ally and his fall would lead to chaos and Islamist revolution. In her early public statements, as well, she warned against hastening Mubarak’s exit.

    In proposing Navalny for the Nobel Peace Prize, Haas seems to have forgotten the last time the honor was given to an opposition politician.

    An even greater problem presents itself when one looks at the actual politics of some of the opposition figures who draw such waves of American and Western enthusiasm. In proposing Navalny for the Nobel Peace Prize, Haas seems to have forgotten the last time the honor was given to an opposition politician. The award to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 was supposed to be for “her non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights… one of the most extraordinary examples of civil courage in Asia in recent decades.”

    After Suu Kyi joined the government in Myanmar she’s been damned in the West for her failure to prevent or condemn the savage state persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, and most of her human rights awards (though not the Nobel prize itself) have been revoked.

    After Suu Kyi joined the government in Myanmar she’s been damned in the West for her failure to prevent or condemn the savage state persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, and most of her human rights awards (though not the Nobel prize itself) have been revoked. What her previous Western admirers are not doing — what they almost never do — is to ask themselves why they so completely misunderstood her before.

    But she is a Burmese politician, not a Western democratic leader, and in building her up as a liberal heroine, the Western media and activists willfully ignored not just the political realities of Myanmar, but her own Burmese nationalist antecedents.  

    (Just in the last 48 hours, Suu Kyi has been detained in an apparent military takeover of her democratically elected government and Biden is predictably mulling over his options for reviewing sanctions and taking “appropriate action.”)

    Like Navalny, Suu Kyi is indeed an exceptionally brave and determined human being and in her way a fine leader; just as Navalny might make a fine Russian president. But she is a Burmese politician, not a Western democratic leader, and in building her up as a liberal heroine, the Western media and activists willfully ignored not just the political realities of Myanmar, but her own Burmese nationalist antecedents.

    There are two factors at work here. The first is a basic human one. Courage, like hard work and self-sacrifice, is a quality that it is humanly impossible not to admire, but the possession of it says absolutely nothing at all about the goals to which they are put. All the leaders of the ghastly totalitarian revolutions of the 20th century were exceptionally brave and determined men.

    The second factor relates to some enduring and seemingly incorrigible flaws in most Western reporting and analysis. One of them is the tendency to personalize issues, whereby “Putin” is used as a synonym for the whole Russian state, and “Navalny” is now being presented as a synonym for the entire, enormously disparate Russian opposition. The merest glance at the groups represented at the pro-Navalny demonstrations reveals that together with genuine liberal democrats, there are also numerous Communists and extreme nationalists whose anti-Western positions are much more extreme and reckless than those of Putin himself. As Aleksandr Baunov of the Carnegie Moscow Centre has written:

    “Saturday’s protests were undeniably anti-regime, anti-elite and anti-corruption but not necessarily liberal, pro-Western and pro-democracy. It’s not surprising that such protests frighten not only the authorities, but also successful members of society: even those who don’t consider themselves supporters of the regime.”

    In their blind demonization of Putin, and consequent sanctification of Navalny, Western commentators seem to be implicitly assuming that should Navalny win power (which he almost certainly will not), Russia’s foreign policy would change radically in a pro-Western direction. This is nonsense. Navalny’s supporters are backing him out of (entirely justified) fury at Russian state corruption, lawlessness, and economic failure, not to change foreign policy. Every independent opinion poll has suggested that Putin’s foreign and security policies have enjoyed overwhelming public support; and above all, there is very little in Navalny’s own record to suggest that he would change them.

    As a 2013 essay by Robert Coalson in The Atlantic documented, Navalny supported the Russian war with Georgia in 2008. He has expressed strongly ethno-nationalist attitudes towards the Caucasian minorities in Russia, and previously made opposition to illegal immigration a key part of his platform. In October 2014 he suggested to a reporter that if he became president he would not return Crimea, which was annexed by Russia earlier that year, to Ukraine (though he also said in that same interview that, “It’s not in the interests of Russians to seize neighboring republics, it’s in their interests to fight corruption, alcoholism and so on — to solve internal problems.”

    Rather like Donald Trump concerning American interventionism, Navalny has strongly condemned Russian military intervention in the Middle East on the grounds of cost and irrelevance to real Russian interests; but (as with Trump), that does not necessarily say much about what he would actually do if in power. Apart from anything else, Russia, like the U.S., has a foreign and security establishment “Blob” with firmly established and deeply held collective views on Russia’s vital interests.

    It is to remind Americans that he is a Russian politician, not an American one; that he will respond to Russian realities, not Washington fantasies; and that in the end, U.S. administrations will have to deal with whatever government is in power in Moscow.

    To recall this is not to condemn Navalny. It is to remind Americans that he is a Russian politician, not an American one; that he will respond to Russian realities, not Washington fantasies; and that in the end, U.S. administrations will have to deal with whatever government is in power in Moscow. Russian governments will defend Russian interests, along lines that are mostly quite predictable if one knows Russian history and culture. The sooner we realize this, and stop setting up plaster saints in the hope that they will perform miracles, the better for U.S. foreign policy overall.

     

    Feature Image – Protesters gather near a monument of Russian playwright Alexander Griboyedov during a protest against the jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in St. Petersburg, Russia, Sunday, Jan. 31, 2021. www.arabnews.com
    Image –     Navalny and Putin: www.hilltimes.com
    Image – Aung San Suu Kyi: www.mmtimes.com

  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first ‘focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • e-SLA and the Delhi Act 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time-bound delivery of Services)- Policy Analysis

    e-SLA and the Delhi Act 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time-bound delivery of Services)- Policy Analysis

    Introduction

    As the functions of the modern welfare state expand and the dependency of citizens on it increases, its services must be delivered in timely manner. To this end, the Delhi government developed a robust policy. Through the Delhi Act of 2011 (Right of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery of Services), referred to as “the Act”, and the Delhi (Right of Citizen to Time Bound Delivery of Services) Rules, 2011 [“the Rules”], it has guaranteed timely delivery of 361 services.[1] Delhi is not the only state to confer such a right. However, in these other states, the enforcement of this right requires physical presence. Delhi has used an e-Service Level Agreement [“e-SLA”] to digitise the entire enforcement process. Digitisation has enabled greater accountability, performance review, and convenience, whilst also reducing the invested time and cost of every stakeholder. Thus, through this e-governance tool, Delhi has developed a ‘new ecology’ for the citizen-state relationship.

    In this paper, I will first provide a primer on both the Act and the e-SLA. In the second section, I will examine the constitutionality of the Act. Last, I will test the Act against the principles of good governance and citizen-centric administration.

    Understanding the Act and e-SLA

    The Act and e-SLA are deeply interrelated. While the Act defines the legal rights, procedures, and obligations, e-SLA is the mechanism for their execution. The Act comprises four major components: defined rights and corresponding liabilities, procedural prescriptions, the delegation of rulemaking, and the monitoring platform.

    Every citizen is conferred with the right to time-bound delivery of services,[2] and a liability of compliance imposed on government servants.[3] In cases of default, the government servant is liable to pay the compensatory cost of ₹10 per day for the period of delay, subject to a maximum of ₹200 per application.[4] Correspondingly, citizens are entitled to recover the compensatory costs.[5]

    The Act makes three different but interrelated procedural prescriptions. First, it provides the appointment process, eligibility criteria, and powers of the “competent officer”.[6] He/she must not be below the rank of Deputy Secretary or its equivalent rank and is empowered to impose a compensatory cost on the defaulting government servant. Second, it establishes the procedure governing fixation of liability.[7] If there is a delay, the aggrieved citizen can approach the competent officer, who immediately pays the cost that has been automatically calculated by e-SLA.[8] At a second stage, the officer issues show-cause notice to the concerned servant. If justifiable grounds exist, then the payment is debited from the government exchequer. Otherwise, it is reimbursed from the concerned servant. Third, it prescribes the appointment process, eligibility criteria, and powers of appellate authority as well as a 30-day time limit for filing an appeal. He/she must not be below the rank of Joint Secretary or its equivalent rank and has final authority on the matter.[9]

    The Act provides for delegation of legislative authority in two senses. There is a power to make rules,[10] and the power to remove difficulties.[11] However, the exercise of these powers is subject to Parliamentary scrutiny.

    It is the duty of departments and local bodies to process the application of every citizen and provide an application number. Furthermore, these authorities are obligated to maintain and update the status of applications online.[12] The e-SLA monitoring system has been designated as an online database.[13] To the government, it provides detailed information on the number of disposed or pending cases, which helps in performance evaluation and corrective measures. To the citizens, it provides online facility to track their applications.[14] The information flow is explained below:

     

    Figure 1: Information flow between government officials under e-SLA

     

    Figure 2: Information flow between government officials and citizens under e-SLA

     

    Constitutionality of the Act

    The Constitution provides certain safeguards to “civil servants”.[15] At the outset, it must be noted that these employees are only a sub-set of the “government servants” defined in the Act.[16] Thus, the applicable scope of protection, if any, is not to the entire class of employees enumerated in the Act, but only to civil servants.

    The legal issue herein is the constitutionality of imposing a compensation cost on the civil servant. This is a two-fold question:

    1. Whether there is the power to impose such a cost?

    Appropriate legislatures are empowered to regulate the service conditions of civil servants.[17] As the cost relates to a service condition (i.e., timely delivery), the Delhi Legislative Assembly was empowered in imposing it.

    1. If so, has this exercise violated any constitutional safeguard?

    However, this power is subject to constitutional safeguards guaranteed under Article 311.[18] The protection offered under Article 311(2) is exhaustive and with specific reference to the imposition of three penalties: dismissal, removal, and demotion.[19] Accordingly, the imposition of compensatory cost on the civil servant is beyond the scope of three-fold protection offered by Article 311. Thus, no constitutional safeguard has been violated herein.

    As the imposition of compensatory cost on the civil servants is both within the power and compliant with safeguards, it is constitutional.

    Testing the Act against principles of Good Governance and Citizen-Centric Administration

    Governance refers to the process of decision-making, and the process of implementing those decisions.[20] Good governance is when these processes are tested against a normative standard. Citizen-centric administration refers to governance that places citizens at the centre of all administrative functions.[21] In this section, I will use the characteristics of good governance and the principles of citizen-centric administration as a collective standard[22] to analyze the process of formation and implementation of the Act, its Rules, and e-SLA.

    Assessing Compliance in Formation and Implementation

    a) Participatory. In the absence of statutory provisions, the administrative authorities are not bound to comply with any procedural norms, including notice and prior consultation with the interested parties. The Delhi Act, 2011 does not provide for any such consultation or ante-natal publicity. In the process of policy-making, there was participation only from the relevant government ministries and departments. The government did not take any active steps to broaden consultation to stakeholders such as the civic society organizations, labour unions, or even the general public.

    The lack of participatory policy-making has directly impacted its awareness and enthusiasm among citizens. It was found that only 50% of the people know that their unique ID can be used to track their applications online. Further, only 15% of the people used their ID to track their application.[23]

    b) Transparency. The e-SLA allows for complete transparency to the citizen as to the status of all his applications. The information is not only easily comprehensible but also accessible. However, the transparency does not extend to releasing statistics of operations to the public domain. Currently, these statistics, such as the figures on the number of applications, pendency, disposal rate, performing/underperforming departments, are accessible only to government officials.[24]

    c) Responsiveness. The e-SLA system does not provide for any feedback mechanism. Thus, there is no avenue for the citizens availing these services to share their experiences. As feedback is the basis on which the system continually improves, this deficiency hinders the potential effectiveness of e-SLA.[25]

    1. Accountability

    The right to time-bound service delivery through the mechanism of compensatory cost has, in theory, ensured that the government and its officials are accountable to citizens. This is buttressed by the fact that the Act seeks to develop a culture of timely delivery among the government servants by additionally punishing habitual offenders and providing cash incentives for those without a single default in a year.[26] However, the liability of government servant has been capped at ₹200, compared to other state legislation that penalizes in thousands. Further, the cash incentives are only up to ₹5000. Thus, the quantum is inadequate to cause attitudinal changes in the servants.

    Moreover, there is no culture among public servants to hold their non-performing colleagues in disrepute.[27] There is no indication that this non-performance is factored into promotions. Anyhow, such public servants are typically complacent and not seeking promotions. The security of their present job and status is adequate incentive to persist with present behaviour. Thus, promotions and reputational loss among peers are not adequate incentives for performance either.

    Furthermore, by releasing all relevant statistics of operations to the public domain, the government can broaden its accountability. These statistics can be used by stakeholders, such as news and media agencies and policy think-tanks, to supplement the government in identifying issues and corrective measures. This would also pressurize the government to be more proactive.

         2.  Consensus orientation

    Through reasonable and extensively deliberated timelines, the Act sufficiently balances the interests of citizens in securing timely delivery with the government’s limited capacity.

         3.  Effectiveness and Efficiency

    The usage of e-governance to guarantee the right to public service is a revolutionary process reform. This must be gauged at two levels:

    • For the citizen, this system has reduced the number of physical visits required, thus saving time and cost. In a survey, 66.6% reported that they are not required to visit government offices more than once after submitting their applications.[28]
    • For the government, it eliminates systemic errors and inefficiencies.[29] The statistics help in assessing performance and preparing corrective action.[30] However, if the system can track internal departmental processes too, it would allow determining the exact level at which service delivery is being delayed. Furthermore, the Act ignores the quality of timely delivered services.[31] To provide a comprehensive right to public service, the legislature must develop standards to assess the quality of services rendered on time.

     

        4.  Equitable and Inclusive

    Under the Act, while the citizen is immediately compensated, the government servant is not immediately penalized for default. The procedure allows him/her to provide justified grounds that could excuse liability. For greater inclusivity, the government can prescribe a pro-rata calculation of the penalty. As the amount is automatically calculated by e-SLA, even complex formulas are acceptable.

       5.  Rule of Law

    The Act provides for a fair legal framework and impartial enforcement.

    Conclusion

    Executing the right to time-bound service delivery through an online portal is truly revolutionary. It has emerged as model legislation for other governments. The Act is constitutionally valid. However, when tested against standards of good governance, this policy suffers from problems of non-participation, transparency, responsiveness, accountability, and effectiveness at the government-level. But it scores par excellence on the principles of consensus orientation, effectiveness at the citizen-level, inclusiveness, and rule of law. To embrace the truly revolutionary potential of this policy, the government must make the suggestions recommended in the last section of the paper, vis-à-vis each principle.

     

    References:

    [1] IANS, ‘245 services brought under Delhi time-bound delivery act’ (Business Standard, 24 August 2014) <https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/245-services-brought-under-delhi-time-bound-delivery-act-114082400707_1.html> accessed 17 January 2021.

    [2] The Act, s. 3.

    [3] The Act, s. 4.

    [4] The Act, s. 7.

    [5] The Act, s. 8.

    [6] The Act, s. 9.

    [7] The Act, s. 10.

    [8] The Rules, r. 4(1).

    [9] The Act, s. 11(1).

    [10] The Act, s. 15.

    [11] The Act, s. 16.

    [12] The Act, s. 5.

    [13] The Rules, r. 2(c).

    [14] Arjun Kapoor & Niranjan Sahoo, India’s Shifting Governance Structure: From Charter of Promises to Services Guarantee (ORF Occasional Paper No 35, 2012).

    [15] Constitution of India 1950, Art. 309, 310, 311.

    [16] The Act, s. 2(g).

    [17] Constitution of India 1950, Art. 309.

    [18] Union of India v. S.P. Sharma (2014) 6 SCC 351.

    [19] Yashomati Ghosh, Textbook on Administrative Law (1st edn, Lexis Nexis 2015) 416.

    [20] UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ‘What is Good Governance?’ <http://www. unescap.org/sites/default/files/good-governance.pdf>.

    [21] Ghosh (n 19) 14.

    [22] Second Administrative Reforms Commission, Citizen-Centric Administration (Report No 12, 2009) p. 8.

    [23] Audit of Functioning of Government of Delhi’s e-SLA Scheme, by Management Development Institute, Gurgaon (2012).

    [24] Ibid.

    [25] Rohit Sinha, ‘Delivering on service guarantee: A case of Delhi’s e-SLA’ (ORF, 29 December 2012) <https://www.orfonline.org/research/delivering-on-service-guarantee-a-case-of-delhis-e-sla/> accessed 17 January 2021.

    [26] The Act, s. 12.

    [27] Kapoor & Sahoo (n 14); Amit Chandea & Surbhi Bhatia, The Right of Citizens for Time Bound Delivery of Goods and Services and Redressal of their Grievances Bill, 2011 (CCS, 2015) p. 25-26.

    [28] Sinha (n 25).

    [29] Chandea & Bhatia (n 27).

    [30] Ibid.

    [31] Kapoor & Sahoo (n 14).

     

    Image Credit: Forbes India

  • India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    The satellite picture below brilliantly depicts the geographical separation of Arunachal Pradesh (called Lower Tibet by the Chinese) and Tibet. The McMahon Line more or less runs along the crest line of the Himalayas.

    The Chinese have never been quite explicit on how much of Arunachal they seek.  I once saw an official map displayed in a travel agents office in Lhasa that showed only the Tawang tract as Chinese territory. In other maps they have their border running along the foothills, which means all of Arunachal.

    The Chinese have based their specific claim on the territory on the premise that Tawang was administered from Lhasa, and the contiguous areas owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. Then the Chinese must also consider this. Sikkim till into the 19th century a vassal of Tibet and Darjeeling was forcibly taken from it by the British! By extending this logic could they realistically stake a claim for Sikkim and Darjeeling? Of course not. It would be preposterous. History has moved on. The times have changed. For the 21st century to be stable 20th century borders must be stable, whatever be our yearnings.

    At the crux of this issue is the larger question of the national identities of the two nations and when and how they evolved. The Imperial India of the Mughals spanned from Afghanistan to Bengal but did not go very much below the Godavari in the South. The Imperial India of the British incorporated all of today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but had no Afghanistan, not for want of trying. It was the British who for the first time brought Assam into India in 1826 when they defeated Burma and formalized the annexation with the treaty of Yandabo.

    It was only in 1886 that the British first forayed out of the Brahmaputra valley when they sent out a punitive expedition into the Lohit valley in pursuit of marauding tribesmen who began raiding the new tea gardens. Apparently the area was neither under Chinese or Tibetan control for there were no protests either from the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Soon the British stayed put.

    Tibet remained in self imposed isolation and the race to be first into Lhasa became the greatest challenge for explorers and adventurers in the second half of the 19th century. Not the least among these were the spies of the Survey of India, the legendary pundits. The most renowned of these was the Sarat Chandra Das whose books on Tibet are still avidly read today. As the adventurers, often military officers masquerading as explorers began visiting Tibet the British in India began worrying. Reports that the most well-known of Czarist Russia’s military explorers, Col. Grombchevsky was sighted in Tibet had Lord Curzon, the Governor General of India most worried.

    In 1903 Curzon decided to send a military expedition into Tibet led by Grombchevsky’s old antagonist, Col. Francis Younghusband. A brigade strong mixed force of Gurkhas and Tommies went over the Nathu La into the Chumbi valley and advanced unhindered till Shigatse. A Tibetan military force met them there but offered what can only be described as passive resistance. Not a shot was fired back as the British Indian troops rained bullets on them. It was a forerunner to Jallianwalla Bagh. From Shigatse Younghusband made a leisurely march into Lhasa. The British got the Tibetans to agree to end their isolation and having extracted trade concessions withdrew in 1904, the way they came.

    In 1907 Britain and Russia formally agreed that it was in their interests to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart.” It may be of interest to the reader to know that the Great Game nevertheless continued. In 1907 Col. Mannerheim then of the Russian Army, later Field Marshal Mannerheim and first President of Finland, led a horseback expedition from Kyrgyzstan to Harbin on China’s northeast to identify a route for the cavalry.

    The next important year was 1913 when the Tibetans declared independence after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a Republic in China under Sun Yat Sen. They attacked and drove the Chinese garrisons in Tibet into India over the Nathu La. Also in 1913 the British convened the Simla Conference to demarcate the India-Tibet border. The British proposed the 1914 McMahon Line, as we know it. The Tibetans accepted it. The Chinese Amban however initialed the agreement under protest. But his protest seemed mostly about the British negotiating directly with Tibet as a sovereign state and not over the McMahon Line as such.

    Things moved on then. In 1935 at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe ICS, then Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, the McMahon Line was notified. In 1944 JP Mills ICS established British Indian administration in NEFA, but excluding Tawang which continued to be administered by the Lhasa appointed head lama at Tawang despite the fact that it lay well below the McMahon Line. This was largely because Henry Twynam, the Governor of Assam lost his nerve and did not want to provoke the Tibetans. In 1947 the Dalai Lama (the same gentleman who is now in Dharamshala) sent the newly independent India a note laying claim to some districts in NEFA/Arunachal.

    On October 7, 1950 the Chinese attacked the Tibetans at seven places on their frontier and made known their intention of reasserting control over all of Tibet. As if in response on February 16, 1951 Major Relangnao ‘Bob’ Khating IFAS raised the India tricolor in Tawang and took over the administration of the tract. The point of this narration is to bring home the fact that India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh doesn’t rest on any great historical tradition or cultural affinity. We are there because the British went there. But then the Chinese have no basis whatsoever to stake a claim, besides a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China among some of the hangers-on in the Qing emperor’s court. The important thing now is that we have been there for over a hundred years and that settles the issue.

    Arunachal Pradesh has a very interesting population mix. Only less than 10% of its population is Tibetan. Indo-Mongoloid tribes account for 68% of the population. The rest are migrants from Nagaland and Assam. As far as religious affinities go Hindus are the biggest group with 37%, followed by 36% animists, 13% Buddhists. Recent census figures suggest a spurt in Christianity, possibly induced by pocketbook proselytizing. In all there are 21 major tribal groups and over 100 ethnically distinct sub-groupings, speaking over 50 distinct languages and dialects. The population of about a million is spread out over 17 towns and 3649 villages. With the exception of a few villages of Monpas who live north of the McMahon Line, it is an ethnically compact and contiguous area.

    In fact in future boundary negotiations India could make a case for inclusion of the few Monpa villages left behind north of the McMahon Line? Many knowledgeable observers suggest that the area south of the Huangpo/Brahmaputra from the Pemako gorge till it enters the Subansiri division of Arunachal would be a logical boundary as the raging and hence un-fordable and unbridgeable river ensures hardly any Chinese administrative presence in the area.

    It is true that historically India never had a direct border with Tibet till the British took Kumaon and Garhwal from Nepal in 1846 and extended its domain over Arunachal in 1886. On the other hand the formidable Himalayas were always culturally a part of India and formed a natural barrier against ingress from the north, whether Tibetan or Chinese. But times have moved and technology and mankind’s great engineering powers now make it possible for even the most hostile terrain to be subjugated. The Himalayas are no longer the barrier they once were. As China and India emerge as the world’s great economies and powers can India possibly allow China a strategic trans-Himalayan space just a few miles from the plains?

    The view from the Chinese side about what exactly constitutes China is no less confused. Apparently like the British, the Manchu’s who ruled China from the 17th to the early 20th century had a policy of staking claim to the lands that lay ahead of their frontiers in order to provide themselves with military buffers. In a recent article in the China Review magazine, Professor Ge Jianxiong, Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai writes: “to claim that Tibet has always been a part of China since the Tang dynasty; the fact that the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim.” Ge also notes that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China was established the idea of China was not clearly conceptualized. Even during the late Qing period (Manchu) the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Qing Empire. At other times it would be taken to refer to only the eighteen interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.

    Professor Ge further adds that the notions of “Greater China” were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the courts self-aggrandizement.” Ge criticizes those who feel that the more they exaggerate the territory of historical China the more “patriotic” they are. In this context I would like to recall a recent conversation I had with the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi. Ambassador Sun said that while he was soundly castigated in India for his unintended comment, he gained a major constituency in China. The mandarins in the Beijing would do well to take heed to Ge Jianxiong’s advice: “If China really wishes to rise peacefully and be on solid footing in the future, we must understand the sum of our history and learn from our experiences.” The same holds true for the babus in South Block and ‘the having writ move on’ media pundits. If we don’t then we know who will be laughing!

     

    Image Credit: Tawang Monastery

  • History – Thailand’s Golden Buddha

    History – Thailand’s Golden Buddha

    In the month of May 2007 I was invited to speak at the Mahidol University of Bangkok during the SSEASR Conference. I gave a talk on Yogachara Buddhism there. During this occasion, I had the opportunity to visit various Buddhist temples at Bangkok. They include the magnificent ones like Emerald Buddha, Golden Buddha, Buddha in his Maha nirvana time etc. It is very interesting to note that in the Sanctum Sanctorum of all Buddha temples, while the right side wall is covered with pictures depicting instances in Buddha’s life, the left side has paintings exclusively from Ramayana. For a Thai devotee, Hinduism is as important as Mahayana Buddhism.

    During the visit of one of the temple, I learnt this great truth about ignorance obscuring Reality.

    One of these famous temples has a Buddha icon nearly 17 feet tall, which is known till the beginning of 20th century as “Terracotta Buddha temple” . The temple was established in the 13th century with its huge icon of Buddha, for several centuries it was worshipped by the devotees as “Terracotta Buddha”. One day the authorities decided to shift the Terracotta Buddha image to a place several kilometers away, probably to do some repairs to the temple. They put the Terracotta Buddha on a truck and were moving it. When they were half way through, a heavy downpour started. The rain was so heavy that the clay image of Buddha started dissolving. They tried to protect the image with tarpaulins and umbrellas, but to no effect. There was a very heavy wind which blew away the tarpaulins and umbrellas. Due to the heavy rain, the Buddha icon in clay was dissolving fast. The devotees were grief-stricken. They were wondering whether it would have been wiser to have left the temple un-repaired rather than allowing the centuries old terracotta Buddha icon to get dissolved in the heavy downpour.

     

    Presto! A wonderful thing was happening. As the clay was dissolving, from within the clay was emerging a golden Buddha idol! as the idol there was of clay. After a short while all the clay, which was covering the idol got completely dissolved. The people were witnessing the presence of a resplendent “Golden Buddha” appearing before them in all its grandeur.

    What really happened? It was really a golden Buddha at the time of its installation in the 13th century. After some time Thailand was experiencing foreign invasions. Fearing that the invaders would take away the golden image, which was 5.5 tons of solid gold, the devotees covered the image with clay. Thinking that it was only a Terracotta Buddha, the invaders left it untouched. That generation knowing that it was a golden Buddha inside the clay, worshipped Buddha in that form. As many years passed by, the subsequent generations were not aware of this fact. They truly believed in what they saw externally and worshipped it as a Terracotta Buddha only. Thus their minds were conditioned by externalities. Once the clay dissolved what is truly inside came out with all its effulgence. It is today worshipped as the golden Buddha in Bangkok.

    It is happening to all of us everyday, we assume ourselves to be only a body-mind-intellect complex and nothing beyond it. We are conditioned by our awareness of our body, our thinking process and our analysis of the phenomena. These are only externalities within each one of us. It is only a clay that surrounds the wonderful Immanence within us. Within each one of us is the golden Buddha, the great immanent Lord who is also transcendent, he is the great Shiva, who is constantly performing his cosmic dance. In our hearts we not aware of it as our minds are conditioned by what we see, do and think. It is like the Thais seeing only the clay image and concluding it as only terracotta Buddha. As the rain dissolved the clay, the golden icon which is the true-one inside is revealed. Likewise when the spiritual sadhaha and devotion dissolves our mental conditioning, the Lord within ourselves is also revealed. This is the lesson we learn from the Golden Buddha temple.

    The same idea is beautifully explained in Thirumoolar’s Thirumantiram. A sculptor has carved out a beautiful elephant from a block of wood. When you see it as an elephant, you do not see the underlying reality of the wood. When you will be able to see the substratum, the underlying reality of the wood, with which all the objects of carving are made, you do not see the carved elephant; you see the substratum of the wood. Likewise, the ignorance enveloping our minds obscure the ultimate reality within us, when we are graded by the body-mind-intellect complex. When the revelation comes to us through god’s grace and gurus’ teachings coupled with our devotion to Him, the conditioning disappears. The phenomena abide in the ultimate. We experience the Divinity within us.

    Even in the area of management, the story of Golden Buddha has a great relevance. A competent Manager, with a penetrating mind, should be able to see what is the reality hidden in the numerous external information. The external covering only obscures the truth, which you will be able to get through. Once you see the substratum, the ultimate truth is revealed.

     

    Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons

  • (Part-II) Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination

    (Part-II) Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination

    I.   Reassessing Vulnerabilities During a Pandemic

    A general problem across all conventional models is their failure to understand that vulnerabilities during a pandemic are created and compounded by socio-economic factors too. Therefore, there is a need to adopt approaches that holistically assess the correlation between socioeconomic factors and vulnerability during a pandemic.[1]

    The Syndemics Approach

    Under this approach, pandemics are understood as an interaction of that disease with other diseases and the socio-economic and political factors that increase the risk of vulnerability.[2] All these factors synergistically interact to impact the health of individuals and society. Through these risk factors, it identifies the overlapping health and socio-economic problems that increase vulnerability (‘syndemic vulnerabilities’). The socio-economic risk factors are influenced by social determinants of health, i.e., the conditions of housing, food, employment, healthcare, and education.[3] Therefore, the utility of this approach lies in its holistic conception of socio-economic factors that impact the formation, clustering, and progression of diseases.[4] Using this approach, I argue that the COVID-19 pandemic has synergistically interacted and exacerbated the existing diseases and socio-economic conditions of marginalized groups across countries.

    Higher Risks of Infection, Transmission, and Mortality: Typically, due to historic discrimination and denial, marginalized communities have a greater number of pre-existing diseases like diabetes and asthma,[5] which in turn elevates their risk of infection and mortality. Moreover, there is unequal access to healthcare among marginalized communities due to the high costs of medical care and the absence of health insurance.[6] Marginalized communities are also disproportionately poor,[7] which affects their ability to mitigate the impact of the pandemic.

    Typically, marginalized communities are housed in crowded neighbourhoods with smaller houses that lack outside space.[8] They also have higher population densities, especially in urban areas, and lower access to communal green space.[9]Due to historic discrimination, marginalized communities are over-represented in essential services, including low-wage healthcare sectors and sanitation jobs.[10] This reduces their ability to work from home, and thus increases their risk of infection and transmission. Marginalized communities are more likely to take public transportation,[11] which further increases their risk of infection and transmission.

    These syndemic vulnerabilities have increased the risk of mortality among these marginalized communities. For instance, in America, the mortality rate of African-Americans and Indigenous/Latino communities is 3.4 times and 3.3 times higher than a non-Hispanic White person.[12] Evidence from past epidemics/pandemics shows that the rates of infection and mortality are always disproportionately higher among marginalized communities.[13]

    Greater Socio-Economic Disruption: Due to a lack of quality education, members of marginalized communities tend to work in lower-wage jobs in the informal sector, which has been worst hit by the pandemic.[14] The percentage fall in employment for marginalized communities has been far greater, indicating that education was a protective factor in the first wave of job losses.[15] Consequently, there has also been greater housing evictions among these communities.[16]The access to quality education for children in marginalized communities has also been severely impacted because they lack access to the internet,[17] affecting their ability to access education. Moreover, low literacy among adults in marginalized communities indicates their inability to assist their children with any form of home learning.[18]

    Therefore, the increased syndemic vulnerabilities of marginalized communities and the consequent disproportionate socio-economic disruptions of the pandemic on them necessitate a greater strive for their inclusion in distributing the vaccine. Early access to such vaccines allows these groups the opportunity to proportionately mitigate these vulnerabilities and disruptions.

    Intersectionality

    Presently, vulnerabilities among individuals are dominantly viewed from a single-axis framework. This ignores the multiple layers and experiences of vulnerability, resulting from an interplay of power structures and different social identities, held by one individual. This ignorance is avoided when using intersectionality, which is an analytical framework that explains how different social, economic, and political identities overlap to create different modes of discrimination and privilege.[19] Thus, it explains how certain individuals in the population are relatively more disadvantaged than others.[20] Intersectionality not only provides a multi-layered understanding of vulnerabilities during a pandemic but also helps prioritize distribution within an identified category, given the scarcity of vaccines.

     

    II.   Proposing a Multi-Value Ethical Framework

    Given its rational criteria, incorporating utilitarianism’s clinical risk factors is quite valuable. However, as argued, vulnerability during a pandemic is also determined by socioeconomic risk factors. Therefore, there is a need to adopt a multi-value approach that incorporates both clinical and socio-economic risk factors. I propose to do so by simultaneously prioritizing the values of ‘collective wellbeing’ and ‘justice’.

    Borrowed from utilitarianism is the value of ‘collective wellbeing’, which aims at maximizing benefits and minimizing harms. Flowing from a syndemic conception of COVID-19 is the value of ‘justice’, which aims at reducing health inequities and treats like people alike. These values are not necessarily always distinct, but their overlap over one parameter indicates a stronger justification. They can be operationalized using an ‘intersectional multi-parameter weighted framework’.

    Operationalizing Values

    The framework is constructed through three layers: (1) for each risk parameter, there is (2) a value-based justification, along with (3) its extent of weightage. The risk parameters are viewed from an intersectional power axis, with value justifications sourced from clinical and syndemic vulnerabilities. The weightage typically connotes a three-point scale, where 3 indicates the highest priority, and 1 indicates the lowest. The priority order is based on the greatness of one’s total score. The lottery method should only be used as a tie-breaker when the score is the same, and no more doses are presently available.

    Age:    Older people are at a significantly higher risk of infection and severe morbidity or mortality due to physiological changes associated with ageing. Globally, more than 95% of COVID-19 deaths were among individuals aged 60 and above. Even among older people, more than half of all deaths occurred in people aged 80 and above.[21]

    Therefore, in descending order, weightage must be given to individuals above 80 years, individuals between 60-80 years, and individuals between 40-59 years.

    Comorbidities:          Depending on the country, between 48-75% of COVD-19 deaths are associated with existing comorbidities. Those with comorbidities are also at moderately higher risk of infection.[22]

    The prioritization has to be categorized based on the severity of the comorbidity, in contracting the infection and causing death. Therefore, in descending order, higher weightage must be given to severe comorbidities, moderate comorbidities, and mild comorbidities. The severity in infection and mortality is different for countries due to distinct socio-economic realities and evolutionary biology. Therefore, this identification and classification need to be uniquely undertaken. However, as a general rule, it is almost universal for HIV, cancer, and most cardiovascular diseases to be severe comorbidities.[23]

    Profession:     Prioritizing frontline healthcare, sanitation, and defence workers are justified because they engage in services, whose absence has the greatest negative societal impact- whether on health, safety/security, or economy. They are also in constant contact with areas and people having the greatest risk of infection. Therefore, protecting them has a multiplier effect, in that their ability to remain uninfected protects the health of others and minimizes societal and economic disruption. Since the state obligates these workers to work in risk conditions, while everyone else is working from home, it is further obligated to protect them.

    Therefore, in descending order, priority must be given to frontline workers, workers in other essential sectors, and workers in non-essential sectors.

    Income:          One’s economic status affects their ability to access healthcare, thus results in higher rates of mortality and severe morbidity.[24] The syndemic approach reveals that poverty compounds one’s syndemic vulnerability.

    Therefore, in descending order, priority must be given to individuals with low-income, middle-income, and high-income.

    Ethnic Identity:         The syndemic approach reveals that marginalized communities are at a greater risk of infection, transmission, and mortality. They are also worst affected by the pandemic, which further compounds their vulnerability. Given these vulnerabilities, prioritized vaccine access to marginalized communities also helps reduce all three risks among the general population.

    The prioritization criteria would depend on the marginalized communities within a country and the extent of their syndemic vulnerabilities. For instance, in America, the syndemic vulnerabilities are greatest for African-Americans, followed by the Indigenous/Latinos communities, and then Pacific Islanders.

    Conclusion

    The conventional models of vaccine distribution are unethical towards disadvantaged groups. While neoliberalism completely ignores the distributive function of law, utilitarianism, lottery, and FCFS at least acknowledge this. However, their criterion of distribution ignores socio-economic vulnerabilities. This ignorance can be addressed using a syndemics approach and intersectionality.

    The syndemics approach explains the socio-economic risk factors that disproportionately disadvantage marginalized communities, both medically and socio-economically. Intersectionality provides a layered understanding of how vulnerabilities affect people, even those in the same group, differently. Using these approaches, I propose a multi-value ethical framework that balances the pragmatic considerations of medical utilitarianism with greater social inclusion. It operationalizes the values of these ethical systems through the priority order generated under an ‘intersectional multi-parameter weighted framework’.

     

    Notes:

    [1] While each country has different marginalized groups, the patterns of vulnerability explored are similar. Thus, marginalized groups have been generally analyzed hereinafter.

    [2] Merrill Singer, Nicola Bulled, et al, ‘Syndemics and the biosocial conception of health’ (2017) 389 Lancet 941, 941-943.

    [3] Clare Bambra, Ryan Riordan, et al, ‘The COVID-19 pandemic and health inequalities’ (2020) 1 J Epidemiol Community Health 964, 965.

    [4] Singer (n 23) 948.

    [5] Harleen Kaur, ‘Indirect racial discrimination in COVID-19 ethical guidance’ (BMJ Blog, 27 August 2020) <https://blogs.bmj.com/covid-19/2020/08/27/indirect-racial-discrimination-in-covid-19-ethical-guidance/> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [6] Bambra (n 24) 965-966.

    [7] Melanie Moses, ‘A Model for a Just COVID-19 Vaccination Program’ (Nautilus, 25 November 2020) <http://nautil.us/issue/93/forerunners/a-model-for-a-just-covid_19-vaccination-program> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [8] Tonia Poteat, ‘Understanding COVID-19 Risks and Vulnerabilities among Black Communities in America: Syndemics’ (2020) 47 Annals of Epidemiology 1, 3.

    [9] Bambra (n 24) 966.

    [10] National Academies (n 16) 30-31.

    [11] ‘Beyond the data: Understanding the impact of COVID-19 on BAME groups’ (2020) Public Health England Report, 22-23 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/892376/COVID_stakeholder_engagement_synthesis_beyond_the_data.pdf> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [12] Harald Schmidt, ‘Is It Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?’ (2020) 324 JAMA <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2771874> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [13] Bambra (n 24) 967.

    [14] Shruti Srivastava, ‘Millions Escaped Caste Discrimination. Covid-19 Brought It Back’ (Bloomberg Quint, 21 August 2020) <https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/millions-escaped-caste-discrimination-covid-19-brought-it-back> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [15] Ashwini Deshpande, ‘Differential impact of COVID-19 and the lockdown’ (The Hindu, 22 August 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/differential-impact-of-covid-19-and-the-lockdown/article32416854.ece> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [16] Schmidt (n 33).

    [17] Deshpande (n 36).

    [18] Ibid.

    [19] Olena Hankivsky, ‘An intersectionality-based policy analysis framework’ (2014) 13(119) Intl J Equity in Health 1, 2.

    [20] Ibid.

    [21] ‘Supporting older people during the COVID-19 pandemic’ (WHO, 3 April 2020) <https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/news/2020/4/supporting-older-people-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-is-everyones-business> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [22] Awadhesh Kumar, ‘Impact of COVID-19 and comorbidities on health and economics’ (2020) 14(6) Diabetes Metab Syndr 1625, 1626-1627.

    [23] Ibid.

    [24] National Academies (n 16) 68-77.

     

    Image Credit: One India

  • Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination [Part I]

    Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination [Part I]

    Introduction

    Distributing the COVID-19 vaccination has been touted as the biggest policy decision in 2021. This stems from the utility and efficacy of vaccines in immediately addressing pandemics. Specifically, the COVID-19 vaccination not only protects the injected person, with a 70%-95% efficacy[1] but also provides ‘herd immunity’.[2] That is, the non-injected population is also benefited due to a reduced risk of transmission and infection, so long as 70% of individuals in society are vaccinated. Therefore, access to the vaccine determines how much and for whom the adversity of the pandemic is mitigated.

    Currently, most vaccine developers are in the final two phases of clinical trials, with some, like Pfizer/BioNTech’s and Oxford University/AstraZeneca’s, already receiving ‘emergency use authorization’ from multiple countries. Most countries have prepared a ballpark action plan for distribution, while the United Kingdom has already vaccinated more than 3.5 million people.[3]

    In this paper, I evaluate the most ethical framework for distributing COVID-19 vaccinations, amongst the population of one country, by its government. I address this question from the perspective of marginalized communities, using the approaches of realism, syndemics, and intersectionality. In Part I of this article, I will evaluate the conventional models for vaccine distribution. In Part II, I will provide an alternative framework for reassessing vulnerabilities during a pandemic, and propose a multi-value ethical framework.

    1. Evaluating the Conventional Models for Vaccine Distribution

    The decision to distribute COVID-19 vaccines is inherently ethical because it involves allocating an important resource in a resource-scarce world. Thus, determining who can pre-maturely mitigate the pandemic’s adversity. There are four models in conventional discourse that have sought to answer the distribution question. In this section, under each model, I will critically evaluate the role of law in distribution and the ethical values that guide prioritized distribution.

    Neoliberalism

    Neoliberalism is characterized by a strict separation between the state, society, and the market.[4] The objective of all economic activity in the markets is wealth and efficiency maximization.[5] To this end, greater involvement of the private sector in the economy is justified because the market allocation of resources is more efficient. Any state intervention beyond a minimum supporting role is conceived as inefficient because rent-seeking, corruption, and capture by special interests are inevitable.[6]

    The diminished role of the state in securing redistribution means that individuals are responsible for their welfare and income. Therefore, individuals would themselves be responsible for ensuring access to the vaccination, notwithstanding their socio-economic status. They must attain this access by successfully competing in the “free market”, through instruments like price point discovery.[7] The underlying rules of competition create a level playing field where fair bargaining over market transactions can occur, so long as the requisite effort is made. This is because the rules are universal in their applicability, and create a distinct economic space, free from state coercion.[8] Therefore, access to the vaccine is determined by one’s ability to pay for it.

    State intervention is only justified when there is a market failure, but even then, preference is accorded to non-state solutions like direct public action or self-regulation.[9] Neoliberalism addresses equity concerns, like non-access to the vaccine, through safety nets and income transfers rather than through market regulation.[10] Otherwise, inefficiencies are introduced into the system, which distorts market incentives, and thus undermines the goal of economic growth.[11] This means that vaccine developers would lose the incentive to undertake expedient and mass production.

    Critique:         Neoliberalism denies that any redistribution to disadvantaged groups is covered by legal reforms. There is no focus on how economic gains are distributed, and the effect of reforms on vulnerable social groups.[12]Neoliberalism’s refusal to acknowledge the distributive function of legal regulation is flawed because rules necessarily always operate to distribute resources and powers to various groups and actors in particular ways.[13] The neoliberal machinery devises a particular allocation of risks, resources, powers, costs, burdens and benefits among different market actors. The effect is that the existing propertied class receive greater entitlement, whilst others are disadvantaged.[14] This perpetuates the inequalities already in status quo, impacting accessibility to the vaccine. Therefore, the relevant question is not whether distributive concerns must be considered, but rather their manner of incorporation in the process of market reform. To this end, the state, which guarantees the regulatory underpinnings of a market economy, must inherently play a greater role in regulating the distribution of economic gains from the market.

    The idea to distribute vaccines based on personal purchasing power is flawed because it ignores the fact that vaccines possess inelastic demand. Therefore, given short supply at short-term and medium-term levels, the price will continually go up to unaffordable rates. This increased price does not encourage new suppliers because the intellectual property rights and R&D is held only by a few developers.[15]

    Utilitarianism

    Utilitarianism assesses the morality of a decision based on its consequences, whether it maximizes benefits and/or minimizes harms. Under this rationale, priority is accorded based on the greatest clinical risks and greatest utility to social functioning. The clinical factors consider the risk of severe morbidity and mortality, risk of infection, and risk of transmission.[16] The greatest utility to society is measured in terms of the risk of negative societal impact, i.e., the public utility of one’s occupation/social role to society and other individuals’ lives and livelihood.[17]

    Therefore, in this pandemic, utilitarianism would prioritize age (above 50/60 years) and associated comorbidities (identified set of diseases) based on the risk of morbidity/mortality and infection, followed by occupation (healthcare and frontline workers) based on the risk of negative societal impact and risk of infection.[18]

    Critique:         Unlike neoliberalism, there is limited value in the utilitarian model because it recognizes the distributive role of law in allocating benefits. Moreover, it pursues this based on a rational objective criterion.

    However, its main problem lies in assessing vulnerabilities through only a clinical lens. It ignores that socio-economic factors also contribute to overall vulnerability during the pandemic, as I argue in the next section. Additionally, it doesn’t acknowledge that even within the identified categories, some are more vulnerable than others. Therefore, it has the effect of compounding existing socio-economic inequalities.

    Lottery

    This approach prioritizes distribution through a random selection of names. This is premised on the assumption that such selection is egalitarian and impartial, and also overcomes the inherent moral relativity/ambiguity of human reasoning.[19]

    Critique:         Random lotteries acknowledge the role of law in distributing benefits, but they lack any rational prioritization to effectively and immediately address the pandemic. While absolute objectivity is unattainable, avoiding moral reasoning altogether is merely “an easy method to avoid hard decisions”.[20] The assumption that everyone’s life is equally important fails to acknowledge the differential disparities that differentially threaten such lives.[21]

    First Come First Serve

    Like lotteries, this approach is premised on avoiding moral decisions and the assumption that everyone has an equal opportunity to access the vaccine.[22]

    Critique:         While this approach acknowledges the role of law in distributing benefits, it is completely blind to the socio-economic realities. Given scarcity, it is inevitable that access will be confined to those with better connections, access to information, communication, and transportation. All these factors are, in turn, tied to one’s socio-economic status. Thus, there is disproportionate denial to disadvantaged communities.

     

    References:

    [1] James Gallagher, ‘Covid vaccine update’ (BBC, 30 December 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-51665497> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [2] Rebecca Weintraub, ‘A Covid-19 Vaccine Will Need Equitable, Global Distribution’ (HBR, 2 April 2020) <https://hbr.org/2020/04/a-covid-19-vaccine-will-need-equitable-global-distribution> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [3] Lucy Rodgers & Dominic Bailey, ‘Covid vaccine: How will the UK jab millions of people?’ (BBC, 23 January 2021) <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-55274833> accessed 24 January 2021.

    [4] Manfred Steger & Ravi Roy, Neoliberalism (OUP 2010) 3-4.

    [5] Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring (Kluwer Law International 2002) 50-52.

    [6] Rittich (n 4) 55-59.

    [7] Sahil Deo, Shardul Manurkar, et al, ‘COVID19 Vaccine: Development, Access and Distribution in the Indian Context’ (2020) Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief No. 378, 6 <https://www.orfonline.org/research/covid19-vaccine-development-access-and-distribution-in-the-indian-context-69538/> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [8] Rittich (n 4) 131.

    [9] Rittich (n 4) 74-76.

    [10] Ibid.

    [11] Steger (n 4).

    [12] Rittich (n 4) 130.

    [13] Steger (n 11)

    [14] Rittich (n 4) 158-160.

    [15] Deo (n 7).

    [16] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine (National Academies Press 2020) 102-105.

    [17] National Academies (n 16) 8.

    [18] Ibid.

    [19] Richard Zimmerman, ‘Rationing of influenza vaccine during a pandemic’ (2017) 25 Vaccine 2019, 2023.

    [20] Ibid.

    [21] Erica Moser, ‘Many ethical questions involved in prioritizing groups for vaccine distribution’ (The Day, 13 December 2020) <https://www.theday.com/article/20201213/NWS01/201219766> accessed 8 January 2020.

    [21] Ibid.

    [22] Zimmerman (n 19).

     

    Image Credit: Crowd Wisdom 360

  • Chief of Defence Staff, a year later: Lack of Clarity and an ambiguous Mandate

    Chief of Defence Staff, a year later: Lack of Clarity and an ambiguous Mandate

    On 31st of Dec 2020 India’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Bipin Rawat, completed one-year in office.  With China recently unveiling its 14th Five Year Plan aiming to bring its military on par with the USA by 2027, it would be interesting to observe if the appointment of CDS has helped the Indian Military spruce up its structure and operational philosophy in any manner.

    Appointment of CDS was put on hold for almost two decades after the Kargil Review Committee made its recommendations.  Opinion among the strategic community has always been divided on the appointment of CDS. Those who argued in favour espoused that CDS would be the panacea for all ills while those who opposed, opined that the time-tested Higher Defence Organisation proposed by Lord Ismay has worked well over the years and hence, the western concept of CDS is unnecessary. Now that the CDS is in place, it is futile to revisit the debate but the functioning of CDS would be a subject of scrutiny for the next few years.

    In the last few months, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) headed by the CDS came for intense criticism for making proposals about the increase in retirement age and reduction in pensions. Previous proposals such as the closure of CSD canteens at peace stations, opening up of cantonment, doing away with Army Day parade etc, which are believed to have emanated from the DMA have been subjected to ridicule and disdain in the social media. It wasn’t exactly clear as to why the office of CDS was being used for such purely administrative issues, which are counterproductive in enhancing the morale and pride of the forces.

    Men in uniform yearned that CDS would play a vital role in bringing about the true integration of Services HQ with the MoD and expedite the process of defence modernisation. However, after one year, it is indeed of great concern that the office of CDS (read DMA) appears to be focussed on administrative and ceremonial issues with absolutely no strategic significance.

    When CDS assumed charge on 1st Jan 20, it was reported that the CDS would be the Principal Military Advisor to the Government (read Def Minister) and he would head the newly created DMA.  Additionally, he would assume charge of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), serve as the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Head the Tri-Service Commands, and be a member of the Defence Acquisition Council besides the Nuclear Command Authority. Quite a tall order indeed but doesn’t seem to be adequately equipped with a statutory mandate to perform effectively. Men in uniform yearned that CDS would play a vital role in bringing about the true integration of Services HQ with the MoD and expedite the process of defence modernisation. However, after one year, it is indeed of great concern that the office of CDS (read DMA) appears to be focussed on administrative and ceremonial issues with absolutely no strategic significance. One of the first initiatives announced by Gen Rawat was to create an Air Defence Command which is yet to materialise and creation of Theatre Commands seems to be a long haul.

    it is beyond comprehension to fathom what prompted the Government to create a Department of Military Affairs within the MoD when the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was already functioning since 2001 awaiting the appointment of a CDS.  As Service Chiefs continue to exercise Command over their respective Service, the CDS as the head of IDS would be rightly placed to promote joint training initiatives, validate joint operational plans and act as a catalyst in defence modernisation.  However, for all this to be achieved, the role and functioning of the CDS should be spelt out; particularly the role of CDS as the “Principal Military Advisor” to the Raksha Mantri, vis-à-vis the Defence Secretary who continues to be the “Principal Advisor” to the Defence Minister. Such vital aspects are never left to chance based on an individual’s equations with political leadership but need to be appropriately institutionalised, mandated and published.

    Currently, Defence Secretary functions as head of the Department of Defence and is additionally responsible for coordinating the activities of the five Departments in the Ministry, including the newly created DMA. The Defence Secretary draws his functional powers from the Cabinet Secretariat –Manual of Office Procedures (CS-MoP) which clearly states that the Secretary of the Department “is the principal adviser of the Minister on all matters of policy and administration within his Ministry/Department, and his responsibility is complete and undivided”. If Defence Secretary is coordinating the affairs of all the five departments including DMA as the Principal Advisor, what is the status of the four-star-CDS?

    The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 are made by the President of India under Article 77 of the Constitution for the allocation of business of the Government of India. The business of the Government is transacted in the Ministries/Departments, Secretariats and offices (referred to as ‘Department’) as per the distribution of subjects specified in these Rules. Allocation of Business Rules has not been revised since 2017 though DMA has been created one year ago.  As a result, the DMA is not listed in the First Schedule of the Allocation of Business.

    Transaction of Business (Rules) 1961 are made by the President of India for the convenient transaction of the Business of the Government of India. The disposal of business by various ministries, inter-departmental transactions and mandates of various committees are published in these rules. The significance of these rules can be gauged from the fact that the rules have been recently amended to deal with unprecedented challenges posed by Covid 19 pandemic. Cabinet Secretariat has amended Government of India Transaction of Business Rules, 1961 to widen powers of two committees to meet the economic crisis caused by Covid 19, using the powers under the Act. However, Transaction of Business Rules has not been revised clearly defining the role of CDS as the Principal Military Advisor to the Government.

    The organisation chart in the MoD has been removed possibly because it would only be too embarrassing to place the CDS under the Defence Secretary. There is an urgent need for the GoI to create a meaningful role for the CDS and empower him with a statutory mandate.

    A cursory glance at the website of the Ministry of Defence would reveal a lack of any sincerity in assigning specific responsibilities for DMA. It has been casually mentioned that DMA “deals with the armed forces of the Union….. and promotes jointness among the three services”. Were these objectives not met by the MoD in the past? So what value addition has the DMA provided? The organisation chart in the MoD has been removed possibly because it would only be too embarrassing to place the CDS under the Defence Secretary. There is an urgent need for the GoI to create a meaningful role for the CDS and empower him with a statutory mandate.

    Indian Military is not expeditionary. However, if there is a convincing need to create Theatre Commands in pursuit of joint operations and interoperability, replacing the existing 17 Service-specific Commands by fewer Theatre Commands would be the most challenging task for the CDS. If the experience of USA, UK and other major militaries is anything go by, such major military reforms could be pushed through only with steadfast backing from the government, taking all three services into confidence and aligning the entire military leadership with the desired outcomes of this humungous exercise which may eventually need constitutional validity through an Act of the parliament.

    For the appointment of CDS to make a meaningful purpose the following measures are imperative:

    • Abolish the DMA and facilitate the CDS to take complete control of the IDS, keeping its functioning outside the purview of Def Secretary
    • Revise the CS-MOP, Allocation of Business Rules, Transaction of Business rules and the Warrant of Precedence, clearly bringing out the role and responsibilities of CDS as the Principal Military Advisor to the Defence Minister, in contrast to the roles and responsibilities of the Defence Secretary which may also now need to be re-drafted.
    • Make CDS a permanent member of the Cabinet Committee on Security facilitating the single-point military advice to the National Security Council.
    • The cabinet should spell out a Defence Policy Guidance (DPG) with a 12 year to the 15-year horizon in the light of prevailing and forecasted geo-political scenario and assist the CDS in preparing a clear roadmap for Indian Military Modernisation

    To abrogate the stigma of “Attached Offices”, and to integrate the Services HQ with MoD, a beginning needs to be made by augmenting the IDS with officials from the MoD.

    • Currently, the budgeting and procurement plans are made in isolation and subject to scrutiny by the Ministry of Fin (Def) thereby losing time and effort. IDS needs to be adequately empowered by augmenting it with an integral wing of the Ministry of Fin (Def) headed by a Joint Secretary ranked officer.
    • A Defence Production Wing under the charge of an Additional Secretary ranked officer reporting directly to the CDS should be created with the long term objective of achieving complete integration of the department of defence production with IDS. This suggestion would certainly be the most unpopular with the bureaucracy but could turn out to be a game-changer if achieved.

    Kargil Review Committee had recommended the appointment of CDS to integrate the armed forces in their planning, procurement and functioning to transform the Indian Military as a unitary force to reckon with.  In the absence of a clear mandate and constitutional validity for the functioning of the CDS, the entire effort of instituting one, seems to be of little consequence, much less, competent of driving any significant reforms. The current arrangement needs a complete overhaul if that is to be achieved.

  • The South: Where the Chariots stopped in the Past

    The South: Where the Chariots stopped in the Past

    There is no apparent reason why Dr. John Jackson (1835-1911), a 19th-century Yorkshire-born British Psychologist should be of any interest to us in the 21st India. Yet, he is important in order to understand what is happening to the BJP’s misplaced ambitions in India south of the Vindhyas.

    First about Dr. Jackson. He was the first scientist to come up with the answer as to why mariners experience directional disorientation when they sail on vast seas. This navigational impairment, described by Jackson as ‘topological agnosia’ (literally, loss of knowledge about directions) was caused in his analysis by a distortion in an individual’s memory. An individual afflicted by this agnosia is found unable to remember to a destination known to him to be able to recall important landmarks seen a long time ago. Among the patients that Jackson studied were some women who knew where the London Bridge was, but they did not know how to go there from their homes. In their memory, the ‘little maps’ were forgotten, though the larger maps were inscribed in their brain. European colonial expansion was distinctly marked by this disorientation. When it was spreading south of Europe, the colonial powers thought of the south as ‘east’ and built a strong binary between the west and the east.

    Topological Agnosia is the term that can most accurately describe the BJP’s ‘Mission South.’ In order to understand why the party that feels so much at home in the Hindi heartland in the north should feel so unsure of its direction in the south, we need to look at the context within which its foundations were laid. Obviously, one has to refer to the shaping of the core ideas of the Hindutva ideology. It is not necessary to state that at its heart is the dubious and non-scientific theory of ‘Aryans as a Master Race’. This idea was in circulation among some of the 19th century European linguists. They imagined that what was initially proposed as the name of a language (‘Indo-Aryan’) was in fact the name of a community (or a race). Some of them went to the length of proving that the Aryans resided in remote ancient times in North Europe. Karl Plenka actually gave a homeland for this imagined master race, unquestioningly assuming that the master race was the master race of the pure Aryans.

    Besides, the traditions of spirituality and worship developed in the south for the last three millennia have their own distinct and syncretic trajectories which do not easily gel with the RSS-VHP idea of Hinduism. Besides, as Basavanna, Akkamma, Periyar, Phule, Shahu, and Ambedkar so ably demonstrate, a larger majority of the people south of the Vindhyas have reason to find the exclusionary and myopic social and cultural interpretations of history entirely repugnant.

    Adolf Hitler

    In the third decade of the 20th century, Adolf Hitler made these theories the foundation of his ‘National Socialism’ and the associated drive for ‘racial purification.’ The founders of the RSS in India were his contemporaries and shared his enthusiasm for the theory of Aryan supremacy. Though completely unscientific in terms of the history of the people of India, the RSS, and the BJP like to believe that someday in the future they will be able to establish the supremacy of the (imaginary) Aryans over the diverse peoples in the Indian subcontinent, the south included. To aid this wishful aspiration, the RSS has brought in a misconstrued idea of what constitutes being Hindu. However, the Indian sub-continent South of the Vindhyas has a long history of resistance to the domination from the north. Besides, the traditions of spirituality and worship developed in the south for the last three millennia have their own distinct and syncretic trajectories which do not easily gel with the RSS-VHP idea of Hinduism. Besides, as Basavanna, Akkamma, Periyar, Phule, Shahu, and Ambedkar so ably demonstrate, a larger majority of the people south of the Vindhyas have reason to find the exclusionary and myopic social and cultural interpretations of history entirely repugnant. It is not a surprise, therefore, that despite desperate efforts by the VHP and RSS throughout the twentieth century, their general support base in the southern states had remained nominal.

    This has changed since 2014. The current regime has displayed an unmatched zeal in intimidating political leaders by using the ED, the CBI, and troll gangs. It has displayed a skill in the use of post-truth and propaganda for generating popular opinion as never before. The erosion of media and the collapse of institutions that are expected to uphold constitutional values and constitutional arrangements to safeguard democracy has apparently increased the chance of success for BJP’s south mission. Besides, the use of funds for party-swapping is a trick that the BJP has mastered well. All these factors—the use of muscle, official machinery, money, intimidation, and propaganda—have made the south more vulnerable to the divisive, exclusionary, and myopic nationalism of the BJP.

    Yet, it would be naïve to believe that countering the Hindutva and Pseudo-Nationalism onslaught would be possible by mouthing our worn-out phrases and analysis related to class-based or caste-based understanding of India in the third decade of the 21st century.

    Countering the flawed ideas of nationalism and the exclusionary notion of dharma is an urgent need for the people, language-communities and the political parties south of the Vindhyas. Probably, it is them alone who are now left with the capacity to do so, since the ‘Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan’ tune has overpowered the people and the northern ‘heartland-states’. Yet, it would be naïve to believe that countering the Hindutva and Pseudo-Nationalism onslaught would be possible by mouthing our worn-out phrases and analysis related to class-based or caste-based understanding of India in the third decade of the 21st century. Also, being fiercely against any geographical, linguistic or social factionalism, we have to reinvent our politics and political terminology. Remaining entirely within the framework of the Constitution, one very powerful message that the Southern States and people can give to the rest of India is that of federalism.

    The Constitution describes the country as a union of states’ and its provisions are oriented towards keeping this union intact and integrated by respecting the difference and diversity.

    The Constitution describes the country as a union of states’ and its provisions are oriented towards keeping this union intact and integrated by respecting the difference and diversity. Hence, our insistence on the principle of federalism would also mean our insistence on constitutional values. It would reiterate the need for recognizing and respecting diversities and, therefore, rejecting the Hindutva agenda of the RSS-BJP. This understanding, if shared by the communities, movements, language groups, political parties, theological sects, and cultural-industries in the states south of the Vindhyas, can—together—stop the BJP where it should be stopped and reverse the fortunes of fascism in India. We all owe it to India, our sacred nation. We also owe it to the great tradition of civilization that the south has built over the past millennia.

    The opinions expressed are personal views of the author.

    This article was published earlier in gaurilankeshnews.com

  • Evaluating the Make in India Policy for Defence Manufacturing and Technology Acquisition

    Evaluating the Make in India Policy for Defence Manufacturing and Technology Acquisition

    Led by the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, the Make in India policy (“MII”) extends to 25 focused sectors. Among these is the defence sector, where the nature of the sector renders MII extremely important and relevant. This is outlined by India’s status as the second-largest standing army and third-largest military spender in the world.[1] Yet, it remains the second-largest arms importer and its exports merely amount to 0.2% of the global pie.[2] China is the fifth-largest arms exporter at 5.5% of the global share.[3] However, this is likely to fall in the post-pandemic world, where China’s credibility has been severely tainted.[4] This represents an opportunity for Indian defence manufacturers to attract present and future foreign investment.

    Against this background, MII was enacted with two objectives: (1) to increase domestic manufacturing of defence equipment; and (2) address the national security interest of self-sufficiency over key technologi. There are two ways in which technology up-gradation can happen: (1) indigenous efforts; and (2) transfer of technology, through international agreements. In this article, I flag the main challenges to argue that India has significantly underperformed in both. Subsequently, I propose macro-policy changes to address identified challenges.

    Evaluating technological upgradation in the Defence sector in india

    1. Evaluating ‘Indigenous Efforts’

    Indigenous efforts are confronted with three main challenges:

    • Inadequate Investment for Research & Development (R&D)

    Only 5.7% of the defence budget is allocated to R&D,[5] despite successive parliamentary committees recommending at least 10% to meet minimum requirements.[6] The average allocation among global rivals like USA, UK, France, and China is well above 15%.[7] Even private-sector players in India, like Tata, L&T, and Mahindra and Mahindra, invest less than 1% of their turnover in R&D, as against the average of 10% in the aforementioned countries.[8] The producer lacks the basic R&D required even for making marginal improvements in performance to the product, or altering it based on user-specifications.[9] The effect of this is that the resulting product is obsolete in an already disruptive market. Thus, a buyer, even if domestic, is unwilling to accept such an obsolete product at higher prices merely for the sake of indigenous production.

    • Shortage of Skilled Workforce

    A skilled workforce is the key to achieving self-sufficiency in defence manufacturing because of the highly specialized nature of this sector and the workforces’ vision and skills determine the efficacy of the produced/procured domestic technology. This shortage exists at both the research and procurement level.

    At the research level, there is a severe shortage of skilled human resources, in terms of quantity and quality, at R&D organizations like DRDO.[10] With more than 3,500 engineering colleges producing about 1.5 million engineering graduates annually, India has an unparalleled talent availability.[11] However, only 17.5% of these graduates are employable because colleges lack proper infrastructure and faculty,[12] along with current curriculum ignoring industry skills, defined career paths, and evolving technologies.[13] Thus, organizations are compelled to spend significantly in making fresh talent “employable”.

    While India has a decent pool of highly qualified low-cost engineers and scientists,[14] they are unwilling to work in the public sector due to limited opportunities and low growth potential,[15] where most defence R&D is undertaken. As the departure of 132 scientists in the last five years from DRDO shows,[16] even those employed mostly do not continue long-term due to better opportunities elsewhere.[17] The contribution of most of these scientists has been limited to the production of academic articles,[18] which hasn’t seen any significant and meaningful absorption in the policy. Therefore, the policy has been unable to capture the huge latent employment potential in this sector.[19]

    This position must be contrasted against global competitors like the US and China, where the highly skilled and employable workforce is significantly and routinely absorbed into the most impactful R&D organization, whether private or public.[20] Moreover, unlike other leading countries, India lacks any training and education infrastructure specialized for R&D personnel in the defence sector. These countries have developed specialist defence schools that have managed to produce large pools of exclusive talent. France itself has managed to produce 134,000 specialist employees.[21]

    At the procurement level, the asset acquisition process is not tasked to a dedicated cadre of the workforce.[22] Further, there are no educational or training programs for employees involved in this process.[23] Thus, there is the loss in terms of the benefits of specialization, especially in a sector where progress is characterized by specialization.

    • Limited Involvement of the Private Sector

    There is a significant lack of incentive for greater private sector involvement. The private sector is commercially motivated to establish its manufacturing base only when it has a good chance, or preferably guarantee, of getting frequent and sizeable orders.[24] However, the current manufacturing and procurement process has ignored this motivation but is also completely converse to it.

    As the BJP government’s Rafale fiasco indicates, the procurement processes lack transparency, and frequently fraught with allegations and counter-allegations.[25] This disincentivizes both domestic and global private sector players from conducting business.

    Despite unprecedented inclusion of the private sector, it is widely believed in the private sector that the government is biased towards public sector undertakings, denying a level-playing field for the private sector and even denying opportunities to bid.[26]

    The government’s Strategic Partnership Model, aimed at inviting world-class defence giants to collaborate with Indian entities, has unduly restricted autonomy. Under this program, the government chooses the Indian partner for the foreign OEM, without consulting them.[27] Global defence giants, like Airbus, Lockheed Martin, ThyssenKrupp, and Dassault, have shown interest in contracting with the Indian private sector.[28] However, it is a combination of these factors that this interest has largely failed to materialise into successfully concluded deals.

    Even where, despite these disincentives, the private sector has been involved, this has been in non-critical and less required areas. Most of India’s defence imports are in the category of major platforms such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, naval guns, and anti-submarine missiles.[29] However, the private sector initiatives are predominantly in the category of ammunitions (including rockets and bombs), and surveillance and tracking systems.[30]

    1. Evaluating ‘Transfer of Technology’

    There has been no transfer of technology (“ToT”) in the critical defence procurement process. All major contracts under MII have been “off the shelf”, and without any crucial ToT.[31] As per the CAG Report, between 2007 and 2018, the government concluded 46 offset contracts but failed to implement the ToT agreements in any of them.[32]

    The failure here can be attributed to successive governments unduly hoping that India’s status as a large arms importer would necessarily make international players compliant as regards sharing their intellectual property (“IP”). While foreign companies have shown interest in contracting with Indian players, the large purchase orders have been inadequate to incentivize foreign players to share their IP.[33]

    The government has also been overly ambitious of ToT as a means of technology upgradation. Even implementing the negotiated ToT is not the end because the more challenging issues of absorption of this technology and ownership of IP remain.[34] Moreover, the ToT route provides India only with the ‘know-how’, without any insight into the ‘know-why’.[35] As India’s acquisition of the Sukhoi Su-30 has shown, the public sector is critically dependent on the OEMs, here the Russians, for even minor systemic upgradations.

    Way Forward

    The government must increase allocation to defence R&D to at least 10% and must incentivize greater contributions from the private sector. Existing capabilities and services at training and diploma centres must be upgraded through public-private partnerships. There must be a separate and devoted institutional structure for all procurement-related functions. The procurement policy must also aim at buying talent, besides technology, to bridge technology gaps. The education curriculum at engineering universities needs to be modernized, with a focus on employability. Specialist defence schools must also be established. However, it is most important that the public sector aims at retaining its talent through unique and lucrative incentive structures.

    To incentivize the private sector through minimum order guarantees, the government must utilize ‘public procurement of innovation’. Under this policy tool, the government uses its exchequer to artificially generate demand for an emerging innovative solution, unavailable on a commercial scale.[36] The private sector can further be incentivized by streaming the procurement and dispute resolution process. As for procurement, a fast-track procedure with single-window clearances can be adopted.[37] As for dispute resolution a permanent arbitration tribunal must be established to expeditiously settle disputes with finality.[38]

    Conclusion

    Firstly, the indigenous efforts at technology up-gradation have failed due to limited R&D output, shortage of skilled workforce, and limited private sector involvement. The R&D budgetary allocation is way below the recommended and global standard. The shortage of skilled workforce is both at the research and procurement due to a lack of education and training infrastructure specific to the defence sector, low employability among most graduates, and unwillingness to work in the public sector among highly qualified graduates. The private sector has been disincentivized due to a lack of order guarantees, the unrealistic and retroactive manner of the procurement process, the constant allegations and counter-allegations, and the continued bias towards the public sector. Moreover, the private sector has been involved in non-critical and less required areas.

    Secondly, while the government has concluded ToT agreements, it has been inefficient in enforcing them. Moreover, even if this were to succeed, it has not established any action plan for absorbing this technology and addressing ownership of IP. It has also been overly ambitious of the utility of ToT.

     

     

    References

    [1] Kuldip Singh, ‘Yes, Indian Military Can Go the ‘Make in India’ Way – Just Not Yet’ (The Quint, 25 May 2020) <https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-armed-forces-defence-sector-military-expenditure-budget-technology-upgrade-make-in-india> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [2] Arjun Srinivas, ‘Private defence business gets one more nudge’ (LiveMint, 1 October 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/private-defence-business-gets-one-more-nudge-11601460654397.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [3] Snehesh Alex Philip, ‘China has become a major exporter of armed drones, Pakistan is among its 11 customers’ (The Print, 23 November 2020) <https://theprint.in/defence/china-has-become-a-major-exporter-of-armed-drones-pakistan-is-among-its-11-customers/549841/> accessed 4 January 2021.

    [4] Rajan Kochhar, ‘Preparing defence sector for post COVID-19 world: Time to treat private sector as equal partner’ (Economic Times, 5 May 2020) <https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/governance/opinion-make-in-india-a-dream-or-reality-for-the-armed-forces/75552970> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [5] Jayant Singh, ‘Industry Scenario’ (Invest India) <https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/defence-manufacturing> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [6] Prof (Dr) SN Misra, ‘Make in India: Challenges Before Defence Manufacturing’ (2015) 30(1) Indian Defence Rev <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/make-in-india-challenges-before-defence-manufacturing/2/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [7] ‘Government Expenditures on Defence Research and Development by the United States and Other OECD Countries: Fact Sheet’ (2020) Congressional Research Service R45441 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45441.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020; A Sivathanu Pillai, ‘Defence R&D’ in Vinod Misra (ed), Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms (Pentagon Press & IDSA 2015) 132-133.

    [8] Misra (n 6).

    [9] Amitabha Pande, ‘Defence, Make in India and the Illusive Goal of Self Reliance’ (The Hindu Centre for Public Policy, 11 April 2019) <https://www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/current-issues/article26641241.ece> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [10] Azhar Shaikh, Dr. Uttam Kinange, & Arthur Fernandes, ‘Make in India: Opportunities and Challenges in the Defence Sector’ (2016) 7(1) Intl J Research in Commerce & Management 13, 14-15.

    [11] Kishore Jayaraman, ‘How Can India Bridge The Skill Gap in Aerospace & Defence Sector?’ (All Things Talent, 24 September 2018) <https://allthingstalent.org/2018/09/24/how-can-india-bridge-skill-gap-in-aerospace-defence-sector/> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [12] Dr. JP Dash & BB Sharma, ‘Skilling Gaps in Defence Sector for ‘Make in India’’ (2017) 32(2) Indian Defence Rev <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/skilling-gaps-in-defence-sector-for-make-in-india/> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [13] Jayaraman (n 10); Dhiraj Mathur, ‘Unlocking defence R&D in India – Do we have the skill?’ (Firstpost, 6 April 2016)<https://www.firstpost.com/business/unlocking-defence-rd-in-india-do-we-have-the-skill-2715650.html> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [14] Mathur (n 13).

    [15] PR Sanjai, ‘Indian aerospace sector needs one million skilled workforce in next 10 years’ (Livemint, 20 February 2015) <https://www.livemint.com/Politics/hRJQjq7ZKVXQ5RFkzWbmAJ/Indian-aerospace-sector-needs-one-million-skilled-workforce.html> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [16] PTI, ‘132 scientists left DRDO on personal grounds in last 5 years: Govt’ (Economic Times, 12 March 2020) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/132-scientists-left-drdo-on-personal-grounds-in-last-5-years-govt/articleshow/74579857.cms?from=mdr> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [17] Dash (n 12).

    [18] PTI, ‘India is world’s third largest producer of scientific articles: Report’ (Economic Times, 18 December 2019) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/india-is-worlds-third-largest-producer-of-scientific-articles-report/articleshow/72868640.cms?from=mdr> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [19] ‘Make in India: An Overview of Defence Manufacturing in India’ (2015) Singhania & Partners LLP Report <https://www.gita.org.in/Attachments/Reports/Make-in-India-Defence-Manufacturing-in-India.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [20] Ranjit Ghosh, ‘Defence Research and Development: International Approaches for Analysing the Indian Programme’ (2015) IDSA Occasional Paper 41, 11-34 <https://idsa.in/system/files/opaper/OP41__RanjitGhosh_140815.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [21] Dash (n 12).

    [22] Shaikh (n 10) 15.

    [23] Ibid.

    [24] Rohit Srivastava, ‘New measures for self-sufficiency in defence – industry perspective’ (Indian Defence Industries, 19 May 2020) <https://indiandefenceindustries.in/defence-reforms-industry-perspective> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [25] Pradip R Sagar, ‘How ‘Make in India’ in defence sector is still an unfulfilled dream’ (The Week, 25 May 2019) <https://www.theweek.in/theweek/current/2019/05/25/how-make-in-india-in-defence-sector-is-still-an-unfulfilled-dream.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [26] Ibid; Lt. Gen. (Retd.) (Dr). Subrata Saha, ‘Execution key for defence manufacturing in India’ (LiveMint, 2 April 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Gx9NVPGvIsVbVzLTJ0VouK/Execution-key-for-defence-manufacturing-in-India.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [27] Prasanna Karthik, ‘India’s strategic partnership policy is counter-productive in its current form’ (Observer Research Foundation, 8 June 2020) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-strategic-partnership-policy-is-counter-productive-in-its-current-form-67511/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [28] Sagar (n 25).

    [29] Srinivas (n 3).

    [30] Ibid.

    [31] Singh (n 1); Sagar (n 25).

    [32] Joe C Mathew, ‘Defence offset policy performance dismal: CAG’ (Business Today, 24 September 2020) <https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/defence-offset-policy-performance-dismal-cag/story/416872.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [33] Lieutenant Commander L Shivaram (Retd), ‘Understanding ‘Make in India’ in the Defence Sector’ (2015) 145(601) J United Service Institution of India <https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/understandingmake-in-india-in-the-defence-sector/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [34] Lt Gen A B Shivane, ‘India needs outcome oriented defence reforms’ (Indian Defence Industries, 22 May 2020) <https://indiandefenceindustries.in/india-outcome-oriented-reforms> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [35] Misra (n 6).

    [36] E. Uyarra & J. Edler, ‘Barriers to Innovation through Public Procurement: A Supplier Perspective’ (2014) 34(10) Science Direct <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166497214000388> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [37] Kochhar (n 4).

    [38] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Dalip Bharadwaj, ‘‘Make in India’ in defence sector: A distant dream’ (Observer Research Foundation, 7 May 2018) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/make-in-india-defence-sector-distant-dream/> accessed 19 December 2020.