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  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first ‘focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    The satellite picture below brilliantly depicts the geographical separation of Arunachal Pradesh (called Lower Tibet by the Chinese) and Tibet. The McMahon Line more or less runs along the crest line of the Himalayas.

    The Chinese have never been quite explicit on how much of Arunachal they seek.  I once saw an official map displayed in a travel agents office in Lhasa that showed only the Tawang tract as Chinese territory. In other maps they have their border running along the foothills, which means all of Arunachal.

    The Chinese have based their specific claim on the territory on the premise that Tawang was administered from Lhasa, and the contiguous areas owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. Then the Chinese must also consider this. Sikkim till into the 19th century a vassal of Tibet and Darjeeling was forcibly taken from it by the British! By extending this logic could they realistically stake a claim for Sikkim and Darjeeling? Of course not. It would be preposterous. History has moved on. The times have changed. For the 21st century to be stable 20th century borders must be stable, whatever be our yearnings.

    At the crux of this issue is the larger question of the national identities of the two nations and when and how they evolved. The Imperial India of the Mughals spanned from Afghanistan to Bengal but did not go very much below the Godavari in the South. The Imperial India of the British incorporated all of today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but had no Afghanistan, not for want of trying. It was the British who for the first time brought Assam into India in 1826 when they defeated Burma and formalized the annexation with the treaty of Yandabo.

    It was only in 1886 that the British first forayed out of the Brahmaputra valley when they sent out a punitive expedition into the Lohit valley in pursuit of marauding tribesmen who began raiding the new tea gardens. Apparently the area was neither under Chinese or Tibetan control for there were no protests either from the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Soon the British stayed put.

    Tibet remained in self imposed isolation and the race to be first into Lhasa became the greatest challenge for explorers and adventurers in the second half of the 19th century. Not the least among these were the spies of the Survey of India, the legendary pundits. The most renowned of these was the Sarat Chandra Das whose books on Tibet are still avidly read today. As the adventurers, often military officers masquerading as explorers began visiting Tibet the British in India began worrying. Reports that the most well-known of Czarist Russia’s military explorers, Col. Grombchevsky was sighted in Tibet had Lord Curzon, the Governor General of India most worried.

    In 1903 Curzon decided to send a military expedition into Tibet led by Grombchevsky’s old antagonist, Col. Francis Younghusband. A brigade strong mixed force of Gurkhas and Tommies went over the Nathu La into the Chumbi valley and advanced unhindered till Shigatse. A Tibetan military force met them there but offered what can only be described as passive resistance. Not a shot was fired back as the British Indian troops rained bullets on them. It was a forerunner to Jallianwalla Bagh. From Shigatse Younghusband made a leisurely march into Lhasa. The British got the Tibetans to agree to end their isolation and having extracted trade concessions withdrew in 1904, the way they came.

    In 1907 Britain and Russia formally agreed that it was in their interests to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart.” It may be of interest to the reader to know that the Great Game nevertheless continued. In 1907 Col. Mannerheim then of the Russian Army, later Field Marshal Mannerheim and first President of Finland, led a horseback expedition from Kyrgyzstan to Harbin on China’s northeast to identify a route for the cavalry.

    The next important year was 1913 when the Tibetans declared independence after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a Republic in China under Sun Yat Sen. They attacked and drove the Chinese garrisons in Tibet into India over the Nathu La. Also in 1913 the British convened the Simla Conference to demarcate the India-Tibet border. The British proposed the 1914 McMahon Line, as we know it. The Tibetans accepted it. The Chinese Amban however initialed the agreement under protest. But his protest seemed mostly about the British negotiating directly with Tibet as a sovereign state and not over the McMahon Line as such.

    Things moved on then. In 1935 at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe ICS, then Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, the McMahon Line was notified. In 1944 JP Mills ICS established British Indian administration in NEFA, but excluding Tawang which continued to be administered by the Lhasa appointed head lama at Tawang despite the fact that it lay well below the McMahon Line. This was largely because Henry Twynam, the Governor of Assam lost his nerve and did not want to provoke the Tibetans. In 1947 the Dalai Lama (the same gentleman who is now in Dharamshala) sent the newly independent India a note laying claim to some districts in NEFA/Arunachal.

    On October 7, 1950 the Chinese attacked the Tibetans at seven places on their frontier and made known their intention of reasserting control over all of Tibet. As if in response on February 16, 1951 Major Relangnao ‘Bob’ Khating IFAS raised the India tricolor in Tawang and took over the administration of the tract. The point of this narration is to bring home the fact that India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh doesn’t rest on any great historical tradition or cultural affinity. We are there because the British went there. But then the Chinese have no basis whatsoever to stake a claim, besides a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China among some of the hangers-on in the Qing emperor’s court. The important thing now is that we have been there for over a hundred years and that settles the issue.

    Arunachal Pradesh has a very interesting population mix. Only less than 10% of its population is Tibetan. Indo-Mongoloid tribes account for 68% of the population. The rest are migrants from Nagaland and Assam. As far as religious affinities go Hindus are the biggest group with 37%, followed by 36% animists, 13% Buddhists. Recent census figures suggest a spurt in Christianity, possibly induced by pocketbook proselytizing. In all there are 21 major tribal groups and over 100 ethnically distinct sub-groupings, speaking over 50 distinct languages and dialects. The population of about a million is spread out over 17 towns and 3649 villages. With the exception of a few villages of Monpas who live north of the McMahon Line, it is an ethnically compact and contiguous area.

    In fact in future boundary negotiations India could make a case for inclusion of the few Monpa villages left behind north of the McMahon Line? Many knowledgeable observers suggest that the area south of the Huangpo/Brahmaputra from the Pemako gorge till it enters the Subansiri division of Arunachal would be a logical boundary as the raging and hence un-fordable and unbridgeable river ensures hardly any Chinese administrative presence in the area.

    It is true that historically India never had a direct border with Tibet till the British took Kumaon and Garhwal from Nepal in 1846 and extended its domain over Arunachal in 1886. On the other hand the formidable Himalayas were always culturally a part of India and formed a natural barrier against ingress from the north, whether Tibetan or Chinese. But times have moved and technology and mankind’s great engineering powers now make it possible for even the most hostile terrain to be subjugated. The Himalayas are no longer the barrier they once were. As China and India emerge as the world’s great economies and powers can India possibly allow China a strategic trans-Himalayan space just a few miles from the plains?

    The view from the Chinese side about what exactly constitutes China is no less confused. Apparently like the British, the Manchu’s who ruled China from the 17th to the early 20th century had a policy of staking claim to the lands that lay ahead of their frontiers in order to provide themselves with military buffers. In a recent article in the China Review magazine, Professor Ge Jianxiong, Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai writes: “to claim that Tibet has always been a part of China since the Tang dynasty; the fact that the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim.” Ge also notes that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China was established the idea of China was not clearly conceptualized. Even during the late Qing period (Manchu) the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Qing Empire. At other times it would be taken to refer to only the eighteen interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.

    Professor Ge further adds that the notions of “Greater China” were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the courts self-aggrandizement.” Ge criticizes those who feel that the more they exaggerate the territory of historical China the more “patriotic” they are. In this context I would like to recall a recent conversation I had with the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi. Ambassador Sun said that while he was soundly castigated in India for his unintended comment, he gained a major constituency in China. The mandarins in the Beijing would do well to take heed to Ge Jianxiong’s advice: “If China really wishes to rise peacefully and be on solid footing in the future, we must understand the sum of our history and learn from our experiences.” The same holds true for the babus in South Block and ‘the having writ move on’ media pundits. If we don’t then we know who will be laughing!

     

    Image Credit: Tawang Monastery

  • Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    China’s GDP expanded from USD 6 trillion in 2010 to USD 14.3 trillion in 2019. It has had exponential growth over the last three decades, with an average GDP growth rate of 9.23% from 1989 to 2020. Although the impact of the COVID pandemic pushed its GDP into decline and negative (-6.80%) in the first quarter of 2020, it has rebounded with a growth of 5% in the third quarter. It’s military spending, officially, is more than three times that of India, unofficially maybe five times or more. China has become one of the key players in the Indo-Pacific as a significant part of its economic activities depend on this region.

    The Indo-Pacific has replaced the Trans-Atlantic as the epicentre of global politics. Its importance to the global order is multifarious. In economic terms, one half of the world’s commercial influx goes through the Indo-Pacific sea routes and the Indian Ocean carries two-thirds of global oil shipments. Besides, a few of the biggest military spenders are part of the region. China’s hostile actions and policies have agitated the US, Japan, Australia and India. A shared concern over the expansion of China’s political and military clout was fundamental to the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad 2.0), on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila, in 2017.

    Quad is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific

    There is growing speculation over what the re-emergence of the Quad means. On the one hand, it is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific; on the other, a strategic alliance towards keeping China’s assertive actions in check.

    The Quad: Overcoming Intransigence

    The Quad is a mechanism that enables a dialogue on regional security issues between the four countries. Its revival, this year, reflects an intersection of strategic interests: that of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order. The Quad came together in November for the naval exercise – Exercise Malabar – in two phases, in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The exercise, in its 24th edition, is the biggest so far and has sent significant strategic signalling to China.

    The Quad should be considered less as a formal alliance and more as a mechanism built on existing bilateral and trilateral partnerships between the four countries. It first emerged as a cooperative response to the 2004 tsunami, when the four navies were involved in providing humanitarian and disaster relief. Despite strong support from Japan and the US to formalise the group, it disbanded with Australia and India backing out in 2007, due to concerns about China’s reaction to the grouping. This gave rise to multilateral partnerships among the four countries.

    Between the four democracies, there are three trilateral and six bilateral partnerships. Trilaterally, Japan, India and Australia first came together in 2015 to discuss shared concerns over maritime security in the Indo-Pacific Region and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. More recently, the three countries agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific Region amid growing recognition of their excessive, economic reliance on China.

    Bilaterally, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) on October 27 that gives India access to American geospatial intelligence that will be useful for precision guidance of its missiles. Further, India-Australia ties have strengthened over the last few years with their initial 2+2 dialogue in 2017 and with Australian participation in India’s Milan exercise in 2018, focusing on interoperability between navies in the region.

    China and the Quad

    Over the years, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a region of strategic importance. As China expands into the region, its actions have created tensions with the Quad members.

    Sino-Indian relations:  India-China relations have touched rock-bottom since the clashes on the LAC in Ladakh.  China’s intrusions and violations along the LAC have been backed up by significant massing of PLA forces, for the first time in 40 years. India’s strong actions at the LAC and subsequent sanctions and banning of Chinese IT applications have signalled that India is not shy of escalating its response. China’s actions are seen as part of its coercive strategy to India’s refusal to back China on BRI, and its vehement opposition to CPEC. It sees India’s closeness to the USA and its coordination in the Quad as a threat to China’s strategic interests.

    China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has raised India’s concerns. It has always been wary of ties between Beijing and Islamabad, which intensified with the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2013. The Chinese-operated Gwadar port off the Arabian Sea in Pakistan, which can be used by the Chinese navy to establish a submarine presence in the region, did not rest well with India. Such a port would also help China with its ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Other ports of such concern are Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar. Though China claims these ports are of economic significance, these are also militarily strategic ports that give it an advantage in the IOR.

    In light of these issues, a revived and active Quad will benefit India’s strategic interests. The partnership could affect China in two ways. First, China would face increased competition in the IOR from India that now works with strong allies. Second, with the recent imposition of the technology ban, China stands to lose a large market for its products.

     Japan-China relations: Over the past few years, the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) has worsened with China’s land reclamation activities and militarisation of islands. Japan sees the South China Sea as key to its security because of its crucial sea lanes vital to its trade and economic health. It is also wary of China’s ability to influence the energy supply chains, which East Asia is dependent on, and the PLA’s movement in the Indo-Pacific region that could affect regional security.

    Despite its renewed trade with China and the recent signing of the RCEP, increased tensions in the SCS has forced Japan to support revival of the Quad. China’s increased naval and air activities in the South China Sea makes the Quad and its possible expansion into Quad Plus even more relevant for Japan.

    China-Australia relations: Australia backed out of the Quad in 2007 primarily because it was concerned about how China would view it, and the possible impact it might have on their bilateral trade. By 2017, China became Australia’s top export destination, and this trend has continued through 2019, pushing Australia into a dangerous economic dependency with China. Further, Australia’s 2016 White Paper called out China for its coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, identifying the South China Sea and the Southern Pacific as vital strategic regions.

    Australia’s economic dependence on China is high and this is unlikely to change despite the strong statements from prime minister Morrison.  Australia’s strong stand against China is also seen as emanating from American pressure. Australia actively supports Quad as it sees an increasingly powerful China working to change the world order. Australia is also a member of the newly signed RCEP, the new economic grouping that will be dominated by China. While Australia has hedged its economic interests by signing the RCEP, its strategic and security priorities are linked to the Quad.

    China-US relations:  China’s rising military power is now seen as a threat to American power and the liberal world order. Since 2011, American strategies and policies have focussed more on the Indo-Pacific. This shift in focus has strengthened its ties with Japan, Australia and India. Tensions between the US and China have increased since then and the 2018 trade war not only aggravated their relations but also kept the rest of the world on an edge.

    With a strong Quad partnership, the US expects to regain and strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific. For China already hit hard by the US trade war, more setbacks will accentuate the problems. Moreover, with a more focused Quad led by the US, China’s efforts to project its power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region will come under pressure.

     Conclusion

     A few aspects about the Quad remain unclear. First, its intent is still uncertain because the respective countries have to evaluate their relations with China if they want to make the bloc official. Second, if it were to be official, to what extent would it serve the interests of the member countries? Third, is the Quad a concert of democracies to contain China? Last, will it coordinate with other members in the Indo-Pacific region, that is will Quad translate into Quad Plus?

    China’s actions have managed to bring the four countries closer.  China, however, has scored a success when the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), the world’s largest plurilateral trade agreement was signed on November 15th. Both Japan and Australia are members of the RCEP. Many see this as a setback for India and America, and an important building block in a new world order, in which China calls the shots all over Asia. It puts in doubt the viability of SCRI (Supply Chain Resilience Initiative), an effort by Quad members to create an alternative to Chinese domination of supply chains.

    The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    While security and military cooperation will help in checking China’s aggressive approach, it must be recognised that this alone will be an incomplete strategy. The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    The conclusion of RCEP maybe China’s gain, but it is important to recognise the fact that ASEAN is the main driver of RCEP. In attempting to balance China, ASEAN and Japan have kept the door open for India to re-join the RCEP. It is possible that the US, under the Biden presidency, may revive the TPP (now proposed by Japan as CATPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership), which could balance the RCEP. The Quad, in this context, will continue to be very relevant for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.

     

  • Vietnam-US Relations under Biden Likely to Remain Unchanged

    Vietnam-US Relations under Biden Likely to Remain Unchanged

    Communist Party Chief and State President Nguyen Phu Trong and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc have sent a congratulatory message to U.S. President-elect Joe Biden. Both leaders have also expressed hope that their comprehensive partnership will “continue to develop in a stable, effective manner, benefiting people of both countries and promoting peace, security, stability, cooperation and development in the region and the world”. Meanwhile, Vice President Dang Thi Ngoc Thinh sent a congratulatory message to the U.S. Vice president-elect Kamala Harris. The Vietnamese leaders also invited Biden and Harris to visit Vietnam.

    The Biden administration could even explore new “areas in which to deepen ties with Vietnam in the economic, political, military, and people-to-people spheres”.

    While these messages and invitations are part of customary diplomacy, strategic commentators across domains believe that US-Vietnam relations will continue as hitherto under President-elect Joe Biden’s Presidency. They argue that the US acknowledges Vietnam’s geopolitical and geostrategic heft, and the new administration will continue to give top priority to cooperation with Vietnam. The Biden administration could even explore new “areas in which to deepen ties with Vietnam in the economic, political, military, and people-to-people spheres”.

    As far as economic relations, the Vietnam-US bilateral trade has grown significantly from US$ 450 million in 1994 to US$ 75.7 billion in 2019. However, in the last few months, a thorny issue has come up. In October 2020, the U.S. Trade Representative announced an investigation of Vietnam for its large trade surplus with the US. The trade deficit widened to US$ 44.3 billion in the first nine months in 2020, as against US$ 33.96 billion in 2019. It has also been noted that some of it is because of US companies exiting China and setting up new supply chains in Vietnam. However, it is unlikely that trade deficit would have an adverse impact on bilateral relations, which would continue to remain “relatively good under Biden unless complicated by an unexpected upsurge in trade tensions.”

    As far as strategic issues, US-Vietnam defence diplomacy had received impetus under President Trump. The bilateral cooperation in security and defence matters between the two militaries has been at an all-time high. In particular, naval cooperation has been top of the agenda and USS Carl Vinson, a US aircraft carrier, made a historic port call to Da Nang in March 2018. This was significant, given that there had been no such port call by an aircraft carrier to Vietnamese ports since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Another visit of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt followed this in March 2020, clearly showcasing growing defence cooperation between the US and Vietnam.

    Perhaps what merits attention is that Vietnam strictly adheres to ‘three-no policy’ i.e. no military alliances; no foreign troops stationed on Vietnamese soil; and no partnering with a foreign power to combat another.

    It is important to keep in mind that such port visits are a significant element of naval diplomacy by any navy. Vietnam has welcomed naval, coast guard, and marine patrol vessels from friendly countries. For instance, in 2018 a Japanese submarine and in 2019 a Canadian warship visited Vietnamese ports; likewise, many other navies have made goodwill visits. It dispatches Vietnamese military personnel and vessels for International Fleet Reviews and other similar events. Also, in 2019, Vietnam signed the Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the European Union (EU) which will provide it “new opportunities for Vietnam to portray itself as a cooperative and pro-active power through land and maritime missions” and “participate and contribute to EU’s Common Security and Defence (CSDP) missions and operations”

    Perhaps what merits attention is that Vietnam strictly adheres to ‘three-no policy’ i.e. no military alliances; no foreign troops stationed on Vietnamese soil; and no partnering with a foreign power to combat another. In this context, it is useful to recall the visit to Hanoi by U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in October 2020. The surprise visit was labelled as an occasion to celebrate the 25th anniversary of diplomatic normalisation of bilateral relations, Pompeo’s tour was also to share with the Vietnamese leaders the US “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy and seek their support.

    There is every reason to believe that Vietnam is unlikely to gravitate towards the US, notwithstanding the fact that its relations with China have been quite rancorous particularly over territorial disputes in the South China Sea, military-naval buildup on the reclaimed features and harassment by Chinese Coast Guard ships of Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in the Paracel Islands including intentional ramming. Vietnam is unlikely to offer affirmation to the US FOIP or the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), a grouping of Australia, India, Japan and US to balance against China.

    We can expect Vietnam to exercise strategic autonomy and its position of ‘not taking sides’ pivoting on its ‘three-no policy’ could prove to be an incentive for the Biden Administration to pursue an enhanced and constructive engagement with Vietnam.

    There are clear signs of contestation between the US and China, which might create Blocks (with the US or with China) that might upset the peace and stability in the region. We can expect Vietnam to exercise strategic autonomy and its position of ‘not taking sides’ pivoting on its ‘three-no policy’ could prove to be an incentive for the Biden Administration to pursue an enhanced and constructive engagement with Vietnam.

    Image Credit: Atlantic Sentinel

  • US strategists lost empathy, along with their wars

    US strategists lost empathy, along with their wars

    This article was published earlier in Responsible Statecraft.

    The great realist thinker Hans Morgenthau stated that a fundamental ethical duty of the statesman is the cultivation of empathy: the ability through study to see the world through the eyes of rival state elites. Empathy in this sense is not identical with sympathy. Thus, George Kennan’s deep understanding of Stalinism led to an absolute hostility to that system.

    This kind of empathy has very valuable consequences for foreign policy. It makes for an accurate assessment of another state establishment’s goals based on its own thoughts, rather than a picture of those goals generated by one’s own fears and hopes; above all, it permits one to identify the difference between the vital and secondary interests of a rival country as that country’s rulers see them.

    A vital interest is one on which a state will not compromise unless faced with irresistible military or economic pressure. Otherwise, it will resist to the very limit of its ability, including, if necessary, by war. A statesman who sets out to challenge another state’s vital interests must therefore be sure not only that his or her country possesses this overwhelming power, but that it is prepared actually to use it.

    Geopolitical power is really, in the end, local and relative: it is the power that a state is willing to bring to bear in a particular place or on a particular issue relative to the power that a rival state will bring to bear. Furthermore, the degree of the willingness to mobilize and use power and to make sacrifices depends ultimately on whether the issue concerned is believed to be a vital national interest. If it is only a secondary interest, then it is one on which the statesman should be prepared to make concessions and seek compromise.

    The first step in this process of empathy is simply to listen to what the other side says. This however is not in itself enough, for they may of course be exaggerating an issue’s importance as a bluff or a negotiating gambit. It is therefore also necessary to study in depth the history, politics and culture of the country concerned. Thus, despite what Chinese officials say, we might doubt that they would actually go to war if Taiwan declares independence. A study of modern Chinese history, and of the importance of nationalism to the legitimacy of the Chinese state, makes clear that they are not bluffing.

    What makes this search for understanding easier is that foreign and security establishments generally hold historically-derived doctrines about their country’s vital interests that are relatively easy to identify given study and an open mind.

    The greatest enemy of an open mind and a capacity for empathy is self-righteousness. One aspect of self-righteousness is a confusion between basic moral commitments and the inevitable moral compromises forced upon state representatives trying to defend their country’s interests in a morally flawed and chaotic world.

    The morality of Western policymakers lies in their commitment to Western democracy, and their renunciation of absolutely immoral means: notably the mass murder of civilians. This commitment however, while it may restrain Western democracies from the most evil actions, does not confer some kind of innate innocence on their conduct of policy.

    This is especially true of the Middle East where I have worked for a number of years. Given the nature of this region, any outside state, democratic or otherwise, seeking to play an important role there will inevitably be compelled to engage in certain immoral actions — including alliances with corrupt and murderous dictatorships. What Western policymakers can, however, be blamed for is the pretense that because our systems are democratic, this somehow in itself makes these immoral actions better than those same actions when engaged in by other states.

    The least excusable Western failure of empathy since the end of the Cold War has been with regard to Russia because — by contrast to some Middle East countries, let alone North Korea — the attitudes and beliefs of the Russian establishment are not hard to understand, at least for anyone with a minimal grasp of Russian history and culture. Moreover, the realism of Russian policymakers fits the mindset of many American security officials.

    The vital interests of Russia are adhered to by the Russian establishment as a whole. They consist chiefly of a belief that Russia must be one pole of a multipolar world — not a superpower, but a great power with real international influence. Also: that Russia must retain predominant influence on the territory of the former Soviet Union, that any rival alliance must be excluded, and that international order depends on the preservation of existing states. In addition, as with any political system, there is a commitment to the existing Russian political order and a determination that any change in it must not be directed from outside.

    There are obvious tensions between some of these Russian interests and secondary U.S. interests, but on one issue — the danger from Sunni Islamist extremism and terrorism — a vital interest of Russia is completely identical with our own. Because of this danger, U.S. administrations, like the Russians, have often supported existing authoritarian Muslim states for fear that their overthrow would lead to chaos and the triumph of Islamist extremism.

    In Syria, Russia followed the policy of the U.S. in Algeria 20 years earlier — and indeed in its support for General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt today. Russian fears of an ISIS takeover of Syria if the state collapsed were echoed in briefings to President Obama by the CIA. Yet a Western narrative has emerged of Russia engaging in wicked support for “brutal dictatorships” in the Middle East, and that this policy in turn is linked not to fear of Islamist extremism, but implacable anti-Americanism and reckless geopolitical ambition.

    Straightforward Western prejudices (now dignified with the abominable euphemism of “narratives”) are part of the reason for these false perceptions derived from the Cold War. The collapse of Communism, however, also led to a growth in Western hubris that led Western policymakers to fail either to listen to their Russian colleagues when they stated Russia’s vital interests, or to study Russia in sufficient depth to understand that they were not bluffing but really meant what they said. Instead, you had the tragicomic picture of American officials lecturing Russian officials on the “real” interests of Russia.

    As a result, U.S. and British officials ignored Russian warnings that if Washington persisted in trying to extend NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine, Russia would fight. And when Russia did fight — albeit in a very limited way — this was taken as a sign not of a Western failure to listen, but of Russian “madness,” aggression, and evil. Though if one thinks of the Monroe Doctrine, Russian concerns in this regard should hardly be incomprehensible to an American official. It should also have been easy enough to accept the Russian point that this was a vital interest for the sake of which Moscow was prepared to make very important concessions to Washington on other issues.

    Instead, the United States establishment embroiled itself in confrontations with Russia, only to recognize at the last moment in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 that these countries were not in fact American vital interests, and that the U.S. was not prepared to fight to defend them. An additional danger therefore in refusing to study other countries’ vital interests is that it makes it more difficult to think seriously about your own. We had better hope that in dealing with the vastly more formidable challenge of China our policy elites will engage in real study, eschew self-righteousness, and identify and not attack the vital interests of China, as long as Beijing does not seek to attack our own.

    This article is republished with the permission of the author and Quincy Institute.
    Image credit: Pexels
     
  • BeiDou: China’s Space Flight to Global Dominance

    BeiDou: China’s Space Flight to Global Dominance

    Technological independence and Economic prowess define a ‘Great power’ in today’s Information Age. In an era of rapid technological advancements, China has emerged as an economic and technology juggernaut, rising in stature as a global superpower. Ever since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s modernisation strategy, China has invested heavily in its science and technology sector aiming to reduce its dependency on foreign technology. After nearly three decades of the relentless pursuit of technological competence, China has now established itself as a dominant force in innovation and technology. One such milestone because of its relentless pursuit is the establishment of its indigenous Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS). BeiDou marks China’s entry into an elite club of GNSS systems, becoming one of only four global navigation systems worldwide. It cements China’s place as a prominent Space Power and as a potential suitor among countries for future space co-operation. BeiDou will directly rival the Global Positioning System (GPS) of the U.S. and its cheap costs with greater accuracy could bring an end to the monopoly of GPS in the global navigation systems arena.

    Military Objectives

    ‘National security’ is the primary reason for the development of the BDS navigation system. China’s ambition to build an indigenous satellite navigation system stemmed from the “embarrassment” it suffered during the Taiwan strait missile crisis in 1996[1]. It is believed that two of the warning missiles fired by the PLA, close to Taiwan’s Keelung military base, failed to hit the designated target due to the sudden disruption of the GPS. Missiles launched rely on Position Navigation and Timing (PNT) data, provided by a constellation of satellites, to navigate accurately to their designated target. With the BeiDou Navigation System (BDS) online, the Chinese military possesses a military and strategic autonomy and no longer requires to be dependent solely on the GPS for tracking and navigation. BeiDou aims to offer the Chinese PLA with precision-guided missile delivery systems, robust communication systems, enhanced cyber and drone warfare capabilities. Thus, integrating BeiDou into military systems and equipment will enable China to effectively bypass any constraints on GPS imposed by the U.S.[2].

    The BDS navigation system offers signals at a higher bandwidth, thus providing better accuracy than the GPS. Its global position accuracy is under 10 cm in the Asia-Pacific compared to the GPS’s 30cm [3]. BeiDou’s higher accuracy and affordable prices may encourage many countries to consider it as a viable alternative to GPS service provided by the U.S. Many militaries today fear manipulation of the navigation signals by the U.S. in times of conflict, as they are solely reliant on GPS for precision guidance and navigation. The BDS is compatible with GPS, GLONASS & GALILEO navigation systems, thus offering militaries with a fool-proof alternative. This dynamism will be a key strategic asset to any country during conflict situations[4]. One such example of countries moving away from GPS is Pakistan, which is all set to incorporate BeiDou into its civil and military domain as part of its defence and strategic cooperation with China. It gives Pakistan access to precise geospatial data for application in surveying and mapping, construction and scientific studies[5]. With Pakistan on a defence equipment buying spree from China, its military would gradually be fully integrated with the BDS navigation system soon, moving away from its reliance on GPS. This shows China’s pursuit of establishing its indigenous navigation system in the Asian region, putting an end to the GPS hegemony.

    Space Silk Road

    The BeiDou navigation satellite system is of critical importance to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BDS navigation system will ensure accurate navigation capabilities that will complement the Land and Maritime Silk routes, which are a part of the larger Belt and Road Initiative of China. The Space Silk road aims to establish an array of space capabilities including a fully operational space station, ground infrastructure, launch services, satellites, aerospace industries and BDS related industries[6]. It offers a wider dimension to China’s ambitions for BRI and could promote greater growth and development of its space infrastructure and technology. It also promotes civil-military dual-use technologies and provides a platform for enhancing China’s indigenisation in communication, satellite navigation, aerospace and artificial intelligence[7]. It aims to provide the international community with credible alternative infrastructure and promote further cooperation in space-innovation and space-technology. China’s Space Silk Road legitimises its stake as a credible leader in space and a growing superpower in the international system.

    Over 30 countries including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Indonesia have already signed agreements with China to integrate the BDS navigational system in the domestic sectors like transportation, communication, etc. They have also allowed the construction of ground stations, which would improve the accuracy and range of the BDS navigation system. The Space Silk road aims to tap into the lucrative satellite navigation industry, its system and components market enabling China to wield greater influence in third countries and their economy[8]. The BDS navigation satellite system is the centrepiece of the Space Silk Road under China’s Belt and Road Initiative and is of massive strategic and geopolitical importance in China’s ambition to establish itself as a global superpower.

    Economic Implications of BeiDou

    It is clear as day that any country that possesses an economic might wields greater influence in the world’s geopolitics. The U.S. has been the dominant force in the world economy until the turn of the 21st century, but not anymore. China’s meteoric rise to economic supremacy is deeply rooted in its aim to knock the U.S. right off their perch and take its place as a global leader in technology innovation and manufacturing. It aims to be the focal point of global manufacturing and offer nations credible and high-tech equipment and exercise a greater foothold in the global markets. ‘Made in China 2025’ espouses this ambition of China to cement its place as a global manufacturing leader in strategic industries like information technology, communication systems, a global navigation system, aerospace, railways, agricultural machinery etc. which are critical to the economic competitiveness and growth in the 21st century[9].

    A major cornerstone of the ‘Made in China 2025’ and the ‘13th 5-year plan’ is to fast-track the commercial applications of the BeiDou navigation satellite system. The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) industry is estimated to be worth US$82.4 billion and is forecast to grow at an average rate of 7% p.a. through 2023 with over 3.6 billion GNSS devices currently in use worldwide. China aims to gain control of this lucrative market, which would give it economic superiority against the U.S. in the GNSS downstream industry and also aims to break the monopoly that the GPS enjoys in the satellite navigation industry. As of 2012, the U.S. led the GNSS downstream industry with a share of 31% followed by Japan 26%, the E.U. 25.8% and China with 7% share. China aims to capture 60% of the domestic GNSS downstream industry and 80% of important applications, becoming globally competitive by 2020. It envisions to build an industrial chain comprising all parts of the GNSS downstream industry ranging from chips, modules, antennae, receivers etc, all compatible with the BDS navigation system. China expects Beidou to have a global market penetration of 60% and attain worldwide coverage by 2020[10].

     In sheer numbers, it projects the GNSS market to grow by US$81.5 billion and have a compounded annual growth rate of 6.6%. Estimated at US$155.1 billion in 2027, the GNSS global market is expected to reach US$228.7 billion by 2027 growing at a CAGR of almost 6% between 2020-2027. The U.S. GNSS market is estimated to be worth US$42 billion in 2020 while China, being the world’s second-largest economy is likely to reach a GNSS market size worth US$47.8 billion in 2027 with a CAGR of 8.6%, effectively getting even with or overtaking the U.S. in the global GNSS market[11]. In a study carried out by a North Carolina based research organization RTI International, sponsored by the U.S. government’s National Institutes of Standards and Technology, between 1984-2017 GPS has generated economic benefits to the tune of US$1.4 trillion. The largest contributing sectors were the telecommunications industry with US$685.9 billion, telematics with US$325 billion and location-based services on smartphones with US$215 billion. It is estimated that losing GPS service business would have a US$1 billion per day impact on the economy[12].

    In a recent report published in the White Paper on the Development of China’s Satellite Navigation and Location Services Industry (2020), released by the GNSS and LBS Association of China, China’s satellite navigation and location-based services industry achieved an output of US$48.58 billion in 2019. The industry’s core sector associates with the development and implementing satellite navigation technology including chips, devices, algorithms, software, navigation data, terminal equipment and infrastructure. The BDS navigation system alone has contributed a whopping 80% of output value generated from these sectors[13]. The sheer scope and economic opportunity in the GNSS sector substantiate China’s dogged persistence to gain control of this industry. As the global navigation satellite systems move towards interoperability soon, BeiDou could lead the race to offer high-tech navigation systems and equipment compatible with GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO to the international community. Implementing the BDS navigation system has bolstered China’s standing in the international community as an economic powerhouse and stands as a testament to the country’s resilience and steadfast vision to become a global superpower and a leader in space.

    BeiDou’s Geopolitical Implications and the Future of Space

    The BeiDou Navigation Satellite System is an important strategic asset for China, in its ambitions to achieve global supremacy and establish itself as a leader in Space. China looks to use BeiDou’s scope and potential to achieve its larger geopolitical and strategic goals in the military and economic domain. On the economic front, this would negatively affect U.S. companies operating in the Chinese markets, as China has taken steps to reward its domestic sector to promote BeiDou and expand its GNSS industry. Effectively, U.S. suppliers would be driven out of the market by the local Chinese suppliers whose equipment would be on par or even better than equipment bought from the West. It would enable China to create a global industrial chain of satellite navigation and telecommunication equipment, which are of the highest quality and at affordable prices, wooing third countries and providing a credible alternative to the Western equipment. This serves well to two of China’s prominent strategic objectives of establishing itself as a leading global economy and driving the U.S. out of the Asian markets.

    Considering heightened U.S. presence in the highly contested South China Sea and China’s lingering territorial disputes with neighbouring countries, BeiDou’s initial deployment in South East Asia offers China strategic advantage and Area Access/Area Denial capabilities. Incorporating the BDS navigation system, possessing greater accuracy than GPS, in both ballistic and cruise missile systems offers China with precision-guided weapons capability, thus acting as an effective deterrent and strategic threat to the U.S. in the region. Greater precision and accuracy implies greater reconnaissance capabilities, digital espionage and enhanced tracking capabilities, thus countries like the U.S. feel BeiDou poses a critical security threat to their national security[14] With the BeiDou navigation satellite system going online, all roads lead to China realizing its dream of an Asia devoid of the West and attaining military autonomy over the U.S., especially in South East Asia.

    The BDS satellite navigation system is the third dimension of China’s strategic Belt and Road Initiative, aiming to achieve global coverage from all fronts. It is an effective foreign policy tool that China can utilise to garner international support and cooperation. With over 130 countries on board China’s BRI project, BeiDou would be a critical asset to attract more countries aboard its ambitious project. Achieving global coverage through BRI, supported by BeiDou, would increase China’s standing in the international community and mark another step towards the end of U.S. dominance in the global geopolitical arena.

    The global ambitions of China with its BeiDou navigation system bring with it a sense of caution and uncertainty in the geopolitical arena. Behind the veil of China’s good Samaritan measures, lie the desires of a power-hungry dragon. The BDS navigation system and its subsequent GNSS downstream industrial chain offer countries lucrative opportunities, but at what cost? Recent patterns would show clearly China’s cut-throat diplomacy with its BRI project. Deceived by vast sums of money in the BRI project, countries who were aboard the project were pushed into a debt-trap by the Chinese, ceding control over their markets and economy to China. BeiDou could be just another tool China could use to seize control of the third country’s markets and strong-arm them to bend to their will and desire.

    In the geopolitical arena of Space, China’s emergence as a space power would no longer give the U.S. leverage that it had been enjoying in the international institutions on discussions and matters on Space technology and governance. BeiDou could be China’s ticket to space superiority. It could give China the upper hand in GNSS discussions and the ability to wield greater influence in Space innovation and technology. History has taught us frequently that once a nation or group of nations achieve technology superiority in any sector, they monopolize it to safeguard their strategic interests and consolidate their position of power. A good example would be the discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty which, under the pretext of bringing order in the domain of Nuclear Technology, has only achieved to limit the capabilities and ambitions of aspiring nuclear states driving a wedge between haves and have-nots. The signatory parties themselves show no compliance with the guidelines of the Treaty. Today, there are nine countries having space launch capabilities. China’s place at the top in countries having space capabilities is fast becoming a reality, and its role in the politics of Space presents an interesting conundrum. China’s pattern of unilateral acts of aggression and its zero-sum approach could sow the seeds for its hegemony in Space. BeiDou could be the most important piece for China in the jigsaw of Space, setting the precedent for an interesting future in the geopolitics of Space, possibly tilting the fine margins of power in favour of the Dragon that is poised to take its decisive flight.

     

     

    References

    [1] Chan, Minnie. “‘Unforgettable Humiliation’ Led to Development of GPS Equivalent.” South China Morning Post [Hong Kong], 13 Sept. 2009, www.scmp.com/article/698161/unforgettable-humiliation-led-development-gps-equivalent

    [2] Sloane, Heath. “Precision Politics: China’s Answer to GPS Comes Online.” The Diplomat, 7 Apr. 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/precision-politics-chinas-answer-to-gps-comes-online/

     [3] Woo, Ryan, and Liangping Gao. “China Set to Complete Beidou Network Rivalling GPS in Global Navigation.” Reuters [Beijing], 12 June 2020, www.reuters.com/article/us-space-exploration-china-satellite-idUSKBN23J0I9

    [4] Xiaoci, Deng. “China Completes BDS Navigation System, Reduces Reliance on GPS.” Global Times, 23 June 2020, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1192482.shtml.

    [5] “Pakistan Military to Use Chinese Navigation System BeiDou to Improve Interoperability.” The Economic Times, 21 Aug. 2020, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-military-to-use-chinese-navigation-system-beidou-to-improve-interoperability/articleshow/77675471.cms?from=mdr

     [6]  Ibold, Sebastian. “China’s Space Silk Road.” Belt and Road Initiative, 12 Apr. 2018, www.beltroad-initiative.com/space-silk-road.

    [7] Aluf, Dale. “China’s Space Silk Road Reaches Mars and beyond.” Asia Times, 31 July 2020, https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/chinas-space-silk-road-reaches-mars-and-beyond/

    [8] China Briefing. Dezan Shira & Associates, www.china-briefing.com/news/made-in-china-2025-explained. Accessed 4 Nov. 2020.

    [9] United States Chamber of Commerce. “Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Ambitions”. Washington D.C.: 16 March 2017, https://www.uschamber.com/report/made-china-2025-global-ambitions-built-local-protections-0

     [10]  Wilson, Jordan. “China’s Alternative to GPS and its implications for the United States”, U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission. 5 January 2017. https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-alternative-gps-and-its-implications-united-states

    [11] “Global Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) industry.” ReportLinker, July2020, www.reportlinker.com/p05443565/Global-Global-Navigation-Satellite-System-GNSS-Industry.html?utm_source=PRN.

    [12] RTI International, “Economic Benefits of the Global Positioning System”. North Carolina. 31 May 2019. https://www.rti.org/publication/economic-benefits-global-positioning-system-gps

    [13] Global Times. “China’s Satellite Navigation Industry Turned up $49 Billion in 2019.” Global Times, 23 Sept. 2019, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1188659.shtml.

    [14]https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Report_China’s%20Alternative%20to%20GPS%20and%20Implications%20for%20the%20United%20States.pdf

  • International Institutions in post-Covid Era

    International Institutions in post-Covid Era

    Pandemic exposes inadequacies in the 21st century world

    At the Munich Security Conference 2020, the Indian External Affairs Minister stated that multilateralism has weakened, and attributed it to the inadequacy of international institutions, established seventy-five years ago, to cope with the challenges of 21st century. This was just before the coronavirus became a global pandemic. Today, among other aspects of society that are challenged by the pandemic, its impact on the world has exposed the inability of international organizations to develop a globally cooperative strategy. The September edition of the UNSC meeting held regarding the coronavirus pandemic saw the United States, China, and Russia fight bitterly over responsibility and responsiveness to the pandemic. Instead of building constructive solutions to face the challenge each country focused on accusing others. Similarly, although the Covid-19 global response pledging event secured 7.4 billion euros, their origins (whether new or retargeting of approved grants), method of fund application, proposed call for global research sharing platforms are either ambiguous or not yet set up. Hence, although international organizations have promoted dialogue, the jury is still out on their efforts towards alleviating the crisis or cushioning its impact. The pandemic thus leads to questions about their effectiveness and what post-covid international institutions might look like.

    Given the manner in which various nation-states represent, contribute to, and run international organizations it is definitive that the nature of international institutions is susceptible to change.

    Institutionalism and International Organisations

    International Organisations such as the United Nations and its predecessor the League of Nations mark the variety of multilateralism brought to life based on the theory of institutionalism. Institutionalism originated from the thought that if humans are fundamentally good but act otherwise it is because of anarchy in the international system, and through institutions fostering international cooperation anarchy can be countered to promote the fundamental good in human nature. The final goal of institutionalism stood to promote supranational organizations. However, there have been drawbacks in bringing practicality to this theory. These institutions are built on belief (an individual external factor to the institution itself brought by participants) and power in international institutions is extended when states surrender part of their sovereignty. The changes and differences in individual beliefs cause significant changes in institutions in both the way they operate and the consequences of their operations. Given the manner in which various nation-states represent, contribute to, and run international organizations it is definitive that the nature of international institutions is susceptible to change. Hence, better international coordination and responses to the past crisis such as the 2008 financial crisis, controlling the Ebola breakout in West Africa were also a result of the leftist individual beliefs of participants. However, with global politics inclining towards the right, with waves of hyper-nationalism sweeping across nations, efforts towards multilateralism have taken a back seat. Stephen Walt maintained that the pandemic will reinforce nationalism as the world retreats from hyper-globalization to reduce future vulnerabilities and will create a world that is ‘less open, less prosperous, and less free’. The pandemic has put the world on a trajectory towards the right with politicians becoming more authoritative, and thus multilateralism will see significant changes in the post-covid era.

    Rise of narrow Nationalism and Right Wing Politics

    Despite the rise of right-wing politics globally, the benefits of multilateralism cannot be foregone. Multilateralism in international institutions in past crises followed a model wherein the United States took the lead across various organizations and coordinated the world towards a united response. Since such leadership has been replaced with great power politics, multilateralism has taken an operational role instead of a supervisory role. The main difference between the two roles is that the latter had better potential to progress as a supranational organization while the former traverses as a platform offering supporting services to different countries. Examples of this are efforts led by NATO to use their airlifting capabilities to move vital medical equipment and food supplies, and WHO’s initiative to share guidelines and important research to countries who then took individual decisions. In the current trajectory, these changes in institutional consequences can lead towards three possibilities in the future of multilateralism:

    At the risk of sounding highly pessimistic, the institutional belief in multilateralism is likely to see a steep decline and sovereignty surrendered to international organizations will erode. The role of the UN and its organs may change focus on global data collection, analysis, and politically motivated discussions from the current (weakening) narrative of progress, development, conflict prevention, and resolution.

    • As Robert Kaplan argues, Coronavirus has become the watershed movement segregating the upcoming era as Globalisation 2.0 with the rise of autocracies, social and class divides, and new emerging global divisions. This image of globalization 2.0 can be used to reflect on what the next era of multilateralism will be. In the continuing trajectory with no clear international leadership, international institutions would reduce to becoming a platform of dialogue in great power politics with the initiative and effectiveness of resolutions substantially watered down. At the risk of sounding highly pessimistic, the institutional belief in multilateralism is likely to see a steep decline and sovereignty surrendered to international organizations will erode. The role of the UN and its organs may change focus on global data collection, analysis, and politically motivated discussions from the current (weakening) narrative of progress, development, conflict prevention, and resolution. For instance, the pandemic-induced embargo on the movement of people would in turn catalyse the degeneration of organs such as the UNHCR as the dialogue focuses on data collection and blame allocation instead of refugee crisis management. The international political narrative will shift from globalism to regionalism for effective conflict resolution.

     

    • As US-China rivalry hampers effective policymaking, relatively smaller powers will lead the narrative in these institutions. The foundations for this possibility are already evident. The United Kingdom and other European countries have been increasingly calling for global summits to promote multilateralism. Their efforts can be theorized to be an enmeshment strategy similar to that used by small states in ASEAN. The objective of this strategy is to alleviate the high risks of major powers directly competing by creating interdependence (if not directly between the great powers) among the various actors in the system through increased multilateral participation to an extent that great powers are tied down in this system and their interests are intertwined such that conflict would become costly. Thus smaller powers prevent the complete breakdown of international organizations by continuing to promote dialogue and ensure the persistence of multilateralism, albeit weaker, but prevent the division into two great-power blocs as with the first scenario. This approach where smaller states remain neutral to great power influences would in turn result in the latter’s effort to win over small states characterized by the exploitation of the cold war by small states. Although the US has so far managed to step away from this, with the oncoming elections it is likely that a change in administration would enable the enmeshment strategy to prevent an extreme global division.

     

    • Taking an optimistic view, the pandemic may catalyse the trajectory towards Ikenberry’s Multilateralism 3.0 where power in the institutions is more reflective of present-day world powers. Given the shift in American foreign policy and lack of initiative, the pandemic could become an important shaper for other Asian powers to get higher representation to balance China’s rise. Although this demonstrates an idealistic situation far from the rightist trajectory, Ikenberry concedes to the fact that in the short-run countries will be nationalistic but in the long run, democracies will break out from the authoritarian, nationalistic regimes to promote a pragmatic and protective internationalism. Ikenberry makes this interpretation based on the enlightenment world leaders had following the destruction and suffering from the world wars. Hence, the pandemic marks the starting point for the butterfly effect which will lead to wartime-like geopolitics, followed by enlightenment to build stronger international institutions with representations reflective of the new world order and better capable of dealing with issues the current institutions struggle to resolve.

    Conclusion

    Although international cooperation would be the sensible means to navigate through the pandemic and other crisis induced by the pandemic, due to factors external to the institution, such as domestically controlled participant change – multilateralism will see considerable weakening. Among the three possibilities identified for the future of international institutions, only time can tell which path the world will take. However, a combination of the second possibility in the short run progressing to the third over the long run is the most optimistic option to work upon for a better pathway to navigate through this crisis.

    Image: Pixabay

  • Chinese Economic Sops over the South China Sea: A Mixed Bag of Successes

    Chinese Economic Sops over the South China Sea: A Mixed Bag of Successes

    The South China Sea is a resource-rich sea space and its net worth is estimated to be US$ 2.5 trillion.[i]  The proven oil reserves are around 7.7 billion barrels and natural gas reserves could be around 266 trillion cubic feet.[ii] The Chinese strategy in the South China Sea against other claimant States is a mix of aggressive posturing including the threat of use of force as also offering economic incentives and sops such as ‘joint development of resources’ in the contested waters.

    Deng preferred a “moderate approach” i.e. “sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development.

    The idea of joint development can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader and author of market-economy reforms in the 1980s that earned him the title of ‘Architect of Modern China’. Deng preferred a “moderate approach” i.e. “sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development.”[iii]

     

    Map Credit: The Australian Naval Institute

    China’s current thinking on joint development of resources in South China is built around at least seven policy choices i.e. (a) promote good faith in the South China Sea; (b) limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; (c) focus on less-sensitive areas of the South China Sea; (d) reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; (e) begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; (f) define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus, and (g) discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.[iv] Further, it has been argued that the ASEAN-China Single Draft Negotiating Text of the Code of Conduct (COC) is “conducive to creating benign bilateral relations, which serves as a prerequisite to joint development”.[v]

    The general belief among the claimants is that China thinks ‘what is mine [Chinese] is of course mine, but what is your [claimants] is also mine’

    However, the above policy choices for joint development and intention are flawed and dismissed by the aggrieved claimants of the South China Sea. The general belief among the claimants is that China thinks ‘what is mine [Chinese] is of course mine, but what is your [claimants] is also mine’; i.e.  Chinese joint development initiatives are based on the wrong assumption that what belongs to China is for China only to develop, and what belongs to other claimants is for development.

    In 2018, China and the Philippines signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development. President Xi Jinping urged President Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to “set aside disputes, eliminate external interference, and concentrate on conducting cooperation, making pragmatic efforts and seeking development”; furthermore, “both sides can take a ‘bigger step’ in the joint development of offshore oil and gas”.[vi] The Philippines proposed a “60-40 sharing arrangement in its favour” and both sides could then develop the “Reed Bank, the main site of the oil and gas reserves, despite the arbitration award declaring that Manila had sovereign rights to exploit them”.[vii]

    Similarly, Brunei has an ongoing arrangement with China on bilateral joint development/cooperation in the South China Sea. Economic and strategic considerations are Brunei’s twin drivers; it has been “pushing hard to diversify its economy away from the oil and gas industry” for a long time and the “unstable oil market, a slow foreign investment growth (especially in non-oil and gas sector) and a contracting national GDP” has acted as a catalyst to diversify and “joint development” is an integral part of Brunei’s wider economic diversification strategy. [viii]

    Unlike the Philippines and Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have shied away from joint development of resources with China in the South China Sea.

    Unlike the Philippines and Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have shied away from joint development of resources with China in the South China Sea. This is despite the March 2005 China, the Philippines and Vietnam Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Scientific Research in Certain Areas in the South China Sea by respective national oil companies.

    Malaysia is not averse to joint development with other claimants except China and at least four such projects were undertaken i.e. (a) Malaysia-Thai Joint Development Authority in the Gulf of Thailand based on the 1979 MOU; (b) 1992 MOU which designates overlapping continental shelf claims (about 2000km square) in the Gulf of Thailand as Commercial Arrangement Area (CAA); (c) the 2009 CAA between Brunei and Malaysia; and (d) Fisheries MOU between Malaysia and Indonesia, quasi-joint exploitation of fisheries resources, in overlapping claim area of about 14,300 square kilometres in the Straits of Malacca.[ix]

    Vietnam’s boundary and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea including clashes over the Parcels have resulted in mistrust and preclude joint development with China. In essence, Vietnam does not accept joint development in areas that belong to Vietnam according to the UNCLOS 1982.

    Vietnam promotes international cooperation on resource development and has a rich body of laws to support such initiatives such as the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea, the Petroleum Law (Article 3, No. 12), the Navigation Law, Fisheries Law, the Law on Natural Resources and Environment of Sea and Islands (Article 4, No. 5), the Tourism Law, and the Mineral Law. However, its boundary and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea including clashes over the Parcels have resulted in mistrust and preclude joint development with China. In essence, Vietnam does not accept joint development in areas that belong to Vietnam according to the UNCLOS 1982.

    The US rejects Chinese maritime claim in the South China Sea and proclaimed “any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development in these waters – or to carry out such activities unilaterally – is unlawful.”[x]Furthermore, while extending help to Vietnam on the matter, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that “America stands with our South-East Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law.”

    Notes

    [i] “China Escalates Coercion against Vietnam’s Longstanding Oil and Gas Activity in the South China Sea”, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/china-escalates-coercion-against-vietnams-longstanding-oil-and-gas-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/  (accessed 15 September 2020).

    [ii] “South China Sea: Beijing has a major natural advantage in the geopolitical power game”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/south-china-sea-beijing-has-a-major-natural-advantage-in-the-geopolitical-power-game/articleshow/76423659.cms (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [iii] “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Disputes”, https://taylorfravel.com/2013/08/xi-jinping-and-chinas-maritime-disputes/  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [iv] “Joint development in the South China Sea: China’s incentives and policy choices”,https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [v] Ibid.
    [vi] “China Focus: Xi, Duterte meet on pushing forward ties”, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/30/c_138350348.htm  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [vii] “China’s Xi sees bigger role for joint energy exploration with Philippines”, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines/chinas-xi-sees-bigger-role-for-joint-development-of-offshore-oil-gas-with-philippines-idUSKCN1VK00M  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [viii] “Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development in the South China Sea: Incentives, Policies & Ways Forward”, http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/9f/21/992faf20465fae26c23ccce1ecc6/f003a68f-eb6a-4b09-a506-3c00897b0862.pdf  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [ix] “Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development in the South China Sea: Incentives, Policies & Ways Forward”, http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/9f/21/992faf20465fae26c23ccce1ecc6/f003a68f-eb6a-4b09-a506-3c00897b0862.pdf  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [x] “China pressurizes Vietnam to cancel, compensate offshore firms operating in South China Sea”, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/china-pressurises-vietnam-to-cancel-compensate-offshore-firms-operating-in-south-china-sea/77189060  (accessed 15 September 2020).

    Image Credit: nbcnews.com

  • US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

    US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

     The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    A recent US government-funded study has noted that in 2019 China held back large amounts of water upstream in dams on the Mekong River which caused a  severe drought in the downstream countries,[1] prompting a US ambassador in the region accusing China of “hoarding” water and “harming the livelihoods of millions of people in downstream countries”.[2] Likewise, another report by Stimson Centre, a Washington-based think tank, has corroborated the above and pointed that in 2019 “upstream dams at Nuozhadu and Xiaowan had restricted around 20 billion cubic meters of water between July and November” and that current “satellite images show those dams are once again poised to restrict a similar amount of water from July 2020 through the end of this year … Portions of the Mekong mainstream are once again dropping to historically low levels,”[3]

    China has dismissed the reports and the Global Times in an article cited a report by the Tsinghua University and clarified that the “river dams in China [instead] helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong”; furthermore, in November 2019, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) had concluded that “the drought was caused by insufficient rainfall during the wet season with a delayed arrival and earlier departure of the monsoon rain and an El Niño event that led to abnormally high temperatures and high evapotranspiration”.[4]

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.  The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    China has been reluctant to share hydrological data particularly during the dry seasons and releases water during rainy seasons causing flooding in lower riparian countries. This is despite the 2002 MoU under which China had agreed to provide daily river flow and rainfall data from two monitoring stations in Yunnan Province during the wet season, and the periodic MRC Heads of Government meeting over a Summit which is held every four years.

    Earlier this year, the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had assured that his country would “give positive consideration to share the full-year hydrological information with Mekong countries and enhance cooperation under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework to ensure reasonable and sustainable use of water resources”.[5]

    Perhaps a recent statement by the MRC may temporarily obviate suspicions over China not sharing hydrological information on the Lancang-Mekong River which notes that it welcomes China’s sharing of data “ throughout the year” as also for the “ establishment of an information-sharing platform for water resources cooperation led by China and Myanmar”.[6] Also, during the 3rd Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Leaders’ Meeting, the Global Center for Mekong Studies (GCMS) has been tasked to study the potential benefits from “aligning and synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor with a vast market”.[7]

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement.

    In 1995, the upper and lower riparian countries had adopted Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin which lays out “principles and norms of regional cooperation in managing the river basin”. A formal dialogue process under the MRC was instituted to address issues relating to Mekong River and the Member States agreed to “promote common procedures and practices throughout the region for data collection, storage and analysis to support data sharing and integration of existing data management systems based on the voluntary participation of countries and institutions.”[8] In 2001, they adopted the “Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing,” or PDIES to enable the Member States to share data ‘to provide real-time water level information and more accurate flood forecasting.

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement. The conflict resolution mechanism is also not clearly stipulated”.[9] This is one of the many reasons for discord among the Parties which needs to be addressed by the MRC whose mandate includes dispute resolution.

    Be that as it may, the lower Mekong countries have set up the Mekong Water Data Initiative, and at the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2017 to ‘create a robust, integrated, and transparent platform for collecting, sharing, and managing data on the Mekong River system.’[10]

    there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea.

    At another level, there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea; and the current situation is being described as “becoming a geopolitical issue, much like the South China Sea, between the United States and China,”[11] Perhaps the biggest worry is that the Lancang-Mekong River should not attract contestation between the US and China which surely is going to make the region more turbulent. It would thus be prudent that ASEAN and China work on a Code of Conduct to manage the river affairs or add more robustness in the existing dialogue mechanism over the Lancang-Mekong River.

    End Notes
    [1] “China could have choked off the Mekong and aggravated a drought, threatening the lifeline of millions in Asia”, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/28/china-choked-off-the-mekong-which-worsened-southeast-asia-drought-study.html  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [2] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [3] “The next US-China battleground: Chinese dams on the Mekong River?”,https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3095581/next-us-china-battleground-chinese-dams-mekong-river  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [4] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [5] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [6] “Lancang-Mekong cooperation provide stronger impetus for regional development and prosperity”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/hzdt_1/t1812281.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020)
    [7] “Full text of Co-chairs’ Statement on Cooperation of Synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor of the Third MLC Leaders’ Meeting”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/zyxw_5/t1808947.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [8] “Joint Statement To Strengthen Water Data Management and Information Sharing in The Lower Mekong”,
    https://www.lowermekong.org/news/joint-statement-strengthen-water-data-management-and-information-sharing-lower-mekong (accessed 14 April 219)
    [9] “Code of Conduct for the Mekong”,https://vannarithchheang.com/2018/04/04/code-of-conduct-for-the-mekong/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [10] “Mekong River Commission keen to improve data sharing and management in the Lower Mekong Basin”, https://mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-keen-data-management-in-mekong-basin/  (accessed 12 September 2020.
    [11] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).

    Image: Mekong Riverside, Phnom Penh-Cambodia

  • Vietnam: Bright Economic Outlook post-COVID

    Vietnam: Bright Economic Outlook post-COVID

    COVID-19 is truly a ‘Black Swan’ event and its impact is being felt across the globe. There is widespread worry about the future of economic growth in the post-pandemic period and the World Bank has observed that the pandemic caused the deepest global recession since Second World War. [i] There are at least three reasons which triggered and added to the current crisis. First, it has involved the US and China in a trade war since July 2018, when US President Donald Trump imposed wide-ranging tariffs on China for its alleged unfair trade practices. In August 2019, Trump ordered U.S. companies to “immediately start looking for an alternative to China, including bringing your companies home and making your products in the USA.”[ii] China responded in a similar manner with counter tariffs on US goods. Since then numerous negotiations between them have been held, the last in June 2020 at Hawaii, did not yield any breakthrough. This revengeful tariff war has now blown into a full-fledged trade war and President Trump aggravated with the renewed threat of a “complete decoupling from China.”

    There is widespread worry about the future of economic growth in the post-pandemic period and the World Bank has observed that the pandemic caused the deepest global recession since Second World War.

    Second, amid the trade war, the Corona-19 pandemic made matters worse for the two protagonists. The US accused China of withholding information about the Wuhan virus which was detected in December 2019 and Beijing did not make public the information till January 2020 after which it spread across the globe from Europe to the US. The pandemic has caused massive disruptions in supply chains and some countries have decided to shift businesses out of China. For instance, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe government announced US $2.2 billion stimulus package to help companies shift production out of China back to Japan or elsewhere.[iii]

    Third, the new security law in Hong Kong has triggered an exodus by several companies to move out of China. The Law “targets acts of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces, with life in prison for those committing the most serious offences”[iv] has scared common people. Many technology companies, startups, entrepreneurs are now confronted with uncertainty and are exploring alternative destinations.[v]

    many companies are being forced to shut down their operation in China and rethink-reevaluate-reinvest in new destinations to remain buoyant for the time being and slowly make their networks more resilient across sectors for the future.

    Furthermore, the pandemic exposed the weaknesses and susceptibilities of many organizations, business houses and industries particularly those that are intimately connected and dependent on China to fulfil their need for raw materials or finished products. Consequently, many companies are being forced to shut down their operation in China and rethink-reevaluate-reinvest in new destinations to remain buoyant for the time being, and slowly make their networks more resilient across sectors for the future. According to a leading business research and advisory company, “tariffs imposed by the U.S. and Chinese governments during the past years have increased supply chain costs by up to 10% for over 40% of organizations” and “popular alternative locations are Vietnam, India, and Mexico.” [vi]

    Vietnam and Thailand have a very good scorecard in their fight against COVID-19 and are rearing to attract investments and kick start the economy.

    Even before COVID-19 pandemic crisis, in 2019, five Asian countries i.e. Malaysia, India, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam (MITI-V) or “Mighty Five” had been identified as “up-and-coming players” with high potential for being world’s next manufacturing hubs.[vii] Among these, Vietnam and Thailand have a very good scorecard in their fight against COVID-19 and are rearing to attract investments and kick start the economy.

    According to the World Economic Forum, Vietnam’s economic rise is marked by trade liberalization, domestic reforms through deregulation, lowering the cost of doing business and investments made in human resource development.[viii] During the first six months of the current year, FDI commitments was at over US$15 billion which is a positive outlook for the country. In fact, Vietnam has attracted FDI from 136 countries and territories with nearly 32,000 projects with a combined value of US$378 billion. Among these Japan is the second largest investor with over US$60 billion. Last month, Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment, Embassy of Japanese at Hanoi, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) held a virtual conference to explore FDI investments “especially in the context of Japanese government providing a US$2.3 billion aid package for Japanese firms to diversify their supply chains”.[ix]

    Vietnam has many common export products from China such as broadcasting equipment, and could emerge as the “top exporter of broadcasting equipment to developed countries” but is constrained by “smaller GDP and workforce”; but its   progresses in infrastructure could potentially make it a more appealing option.[x]

    Vietnam has attracted FDI from 136 countries and territories with nearly 32,000 projects with a combined value of US$378 billion. Among these Japan is the second largest investor with over US$60 billion.

    Besides, there are other contenders such as Thailand and India to attract FDI and these two countries offer attractive FDI policies and manufacturing infrastructure. In mid-2019, as many as 200 American companies were planning to move their manufacturing base from China and were looking at India.[xi] Similar trends have been reported from South Korea [xii] and Japan [xiii] who could migrate to “production-conducive economies like India, Vietnam and Thailand”.[xiv]

    According to one estimate, FDI “across the globe may decline by 40% this year due to the Covid-19 crisis”[xv], but by all counts and accounts, Vietnam is a resounding success story.  It is a stable economy, possesses necessary infrastructure and facilities, and above all it enjoys “multilateral and bilateral agreements with foreign countries”[xvi], which makes it a popular destination in the post-COVID economic revival outlook.

    Notes

    [i] “Global Economic Prospects”, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects (accessed 16 July 2020).
    [ii] “Trump says he’s ordering American companies to immediately start looking for an alternative to China”, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/23/trump-says-hes-ordering-american-companies-to-immediately-start-looking-for-an-alternative-to-china.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [iii] “Coronavirus Impact: Japan to offer $2.2 billion to firms shifting production out of China”, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/world/coronavirus-impact-japan-to-offer-22-billion-to-firms-shifting-production-out-of-china/story/400721.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [iv] “Hongkongers contemplate a second exodus”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3093517/home-and-away-after-national-security-law-hongkongers (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [v] “Tech Firms Begin to Abandon Hong Kong over Security Law”, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:tmQW3Yjx5vcJ:https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-20/tech-firms-begin-to-abandon-hong-kong-because-of-security-law+&cd=13&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [vi] “Gartner Survey Reveals 33% of Supply Chain Leaders Moved Business Out of China or Plan to by 2023”, https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2020-06-24-gartner-survey-reveals-33-percent-of-supply-chain-leaders-moved-business-out-of-china-or-plan-to-by-2023 (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [vii] “5 China Sourcing Alternatives In Asia”, https://www.intouch-quality.com/blog/5-alternatives-to-sourcing-from-china (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [viii] “Vietnam races ahead of China in economic growth: opportunities and challenges for Vietnam in the post-COVID- 19 period”, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/vietnam-races-ahead-of-china-in-economic-growth-opportunities-and-challenges-for-vietnam-in-the-post-covid-19-period/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [ix] Ibid.
    [x] “COVID-19: Developing countries and shrouded opportunities”, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/covid-19-developing-countries-and-shrouded-opportunities/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xi] “About 200 US firms aim to move manufacturing base from China to India post-general election: USISPF”, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/about-200-us-firms-aim-to-move-manufacturing-base-from-china-to-india-post-general-election-usispf/story/341011.html ( 30 July 2020).
    [xii] “Korean companies keen to move out of China to India”, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/75130387.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst (30 July 2020).
    [xiii] “Global firms look to shift from China to India”, https://www.livemint.com/industry/manufacturing/global-firms-look-to-shift-from-china-to-india-11587494725838.html  (30 July 2020).
    [xiv] “India isn’t ready yet for foreign companies that want to quit China”, https://theprint.in/opinion/india-isnt-ready-yet-for-foreign-companies-that-want-to-quit-china/415040/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xv] “1,000 Japanese firms looking for investment opportunities in Vietnam”, http://hanoitimes.vn/1000-japaneses-firms-looking-for-investment-opportunities-in-vietnam-313133.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xvi] “Vietnam races ahead of China in economic growth: opportunities and challenges for Vietnam in the post-COVID- 19 period”, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/vietnam-races-ahead-of-china-in-economic-growth-opportunities-and-challenges-for-vietnam-in-the-post-covid-19-period/ (accessed 30 July 2020).

     

    Image: Ho Chi Minh city and Saigon River – Credit: Adobe Stock