Category: India

  • The Cockroach and the Firewall

    The Cockroach and the Firewall

    India banned a joke on national security grounds. The joke went to court, found a cause, and began to splinter — all in a single week. None of it is a revolution yet. All of it is worth watching.

    When the Chief Justice of India reportedly likened unemployed young people to cockroaches and parasites, he was not making policy. He was making a mistake. The clarification came within a day — he meant only holders of fake degrees; the youth are “the pillars of a developed India.” But the insult had escaped. Within a week, a satirical “Cockroach Janta Party,” its name a mocking echo of the ruling party, had drawn more than twenty-two million Instagram followers — more than double the BJP’s, well past the Congress’s — along with a million sign-ups and a petition. Then the government did the most revealing thing it could have done. It treated the joke as a threat to India’s sovereignty.

    On the twenty-first of May, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology ordered the party’s account to be blocked under Section 69A of the IT Act, acting on Intelligence Bureau inputs alleging it endangered national security. No public order was published; the directive remains secret under the blocking rules. The website went dark, the founder’s personal pages were hacked, and — by his account — the death threats arrived, one reportedly promising he could be “murdered even in America.” Sit with the official rationale, because it collapses under its own weight. A state cannot, in one breath, tell its citizens that something is a frivolous meme and that it imperils the nation. By reaching for the sovereignty of India against an Instagram page, the government made a public confession about which of the two it believes. A confident order ignores satire. It does not invoke the Intelligence Bureau against it.

    That is the first thing worth noticing, and it is not the follower count. It is the asymmetry. A throwaway courtroom remark, instantly retracted, produced a movement; a movement of memes produced a national-security order. When effects keep dwarfing their causes like this, the cause is never really the cause. The Chief Justice did not create the anger he released, and the censor did not create the defiance he provoked. Both struck matches beside a fuse that has lain there, dry, for more than a decade.

    The fuse is not mysterious. India’s inequality is the highest in its recorded history — the top one per cent holds about forty per cent of the nation’s wealth, a concentration the economists who measured it called hard to sustain “without major social and political upheaval.” The country graduates more than eight million young people a year into a graduate unemployment rate near thirty per cent. A quarter of Indians belong to a generation promised development and handed a culture war. For ten years, the noise of majoritarian politics kept that fuse damp. The cockroach remark landed because it told an entire generation, in one word, what the system thought of them. The ban landed because it proved the system was afraid of what they might do about it.

    And yet — to say this plainly, because the temptation to romance the moment is strong — this is not a revolution, and a ban will not make it one. Not because Indians are docile; that old slander is simply false. This is the country of the JP Movement, of the 2011 anti-corruption surge, of the farmers who made a government blink. It is because the things that actually topple regimes are absent here, and the thing that is present is the thing that stops them.

    Revolutions do not run on anger. If they did, half the world would be in flames. They run on state collapse. France in 1789 was bankrupt; Russia in 1917 was losing a war; the regimes that fell in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal these past three years were small, centralised, and hollow, where seizing one square in the capital was the same as seizing the country. None of that describes India. Its treasury is solvent, its army intact, its agencies obedient. There is also an exit the burning countries lacked: a ballot that still works — in 2024 the ruling party lost its majority and now governs on sufferance, its worst losses where the jobs ran out. And there is the deepest barrier of all: India is too many things at once. The countries that fell had a single national crowd. India has a hundred separate angers that flare in the same season without ever becoming the same fire. A movement can own the internet in Delhi and remain a rumour in Chennai. India’s diversity, so often praised as its glory, is also its great circuit-breaker. It does not extinguish anger. It prevents anger from adding up.

    Watch, then, what the past week has actually done to the joke — because the most interesting news is not the ban but everything that has happened since, and almost all of it cuts both ways. The movement went to the Delhi High Court, challenging the block as unconstitutional. That is the system working as designed: anger flowing into an institutional channel rather than onto the street, the very pressure valve a revolution requires to be sealed shut. At the same moment, the energy found something a meme had lacked — a concrete cause. The party has fused itself to the NEET examination scandal, the leaked medical entrance test that was cancelled in May, that upended the futures of twenty-two lakh students, and that has been linked to at least fourteen student suicides. Its demand is now specific and nameable: the resignation of the education minister. A grievance with a face and a number is a different creature from a grievance with only a punchline.

    And then, almost on cue, the splintering began. A lawyer in Haryana, declaring himself the movement’s “national convener,” filed to register the party with the Election Commission in his own name — with a softened, sanded-down list of aims — against the wishes of its founder. Opposition figures rushed to amplify the memes; Congress and Left accounts adopted the cockroach as their own. This is the oldest story in Indian protest, and it is happening in fast-forward: the instant a movement matters, the formal players move to capture, fork or absorb it. India did this to the 2011 anti-corruption wave, which it turned into a party and then ground down — and the cockroach’s own founder comes from precisely that lineage. The system’s reflex is not to crush such energy. It is to digest it. A week in, the digestion has already started.

    So why does a confident state still swat so frantically at a cartoon insect? Because it has read the same history I have, and read it badly. It remembers that Nepal’s collapse last year was triggered not by hunger but by a clumsy social-media ban — and it has just repeated the act it should most have feared. Suppression does not delete a grievance; it dramatises it. The party was back within hours under a new handle, Cockroach is Back — “You thought you can get rid of us? Lol” — and a resurrection travels further than a meme. Every citizen who watches the government panic over a joke quietly revises upward the number of people who must, like them, be unhappy. That is the real engine here: not the followers, but what the followers learn about one another when the state overreacts. Denying a permit for a human chain in Bengaluru, or floating a criminal probe, only widens the audience for the next post.

    Here is the part the censors have not thought through. The one grievance that could cross India’s linguistic borders — the borders that have always kept its angers apart — is an attack on the internet itself, because the net is the country’s only truly national commons. A Tamil student and a graduate in the Hindi belt do not share a language, a politics, or a hero. They share a feed, and now they share a banned one, and a ruined exam that was sat in five hundred cities at once. In choosing to censor the single medium that ignores the firewalls — over a scandal that respects no region — the government may have picked the rare battlefield where India’s diversity does not protect it. That is why this is a blunder, not merely a heavy hand.

    India now carries nearly every structural precondition for upheaval — the inequality, the idle graduates, the curdled consent, a dead exam with a body count, and a state frightened enough to show its hand — and is held back by exactly one thing. Its anger has not yet become a single anger.

    Even so, resist both the fantasy and the complacency. The fantasy is that twenty-two million followers, a viral ban, or a court date are a barricade. They are not; the Indian state has blocked 1,400 accounts in a single protest before and absorbed the consequences, and a movement already fighting over its own name before the Election Commission is not yet a threat to anyone’s power. The complacency is the old lie that Indians never revolt. The truth is more demanding than either: India now carries nearly every structural precondition for upheaval — the inequality, the idle graduates, the curdled consent, a dead exam with a body count, and a state frightened enough to show its hand — and is held back by exactly one thing. Its anger has not yet become a single anger.

    Watch for the day it does. Not the follower counts, not the unemployment graphs — those are already maxed out. Watch whether the High Court lets the block stand or strikes it down; watch whether the NEET families in one state find the banned feed in another and recognise their grief in it; watch whether the movement survives its own capture. The government has handed that convergence its best possible candidate — not a judge’s insult, not joblessness in the abstract, but a censored network and a wrecked examination, two things that look identical in every language. The cockroach did not break the firewall. The question this week left open is whether the people swinging at it have just found the one crack that runs all the way through.

    Feature Image Credit: dw.com

    Text Image Credit: pratidintime.com

    This article has used AI assistance.

  • India-EU Free Trade Agreement

    India-EU Free Trade Agreement

    Introduction

    After almost two decades of negotiations, the India-European Union Free Trade Agreement (FTA), an important milestone in strategic and economic partnership, was concluded. The FTA is crucial for navigating contemporary global challenges by enabling deeper market integration between the world’s 4th– and 2nd-largest economies.

    Dubbed as the “mother of all deals”, the agreement links India’s tightly guarded market to the 27 nations of the EU bloc. The focus will be on the manufacturing and services sectors and on easing market access for key European products such as cars and wine, in return for easier exports of textiles, gems, and pharmaceuticals. The formal signing of the agreement would take place later this year, after the legal scrubbing is complete and ratification by EU member states.

    The evolution of bilateral ties and the FTA

    Post-Cold War, shared democratic values increased political and economic engagement, leading to the establishment of a Strategic Partnership in 2004. The Eurozone crisis stalled the progress made under the Joint Action Plan (2005) and Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) talks (2007). Ties remained under-leveraged as Europe turned inward and India diversified its partnerships, turning the relationship economically transactional and geopolitically underdeveloped.

    The talks for the FTA started in 2007, but differences over market access for automobiles in 2013 led to a jettison. The EU had stringent legal mandates for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), investment protection, massive import duty cuts and sustainable development goals (SDGs). India, on the other hand, needed a more liberal framework for skilled professionals, addressing non-tariff barriers and excluding government procurement.

    The 2019 COVID-19 Pandemic resulted in supply chain shocks. China’s assertiveness triggered convergence on resilience and technology, leading to the revival of trade talks and the establishment of the trade and technology council (2022).The resumption of negotiations aimed at three separate agreements- two on investment protection and geographical indication, to try for an early harvest on trade. Issues like data privacy and security-related legislation, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and IPR were not of primary concern and opening up government procurement was to follow the deals as concluded with the UAE and UK in 2025.

    The FTA has now been finalised during the 16th India-EU summit, held in New Delhi on 27 January 2026. The summit has also led to the creation of a comprehensive strategic agenda towards 2030, which will replace the EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025. The past six months of accelerated talks leading up to the agreement are a by-product of incessant increases in tariff rates on the US side, China’s economic heft, and the economic impact on the EU from the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The deal aims to advance the security alignment between the EU and Indiaami with growing concerns about India’s ties with Russia.

    The EU-India Agenda 2025 strategy is to reinforce prosperity and security with India. The key pillars of this engagement are foreign policy and security cooperation, trade and investment, sustainable modernisation, transport and urban development, clean energy, focus on outer space, artificial intelligence, issues such as global economic governance, migration and mobility, education and culture and human rights.

    Sectors of engagement

    Currently, the major focus of bilateral ties is the trade and services sector, which is showing steady growth. The EU is India’s largest trading partner; total merchandise trade with the bloc was 136.54 billion USD in 2024-25. Indian exports have increased from EUR 19 billion in 2019 to EUR 37 billion in 2024, and imports from the EU have also reached EUR 29 billion in 2024. India-EU trade in services reached INR 7.2 Lakh Crore (USD 83.10 billion) in 2024.

    Security and defence ties have deepened since the College of Commissioners’ visit to India in February 2025. The statement from this visit agreed to explore a security and defence partnership between the EU Commissioner for Defence and Space and India’s Minister of State for Defence. Simultaneous visits from the EU delegation in September and December 2025 led to advances in strategic dialogue.

    The talks have been complemented by joint naval exercises and escort operations for humanitarian assistance near Somalia in 2018 and 2019, the Gulf of Aden in June 2021, the Gulf of Guinea in October 2023 and the Indian Ocean in June 2025. On the sidelines of the EU-India summit, a security and defence partnership has also been signed. This will expand cooperation in maritime security, counter terrorism and cyber defence.

    Benefits for EU countries

    Tariffs on 96.6% of EU goods will be eliminated or reduced, saving up to 4 billion euros per year in duties on European products. The FTA grants a competitive advantage for EU exporters, granting the biggest trade opening India has given to any trade partner. The deal ensures privileged access to the Indian services market in key sectors like financial services and maritime transport, but also ensures protection of the EU intellectual property, like trademarks. This makes the customs procedures in exports quicker and easier.

    Breaking down the available data on exports for 2024 and considering the current and finalised tariff rates for the upcoming year, the bilateral relations look promising. The exports of machinery and electrical equipment amounted to 16.3 billion euros in 2024, with prevailing tariff rates of 44%. Aircraft and spacecraft, optical, medical, and surgical equipment exports amount to up to 6.4 and 3.4 billion euros, with tariff rates of 11% and 27.5%, respectively. Exports of plastics and pearls, precious stones and metals amounted to 2.2 and 2.1 billion euros, with tariff rates of up to 16.6% and 22.5%, respectively, in 2024.

    Similarly, trade in other products is depicted as product (amount of exports, tariff rates) as of 2024: In chemicals (€3.2 billion, 22%), motor vehicles (€1.6 billion, 110%), Iron and steel (€1.5 billion, 22%) and pharmaceuticals (€1.1 billion, 11%) are also remarkable. The future tariffs on these products, as part of the deal, will be 0% except for motor vehicles, which will be 10% with a quota of 250,000 EU vehicles annually; this is still beneficial for European car makers.

    Benefits for Indian sectors

    With the FTA, over 99% of Indian exports gain preferential entry into the EU, apart from bolstering the ‘Make in India’ initiative, granting new opportunities for MSMEs and creating jobs for women, artisans, youth and professionals. Indian products worth 75 billion USD are set to be exported, and commodities from sectors like textiles, leather, marine products, gems, and jewellery amounting to 33 billion USD will gain immensely from the preferential access from the FTA.

    India is powered by a young and dynamic workforce that can be leveraged to unlock opportunities across sectors and to enhance competitiveness on the global stage. The FTA also helps in integrating Indian businesses more deeply into global value chains, ensuring the country maintains its role as a key player and supplier in global trade. The labour mobility agreement opens opportunities for young professionals and seasonal workers and brings India into the EU’s Horizon research programme. The EU’s commitment to opening 144 subsectors in IT, professional services and education, and to facilitating easier labour mobility has also brought in a positive outlook.

    In exchange for the tariff cuts, the EU has granted India immediate zero-duty access for labour-intensive exports such as textiles, apparel, leather, footwear, gems and jewellery. The deal is also expected to boost India’s agricultural and food sector through preferential market access for its agricultural exports and increased competitiveness for processed foods.

    Geopolitical side of the agreement

    In the past two decades, EU-India relations have matured in a stable geopolitical environment. The India-US relationship and Europe’s transatlantic bond were held as a matter of long-term potential rather than immediate necessity. But the scenario has changed, with rampant changes in the political leadership and incessant wars. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has forced Europe to commit to long-term defence rearmament and deterrence planning. The return of President Donald Trump to the White House has reduced trust and introduced uncertainty into Washington’s role for both Brussels and New Delhi, albeit in different ways.

    The FTA was the result of a growing common concern: aggressive tariff rates by the US and its one-sided, unilateral approach with absolute disregard for the principle of reciprocity. Some EU countries recently faced fresh tariff threatsfrom Trump, who was put out by their refusal to accept his proposed takeover of Greenland. The deal was secured amid a flurry of countries striking deals and patching things up to navigate global uncertainty. During negotiations for the FTA, the potential repercussions of US interference were a concern, particularly the kinds of reactions to the agreement.

    India-US Trade Deal

    Fortunately for India, the US and India reached a trade deal on 1 February 2026, less than a week after the India-EU FTA was announced. The current tariff rates will be cut down from 50% to 18% on Indian goods in the US. The trade relationship between the US and India has been strained since the US imposed 50% tariffs, including a 25% penalty linked to India’s purchases of Russian oil. US stocks inched higher after Trump announced the deal with Delhi on Truth Social. On the other hand, this reduction will affect small businesses in the US, which will have to pay an average tariff of 2.5% on goods from India.

    India, EU, Russia and China Relations

    The EU-India relationship is often framed as a natural strategic alignment rooted in shared values and converging interests, but it is better understood as a parallel response to a shared pressure environment. India’s decision to preserve ties with Moscow, refrain from political condemnation, and expand economic engagement through a sharp rise in energy imports remains a persistent source of friction in the EU-India relationship. Meanwhile, recalibrated threat perceptions regarding economic and security policy are a serious point of friction with India. On the sidelines of the announcement of the trade deal, the EU has pressed for a change in India’s stance toward Moscow.

    In their dealings with China, neither side can afford to fully decouple from Beijing. Deeper EU-India economic integration can help mitigate vulnerabilities linked to trade imbalances, technological dependence, and critical digital infrastructure. But India’s concerns about China’s territorial proximity and its defence engagement with Pakistan are significant. The FTA functions less as a mechanism for strategic risk reduction than as a political catalyst for strengthening resilience and autonomy.

    Challenges

    The lack of a resolution in some of the issues that jeopardised the finalisation of the deal in 2013 persists and is not addressed in the current agreement. Agricultural trade negotiations, which  historically have been a sticking point, are kept outside the tariff reductions on both sides. Under the agreement, India will not be granted exemptions under the CBAM, which came into effect on 1 January 2026. CBAM can negatively impact Indian Iron and Steel exports. This was a contentious issue even in the India-UK FTA, with a fear of exporters from India having to pay ‘Green tax’. The duty-free access of EU goods into India can disrupt the trade balance and negatively affect domestic products.

    On issues like easing of regulatory complexity, non-tariff barriers, high compliance standards, climate-related commitments, and rules of origin, both parties have differing interests. All of these issues carry adjustment costs that may be felt most acutely by exporters and suppliers operating with limited capacity. It would be critical to see whether, after the current geopolitical uncertainty settles, the intention to smooth these issues still remains.

    The FTA’s ratification in the European Parliament is pending, but the commitment to early operationalisation means the deal is set to enter into force within a year. However, the EU-Mercosur agreement, concluded after 25 years of negotiations, is now facing opposition from the European Parliament. Although approval from each country is not necessary for the India-EU FTA to be operationalised, it would still need parliamentary approval.

    Apart from the trade deal, the agreement also considers a broad array of topics. Maintaining balance amid shifting positions and competing geopolitical interests is essential for the deal to meet its preconditions.

    Feature Image Credit: weforum.org

    Infograph Credit: Al Jazeera

  • India’s Shadow Wars: Challenges of Chronic Disputes and Insurgencies

    India’s Shadow Wars: Challenges of Chronic Disputes and Insurgencies

    Abstract

    This article contends that insurgencies in India tend to be protracted and are often hard to resolve definitively. They are characterised as “shadow wars” involving asymmetrical tactics, blurred distinctions between combatants and civilians, and an ongoing struggle for legitimacy and control. In this article, the adaptability of insurgent organisations, deep-rooted socio-political and economic disputes, and the limitations of traditional counterinsurgency methods in the Indian context are identified as key factors contributing to the persistence of these conflicts. To effectively address these issues and foster sustainable conflict resolution, it is essential to tackle their root causes and long-term impacts on India’s internal security, governance, and development.

    It is crucial to analyse the nature of India’s ongoing and persistent insurgencies, paying attention to the interplay between asymmetric warfare, socioeconomic grievances, and the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategies.

    Key words:

    Shadow war, chronic, strategic, insurgency,

    India’s Shadow Wars: The Chronic Challenge of Internal Disputes

    Many highlight a fundamental and complex issue. India’s internal security landscape is marked by ongoing “shadow wars,” driven by several interconnected factors. In these asymmetric conflicts, the distinction between civilians and combatants blurs, creating a challenge that non-state actors often exploit by blending into local populations. At the same time, long-standing economic inequality, social injustice, and political marginalisation serve as breeding grounds for unrest, providing a continuous influx of recruits and supporters for insurgent groups. Developing effective counterinsurgency tactics demands a deep understanding of the complex interactions among these factors.

     The Connection between the Blurring of Civilian-Combatant Lines and Asymmetric Warfare

    Ongoing domestic insurgencies are characterised by the interaction of asymmetric warfare and the blurring of civilian-combatant boundaries. When confronted with the Indian state’s overwhelming conventional military strength, insurgent organisations deliberately adopt asymmetric tactics. These include targeted killings to instil terror and undermine the state’s authority, the deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to attack security personnel, and guerrilla ambushes in challenging terrain, such as the mountains of Kashmir and the Northeast or the forests of Chhattisgarh. These strategies aim to minimise direct engagement where they would be at a disadvantage while maximising their impact. An important aspect of this asymmetric approach is the extensive infiltration of rebels into civilian communities, which is often driven by various factors. It arises from genuine local support rooted in a sense of marginalisation and historical grievances. Strong tribal ties, for example, sometimes provide rebels with local sympathy and logistical assistance in the Northeast. In other cases, where villages are compelled to provide food, shelter, or intelligence, coercion and intimidation become essential.

     

    Furthermore, security forces find it challenging to conduct successful operations without risking civilian casualties, as operating within residential areas provides strategic cover. By operating in plain clothes and reintegrating into society following operations, insurgents often intentionally blur boundaries. This ambiguity hampers counterinsurgency efforts (Winter, 2011). The main challenge lies in accurately distinguishing between fighters and non-combatants. Indirect damage poses a significant threat to security operations, making intelligence gathering extremely difficult. Even unforeseen civilian casualties can deepen local discontent and alienation, potentially prompting more people to support the rebels. This leads to an endless cycle where harsh security measures aimed at ending the insurgency unintentionally exacerbate the problem by eroding trust and increasing local grievances. Traditional military tactics, emphasising direct conflict and large-scale operations, may fall short against foes that are deeply rooted and adaptable. A more sophisticated approach is needed—one that goes beyond military strength—requiring accurate intelligence, efforts to secure local cooperation, and tactics designed to minimise civilian harm. The persistent nature of India’s internal insurgencies mainly stems from the inability to effectively manage this complex interaction, which hampers long-term peace and stability by perpetuating cycles of violence and mistrust.

    Enduring economic, social, and political grievances as catalysts

    Long-standing sociopolitical and economic grievances significantly fuel internal insurgencies. A sense of isolation and alienation has been brought about by historical marginalisation, primarily affecting ethnic and tribal groups. Mining for resources and development projects have forced many tribal communities to flee their homelands, sometimes without appropriate compensation. This has led to hostility and the loss of traditional livelihoods. Insurgent groups exploit the narrative of the oppressed, driven by this historical injustice, to recruit new members. The inadequate political representation of certain communities further deepens these grievances. When groups believe their voices are not heard within the democratic system and that the state ignores their specific demands and concerns, feelings of helplessness may grow, and they may resort to more extreme methods for redress. For instance, a perceived lack of political agency and responsiveness by the central government often sparks calls for increased autonomy or even independence in various regions. Inequalities in development and economic status across India’s many regions are also significant. Areas affected by insurgency tend to have poor development outcomes and lag in employment, healthcare, education, and infrastructure. This uneven development fosters a sense of injustice, giving people a tangible reason to complain about ineffective or poor governance. Disadvantaged young people seeking purpose or financial stability may find insurgent groups appealing due to limited viable economic options. Security measures alone cannot resolve these complex, longstanding issues. Despite continuous counterinsurgency efforts, insurgencies may endure for decades because of the deeply rooted nature of these grievances. Addressing these underlying causes requires equitable development policies targeting underserved regions, inclusive governance that guarantees representation and participation for all communities, and a commitment to social justice that redresses historical wrongs and counters ongoing bias. Since the core causes of conflict persist, enduring peace cannot be achieved without these comprehensive, multifaceted strategies (Staniland, 2013).

    The Efficacy and Obstacles of Counterinsurgency Strategies:

    India has effectively contained violence in certain areas through its counterinsurgency methods, which often depend heavily on military and paramilitary forces. However, a solely kinetic approach has struggled to achieve lasting peace. Traditional military superiority is often insufficient due to the challenges of operating in complex terrains and among civilian populations, as well as the rebels’ asymmetric tactics. The “hearts and minds’ strategy, aimed at gaining local support through good governance and development initiatives, has yielded mixed results. These programmes are often impeded by corruption, flawed implementation, and a disconnect between policy and reality on the ground.

    Furthermore, any benefits of development efforts may be undermined by strict security measures that alienate the population. Given its importance, political discourse is often irregular and uneven. Meaningful discussions are impeded by internal divisions within insurgent organisations and by a lack of trust between the state and rebel factions. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), a legal and administrative framework designed to grant security forces operational freedom, has also faced criticism for suspected human rights abuses, further alienating local people and possibly escalating hostility. India’s ongoing insurgencies highlight the drawbacks of relying solely on fragmented or military-focused counterinsurgency tactics. A comprehensive strategy that combines security measures with genuine political participation, equitable and long-term development, and a commitment to addressing the underlying socio-political and economic grievances that sustain these conflicts is essential to achieve lasting peace (Rajagopalan, 2007).

    Conclusion:

    Addressing India’s ongoing internal conflicts requires an integrated approach that goes beyond mere security interventions. While managing existing conflicts involves effective counterinsurgency strategies, long-term stability relies on proactively addressing the root causes of unrest. This includes ensuring fair political participation, promoting social justice, and fostering inclusive economic growth. To truly heal divisions and achieve lasting peace, ending these “shadow wars” ultimately demands a comprehensive strategy that combines security efforts with broad socioeconomic and political reforms.

    References:

    Rajagopalan, R. (2007). Force and Compromise: India’s Counterinsurgency Grand Strategy. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 75-91. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00856400701264035

    Staniland, P. (2013). Insurgencies In India. In Routledge Handbook of Indian Politics (p. 11). Routledge.

    Winter, Y. (2011, September). The asymmetric war discourse and its moral economies: a critique. International Theory, 3(3). doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971911000145

     

    Feature Image Credit: thekootneeti.in

  • INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN: PRAGMATISM IS KEY

    INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN: PRAGMATISM IS KEY

    Given that the Taliban appear sincere in their determination to secure peace and improve their citizens’ standard of living, it is prudent for India to remain cooperative and avoid overinvolvement in such matters at this time. It is also likely that, over time, Indian influence on Afghanistan—whether through development, trade, security, health, or education—will have a positive impact on Afghan society, mainly through the younger generation of Afghans studying in India

     

    Introduction

    During his week-long visit to India in October 2025, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the foreign minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, became the first high-ranking Afghan official to travel to the country since the fall of the Ashraf Ghani regime in August 2021. The minister who faced a travel ban was permitted to enter India after the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee approved a waiver application on his behalf [1]. His visit and its portents have sparked numerous commentaries across South Asia. India-Afghanistan relations, which had receded from the limelight post the 2021 Taliban takeover in Kabul, are now being viewed with renewed interest.

    ‘Afghanistan Map: courtesy Nations Online Project’

    Afghanistan’s Enduring Importance

    A glance at the map above shows why Afghanistan is called the ‘Heart of Asia’. A country for the most part rugged and mountainous, it borders seven nations – Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China (Tibet at the tip of the Wakhan Corridor), India, and Pakistan- and sits at the crossroads of South, Central, and West Asia. The sheer geostrategic importance of this location, the multitude of tribal ethnicities and loyalties that transcend borders, and a fierce sense of independence have resulted in a turbulent history and the awarding of a less flattering designation: ‘Graveyard of Empires’. The most recent example is the defeat of the mighty Soviet Union by the Afghan Mujahedin, who were armed and aided by the West and trained by its proxy, Pakistan.

    Another reason for interest in Afghanistan is its vast untapped mineral reserves, valued at over $1 trillion, located in 24 specific ‘areas of interest’ across the country’s 34 provinces[2]. With nations eager to diversify sources of critical minerals and rare earths, this represents a hugely attractive opportunity. Landlocked Afghanistan’s access to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf passes through Pakistan and Iran, respectively. This has implications for the West’s relations with both countries. Russia, seeking to consolidate influence in its neighbourhood, became the first country to recognise the Taliban regime in July this year. However, it is China that has arguably taken the lead in rehabilitating the Taliban regime globally. It has resumed full diplomatic relations by posting an ambassador in Kabul. To quote Shivam Shekhawat in his paper of July 2025, ‘…At the international level, Beijing has argued for Afghanistan’s reintegration and urged the international community not to interfere in its internal affairs. It has called for the removal of sanctions imposed on the Taliban leaders, the release of the country’s foreign reserves, and keeping aid independent from any political preconditions[3]. Also, it steadily expands its influence through trade. During the period August 2024 to August 2025, its exports to Afghanistan increased by 41.7% from $114 million to $161 million[4].

    With its unbroken history of conflict since 1979 and the geopolitical, social, and economic consequences on its neighbours, Afghanistan remains crucial to regional stability. Zobair Solahi discusses this in his April 2022 paper, where he states, ‘..A stable and peaceful Afghanistan could be an integral actor in trade, transit, and political stability across the Eurasian continent, but continued unrest will undermine regional peace and stability…’[5] This perspective needs to be appreciated by those who hold reservations about India-Afghanistan relations and who attribute hidden motives to our development efforts aimed at improving the lives of the Afghan people.

    The Situation Today

    The reasons for the failure of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (the US mission focused on counterterrorism and strengthening Afghan security forces) and NATO’s Operation Resolute Support are widely debated. What is not debated is the outcome – a Taliban regime that holds sway over the entire country. The new government (Taliban 2.0) now includes various factions of the Taliban militia, integrated into a new Afghan Army (AA). This AA has kept the structures of the old Afghan National Army (ANA) intact, replacing key commanders with Taliban loyalists. The AA has successfully sidelined a splintered opposition. While certain officials of previous regimes are eking out a quiet existence in Kabul under Taliban watch, warlords of past eras like Gen Rashid Dostum, now largely ineffective, live in exile. Younger men such as Ahmed Masood, son of the renowned ‘Lion of Panjsher’, Ahmed Shah Masood, lack both experience and influence. The few leaders of significance who still hold credibility, like former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, do not possess the resources to challenge the Taliban on a large scale needed to effect regime change. Although an armed opposition will continue mounting guerrilla actions against the Islamic Emirate, these are unlikely to lead to a change of government, at least in the medium term, and that too with extensive outside support, which is currently not forthcoming.

    After its voluntary exit in 2021, the recent shift of the US towards Afghanistan has sparked much speculation. The US desire to retake the Bagram air base outside Kabul is being linked to a host of reasons, including the official one of monitoring Chinese nuclear assets across the Wakhan corridor. There may be other motives—such as using a strategic asset like Bagram to effectively oversee activities in Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, and even the possibility that the threat of retaking the base could be used to extract unspoken concessions from the Taliban. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the US would forcibly enter Afghanistan without the Taliban’s approval. More critically, even if a small American military presence is allowed by the Taliban, the implications of a superpower’s re-entry into the Heart of Asia will be significant, considering China’s and Russia’s footprints, and the situations in Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan will once again be a key factor, with potential consequences for India.

    India and Afghanistan

    The Indian Embassy in Kabul. Original photo courtesy India Today, posted on KabulNow 22 October 2025

    Although India downgraded its diplomatic presence in Kabul following the Taliban takeover, it maintained a ‘technical mission’ with minimal staff. After a four-year period of ‘wait and watch’, it became evident that the Taliban is now the sole governing force in Afghanistan. The longstanding history of friendly economic, developmental, and people-to-people ties, the shared strategic understanding with previous regimes dating back to 1947, and the current regional security concerns highlight the need to restore the relationship for the benefit of both nations. On its part, the Taliban is eager to once again secure Indian developmental assistance, especially amid the reduction of Western aid following criticism of the human rights situation in the country.

    The outcome of this understanding is the visit of Mawlawi Muttaqi, an event of seminal importance. This was followed by the elevation of the technical mission in Kabul to the status of the Embassy of India on 21 October 2025[6]. Even a brief review of India’s assistance to Afghanistan over the years would reveal the substantial stakes India has in that country and the benefits it has gained in terms of goodwill. Areas of cooperation and assistance (including security collaboration) are well-known and numerous. It is to the credit of successive Indian governments that policy towards Afghanistan has remained consistent (except for a brief cooling period during the first Taliban regime and the current situation).

    Understandably, India at this juncture does not want to be crowded out of Afghanistan, ceding all the space to others. To their credit, the Taliban have recognised the advantages of cooperation. Mawlawi Muttaqi struck the right chords in his media interactions in Delhi by answering all questions (including those about women’s rights from Indian women journalists). He has welcomed the return of Sikh and Hindu refugees (an unlikely event, considering that most have either obtained Indian citizenship or secured asylum in the West) and has echoed India’s stance on terrorism. Importantly, he has criticised Pakistan, blaming its policies for the unrest along the Durand Line. India, on its part, has announced six new development projects in Afghanistan, along with several other measures outlined by External Affairs Minister Mr Jaishankar during his meeting with Mawlawi Muttaqi[7]. Muttaqi has also requested increased trade, including via Wagah-Attari, for which Pakistan’s cooperation is vital. Given that countries with hostile relations continue to trade (Bangladesh and Myanmar being examples, with Bangladesh approving the import of 50,000 tonnes of rice from Myanmar under government-to-government agreements)[8], this is a proposal worth pursuing, especially with Chabahar under US sanctions and the economic unviability of a sustained air corridor for trade and commerce.

    Importantly, on security issues, India and non-Taliban Afghan regimes have traditionally shared a similar outlook. With Taliban 2.0 promising to end the influence of terror organisations, including Al Qaeda and Islamic State, a stable Afghanistan could become a reality, benefiting regional stability. This would support Indian plans for trade corridors to Central Asia and beyond. It is clear that Afghanistan no longer considers Pakistan its benefactor, as shown by the changes in Afghan-Pakistani relations following the rise of Taliban 2.0. Actions such as Pakistan’s unilateral fencing of the Durand Line (allegedly even encroaching on Afghan territory in certain instances)[9], forcibly returning Afghan refugees, and border skirmishes culminating in Pakistani air strikes on Kabul, followed by the Doha ceasefire, are indicators. Currently, Pakistan’s prized ‘strategic depth’ through Afghanistan stands denied. This benefits India, as Pakistan must maintain heightened vigilance on two borders. If the Pakistani government recognises its constraints, a less hostile relationship with India might also be possible.

    Conclusion

    Optimists might argue that India-Afghanistan relations have come full circle over four years. However, there are vital differences in how the two nations approach ideology and governance. Despite claims to the contrary, gender and ethnic disparities in Afghanistan are too evident to overlook. Additionally, India must bear in mind that the opposition’s return to power could always be a possibility in the long run. Therefore, fully endorsing Taliban policies in the face of visible social instability in Afghanistan is neither wise nor desirable, as it conflicts with India’s longstanding views on such issues.

    That said, the mere fact that such problems have been acknowledged by Taliban 2.0, even if somewhat vaguely, is a step forward. Also, given that the Taliban appear sincere in their determination to secure peace and improve their citizens’ standard of living, it is prudent for India to remain cooperative and avoid overinvolvement in such matters at this time. It is also likely that, over time, Indian influence on Afghanistan—whether through development, trade, security, health, or education—will have a positive impact on Afghan society, mainly through the younger generation of Afghans studying in India. With a combination of pragmatism and goodwill, this relationship is destined to benefit both nations.

     

    End Notes:

    [1]‘UNSC Panel Clears Muttaqi’s Travel, Paving Way for Taliban’s First Ministerial Trip to India’ The Wire 03 October 2025.

    [2]  ‘Mapping Afghanistan’s Untapped Natural Resources’ Mohammed Hussein and Mohammed Haddad  Al Jazeera, 24 September 2021.

    [3] ‘Understanding China’s Engagement with Afghanistan Under Taliban 2.0’  Shivam Shekhawat  Issue Brief Issue No 816 July 2025 Observer Research Foundation.

    [4] ‘  Website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) China and Afghanistan trade figures’.

    [5] ‘Afghanistan: A Junction of Asia’s Connectivity’  Zobair Salahi  The National Bureau of Asian Research May 28, 2022

    [6] Upgradation of the Technical Mission of India in Kabul to Embassy of India, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs  , media centre press release dated 21 October 2025 on website mea.gov.in

    [7] EAM’s opening remarks during meeting with Foreign Minister of Afghanistan (October 10, 2025)’ Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs media centre speeches and statements on website mea.gov.in

    [8] 100,000 tons of rice to be imported from Myanmar, Dubai, Dhaka Tribune, 22 October 2025,   Tribune Desk.[4] ‘  Website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) China and Afghanistan trade figures’.

    [9] ‘The Durand Line and the Fence: How are communities managing with cross-border lives?’ Sabawoon Samim,  Afghanistan Analysts Network  , Regional Relations  , April 2024.

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.arabnews.com

     

  • India’s war on the Mughal Empire

    India’s war on the Mughal Empire

    The profound legacies of the Mughal Empire, forged through a remarkable fusion of Persian and Sanskrit worlds, are now under siege from a mythical vision of India’s past.

    On every 15 August since 1947, India’s Independence Day, the country’s prime minister unintentionally acknowledges the Mughals’ political legacy by delivering a nationwide address from the parapets of the mightiest symbol of Mughal power – Delhi’s massive Red Fort, built in 1648.

    ‘As is true of autocracies everywhere’, wrote David Remnick last April, ‘this Administration demands a mystical view of an imagined past.’  Although Remnick was referring to Trump’s America, something of the same sort could be said of India today. Informed by Hindutva (Hindu-centric) ideals, the country’s governing BJP party imagines a Hindu ‘golden age’ abruptly cut short when Muslim outsiders invaded and occupied an imagined sacred realm, opening a long and dreary ‘dark age’ of anti-Hindu violence and tyranny. In 2014, India’s prime minister declared that India had experienced 1,200 years of ‘slavery’ (ghulami), referring to ten centuries of Muslim rule and two of the British Raj. But whereas the British, in this view, had the good sense to go home, Muslims never left the land they had presumably violated and plundered. To say the least, India’s history has become a political minefield.

    Today’s India would be unrecognisable without the imprint the Mughals had made, and continue to make, on its society and culture. It was they who, for the first time, unified most of South Asia politically.

    Between the early 16th and the mid-18th century, towards the end of those 12 centuries of alleged ‘slavery’, most of South Asia was dominated by the Mughal Empire, a dazzling polity that, governed by a dynasty of Muslims, was for a while the world’s richest and most powerful state. Although it declined precipitously during the century before its liquidation by Queen Victoria in 1858, today’s India would be unrecognisable without the imprint the Mughals had made, and continue to make, on its society and culture. It was they who, for the first time, unified most of South Asia politically. On every 15 August since 1947, India’s Independence Day, the country’s prime minister unintentionally acknowledges the Mughals’ political legacy by delivering a nationwide address from the parapets of the mightiest symbol of Mughal power – Delhi’s massive Red Fort, built in 1648. Much of modern India’s administrative and legal infrastructure was inherited from Mughal practices and procedures. The basis of India’s currency system today, the rupee, was standardised by the Mughals. Indian dress, architecture, languages, art, and speech are all permeated by Mughal practices and sensibilities. It’s hard to imagine Indian music without the sitar, the tabla, or the sarod. Almost any Indian restaurant, whether in India or beyond, will have its tandoori chicken, kebab, biryani, or shahi paneer. One can hardly utter a sentence in a north Indian language without using words borrowed from Persian, the Mughals’ official language. India’s most popular entertainment medium – Bollywood cinema – is saturated with dialogue and songs delivered in Urdu, a language that, rooted in the vernacular tongue of the Mughal court, diffused throughout India thanks to its association with imperial patronage and the prestige of the dynasty’s principal capital, Delhi.

    Yet, despite all this, and notwithstanding the prime minister’s national address at Delhi’s Red Fort, India’s government is engaged in a determined drive to erase the Mughals from public consciousness, to the extent possible. In recent years, it has severely curtailed or even abolished the teaching of Mughal history in all schools that follow the national curriculum. Coverage of the Mughals has been entirely eliminated in Class Seven (for students about 12 years old), a little of it appears in Class Eight, none at all in Classes Nine to 11, and a shortened version survives in Class 12. In 2017, a government tourism brochure omitted any mention of the Taj Mahal, the acme of Mughal architecture and one of the world’s most glorious treasures, completed in 1653. Lawyers in Agra, the monument’s site, have even petitioned the courts to have it declared a Hindu temple.

    Although such radical measures have failed to gain traction, the national government has made more subtle efforts to dissociate the monument from the Mughals and identify it with Hindu sensibilities. For example, authorities have eliminated the initial ‘a’ from the name of one of its surrounding gardens, so that what had been Aram Bagh, the ‘Garden of Tranquility’, is now Ram Bagh, the ‘Garden of Ram’, the popular Hindu deity. This is the same deity to which India’s current government recently dedicated an extravagant temple complex on the site of the Babri Masjid, the mosque in eastern India that the Mughal Empire’s founder had built in 1528, but which a mob of Hindu activists tore down brick by brick in 1992.

    All of this prompts two related questions: how did a rich, Persian-inflected Mughal culture sink such deep roots in today’s India in the first place? And why in recent years has the memory of that culture come under siege?

    Ever since the early 13th century, a series of dynastic houses, known collectively as the Delhi sultanate, had dominated the north Indian plain. The last of these houses, the ethnically Afghan Lodis, was dislodged by one of the most vivid figures in early modern history, Zahir al-Din Babur(1483-1530). In 1526, Babur led an army of mostly free-born Turkish retainers from his base in Kabul, down through the Khyber Pass and onto the wide Indo-Gangetic plain, thereby launching what would become the Mughal Empire.

    As was true for the Delhi sultans, the new polity’s success lay in controlling access to ancient trade routes connecting Delhi and Lahore with Kabul, Balkh, and Central Asian markets, such as Samarkand and Bukhara. For centuries, cotton and other Indian goods moved northwards along this route, while horses – more than a hundred thousand annually, by Babur’s day – moved southwards to markets across South Asia. War horses had long formed the basis of power for Indian states, together with native war elephants. But the larger and stronger horses preferred by Indian rulers had to be continually imported from abroad, especially from Central Asia’s vast, long-feathered grasslands where native herds roamed freely.

    Having established a fledgling kingdom centred on Delhi, Agra and Lahore, Babur bequeathed to his descendants a durable connection to the cosmopolitan world of Timurid Central Asia, a refined aesthetic sensibility, a love of the natural world reflected in his delightful memoir, the Baburnama, and a passion for gardens. Aiming to recreate in India the refreshing paradisiac spaces that he knew from his Central Asian homeland, Babur built gardens across his realm, a practice his descendants would continue, culminating in the Taj Mahal.

    Since he died only four years after reaching India, Babur’s new kingdom merely continued many institutions of the defeated Lodis, such as giving his most trusted retainers land assignments, from which they collected taxes and maintained specified numbers of cavalry for state use. It was Babur’s son Humayun (r. 1530-40, 1555-56) who took the first steps to deepen the roots of Mughal legitimacy in Indian soil, as when he married the daughter of an Indian Muslim landholder rather than a Central Asian Turk, a practice he encouraged his nobles to follow. More importantly, while seated in a raised pavilion (jharokha) that projected from his palace’s outer walls, he would greet the morning’s rising sun and show his face to the public, just as the sun showed itself to him. This followed an ancient practice of Indian rajas that subtly conflated the image of a seated monarch with the icon of a Brahmanical deity, before whom one pays respectful devotion through mutual eye contact (darshan).

    The Mughals became further Indianised during the long reign of Humayun’s son Akbar (r. 1556-1605). Whereas for three centuries the Delhi sultans had struggled to defeat the Rajput warrior clans that dominated north India’s politics, Akbar adopted the opposite policy of absorbing them into his empire as subordinate kings. Nearly all Rajput kings accepted this arrangement, for by doing so they could retain rulership over their ancestral lands while simultaneously receiving high-ranking positions in Akbar’s newly created ruling class – the imperial mansabdars. Their new status also allowed them to operate on an all-India political stage instead of remaining provincial notables. Moreover, they were granted religious freedom, including the right to build and patronise Hindu temples. Over time, there emerged a warrior ethos common to both Mughals and Rajputs that superseded religious identities, allowing the latter to understand Muslim warriors as fellow Rajputs, and even to equate Akbar himself with the deity Rama. For their part, Akbar and his successors, as the Rajputs’ sovereign overlords, acquired regular tribute payments from subordinate dynastic houses, the service of north India’s finest cavalry, access to the sea through Rajasthani trade routes leading to Gujarat’s lucrative markets, and the incorporation of Rajput princesses in the imperial harem.

    Moreover, since Rajput women could become legal wives of the emperor, from Akbar’s time onwards, an emperor’s child by a Rajput mother was eligible for the throne. As a result, Akbar’s son Jahangir (r. 1605-23) was half Rajput, as his mother was a Rajput princess. Jahangir, in turn, married seven daughters of Rajput rulers, one of whom was the mother of his imperial successor Shah Jahan, making the latter biologically three-quarters Rajput.

    This last point proved especially consequential. As more Rajput states submitted to Mughal overlordship, the imperial court swelled into a huge, multi-ethnic and women-centred world in which the Rajput element steadily gained influence over other ethnicities. Moreover, since Rajput women could become legal wives of the emperor, from Akbar’s time onwards, an emperor’s child by a Rajput mother was eligible for the throne. As a result, Akbar’s son Jahangir (r. 1605-23) was half Rajput, as his mother was a Rajput princess. Jahangir, in turn, married seven daughters of Rajput rulers, one of whom was the mother of his imperial successor Shah Jahan, making the latter biologically three-quarters Rajput.

    Inevitably, Rajput mothers in the imperial harem imparted their culture to their offspring, who were raised in the harem world. This allowed Indian sensibilities and values to seep deeply into Mughal imperial culture, reflected in imperial art, architecture, language, and cuisine. At the same time, the absorption of Rajput cavalry in the imperial system allowed native military practices to diffuse throughout the empire’s military culture.

    The Mughals engaged with Sanskrit literary traditions and welcomed Brahmin and Jain scholars to their courts. From the 1580s on, Akbar sponsored Persian translations of the great Sanskrit epics Mahabharata and Ramayana, effectively accommodating Indian thought to Mughal notions of statecraft.

    Like all authentically Indian emperors, moreover, the Mughals engaged with Sanskrit literary traditions and welcomed Brahmin and Jain scholars to their courts. From the 1580s on, Akbar sponsored Persian translations of the great Sanskrit epics Mahabharata and Ramayana, effectively accommodating Indian thought to Mughal notions of statecraft. Whereas the Sanskrit Mahabharata stressed cosmic and social order (dharma), its Persian translation stressed the proper virtues of the king. Similarly, the Sanskrit Ramayana was subtly refashioned into a meditation on Mughal sovereignty, while the epic’s hero, Rama, was associated with Akbar himself, as though the emperor were an avatar of Vishnu.

    Beginning with Akbar, the Mughals also fostered cultural fusions in the domains of medicine and astronomy.  By the mid-17th century, the Mughals’ Greco-Arab (Yunani) medical tradition had become thoroughly Indianised, as Indo-Persian scholars engaged with Indian (Ayurvedic) works on pharmacology and the use of native Indian plants.

    Similarly, from the late 16th century on, Persian-Sanskrit dictionaries allowed Sanskrit scholars to absorb Arabo-Persian ideas that had derived from ancient Greek understandings of the uniformity of nature and laws of motion. That knowledge, together with astronomical tables patronised by Shah Jahan that enabled the prediction of planetary movements, then spread among the Mughal-Rajput ruling class at large.

    The most telling indication of the public’s acceptance of the Mughals as authentically Indian is that in both the 18th and 19th centuries, when the empire faced existential threats from outside, native forces rallied around the Mughal emperor as the country’s sole legitimate sovereign. In 1739, the Persian warlord Nadir Shah invaded India, routed a much larger Mughal army, sacked Delhi, and marched back to Iran with enormous loot, including the symbolically charged Peacock Throne. At this moment, the Marathas, who for decades had fiercely resisted the imposition of Mughal hegemony over the Indian peninsula, realised that the Mughals represented the ultimate symbol of Indian sovereignty and must be preserved at all costs. The Marathas’ chief minister Baji Rao (1700-40) even proposed that all of north India’s political stakeholders form a confederation to support and defend the weakened Mughal dynasty from foreign invaders.

    Similarly, by the mid-19th century, the English East India Company had acquired de facto control over much of the subcontinent, while the reigning Mughal ruler, Bahadur II (r. 1837-57), had been reduced to a virtual prisoner in Delhi’s Red Fort, an emperor in name only. But in 1857, a rebellion broke out when a disaffected detachment of the Company’s own Indian troops massacred their English officers in the north Indian cantonment of Meerut. Seeking support for what they hoped would become an India-wide rebellion, the mutineers then galloped down to Delhi and enthusiastically rallied around a rather bewildered Bahadur II.  Notwithstanding his own and his empire’s decrepit condition, to the rebels, this feeble remnant of the house of Babur still represented India’s legitimate sovereign.

    Through the Mughals’ twilight years, spanning the two incidents mentioned above, one emperor was especially revered in public memory – ‘Alamgir (r. 1658-1707), widely known today by his princely name, Aurangzeb. Upon his death, large and reverential crowds watched his coffin move 75 miles across the Deccan plateau to Khuldabad, a saintly cemetery in present-day Maharashtra. There, the emperor’s body was placed, at his own request, in a humble gravesite open to the sky, quite unlike the imposing monuments built to glorify the memory of his dynastic predecessors (excepting Babur). That simple tomb soon became an object of intense popular devotion. For years, crowds thronged his gravesite, beseeching ‘Alamgir’s intercession with the unseen world, for his saintly charisma (baraka) was believed to cling to his gravesite, just as in life it had clung to his person. For, during his lifetime, the emperor was popularly known as ‘Alamgir zinda-pir, or ‘Alamgir, the living saint’, one whose invisible powers could work magic.

    ‘Alamgir’s status as a saintly monarch continued to grow after his death in 1707. Already in 1709, Bhimsen Saksena, a former imperial official, praised ‘Alamgir for his pious character and his ability to mobilise supernatural power in the empire’s cause. In 1730, another retired noble, Ishwar Das Nagar, credited ‘Alamgir for the exceptional peace, security, and justice that had characterised his long reign. Nagar’s account followed a spate of histories that praised the emperor as a dedicated, even heroic administrator, and his half-century reign as a ‘golden age’ of governmental efficiency.

    Further contributing to ‘Alamgir’s cult was the appearance of hundreds of images depicting the emperor engaged in administration, military activity, or religious devotion. Reflecting the extent of the ‘Alamgir cult, many of these post-1707 paintings were produced not at the imperial court but in north India’s Hindu courts, including those of the Mughals’ former enemies. No other Mughal emperor was so venerated, and for so long a period, as ‘Alamgir.

    Over time, however, Indians gradually came to see the Mughal period – and especially ‘Alamgir’s reign – in an increasingly negative light. As the East India Company attained control over South Asia in the late 18th century, British administrators, being unable as foreigners to deploy a nativist rationale to justify their rule, cited the efficiency, justice, peace and stability that they had brought to their Indian colony. And because the Mughals had immediately preceded the advent of Company rule, those rulers were necessarily construed as having been inefficient and unjust despots in a war-torn and unstable land. The colonial understanding of Muslims and Hindus as homogeneous and mutually antagonistic communities also facilitated aligning colonial policies with the old Roman strategy of divide et impera. More perniciously, the colonial view of the Mughals as alien ‘Mahomedans’ who had oppressed a mainly non-Muslim population reinforced the notion of a native Hindu ‘self’ and a non-native Muslim ‘other’ – constructions that would bear bitter fruit.

    Although originating from within the colonial regime, such ideas gradually percolated into the public domain as the 19th century progressed and Indians became increasingly absorbed in the Raj’s educational and administrative institutions. It was not until the 1880s, with the first stirrings of Indian nationalist sentiment, however, that such colonial tropes became widely politicised. As the possibility of an independent nation took root, Indian nationalists began to look to their own past for models that might inspire and mobilise mass support for their cause. The writing of history soon became a political endeavour, ultimately degenerating into a black-and-white morality play that clearly distinguished heroes from villains. In short, India’s precolonial past became a screen onto which many – though not all – Hindu nationalists projected the tropes of the Hindu self and the Muslim other.

    Between 1912 and 1924, one of India’s most esteemed historians, Jadunath Sarkar, published his five-volume History of Aurangzib, the princely name of ‘Alamgir, who would soon become the most controversial – and ultimately the most hated – ruler of the Mughal dynasty. Sarkar’s study was so detailed, so thoroughly researched, and so authoritative that, in the century following its publication, no other historian even attempted a thorough survey of ‘Alamgir’s reign.

    Importantly, Sarkar wrote against the backdrop of the Great War and a nationalist movement that was just then reaching a fever pitch. In 1905, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy for India, had partitioned Sarkar’s native province of Bengal in half, a cynical divide-and-rule measure that ‘awarded’ Bengali Muslims with their own Muslim-majority province of eastern Bengal. The very next year, there appeared the All-India Muslim League, a political party committed to protecting the interests of India’s Muslims. Meanwhile, the partition of Bengal had provoked a furious protest by Bengali Hindus, leading to India-wide boycotts against British-made goods. Ultimately, the government gave in to Hindu demands and, in 1911, annulled the partition, which only intensified fear and anxiety within India’s Muslim minority community.

    It was in this highly charged political atmosphere that Sarkar worked on his biography of ‘Alamgir. With each successive volume of his study, the emperor was portrayed in darker colours, as were Muslims generally. In the end, Sarkar blamed ‘Alamgir for destroying Hindu schools and temples, thereby depriving Hindus of the ‘light of knowledge’ and the ‘consolations of religion’, and for exposing Hindus to ‘constant public humiliation and political disabilities’. Writing amid the gathering agitation for an independent Indian nation, Sarkar maintained that ‘no fusion between the two classes [Hindus and Muslims] was possible’, adding that while a Muslim might feel that he was in India, he could not feel of India, and that ‘Alamgir ‘deliberately undid the beginnings of a national and rational policy which Akbar [had] set on foot.’

    Perhaps more than any other factor, Sarkar’s negative assessment of ‘Alamgir has shaped how millions have thought about that emperor’s place in Indian history. Since the publication of History of Aurangzib, professional historians have generally shied away from writing about the emperor, as though he were politically radioactive. This, in turn, opened up space in India’s popular culture for demagogues to demonise the Mughal emperor. For millions today, ‘Alamgir is the principal villain in a rogues’ gallery of premodern Indo-Muslim rulers, a bigoted fanatic who allegedly ruined the communal harmony established by Akbar and set India on a headlong course that, many believe, in 1947, culminated in the creation of a separate Muslim state, Pakistan. In today’s vast, anything-goes blogosphere, in social media posts, and in movie theatres, he has been reduced to a cardboard cutout, a grotesque caricature serving as a historical punching bag. A recent example is the film Chhaava, a Bollywood blockbuster that was released on February 14, 2025 and has since rocketed to superstar status. Among films in only their sixth week since release, already by late March, it had grossed the second-largest earnings in Indian cinema history.

    Loosely based on a Marathi novel of the same title, Chhaava purports to tell the story of a pivotal moment in ‘Alamgir’s 25-year campaign to conquer the undefeated states of the Deccan plateau. These included two venerable sultanates, Bijapur and Golkonda, and the newly formed Maratha kingdom, launched in 1674 by an intrepid chieftain and the Mughals’ arch-enemy, Shivaji (r. 1674-80). The film concerns the reign of Shivaji’s elder son and ruling successor, Sambhaji (r. 1680-89), his struggles with Mughal armies, and finally his capture, torture, and execution at ‘Alamgir’s order in 1689.

    The film is not subtle. With its non-stop violence, gratuitous blood and gore, overwrought plot, and black-and-white worldview, the movie turns the contest between Sambhaji and ‘Alamgir into a cartoonish spectacle, like a Marvel Comics struggle between Spiderman and Doctor Doom. Whereas Sambhaji single-handedly vanquishes an entire Mughal army, ‘Alamgir is pure, menacing evil. Mughal armies display over-the-top brutality toward civilians: innocent Indians are hanged from trees, women are sexually assaulted, a shepherdess is burned to death, and so forth.

    In reality, ‘Alamgir is not known to have plundered Indian villages or attacked civilians (unlike the Marathas themselves, whose raids in Bengal alone caused the deaths of some 400,000 civilians in the 1740s). On the other hand, contemporary sources record Sambhaji’s administrative mismanagement, his abandonment by leading Maratha officers inherited from his father reign, his weakness for alcohol and merry-making, and how, instead of resisting Mughal forces sent to capture him, he hid in a hole in his minister’s house, from which he was dragged by his long hair before being taken to ‘Alamgir.

    Historical accuracy is not Chhaava’s strength, nor its purpose. More important are its consequences. Within weeks of its release, the film whipped up public fury against ‘Alamgir and the Mughals. In one venue where the movie was showing, a viewer wearing medieval warrior attire rode into the theatre on horseback; in another, a viewer became so frenzied during the film’s protracted scene of Sambhaji’s torture that he leapt to the stage and began tearing the screen apart.

    Politicians swiftly joined the fray. In early March, a member of India’s ruling BJP party demanded that ‘Alamgir’s grave be removed from Maharashtra, the heartland of the Maratha kingdom. On 16 March, another party member went further, demanding that the emperor’s tomb be bulldozed. The next day, a riot broke out in Nagpur, headquarters for the far-right Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, India’s paramilitary Hindu supremacist organisation. It began when around 100 activists who supported bulldozing ‘Alamgir’s grave burned an effigy of the emperor. In response, a group of the city’s Muslims staged a counter-protest, culminating in violence, personal injuries, the destruction of property, and many arrests. The fevered demand for bulldozing ‘Alamgir’s final resting place, however, is deeply ironic. In 1707, Sambhaji’s son and eventual successor to the Maratha throne, Shahu, travelled 75 miles on foot to pay his pious respects to ‘Alamgir’s tomb.

    In the end, the furore over ‘Alamgir’s gravesite illustrates the temptation to adjust the historical past to conform to present-day political priorities. Indicating the Indian government’s support for Chhaava’s version of history, in late March, India’s governing party scheduled a special screening of the film in New Delhi’s Parliament building for the prime minister, Cabinet ministers, and members of parliament.

    Nor is it only the historical past that is being adjusted to accord with present-day imagination. So is territory. In 2015, the Indian government officially renamed New Delhi’s Aurangzeb Road – so-named when the British had established the city – after a former Indian president. Eight years later, the city of Aurangabad, which Prince Aurangzeb named for himself while governor of the Deccan in 1653, was renamed Sambhaji Nagar, honouring the man the emperor had executed in 1689.

    Such measures align with the government’s broader agenda to scrub from Indian maps place names associated with the Mughals or Islam and replace them with names bearing Hindu associations, or simply to Sanskritise place-names containing Arabic or Persian lexical elements. Examples include: Mustafabad to Saraswati Nagar (2016), Allahabad to Prayagraj (2018), Hoshangabad to Narmadapuram (2021), Ahmednagar to Ahilyanagar (2023), and Karimgunj to Sribhumi (2024). Many more such changes have been proposed – at least 14 in the state of Uttar Pradesh alone – but not yet officially authorised.

    It is said that the past is a foreign country. Truly, one can never fully enter the mindset of earlier generations. But if history is not carefully reconstructed using contemporary evidence and logical reasoning, and if it is not responsibly presented to the public, we risk forever living with a ‘mystical view of an imagined past’ with all its attendant dangers, as Remnick warns.

     

    This essay was published earlier on www.engelsbergideas.com

    Feature Image Credit: www.engelsbergideas.com

     

  • India–U.S. Ties Beyond the Trump Show

    India–U.S. Ties Beyond the Trump Show

    With its deep institutional roots and strategic clarity, the India–U.S. relationship is well-positioned to advance further, driven not by transient rhetoric but by enduring common purpose

    U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated assertions about mediating a ceasefire between India and Pakistan have reignited long-standing apprehensions surrounding external involvement in the Kashmir issue. His remarks, including those referenced during a U.S. court hearing in May 2025—where U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick testified that the Trump administration’s trade policies helped avert a potential nuclear confrontation in South Asia—were met with widespread criticism from strategic experts and policymakers alike. New Delhi has remained steadfast in its position: the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is strictly bilateral and not subject to international mediation.

    Diaspora Influence and Institutional Depth

    Despite Trump’s controversial rhetoric, the India–U.S. relationship has matured well beyond the influence of individual leaders. It now stands as a robust, multi-dimensional partnership, underpinned by shared strategic interests, deepening economic ties, and strong people-to-people linkages. This is evident through the formalization of the relationship via key agreements and strategic initiatives. Today, it is regarded as a promising and one of the most consequential partnerships of the 21st century, given its potential to reshape the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Moreover, this strength is particularly reflected in the vibrant Indian diaspora in the United States—numbering over four million—one of the most educated and affluent immigrant communities in the country, playing an increasingly influential role in shaping policy.

     

    The diaspora’s clout in U.S. policymaking has grown remarkably. A striking example of this influence was witnessed during the COVID-19 crisis in 2021. At a critical juncture, when the Biden administration had imposed export restrictions on essential medical supplies, Indian-Americans mounted an organized lobbying campaign. Their efforts succeeded in convincing the administration to reverse the ban and dispatch critical medical equipment and raw materials for vaccines to India. This intervention demonstrated the community’s capacity to influence key policy decisions at the highest levels. Their role is not limited to crisis management. The Indian-American community has been instrumental in advancing landmark initiatives such as the U.S.–India civil nuclear agreement, and today, many Indian-Americans serve in influential roles within the U.S. government. This diaspora acts as a cultural and strategic bridge, enhancing bilateral understanding and reinforcing long-term cooperation.

    The evolving India–U.S. partnership is bolstered by a diverse and committed set of stakeholders,including government institutions, private enterprises, think tanks, academic bodies, and civil society in both nations. Crucially, U.S. institutions such as the State Department and Congress continue to regard India as a vital strategic partner, particularly in the context of the Indo-Pacific strategy and broader efforts to counterbalance China’s growing regional influence. These institutions take a long-term, bipartisan approach to India–U.S. relations, one that is grounded in continuity and strategic alignment rather than reactive or transactional impulses, such as those reflected in Trump’s pronouncements.

    Strategic Continuity

    Trump’s leadership style has often been described as transactional, business-oriented, and self-promoting. He frequently projects himself as a master negotiator and dealmaker, but many of his actions suggest otherwise. His tendency to prematurely claim success and take credit has often weakened his own negotiating position, whether in the context of Ukraine, North Korea, Iran, or South Asia. For instance, Trump repeatedly announced breakthroughs in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that never materialized, thereby weakening his credibility and diminishing his effectiveness as a serious diplomatic actor.

    While Trump’s erratic rhetoric may generate headlines, it is critical not to exaggerate its impact on this deeply rooted relationship. His habitual tendency to seek the spotlight and amplify his personal role in global diplomacy often lacked substantive backing or long-term vision.

    In the case of India and Pakistan, Trump’s attempt to “hyphenate” the relationship—suggesting he could broker a deal between both nations—ignored the decades-long efforts by previous U.S. administrations to de-hyphenate the ties and treat each relationship on its own strategic merits. His statement that “they’ve been fighting for 1,500 years” reveals a superficial understanding of South Asian geopolitics and history. Such remarks reflect a lack of diplomatic nuance and strategic depth.

    In contrast, previous U.S. presidents devoted sustained efforts toward cultivating strategic trust with India—especially in light of their fraught Cold War history and the lingering presence of anti-American sentiment within Indian political and intellectual circles. During this era, American foreign policy toward India embodied a form of strategic altruism, emphasizing long-term engagement grounded in mutual respect rather than immediate concessions or gains. Successive administrations—Republican and Democratic alike, including Trump’s own during his first term—recognized the importance of winning India’s trust, acknowledging its historic skepticism of U.S. intentions and its adherence to a non-aligned foreign policy stance.

    These efforts bore fruit in the form of landmark agreements and growing strategic alignment across a broad spectrum of areas, including defense cooperation, civil nuclear energy, high technology, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism. Recent developments—including the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), the U.S.–India Major Defense Partnership Framework (2025–2035), the COMPACT Initiative, and collaborations through platforms like INDUS-X and the Artemis Accords—have deepened cooperation. These engagements signify that the India–U.S. partnership is now an essential component of the 21st-century global security and economic architecture.

    the India–U.S. partnership rests on far more stable and enduring foundations: bipartisan consensus within the U.S. strategic establishment, shared democratic values, converging geopolitical interests, and institutional mechanisms that safeguard continuity and progress.

    While Trump’s erratic rhetoric may generate headlines, it is critical not to exaggerate its impact on this deeply rooted relationship. His habitual tendency to seek the spotlight and amplify his personal role in global diplomacy often lacked substantive backing or long-term vision.  Even his relationship with Elon Musk—once a vocal ally who contributed nearly $300 million to pro-Trump political efforts during the 2024 campaign—has deteriorated into public conflict, highlighting the unpredictability of Trump’s leadership style. In stark contrast, the India–U.S. partnership rests on far more stable and enduring foundations: bipartisan consensus within the U.S. strategic establishment, shared democratic values, converging geopolitical interests, and institutional mechanisms that safeguard continuity and progress.

    West Asia dynamics: No Indian shift

    Moreover, recent U.S. gestures toward Pakistan—including inviting Pakistan’s Army Chief to U.S. Army Day celebrations, public praise for its leadership, the release of funds for upgrading the F-16 fleet—and support in securing IMF bailout packages—should be analysed through the lens of broader strategic imperatives, particularly concerning Iran. Amid escalating tensions with Tehran and recent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets by its close ally Israel, Washington may be positioning itself for potential regional contingencies and wider escalation. In this context, logistical access to Pakistani military bases—notably Noor Khan Airbase, and other facilities which, according to senior analyst Imtiaz Gul, is already under partial U.S. operational control—could become critical. Pakistan has a history of facilitating U.S. military operations, such as during the War on Terror. Given its proximity to Iran, Pakistan is strategically well-placed to support U.S. initiatives in the region.

    The U.S. may also seek to ensure that Pakistan remains aligned with Western objectives should Israel act unilaterally against Iran. Therefore, recent goodwill gestures by the U.S. toward Pakistan should be interpreted not as a shift away from India, as some within the Indian strategic establishment might fear, but as part of a calculated strategy to secure regional flexibility amid evolving geopolitical uncertainties in West Asia.

    Ultimately, the strength and resilience of the India–U.S. relationship derive from its firm institutional foundation and shared strategic vision. It is largely insulated from the whims of transient political figures. Despite periodic turbulence, the partnership has demonstrated remarkable continuity and adaptability. Key U.S. national security documents—including the Indo‑Pacific Strategy and the National Security Strategy—consistently describe India as a “major defense partner” and an indispensable actor in the effort to balance China’s regional ambitions. These structural commitments ensure that the bilateral relationship remains on a trajectory of deepening cooperation. As articulated in the 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, India is seen as a “like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia,” and a “driving force of the Quad and a net security provider in the region.”

    Conclusion

    Today, the India–U.S. relationship stands as a beacon of mutual trust, strategic alignment, and forward-looking engagement. Decades of deliberate diplomacy, institutional investment, and cultural linkage have given rise to one of the most promising partnerships of the 21st century. While figures like President Trump may generate momentary uncertainty, they lack the capacity to derail the deep-rooted and multidimensional nature of this partnership. The future of India–U.S. relations remains bright, anchored in shared democratic ideals, strategic complementarity, and a common vision for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

    Feature Image credit: news18.com

    Image of  President Bush and PM Manmohan Singh: wikipedia India-United States Civil Nuclear Deal.

  • Indus Water Treaty: A Model for International Water Governance

    Indus Water Treaty: A Model for International Water Governance

    Introduction

    Water is the basis of biological sustenance, without which no civilisation can sustain. Access to clean and safely managed water is therefore a human right, not a privilege.

    According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) —

    One in four people still lives without safely managed water services or clean drinking water. Approximately 4 billion people live with severe water scarcity for at least one month of the year, and about half a billion people face water scarcity year-round.

    The water crisis is not an isolated issue but a global challenge. It calls for effective governance not just within the local governments and authorities of a country but transnationally as well.

    International Water Governance refers to this process of decision-making, formulation, and implementation of policies pertaining to the use, management, and distribution of transboundary water resources.

    Peace and cooperation on matters of conflict over water are hard to reach and much harder to maintain. Treaties, multilateral agreements and conventions often govern transboundary waters; one such example of a successful bilateral water-distribution treaty is the Indus Water Treaty (the IWT) of 1960 between India and Pakistan over the regulation and use of the Indus River Basin and its tributaries.

    Indus Water Treaty

    The Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960 in Karachi between India and Pakistan as facilitated by the World Bank (erstwhile International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or IBRD). It demarcates the sharing and usage of the Indus River and its major tributaries, categorised into “eastern” and “western” rivers for Indian and Pakistani use, respectively.

    The Indus River flows mainly from Tibet and the Himalayan regions of India’s Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and across Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh before emptying into the Arabian Sea through Karachi.

    Of the six major tributaries of the Indus River— the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej are the “eastern rivers” and the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum are the “western rivers”. The former is for India’s exclusive use after Pakistan’s permitted water use, and the latter is for Pakistan’s exclusive use after the criteria of India’s permitted use are met.

    As a result, the split was made in the ratio of about 20:80 of the total water flow from the Indus system in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan has unrestricted access to the waters of the western rivers for agricultural, domestic, and industrial purposes.

    India too is permitted to use a limited amount of water from these rivers, apart from the eastern rivers, for specified purposes, such as irrigation and power generation. It also lays down detailed regulations for India in building projects over the western rivers.

    Historical context and Security concerns

    As the partition of British India took place on religious lines instead of geographic factors, the division of the historically integrated water system in a manner satisfactory to both countries was a challenging feat. Although most of the river naturally flows through the regions of Pakistan, it primarily originates from India before it enters the former. Hence, Pakistan is the downstream nation of the Indus River. This places Pakistan in a vulnerable position, exposed to the risks of India causing artificial droughts or flooding of its arable lands, which may be used as leverage to control water and food security in times of hostilities.

    According to Pakistan, it was entitled to all the waters of the Indus and its tributaries due to its historical right before or until the partition, also highlighting the threat of severe water scarcity without the continuous flow of the rivers. Whereas India insisted that the waters be equitably distributed on a new post-partition basis by proposing for the first time the separate rationing of the western and eastern rivers between the two nations. Ergo, paving the way for arguably one of the most successful, long-standing bilateral agreements struck between any two agnostic states.

    Provisions and Objectives of IWT

    In 1952, with the World Bank as the mediator, a Working Party consisting of Indian, Pakistani, and World Bank engineers was formed to draw up a cooperative plan for the use, allocation and distribution of the disputed waters. After almost eight long years of negotiations, the Indus Water Treaty was finally ratified in 1960.

    The main provisions of the IWT are as follows:

    • Water distribution:

    India and Pakistan received approximately 30% and 70% of the total waters of the Indus rivers located in India. India’s eastern rivers have a mean annual flow of 40b/m3 while the western of Pakistan have an MAF of 100b/m3.

    • Regulation of water use:

    Use of waters of the eastern and western rivers are explicitly demarcated between India and Pakistan while limited usage of the other country’s rivers is also permitted for specific purposes that are of non-consumptive nature, like hydropower generation, fishing, etc.

    • Water rights:

    According to IWT, although the liberty to use unutilized water of the other country exists, the right over the water is not forfeited over time, even in case of repeated underutilization.

    • Conflict resolution:

    A Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) comprising commissioners from both India and Pakistan is provided for by the Treaty. The PIC serves as a forum for the exchange of hydrological data, information, and views on the implementation of the treaty and the resolution of disputes.

    Aftermath

    The treaty has survived several border skirmishes, terror attacks including the 26/11, and even two full-fledged wars in 1965 and 1971. The terms of water sharing as agreed upon have been adhered to despite such hostilities.

    After the 2016 Uri Attack on an Indian Army base in Jammu and Kashmir and the 2019 Pulwama Attack, threats of revoking the Treaty have been made by India but never materialised, as the Treaty continues to remain intact. However, according to the IWT, the bombing or destroying of dams, barrages, power stations, etc. located in the Indian part of the Indus basin by Pakistan violates the Treaty which can lead to its abrogation.

    Despite Pakistan’s repeated violation of the Treaty by using groundwater of Ravi and Sutlej areas of India for various uses before they cross into its area, and by constructing river training works to reduce river flooding in Pakistan and enhance flooding in India’s Great Rann of Kutch area; no concerns have been raised by the latter hereto.

    With the Treaty in place, several projects have been undertaken on the allotted rivers, India has constructed the Bhakra-Nangal and Salal dams for hydroelectric power generation. Pakistan constructed the Tarbela and Mangla Dams for water storage, irrigation, and hydropower generation.

    Shahpur Kandi and Ratle Projects:

    The Shahpur Kandi project of India over the Ujh river has been objected to by Pakistan for diverting waters of Ujh, a tributary of Ravi, an eastern river exclusive for India’s use. The dam was officially completed in February 2024.

    India’s ongoing Ratle Hydroelectric Project on the Chenab also made headlines, for Pakistan’s objection to its construction in the Indian area after its funding was finally approved in 2021. The dam would have an 850 MW generative capacity, for which a limited reserve of water is required to be reserved. This alarmed Pakistan as it claimed it would pose a risk of possible weaponization of water supply by India in wartime situations. Disagreement over the summoning of a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration as authorised by the Treaty for dispute resolution was settled in 2016 by the World Bank’s decision to let both motions proceed simultaneously. Later, India was allowed to construct the dam by the World Bank despite objections by Pakistan. The project is scheduled to commence operations in 2026.

    A Blueprint for Transboundary Water Cooperation

    The success of the IWT sets an example of how countries can overcome their political differences and contribute to an efficient system of shared resource governance. It successfully helped the Indian subcontinent evade a potential war between the two nuclear-armed states over the river basin, a model for other regions struggling with water scarcity and competition to follow.

    Climate change coupled with the construction of dams and barrages for water storage and regulation carries heavy ecological repercussions like the disruption of river ecosystems, aquatic habitats, and biodiversity of the concerned region. Consequently, endangering the livelihood of the nearby occupants, even forcing them to relocate.  Hence, such a cooperative regulatory mechanism must be in place to facilitate constructive dialogue towards incorporating environmental considerations into water management strategies to tackle and mitigate any negative repercussions.

    The Indus Water Treaty has demonstrated its efficacy as a significant diplomatic agreement between the two neighbouring states, consistently withstanding various challenges over time. The treaty primarily emphasises the importance of cooperation and diplomacy in resolving transboundary water disputes while also establishing a foundation and providing scope for potential future collaboration in numerous domains of shared governance.

    Proposals for its abrogation have been deemed impractical for both parties, as the treaty has endured for six decades. Nevertheless, there is a recognised need to re-examine, renegotiate, revise, and amend the long-standing Treaty to better address contemporary issues, including new ecological and climate change concerns, as well as evolving terms of negotiation.

     

     

    References:

    ET Online, (2024, February 26). India completely stops Ravi River water flow to Pakistan. Historical context and significance. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-completely-stops-ravi-river-water-flow-to-pakistan-historical-context-and-significance/articleshow/107980936.cms

    Gupta, M.S. (2024, February 25). Shahpurkandi dam complete after 3 decades, will help check unutilised Ravi water flowing to Pakistan. The Print. https://theprint.in/india/governance/shahpurkandi-dam-complete-after-3-decades-will-help-check-unutilised-ravi-water-flowing-to-pakistan/1978380/

    Gupta, S [The Print]. (2023, January 31). Understanding the Indus Waters Treaty & why India is pushing Pakistan for changes [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/pVp93u2IgSg

    MEA Media Centre, (1960, September 19). Bilateral/Multilateral Documents: Indus Waters Treaty. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (MEA, GOI). https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6439/Indus

    Samantha, P.D. (2023, January 31). The Indus Question: India, Pakistan and rivers of concern. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/analysis-india-pakistan-looking-to-exploit-resources-for-more-electricity/articleshow/97462196.cms

    Times Now Digital, (2018, November 7). Pak ‘diplomatic sabotage’ busted: India to go ahead with Ratle hydroelectric project, govt to send team to J&K. Times Now. https://web.archive.org/web/20190225224015/https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/pakistan-india-ratle-hydroelectric-project-indus-water-treaty-agreement-chenab-shahpur-kandi-dam-project-ujh-multipurpose-project-jammu-and-kashmir/310636

  • Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

     

    TPF Occasional Paper: 10/2024

    Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    Maj Gen Alok Deb (Retd)

    On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi’[i]. The item went on to specify that the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic minority rebels from the states of Chin, Rakhine and Kachin bordering India had been invited to a seminar in mid-November, to be hosted by the Delhi-based Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a foreign policy think tank funded by the Government of India. The piece was also carried by some major Indian newspapers with its origin attributed to Reuters. At the time of writing, there has been no acknowledgement or rebuttal of this report by any government agency. Neither has the ICWA posted this on its website as a forthcoming event. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

    A Summary of India’s Act East Policy

    India’s ‘Act East’ policy of 2014 is an initiative that takes off from its earlier ‘Look East’ policy. ‘Act East’ envisages initiatives at multiple levels with the nations of ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific region. These initiatives are to be taken forward through a process of continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, thereby providing enhanced connectivity in its broadest sense, including political, economic, cultural and people-to-people relations.[ii]

    To successfully implement the ‘Act East’ policy, the Indian government is working to make the North East its strategic gateway to ASEAN. Accordingly, it has increased the allocation for the region’s development by more than four times over the last 10 years.[iii]  The North East is also poised to benefit from initiatives from countries like Japan which earlier this year had proposed developing an industrial hub in Bangladesh with supply chains to the North East, Nepal and Bhutan.[iv]

    As the North East becomes India’s gateway to ASEAN,  the centrality of Myanmar to our Act East becomes apparent. It is the key link in the road connectivity between India’s North East and other ASEAN nations whereby the free flow of inland goods, services and other initiatives to and from these nations to India can be ensured. The success or otherwise of Act East is thus directly affected by the security environment in Myanmar. Instability here will negatively impact our North Eastern states sharing borders with that country. The internal situation in Myanmar therefore becomes an area of prime concern for India, warranting close attention.

    For similar reasons, another neighbour, Bangladesh, is equally important for the success of India’s Act East Policy. India’s North East has benefitted from good ties with Bangladesh, both security-wise and economically. Militancy in the North East has reduced over the last decade and a half. With Bangladesh agreeing to provide access to its ports in the Bay of Bengal for the movement of Indian goods, the North Eastern states have a shorter route to the sea. Additionally, states bordering Bangladesh such as Assam and Meghalaya have developed trade links with that country for mutual benefit. The  BBIN (Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic was signed in 2015 to ‘ promote safe, economically efficient and environmentally sound road transport in the sub-region andfurther help each country in creating an institutional mechanism for regional integration’  is another mechanism for implementing our Act East and Neighbourhood First policies[v]. The role of Bangladesh here is pivotal.

    State of the Civil War in Myanmar

    Fighting in Myanmar is now in its fourth year. The military junta continues to suffer reverses on the battlefield. Large portions of Rakhine State and certain portions of Chin State are now under the control of the Arakan Army (AA). International Crisis Group has recently averred that ‘..in just a few months, the Arakan Army has created the largest area in Myanmar under the control of a non-state armed group – in terms of both size and population – and is now on the verge of securing almost all of Rakhine[vi].

    In Shan state to the North, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) of three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) had by December 2023, captured over 20,000 square kilometres of territory, including key border crossings and trade routes between China and Myanmar in Operation 1027[vii].  On 07 March 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) launched Operation 0307 and successfully captured certain military posts across  Kachin State close to the Chinese border. This forced the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) to redeploy, further thinning out forces[viii]. Fighting also continues in other states and regions across the country, notably Sagaing and Kayah.

    Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..’.The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. 

    Notwithstanding these losses, there is no let-up in the Tatmadaw’s efforts to combat the rebels. The Junta has resorted to conscription to stem rising attrition, activating an old law in this regard. Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..[ix] To further contextualise, the same article stated the rebel National Unity Government’s (NUG) claim that more than 14,000 troops have defected from the military since the 2021 seizure of power. The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. The Chins fear that they too will be acted upon similarly.[x]

    To overcome the asymmetry of force especially in artillery and airpower, the rebels have acquired large numbers of drones. These are being used to bomb military positions, contributing significantly towards the successes of the CNA’s operations[xi].  To summarise, Myanmar’s civil war continues to see-saw with no signs of ebbing. The Junta continues to make periodic peace overtures to the NUG with conditionalities that the latter is unwilling to accept[xii]. With the multiplicity of actors and issues involved, there are no clear indications of how and when the conflict will be resolved.

    Impact of the  Myanmar Conflict on India’s North-East

    The impact of Myanmar’s internal situation on India’s border states has progressively worsened. Initially, after the Junta takeover, it was Mizoram which bore the brunt. The state government citing common ethnicity and humanitarian concerns accepted the influx of Chins from Myanmar as a moral responsibility and initiated rehabilitation measures. These refugees along with earlier refugees from Bangladesh recently joined Kukis from Manipur, number around 44000 and continue to remain in refugee camps.[xiii] The Central government has had to reconcile its policy of preventing infiltration across borders with the societal realities of Mizoram. A positive outcome of this approach is that there has been no violence in Mizoram.

    In Manipur, by September 2024, the 18-month-long ethnic conflict had resulted in over 225 deaths and some 60,000 people displaced.[xiv] The administration has been derided by both sides, more so with recent warnings about impending threats to law and order[xv] followed by retractions[xvi]. People of either community have been uprooted from their homes and moved to safe areas separated by buffer zones guarded by security forces.  So great is the mutual suspicion that on the clamour of the Meiteis to replace the Assam Rifles, two battalions of this central force have been withdrawn and replaced by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), against the wishes of the Kukis[xvii].

    Voices for an independent ‘Kukiland’ for the Kuki Zo peoples are being raised,[xviii] which are variously interpreted as a demand for greater autonomy within Manipur or for a separate union territory. The current happenings also dredge up the old ghost of ‘Zale’n-gam’ or Kuki nation, comprising the Chin Kuki Zomi peoples (including Mizos) residing across India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Zale’n- gam has few takers and appears restricted to a YouTube channel[xix]. Today both sides fight each other with a variety of weapons including improvised rockets and drones. Hostage-taking is the latest tactic that has been adopted.[xx]

    Tension between the Nagas of Manipur and other communities is discernible with some reports of violence against the former.[xxi] As of now Nagas have kept out of the Kuki-Meitei dispute; also, other than the insurgent National Socialist Council of Nagaland ( Isak Muviah) faction (NSCN-IM) that is observing a ceasefire with the Centre, no other party has demanded integration of all Naga inhabited areas in India ( Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur) and Myanmar – the idea of  Greater Nagalim.

    At the state level, the responses of Mizoram and Manipur to the Myanmar crisis vary. This can be best seen in their reactions to the Centre’s recent notification to fence the entire 1643 Km Myanmar border and its earlier decision to end the Free Movement Regime that permits movement on both sides of the border for up to a distance of 16 km.[xxii]  While the Mizoram government and tribes living in both states oppose the decisions, the Manipur government clamours for its implementation. Currently, only around 30 Km of the border has been fenced.

    Since the Tatmadaw now has limited control over its border areas, it has become imperative for India to commence a structured dialogue with other warring parties in Myanmar’s border regions. This, with a view to restoring the situation in Manipur (and on the border) through mutually acceptable solutions at least for the short to medium term, is necessary. Only then can a modicum of security on the border be guaranteed. This involves navigating a maze of ethnic, religious, historical and societal issues with great sensitivity. The importance of such a dialogue cannot be overemphasised, more so because of recent developments in Bangladesh.

    The Impact of Bangladesh’s ‘Second Liberation’

    The events of 5 August 2024  that witnessed the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina’s government have proved to be yet another watershed in India-Bangladesh relations. India has invested more in the India-Bangladesh relationship than with any other neighbour in South Asia. A glance at the website of our Ministry of External Affairs[xxiii], where details of various agreements and summaries from the last Prime Ministerial meeting in Delhi in June 2024 are provided, will suffice to show just how strong and all-encompassing this relationship has become.

    Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen. Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners.

    At the time of writing, it is two months since the interim government headed by Chief Advisor Mohammed Yunus assumed charge.  The country continues to make efforts to reestablish the rule of law. All wings of the armed forces have been given magisterial powers[xxiv]. The functioning of the judiciary, higher civil services, local administration, police, security agencies, banking, economy, and higher education, is under review. Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen.[xxv] The Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners. Commissions have been set up to suggest reforms in the constitution, electoral system, police, judiciary, public administration and in tackling corruption.  Elections do not seem to be on the horizon yet. The advisers ( as the ministers are currently known) are new faces, not well known in India.

    While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here.

    With the removal of Sheikh Hasina, the India-Bangladesh relationship is undergoing a major reset. Statements of certain public figures and sentiments of a section of the population in that country suggest that a different perspective on the evolution of Bangladesh as a nation from 1971 onwards is emerging. While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here. This will make it an arduous task for both countries to go back to the trusted, cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship that existed. As mentioned, the list of achievements for both countries is far too numerous –  settlement of land and oceanic borders,  road, rail and riverine connectivity (including use of ports), economy and business ( both government and private), education including educational scholarships, technology, disaster management, border management, maritime security, military to military cooperation, improved people to people contacts, culture and health. As per records, of the 16 lakh visas issued by India for Bangladesh nationals in 2023, 4.5 lakhs were for medical treatment alone[xxvi]. Economies are so embedded that everyday necessities like onions are exported regularly to Bangladesh ( approximately 6 to 7 lakh tonnes annually).

    Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

    A parallel reality, however, is that negative perceptions about India have historically found space in sections of Bangladesh’s polity. These have received a huge fillip after the change of regime with even settled agreements prone to misunderstanding. A recent example pertains to a tripartite agreement dating back to the Hasina period whereby electricity is to be imported from Nepal via India to Bangladesh. The agreement was signed in Kathmandu in the first week of  October 2024. Newspaper reports from Bangladesh indicate that there is palpable resentment over the condition that Indian transmission systems inside Indian territory be utilised for this purpose since it increases costs per unit of electricity in Bangladesh.[xxvii] Another issue currently bedevilling relations is the state of minorities in Bangladesh who have faced attacks on their homes, businesses and religious places with some loss of life, since the protests in July. India’s concerns in this regard have been conveyed at the highest level. Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

    Larger Implications for India

    Bangladesh and Myanmar are pivotal for India’s Act East policy from the security, economic and connectivity angles. The issues pertaining to Myanmar and Manipur have been brought out earlier. A common concern affecting both nations and  India is the Rohingya crisis. Despite international pressure and requests from Bangladesh for China to intercede with Myanmar on its behalf, there has been no positive response from Myanmar. Bangladesh, which currently hosts close to one million refugees,[xxviii] has publicly expressed its inability to accommodate any more Rohingyas and asked for a speedy ‘third country settlement’ [xxix]. A detailed report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) in October 2023[xxx]provides details of activities of militant organisations like the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) which are involved in drug running from Myanmar along with Bangladeshi syndicates for sale of the product in that country. Their participation in violent crime and other illegal activity has become a pressing concern within Bangladesh. Rohingyas have infiltrated into India as well, and have been identified as far North as Jammu. The security implications of such migration for both Bangladesh and India are apparent. The insensitivity of the Myanmar Junta on this account is heightening security risks for India and Bangladesh and merits diplomatic intervention.

    With the situation in Bangladesh evolving by the day, it is prudent for India to take a strategic pause as it weighs its options for pursuing its Act East policy. While giving the new regime in Bangladesh its due, India has to consider the impact of resurgent forces aided by inimical powers that aim to derail the India-Bangladesh relationship beyond repair. Even as both countries attempt to reestablish strong ties, the old adage preached by educated Bangladeshis in the context of support to Sheikh Hasina’s regime that ‘India should not put all its eggs in one basket’ resonates. While Myanmar geographically cannot provide the singular advantages that Bangladesh can, it is time for India to press for securing Myanmar’s cooperation to complete pending projects in that country, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Port Project (KMMPP) via Sittwe and Paletwa, that provides an alternate route to our North East, as well as the Trans Asian Highway (TAH) that provides connectivity with the rest of ASEAN, amongst others.

    To summarise, two possible reasons for inviting rebel Myanmar groups to Delhi could be: first, the relative viability of either Bangladesh or Myanmar to help implement the Act East policy in light of the emerging situation in Bangladesh and the state of the civil war in Myanmar. The second, ensuring security on the India-Myanmar border, to prevent aggravating the situation in India’s border states.

     

    Notes:

    [i] ‘Exclusive: India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar’s anti-junta forces, sources say’ Wa Lone and Devjyot Ghoshal Reuters September 23, 2024

    [ii] ‘Govt aims to make Northeast gateway of ‘Act East Policy’: President Murmu’ Press Trust of India 27 June 2024.

    [iii] Ibid.

    [iv] ‘Japan to tie landlocked Northeast India with Bangladesh’  Saleem Samad  The Daily Messenger 05 March 2024.

    [v] Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Shipping note dated  10 June 2015

    ‘Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic amongst BBIN’

    [vi]   ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State Asia Report N°339 | 27 August 2024’ International Crisis Group (Executive Summary).

    [vii]   ‘As Myanmar’s Junta Loses Control in the North, China’s Influence Grows’  Jason Tower, United States Institute for Peace, August 1, 2024.

    [viii] Ibid.

    [ix]   ‘Facing setbacks against resistance forces, Myanmar’s military government activates conscription law ‘ Associated Press, February 12, 2024.

    [x] ‘India’s ‘Forgotten Partition’ and the Myanmar Refugee Crisis’  Swapnarka Arnan The Diplomat  11 May 2024.

    [xi] ‘We killed many … drones are our air force’: Myanmar’s rebels take on the junta from above. Aakash Hassan and Hannah Ellis-Petersen  The Observer 20 January 2024.

    [xii] ‘Armed Groups Snub Myanmar Junta ‘Peace’ Offer’  The Irrawaddy 28 September 2024

    [xiii] ‘Centre provides 1,379 MT rice to Mizoram for Manipur, Myanmar, B’desh refugees’ Morung Express 25 September 2024.

    [xiv] ‘Ethnic violence in India’s Manipur escalates, six killed’  Tora Agarwala Reuters  September 7, 2024

    [xv] ‘900 Kuki militants infiltrated Manipur from Myanmar, says Security Advisor’ India Today NE September 20 2024.

    [xvi] ‘Input on infiltration by 900 Kuki militants could not be substantiated on the ground, says Manipur security advisor’ Vijaita Singh The Hindu 26 September 2024.

    [xvii] ‘Kukis call removal of Assam Rifles from 2 Manipur areas ‘biased, appeasement’, Meiteis call it ‘victory’  Ananya Bhardwaj  The Print 04 August 2024.

    [xviii]‘ Manipur: Kuki-Zo organizations hold rallies, demand separate ‘Kukiland’ for peace  by Northeast News

    August 31, 2024.

    [xix] YouTube channel titled ‘Zalengam Media’.

    [xx] ‘Kuki militants seek release of ‘secessionist’ in Manipur’ Prawesh Lama and Thomas Ngangom Hindustan Times Sep 30, 2024.

    [xxi] ‘Keep us out of your war, Manipur Naga body warns two warring communities’  The Hindu Bureau 06 February 2024

    [xxii] ‘Government sanctions ₹31,000 crore to fence Myanmar border’   The Hindu

    Published – September 18, 2024

    [xxiii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India website mea.gov.in.

    [xxiv] ‘Navy, the air force also granted magistracy powers’  The Daily Star September 30 2024

    [xxv] ‘Bank accounts of Joy Putul Bobby frozen’ Dhaka Tribune 30 Sep 2024.

    [xxvi] ‘Indian High Commission in Dhaka, facing protests & threats, returns 20,000 visa applicants’ passports ‘ Ananya Bhardwaj  The Print   29 September 2024.

    [xxvii] ‘Bangladesh delegation in Nepal to sign the contract to import 40 MW electricity’ Dhaka Tribune 30 September 2024.

    [xxviii] Operational Data Portal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for Bangladesh.

    [xxix] ‘Bangladesh calls for faster resettlement process for Rohingya’ Ruma Paul  Reuters  September 8, 2024

    [xxx] ‘Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis’ International Crisis Group Autumn Update 04 October 20223.

     

    Feature Image Credit: What does Sheikh Hasina’s resignation mean for India-Bangladesh relations? – aljazeera.com 

    Map Credit: National Online Project

    Bangladesh Parliament Image: The Shattered Identity of a Nation: From Liberation to Chaos – borderlens.com

    Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Statue: Bangabandhu to Toppled Statue: Mujibur Rahman’s contested legacy post Bangladesh upheaval – Economic Times

     

  • “And Now to some serious Governance”

    “And Now to some serious Governance”

    A time comes for each leader and government to rise above pettiness, discarding ill will and hatred towards all. For the BJP, now uniquely in its third term, this is the time to show the nation that it is a party with a difference. For the opposition equally, this is the time to cooperate with the government on critical issues impacting the country.  

     

    Since my retirement from active service, I have avoided politics and political writings like the plague, but the avoidable happenings of the past few months have caused me, like am sanguine would have to millions of our countrymen, pain and a sense of despair.

    India has conducted over 18   general elections to its Parliament since 1952 with a lot of fury and vibrancy, but the Lok Sabha 2024 general elections were indeed an example of abysmally low-level politics transcending our better senses.

            How the world’s largest democracy indulged in its Lok Sabha 2024 elections was hardly complimenting to it considering the unquestionable fact that among the emerging nations in the world, call it from the Global South, the conduct of our elections showed some among those participating in poor light. Between competing political parties, enlightened debates and mutual civility were sadly lacking.   India has conducted over 18   general elections to its Parliament since 1952 with a lot of fury and vibrancy, but the Lok Sabha 2024 general elections were indeed an example of abysmally low-level politics transcending our better senses. India, which carries a fair amount of moral authority and is considered an example of a true and vibrant democracy, cannot let its hallowed image be sullied attributable to the selfish electoral games of some of its political leaders. The party in power at the Centre, the principal Opposition party and all those regional parties at the helm in the states have to display adequate maturity and a modicum of propriety and civility towards each other and not politicize each and every aspect of governance or national issues impacting India. The opposition, as it shows the mirror to the government on critical issues of governance, must not criticise each and every act of the government as a matter of routine.

             With the outcome of the general elections now done and dusted and the previous BJP government back in power, albeit with a clear reduction in its seats tally from 303 down to 240, it must get down to the exacting business of good governance from the Centre. That the same government, with its experience of the last ten continuous years in power, fielding more or less the same faces in the Cabinet in critical ministries and importantly serviced by the same bureaucrats should have, relatively speaking, not such an arduous task in governance. However, the thrust for fair, equitable, and sensitive handling of all critical matters across the nation has to come from the top political leadership. All our states must never feel discrimination by the Centre, especially in financial allocations urgently required for developmental works and disaster management. Additionally, the new government must take stern measures to keep rising inflation and unnecessary governmental expenditure under check before the economy takes a severe nose-dive.

             The Modi government, with the continuous experience of the last ten years, will have more than a good idea of the systemic improvements required and about areas needing additional financial resources and effort. It is unnecessary to worry too much about criticisms from the opposition but to carry on regardless in developmental works, without fear or favour, and with impartiality towards all the states in the true spirit of federalism. A time comes for each leader and government to rise above pettiness, discarding ill will and hatred towards all. For the BJP, now uniquely in its third term, this is the time to show the nation that it is a party with a difference. For the opposition equally, this is the time to cooperate with the government on critical issues impacting the country.

             New Delhi’s hands will be full of the nation’s diverse and formidable challenges, requiring attention and effectiveness. On the foreign policy front, India will have to walk the tightrope of maintaining strategic autonomy and sustaining its good relations with both the US and Russia. However, as it determinedly confronts an overly assertive China, India needs to use its economic clout and sophisticated diplomacy to get its South Asian neighbourhood closer to it and each other, avoiding the debt trap diplomacy and financial machinations of China.

    The number of terror-related incidents in J&K has gone up substantially in the last three months, and Pakistan will have to be kinetically chastened.

          India must, at the appropriate level, convey to China that their confrontationist attitude towards us will be harmful to the Chinese, too and may propel India to rethink its existing Tibet policy. Nevertheless, India must maintain the utmost vigil along the 3485 km Line of Actual Control/ IB, which it shares with  China. Meanwhile, Pakistan once again needs to be cautioned against stepping up terror activities in J&K  or elsewhere in the Indian hinterland. India is in full knowledge of Pakistan’s many fault lines. Still, it has refrained from exploiting these, and Pakistan must also cooperate in ensuring a peaceful and prosperous South Asian neighbourhood independent of China’s wily stratagems. The number of terror-related incidents in J&K has gone up substantially in the last three months, and Pakistan will have to be kinetically chastened.

    Meanwhile, India’s preparations to successfully improve its security capabilities to confront a two-front war must go ahead with realism and an unfailing determination. Measures to augment capital expenditure for major defence acquisitions must be identified. Transformative defence reforms like the introduction of integrated theatre commands will need the attention of the Centre. In addition, India must take all steps to restore peace in our restive NE states.

             The Modi government has come in for some criticism abroad on its human rights record and dealings with its Muslim population. This unjust criticism must be dealt with judiciously and with maturity. India’s overall inclusiveness and celebration of its diversity are unique examples for the entire world, especially the nations of the Global South. We must never deviate or be even seen to shift from this noble orientation.

    Reduction of the yawning gap between the countless ultra-rich and those millions in abject poverty is essential as we boast of becoming the 5th largest economy in the world. The many human indices where we are faltering also need to be addressed.

             As economic strength is the pillar that propels and sustains progress, the Modi government must take measures to improve our economic health. Reduction of the yawning gap between the countless ultra-rich and those millions in abject poverty is essential as we boast of becoming the 5th largest economy in the world. The many human indices where we are faltering also need to be addressed.

             By all yardsticks, India is deservingly on the cusp of acquiring a seat on the global high table. Let us not squander away this golden opportunity by internal squabbling but instead work together in addressing crucial issues that affect our nation; we must seize this opportunity.

    Feature Image Credit:  vskbharat.com    

    Cartoon Credit: Times of India

  • Can a Muscular Response deter Chinese Aggression?

    Can a Muscular Response deter Chinese Aggression?

    The Sino-Indian War of 1962, which is seen as a humiliating defeat for India, continues to rankle all Indians. Clearly, it is seen as a result of poor leadership both at the political and military levels. In hindsight, many believe that the PLA could have been routed had India regrouped its Army and used the IAF in a massive counterattack. It was November, and with the onset of winter and the closing of the Himalayan passes, the PLA could have been demolished completely. That we didn’t even think of it shows the serious vacuum in strategic thinking. More than half a century later, and with the Indian military much stronger and battle-hardened, it is inexplicable why India’s leadership is shy of following an aggressive strategy, including the use of force proactively against China. Brigadier Deepak Sinha, a vetran and TPF’s Senior Fellow, raises this question while correlating the current situation with that of 1962.

    There is an urgent need for us all to shed our divisive politics, long-held dogmas and skewed perceptions, forget fanciful visions and face reality, especially when it comes to the question of national security. The last thing we need is for petty politics and fragile egos to control our nation’s destiny. Nothing can be more consequential, traumatic or shameful than being bested by a rival on the battlefield. The consequences of our “defeat” in the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 continue to rankle and haunt us to this day.

    Quite clearly, the fear psychosis that permeates our higher military and political leadership is palpable.

    Indeed, our reluctance, for fear of escalation, to launch a quid-pro-quo riposte and grab disputed territory elsewhere as a bargaining chip following the PLA’s blatant land grab of disputed territory in Eastern Ladakh is a clear indication of this. This was reinforced by an earlier interview with ANI by our Foreign Minister, who stated, “Look, they (China) are the bigger economy. What am I going to do? As a smaller economy, I am going to pick up a fight with the bigger economy? It is not a question of being reactionary, it’s a question of common sense….” Quite clearly, the fear psychosis that permeates our higher military and political leadership is palpable.

    On the other hand, the Chinese leadership has a very different perception of our capabilities as was reflected back in 1959 following the Longju incident. A declassified United States document of that time points out that “the late August clashes point to a mode of thought which has remained an ingredient in the Chinese leaders’ calculations on the border dispute: ‘When the Indians show a temperament to advance on the ground, we must alter their frame of mind by letting military action take over political caution. Besides, military risk itself is negligible because we are the stronger side.” Obviously, over the years, they have been given no reason to believe otherwise. In order to understand what ails us, it is worth briefly examining the course of the 1962 conflict to get a clearer idea of the extent of our loss at the hands of the Chinese. That should help us understand why, over fifty years later, we continue to remain so traumatised and fearful.

    The opening skirmish of that conflict occurred in the North East with the capture, on 8th Sept, of the isolated Assam Rifles post at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La ridgeline. This post was surrounded and completely dominated by PLA positions on higher ground, and its loss was a foregone conclusion. The actual conflict commenced at approximately 0500 hours on 20th October, when the PLA launched a massive infantry attack, supported by artillery, on the 7 Infantry Brigade positions. The Brigade was deployed in a tactically unsound manner on direct orders of GOC 4 Corps, Lt Gen B M Kaul, along the Southern banks of the Namka Chu River over a 20 Km frontage instead of on the heights overlooking the river.

    The battalions were deployed in platoon penny pockets, lacking mutual support, in temporary positions with no overhead cover. Artillery support was restricted to just one battery of Heavy Mortars and a troop of two field guns with limited ammunition. No intelligence was available to the Brigade Headquarters or any of the other higher headquarters as to PLA force levels or their intentions. The assault came as a surprise and just four hours later, by 0900 Hours, the Brigade ceased to exist as a fighting force. Within just another 96 Hours, the strategic border town of Tawang, approximately 100 Km in-depth, held by an understrength battalion, was attacked and captured without a fight.

    Almost simultaneously in the Northern Theatre, isolated forward positions at Aksai Chin and the Pangong Tso area were also cleared after a brief skirmish. After an administrative pause of approximately a month, the PLA launched the next phase of its offensive with its assault on the Walong positions on 16th Nov and on the main defences of the 4 Infantry Division at Bomdi La, Se La and on the Division Headquarters at Dirang Dzong. Simultaneously, on 20th Nov, Chushul came under attack by an Infantry Divison. On 21st Nov the Chinese announced a unilateral ceasefire and subsequently withdrew to positions occupied by them prior to the commencement of the conflict.

    There are three main deductions that can be drawn from an examination of the facts. Firstly, that the conflict was, in essence, extremely limited in terms of time, space and force levels involved. From an army of 550,000 personnel, approximately 20,000 personnel were committed into this conflict, primarily due to our limited logistical capabilities. The conflict was primarily restricted to the tactical level only, at battalion level and below. While the conflict itself was spread over one month, the tactical engagements themselves lasted a few hours at best, and on one or two occasions where stiffer resistance was put up, extending to 48-72 Hours. Unfortunately, given the terrain, lack of field fortifications, etc, casualties suffered were relatively high, with approximately fifteen hundred killed, similar numbers wounded, two thousand missing and another 4000 taken prisoner. The Air Force, which could have played a critical role in blunting the PLA attacks and destroying their lines of communications, was deliberately confined to the logistics role for reasons that are still not clear, while the Navy remained a bystander.

    Sadly, our military and political leadership exhibited an utter lack of moral courage, determination and willpower by quietly acquiescing to the unilateral ceasefire, thereby kicking the main irritant of the demarcation of borders further up the road, where it has once again come to bite us on our posteriors.

    Secondly, far from being a major defeat, as has been commonly made out, it was at best a temporary reverse that could, and should, have been countered with the use of fresh troops under a more determined and professional leadership. More importantly, the PLA understood this fact and, therefore, undertook a unilateral withdrawal to its earlier pre-war line of defences. It must have been fully cognisant that if hostilities were to continue, it would find itself in an increasingly untenable position with its supply lines already badly stretched and being further impacted with the onset of winter. It would only have been a matter of time before the Indian Army got over its shock, regrouped and reorganised itself and launched a counter-offensive to recapture lost territory. Sadly, our military and political leadership exhibited an utter lack of moral courage, determination and willpower by quietly acquiescing to the unilateral ceasefire, thereby kicking the main irritant of the demarcation of borders further up the road, where it has once again come to bite us on our posteriors.

    Thirdly, what continues to remain totally inexplicable is the reasons why our military and political leadership continue to remain so traumatised and scared to this day. The truth is that the narrative that emanated following the reverses was set by officers and men belonging to units that, for the most part, had withdrawn before coming in contact with the PLA. They were low on morale and had come to believe the Chinese were supermen who could not be stopped by mere mortals. It was from amongst the experience and perception of these personnel that pamphlets on the tactics and capabilities of the PLA were subsequently formulated that continue to be relied on to this day, thereby giving further credence to that distorted narrative.

    The fact of the matter is that in any future conflict, the PLA will be fighting over 2000 Kms away from its home bases, supported along communication lines that run over some of the most difficult and inhospitable terrain in the world. They are also easily susceptible to interdiction, given the nature of the terrain. In addition, they would have to contend with a hostile and badly oppressed population not just within Tibet but in Xingjian as well, which could revolt if a suitable opportunity arose. This would require the PLA to deploy additional forces for rear area security to prevent disruption of the lines of communication.

    Moreover, while there are sizeable disparities in aspects such as force levels and capabilities, infrastructure development and economic strength, one needs to be cognizant of the fact that we have also made tremendous strides with regard to infrastructure development, logistics and offensive capabilities. Our forces still hold the edge vis-à-vis combat experience and operating in mountains, while the Air Force continues to hold the upper hand in the TAR purely on account of terrain profile and radius of action. Most importantly, the availability of two Mountain Strike Corps gives us immense flexibility, if properly utilized, to grab the initiative and force a decision dilemma on the PLA. In the circumstances, the reason for our extreme reluctance to stand up against the Chinese bully must lie elsewhere. One distinct possibility is that our political leadership lacks faith in the military leadership and its ability to fight and win.

    This will seem at odds with the fact that the military has a splendid history of having always successfully completing any task given to it. If anything, it has been grossly misused by the Central and State Governments to carry out tasks that are not in their ambit, whether these be organizing the Commonwealth Games or construction of railway over-bridges, because the concerned departments and agencies have been unable to produce the requisite results. Clearly, this mistrust, primarily in the sphere of civil-military relations, has more pernicious roots and is very deeply embedded in the politico-bureaucratic psyche.

     Interestingly, in the Official History of the 1962 Conflict with China, available in the public domain but yet to be published, the Chief Editor, Dr S N Prasad, concludes that the chief reason for our defeat was that the political establishment was unable to avoid war while it was in the process of transforming the military establishment. Given Prime Minister Nehru’s apprehensions about the military taking control, he wanted to change it from being, as Mr Prasad puts it, a “close-knit professional body, deliberately isolated from the citizen. Its predominant motive force remained esprit de corps and not identification with the people… Perhaps he wanted to model it after the People’s Liberation Army of China, more egalitarian, flexible, closer to the people………Such basic changes required a committed, or at least a pliant, band of army officers in key positions. So mediocre Thapar was selected instead of the doughty Thorat as Army Chief, and Bijji Kaul was made CGS……. “

      He further goes on to add that “To carry out this transformation of the national defence set up, a decade of peace was absolutely essential. For establishing indigenous weapons manufacture, money had to be found by cutting arms imports. The armed forces would be short of equipment and stores for several years till the new arms factories started producing. The officer cadre was a house divided within itself till the new breed fully took over. A period of transition was inevitable, during which the fighting machine would not be fully efficient and would be vulnerable………Therein seems to lie the basic cause of the debacle of 1962. India failed to avoid a war during the transition period. Lulled by faulty political assessment and wrong intelligence forecasts, the country got caught in a war when it was least prepared.

    With Mr Modi’s ascension to power, we came a full circle as he took it upon himself to steer it away from its apolitical and secular character towards a more ideologically compatible institution that would be in sync with his Party’s long-held vision of making India into a Hindu Rashtra.

    Fortuitously for the country, Nehru’s vision for a transformed military was stymied by the 1962 Conflict and the most important lesson that his successors assimilated quickly was to stay away from interfering in the internal affairs of the military as that could gravely damage internal cohesion and morale. With Mr Modi’s ascension to power, we came a full circle as he took it upon himself to steer it away from its apolitical and secular character towards a more ideologically compatible institution that would be in sync with his Party’s long-held vision of making India into a Hindu Rashtra.

    Towards this end Mr Modi has smartly used the concept of “deep selection” to ensure key senior appointments were filled by officers displaying an affinity for his government’s ideology, regardless of existing rules, seniority or merit. This, in turn, made them personally beholden to him, and he was thus able to use them to take ownership and deflect criticism from initiatives that were pushed through by his government regardless of their adverse impact on long-standing and cherished customs and traditions or on the operational capabilities of the Services. This has led to schisms within the institution, damaged the integrity and cohesion of the chain of command and cast a big question mark on the apolitical and secular character of the Services.

    In this context, a politically compromised Chief of Defence Staff and other senior officers shamefully endorsed the PMO, thrusting down the ill-conceived Agnipath Scheme on the military with not a single objection being raised. This scheme has all but destroyed the basic ethos of our fighting arms, ensuring that the deeply entrenched and effective Regimental System has been severed at the roots. Given their ignorance of matters military, they would have been ignorant of Winston Churchill’s wise advice that “Regiments are not like houses. They cannot be pulled down and altered structurally to suit the convenience of the occupier or the caprice of the owner. They are more like plants; they grow slowly if they are to grow strong…and if they are blighted or transplanted, they are apt to wither.”

    And wither they have, the resulting adverse impact on morale is not difficult to gauge. This is undoubtedly being further exacerbated by the considerable voids in manpower, with combat units reportedly functioning at less than 75% of their authorised strength, and truncated peace tenures to fill up operational voids in Eastern Ladakh, Manipur and Jammu & Kashmir. In addition, the government’s emphasis on the ‘Atman Nirbhar Abhiyan’ and ‘Make in India Scheme’ has resulted in deficiencies, even if temporary, in the holdings of weapons systems, ammunition and other warlike stores. Given all these factors, the military obviously finds itself in an extremely precarious situation, committed to its fullest capacity with limited options available. Ironically, a government that lays such a great emphasis on our Hindu origins, culture and history has managed to display a profound ignorance of statecraft and warfare, as brought out in Kautilya’s Arthashastra. In this classic, Chanakya points to the necessity for a strong army because, for all nation-states, there are only two states of being: either conquer or be conquered.

    …at the present time, we are once again confronted with an extremely turbulent geopolitical situation, with the world’s attention on the ongoing crises in Europe and the Middle East. The situation today, in many ways, is clearly reminiscent of the period on the eve of the 1962 Conflict. For reasons not very different from then, the Indian Military finds itself in a very similar situation as well.In these circumstances, the real question that we should be asking ourselves is not whether we can overcome our past traumas and face down the PLA, but more importantly, whether China will seize this opportunity to recalibrate the Sino-Indian relationship through the use of force.

    Interestingly, in 1962, China launched major operations against us at the end of the campaigning season, which could have been jeopardised by unseasonal snow. Obviously, this was because, at that time, the world’s attention was riveted to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Similarly, at the present time, we are once again confronted with an extremely turbulent geopolitical situation, with the world’s attention on the ongoing crises in Europe and the Middle East. In addition, the United States is deeply immersed in its own internal problems with presidential elections just around the corner and with little time for other matters.

    The situation today, in many ways, is clearly reminiscent of the period on the eve of the 1962 Conflict. Moreover, at that time, Chairman Mao was under intense pressure as his Great Leap Forward experiment had failed, and he had been removed from his appointment as State President. Today, President Xi also finds himself under similar pressure following his disastrous Zero Covid and hard-line economic policies that have tanked the economy. For reasons not very different from then, the Indian Military finds itself in a very similar situation as well.

    Undoubtedly, the political leadership and the military top brass must be fully cognizant of this state of affairs. Clearly, they are in no position to stare down the PLA. What makes matters worse is that following the General Elections, Mr. Modi’s authority and standing have been greatly diminished. Where does this leave those senior officers who have progressed by hanging on to his ideological coat-tails? Has the authority and credibility of the CDS, an out-and-out political appointee and loyalist, been affected within the Chiefs of Staff Committee of which he is the Chairman? What will be its impact on the move towards the establishment of theatre commands? In these circumstances, the real question that we should be asking ourselves is not whether we can overcome our past traumas and face down the PLA, but more importantly, whether China will seize this opportunity to recalibrate the Sino-Indian relationship through the use of force.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Border Clashes between India and China ‘regularly covered up’  The Telegraph

    Namka Chu and Dhola Post Picture credit: www.indiasentinels.com