The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: China

  • Trade during the Sangam Age: Exploring the Sangam literature and Keezhadi excavations

    Trade during the Sangam Age: Exploring the Sangam literature and Keezhadi excavations

    The sculpted marvels which bejewel the ancient temples all across Tamil Nadu stand testimony to the magnificence of Sangam age (3rd century BC to 3rd century AD) and the prolific artistic innovations which are characteristic of that period. But that’s not all there is to it. Matching the artistic and cultural fervour, trade activities were also at an all-time high during the Sangam age. Evidentiating this claim, the Sangam literature chronicles details of all the fine merchandise which were produced in Ancient Tamilakam. Building up on their strengths, the Tamils ventured into lands far and wide, establishing trading associations in foreign countries, some of which till date retain imprints of their existence. Coupled with manifest cultural similarities, archaeological and inscriptional evidence add on to the credibility of Sangam literature by making a strong case for the existence of an extensive trade between Tamilakam and the rest of the Old World.

    Sangam Literature: Valuable source of Information on Trade

    Pattinappalai, one of the poems (301 lines in ‘Vanji’ meter and Asiriyapa/Akaval meter) in Pattuppāṭṭu which is a corpus of ten poems, talks in great detail about Kaveripoompattinam, the capital city of the Early Cholas.

    Even though only half of what is claimed to have been created remains, the Sangam literature is too big a chunk to be thoroughly studied in a short time. There might still be parts of it that are waiting to be looked into. But of what has been discovered, the details pertinent to trade can predominantly be found in three major literary works, namely Pattuppāṭṭu, Silappatikaram and its sequel Manimekalai. Pattinappalai, one of the poems (301 lines in ‘Vanji’ meter and Asiriyapa/Akaval meter) in Pattuppāṭṭu which is a corpus of ten poems, talks in great detail about Kaveripoompattinam, the capital city of the Early Cholas. The port of Puhar / Kaveripoompattinam had ” an abundance of horses brought over the seas, sacks of black pepper brought overland in carts, gemstones and gold from the northern mountains, and sandalwood and eaglewood from the Western hills, pearls from the southern seas and coral from the eastern seas, grains from the regions of Ganga and Kaveri, food grains from Eelam (Sri Lanka) and products from Burma and other rare and great commodities.”

    A description of the port warehouses of Kaveripoompattinam in Pattuppattu is revealing of the flourishing trade – “Like the monsoon season when clouds absorb ocean waters and come down as rains on mountains, limitless goods for export come from inland and imported goods arrive in ships. Fierce, powerful tax collectors are at the warehouses collecting taxes and stamping the Chola tiger symbols on goods that are to be exported.”

    Silappatikaram and Manimekalai, on the other hand, talk about the cities of Madurai, Puhar and Kanchipuram, which served as major centres for cloth weaving, from whence fine quality fabrics were manufactured and exported through the Coromandel Coast. Silk, cotton and wool are some of the fabrics which are mentioned to have been exported from the coast. The epics also present a vivid description of the urban market scenes. The details paint the picture of a buzzing market where trade was carried out in a variety of supreme quality products, starting from agricultural products like black pepper, food grains, areca nuts, white sugar, eaglewood to luxury commodities like gold, pearls, gems, jewels, coral and silk, among other things. In fact, the urban markets are said to have had a separate street dedicated to food grains alone. So high was the demand for food grains that despite having close to eighteen indigenous varieties, grains also had to be imported from other countries in exchange for white salt. Likewise, the demand for aromatic products were too high to be met by home-gown eagle woods and sandalwoods, resulting in the import of the same from South East Asian countries, particularly from China and Indonesia.

    Tamilakam: Maritime Trade hub-centre between the East and the West

    Both literary and archaeological evidence have time and again reaffirmed one another; the merchants of Tamilakam had traded with the East and the West with equal flair. While there is a substantial amount foreign and native literature, and archaeological findings to assert the latter, there is relatively less evidence to support the former. And not only did Tamilakam engage in direct trade with the West, but because all products from Southeast Asia had to be sent through ports along the coast of South India, Tamilakam also acted as the hub-centre for the trade between the East and the West.

    Commodities from Tamilakam had a great demand in Rome. Black pepper, cardamom, pearls and gemstones, especially Beryl which was mined from sites in Kodumanal, Padiyur and Vaniyampadi, were highly sought after in Rome.

    With regard to the West, Tamil merchants have had a long-standing trade relationship with the Egyptians and the Romans. Beginning from the period when Alexandria was the centre of Mediterranean commerce, trade with the West extended well into the time when Rome assumed dominance and became the centre-stage of Mediterranean economy. Trade with Tamilakam was in fact a deciding factor in the question of dominance in sea trade. The Arabs held ground against the competing Romans by monopolizing the knowledge regarding direct sea route to India and information about the source markets in India. Nevertheless, eventually the Romans established direct trade links with India and Rome became the largest market ground for Indian products. Commodities from Tamilakam had a great demand in Rome. Black pepper, cardamom, pearls and gemstones, especially Beryl which was mined from sites in Kodumanal, Padiyur and Vaniyampadi, were highly sought after in Rome.

     

    Picture: Interpretation map from ‘The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea”.

    In the interpretations of a historical document called ‘The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, originally authored by a Greek Navigator in the 1st century, there is said to have been  mentions of a marketplace called Poduk’e in the historical text . G.W.B. Hunting Ford, a historian, has postulated that this place might have been Arikamedu, a location two miles away from modern day Pondicherry.  Hunting Ford also notes that Roman pottery have been excavated in Arikamedu and that these evidence point at the possibility that this region might have been a trading centre for Roman goods in the 1st century AD. Arikamedu, known as Poduk’e in the Greco-Roman world was a manufacturing hub of textiles particularly of Muslin clothes, fine terracotta objects, jewelleries from beads of precious and semi-precious stones, glass and gold. The city had an extensive glass bead manufacturing facilities and is considered as “mother of all bead centres” in the world. Most of their production were aimed for export.

    Picture: Arikamedu – credit: Wikipedia

    Arikamedu, known as Poduk’e in the Greco-Roman world was a manufacturing hub of textiles particularly of Muslin clothes, fine terracotta objects, jewelleries from beads of precious and semi-precious stones, glass and gold. The city had an extensive glass bead manufacturing facilities and is considered as “mother of all bead centres” in the world.

    Descriptions of Puhar, Korkai, Muziris and Arikamedu in Sangam literature indicate extensive presence of Yavanas’ (foreigners) settlements in port cities on account of trade. Pattinapalai describes the port activities and the Chola customs revenue system in detail.

    Keezhadi: Evidences of  Industrial and Trade Centre

     In addition to these, the Keezhadi excavation, conducted by the Archaeological Survey of India in 2016, has unearthed around 13000 antiquities like shells, glass beads, rusted old coins, weapons, pottery of various kinds and iron tools, belonging to the Sangam age. Among the fine quality red and black ware bowls excavated in the region, are the Roman roulette wares which evidentiate the existence of trade links between the Tamils and Romans. Moreover, seven furnaces were discovered at the site and these, according to the archaeologists, are an indication of the possibility that the site might have been a textile unit and settlers in the region might have been involved in industrial activities.

    Keezhadi findings places the Sangam age to an even earlier period starting from 6th century BC. As per Amarnath Ramakrishna, who led the first two phases of excavations, Keezhadi site was one among the 100 sites of possible human habitation shortlisted for excavation. Discovery of Tamil Brahmi inscriptions and graffiti that date back to earliest times as compared to any other findings in India. Quite obviously, Keezhadi points to the potential of a huge trading and manufacturing habitation and a distinct civilization – the Tamil Vaigai River Valley Civilisation. The Sangam literature is rich and a huge treasure trove of information that needs to be researched extensively.

     

    Picture: Australian seaboard, Statue of Garuda and Tamil Inscriptions, symbolising maritime culture – Credit: ancient-origins.net

    Maritime Trade in Tamilakam: A Core Activity

    Several artefacts with Tamil Brahmi inscriptions have been excavated in foreign countries as well. In Thailand, potsherd with Brahmi inscriptions were unearthed. Likewise, Cheena Kazhakam ( Chinese gold coins) were discovered in Srivijaya (modern day Sumatra in Indonesia) and Kadaram (modern day Kedah in Malaysia), places which were under the occupation of the Cholas.

    The aforementioned evidence when correlated with the inscriptional evidence, found in foreign lands about Tamil trading settlements, will help in the historical reconstruction of the maritime trade links of Ancient Tamilakam and will attest to the extensive nature of trade carried out by the Tamils during the Sangam age.

     

    References

     Mukund, Kanakalatha. The Trading World of the Tamil Merchant: Evolution of Merchant Capitalism in the Coromandel. Orient Blackswan, 1999. https://books.google.co.in/books?id=tjXdDYChdGsC&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false.

    Mukund, Kanakalatha. The World of the Tamil Merchants. Portfolio Books Limited, 2015. https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Bha2eLqMPWcC&lpg=PT6&ots=tw2qDuzDlf&dq=trade during sangam age kanakalatha mukund&pg=PT5#v=onepage&q=trade during sangam age kanakalatha mukund&f=false.

    “Roman Trade with India.” Roman Trade with India – New World Encyclopedia. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Roman_trade_with_India#cite_ref-31.

    Kannan, Gokul. “Keezhadi Excavation Points to Vaigai River Civilisation in Sangam Period.” Deccan Chronicle. October 1, 2016. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.deccanchronicle.com/amp/nation/in-other-news/011016/keezhadi-excavation-points-to-vaigai-river-civilisation-in-sangam-period.html.

    Annamalai, S. “Uncovered: Pandyas-Romans Trade Link.” The Hindu. May 16, 2017. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/archaeological-excavation-in-sivaganga-uncovers-pandya-roman-trade-links/article10879282.ece/amp

    Saju, M.T. “Tamil Trade Ships That Sailed to Foreign Shores.” Times of India. March 29, 2018. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www.google.com/amp/s/timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/tracking-indian-communities/tamil-trade-ships-that-sailed-to-foreign-shore

    Main Image: Keezhadi Excavation Site – Credit – ASI

  • The Catalysing Effect of Covid-19 on the Changing World Order

    The Catalysing Effect of Covid-19 on the Changing World Order

    Contrary to the realist belief, international states co-exist in a world order of hierarchy rather than anarchy. Ikenberry presents this hierarchical world order and the cyclical rise and fall of hegemonic powers. Early 20th century witnessed the shift from Pax-Britannica to Pax-Americana that was complete by 1945, from which point the US defended its position during the Cold War with the erstwhile USSR. It exercised its hegemonic influence even more aggressively after the Cold War. However, US dominance of the world order has been diminishing owing to the Trump administration’s isolationist approach to foreign policy, and the increasing influence of China in world politics. This article examines the catalysing effect of Covid-19 and the rise of China on the current World Order.

    Trump’s policy of disregarding multilateralism and imposing its unilateralism on the world has catalysed into an involuntary retreat, protectionism, and isolationism for the USA with dire consequences for its foreign policy effectiveness.

    Trump’s policy of disregarding multilateralism and imposing its unilateralism on the world has catalysed into an involuntary retreat, protectionism, and isolationism for the USA with dire consequences for its foreign policy effectiveness. The net result is that the world is witnessing an abdication of leadership by America in a world disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic. A clear pattern of isolationism can be seen in various actions of the Trump Administration since it’s assumption of the Office. In 2017, the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement, in 2018 it unilaterally reneged from the JCPOA, re-imposed sanctions on Iran and threatened sanctions on allies who supported Iran. In 2019, it withdrew troops from Syria, which led to subsequent Turkish incursion on Rojava Kurds, and in early 2020 it negotiated with the Taliban to enable withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. With the onset of Covid19 global pandemic, the Trump administration has accused the WHO of protecting China. In a unilateral action not endorsed by its allies, USA first stopped its funding for WHO and then terminated its relationship with the UN institution. This comes as a blow to multilateralism since the US was WHO’s largest donor, contributing about $440 million yearly. In addition to this, the US has failed to provide the lead in the global response to tackle the virus despite its initiatives in the past pandemics such as H1N1, Ebola and the Zika virus. The US was absent from the WHO initiative – Global Coronavirus Response Summit (before its withdrawal from the association). In addition, the US has been unable to provide external aid to combat the virus due to domestic shortages, which explains its restraint to guide an international response in the absence of a coherent domestic plan of action. Thus, the coronavirus pandemic has acted as a catalyst in increasing the pace of US isolationism from world politics.

    China has turned the tide on its previous missteps in containing the virus by publicising its governance model as the most effective way to combat the pandemic.

    Meanwhile, the pandemic has established firmly China’s rise in the international stage. Though China is facing backlash for suppressing details about the virus, it is battling to overcome this criticism by providing international aid and stepping up to lead a global response using Beijing’s success as a template to overcome the novel virus. China has contributed significantly to the global response by providing materials such as ventilators, respirators, masks, protective suits and test kits to Italy, Iran, Serbia, and the whole of Africa. Grabbing its opportunities to lead international responses, China hosted Euro-Asia conference, participated in the Global Coronavirus Summit where it pledged an emergency funding of $20 million to WHO, and pledged $ 2 billion to the WHO (equalling its annual budget) to be disbursed over the next two years, thus contrasting sharply with the US behaviour of withdrawing from the WHO. China has turned the tide on its previous missteps in containing the virus by publicising its governance model as the most effective way to combat the pandemic. It continues to highlight the inadequacies and shortfalls in healthcare systems of the western world as against the success of its governance model, Beijing Consensus, and variations of it in East Asia. It is clear that China has seized the Covid-19 pandemic as a huge opportunity to establish its global leadership.

    Taking advantage of the global disarray due to the pandemic, China has taken strong actions to deflect global criticism of its initial handling of the virus. Two prominent examples of this being, European Union watering down the report on Covid19 disinformation owing to pressure from Beijing, and the passing of the controversial Hong Kong security law. While the US has taken initiative in cracking down on China by repealing the special privileges to Hong Kong, other countries were cautious in retaliating against China significantly and limited their actions to sympathetic support for pro-democracy protestors. The exception to this was Britain, which offered UK citizenship to British National Overseas Passport holders in Hong Kong, despite seriously offending China. Despite the global backlash against Chinese diplomacy in the form of generous aids, international actors have expressed limited concerns through action against Chinese domination. This is due to the circumstantial mismatch in global balancing against China’s rise. The US uses unilateral actions and ‘expects’ its allies to follow, while its allies despite their serious concern over China’s rise, remain vary of following in the American footsteps. This is because US allies treat coronavirus as an immediate threat as opposed to China’s rise. The US being a status quo power is more threatened by China’s rise since it posits as a revisionist state. However, in view of China’s proactive efforts in leading global contributions to battle the coronavirus, US allies remain tolerant of China’s dominance.

    The passive and fractured response to China’s aggressive exploitation of the pandemic to establish its global leadership is a concern for India. The recent setting up of Chinese military camps in Indian controlled territory of Ladakh is a manifestation of China’s complex strategy. India has, true to its traditional policy, opted out of involving the United Statesin the ‘bilateral issue. However, it would be beneficial to be united in balancing against China’s rise. While it is necessary to work together to utilise Global Supply Chains (GSC) during the pandemic to battle the coronavirus pandemic, it is equally important to look at global balancing against China to ensure its compliance to rules-based world order. Since China’s power is derived from its economic strength, balancing strategy against China should focus on trade and economy. Chinese foreign policy depicts a pattern of economic coercion to reward or punish its counterparts. This can be tackled through concerted global action. India is, as one of the largest producer of pharmaceuticals, playing a crucial role in global efforts to fight the pandemic by providing Hydroxychloroquine globally. However, given that most raw materials are sourced from China, balancing against China requires a favourable movement of GSC diversification. US-China trade war has, encouraged companies to move production out of China and into Asian countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan. As a result of the coronavirus crisis and the global backlash, companies look to further diversify their resources and supply chains. India and other Asian countries could benefit from this if they adapt their policies suitably.

    Global backlash against China’s handling of the virus in Wuhan is still a challenge for China’s geopolitical strategy. Its foreign policy is seen more as displaying aggressive and coercive approach than persuasive diplomacy.

    It is difficult to estimate whether China would aspire for hegemonic leadership. Global backlash against China’s handling of the virus in Wuhan is still a challenge for China’s geopolitical strategy. Its foreign policy is seen more as displaying aggressive and coercive approach than persuasive diplomacy. Given the current volatile scenario most countries have, in the absence of US leadership, increased their dependence on China as it is now the largest provider of aid. While all this tips the scale in China’s favour, it’s hegemonic ambitions can be countered through trade strategies as its weakness stems from the fact that it is a hugely export driven economy. Global diversification of supply chains would reduce the world’s increasing dependency on Chinese manufacture and products. The world will need to be cautious as the pandemic has provided China an opportunity to tighten its grip on the global economy as the world’s workshop and technology provider. Here on, international efforts to bandwagon or balance will become a decisive factor in determining China’s rise to apex position in the world order.

     

  • ASEAN Unity Critical for South China Sea: But Time to Address Newer Issues

    ASEAN Unity Critical for South China Sea: But Time to Address Newer Issues

    Perhaps the most defining character of the ASEAN in the last six decades of its existence has been ‘Unity’ among its Member States who have scrupulously adhered to the fundamental principles contained in the various treaties signed by the Member States. The ‘ASEAN Way’ is unique and helps them to remain ‘united’ despite diversity in their political systems, national economic indicators, development levels, and military capabilities. ASEAN has also done well to be labelled as the ‘driver of regional integration’ and promoted a variety of regional political, security and economic initiatives to ensure peace and stability. It has managed with sophistication and alacrity relations with its partner countries bilaterally as also through multilateral structure.

    The ‘ASEAN Way’ is unique and helps them to remain ‘united’ despite diversity in their political systems, national economic indicators, development levels, and military capabilities.

    ASEAN’s engagements with China are through various political and diplomatic exchanges such as Summits and several ASEAN led mechanisms also provide opportunities to its Member States to engage China. The free trade agreement (FTA) is particularly important and catalytic for trade and both sides have taken upon themselves to accelerate negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

    At the strategic level, ASEAN Member States have been quite disillusioned with China over its intention to resolve disputes in South China Sea; but the ASEAN leadership has assiduously pursued the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and succeeded in completing the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text. It is now putting pressure on China to quickly conclude the CoC in the stipulated timeframe to ensure region remains peaceful and stable to enable member countries to invest in national and regional development.

    Ironically some ASEAN Member States have not been keen to openly making reference to Chinese reclamation in South China Sea and near continuous buildup of military infrastructure on islands and features in the Parcels and the Spratly group of islands.

    The report card of ASEAN Unity vis a vis China, so far, has been just about quite decent with at least two exceptions when China was suspected of interfering in ASEAN matters; first in 2012, Cambodia resisted reference to South China Sea in the Chairman’s statement, and again in 2016 soon after the South China Sea Arbitration award.[i]

    Ironically some ASEAN Member States have not been keen to openly making reference to Chinese reclamation in South China Sea and near continuous buildup of military infrastructure on islands and features in the Parcels and the Spratly group of islands. While Vietnam and the Philippines have openly confronted China over their claims in South China Sea, Malaysia chose to pursue “quiet diplomacy” but has stubbornly displayed “lawfare in the South China Sea”;[ii] Brunei has remained quiet because its policy makers “see little choice but to remain quiescent about its dispute with China,” Notwithstanding that, the Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit 26 June 2020 is a clear display of their ‘unity’ and they have collectively expressed concerns on the Chinese activities and recognised the seriousness of a series of incident at sea which have eroded trust and confidence.

    To some extent ASEAN has succeeded in internationalising the Chinese non-compliance of international treaties such as the 1982 UNCLOS to which Beijing is a signatory.

    Today, South China Sea issue has made global headlines. The US has unabashedly rejected Chinese claims over South China Sea and China is accused of not adhering to internal law. To some extent ASEAN has succeeded in internationalizing the Chinese non-compliance of international treaties such as the 1982 UNCLOS to which Beijing is a signatory as also retained a “minimal formal consensus on the South China Sea, rejecting the pernicious idea that the waterway is only the concern of littoral states, and resisting Chinese pressures to avoid discussion of the issue in ASEAN -led forums, certainly contributed to this outcome.”[iii]

    Perhaps it is time for the ASEAN to bring to the forefront the Lachang-Mekong river issue. Several trans-boundary river management issues and concerns between China (the upper riparian and Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian) have emerged over the years. China has been building dams on the river and its tributaries; has avoided sharing full hydrological data particularly during dry seasons; and released river water untimely. The lower riparian states have called for a ‘code of conduct’ and a ‘rule based trans-boundary resource management’ mechanism for the Mekong River between the upper and the lower riparian states.[iv]

    It is tempting to believe that China has successfully stifled lower riparian member states concerns through sops and infrastructure development projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. Interestingly, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), the most active forum is dominated by China.

    Non-riparian ASEAN members are accused of “minimal interest” in the Lancang-Mekong issues and they “generally do not participate”. Even attempts to interest the rest of ASEAN on Mekong issues “are met with only the pretense of polite interest”. [v]

      If ASEAN is to preserve ‘unity’ it must see maritime and continental Southeast Asia as one strategic space and take into account challenges faced by ASEAN Member States who border China on land particularly Myanmar who has accused China of interfering in its internal politics and arming the ethnic armed groups operating near the Chinese border,[vi]  and Laos[vii] that is economically and militarily weak to fend off Chinese pressures unlike Vietnam which has withstood Chinese pressures on land and at sea. Otherwise, China will open yet another contentious front for the ASEAN.  Finally, under the circumstances, prudence necessitates that ASEAN should prepare to incorporate newer issues other than the South China Sea in its agenda!

    Notes:
    [i] “ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean/asean-deadlocked-on-south-china-sea-cambodia-blocks-statement-idUSKCN1050F6 (accessed 18 July 2020).
    [ii] “US-China tensions: why is Malaysia so quiet about the South China Sea?”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3093715/us-china-tensions-why-malaysia-so-quiet-about-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).
    [iii] “Why Asean should treat the Mekong like the South China Sea”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3093546/why-asean-should-treat-mekong-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).
    [iv] Chheang Vannarith, “Code of conduct for the Mekong”, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/298648/code-of-conduct-for-the-mekong/ (accessed 19 July 2020).
    [v]“Why Asean should treat the Mekong like the South China Sea”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3093546/why-asean-should-treat-mekong-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).
    [vi] “After ASEAN & India, Now Myanmar Accuses China of Creating trouble on the Border”, https://eurasiantimes.com/now-myanmar-accuses-china-for-creating-trouble-in-the-country/ (accessed 19 July 2020).
    [vii] China also claims its right over a large part of Laos on historical precedents (China’s Yuan Dynasty, 1271-1368). “China faces territorial issues with 18 nations; check details”, https://zeenews.india.com/world/china-faces-territorial-issues-with-18-nations-check-details-2292826.html (accessed 19 July 2020).

    Image: Adobe Stock

  • What After The Galwan Incident?

    What After The Galwan Incident?

    As one writes, a phase of the events in the Galwan valley near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has come to an end. Inputs from government, media and private commentators, have provided a perspective of the events preceding the incidents of 15/16 June and thereafter till the current day. For the world, the occasion has provided the opportunity yet again to witness the fighting spirit and junior leadership of all ranks of the Indian Army, who despite being outnumbered, were able to inflict far greater casualties on their adversaries, in inhospitable terrain under fading light conditions. The sacrifices of the men of 16 BIHAR, 3 PUNJAB, 3 Medium Regiment, and individual personnel from 81 Field Regiment, Corps of Signals and the Army Medical Corps have added lustre to the reputation of the Indian military. Their deeds shall remain enshrined in the memory of a grateful nation. At this watershed moment, we salute them.
    China is contesting control over settled areas (Galwan), exploiting laid down rules and norms of border management by resorting to use of primitive weapons instead of firearms, and pushing the envelope on the ground in attempting to increase areas under control such as at Hot Springs and Pangong Tso – all actions just short of war.
    One theory gaining currency in attempting to understand China’s recent behaviour, pertains to its unhappiness over what it perceives as alteration of the status quo on the LAC by designating Ladakh as a Union Territory – resulting in active collusion with Pakistan which shares Beijing’s sentiments on this issue, amongst others. However, there is no doubt that the strategy applied by China in East Ladakh comes straight out of its manual on Grey Zone Warfare. It is contesting control over settled areas (Galwan), exploiting laid down rules and norms of border management by resorting to use of primitive weapons instead of firearms, and pushing the envelope on the ground in attempting to increase areas under control such as at Hot Springs and Pangong Tso – all actions just short of war.

    While the situation on the Pangong Tso awaits resolution, what is amply clear is that the era of explaining away patrol clashes on the LAC to the Indian public, in terms of ‘varying perceptions held by both sides’, is past. By its perfidious actions in East Ladakh this year, China has shredded in letter and spirit the border agreements built up over the last three decades. The recent incidents have brought greater clarity to the public mind, with a consensus that China’s salami slicing tactics cannot be tolerated any further. Indian soldiers see the LAC as a line marked on the map. Commanders are clear that the areas up to that line are to be either physically occupied or patrolled at will from bases in the vicinity, supplemented by other forms of surveillance. As per media reports, the Government has over the weekend ‘revised the Rules of Engagement’, giving ‘a free hand to the Army’ to deal with occurrences of this nature. By implication, in future if patrols cannot resolve their face offs peacefully, there will be no resorting to hand to hand scuffles with primitive weapons – unsuccessful efforts at border management will give way to border defence, through resort to tactical military operations.
    As per media reports, the Government has over the weekend ‘revised the Rules of Engagement’, giving ‘a free hand to the Army’ to deal with occurrences of this nature. By implication, in future if patrols cannot resolve their face offs peacefully, there will be no resorting to hand to hand scuffles with primitive weapons – unsuccessful efforts at border management will give way to border defence, through resort to tactical military operations.
    Response to this new paradigm places another set of challenges before the Indian Army. Prior to May 2020, Galwan was not in the category of disputed areas, as understood in LAC parlance. Neither had any Chinese activity been sensed in the preceding years. While construction of the DSDBO road could be the trigger, the fact that an area where the LAC had lain undisturbed since 1962 could become the scene of such a violent action, warrants scrutiny of PLA intent across the board. Previous assumptions with respect to the PLAs likely areas of interest across the entire Northern border, therefore, certainly warrants a relook. Conclusions drawn would mandate contingency planning and consequent tasking at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Such plans doubtless exist. However, it is obvious that their scope, timelines, and imperatives for successful implementation will need review in conjunction with the other services.
    Outcomes of such reviews would inevitably renew the focus on capability building and in the middle term, might even alter priorities for the same. Substantial enhancements in the areas of surveillance, tactical and strategic air mobility and real time communication links continue to retain their importance. Induction of greater varieties of kinetic non-contact weapon systems, complemented by force multipliers such as cyber warriors and special forces too remain on top of the list. Also, the continued ceasefire violations on the Line of Control to the West, and the relentless tempo of counter terrorist operations in the Valley during this period smack of collusion and tell a tale which defence planners must take note of. Developing the desired capability will be predicated on guaranteed funding and fast track procedures. It is heartening to peruse reports in the Economic Times of 22 June that the Government has granted emergency financial powers up to Rs 500 crore per procurement project to each service for buying weapons and ammunition. Even if new projects cannot be initiated immediately because of fund constraints imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic and otherwise, it is time for stalled ones like the Mountain Strike Corps to be quickly completed. The example of the PLA which has almost completed its reorganisation for fighting wars of the future and tested the response of its field force during the Covid-19 pandemic, must be taken note of.
    Thanks to the Galwan episode, the vital aspect of border infrastructure has gained nationwide attention. There is perceptive increase in the pace of development over the last few years. The sequence and methodology however are dictated essentially by two factors – availability of resources (funds and specialist equipment) and the need for calibrating messages implicit in such actions to China. Despite Covid-19 constraints, the current crisis mandates that funds currently earmarked for infrastructure development continue to flow so that development progresses, albeit at a slower pace. As regards messaging to China, we have reached a watershed moment. As high level military talks continue and spell out the Indian position on the ground to the Chinese, creating an ‘all of nation approach’ for tackling China becomes necessary.
    Galwan incident has ensured that the negative perception of China worldwide is now shared by almost all sections of Indian society. This bitterness is fuelled by the sheer brutality of the Chinese military and duplicity of the Chinese government, bringing back memories of 1962 for many who have only heard of that era. It is driven further by a realisation of the scale of India’s dependence on China, be it in the import of manufactured goods of all hues, or technology, and the consequent harm to Indian interests and livelihoods. Awareness has spread amongst Indians that China’s constant working against India’s interests in world fora, be it in vetoing expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council for ‘technical reasons’, blocking its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group or introducing discussions on Kashmir are all part of its plan to obstruct India’s progress to its rightful place in the comity of nations. In attempting to correct an unequal economic relationship, ensuring that India retains its position in the region and preventing erosion of its influence in South Asia and beyond, all elements of the Indian state have their tasks cut out. It becomes imperative now to prepare a different toolkit with a wider range of options (including those not envisaged earlier) to manage India-China relations. Such options now require to be coordinated at all levels of the government and intimated to stakeholders including industry and other influencers for implementation. This coordination is long overdue. Resetting the economic relationship will not be easy. However, announcement of a practical time bound and holistic road map which has been thought through with all stakeholders would be a beginning.
    Galwan incident has ensured that the negative perception of China worldwide is now shared by almost all sections of Indian society.
    To supplement the proposed policy outlined above, articulation of a holistic Strategic Narrative vis-a-vis China becomes necessary. Such a narrative would pertain to as many aspects as possible – bilateral issues (including border management), local and regional matters, so that consistent, coherent and long term views are voiced, keeping in mind the national interest. information operations would be a subset of such a narrative, and briefings organised as frequently as possible would be useful force multipliers. It might be necessary for the concerned sections in the newly formed Department of Military Affairs and the Department of Defence to coordinate these aspects. India must also actively consider the possibilities that other forms of conflict, including hybrid warfare, are necessary to exploit and invest in the same. Here too, employment of such methodologies by China is an example. China has been refining its doctrine of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ since the early 90s. The effects are there to see in South China Sea and elsewhere. It is executing certain aspects of this strategy against India on the Northern borders.
    Managing relations with China is destined to remain the major preoccupation for Indian strategic thinkers in coming years. Tensions along the LAC are but one manifestation of this problem. Both nations are hostage to geography. China’s behaviour over the last decade has influenced Indian foreign and military policies like no other, causing India to take decisions that were not in the realms of possibility earlier. Articulating a holistic China strategy through an all of government approach within the overall ambit of a National Security Strategy to ensure that India achieves its rightful place, has never been so important.
    Image Credit: ASPI:The Strategist – Nathan Ruser

  • Daulet Beg Oldi: Operating from the World’s Highest Airfield

    Daulet Beg Oldi: Operating from the World’s Highest Airfield

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    Daulet Beg Oldi (DBO) is a historic campsite in Ladakh on an ancient trade route connecting Ladakh to the Tarim Basin. It is named after Sultan Said Khan (Daulet Beg), who died here on his return journey after the invasion of Ladakh and Kashmir. DBO is strategically significant as it is close to the Siachen Glacier, the Karakoram Pass, and China’s Xinjiang-Karakoram highway. The Chip Chap river flows just to the south of DBO from east to west. It has an airstrip at an altitude of 5064 meters (16,614 ft), the world’s highest airstrip. India activated DBO as a military base and Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) following the border dispute with the PRC in the late 1950s. The IAF activated DBO airfield in 1962 and it became a crucial ALG since then. DBO continued to be in use till 1966. The airfield was damaged following an earthquake in 1966, which put a stop to its further use. The IAF maintains many of the forward posts and villages in the himalayan regions through airdrops using a string of ALGs. Following increased belligerence from China, DBO was reactivated in 2008. The completion of the Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road added immense logistical strength to the Indian military in the region. Since 2013, China has intensified its probing incursions in this region. The recent clash in the Galwan valley is a high point of increasing tensions along the borders.

    Operations from the DBO have been a huge challenge, given its high altitude, mountainous terrain, and loose soil conditions. Group Captain A G Bewoor VM (Retd), an air force veteran with immense transport flying experience, describes the challenges overcome by the IAF in activating the DBO through first landings spaced out by 46 years.

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    The Law of Armed Conflict and its continuing relevance to the South Asian Region[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]

  • China’s support to Syria: In Conflict and Redevelopment

    China’s support to Syria: In Conflict and Redevelopment

    China is looking to ramp up relations with Syria both as part of its strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but also to take advantage of the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort that is expected to materialise following the gradual winding down of the war.

     

    Syria is an ancient civilisation and also an important part of the ancient silk route, with cities such as Palmyra, Aleppo and Damascus playing an important role in trade and travel between the East and the West. While the discovery of a maritime route between Europe and Asia has to some extent diminished its importance in this regard, Syria is still strategically important. China is looking to ramp up relations with Syria both as part of its strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but also to take advantage of the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort that is expected to materialise following the gradual winding down of the war.

    China’s non-interference policy is an integral aspect of its involvement and role in the Middle East. During the course of the Syrian war, China has consistently supported the Bashar Al Assad government on the diplomatic front – through the exercise of the veto power against the resolutions introduced in the United Nations Security Council either condemning the Syrian government, calling for ceasefire or for imposing sanctions on suspected war criminals. While negotiating the renewal of border crossings for aid, China agreed on the need for humanitarian assistance but emphasised on state sovereignty. China’s policy of non-interference has served it well in strengthening bilateral relations and advancing its interests.

    One of the reasons for the diplomatic support extended by China to the Syrian government is also the involvement of the Uighur fighters in the Syrian conflict which has greatly bothered China. While it has never got directly involved militarily in the Syrian conflict there are unconfirmed media reports which suggested that China was sharing military intelligence with the Syrian government and also sent its military advisors to Syria to help it in its fight against the rebels. In this sense, it saw Syria as a key player in its fight against religious extremism thereby preventing its export to its own volatile Xinjiang province.

    With the Syrian conflict slowly winding down and Bashar Al Assad’s hold on Syria greatly strengthened more than at any other time since the beginning of the civil war, China is ramping up its diplomatic efforts in Syria  using trade as an important policy tool to ramp up the relations between the two great civilisations.

    Based on Chinese government’s invitation Syria has participated in the second BRI summit held in Beijing in April 2019. Previously in 2018, China held a Trade Fair on Syrian reconstruction projects which was attended by nearly one thousand Chinese companies and which saw investment proposals of nearly USD two billion. The collapse of most of the industry in Syria due to the war has also resulted in a significant increase of cost-effective Chinese imports into Syria ranging from toys to car parts and industrial machinery and equipment.

    China is also leveraging its economic strength fully by using aid as a foreign policy tool. In 2019,  Xinhua reported on the  that an economic cooperation agreement was signed between Syria’s Planning and International Cooperation Commission (PICC) and the Chinese embassy in Damascus. As part of this agreement, a donation will be set aside to fund a series of humanitarian projects as agreed upon by both sides.

    The collapse of most of the industry in Syria due to the war has also resulted in a significant increase of cost-effective Chinese imports into Syria ranging from toys to car parts and industrial machinery and equipment.

    China is expected to be a key player in the international reconstruction and development effort that is expected to take place in Syria due to its strong bilateral ties with not only Syria but also its alignment with Russian and Iranian position on Syria , these two players being the major supporters of Bashar Al Assad’s government in the civil war. While Russia and Iran are surely expected to carve out a large part of the reconstruction contracts between themselves, their capacity to make the huge investments in these projects, estimated to be worth anywhere between USD 200 million to USD 1  trillion is doubtful. This creates the ripe opportunity for China to enter the reconstruction business effort either by themselves or, as is more likely, in partnership with Russian and Iranian governments or businesses.

    Beyond the business opportunities provided by the potential reconstruction of Syria, China is also strategically interested in Syria. China was always interested in securing access to the Ports of Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Such an access is expected to complement Beijing’s interests in the Greek port Piraeus (COSCO shipping, the Chinese state-owned shipping and logistics services supplier company in the Port authority) and the Israeli port of Haifa, in securing a trade route to Europe. In alignment with these strategic interests, Chinese companies’ area also exploring the possibility of upgrading the deep seaport of Tripoli, Lebanon to allow it to accommodate larger vessels and also the possibility of building a railroad that would connect Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon to Homs and Aleppo in Syria.

    Beyond the business opportunities provided by the potential reconstruction of Syria, China is also strategically interested in Syria. China was always interested in securing access to the Ports of Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.

    Chinese investments into and trade ties with Syria however, risk the attraction of US sanctions on Syria. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Chief Financial Officer of Huawei, , in Canada, based on a request by the United States highlights the extent of these risks. “The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act”, also known as “The Caesar Act”, a United States legislation that sanctions the Syrian government, including Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, for war crimes against the Syrian population, parts of which  are now incorporated  in the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020” greatly tightened the sanctions environment against the Syrian government and a number of its industries potentially impacting the Chinese investments and trade ties. While China has called for an end to sanctions stating they were “inhuman,” they have been wary of being targeted by sanctions and further straining their relations with the US. However, it is unlikely that the sanctions would have a significant effect on China given the size of China’s economy and its ability to circumvent sanctions while dealing with Iran and North Korea. China, as part of its ‘mask diplomacy,’ is increasingly providing aid to the Syrian government in their efforts against Covid-19. This serves the dual purpose of strengthening China-Syria relations and strengthening China’s narrative of Covid-19.

    To conclude, China has been a staunch supporter of the incumbent Syrian government of Bashar Al Assad during the almost decade long Syrian civil war and is set to reap the benefits from the post-war Syrian reconstruction effort in conjunction with the Russians and the Iranians to advance its interests.

    Image: Middle East Institute

     

  • POST COVID 19: RE-IMAGINING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

    POST COVID 19: RE-IMAGINING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

    As the world grapples, rather unsuccessfully so far, with its worst pandemic in a century, COVID 19, it would be an understatement that the world, as mankind has known for decades, will ever be the same again! The Coronavirus is not just a medical emergency which has afflicted the entire world, already caused over 125,000  fatalities and  with its rampage  continuing alarmingly,   the socio-economic-political consequences for the world, in the near future, are likely to be as horrendous as the employment of a weapon of mass destruction(WMD).

    Post COVID 19, whenever that period dawns, what the new world order or disorder would be is agitating the minds of governments and analysts the world over. Though it is rather premature today to crystal-gaze as to when the world can rejoice that COVID 19 is now part of history, it is equally imperative for governments and global institutions, the world over, to frankly analyse the ramifications of  the aftermath of such an apocalyptic event. It will be better to be prepared for the after-results now than be found ill-prepared as the world was when this pandemic struck in full surprise and ferocity.

    The onslaught of this coronavirus was indeed a Black Swan event and hence it found the world, including the most powerful nation on the earth, US and most of the technologically advanced nations, like in Europe, grossly under-prepared – a fact that will puzzle future historians. For the uninitiated, a Black Swan event is a metaphor for an unpredictable event that is beyond what is normally expected of a grave situation and is characterized by both extreme rarity and equally severity in occurrence. Events like the Black Death plague which had engulfed the world 600 years back and took a toll of 25 million lives, the Spanish Flu a hundred years back which took millions of lives, the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan by the US Air Force at the near- end of World War II  or the 9/11 terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in the US could be categorized  as Black Swan events.

    Prior to ascertaining through the prism of uncertainty the contours of the “new normal” or the “next normal”, it will be in order to study what all went grievously wrong in the globe’s response to the pandemic. Firstly and, unquestionably, was the emerging superpower China’s total disdain for the fallout of the coronavirus. Reliable reports in the western media point out that as early as 17 Nov 2019, the virus was detected in the Wuhan laboratory in China’s Hubei province. It was attributed to the major animal market of Wuhan which sells dead bats, dogs, cats, fish, seafoods and many other forms of animal produce for the Chinese palate. Once the virus started spreading uncontrollably, it was only on 31 Dec 2019 that China cared to inform the WHO regards the spread of an “abnormal pneumonia”.

    From the beginning of Jan 2020, the pandemic rapidly spread its tentacles to the US and most nations of Europe with devastating effect. Amazingly and regrettably, the US and most nations were rather sluggish in their response mechanisms to combat this dreadful virus. No stringent lockdowns or social/physical distancing or curbs on travel or congregations was enforced—- the tragic results were for all to see with medical systems collapsing and no drugs/vaccines available, no hospital beds or ambulances, as  required, available. It was only that by end Feb/ mid-March some emergency measures were enforced—much too late though. The world expects all fellow nations to share critical information with each other in the event of such emergencies as such viruses do not recognize any international borders.

    In India too, there is a view that we may have been a bit late in enforcing lockdowns and other stringent measures. Nevertheless, PM Narendra Modi’s much awaited 21 days lockdown announced on 24 March (and its subsequent extension till 03 May 2020), though necessary, could have been better implemented with some advance planning. Though the centre and state bureaucracy did step up subsequently to resolve the teething problems, especially of migrant labour, many helpful interventions from well-meaning NGOs, gurdwaras, temples, the public and others, the humanitarian problems have been overcome to a large extent. Overall, the nation’s response, cutting across religious lines, to this medical emergency has been encouraging and embellished with humanitarianism.

    The other major fall-out of the COVID 19 pandemic will, in all certainty, be the catastrophic economic costs the world will have to bear. The IMF has stated that the current crisis is the most horrible in a century and will be likely worse than the “Great Depression” (1929-1939). It visualizes the global GDP to shrink by a whopping 3 percent though it forecasts that next year could witness an improvement. As observed all over the world, stock markets have tumbled to abysmally low levels, production facilities come to virtual shutdowns, staff laid off, air and rail travel shut, supply chains both international and intra-nation disrupted etc. In addition, oil prices have had a dangerously steep decline throwing the world trade and economy out of gear. The US with its financial muscle ultimately, despite being financially badly mauled, is expected to slowly bounce back. President Donald Trump, now in his crucial re-election year, may take some out-of-the box fiscal initiatives to bring the US economy back on track. The ongoing trade war between China and the US may witness contours of a rivalry not witnessed so far. Anyway, China needs to be globally chastised for its unethical practices.

    It will be a natural fall-out for most nations now to take a fresh look at their trade relations with China. Japan has already announced a US $ 2.2 billion package for their industrialists to pull out of China. Others like Taiwan may do so too. Some of the industries moving out of China may prefer to re-locate to India and here is a good chance for India to welcome them here and give a fillip to India’s currently near-stagnant “Make in India” programmes. However, the Indian establishment will have to shed its hollow big talk, traditional lethargic attitudes and genuinely encourage foreign investments into India. India’s private industry is modern, robust, and skilful enough to work together with foreign collaborators.

    The world now must rise and strengthen global institutions like the UN and its various agencies to combat global challenges. No country, however powerful, can exist as an island as witnessed now. Nations like China, notwithstanding its deep pockets, must be cautioned not to disturb the economic equilibrium of the world, most of which is reeking with poverty and under-development. China’s intransigent attitude not even allowing a discussion on the pandemic at the United Nations Security Council last fortnight is unacceptable to the world.

    In the coming years, it is certain that owing to the gruesome after-effects of COVID 19, nations, both the powerful and the poor, are going to take far more seriously their public health preparedness and emergency standard operating procedures. Medical infrastructures, rightly so, demand far greater thought, planning and investments than hithertofore.

    It is well on the cards that even the militarily powerful nations will look into the various nuances of biological warfare. It is now clear to the entire world that a virus can prove to be far more lethal than many megatons of explosives and modern weaponry. According to many western journalists, China may deny its botched-up bio warfare experiment, but it is a matter of time when the bitter truth will unravel. India as a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1972 (effective since mid-1975) to eschew production and experimentation of  WMDs including bio weapons should not only  use its moral authority to make nations be sincere adherents of existing UN protocols  but, importantly, for its own safety put into place  adequate defensive mechanisms to thwart such challenges. The lessons to be drawn from COVID 19 must be taken seriously. In addition, the UN must draw up contingency plans to prevent, contain and manage and ultimately defeat such likely challenges in the future. It will have to be a synthesis of health, economic, political, and even military measures.

    The new world order, in all likelihood, will be drastically differing, more sobering, additionally fiscally prudent, and conservative and with nations becoming isolationist and inward looking. China’s image and its economy will certainly take a sound beating. Though the pandemic is world-wide and global problems, unquestionably, require global solutions, yet in the coming years we may witness the rise of hyper-nationalism and authoritarianism in most nations including democracies. Nevertheless, as India strives to do its bit to get its economy back on track and takes various prophylactic measures for the future, it must do its bit to strengthen global institutions.

    This article was published earlier in ‘USI – Strategic Perspectives‘. Views expressed are the author’s own.

    Image credit: Tehran Times

     

  • Taiwan Elections 2020: Emphasising Taiwan’s Democracy, Nationalism and Sovereignty

    Taiwan Elections 2020: Emphasising Taiwan’s Democracy, Nationalism and Sovereignty

    Taiwan’s first female President, Tsai Ing-Wen of the pro-democratic DPP Party won a landslide victory for second term in the national elections held in January. China condemns Tsai’s victory by reiterating its “one country, two systems model.
    Election Results: Voice for Democracy and Sovereignty

    Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen won re-election on January 11rth  by a historic landslide, a decisive result widely seen as a rebuke to Beijing’s efforts to integrate Taiwan into the ‘one-China’ concept. The DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), rode on Tsai’s popularity and maintained control of the Legislative Yuan, the country’s parliament. DPP has consistently taken a very ‘Taiwan nationalistic’ approach and has been a strong opponent of Beijing’s ‘one-China policy’ and the so-called ‘1992-consensus’. This landslide victory and a second term gives Tsai the power to uphold Taiwan’s commitment to democracy. Taiwanese voted to reject China’s “one country, two systems model” while still maintaining support for Tsai’s stand on the “1992 consensus”, which would dictate the Cross-Strait ties based on “peace, parity, democracy and dialogue”.

    On winning the elections, President Tsai remarked – China must ‘face reality’ of Taiwan’s independence and called on China to ‘review’ it’s current policy toward the de facto nation that Beijing claims is part of its territory.

    China refuses to acknowledge the victory of pro-democratic forces and maintains that this development would not alter its “one-China” principle. China’s Foreign Ministry stated that “regardless of what happens in Taiwan, the basic facts won’t change: there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China.”

    In the voting week, Xi Jinping ushered in a range of measures “to further promote economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait”. Despite these positive announcements, he sent a Chinese aircraft carrier to sail through the Straits to intimidate, should Tsai’s victory initiate a declaration of independence.

    The Chinese army also conducted a naval and air force drill on 9-10 February in a threatening attempt to which Washington responded with the US Air Force sending two surveillance planes as an expression of solidarity with Taiwan.

    Election results and impact on KMT

    In the aftermath of the astounding defeat in January, the opposition KMT has been forced to re-examine its policies and priorities. The party elected Mr Johnny Chiang, a 48-year old lawyer, as its president in March first week. Chiang represents the younger generation who are more focused on separate Taiwan identity, reflecting DPP’s resonance across the young voters. KMT has some serious issues to resolve if it wants to remain relevant in Taiwan. It is constrained by its linkage to the inconvenient history of Taiwan and a support base that is seen as focused on benefitting from cross-Strait engagement, and in some cases, unique access to the CCP through party-to-party ties. The main internal issue is the party’s cross-Strait policy with China, whether 1992 consensus will endure as the foundation for official mechanisms. Chiang is seen as one who will most likely ‘discard’ the 1992 consensus arguing that the consensus has lost its utility and undergone ‘distortion’ when linked with the ‘one country, two systems’ model used in Hong Kong.

    Background: 1992 Consensus – discarded by rising Taiwanese identity?

    Taiwan was ruled for more than three decades by the nationalist army, the Kuomintang (KMT),which fled to the island in 1949 after being defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and created a rival government, the Republic of China, better known as today’s Taiwan. It has since transformed into a multiparty democracy, under a government and political system, completely separate from China’s. KMT’s position stems from the legacy of the Chinese civil war with the CCP, which is a complicated history of KMT and CCP vying to represent ‘one China’ as the ‘Republic of China’ by KMT and the ‘People’s Republic of China’ by CCP. KMT, in view of this history, is seen as the most pro-mainland of Taiwan’s two major political parties. In contrast, the DPP has always maintained much tougher stance with Beijing. It has played a prominent role in democratisation of Taiwan and places greater emphasis on uniqueness of Taiwanese identity and a history of more than 100 years that is separate from that of China’s. From the late 1980s when democratisation of Taiwan began, more and more Taiwanese are embracing a Taiwanese consciousness and favouring independence even though maintaining status quo still remains the majority priority for the moment. Majority of the youth, and 60-70% of Taiwanese are fiercely conscious of their Taiwanese identity, and view Taiwan as an independent and sovereign nation-state. This also means that the idea and legacy of nationalist party’s ROC is  seen as impractical, in consonance with geopolitical realities.

    The 1992 Consensus, seen as having enabled the growth of Taipei-Beijing cooperation, revolves around the issue of ‘one-China’ interpretation – ‘that there is only one China and that Taipei and Beijing agree to disagree on which government is its legitimate representative’ has been the foundation of cross-Strait relations. It was curated by the KMT and the PRC wherein in principle they agree that there is “One China”. However, the contentious terminology “One China” can be interpreted by either side having accorded its own meaning. The CCP believes “one China” is the “People’s Republic of China,” while Taiwan believes “one China” should mean the ROC established in 1912 and hitherto exists.

    The KMT government in 2008-16, led by Ma Ying-jeou used the so-called 1992 Consensus to strengthen economic, trade and cultural relations between Taiwan and PRC. It led to rapid development of  economic links  and integration with PRC while political issues were kept away. Trade, indirect investment, and travel via Hong Kong grew steadily. By 2014, over 40% of Taiwan’s trade was with the mainland, and some 80% of its foreign direct investment (FDI) went to China; Taiwan businesses operated more than one hundred thousand businesses on the mainland. Taiwan-China two ay trade in 2019 was USD 244.35 billion. The trade balance has, consistently been in Taiwan’s favour.

    KMT’s strategy, under Ma’s leadership, focused on reviving Chinese nationalism and was aimed at anchoring Taiwan in the Chinese nation, bridging the gap with PRC, opposing Taiwan independence, favouring reconciliation and eventually unification between the two sides of the Straits. By 2012-13 this approach gave rise to suspicions amongst the Taiwanese about Ma’s rapprochement policy. Paradoxically it strengthened the predominance of Taiwanese identity, which is stronger amongst the youth. This resulted in KMT’s internal fractures in 2012-13, its loss in local elections of 2014, the turbulence of the Sunflower revolution of 2014, and its huge loss to DPP in the presidential elections of 2016.

    The ideological battle between the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) has persisted since 2016 (when Tsai became President) and the DPP refused to recognise the “1992 consensus”. In 2000, Tsai as the minister of Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said, “The so-called ‘one China, differing interpretations’ is only a usage by our side to describe the process of the meeting. It is a way of description that the new government can accept, but it does not mean that we have accepted Beijing’s ‘one-China, two models principle.’

    Though DPP lost the local elections in 2018 to the pro-China Kuomintang party (KMT), and had no hopes of winning the presidential 2020 elections, Tsai has been trying to replace the Chinese identity with the Taiwanese identity by promising people that the Taiwanese sovereignty will be protected. By articulating “maintenance of status quo”, she indicates that she may not actually pursue outright independence in order to maintain a peaceful environment that helps growth and development; in effect allowing PRC to see it as a support for “One China” in principle and being open to cross-Strait dialogue. But she makes it clear to rest of the world – “we don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan.”

    Diversifying Economic and Trade Strategies

    During her presidency in 2016, she had initiated “new south-bound policy (NSP)” to strengthen relations with selected countries in South and South-East Asia and gain entry into regional blocs. As the US unveiled its Indo-Pacific strategy of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Taiwan saw great benefits in dove-tailing it’s NSP strategy into the Indo-Pacific. The NSP has made notable gains in the first term, and Tsai’s re-election offers great opportunity to diversify the gains in the second term. The Chinese have been  aggressively countering this strategy by compelling nations to switch allegiance to China. This had resulted in Taiwan having only close to 16 diplomatic allies which include small nations like Belize and Naru. Despite this, major nations have come around the issue to strengthen ties with Taiwan through economic and cultural centres. Nevertheless, the ‘New South-bound Partnership’ strategy is a conscious effort by Taiwan to reduce its economic dependency on the mainland. Taiwan has aggressively pursued economic partnerships with countries like India, and has encouraged investments by Taiwanese companies. Its investments in South-East Asia has more than doubled in this period.

    China has also been accused of meddling with local Taiwanese elections in 2018, according to Wang William Liqiang, a self-identified Chinese spy presently seeking political asylum in Australia. As a counter-strategy and to prevent foreign influence in the country’s elections, Taiwan’s legislature passed the anti-infiltration act on 31 December 2019, which criminalises external meddling. According to MAC Chief Chen Ming-tong, “[the act] aims to counter infiltration”. He added that it acts “as a corrective measure to ensure normal cross-Strait exchanges and reduce politically-motivated infiltration and intervention by Beijing. The Act prevents hostile external powers from engaging, through local collaborators, in illegal lobbying and election campaigning, disrupting rallies and assemblies, and making political donations.”

    Rising anti-Chinese sentiment has gained momentum due to the recent protests in Hongkong. Young voters have been deeply influenced by this and are supporting Tsai. This is supplanted by the economic slowdown which affected Taiwan and has divided the Taiwanese voters—those who support the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China and those who don’t.

    Taiwan had also altered its economic policy since the election of DPP in 2016, wherein industrial restructuring has resulted in a large businesses (heavy industries) moving to China in order to reduce the labour cost. This has led to an increase in trade and investment in China. However, the catch is that since both governments don’t recognise each other, the Taiwanese companies are exposed to high risk and no dispute settlement is prevalent currently nor is it guided by international norms. China continues to be Taiwan’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly 30% of the island’s total trade. However, Taiwan’s investment into the mainland has been declining over the last five years, and so also mainland’s investment in Taiwan.

    The Future

    The ‘one-China policy’ is a zero-sum game between the PRC and the ROC. China has always reiterated that only by accepting China’s authoritarian rule can the Taiwanese people attain prosperity and peace. From the beginning of 2005, the “carrots and sticks” policy has been predominant in the Cross-Strait relations. Since China’s policy has backfired, she is capable of adopting coercive measures—economic crippling, isolation by cutting off diplomatic allies, direct invasion or meddling with internal politics. If Beijing decides to use force, it could spiral into a regional conflict inviting Taiwan’s allies and heavy economic repercussions.

    China’s isolation strategy with respect to Taiwan is a constant challenge, which influences majority of the Taiwanese to maintain status quo in current environment. Status quo can mean different things to different people. Chinese president Xi’s aggressive articulation in 2019 of ‘one-China policy’ with respect to Taiwan and the events in Hong Kong has triggered a massive nationalistic fervour in support of democracy and Taiwan identity amongst the younger population.

    China has repeatedly said that it will bring Taiwan under its authority by any means necessary, including force. Analysts believe Xi Jinping aims to achieve that by 2049, the deadline for the country to achieve its ‘great rejuvenation’. Beijing’s refusal of renouncing the possible use of force for unification is reflected in the continued military build-up on the Fujian coast. By 2014, PLA had over 1500 ballistic and cruise missiles targeting Taiwan, ten times more than in 2000, and more accurate and destructive than in 2000.

    Chinese state media have downplayed President Tsai’s election, but there is no doubt that China considers it as a major setback to its reunification efforts. The election has resulted in a cooling off period for cross-Strait relations, and the global ‘Corona Virus pandemic’ has only added to put this off any priority for some time.

    Only time will tell if Taiwan and China manage to engage in dialogue and come to a consensus regarding their irreconcilable differences. As democracy and  pro-democratic forces continue to strengthen and sustain Taiwanese identity and nationalism, Taiwan’s functioning as a sovereign independent state is stronger than ever, while Beijing’s strategy of geo-economic boxing-in Taiwan into accepting its ‘one-China’ policy looks less probable. On the other hand, giving legitimacy to Tsai’s government will be a tricky call for many countries as they have to walk a tight rope in order not to rupture relations with China. How different nations recognise and engage with the new Taiwanese government will definitely be a contributing factor in determining Taiwan’s future.

  • High expectations during Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN

    High expectations during Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN

    Vietnam assumed ‘2020 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’ in November 2019 from Thailand in accordance with Article 31 of the ASEAN Charter under which the Chairmanship rotates annually. Hanoi announced the theme for its Chairmanship as ‘Cohesive and Responsive’, in which ‘Cohesive reflects the need to enhance ASEAN unity and solidarity, economic integration, ASEAN awareness and identity, and work toward a “people-centered” community’ and                                 ‘Responsive underlines the importance of promoting ASEAN pro-activeness, creativity and capacity in response to opportunities and challenges brought about by rapid changes in regional and global landscape’.

    Soon after taking over the 2020 Chairmanship, Vietnam was confronted with a ‘black swan’ event i.e. COVID-19. It  delivered admirably by taking bold measures to control the spread of the virus in the country and announced that the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) will compile a report on the COVID-19 to be submitted to ASEAN leaders at the 36th ASEAN Summit scheduled in Vietnam in April.

    Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Quoc Dung, who is the Secretary-General of the 2020 ASEAN National Committee, has identified five key priorities for his country’s Chairmanship Year and it is not surprising to see reference to Hanoi’s commitment to ‘regional peace and stability amid strategic complexities’. Boundary and associated disputes including illegal occupation, reclamation and weaponization of islands and features in South China Sea are central to ASEAN, and as a corollary a major issue for Vietnam’s 2020 Chairmanship. There is now evidence of a push back against Beijing’s intimidation. This is evident from the forceful statements and credible operational initiatives in South China Sea by the claimant states against China which has deployed law enforcement and paramilitary vessels.

    In this context there are expectations from Vietnam to vigorously pursue and make substantive contributions towards keeping the South China Sea less turbulent and more peaceful, and address issues that threaten regional peace and security. It would also be Hanoi’s endeavor to prevent any confrontation and further escalation in disputes in the South China Sea. However, this may not be the case as a number of incidents in the South China Sea over resources i.e. fishing and offshore energy exploration have begun rather very early in Vietnam’s ‘2020 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’.

    First is about Indonesia and China. The former does not claim any island or features in the Spratly Islands and therefore does not have any dispute in South China Sea; but presence of Chinese coast guard vessel escorting Chinese fishermen to fish in Natuna, part of  Indonesian waters, which China claims to be the traditional fishing ground, prompted political and military response from Jakarta. There was also a standoff between China and Vietnam in the Vanguard Bank involving 50 Vietnamese and 40 Chinese vessels over the operations of the drilling rig Hakuryu 5 operated by Russia’s Rosneft in Vietnam’s oil and gas Block 06-01.

    Another three-way standoff over oil and gas operations is playing out between China and Malaysia in which the state-owned Petronas is exploring on the extended continental shelf of a ‘Malaysian oil and gas block in the area for which Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur had submitted a joint claim’. China has resorted to intimidation similar to the Vanguard Bank between China and Vietnam.

    At another level, United States military response in support of Taiwan after Chinese military airplanes flew across the Taiwan Straits and the Bashi Channel is noteworthy. Likewise, US’ support has been forthcoming for Vietnam against China and could trigger enhanced defence and security cooperation between the two sides as also create new opportunities for Hanoi to inform Beijing about its confidence to deal with China on the South China Sea issue at its own terms.

    However, the Philippines would be a different challenge for Vietnam after President Rodrigo Duterte announced annulment of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) notwithstanding the fact that the US has been the most important ally of the Philippines in countering China’s expansive claims in the disputed Philippines Sea. It is useful to mention that Philippines is critical  for US’ Indo-Pacific  strategy of a free and open oceans.

    Second is the about the Code of Conduct (CoC), an upgraded document of the earlier Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC), which is under negotiation between China and ASEAN member states and is expected to be adopted in 2021.Vietnam must concentrate on the CoC. The onus will be on Vietnam to not only build consensus among the  ASEAN , Hanoi will have to work hard  to put in place a workable COC which can then be taken forward by Brunei Darussalam who would assume the ‘2021 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’.

    Third is about the contestation between the US and China over freedom of navigation operation (FONOP). During the last three years, the US forces have routinely conducted FONOP which Washington claims to be in accordance with international law and that its military will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits. Chinese reaction and response to the FONOP has been at the political, diplomatic and strategic levels. It has exercised coercion at sea through dangerous maneuvers and more recently a PLA Navy destroyer fired a military grade laser at a US P-8 surveillance aircraft.

    ASEAN Chairmanship is a challenging position and attracts high expectations from the member countries. The position entails building upon the work done by the previous Chair as also pursue new regional issues that are always as challenging as the earlier ones. Besides, there are anticipations by regional and other global players to not only follow up the ongoing challenges but address new questions that confront the ASEAN. More often than not, the ASEAN countries have delivered and received appreciation from the international community.

    By all counts Vietnam’s chairmanship of the ASEAN can be expected to be both challenging and rewarding. Hanoi is expected to live up to the expectations on the responsibilities enshrined in the ASEAN charter and deliver to the peoples of the ASEAN as also build upon the themes and priorities set by previous Chairmanship. Vietnam will also be under pressure to adopt a tougher line against China on the South China Sea issue in view of the recent spats between China and other claimant states. But Vietnamese leaders are known for their maturity and diplomatic skills and would play a pragmatic role to manage tensions in the region.

    Image Credit: Vietnam Economic Times

  • China Tightening its grip on Indian Ocean

    China Tightening its grip on Indian Ocean

    Category : International Affairs/China

    Title : China Tightening its grip on Indian Ocean

    Author : G Parthasarathy 10-02-2020

    In comparison to India, China has moved ahead to strengthen its maritime ties with countries across the Indian Ocean. With the expansion of its submarine fleet and commissioning of its aircraft carriers and fifth generation aircraft, China has augmented its naval strength significantly. Ambassador G Parthasarathy looks at China’s expanding profile in the Indian Ocean and India’s response.

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