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Category: India

  • India and Nepal: Energy Cooperation

    India and Nepal: Energy Cooperation

    Introduction

    Sustained availability of energy at affordable cost is an essential prerequisite for the growth of a country. Currently the energy consumption per capita in case of Nepal is134 KWH per capita per year, as against world average of 2674 KWH per capita per year.

    GDP Per Capita in $ (PPP)

    Country Energy Consumption in kWh per capita per year GDP Per Capita in $ (PPP) GDP Per Capita in $ (Nominal)
    World Average 2674 11673 11673
    Bhutan 2779 3392 3392
    India 1122 1980 1980
    Maldives 1122 9802 9802
    Pakistan 471 539 539
    Sri Lanka 414 4135 4135
    Bangladesh 351 1564 1564
    Myanmar 193 1256 1256
    Afghanistan 141 538 538
    Nepal 134 900 900

    Table-1: Energy Consumption Vs Gross Domestic Product
    Source:  1.GDP figures for 2017 vide https://www.worldometers.info/gdp/gdp-per-capita
         2.World Fact Book: Power consumption for various countries of the World.

    Although correlation between energy consumption and the prosperity depends on a number of factors like population but a fact which clearly overshadows others is that as energy consumption increases the prosperity increases. This relationship is equally valid for reverse relationship, i.e. as prosperity increases the necessity for additional energy becomes obligatory. Another interesting observation can be made based on the content of this table. Bhutan is a land locked country which has hardly any major industry in that country, yet their GDP per capita is more than India’s. An examination suggests that Bhutan has adequate hydro resources and hydroelectricity generated exploiting her indigenous resources is far more than her requirement. This surplus generation is sold by Bhutan to India. Revenue thus earned has transformed the country from a poor developing country to a prosperous country quite distinct from other South Asian countries. For the record Bhutan’s revenue from hydro power is 27% of the entire govt revenue and is 14% of Bhutan’s GDP. This also flags an approach which can also help other South Asian countries to improve their economic strength by exploiting their indigenous resources. Another country of South Asia; Nepal can benefit from the model which Bhutan is currently following for sharing its energy resources with India in a ‘win-win’ situation.

    Topography of Nepal

    topography-of-nepal

    Map1: Nepal and its Rivers and Physical features
    Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Nepal 

    A report of International Hydropower Association, “Bhutan” uploaded on https://www.hydropower.org/country-profile/bhutanography_of_Nepal 

    • Lie of the country is such that all the rivers flow from Nepal to India.
    • High Himalayas separate Nepal from Tibet, whereas southern side of the country is having  a terrain which is plain and that separates Nepal from India therefore while Northern Areas of Nepal act as a barrier between Nepal and Tibet, plains in southern side of the country lends itself for cooperation between India and Nepal. Recent operationalization of an oil pipeline from Motihari in Bihar to Amlekhganj in Nepal is a manifestation of such a cooperation (Little more about it a little later.)
    • Nepal has a huge hydropower potential. In fact, the perennial nature of Nepali rivers and the steep gradient of the country’s topography provide ideal conditions for the development of some of the world’s largest hydroelectric projects in Nepal. Current estimates are that Nepal has approximately 43,000 MW of economically feasible hydropower potential. However, the present situation is that Nepal has developed only approximately 753 MW of hydropower. Therefore, bulk of the economically feasible generation has not been realized yet. Besides, the multi-purpose secondary and tertiary benefits have not been realised from the development of its rivers. Nepal is utilising only 2% of it (i.e., 98% remains unutilised). It may be noted that an optimum exploitation of the hydro resources will contribute substantially to the financial well-being of Nepal. However, it is also a fact that Nepal neither has the financial muscle nor technical knowhow to harness its hydro resources. Therefore, support from friendly foreign countries becomes essential. China has been trying to make inroads into Nepal but whether it can be cost-effective or not is something that needs to be examined in carefully. India, on the contrary, has everything in her favour to support hydro power exploitation by Nepal. In fact power generated in Nepal can also be shared with Bangladesh using Indian grid system, which will be an excellent example of Nepal-India-Bangladesh cooperation, and still better as a BBIN (Bhutan-Bangladesh- India-Nepal) initiative and will be a ‘Win Win’ situation for all three countries.  India will have to use all its traditional heft with Nepal, its diplomatic skills, financial support to beat China who is trying hard to gain a foothold in Nepal’s Hydro energy exploitation domain as they are desperately wanting power.

    Map-3: River Systems of Nepal
    Source: Firoz Alam et al, “A review of hydropower projects in Nepal1st International Conference on Energy and Power”, presented during ICEP2016 at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia, 14-16 December 2016 and Available online at www.sciencedirect.com ScienceDirect Energy Procedia 110 (2017) 581 – 585

    • While planning hydro power plants in Nepal, some extra care would be required to be undertaken. Nepal’s topography is unstable due to seismic activities. Hence, all hydropower plants with dam must be well planned and designed to mitigate the environmental impact. Also most Himalayan Rivers contain huge quantities of sediment with hard abrasive particles. The region’s climate and tectonic conditions as well as human activities are highly conducive for erosion and sedimentation. Therefore, sediment management is paramount for the safety, reliability and longer life of infrastructures (hydropower dam, equipment, roads, bridges, irrigation systems and drinking water).

    As close neighbours, India and Nepal share unique ties of friendship and cooperation characterised by an open border and deep-rooted people-to-people contacts of kinship and culture. There has been a long tradition of free movement of people across the border. Nepal shares a border of over 1850 km with five Indian states – Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand. The India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 forms the bedrock of the special relations that exist between India and Nepal. Nepalese citizens avail facilities and opportunities at par with Indian citizens in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Nearly 6 million Nepalese citizens live and work in India. However Nepal is still not well developed and as has been explained earlier suffer from lack adequate energy to fuel its development. India has been a major partner in exploiting its indigenous energy resources and also making up the shortfall on this account.

    Potential and Scope of Hydro Power Cooperation

    Certain studies have been done to ascertain scope for the Indo-Nepal Cooperation in the domain of energy. It has been concluded that in the high build scenario, Nepal’s hydropower capacity is estimated to be 4551 MW. The generation cost in an arrangement of Indo-Nepal combined system would fall by approximately US $106 billion per year. This enhanced capacity will help Nepal to increase her power export to India by 60%. However Nepal’s high build out hydro resources would be fully utilised if operations between Nepal and India are further coordinated and an economic union strategy adopted by the two countries. Effectively, this would mean that trade with Nepal is institutionally is same as trade is between Indian States. Such enhanced power generation will help Nepal to become net exporter of power during dry as well as wet season, with reduced generation cost. On the contrary India ranks 81st in overall energy self-sufficiency at 66% in 2014 . Primary energy consumption in India grew by 7.9% in 2018 and it happens to be the third biggest consumer after China and USA, with 5.8% global share.

    Details of Completed Projects for Energy Cooperation between India and Nepal

    Motihari-Amlekhgunj Oil Pipeline: On 10th September 2019, the Prime Ministers of Nepal and India jointly inaugurated a cross-border oil pipeline through video conferencing. This line will transport fuel to the landlocked country. The aim of this pipe line is to cement India-Nepal ties in the face of major inroads made by China into the Himalayan nation, and seeks to repair the trust deficit between the two countries due to an economic blockade allegedly imposed by India in 2015 to persuade Nepal to change some provisions in its new constitution. Basically the protests at that time were done by people of Madhesh (region bordering India) as they felt that there were certain provisions of the constitution of Nepal which were discriminatory against them. India said at that time that the trucks laden with fuel and medicines, besides other essentials, were stopped by sections of Nepalese population (Madheshis) unhappy with some provisions of their constitution, which they felt were practically disenfranchising them. Nepal, however, viewed it as if India was blocking the supplies to compel Kathmandu to amend the provisions of the constitution that was seen as disenfranchising almost half of the Nepalese population. Therefore, the current initiative seeks to rebuild the confidence between the two countries and will help to bind Nepal closer to New Delhi, economically and strategically. The development comes against the backdrop of recent plans for a rail link between Nepal and China cutting through the Himalayas. There were also plans to link Nepal and China through an energy pipeline running through the Himalayas. Both were seen as means by Nepal to find an alternative to its dependency on India. The 69 km pipeline will transport fuel from the Barauni refinery in Bihar to Amlekhgunj in south-east Nepal and is the first cross-border petroleum products pipeline in South Asia. The Motihari-Amlekhgunj oil pipeline project was first proposed in 1996. The project was put back on the agenda during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Kathmandu in 2014. The two governments had signed an agreement to execute the project in August 2015. Construction had begun in April 2018. Construction of the pipeline was undertaken by the Indian Oil Corp. Ltd (IOCL), India’s largest refiner, with an investment of over ₹324 crore, in collaboration with Nepal Oil Corp. Ltd (NOCL). The two sides are also working on building additional storage facility at the Amlekhgunj Depot, wherein NOCL has committed an estimated ₹75 crore. The pipeline can carry up to 2 million metric tonnes of petroleum products each year. Currently, petroleum products are carried from India to Nepal using oil tankers as part of an arrangement which has been in place since 1973. The NOCL not only hopes to save ₹200 crore annually with the new pipeline but will also ensure the transportation is no longer vulnerable to any kind of blockade.

    Power Supply from India to Nepal: India and Nepal have a Power Exchange Agreement since 1971 for meeting the power requirements in the border areas of the two countries, taking advantage of each other’s transmission infrastructure. There are more than twenty 132 kV, 33 kV and 11 kV transmission interconnections which are used both for power exchange in the border areas and for power trade. For enhanced transmission of electricity, the first high-capacity Muzaffarpur (India) – Dhalkebar (Nepal) cross-border power transmission line (initially charged at 132 kV), with GoI Letter of credit (LoC) funding of US$ 13.2 million, was completed in 2016. Two additional 132 kV cross-border transmission lines between Kataiya (India) – Kusaha (Nepal) and Raxaul (India) – Parwanipur (Nepal), built with GoI grant assistance, were completed in 2017. India is currently supplying a total of about 450 MW of power to Nepal. An Agreement on ‘Electric Power Trade, Cross-border Transmission Interconnection and Grid Connectivity’ between India and Nepal was signed on 21 October 2014. The Agreement is aimed at facilitating and further strengthening cross-border electricity transmission, grid connectivity and power trade between Nepal and India. The Agreement provides a framework for power trade between the two countries, import by Nepal from India until it becomes power surplus and subsequent import by Indian entities from Nepal, on mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Two mechanisms, Joint Working Group (JWG) and Joint Steering Committee (JSC) envisaged under the Agreement have been established. Joint Technical Team (JTT) was formed for preparation of a long-term integrated transmission plan covering projects up to 2035.

    Cooperation in the Domain of Hydro Energy: Cooperation in water resources primarily concerning the common rivers is one of the most important areas of bilateral relations. A large number of small and large rivers flow from Nepal into India and constitute an important part of the Ganges River basins (Refer Map-3 above). These rivers have the potential to become major sources of irrigation and power for Nepal and India. A three-tier bilateral mechanism was established in 2008, to discuss issues relating to cooperation in water resources, flood management, inundation and hydropower between the two countries. A Development Authority was set up in September 2014 to carry out the Pancheshwar Multipurpose project. A Power Development Agreement (PDA) for the 900 MW Arun-III hydroelectric project between India’s Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam Limited and the Investment Board of Nepal (IBN) was concluded in November 2014. Also, a PDA for the 900 MW Upper Karnali hydroelectric project was concluded between IBN and M/s GMR in September 2014.

    Projects under Planning/Execution

    Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project: India and Nepal had signed a Treaty known as Mahakali Treaty in February’1996. Implementation of Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project is the centerpiece of the Mahakali Treaty. Required field investigations for the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project have been completed by a Joint Project Office (JPO-PI) in 2002 (except for some confirmatory tests). But mutually acceptable DPR of Pancheshwar Project is yet to be finalised. The constitution of Pancheswar Development Authority has already been notified. Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (PMP) is a bilateral project, primarily aimed at energy production and augmenting irrigation in India and Nepal. A Treaty known as “Mahakali Treaty” concerning the integrated development of the Mahakali River, which included Sarada barrage, Tanakpur barrage and Pancheshwar Dam Project, was signed between the Government of Nepal and the Government of India on February 12, 1996. During the year 2009, pursuant to the Article-10 of the Mahakali Treaty, the Government of India and the Government of Nepal agreed and framed draft ToR for setting up the Pancheshwar Development Authority, as an independent autonomous body, for development, execution and operation of the Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project. To accomplish this shared goal, the Terms of Reference (ToR) of the PDA as agreed upon by the two Governments and as may be amended from time to time, were created. As per the Statute of PDA the administrative organs of the authority are the Governing Body (GB) and the Executive Committee (EC). In order to execute the specific tasks assigned to the Governing Body, five meetings of GB have taken place so far. Pancheshwar Main Dam is proposed on River Mahakali (known as River Sarada in India), where the river forms the international boundary between the Far Western Development Region of Nepal and State of Uttarakhand in India. The dam site is around 2.5 km downstream of the confluence of River Sarju with River Mahakali. The project would comprise of a rock-fill dam with central clay core of 311m height from the deepest foundation level. Two underground power houses at Pancheshwar dam, one on each bank of Mahakali River, each with a capacity of (6×400 MW) with the total installed capacity of nearly 4800 MW are proposed to be constructed. The power plant at main dam will be operated as the peaking station to meet energy demand in India and Nepal. A re-regulating dam at Rupaligad is proposed around 27 km downstream of the main dam to even out peaking flows released from Pancheshwar power houses for meeting downstream irrigation water requirement. Here, two underground powerhouses on both sides of river with total installed capacity of 240 MW (2 x 60 MW on either bank) are envisaged. The main dam (when impounded with water up to Flood Regulating Level (FRL)) will form a reservoir of around 11,600 hectare area with a gross storage volume of about 11,355 million cubic metres. The submergence area on Indian side is 7,600 hectare, covering districts namely Pithoragarh, Almora and Champawat in the state of Uttarakhand whereas remaining 4000 hectares of submergence will be in Nepal. The project aims at producing hydro power and enhance the food grains production in both the countries by providing additional irrigation resulting from the augmentation of dry season flows. Year round irrigation will be possible in agricultural land in Kanchanpur district in Nepal due to enhancement in flows during non-monsoon months. The project will generate Two underground power houses at Pancheshwar dam, one on each bank of Mahakali River, each with a capacity of (6×400 MW) with the total installed capacity of nearly 4800 MW are proposed to be constructed. The power plant at main dam will be operated as the peaking station to meet energy demand in India and Nepal. Power generated will be shared equally between both the nations as per Treaty. Irrigation benefits in form of annual irrigation will be about 0.43 Mha, out of this, annual irrigation in Nepal would be 0.17 Mha and remaining 0.26 Mha in India. In addition, due to moderation of flood peak at reservoir(s), incidental flood control benefits for both the countries are also envisaged from the project. Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project is one of the top priority projects to be implemented in phased manner to reap the benefits of the project as early as possible. The work of preparation of Detailed Project Report (DPR) was entrusted to Water and Power Consultancy Services Limited (WAPCOS) by PDA and WAPCOS have in turn submitted the draft final DPR of the project to PDA in November, 2016. At present the finalization of Detailed Project Report (DPR) of the project is underway. A Team of Experts/Officials has been formed by both the countries for discussing and resolving all issues towards finalization of the DPR. After finalization of DPR, the Pancheshwar Development Authority shall undertake the execution, operation and maintenance of the project, including the work of re-regulating dam at Rupaligad site in an integrated manner.

    Sapta-Kosi High Dam Project and SUN Kosi storage cum diversion scheme: After exchange of letter of Understanding between the two Governments in June’ 2004, a Joint Project Office (JPO) was set up in August’ 2004 to undertake detailed field investigations for preparation of DPR of SaptaKosi High Dam Project at Barakshetra in Nepal.  DPR is under progress.

    Kamla and Bagmati Multipurpose Projects The JPO-SKSKI has also been entrusted to undertake the feasibility study of Kamla Dam and preliminary study of Bagmati Dam Projects. These studies are in progress.

    Project Completion Prospects

    Hydro power projects have a long gestation period and therefore, it can safely be assumed that the export from Nepal of power will not be able to commence before 2025. Nepal will be able to export 18 billion kWh in 2025 which will go up to 93 billion kWh by 2035 and then will start flattening and by 2040 it would be 115 trillion Watt hour because by that time it is anticipated that because of the growing prosperity domestic consumption will also pick up. In rainy season when the reservoirs will be at their peak capacity, it is estimated that by 2030 13 GW would be available for export.

    Conclusion

    Notwithstanding the political division within South Asia, it is important to appreciate that the energy resources are monolithic in nature. Due to topography of the country most of the hydropower resources are concentrated in the Himalayas; spanning Nepal, Bhutan and Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh. Hydro power is a form of green energy and it would be ideal in case a mechanism can be evolved to exploit it for common good. It is essential that India, in conjunction with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, needs to make attempts to make use of energy resources available in all these countries; hydro power is one such resource. In this connection the platform of BBIN (Bhutan-Bangladesh-India-Bhutan-IndiaNepal) needs to be exploited. In fact recent pipeline laid by India between Motihari in Bihar and Amlekhgunj in Nepal is great example of cooperation that benefits the region and the parties involved.

  • Chennai’s Water Stress: Urgent Need for Effective Water Security

    Chennai’s Water Stress: Urgent Need for Effective Water Security

    In Chennai, while the demand for water has been rising steeply with rapid urbanisation and growing population, water supply has been hit hard due to monsoon failures, over-exploitation of groundwater, heat waves and inadequate infrastructure. Following poor rainfall since 2018, all four major drinking water sources (four lakes) in the city dried up holding less than 1 percent of their capacities, aggravating the city’s water gap. The summer 2019 water crisis in Chennai has revealed the scale and magnitude of the water challenge, which can be viewed from two angles- one that is caused from a lack of safe water provisions and the other due to scarcity of available water resources.

    In Tamil Nadu, over 95 percent of surface water and 80 percent of groundwater have been utilised, with the per capita availability of water merely 900 cubic meters against a national average of 2200 cubic meters. Additionally, the state is, almost entirely, dependent on rainfall to restore its water resources. Erratic monsoon, therefore, create acute water shortage and droughts in the state. Further, Chennai being a coastal city, there is a high run off rate.

    Water Shortage – Man made Crisis

    Of the total water available, 75 percent of the available water is utilised for agriculture, leaving very little for industrial and personal consumption. The shortage has led to many unregulated private borewells and groundwater extraction. Others have resorted to private tankers who charge exorbitantly, in the absence of alternatives. While the coping costs is only 1 percent of the total income for high income groups, it is 15 percent for middle income groups and 40-50 percent for low income groups. To level the burden, state’s interventions are indispensable and all attempts towards regulating rates have failed due to tanker lobbies.

    In the absence of proper legislation, there has been an 85 percent decline of groundwater levels. Depleting groundwater level and intrusion of seawater have significantly reduced the water quality as well. Additionally, the state needs to build storage facilities and prevent water runoff, evident from the failure of at storing excessive water from 2015 flood which flowed back to the sea. The authorities have also ignored the illegal encroachment and excessive migration of people. An estimated 8,20,000 people live in slums, often without access to a consistent water supply. Poor infrastructure to retain water and low water holding capacity of soil have also affected green water within the soil that supports food and biomass production.

    The water shortage have spilled over to other dimensions as well. The unbalanced emphasis on the supply side issues has created water rage and incidents of local arguments over conservation methods, utilisation patterns, etc. Small businesses, schools, restaurants and others have evolved their own methods to tackle the crisis. Corporates encouraged work from home, many skipped daily wages waiting for water delivery and Chennai Metro temporarily stopped air conditioning in non-peak hours. The water disruptions also affected production, increased input costs and reduced investments in the city.

    Need for Active State Intervention

    Since water is a state subject, its management remains the responsibility of state government. The evident and growing water scarcity immediately demanded policy interventions and action programmes from the Tamil Nadu government. To tackle the high prices charged by tankers, the Municipal Administration hired water tankers for supplying water to the public and demanded that people refuse services of those charging steep rates. However, the Chennai Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board was delivering 500 million litres, less than half of the city’s needs. In such a scenario, authorities should instead actively regulate the prices and penalise defaulters.

    Water Supply Scheme in Chennai has been approved under JNNURM for improving and strengthening water supply within the city. However, leak detection and rectification is only part of Phase 6 of the scheme. This needs to be prioritised to prevent water wastage. Further, proposal to extend basic amenities to unserved areas under the scheme is still pending. To stop the complete dependence on rainwater, the administration has taken up the construction of a third desalination plant, financed through a KFW loan and AMRUT funds. A Request for Interest has also been issued for setting up three small scale Seawater Reverse Osmosis desalination plants of 10MLD each. However, many argue that desalination should be the last resort since it is expensive, energy intensive and environmentally damaging. Instead, the government should restore and rejuvenate water bodies in the city (currently there are over 100 such bodies each ranging between 2-50 acres), currently polluted with untreated waste, plastic and water hyacinths. There should also be regulations in place to prevent encroachment and pollution of water boundaries by humans.

    To have a sustainable system, rainwater harvesting was made mandatory since 2003, requiring buildings to install rooftop water catchment system and collect rainwater. However, poor implementation and maintenance have proved this measure ineffective. Local and state buildings should lead in rainwater harvesting. Following this, there should be regular checks and local bodies should provide assistance in maintaining these structures. The government is also engaging with NGOs and experts to desilt rivers to improve storage capacity in time for North East monsoons. While the measure is not an immediate fix, it is a long term measure. Though CMWSSB has pushed for desilting, many suggested plans are yet to be approved by the Water Resources Department. Even approved projects are prolonged and poorly managed. For instance, 1.93 lakhs cubic metres of silt are yet to be cleared in Porur lake, the process is yet to begin at Cholavaram lake, etc.

    On a careful observation, it can be established that most efforts currently employed address supply side issues like desalination, mismanagement, restoring water sources, etc. While supply oriented approaches are necessary, it is dependent on availability of water that is largely a product of nature and climate. The demand for water, however, is largely dependent on humans, directly impacted by the population size, industrial use patterns, water efficiency, etc. Hence, there is a need to equally focus on demand management measures, to formulate proper policies for water security.

    TN government has rejected the pricing of agricultural electricity consumption stating that it will burden the farmers and raise food prices. However, the state should actively try to reduce water consumption through irrigation, by measures like fixed timing for supply of power (used to pump groundwater), training farmers on water conservation methods, encouraging efficient irrigation techniques(drip irrigation or spray irrigation instead of flood irrigation), etc.

    Data intensive Analysis should guide Effective Policy Formulation and Implementation

    With wide spread experience of water scarcity and data projecting a situation normalising drought, it is the right time to adopt water conservation methods and push for change to limited water use lifestyle. Cape Town, that faced a similar situation, successfully implemented behavioural nudges to reduce water use. Most effective nudges included offering conservation feedback to users on their performance in relation to neighbours, and creating Water Maps that highlighted areas compliant with the targets. Further, reuse of water should be encouraged for landscaping, flushing toilets, etc.

    More importantly, to develop ideal policies and evolve schemes, there is a need for water accounting to track and understand the extent of water scarcity, check inter basin river transfers for better negotiations and make trade-offs with other states, improve preparedness for emergencies, etc. There should also be public water audits on institutions, laws, public and private usages, etc for transparency and accountability.

    Currently, water is managed by multiple agencies – one to handle encroachment, one for lake rejuvenation, another for pollution control, and so on- with overlapping responsibilities and little coordination between them. For responsible and accountable water governance, these bodies should be under an integrated agency. Overall, the demand side measures should equally be managed by the state. Towards this, the model of city’s development should be altered to distribute migration across the state, especially to areas that receive higher annual rainfall and have abundant water sources. In addition to reducing the water stress faced by the city, it will hinder the overcrowding in Chennai’s urban space and bring equitable development across the state.

    Renuka Paul is a Research Analyst with ‘The Peninsula Foundation’.

    Photo by Adhithya Srinivasan on Unsplash

  • Conference Report- India and the Indian Ocean Region: Dynamics of Geopolitics, Security, and Global Commons

    Conference Report- India and the Indian Ocean Region: Dynamics of Geopolitics, Security, and Global Commons

    TPF Team                                                                                                    August 19, 2019/Conference

    The Peninsula Foundation held its first international conference titled “India and the Indian Ocean Region: Dynamics of Geopolitics, Security and Global Commons” on the 12thand 13thof July at the Women’s Christian College, Chennai. Fifteen papers authored by research scholars from various institutions and backgrounds were presented during the course of the two-day conference comprising five sessions.The inaugural address was delivered by the Chief Guest, Vice Admiral N Ashok Kumar AVSM VSM, Vice Chief of Naval Staff (VCNS). In an eloquent speech, the VCNS highlighted the growing importance of the Indian Ocean Region and the need to debate and discuss issues relating to chokepoints and the trade routes. He spoke about historical evidence of the criticality of the trade routes in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and related it to the present context of ship movements in vital sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) that are vital for economic growth of countries in the Asia-Pacific Region. India’s geographic location gives it a dominant strategic position, as seventy-five percent of international shipping links go through the IOR. He pointed out that China is deeply focussed on safeguarding its interests in the IOR since more than seventy percent of its energy requirements are dependent on Indian Ocean sea lanes. Stressing on the importance of the IOR, the VCNS highlighted the vulnerability of chokepoints and the need to ensure freedom of the seas.

                The keynote address was delivered by Professor Kanti Prasad Bajpai, Vice Dean and Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. He focused on the contemporary understanding of the term ‘region’ and its context with regards to geopolitics and international relations, stating that when we refer to a region in the geopolitical context, we essentially refer to a zone of conflict, a war-zone or an area of potential conflict. Thus, South Asia often implies the India-Pakistan conflict, Middle East or West Asia the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the conflict between North and South Korea when talking about Korea as a region. Similarly, the Indian Ocean region is one of geopolitical contest amongst the great powers. It is a strategically important region where interdependence is inevitable amongst the nations that have vested interests in the IOR.

                Professor Bajpai further elucidated the fundamentals of trade development in the region and substantiated a case for the IOR as a strategic zone, citing the consistency with which external powers compete to control the region. He highlighted the three forms of culture that govern or define power positions in the IOR: classical culture, popular culture and strategic culture. India, aspiring to position itself as an important player in the region, has to evaluate the choices that are available to it: accept one dominant power to manage the region in a rule-based order or actively participate in the dialogue for a negotiated order that can be achieved through multilateral trade agreements. In conclusion, Professor Bajpai raised questions to be addressed in the upcoming sessions. The inaugural session ended with a special lecture on the cultural legacies of the Asia-Pacific Region, delivered by Indian classical dancer and Padma Bhushan awardee, Dr Padma Subrahmanyam.

    Session One: ‘Indian Ocean: Culture, Civilizations and Connectivity’

                The topic of the first session chaired by Cmde. C. Uday Bhaskar, Director of the Society for Policy Studies (SPS), was ‘Indian Ocean: Culture, Civilizations and Connectivity’. The speakers discussed the history, culture and impact of trade on the IOR. G Padmaja, an independent researcher, emphasised India’s maritime heritage and argued that policies do not move beyond mere talk with respect to the IOR. Dr Vijay Sakhuja, Trustee of The Peninsula Foundation, stated that the IOR is the busiest trade route in terms of development and commodity exchange. He elucidated the importance of digital shipping and the scope of 5G technology and reliance on Artificial Intelligence in driving the trading ecosystem. The third speaker Dr D Dhanuraj, Chairman, Centre for Public Policy Research (CPPR), explored the idea of the modern political economy influencing the flow of men and commodities, and talked about the possibility of India reclaiming its rights over the IOR.

    Session Two: ‘Power Politics in the IOR: Geostrategies and Geo-economics’

                Through his paper “Competing Pivots in the Indian Ocean Region”, Dr Lawrence Prabhakar, Associate Professor, Madras Christian College, highlighted that the region can be constructed and contested through a maritime mandala that goes beyond security and economic factors to include cultural, governance, transnational and other aspects. Dr Arvind Kumar, HOD, Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University, in his paper “Stability of Trade and Commerce: Energy Corridor” discussed the potential of energy resources in the IOR and the need to include energy security as a significant feature in global trade and growth drive. In his paper titled “China’s BRI: Responses in the IOR and Implications for Regional Order”, Dr Jabin Jacob, Associate Professor, Shiv Nadar University, focussed on smaller nations affected by the Belt and Road Initiative and the responses by the Chinese government. Chairperson Dr TCA Raghavan, DG, ICWA, summarised the session by observing that the actions of regional states cannot be categorised as malicious but are rather reactions to Indian and Chinese policies over time.

    Session Three: India’s Strategic Interests in the IOR

                In the final session of the day, speakers discussed maritime security, power projections and evolving ties with littoral states in the region.  The session was chaired by Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (retd), Trustee, India Foundation. Cmde Somen Bannerjee, of Vivekananda International Foundation, pointed out in his paper titled “Maritime Security and Power Projections” that China is set to become the biggest power in the IOR in the next fifteen years. He also discussed the need for India to strategize power projection as a necessary course of action in order to secure importance on the global stage.  Through his paper, “Strategic Partnerships: India & ASEAN”, Ambassador Antonio Chiang brought to attention the strategic partnership between Taiwan and China, and the implications of China’s rise to power on Taiwan. Group Captain PB Nair spoke about the role of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the context of the IOR, providing assistance in navigating sea routes, and the significance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology in carrying out sea operations.

    Day Two: Panel Discussion on India’s Approaches in the IOR

                Day Two commenced with a panel discussion on India’s strategic approaches in the IOR, its aspirations and the contradictions. The panel consisted of Dr TCA Raghavan, Ambassador Antonio Chiang, Lt Gen S.L. Narasimhan, Cmde Uday Bhaskar and Professor Kanti Bajpai. The session, moderated by Air Marshal M Matheswaran, addressed three main points: the power struggle in Asia, India’s inadequate investment with regard to being a rising power, and India’s engagement with multilateral institutions.

                The discussion focussed on the ramifications of Chinese economic power and military strength in the region, its effect on India’s policies, as well as the need for utilization of soft power and soft balancing techniques by smaller countries to level the international playing field.

                With regard to India’s investment activities, Dr TCA Raghavan mentioned that ineptness in domestic spheres would spill over and reflect in international projects.

                On the topic of India’s engagement in multilateral institutions, Professor Kanti Bajpai noted that while it cannot be said that India doesn’t deliver, there is a certain level of ambiguity about what the expectations are. The delay in finalising the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was discussed; Lt Gen S L Narasimhan explored the reason behind India’s hesitancy to the agreement, stating that RCEP only covered the free movement of goods and not of services. Thus, India being a service-strong nation would be at a disadvantage.

                With regard to China’s technological advancements and its potential economic superpower status, Ambassador Chiang stated that intellectual power would be a game-changer for India. He noted that China resorts to hard and fast action for solving problems as opposed to the kind of strategic decision-making employed by India.

    Session Four: International Cooperation and Global Commons

                Session Four of the conference was chaired by Dr Joshua Thomas, Deputy Director at the North Eastern Regional Centre of the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR). The first speaker, Dr Suba Chandran, spoke on the topic of “Cultural Legacies & Competing Zones of Influence: India, China and External Powers.” His talk addressed two questions: who the actors are and their nature of influence, and how India can respond.  Embracing our shared religious and cultural history and strengthening the education system in India were among the measures suggested by Dr Chandran to build bridges and enable India to assume a more central position of power in the region. Rear Admiral S Shrikande presented a paper on the subject of “International Institutions: SLOCs, Chokepoints, Freedom of Navigation”, and shared insights on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The final speaker of the session, Rear Admiral K Swaminathan, spoke on India’s role as a net security provider in the region, and mentioned several instances of the Indian Navy providing assistance to neighbours in times of need and contributing to preserving international security. While Dr Chandran spoke about cultural connectivity across countries in the IOR through a ‘Bring East Policy’, the naval officers emphasised on the need for connectivity, capacity and credibility in the international sphere.

    Session Five: Transnational Issues, Threats and Challenges in the IOR

                In his paper titled “International and Regional Cooperation in Disaster Management”, Air Vice Marshal Ashutosh Dixit underlined the vital role played by the UN and Armed forces in mitigating the risks of disasters. While the UN plays a multifaceted role of being the interface between local and international responders, it is most often the armed forces that promptly and efficiently mobilize resources to the disaster-struck nation, as their reach has no limitations. Dr Arabinda Acharya, Associate Professor, National Defense University, Washington DC, in his paper “Non Traditional Security Threats: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism, Climate Change, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, Illegal Immigration, and Smuggling of Arms and Drugs” explored challenges to good order at sea and proposed investment in resources to thwart non-state actors on land so as to reduce their power at sea. Through his paper, “India and the Blue Economy: Evolving Partnerships,” Dr R P Pradhan, Associate Professor at BITS Pilani, Goa Campus, emphasised the critical role of the Big Push Theory in developing the blue economy. Investing in strategic assets such as seaports similar to China, Indonesia, South Korea, etc. is vital for realising India’s aspirations for a larger role in the region. In his closing remarks, Lt General SL Narasimhan, Director General, Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, Ministry of External Affairs, emphasised the need for states and regional organizations to collaborate rather than compete in order to address challenges that transcend national borders.

                Lastly, in his valedictory address, Dr TCA Raghavan identified crucial points with respect to the theme of the conference, including the difference between military and diplomatic thinking, and strategic and tactical strength. Dr Raghavan stressed the need for developing dialogue forums and intergovernmental organisations in the Arabian Sea littoral with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Iran, among others, to focus on pressing issues in the region.

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  • Strategic Autonomy and the Looming Oil Crisis

    Strategic Autonomy and the Looming Oil Crisis

    Kamal Davar                                                                                             May 31, 2019/Commentary

    The new Modi government will have to speedily contend with a serious foreign policy challenge on its hands.

    That this ordeal comes in the wake of some underplayed serious economy problems currently facing the nation will compound the problems for India which imports over 80 per cent of its burgeoning oil needs.

    Thus, if the looming crisis in the Persian Gulf between an arrogant US and an equally defiant Iran does not get resolved peacefully, ominous ramifications await the region, the world and all those nations which import crude oil from Iran.

    The genesis of the current crisis between the US and Iran has its roots in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) which was agreed upon by Iran and six western nations in 2015, led by the US, to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, which boils down to deterring Iran from developing nuclear weapons. But in May 2018, the US, under its mercurial President Donald Trump, chose to renege on this treaty as Trump felt that this was the “worst deal ever negotiated.”

    It is also a fact that Iran did not violate any norms of the law as regards this agreement.

    Meanwhile, the US allowed some nations, including India, which import oil from Iran a six-month waiver, which ended on May 2, 2019. As a consequence of the US action, oil prices the world over have jacked and soon its adverse effects will be felt in India as inflation will hit the already strained Indian economy. Over a 10 per cent hike in global oil prices has already taken place in the last one month and a crippling escalation in oil prices ahead is well on the cards.

    Notwithstanding any US pressure on India, the unalterable fact of Iran’s strategic significance to India in the region remains beyond question. India imported 24 million metric tonnes of crude from Iran in the 2018-19. India was Iran’s second largest buyer of crude last year, while Tehran was the third largest supplier to India after Iraq and Saudi Arabia (11 per cent of a total of India’s oil imports).

    Additionally, Iranian crude comes with a longer credit period and cheaper freight owing to Iran’s geographical proximity to India and, thus, Iranian oil remains the best option for India in more ways than one.

    Higher oil prices also make the Indian rupee weaker, making imports to India costlier. Importantly, that Iran-India collaboration in the development in the vital Chabahar Port in Iran will give India vital ingress to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics cannot be understated.

    Meanwhile, the US has rushed the formidable USS Abraham Lincoln carrier-borne Task Force to the Persian Gulf region and undertaken certain prophylactic steps in case war breaks out.

    The Iranians, too, have mounted some small-range anti-ship missiles on their warships. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recently said that his nation is facing acute pressure from international sanctions, dubbing it a “war unprecedented in the history of the Islamic revolution.”

    The US has also branded Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards as a foreign terrorist organisation. A war of words has broken out, with President Trump declaring that if “Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran. Never threaten the United States again.”

    Replying back sternly, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif retorted that Iranians have stood tall for millennia against aggression and that “economic terrorism and genocidal taunts won’t end Iran.” He added that “never threaten an Iranian. Try respect it works.”

    Importantly, even US allies have steered away from of taking any partisan positions with either the US or Iran. Meanwhile, oil-producing nations like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Mexico and the US itself have been requested to step up their oil production to cater for Iranian oil shortfalls.

    How this oil crisis will shape up to meet global demands is anyone’s guess.

    It is a strategist’s nightmare in conjuring up a scenario concerning the ramifications of a war between Iran and the US. The Persian Gulf is easily one of the world’s critically significant strategic waterways through which one-third of the world’s oil is transported.

    In the event of a war, Iran will definitely close the vital Straits of Hormuz for commercial shipping purposes, throwing the region’s economy out of shape — an eventuality which, hopefully, should not ever take place.

    Preoccupied with its General Election, India, as a major regional player, has so far not reached out to its strategic partner, the US, to impress upon it to defuse the crisis.

    Recently, the Iranian Foreign Minister made a trip to India to explain their position to India on the current standoff.

    India, however, need not succumb to any US pressures or take sides. India has an adequate financial standing and moral stature to play a peacemaker’s role. India must conscientiously follow the time-honoured policy of zealously guarding its strategic autonomy. Respect for India from nations even adversarial to each other — as in earlier decades — will follow automatically and some of India’s economic tribulations will also get simultaneously addressed.

    Let the new government in New Delhi bear in mind Iran’s more than significant strategic value for India in the region.

    The author, Lt Gen Kamal davar is a former DGDIA and is visiting Distinguished fellow at TPF. 

    This article was earlier published in The Tribune.

  • How the newly inducted IAF Chinook heavy-lift helicopters provide huge versatility in operations

    How the newly inducted IAF Chinook heavy-lift helicopters provide huge versatility in operations

    M Matheswaran                                                                                                 May 22, 2019/Opinion

    The Indian Air Force inducted the first batch of four Boeing C-47 F(I) Chinook helicopters last month into its inventory. These are part of the order for fifteen heavy lift helicopters. With a payload capability of 10 tonnes and a significantly good high altitude performance, the Chinooks fill a long-felt gap in IAF’s heavy lift helicopter capability. For long the IAF had depended solely on its small fleet of Russian built Mi-26 helicopter, which is still the world’s largest and heaviest payload helicopter. The Mi-26, with an enormous payload capability of 20 tonnes, had provided yeoman service for more than two decades.

    Starting with a fleet of four aircraft, the Mi-26 has played extensive role in meeting major airlift requirements of material, machinery, and men, for the military and civil administration in the Himalayan border regions.With one aircraft having crashed few years ago, the surviving fleet had been hampered by maintenance and technical support problems, virtually bringing to halt the heavy heli-lift capability of the IAF. Besides, increasing emphasis on infrastructure build-up in the border regions has highlighted the importance of heli-lift capabilities for both the IAF and the Indian Army. This is what prompted the IAF to look out for building and enhancing its heli-lift capabilities in the heavy-segment.

    India’s borderlands, dominated by the mighty Himalayan ranges, are unique, treacherous, and the most demanding in the world. The need to operate at altitudes higher than 20000 ft on regular basis is unique to India, and is a challenge to most helicopters designed in the West and Russia. Operations in Indian environment puts gruelling demands on these helicopters. High altitude performance in other parts of the world is at less than 20000ft, in fact, it would average between 5000 and 10000 ft, with exceptions at 15000 ft. In India, 20000 ft operations would be routine in the Himalayan stretches and valleys all across our nearly 4000 km long border in the north and north-west. High altitude operations put severe demands on the engine, has a drastic reduction in effective payload, and has adverse impact on total technical life. These will need to be addressed by appropriate technical enhancements that are fairly expensive as well.

    Indian MOD signed the contract with M/s Boeing in Sep 2015 for supply of 15 CH-47F(I) Chinook Helicopters. The contract is for USD 1.1 billion, with an option clause for further seven aircraft. All 15 aircraft are planned to be supplied before March, 2020. It is almost certain that the option clause would be exercised. The first aircraft was handed over in a ceremony at the manufacturer’s production facility in Philadelphia on Feb 1 st , and the first batch of four were shipped out to Mundra Port in Gujarat. The four were then assembled and integrated into fully operational helicopters at the IAF base in Chandigarh and inducted on the 25 th March. Some of the specialist systems, self-protection systems and EW equipment are contracted through the FMS (Foreign Military Sales) procedure.

    While the payload capability is only half that of the Mi-26 helicopter, the Chinook provides huge versatility in operations. The IAF version is the CH-47 F(I), which is the latest and advanced version of the Chinook, designed more than 50 years ago in 1962. The IAF aircraft is upgraded with new generation avionics and flight control systems that make the aircraft capable of very precise and versatile operations during day and night. The Chinook’s twin-rotor design gives it good agility and stability in high altitude operations. Its advanced mission computer and the DAFCS (Digital Automatic Flight Control System) allows the pilot to feed in the complete mission profile and fly automatically and with hover precision in one foot increments vertically and laterally. The CH-47 F(I) is an advanced multi mission helicopter with the true multi-role, vertical-lift capability. It contains a fully integrated, digital cockpit management system, Common Aviation Architecture Cockpit and advanced cargo-handling capabilities that complement the aircraft’s mission performance and handling characteristics. Its primary role will be for transportation of troops, artillery, equipment, and fuel. The army is particularly keen on the Chinook heavy heli-lift capability for transportation and deployment of its recently procured M-777 Ultra-Light howitzer artillery guns in the Himalayan border regions with China.

    As opposed to the small fleet of three Mi-26 helicopters, the larger fleet size of the CH- 47 F(I) would provide the IAF immense flexibility and availability of aircraft for a variety of tasks. It will provide a boost to the construction of infrastructure and border road projects, long overdue. Border Roads Organisation would get a fillip to its long-delayed road construction projects in the north-east. Our continued requirements of aerial maintenance in remote regions will be better served with this new capability, as also for critical needs of HADR operations, in missions for transportation of relief supplies, and evacuation of refugees. The IAF plans to deploy the two squadrons, one in the Western sector in Himachal Pradesh and adjoining Himalayan regions, and the other in the East sector in Assam/Arunachal Pradesh.

    The Chinook acquisition was also accompanied by acquisition of the Apache attack helicopter, also from Boeing. Both contracts, worth together over USD 3.5 billion, were signed on the same day on 28 Sep 2015. Both are also a combination of DCS (Direct Commercial Sales) and FMS (Foreign Military Sales) processes. The two inductions have followed a series of procurements from the USA, mostly through the FMS route. Having started with the first major defence deal in 2008, the Indo-USA defence business is likely to touch a whopping USD 18 billion by the end of 2019. Most of these acquisitions are through FMS and are virtually replacing the earlier Russian fleets: Apache replacing the Mi-35, Chinook replacing Mi-26, Sikorsky MH-60 Romeo replacing the Kamov in the Navy, with the likelihood of 110 NMRH to follow; this is a sort of indirect CAATSA in play.
    It is important for India to realise that while many of these acquisitions have given significant teeth to Indian operational capability, in terms of business it has been huge business to the US companies with very little to show for India in 3 terms of Technology transfer or industrial gain in terms of manufacture or co-design and co- development.

    The CAG report number 3 of 2019 comes down heavily on these acquisitions. It castigates the MOD and the IAF for procedural lapses, long drawn out acquisition processes, and more importantly of having skewed the QRs in such a way that only Chinook and Apache would have been successful. That’s a serious indictment. However, India will do well to remember that major procurements like the Apache and the Chinook at huge costs, while meeting the IAF’s operational requirements, should also be leveraged to benefit India’s larger strategic interests of technology acquisition, industrial capability, global partnerships, and of course, strengthening US-India strategic partnership. It needs to be a win-win for both.

    The author is retired Air Marshal and former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff. He is the founding Chairman and President of The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai. Views expressed are personal. 

    This article was published earlier in Financial Express.

    Image Credit.

  • Undertones of a Potential India-Pakistan Water War

    Undertones of a Potential India-Pakistan Water War

    Renuka Paul and M Matheswaran                                                           (March 9, 2019/Analysis)

    Last week saw India-Pakistan tensions touch a crescendo as India, for the first time, executed a punitive strike into Pakistan. While Pakistan’s retaliatory strike was thwarted by IAF’s air defence mechanism it also resulted in a MiG 21 aircraft being shot down and the Indian pilot taken as prisoner. While international pressure forced Pakistan to release him within 48 hours, it also led to quick de-escalation. In the bargain, India’s pressure on Pakistan became diluted significantly. The genesis of this spike in tensions between the two nuclear powered neighbours, relates to the event of February 14th, 2019 when Pakistan based Jaish-e-Mohammad launched a terror attack in Pulwama, Jammu and Kashmir that killed over 40 Indian paramilitary personnel.

    Blaming Pakistan for the incident, New Delhi has revoked the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status granted to Islamabad, imposed 200 percent duty on imports from Pakistan and vowed to end the flow of unutilized water from India’s shareflowing to Pakistan. On February 26th, India carried out “non-military, pre-emptive” airstrikes to destroy terrorist camps in Balakot, Pakistan. The tough and unprecedented (since 1971) retaliatory measure of crossing Pakistan’s airspace makes sense given the political pressure due to the upcoming elections and the media fuelled public sentiments. This changed discourse proves that Pakistan’s approach of employing Islamic proxies to cause destructions and using nuclear weapons as a safeguard to deter Indian response does not hold true any longer. Moreover, the international community including China and Saudi Arabia, usual Pakistan allies, has condemned the terror activities.

    Some argue that the strongest threat India has made since the Pulwama incident is the decision to alter the course of water flowing into Pakistan towards Punjab and Kashmir instead. The recent claim, however, seems irrelevant as it is in fact a two-year-old announcement that the excess of Indian waters that flow into Pakistan will be used for hydroelectric projects. But what this has sparked is a boost to those advocating abrogation of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) and has highlighted a potential water conflict in the subcontinent.

    Post partition, in 1948, Pakistan argued that it needs Kashmir partly for its water security as it is nearly 65-percent dependent on the Indus river system. Following escalated issues, India partially cut off water supply to Pakistan by shutting off water from Ferozepur Headworks to Dipalpur Canal, portions of Lahore and main branches of the Upper Bari Doab Canal. To de-escalate the situation and to prevent further water crisis, the World Bank, after years of negotiations, brokered the IWT in 1960. According to this deal, India is allocated the eastern rivers- Ravi, Beas and Sutlej- while Pakistan has the western rivers- Indus, Chenab and Jhelum- and it mandates a bilateral meet twice a year to share data regarding flow, flooding etc. However, over the years the undertones of looming water dispute is evident. Being the upper riparian state, India has a clear advantage that sustains Pakistan’s insecurities. For instance, it has built multiple dams and barrages over river Jhelum. While 1.50 MAF water is allowed to India from Jhelum under IWT, constant disputes exist regarding the amount of water diverted (stop the flow or flood).

    In 2008, Lashkar-e-Taiba chief Hafiz Saeed accused India of water terrorism, followed by Pakistan government in 2010 claiming that India chokes water supply consistently. In the aftermath of Uri attacks in 2016, Modi proclaimed that “blood and water cannot flow simultaneously” and dismissed the bilateral meet of IWT committees. In addition, New Delhi set up dozens of small and medium hydroelectric and irrigation projects like Wular barrage, Baglihar Dam, etc that obstruct Pakistan’s water share. Though India cannot unilaterally end the treaty, it can reduce the water flow to Pakistan utilizing the provisions of IWT that allows India to use water from Western rivers for non-consumptive needs like irrigation, hydroelectricity production, etc. Islamabad responded that revocation of IWT “can be taken as an act of war” and garnered international support to stop India’s project efforts.

    Given that Pakistan is allotted 80 percent of the water from the Indus river system, many in India call for ending IWT. However, the potential consequences of retraction from IWT are manifold. As signatory to the international agreement, backing out from IWT will invite international condemnation affecting India’s global image and its bid for UNSC seat. Moreover, the trust relation with neighbours (Nepal and Bangladesh) with whom India shares water treaties will be affected. Additionally, India does not have the infrastructure to use the extra water and this could result in the flooding of Kashmir. Even the underutilized water that belongs to India (from eastern rivers) is free flowing to Pakistan. Despite continued claims of diverting the water that flows to Pakistan to other parts in India, New Delhi is yet to materialize these claims.

    Experts argue that this is to avoid water crisis within the country. Water disputes within states in India are common. For instance, it was only after 40 years of interventions that Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Haryana signed an agreement in 2018 on the Shahpur Jandi dam project for access to and use of the water from these rivers. There is also the risk of China following India’s steps and reducing water flow to the Brahmaputra river. They have already done so by building the Lalho project on the Xiabuqu river, a tributary of Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra as known in India). Realizing the disadvantages of withdrawing from IWT, India has looked at other alternatives.

    New Delhi is engaging in water power play by further limiting Pakistan’s water supply through Afghanistan – India investing on the $236 million Shahtoot Dam on Kabul river in Afghanistan is an example. Using water as a political weapon is not new. Turkey completely stopped water flow from Euphrates to Syria, Israel cut fresh water supply to Gaza, and so on. In the absence of a water sharing agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, India is investing in river and dam projects on Afghanistan’s eastern rivers- Kabul and Kunar- that eventually flow into Pakistan. However, this seems to set a dangerous precedent and will further worsen the distributional conflicts in the region. In parallel, India has also taken up multiple projects utilizing the provisions under the treaty that can potentially reduce the water flow to Pakistan. Though it takes time, given the costs and objections involved, this seems to be a move in the right direction.

    With political tensions and water stress rising in both nations, water diplomacy needs to be an important factor to be considered in Indo-Pak negotiations. Moreover, issues like climate change and global warming were irrelevant when IWT was brokered and left out of its gambit. Intermittent floods and droughts could be controlled through mutual coordination. Therefore, water should be seen as a factor for cooperation and not conflict.

    Renuka Paul is a Research Analyst with The Peninsula Foundation. She holds a Masters in Public Policy from Mumbai University. Views expressed are the author’s own.

    Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (Retd) is the Founder President and Trustee of TPF.

  • Reaping the Whirlwind: Pulwama and After

    Reaping the Whirlwind: Pulwama and After

    Deepak Sinha                                                                                                         01 Mar 2019

    It was the military disaster of 1971 that forced the Pakistani establishment, the military which runs the country for all practical purposes, to face up to the fact that it could never win a conventional war against India. If it was to avenge its humiliation and cut India down to size, it had little choice but to fight through proxies, bleed India through a thousand cuts.

                This idea must surely have germinated from its successful employment of Islamic militants, the forerunners of the Taliban, used to oppose the rule of the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) that had deposed President Mohammed Daud Khan in what came to be known as the Saur or April Revolution of 1978, It was this Pakistani fomented insurgency which finally led to the Soviet intervention and occupation of Afghanistan in Dec 1979. Incidentally, while conventional wisdom would have us believe that it was the CIA that came up with the idea of using militants to fight the Soviets, facts show that they came to the party much later and only added their considerable resources to the techniques perfected by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in the use of irregulars for its own ends.

                Thus from the early Eighties Pakistan commenced its support for secessionist elements within India that were involved in fighting against the State, firstly the Khalistan Movement and subsequently, with greater success, in Jammu and Kashmir. It clearly had advantages as there was credible deniability, economy of effort with the dirty work being done by proxies keeping Indian Security Forces tied down and finally, the most important of all, creating fear and anxiety within the general population that impacted every aspect of our democratic way of life.

                There is of course one major disadvantage of using proxies, they tend to have a mind of their own and often times respond inappropriately and at cross purposes to what its mentors may be wishing to achieve. The Pulwama suicide attack falls in this category. There have been numerous statements over the past four years that have made clear that Pakistan prefers to deal with Indian Governments run by the more “liberal and secular” parties compared to having to deal with the more conservative, Hindutva driven BJP. With elections around the corner and with the BJP facing the very real likelihood of a serious decline, if the recent state elections were any indication, it would have been in Pakistan’s best interest to maintain a low profile.

                Masood Azhar, the Jaish- e- Mohammed supremo, obviously had a different view. Not only did his organization carry out the suicide attack that led to the death of 45 policemen, but also went on to claim credit for the action. Thus, in one thoughtless act he not only destroyed the Pakistan Government’s attempts at deniability, but he also made Imran Khan’s call for India to provide credible evidence infructuous. Most importantly, the timing of the devastating attack left the Modi Government with little choice but to respond overtly and with speed, if it was to still retain any hope of doing well at the hustings. There was also the possibility that if India responded in an effective manner to the outrage, the Governments stock would go up rapidly and that would enhance Mr. Modi’s reputation and chances of return to power, just as the earlier cross- border strike helped the BJP in the Uttar Pradesh elections. This could hardly have been to Pakistan’s advantage and in the event it was facilitated by the Army, then General Bajwa has certainly made a serious miscalculation.

                Regardless of the number of casualties that the Indian Air Force’s attack on terror camps deep inside Pakistan may have caused, the very fact that the Indian Government displayed the intent to take on terrorists inside Pakistan has clearly changed the narrative prevalent for the past four decades. It has also shown up Pakistan’s repeated threats of a nuclear riposte as sheer hyperbole and bluster. More importantly the initiative has finally shifted in India’s favour along with world opinion which has had enough of Pakistan’s duplicitous behaviour. Moreover, any escalation above a perfunctory retaliation, which was to be expected to assuage domestic opinion, by Pakistan, would destroy the fig leaf of deniability it has used over the years. Most importantly, it would force their military into a direct confrontation, something that the proxy war waged by them over the years allowed them to avoid.

                In this context one can only hope better sense will prevail and we will be able to avoid a serious escalation of the conflict which can hardly help either side given the huge challenges that we face in lifting vast swathes of our population out of the twin evils of poverty and illiteracy.  However, it must be emphasized that true progress will only occur as and when Pakistan starts to wind up the Jihad factory it has built over these years. In any case the Indian cross- border raid cannot be a one- off affair and we must be willing to do all that it takes to neutralize the Jihadi network and its vast army of financiers, mangers and facilitators.

                Finally, while all our attention may be taken in dealing with the issue at hand, the fact as to what led to the Pulwama attack must not be lost sight off. For this serious lapse on the part of our intelligence services, it is imperative that heads must roll. There have also been clear indications that despite increasing numbers of militants being neutralized in the Valley the Army and other Security Forces were being increasingly marginalized, especially in South Kashmir, because of popular discontent. They had consequently lost their ability to dominate the countryside, thereby losing out on intelligence. These aspects continued to be ignored by the Central Government and the military hierarchy. Little thought was given to the necessity for reviewing either counter insurgency strategies or tactical procedures and the leadership continued to be swayed by tactical successes with little attempt to resolve the growing disillusionment and radicalization within the population, especially the youth. This must certainly change.

     

    The writer, a military veteran is a Consultant with the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi and Senior Visiting Fellow with The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai.

    This article was also published in the Pioneer https://www.dailypioneer.com/2019/columnists/stifle-the-jihadi-network.html. Opinions expressed in the article are those of the author alone.

  • Looking Beyond the Rafale Imbroglio

    Looking Beyond the Rafale Imbroglio

    The tenor of the debate, especially in the election year, can hardly be expected to be moderate or mature. While wild assertions made by the politicians in hope of swaying the electorate is to be expected and accepted, there is also a vital need for politicians to ensure that matters pertaining to National Security are kept out of the ambit of politics. Just as Georges Clemenceau, French Prime Minister during the Great War, commented that “War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men”, so too is the case with entrusting national security to just politicians. But politicians being politicians care little for such niceties, which explains why allegations of wrongdoing are flying so thick and fast in the ongoing Rafale procurement imbroglio, who, unfortunately, have been joined by respected academics and researchers, who should know better.

    Attempts to garner the limelight and the few minutes of fame that goes with it is understandable in the case of politicians, but for academics to do so by drawing conclusions based on speculation that passes for facts and little else, seems to be rather hasty, if not downright fallacious and unprofessional.  A respected academic, for example, has concluded that the decision to procure just 36 jets instead of the original 126 with the attendant increase in unit cost shows “extraordinary ineptitude can only be explained by the circumvention of laid down procedures.” He further  goes on to equate the manner in which this decision was made to that of demonetization, berates the Government for being “parsimonious and incompetent” and suggests that their action was “worse than a crime—it was a blunder.”

    He may well be proved right in his conclusions subsequently, but the truth is that it is one thing to question the Governments’ motivation or influence in the selection of the aircraft or the offset partners, but quite another to question the decisions it takes, however much we may disagree with them. For one, Mr. Modi was elected by a substantial majority to do just that, since that is what is expected of a leader. Moreover, we are wholly unaware as to circumstances that led to the Government to take the decision that it did, and therefore to question his decisions clearly smacks of arrogance, if not an ulterior motive. It is all very well to rant about the ineptitude and incompetence of this Government and its adverse impact on defence modernization, but what then are we to conclude at the previous Governments’ inability to push through the earlier deal in the seven years that it had to do so? Surely ineptitude or Incompetence may be too mild a term in their case.

    There is no gainsaying the fact that defence procurement and corruption have had a symbiotic relationship ever since Independence and our first procurement scandal, the infamous “Jeep Scandal” of 1948. Politicians have always seen defence procurement as a lucrative source of funds and as long as our political funding regulations remain opaque, nothing is going to change. Therefore, if this Government has actually resorted to underhand means as alleged, despite it being a government to government deal, then they have only trod on the well-beaten path of their illustrious predecessors. Thus, if precedent is to be our guide, then all the brouhaha on the issue will only result in a setback for the Air Force while politicians and their minions involved getting away, as we saw in the Bofors case.

    If it is accountability that we are interested in, then we need to look beyond this specific issue of procurement and ask ourselves as to why the Air Force finds itself in such desperate straits today, with regard to its combat strength. The fact that its combat strength has fallen from its authorized forty-two squadrons to the present thirty plus, over the past two decades, was neither unanticipated nor unexpected.  Like all machines, aircraft have a quantifiable life span, which while possible to extend with mid-life upgrades, will at a point in time require replacement by the next generation, if the Air Force is to be able to match and overcome the adversary’s capabilities. This does not call for either vision or foresight, just common sense and a practical understanding of the facts, which somehow the Government of India with its vast resources was unable to do. Surely someone must be held accountable for this negligence because not only does it put our national security at risk but endangers pilots who are expected to make do with shoddy outdated aircraft.

    While the Air Force hierarchy must carry some of the blame, not least for lack of moral fibre for its inability to stand up for its rights, governments over the years, especially the Ministry of Defence and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) that it controls, have much to answer for. For the most part, much of our current problems can be traced to the utter failure of HAL to produce the hugely over-budget, inordinately delayed and ostensibly indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, the Tejas. In this context, the existing perceptions within the Air Force that quality control in HAL is all but non- existent have been borne out by the recent crash of the Mirage 2000 aircraft undergoing upgradation. Initial reports doing the rounds suggest that the nose wheel broke while it was taking off resulting in the tragic death of two test pilots, the best of the best.  It also brings to mind a similar case when three paratroopers slithering down from a HAL manufactured Advanced Light Helicopter at the Army Day Parade in January 2018 fell and were grievously injured because the “strong point” to which their rope was tied broke and separated from the aircraft’s body. The question that needs answering is not just how many such cases have happened in the past, but also how many in HAL have been held accountable for such shoddy work?

    This also explains to a large extent the previous governments’ inability to successfully close the deal for the 126 aircraft. It was reportedly blocked by the unwillingness of the Air Force hierarchy to accept aircraft manufactured by HAL without certification by Dassault Aviation, the manufacturers of the Rafale, something they refused to do.  That they would prefer to work with an untried and untested offset partner, allegedly thrust on them, rather than with HAL speaks volumes about what they think of the capabilities of this Defence PSU!

    Therefore, politicians and academics critical of this governments’ decision to keep HAL out of the loop in this case, especially their accusation that by doing so we have lost out on technology transfer, are either being deliberately obtuse or completely out of touch with reality. In this context, Mr. Rahul Gandhi has been particularly vocal, even to the extent of meeting workers of HAL. It would be wonderful if he took the initiative to volunteer to fly in one of these aircraft or take time off to interact with the pilots who do. Maybe, just maybe, he would have a change of heart and leave national security issues out of the realm of politics.  Finally, our leaders would do well to remember that even after these aircraft are inducted into service, they will continue to be confronted by that gargantuan problem, where will the other hundred-odd aircraft desperately need come from? After all what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander!

     

    Brigadier Deepak Sinha (retd), an Army veteran, is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the TPF and is also a Consultant at ORF, New Delhi.

    This article was published earlier in the Times of India. The views expressed are the author’s own. 

  • The state of Bihar!?

    The state of Bihar!?

    The Prime Minister in the run up to the Bihar assembly elections announced a Rs.50,000 crores package for the state. Just as he announced a Rs.100,000 crores package for Jammu and Kashmir that July. Bihar has a population of over 103 million and J&K has a population of 12.5 million.

    This is not a new story. Bihar has been systematically exploited by denying it its rightful and deserved share of central funds from the First Plan.

    That Bihar is India’s poorest and most backward state is undeniable. The facts speak for themselves. But what makes its situation truly unique is that Bihar is the only state in India where the incidence of poverty is uniformly at the highest level (46-70%) in all the sub-regions. The annual real per capita income of Bihar of Rs. 3650 is about a third of the national average of Rs.11, 625. Bihar is also the only Indian state where the majority of the population – 52.47% – is illiterate.

    But Bihar has its bright spots also. Its infant mortality rate is 62 per 1000, which is below the national average of 66 per 1000. But what is interesting is that it is better than not just states like UP (83) and Orissa (91), but better than even states like Andhra Pradesh and Haryana (both 66).

    Even in terms of life expectancy, the average Bihari male lives a year longer (63.6 yrs.) than the average Indian male (62.4 yrs) and the state’s performance in increasing life spans has been better than most during the past three years.

    Bihar has 7.04 mn. hectares under agriculture and its yield of 1679 kgs. per hectare, while less than the national average of 1739 kgs. per hectare is better than that of six other states, which include some big agricultural states like Karnataka and Maharashtra.

    Despite this, in overall socio-economic terms, Bihar is quite clearly in a terrible shape.

    As opposed to an All-India per capita developmental expenditure during the last three years of Rs.7935.00, Bihar’s is less than half at Rs.3633.00. While development expenditure depends on a bunch of factors including a state’s contribution to the national exchequer, no logic can explain away the per capita Tenth Plan size, which at Rs. 2533.80 is less than a third of that of states like Gujarat (Rs.9289.10), Karnataka (Rs.8260.00) and Punjab (Rs.7681.20).

    Simple but sound economic logic tells us that when a region is falling behind, not just behind but well behind, it calls for a greater degree of investment in its progress and development. It is analogous to giving a weak or sick child in the family better nutrition and greater attention. Only in the animal kingdom do we see survival of the fittest with the weak and infirm neglected, deprived and even killed.

    But instead of this we see that Bihar is being systematically denied, let alone the additional assistance its economic and social condition deserves, but also what is its rightful due.

    From the pitiful per capita investment in Bihar, it is obvious that the Central Government has been systematically starving Bihar out of funds. Quite obviously Bihar has also paid the price for being politically out of sync with the central government for long periods. The last one was for a dozen years from 1992 to 2004. For the last one year Bihar had a government in New Delhi that was supposed to be favorably disposed to the regime in Patna.

    Quite clearly states that are in political sync do much better in terms of central assistance. Lets take a look at how Andhra Pradesh, a state that has stayed largely in political sync with New Delhi, has fared in the past few years. In terms of grants from the Central Government (2000 to 2005), Bihar fared poorly receiving only Rs. 10833.00 crores while AP got Rs. 15542.00 crores.

    Bihar has also been neglected as far as net loans from the center are concerned. It received just Rs.2849.60 as against Rs.6902.20 received by AP from 2000-02. It’s only in terms of per capita share of central taxes do we see Bihar getting its due. This gross neglect by the central government is reflected in the low per capita central assistance (additional assistance, grants and net loans from the center) received by Bihar in 2001. While AP received Rs.625.60 per capita, Bihar got a paltry Rs.276.70.

    The results of the economic strangulation of Bihar can be seen in the abysmally low investments possible in the state government’s four major development thrusts. Bihar’s per capita spending on Roads is Rs.44.60, which is just 38% of the national average, which is Rs.117.80. Similarly for Irrigation and Flood Control Bihar spends just Rs.104.40 on a per capita basis as opposed to the national average of Rs.199.20.

    Now the question of how much did Bihar “forego”? If Bihar got just the All-India per capita average, it would have got Rs. 48,216.66 crores for the 10th Five Year Plan instead of the Rs.21,000.00 crores it has been allocated.

    This trend was established in the very first five-year plan and the cumulative shortfall now would be in excess of Rs. 80,000.00 crores. That’s a huge handicap now to surmount. Then it would have got Rs. 44,830 crores as credit from banks instead of the Rs. 5635.76 crores it actually got, if it were to get the benefit of the prevalent national credit/deposit ratio.

    Similarly Bihar received a pittance from the financial institutions, a mere Rs.551.60 per capita, as opposed to the national average of Rs.4828.80 per capita. This could presumably be explained away by the fact that Bihar now witnesses hardly any industrial activity. But no excuses can be made for the low investment by NABARD. On a cumulative per capita basis (2000 to 2002) Bihar received just Rs.119.00 from NABARD as against Rs.164.80 by AP and Rs.306.30 by Punjab. It can be nobody’s argument that there is no farming in Bihar.

    If the financial institutions were to invest in Bihar at the national per capita average, the state would have got Rs.40, 020.51 crores as investment instead of just Rs.4571.59 crores that it actually received.

    Quite clearly Bihar is not only being denied its due share, but there is a flight of capital from Bihar, India’s poorest and most backward state. This is a cruel paradox indeed. The cycle then becomes vicious. This capital finances economic activity in other regions, leading to a higher cycle of taxation and consequent injection of greater central government assistance there. If one used harsher language one can even say that Bihar is being systematically exploited, and destroyed by denying it its rightful share of central funds.

    To even make a dent on the abysmal state that Bihar is now in, Bihar will need at least twice what it gets from the Centre, as of yesterday.

     

    Mohan Guruswamy is a prolific commentator on politics, economics, development and governance. He is a trustee of TPF. The views expressed are the author’s own.

  • India and China Talks: No Give, No Take

    India and China Talks: No Give, No Take

    The Indian and Chinese Special Representatives, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, had the 21st round of talks ostensibly to discuss the “Border Issue” on November 24 at the picturesque town of Dujiangyan in Sichuan province. Though this was the first appearance of Wang Yi at these talks, there is now a monotonous regularity in this and no resolution of the vexatious border issue seems to be in sight, let alone be discussed.  Since the border issue now seems very intractable, the two representatives have broadened the scope of the talks to discuss other bilateral issues. Nevertheless, while it is clearly understood that the resolution of the border territories dispute may never be on the horizon, but at least agreeing on where the interim lines of control lie the military vigil on the borders will ease off into a less tense standstill. Sadly for us, there was a time when with a little bit of give and take this contentious and now protracted problem seemed solvable.

    In 1960 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai suggested something akin to a status quo as a permanent solution. This was repeated in 1982 by Chairman Deng Xiaoping to India’s Ambassador in Beijing, G Parthasarathy. Once again it was offered during Rajiv Gandhi’s tenure as Prime Minister to the then Indian Ambassador AP Venkateshwaran and senior advisor to then Chinese PM Zhao Ziyang. But when Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, both countries decided to keep a permanent solution aside and focus on immediate “doable’s”. All along India felt that the internal political situation will not allow the government of the day the room to go with it. It hasn’t changed much, with the historical issues even less understood and inflamed public opinions prevailing on both sides.

    What is commonly referred to as the “Border Dispute” between India and China has now manifested itself into two distinct disputes. The first is the dispute over two large and separated tracts of territories. One is Aksai Chin, a virtually uninhabited high altitude desert expanse of about 37000 square kilometers. The other is what is now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, a diversely populated hill region with a population of around 1.4 million people spread out over 84,000 square kilometers, which China claims as Lower Tibet.

    Aksai Chin lies between the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and China’s Xinjiang province, both regions that are also riven by separatist conflicts. Arunachal Pradesh borders Tibet, which also has a separation conflict with China. India claims that these borders were agreed upon by British India, and independent or semi-independent authorities, in Xinjiang and Tibet in the early days of the last century. China doesn’t agree with these. Both countries agree that these are legacies of history and cannot be solved in the immediate or near term and best be left to the future to resolve.

    But what causes the frequent frictions between the two is that they do not have agreed Lines of Actual Control (LAC) to separate the jurisdictions under the control of the armies of the two countries. The perceptions of the LAC differ at many places. At some places it might be by just a few meters, and elsewhere by tens of kilometers.

    To minimize the inflammability due to actively patrolling of security personnel of both sides, the two countries have a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement that sets out norms of behavior for both sides. The important things being that nothing of a permanent nature will be built on these disputed areas, and that the patrols take all precautions not to confront each other. Which simply means, if they come face to face they will both withdraw. The corollary to this is that the patrols will not tail each other. The agreement also requires local commanders to frequently meet and exchange views and sort out local differences across the table.

    Despite the adverse geographical and climatic conditions, and the overarching tensions between Asia’s biggest economies, the troops on the ground are able to show surprising bonhomie and friendliness. But periodically, either due to misunderstanding or local level posturing by either side, there are frictions that threaten to erupt into a conflict with use of arms. But it has not happened since 1967 when the two armies fought a fierce localized battle in the Sikkim sector, quite close to where the recent Dokolam dispute took place.

    The two countries have been engaged in frequent talks at various levels since 1981. After Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988, both countries had agreed to set up a task force to find a solution to the “border issue”. Chairman Deng welcoming his “ young friend” suggested they “forget the past” as they stood in the centre of the cavernous Great Hall of the People and the handshake lasted three long minutes.

    For three long decades since then the two countries have been meeting to discuss the border issue, but so far we have seen unwillingness by both sides to forget the past. Since 2003 these talks were elevated to a high level political dialogue between Special Representatives, in India’s case the National Security Advisor and in China’s case an official at the level of State Councilor. The first meeting at this level took place between Indian NSA Brajesh Mishra and Chinese State Councilor Dai Bing Guo. We are now having the 20thround of this dialog between India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and China’s State Councilor, Yang Jeichi.

    A former Indian NSA once told me that the talks are high in style and hospitality, with the Indian side trying hard to match the Chinese, but there has been little traction. This is because of the versions of the claims that have been internalized and now form public opinion in both countries. Both countries are gripped by strong nationalism bordering on jingoism, which makes give and take, so vital in the resolution of such vexatious disputes, extremely difficult.

    But the Border Management and Cooperation Agreement is a major outcome of these talks and that has by and large worked. The next logical step of these talks should be to agree on an LAC. But unfortunately even that is now being weighed down by aggressive nationalism driven by social media that equates “giving up” with national loss of face. This is something increasingly very important to both countries. We will not be seen giving up anything, even our obduracy and historical short sightedness.

    Both countries are now very different then what they were in the last century. Both, India and China, are relatively prosperous and militarily powerful, but not so powerful to take by force what they desire.  The new geopolitics and the new interdependent economics also will not permit a major dislocation in the world order.  But the rise of new nationalisms has also led to a hardening of hearts. Neither now seems capable of giving or taking. So once again when Ajit Doval and Wang Yi met, both sides did not give away anything and we will have to wait for another time for that.

     

    Mohan Guruswamy is a Distinguished Fellow and Trustee of TPF. This article was earlier published in ‘The Citizen’.