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  • Lebanon’s Food Security Crisis

    Lebanon’s Food Security Crisis

    Security has been a buzzword in the arena of International Politics since the Cold War, and this is widely recognized to be the subject’s genesis as articulated by Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen in their book, The Evolution of International Security Studies. The traditional view of security as largely related to military is the aspect that is given the most prominent focus in discourses on the subject. However, since the 1990s, “societal security” and concepts related to people are broader and sub-concepts such as food security have gained in importance. Food security looks at how much food is available, the access and affordability of food to all people in a country. Food security is also the ability of the country to keep sufficient food available during tough times, such as inflation, disasters, and other such hardships. The Food Climate Research Network speaks of the five factors of food security; availability of food, access to food, utilization of food, stability, and malnutrition. Perhaps food security is one of the most essential forms of security, as the lack of food leads to starvation. This is the reason one hears of bread riots and bread in many protest slogans; ‘bread’ symbolizes food security and represents people’s survival. The economic meltdown of Lebanon and the failure of governance has created a human catastrophe of instability and poverty. The recent Beirut explosion has highlighted not only the failure of the government but a complete breakdown of safety and social security for its common citizens. Under the current circumstances, Lebanon’s food security situation is a major cause for concern.

    Hikes in Food Prices

    Lebanon today is a country with massive debt, income inequality, with much of its revenue going towards servicing of national debts. In addition, Lebanon has been facing high inflation for the last few months, making it very difficult for families to access food. As a result, basic food items are overpriced and in short supply; for instance, a pat of butter costs 9.4 Euros.  Meat, fruits and other commodities have become luxuries for most Lebanese citizens. There are huge breadlines across Lebanon, and many grocery stores cannot afford to buy food to sell to consumers. The COVID-19 crisis has compounded the economic crisis. Prices of eight basic food items have increased by 56%. Lebanon’s food crisis is so grave that parents are bartering their children’s toys and furniture for food online.

     Economic collapse and Food Security

    The most circulated pictures over the last few weeks on media are of the explosion in Beirut and the spillage of grains. This blast occurred because of the unsafe storage of ammonium nitrate and has led to the death of over 200 people, with over 6,000 injured so far. There are many still missing. For Lebanon, this is a triple layer of burden, as the country is fighting a mismanaged economy, a pandemic, and now the horrific aftermath of the explosion. Post the explosion, many countries and global institutions have rushed emergency support by providing minimal aid and funding to facilitate fast recovery from this catastrophe.  While the world has come together to help Lebanon, the situation remains grim because of the shortage of various necessities like medicine and food. The second-largest port in Lebanon, Tripoli has some storage of flour; however, this suffices to cover just one month’s requirements. Beirut port, the largest in Lebanon, is virtually unusable because of the blast. The port infrastructure is severely damaged, thus hurting imports. Lebanon is a country that relies hugely on imports; it imports 85% of its food from outside, making this a major crisis . By one estimate the blast has destroyed 120,000 metric tons of grains, and this could affect food availability as well as sky-rocketing of food prices. The United Nations Food Program reiterated that Lebanon is in a grim situation regarding food security. The current assessment is that the grains can sustain them for less than a month.

    Grim Outlook and Tough Challenges

    The looming food security crisis is a direct fall-out of the economic collapse and multiple crises facing the country. Discontent with the government in Lebanon is not new, since the protests have been on since last October. The explosion and its resulting loss of life and property have triggered waves of protests again, forcing Hassan Diab, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, to step down from his office on 10th August. Decades of poor governance, entrenched kleptocracy, corrupt political class, criminal negligence, incompetence and economic mismanagement have led to the current catastrophe. The former economy minister, Nasser Saidi, says that ‘Lebanon is on the brink of the abyss of depression, with GDP declining by 25% this year, growing unemployment, hyperinflation, and humanitarian disaster with poverty exceeding half the population. The growing food crisis and poverty could lead to famine conditions’. The government will need to address income inequality, large-scale corruption, and the role of foreign players in contributing to the economic collapse.  Financial institutions and other creditors, more often foreign powers, need to suspend debt repayments and allow the Lebanese economy to recoup; since a considerable portion of the revenue goes into debt servicing, which is unsustainable for long.  International funding agencies, while sympathetic to the common peoples’ plight, are hesitant to go ahead with aid due to the poor governance track record of the political class. By some estimates, they put the immediate requirement for humanitarian aid and the cost of rebuilding essential infrastructure post the blast at USD 15 billion. This pales compared to the even bigger mess in the financial system. Ghazi Wazni, the country’s finance minister who quit with the rest of the government last week, has put the total losses in the banking system at $83 billion, and a black hole in the central banking system of $50 billion. The people are displaying discontent over the sectarian politics that have afflicted the country for decades and are the root cause of endemic corruption. Last year’s protests led to a new government in December, which was forced to resign post the explosion.

    Amidst the political crisis, food security is increasingly the major problem in Lebanon for months now. The blast has left 300,000 people homeless.  International Organizations and Civil Society Organizations, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are enabling and mobilizing food supplies.

    Poverty is the immediate concern; there are already one million Lebanese in poverty, with the likelihood of more than half of the Lebanese population falling into poverty. Food shortages will most likely result in starvation, malnutrition, and death. Looking at the five tenets of food security mentioned above, Lebanon satisfies neither of the five criteria. Lebanon is an example of how decades of factional strife, warlordism, corruption, and power in the hands of the kleptocratic elite can push a country and its people into the abyss of poverty. While resolving Lebanon’s food security crisis is possible through immediate international aid and support, resolving the larger problem of its economic mess and humanitarian catastrophe will need international intervention.

  • Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis and the way Forward

    Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis and the way Forward

    Introduction

    Over the last few decades, migration has become a global norm. Although a substantial part of the global population migrates for economic and personal reasons, it is undeniable that migration as a phenomenon is exacerbated by factors such as armed conflicts, ethnic or politico-social tensions, climate change and others. The effect that migration has on global economic, social and political transformations is widely recognized.[1] Naturally, in contrast to migration policies, all States have specific laws to regulate the acquisition of nationality by birth, descent and/or naturalization. While most of us realise the significance of the concept of nationality, we tend to overlook the fact that inclusion by nationality often brings the phenomenon of statelessness with it. In this context, the latest developments in the Indian laws regulating nationality raise several social and legal conundrums. However, the lack of any legal framework on statelessness or India’s abstinence from signing the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is a clear indication of India’s unpreparedness to deal with the potential long-term consequences of its new laws.

    Deprivation of Citizenship and Statelessness in the Contemporary Era

    The concepts of nationality and citizenship have attracted great attention for raising several contemporary politico-legal and social issues. Citizenship confers an identity on an individual within a particular state. Consequently, a citizen is able to derive rights and is assigned obligations by virtue of this identity.[2] Political Philosopher, Hannah Arendt, terms this as “the right to have rights”.[3] Citizenship is what entitles a citizen to the full membership of rights, a democratic voice and territorial residence. While we understand the significance of being a citizen of a country, we often fail to ponder upon the consequences of losing it. Immanuel Kant argues that citizenship by naturalisation is a sovereign privilege and the obverse side of such privilege is the loss of citizenship or “denationalisation”.[4] Arendt has also identified the twin phenomena of “political evil” and “statelessness”.[5]

    This condition of statelessness is not only a harmful condition which makes the person vulnerable to violation of human rights, but it also works in delegitimising a person in the socio-legal order of a State.

    An introspect into the right to have the right to a nationality goes on to throw light on the issue of statelessness. Although history has proven the existence of both de facto and de jure statelessness, this chapter is only concerned with de jure statelessness, specifically within the Indian context. The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines a “stateless person” as ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’.[6] This condition of statelessness is not only a harmful condition which makes the person vulnerable to violation of human rights, but it also works in delegitimising a person in the socio-legal order of a State.[7] The number of stateless persons globally in the year 2018 was 3.9 million.[8] This number is still regarded as a conservative under-estimation owing to the fact that most of the affected population reside precariously within the society and most countries do not calculate comprehensive statistics of stateless persons within their territory. UNHCR estimates at least a global figure of 10 million stateless persons globally.[9]

    Statelessness hinders the day-to-day life of a person by depriving them of access to the most rudimentary rights like education, employment or health care to name a few.  It may be attributed to multiple causes inter-alia discrimination, denationalization, lack of documentation, climate change, forced migration, conflict of laws, boundary disputes, state succession and administrative practices.[10] Discrimination based on ethnicity, race, religion or language has been a constant cause of statelessness globally. Currently, at least 20 countries uphold laws which can deny or deprive a person of their nationality in a discriminatory manner.[11] Statelessness tends to exaggerate impact of discrimination and exclusion that minority groups might already be facing. It widens the gap between communities thus deepening their exclusion.[12]  The phenomenon of statelessness has been the more prominent in South and South East Asian countries. The Hill Tamil repatriates in India from Sri Lanka and the Burmese refugees in Cambodia are examples of Asian Stateless populations who are vulnerable to human rights abuses. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are the two most important conventions addressing this issue. The former has 94 parties and 23 signatories, and the latter has 75 parties and only 5 signatories. Albeit international legal norms on the issue of statelessness have restrained the States’ denationalisation power, it has however not erased the use of discrimination as a tool for denationalization.[13] This has been particularly relevant in the case of naturalization of nationals from Muslim-majority countries.[14]  It can be argued that India’s Citizenship Amendment Act has also joined this bandwagon.

    Interplay of the NRC and Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019

    The Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament on 11th December 2019 has caused a lot of uproar and outbreak of protests all over the country. This Act has attracted wide international condemnation[15] for being discriminatory[16], arbitrary and unconstitutional.[17] Before we go on to scrutinise the role of Citizenship Amendment Act in statelessness creation, an analysis of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) is warranted. The NRC process has been the source of several issues regarding migration, citizenship and polarisation of political support in the state of Assam. It has culled out a distinct space in mobilising the political discourse in Assam specifically during the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections.[18]

    The NRC is a register containing names of Indian Citizens. This register was prepared for the very first time in the year 1951 based on the data collected during census. This process was done subsequent to various groups[19] causing agitation in Assam over the non-regulation of immigrant inflow into the region. This resulted in resorting to laws like the Foreigners Act, 1946 and Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1939. The contrast in India’s approach to disregard the aforementioned laws to accommodate people escaping violence in West Pakistan[20] is to be noted here.  The NRC process in Assam determines illegal migrants based on their inability to prove the nexus between their documented ancestral legacy to the Indian State. The NRC process defined such illegal immigrants irrespective of their religious affinity. The cut-off date used to determine a person’s ability to prove ancestral legacy was set to March 24, 1971 which is in line with Bangladesh’s war of liberation.

    Despite the criticisms and drawbacks, the NRC process is  in fact a much needed exercise in the State of Assam. Owing to its shared border with Bangladesh, Assam has been the gateway for refugees, economic and illegal migrants who come to India.

    As Assam has been a hub for labour migration right from the colonial era, the ethnic Assamese have been insecure about the potential demographic shifts in favour of the ethnic Bengali migrants, for a long time.[21] This concern was exacerbated by the mass influx of Bengali migrants after the birth of Bangladesh. This mass migration which aggravated the already anti-immigrant sentiment culminated in a student-led movement in the 1970s and 1980s.[22] A series of protests broke out in the Assam to pressure the government to identify and expel illegal immigrants. In the year 1985, the Union government and the AASU signed the Assam Accord by which the government assured the establishment of a mechanism to identify “foreigners who came to Assam on or after March 25, 1971” and subsequently take practical steps to expel them.[23] Consequent to a Public Interest Litigation[24] filed in 2009. In the year 2014, the Supreme Court assumed the role of monitoring the process of updating the NRC to identify Indian citizens residing in Assam in accordance with the Citizenship Act of 1955. The very first draft of the process was published in December 2017 and 1.9 million people were left out of the register from a population of 3.29 million people in Assam.[25] In August 31, 2019, the final list was published which left out 4 million residents from the NRC.[26] Neither drafts of the NRC specifically mention the religion or community of the non-included applicants, although certain commentators[27] and media outlets[28] have alleged  that five out of nine Muslim-majority districts of Assam had the maximum number of rejections of applicants.[29] Out of the 4 million applications which were excluded from the final list, 0.24 applicants have been put on ‘hold’. These people belong to categories: D (doubtful) voters, descendants of D-voters, people whose cases are pending at Foreigners Tribunals and descendants of these persons.[30] The NRC process has for long attracted mixed reviews. Scholars have suggested that the process has been an arbitrary one that is aimed more at exclusion[31] than inclusion.[32] It has also been regarded as an expensive process, the brunt of which is borne substantially by the people of India.[33] Despite the criticisms and drawbacks, the NRC process is  in fact a much needed exercise in the State of Assam. Owing to its shared border with Bangladesh, Assam has been the gateway for refugees, economic and illegal migrants who come to India. This not only led to the cultural identity crises of Assamese people but it also significantly influenced the political operations in the State.[34] It is also important to note that, owing to the absence of a concrete refugee law in place and due to the general population’s lack of awareness about refugees in India, the distinction between refugees, illegal migrants and economic migrants often get muddled. This is reflected in the anti-migration narrative that brews in the State. Although we maintain that the NRC process is not necessarily a communal exercise, it does have seem to have such repercussions when read together with the Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament last year.

    The Preamble of the Indian Constitution recognises the India as a secular state. This has also been reiterated in landmark Supreme Court decisions, whereby the principle of secularism has been recognised as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.Therefore, the fact that the Citizenship Amendment Act discriminates migrants based on their religion, makes is fundamentally unconstitutional.

    According to the Indian citizenship Act of 1955, an “illegal migrant” is a foreigner who enters India without a valid passport or such other prescribed travel documentation.[35] The Citizenship Amendment Act, amends this definition. The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is not just discriminatory, but it also goes against the basic principles of the Constitution of India. This Act provides that ‘any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community for Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan’, who entered into India on or before December 31, 2014 who have been exempted by the central government by the Passport Act, 1920 or the Foreigners Act 1946, shall not be treated as an illegal migrant.[36] Further, the Act has reduced the aggregate period of residence to qualify for naturalization from 11 years to 5 years for the aforementioned communities.[37] This Act has attracted worldwide criticism from various human rights groups and international organizations. The alleged raison d’etre for the Act is two fold – the alleged religious persecution of minorities in the three Muslim-majority countries mentioned before and rectifying the misdeeds of partition.[38] However, on a careful scrutiny, both these reasons fail to stand the test of rationale and reasonableness. Firstly, it has to be noted that prima facie the Act violates Art.14 of the Indian Constitution by specifically enacting a law that discriminates based on a person’s religion. Documented evidence of persecution of the Islamic minority sects such as the Shias[39] [40], Baloch[41] and Ahmadis[42] [43] in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan is existent. Therefore, the contention that people belonging to Islamic sects would not have faced persecution in Muslim-majority countries is misconceived and simply wrong. Unlike Israel[44], India does not have a ‘Law of Return’. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution recognises the India as a secular state. This has also been reiterated in landmark Supreme Court decisions, whereby the principle of secularism has been recognised as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.[45] Therefore, the fact that the Citizenship Amendment Act discriminates migrants based on their religion, makes is fundamentally unconstitutional.

    Further, the Act seems to operate vis-à-vis three Muslim-majority countries. However, India hosts a large number of refugees and migrants from other neighbouring countries also, particularly Myanmar, Nepal, China and Sri Lanka.[46]There has been no clarification rendered as to the rationale behind including only Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Finally, unlike the cut-off date mentioned in the Assam Accord, the date of December 31, 2014 lacks rationale and therefore comes across as arbitrary. While the NRC process is already criticised for being exclusionary, the effect of NRC combined with the operation of provisions of the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to benefit the non-Muslim communities mentioned in the Act while disadvantaging the Muslim migrants whose names did not figure in the list. This essentially pushes the latter into a predicament of statelessness. It has to be noted here that this legislation is not merely discriminatory, but also wildly inconsistent with India’s obligations under International law.

    India’s Approach to Statelessness in the Past

    The outcome of NRC-CAA is not the first time India had to deal with the issue of statelessness. India has taken steps to mitigate the risks and consequences of statelessness in the past. The situation of enclave dwellers being a key example. Chittmahal or enclaves are pieces of land that belonged to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), yet remained in India, and vice versa. After the India-Pakistan partition in 1947 and the boundary limitations thenceforth, the enclave dwellers were essentially cut-off from access to their country of nationality as they were surrounded by foreign land, eventually pushing them into a state of de facto statelessness. Therefore, crossing borders for daily engagements became an illegal activity.[47] The hostility that ensued from the Partition reflected in the control of these enclaves. In the year 1952, both countries tightened visa policies, making their borders rigid. This trapped the enclave dwellers in a state of virtual lockdown.[48]Despite the sovereignty shift in 1971, with the creation of the independent nation state of Bangladesh, the plight of enclave dwellers remained unaddressed. On the other hand, the Bangladeshi enclave dwellers in India also lived under the constant fear of being arrested under the Foreigners Act of 1946.[49] The very first headcount in enclaves was conducted by state authorities only in the year 2011.[50] After decades of failed negotiations between India and Bangladesh, a Land-Boundary Agreement  was finally implemented on 31 July 2015 at the Indo-Bangladesh border.[51] Despite this being a significant step towards progress, several scholars[52] have noted the continuity of the plight of erstwhile enclave-dwellers even after the Land-Boundary Agreement.[53] Since census had never been conducted in these area, the issue of identity crisis is quite prominent. Enclave dwellers are reported to own false voter ID cards and educational documents to “avoid becoming an illegal migrant”.[54] At this point, it is important to note the potential effects of an NRC process being implemented in the State of West Bengal (as promised by the ruling government) and its implications for enclave-dwellers. The identity crisis already existing within the enclaves, the errors in their identity cards, the threat of being suspected as a foreigner has been exacerbated by the looming NRC-CAA process.[55]

    Another group of people that was forced to face the plight of statelessness due to the post-colonial repercussions, are the Hill Tamils from Sri Lanka. The Shrimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964 and the subsequent Shrimavo- Gandhi Pact 1974 were significant steps taken towards addressing the problems of the Hill Tamils.[56] However, there are a group of Hill Tamils who are stateless or at a risk of becoming stateless in India. The change in legislation in Sri Lanka, their displacement to India and their lack of birth registration and documentation has continued to add to their plight.[57] Despite qualifying for citizenship by naturalization under Sec.5 of the Citizenship Act, the fact that the Amendment Act has overlooked the plight of Hill Tamils is disappointing.[58]

    In 1964, owing to the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric project over the river Karnaphuli,  the Chakmas and Hajongs were displaced and forced to migrate to India from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).[59] Although the Indian government encouraged them to settle in the Area of North East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh), they have not been granted citizenship. With neither States claiming them as nationals, these indigenous people have essentially been pushed into a state of de jure statelessness. In the case of Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP) v The State of Arunachal Pradesh, the apex court upheld the rights of the Chakmas to be protected by the State of Arunachal Pradesh under Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution and also said that they “have a right to be granted citizenship subject to the procedure being followed”.[60]Now, the Citizenship Amendment Act would help in materialising the right to be granted citizenship of the Chakmas as upheld by the Supreme Court.

    Just the fact that the CAA offers comfort and chaos respectively depending on the religious inclinations of the stateless populations in India, is a major red flag.

    India has undeniably taken various steps towards protection of refugee populations and mitigating the risks of statelessness under several circumstances. In the year 1995, India also became a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee and has been playing an important part in reformulating international legal instruments concerning refugees and stateless persons. However, despite assuming such a pivotal position in the Executive Committee, the fact that India lacks a framework regulating the treatment meted out to refugees and stateless persons, thereby resulting in the absolute reliance of socio-politically motivated ad-hoc governmental policies, is worth criticising. Just the fact that the CAA offers comfort and chaos respectively depending on the religious inclinations of the stateless populations in India, is a major red flag.

    International and National Legal Framework on Statelessness in India

    The definition and standard of treatment for a Stateless person is enumerated in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.[61] This convention is the most comprehensive codification of the rights of stateless persons yet. It seeks to ensure the fundamental human rights of a person and freedom from discrimination against stateless persons. Although the Convention does not entitle a stateless person to acquire the nationality of a specific state, it does require state parties to take steps towards facilitating their naturalization and integration.[62] On the other hand, the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness provides a directive to States for the prevention and reduction of statelessness.[63] However, as India is a party to neither conventions, as in the case of refugees, we are left to resort to other international human rights instruments that India has signed and ratified.

    The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although a non-binding instrument, has been recognised for contributing to customary international human rights. Art. 15 of the UDHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’[64] and that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality’.[65] Although the principles enshrined under the UDHR are not legally binding, it is pertinent to note that the CAA directly contravenes the right to nationality mentioned above. Further, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 mandates the parties to the convention to ensure that the rights recognized in the Covenant be upheld without any discrimination of any kind in terms of race, colour, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.[66] The Convention also guarantees the right of every child to acquire a nationality.[67]The Convention provides that State parties must ensure the protection of the rights of stateless people, without discrimination including under the law.[68] Despite having acceded to the Convention on April 10, 1979, by virtue of enacting the Citizenship Amendment Act and the operational effects of the NRC process combined with the Act is in clear violation of India’s obligations under the ICCPR.

    Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR can be used particularly in favour of India’s obligations to protect stateless persons. Art. 12(4) states that, ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’. The phrase ‘no one’ under this provision allows scope for inclusion of nationals and aliens within its ambit. Therefore, we ought to analyse the phrase ‘own country’ in order to determine the beneficiaries of this provision. The General Comments of the Human Rights Committee remain the most authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR that is available to State Parties. With regard to Art. 12(4) of the Covenant, the General Comment reiterates that the phrase ‘own country’ does not refer to the concept of nationality alone. It also includes individuals who by virtue of their special ties or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered an alien.[69]The General Comment specifically mentions that this interpretation is to be applied in case where nationals of a country are stripped of their nationality in violation of international law.[70] It also states that the interpretation of Art. 12(4) might be read to include with its scope, ‘stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence’.[71] In order to understand the concept of special ties and claims as mentioned in the General Comment on Art. 12(4), we may also refer to the concept of ‘genuine and effective link’ as dealt by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case.[72] The ICJ upheld that although different factors are taken into consideration in every case, the elements of “habitual residence of the individual concerned”, “the centre of his interests” i.e. “his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.”[73] are significant in determining a “genuine and effective link” between the individual and the State in question. In India, the people who are facing or at a risk of facing the plight of statelessness are long term residents in India who may be both religiously and ethnically similar to Indian communities and therefore maintain a socio-cultural relationship with India.[74] Under such circumstances, the individuals in question evidently qualify for protection from arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter their own country (India), under Art. Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR.

    Further, by denying citizenship or nationality to people based on religion, India risks effectively excluding stateless persons from the loop of human rights itself. This also goes on to violate India’s commitments under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. Besides Section 3 of the Indian Citizenship Act[75] which deprives a child Indian citizenship by birth in case of either of his parents being an illegal immigrant, the NRC process has also rendered several children Stateless. This violates India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC), to which India has acceded. Article 7 of the Convention mandates state parties to provide nationality to the children immediately after birth.[76]Thus, the Indian citizenship policy runs contrary to a number of international legal obligations of India. Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution mandates the government to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations.

    Despite the very evident gap in India’s legal framework on statelessness, Indian Courts have not dealt with the issue in detail. Nevertheless, the Courts have taken innovative approaches to avoid the occurrence of statelessness by applying principles of equity and justice.[77] In the case of Namgyal Dolkar vs. Government of India[78], in 2011, the Delhi High Court upheld, as per Sec.3 of the Citizenship Act that people born in India cannot be denied citizenship and the right to nationality based on their description in the identity certificate. In the case of Sheikh Abdul Aziz vs. NCT of Delhi[79], a ‘foreigner’ in India was detained in Kashmir for entering the country illegally. He was later shifted to the Tihar Central Jail to await deportation proceedings. The deportation proceedings were not executed for several years. In the year 2014, on the basis of the Delhi High Court’s direction to identify the nationality of the Individual, the state identified him to be stateless. Consequently, the State declared that the petitioner could approach the passport office to acquire identification papers and thereby apply for a long-term visa later on.[80] While this case indicates the role of Indian judiciary in identifying and providing relief to stateless persons, it also serves as an illustration of the attitude of the State towards stateless persons. This can be alluded to the fact that a concrete legal framework or mechanism to deal with stateless persons and the data and awareness on stateless persons is practically non-existent. The impact of such lacuna is also evident in the NRC-CAA process in Assam.

    Plight of Stateless People in Assam

    Although the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has communicated that the people excluded from the final draft of NRC would not be put in detention centres until their case is decided by the Foreigners Tribunal[81], the future of people whose cases are rejected by the Tribunal has been left mysteriously evaded. The Detention centres in Assam were originally intended for short-term detention of undocumented immigrants. In the case of Harsh Mander vs. Union of India[82], the Supreme Court of India dealt with important legal questions on the condition of detention centres and indefinite detention of ‘foreigners’. The government of Assam presented a plan to secure the monitored release foreigners who had been in detention centres more than five years on paying a hefty deposit and signing a bond. Ironically, this case which was filed to draw the attention of the apex court to the inhumane conditions in detention centres in Assam, turned into exhortation[83] to the government to work proactively on deporting individuals.[84] Although India does not have any legislation to protect stateless people from being deported to regularise their status or grant them citizenship, it does have legislation in place to deport illegal migrants. The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act 1983, which gave the migrants a right to appeal and placed the burden of proof on the government was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of India in 2005 and is no longer valid.[85] In the Harsh Mander case, the Supreme Court directed “the Union of India to enter into necessary discussions with the Government of Bangladesh to streamline the procedure of deportation”[86]. Deportation, however, is not a unilateral exercise. Such processes usually follow negotiations and bilateral agreements for the readmission of nations of relevant country.[87] There has been no documented of India entering into diplomatic talks with Bangladesh regarding the issue of statelessness. Also, as recently as October 2017, it has been reported that the Bangladesh Information Minister, Hasanull Haq Inu denied any unauthorised migration from Bangladesh to Assam in the past 30 years.[88] According to the data produced before the Parliament, over 117,000 people have been declared foreigners by the Foreigners Tribunal in Assam up to March 31, 2019, of whom only four have been deported until now. Across the six detention centres in Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Silchar, Dibrugarh, Jorhat and Tezpur in Assam, 1005 people reportedly remain jailed according to the data produced before the Assam Legislative Assembly on July 29, 2019.[89] As detention camps are located within the jail premises, persons marked as illegal immigrants are locked up along with those jailed for criminal offences or who are undertrial. The country’s largest detention camp in the Goalpara district of western Assam, in addition to 10 proposed camps in the state.[90] In the case of P. Ulaganathan vs. The Government of India[91], the Madras High Court deciding on a case concerning the plight of Sri Lankan Hill Tamils in India who have been held in detention camps for about 35 years, upheld that, “keeping them under surveillance and severely restricted conditions and in a state of statelessness for such a long period certainly offends their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India”.[92] In the absence of any bilateral agreement dealing with deportation of the stateless persons who are allegedly Bangladeshi nationals, the detention of illegal immigrants seems short-sighted and ill-planned. Additionally, the lack of adequate documentation also makes it unlikely for the individuals to be deported to neighbouring countries in the near future. In addition to the apex court’s ratio in the P. Ulaganathan case on long periods of detention of stateless people, such an indefinite period of detention also violates India’s obligations under the ICCPR to uphold right to life,[93]right to dignity in detention[94] and the right against arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter his own country.[95]In their Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees emphasize the importance of setting a definite period of detention. The Guideline states that, without a cap on the period of detention, it can become prolonged and indefinite, especially for stateless asylum-seekers.[96] In the absence of any legal regulation of detention of the people who are rendered stateless in India, the UNHCR guidelines on detention might serve as a good starting point. Although the guidelines explicitly state that they only apply to asylum seekers and stateless persons who are seeking asylum, it also states that the standards enshrined therein may apply mutatis mutandis to others as well.[97]

    Conclusion: The Way Forward

    Customary international law has placed certain limitations on a state’s power of conferment of citizenship. Article 1 of the Hague Convention 1930, states that “it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other states in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, International custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality”.[98] As explained above, this is not the case with regard to the NRC-CAA process in India. Firstly, in order to deal with the problem of statelessness in India, it is absolutely necessary to identify and acknowledge the gravity of it. The data on the number of stateless persons in India is practically non-existent. It is important for the government to undertake efforts to facilitate data collection on stateless persons in India. This would not only help in mapping the extent of the problem, but it would also facilitate legal professionals, researchers, humanitarian works and practitioners to reach out and offer help where necessary.

    Also, the presence of half-information and non-existence on specific data on the number of stateless persons and government policies vis-à-vis their treatment has allowed room for over-reliance on media sources and resulting confusion and frenzy. It might be important for the government to establish information hubs accessible to the common public to demystify data on statelessness and the rights that stateless persons are entitled to in India.  A database of legal professionals, human rights activists and government representatives should be available in all such places. This would go a long way in reducing unlawful and illegal detention. It would also force the government into exercising transparency in their detention policies.

    the combined effect of NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to be exclusionary and discriminatory. The Act is violative of the Indian constitutional principles and India’s international legal obligations.

    The absolute lack of a national and international legal framework on statelessness operating in India is a major drawback. While the rights enshrined under the international bill of human rights and other human rights instruments that India is a party to may be referred, it is not sufficient to fill the lacuna. This absence of a concrete legal framework may leave room for adverse predicaments such as arbitrary detention, human rights abuses, trafficking and forced displacement. Especially considering the number of people who have been disenfranchised by the latest draft of the NRC, the need for a law promising the basic human rights of the people who are rendered stateless is dire. India has also abstained from ratifying the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 1976 and has thereby denied its people the access to the Individual Complaints Mechanism of the UNHRC. The International Court of Justice which is also vested with the power to address ICCPR violations, cannot investigate into the issue of India’s discriminatory and exclusionary Citizenship law as it is a sovereign act of the State.[99] Without the same being disputed by one or more States, the ICJ cannot exercise its power in this case.[100]

    Finally, as explained above, the combined effect of NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to be exclusionary and discriminatory. The Act is violative of the Indian constitutional principles and India’s international legal obligations. While reviewing the purpose and objective of the Citizenship Amendment Act is important, it is also important for the government to undertake negotiations with the Bangladesh government on the plight of the people who would soon be stateless. The indefinite detention of “foreigners” without a long-term plan in place, would result in grave human rights violations and would also be an expensive affair for India.

    Image Credit: opiniojuris.org 

     

     

    Notes

    [1] See generally IOM, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020 (IOM, Geneva, 2019), available at https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf , [accessed on 15 Feb 2020].

    [2] See generally Emmanuel Kalechi Iwuagwu, The Concept of Citizenship: Its Application and Denial in the Contemporary Nigerian Society, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, Vol. 8 No. 1.

    [3] Seyla Benhabib, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS – ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) P. 49-52

    [4] Ibid at P. 49

    [5] Ibid at P. 49, 50

    [6] Art. 1, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954.

    [7] David Owen, On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness, Citizenship and Human Rights, NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 2018, (65),  P. 301.

    [8] Supra note 1, P. 47.

    [9] Lily Chen et al, UNHCR Statistical Reporting on Statelessness, UNHCR STATISTICS TECHNICAL SERIES 2019, available at https://www.unhcr.org/5d9e182e7.pdf, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [10] See generally Nafees Ahmad, The Right to Nationality and the Reduction of Statelessness- The Responses of the International Migration Law Framework, GRONINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 5 No. 1.

    [11] UNHCR, “This is our Home”- Stateless Minorities and their search for citizenship, UNHCR STATELESSNESS REPORT 2017, available athttps://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR_EN2_2017IBELONG_Report_ePub.pdf, P. 1, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [12] Ibid

    [13] Mathew J. Gibney, Denationalization and Discrimination, JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2019, available at https://doi:10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561065 [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [14] Antje Ellermann, Discrimination in Migration and Citizenship, JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2019, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561053?needAccess=true, P. 7, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [15] Human Rights Watch, India: Citizenship Bill Discriminates Against Muslims, (11 Dec, 2019),  available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/11/india-citizenship-bill-discriminates-against-muslims, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [16]OHCHR, Press briefing on India, (13 Dec, 2019), available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25425&LangID=E, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [17] USCIRF, USCIRF Raises Serious Concerns and Eyes Sanctions Recommendations for Citizenship Amendment Bill in India, Which Passed Lower House Today, (09 Dec, 2019), available at https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases-statements/uscirf-raises-serious-concerns-and-eyes-sanctions, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [18] Manogya Loiwal, India Today, Assam NRC and BJP’s challenge: The votebank politics of NRC,  (31 Aug, 2019), available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/assam-nrc-bjp-challenge-votebank-politics-1593711-2019-08-31, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [19]All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All Assam Gan Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) were the major groups involved in this movement.

    [20] Sanjay Barbora, National Register of Citizens: Politics and Problems in Assam, E-JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY 2019, (3)2, available at  http://app.insoso.org/ISS_journal/Repository/Article_NRC.pdf, P. 14, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [21]Harrison Akins, The Religious Freedom Implications of the National Register of Citizens in India, USCIRF ISSUE BRIEF:INDIA 2019, available at https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019%20India%20Issue%20Brief%20- %20Religious%20Freedom%20Implications.pdf, P.1, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [22] Ibid at P.2.

    [23] Assam Accord, Clause 5.8, available at https://assamaccord.assam.gov.in/portlets/assam-accord-and-its-clauses, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [24] Assam Public Works v Union of India and Ors. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 274 of 2009]

    [25] Alok Prasanna Kumar, National Register of Citizens and the Supreme Court, LAW & SOCIETY 2018, (53)29, available at https://www.academia.edu/37909102/National_Register_of_Citizens_and_the_Supreme_Court, P. 11, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [26]Tora Agarwala, The Indian Express, Assam Citizenship List: Names missing in NRC final draft, 40 ;akh ask what next,  (30 Jul 2018), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/assam/assam-citizenship-list-names-missing-in-nrc-final-draft-40-lakh-ask-what-next-5283663/, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [27] Amit Ranjan, Assam’s National Register of Citizenship: Background, Process and Impact of the Final Draft, ISAS WORKING PAPER 2018, No. 306, available at https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ISAS-Working-Papers-No.-306-Assams-National-Register-of-Citizenship.pdf, P.2, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [28] Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, The Wire, Both the BJP and the Trinamool Congress are Stirring the Communal Pot in Assam, (05 Aug 2018), available at https://thewire.in/politics/bjp-tmc-nrc-assam-communalism

    [29] Supra note 27, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [30]Abhishek Saha, The Indian Express, Assam NRC List: No person will be referred to Foreiners’ Tribunal or sent to detention centre based on final draft, (30 Jul 2018),  https://indianexpress.com/article/north-eastindia/assam/assam-nrc-list-final-draft-foreigners-tribunal-detention-centre-5282652/, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [31] Ditilekha Sharma, Determination of Citizenship through Lineage in the Assam NRC is Inherently Exclusionary, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, Apr 2019, available at https://www.epw.in/node/154137/pdf, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [32] Angshuman Choudhury, National Register of Citizens (NRC): A Synonym for Deep Anxiety, THE CITIZEN , 2019, available at https://www.academia.edu/40257016/National_Register_of_Citizens_NRC_A_Synonym_for_Deep_Anxiety, P. 3, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [33] Anusaleh Shariff, ‘National Register of Indian Citizens’ (NRIC) – Does the Assam Experience help Mainland States?, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, 2019, available at  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337366837_’National_Register_of_Indian_Citizens’_NRIC_-_Does_the_Assam_Experience_help_Mainland_States, P. 18, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [34] Supra note 27 at P. 8-11.

    [35] The Citizenship Act 1955, No.57 of 1955, Sec. 2(1) (b).

    [36] The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, Sec. 2.

    [37] The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, Sec. 6.

    [38] Narendar Nagarwal, Global Implications of India’s Citizenship Amendment Act 2019, (Jan 2020), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338673204_Global_Implications_of_India’s_Citizenship_Amendment_Act_2019, P. 3, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [39] Human Rights Watch, “We are the Walking Dead” – Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan, Jun 2014, available athttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0614_ForUplaod.pdf, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [40] Anon, The State of Minorities in Afghanistan, SOUTH ASIA STATE OF MINORITIES REPORT 2018, available at http://www.misaal.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/afghanistan.pdf, P. 282, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [41] Human Rights Watch, “We can Torture, Kill, or Keep Your for Years” – Enforced Disappearances by Pakistam Security Forces in Balochistan, Jul 2011, available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0711WebInside.pdf, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [42]UK: Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report, Aug 2019, available at  https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5209feb94&skip=0&query=Ahmediyas%20&coi=PAK, P. 142, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [43] Human Rights Watch, History of the Ahmadiyya Community, n.d., available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/bangladesh0605/3.htm, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [44] The Law of Return, 1950 in Israel established Israel as Jewish State based on the Zionist Philosophy which is also reflected in their citizenship policies.

    [45] Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC 1461

    [46] Supra note 38.

    [47] Deboleena Sengupta, What Makes A Citizen: Everyday Life in India-Bangladesh Enclaves, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (53), 15 Sep 2018, available at https://www.epw.in/engage/article/chhit-spaces-a-look-at-life-and-citizenship-in-india-bangladesh-enclaves [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [48] Prachi Lohia, Forum Asia, Erstwhile enclaves in India: A post-LBA Analysis, 10 Dec 2019, available at https://www.forum-asia.org/uploads/wp/2019/12/Enclave-Report-Final-2.pdf, P. 7, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [49] Ibid

    [50] Ibid

    [51] For the current state of erstwhile enclave-dwellers in India, see supra note 48 and also Prasun Chaudhari, The TelegraphThe same old story in Chittmahal, (12 May 2019), available at https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/the-same-old-story-in-chhitmahal/cid/1690343 [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [52] Supra note 48.

    [53] Sreeparna Banerjee et al., The 2015 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement: Identifying Constraints and Exploring Possibilities in Cooh Behar, ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER, Jul 2017, P.5, available at https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ORF_OccasionalPaper_117_LandBoundary.pdf  [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [54] Ibid.

    [55] Supra note 48, P. 45.

    [56] V. Suryanarayanan, Challenge of Statelessness- The Indian Response, IIC Occasional Publication  (88), , (n.d.), available at http://www.iicdelhi.nic.in/writereaddata/Publications/636694277561224320_Occasional%20Publication%2088.pdf, P. 3, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [57] See UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: UPR 27th Sessions, Aug 2016, available at https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5a12b5420&skip=0&query=stateless&coi=IND, P. 2, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [58] Supra note 56, P. 16.

    [59] Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, Executive Summary of the Report on ‘The State of Being Stateless: A Case Study of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh, (n.d.), available at http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Statelessness.pdf [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [60] Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP) v The State of Arunachal Pradesh, [WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.510 OF 2007]

    [61] Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, Art. 1, 7.

    [62] Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, Art. 32.

    [63]  See generally Convention on Reduction of Statelessness 1961.

    [64] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945, Art. 15(1).

    [65] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945, Art. 15(2).

    [66] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 2.

    [67] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 24

    [68] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 26

    [69] CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12(Freedom of Movement), (Nov 2, 1999), ¶ 20 available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139c394.pdf

    [70] Ibid

    [71] Supra note 69.

    [72] Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm Case) 1955

    [73] Ibid, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. reports 1955, Rep 4.

    [74] Unnati Ghia, Suddenly Stateless: International law Implications of India’s New Citizenship Law, OPINIO JURIS, Feb 5, 2020, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2020/02/05/suddenly-stateless-international-law-implications-of-indias-new-citizenship-law/ [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

    [75] The Citizenship Act, 1955, Act  No.  57  of  1955,  Sec. 3.

    [76] Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child 1989, Art. 7.

    [77] Sitharamam Kakarala, India and the Challenge of Statelessness – A Review of the Legal Framework relating to Nationality, 2012, available at  http://nludelhi.ac.in/download/publication/2015/India%20and%20the%20Challenges%20of%20Statelessness.pdf, P. 61, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [78] Namgyal Dolkar vs. Government of India, [Writ Petition (Civil) 12179/2009]

    [79] Sheikh Abdul Aziz v. NCT of Delhi, [Writ Petition (Criminal) 1426/2013]

    [80] Aneesha Mathur, The Indian Express, ‘Stateless man’ to get visa, ID to stay in India, (29 May 2014), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/stateless-man-to-get-visa-id-to-stay-in-india/, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [81]Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Statement by MEA on National Register of Citizens in Assam, (02 Sep 2019), available at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31782/Statement+by+MEA+on+National+Register+of+Citizens+in+Assam, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [82] Harsh Mander v Union of India, [Writ Petition (Civil) No.1045/2018].

    [83] Colin Gonsalves, Human Rights Law Network, Stateless and Marginalised in Assam, (18 Sep 2019), available at https://hrln.org/reporting_publications/nrc-violates-constitutional-morality-principles-of-international-law/, [accessed on 6 Mar 2020].

    [84] Supra note 82.

    [85] Sarbananda Sonawal v. Union of India, [Writ Petition (civil) 131 of 2000]

    [86] Supra note 82.

    [87] See generally, the Shrimavo-Shastri Accord, 1964 (1992).

    [88]Sanjib Baruah, The Indian Express, Stateless in Assam, (19 Jan 2018), available at https://epaper.indianexpress.com/c/25513604, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [89]The Economic Times, 1.17 lakh people declared as foreigners by tribunals in Assam,  (16 Jul 2019), available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/1-17-lakh-people-declared-as-foreigners-by-tribunals-in-assam/articleshow/70244101.cms?from=mdr, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [90] Nazimuddin Siddique, Inside Assam’s Detention Camps: How the Current Citizenship Crisis Disenfranchises Indians, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (55)7, Feb 2020, available at  https://www.epw.in/engage/article/inside-assams-detention-camps-how-current, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [91] P.Ulaganathan vs The Government Of India, [Writ Petition (MD)No.5253 of 2009]

    [92] Ibid

    [93] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 6.

    [94] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 10.

    [95] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 12(4)

    [96] UNHCR, Detention Guidelines – Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention 2012, available at https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/505b10ee9/unhcr-detention-guidelines.html, P. 26, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [97] Ibid, P. 8.

    [98] Nafees Ahmad, The Right to Nationality and the Reduction of Statelessness – The Responses of the International Migration Law Framework, GRONINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (5)1, Sep 2017, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320244117_The_Right_to_Nationality_and_the_Reduction_of_Statelessness_-_The_Responses_of_the_International_Migration_Law_Framework, P. 3, [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

    [99] Supra note 74.

    [100] International Court of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/frequently-asked-questions , [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

  • Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.    

    Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN comes at a time of immense turbulence marked by COVID-19 pandemic, disruption in the global supply chains resulting in economic recession among major economies, and strategic instability in the Indo-Pacific region marked by high tensions between the United States and China in the South China Sea. However, the ASEAN calendar of engagements with its Partner countries has remained busy, and Vietnam has spearheaded the Organisation with adeptness and alacrity and sustained the momentum of the ASEAN’s mandate through meetings and conversations.  During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.

     On 16 June 2020, at the 20th ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting, through a video conference, India and the ASEAN “reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen and deepen their cooperation.” Both sides noted the progress made for the implementation of the ASEAN-India Plan of Action (2016-2020), and “shared their commitment to complete the development of the new Plan of Action for 2021-2025 to further strengthen their strategic partnership over the next five years”.[i]

    A month later Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India, participated in the 22nd annual meeting of the Senior officials of ASEAN countries and India, and commended Viet Nam’s ASEAN chairmanship. Both sides “agreed to continue assisting each other’s citizens affected by the coronavirus outbreak”; provide “ASEAN countries with detailed information about the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative proposed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 16th ASEAN-India Summit in 2019”; welcomed “ASEAN bringing into play its role in fostering cooperation, dialogue and trust building in the region”; and conveyed India’s support for “efforts to seriously and fully implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea and build an efficient and effective Code of Conduct in the waters in line with international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.[ii]

    COVID-19 Pandemic

    India and ASEAN are confronted with COVID-19 pandemic and there is ample evidence that both sides have conveyed their intention to fight the pandemic together. Prime Minister Modi engaged the leaders of Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam through telephonic conversations and assured support to ASEAN Member States. Likewise, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla has had weekly tele-conversations with counterparts from US, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam to share ideas and best practices in the Indo-Pacific region for responding to COVID-19 pandemic.[iii]

    It is an opportune moment for the officials of the health departments in India and ASEAN to set up a dedicated virtual platform/dashboard designated as ‘India-ASEAN Meeting for Health Development (AI-MHD) that can be pluggedinto the ‘ASEAN Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Network, the ASEAN Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Centre, the ASEAN Bio Diaspora Virtual Center (ABVC) and the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) for future public health emergencies’.

     India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jayashankar, in his remarks at the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT), noted that “the impact of the Coronavirus has been beyond our collective imagination. Current estimates put the cumulative loss in the range of USD 5.8-8.8 trillion or approximately 6.5-9.7% of the global GDP.[iv]

    ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP)

    India has acknowledged the importance of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and New Delhi is committed to “explore cooperation in the key areas outlined in the AOIP, covering maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development and economic cooperation, in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace, freedom and prosperity in the region”.[v] Similarly, ASEAN has endorsed synergies in various sectors and promoted regional frameworks under India’s Act East Policy, and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision. Although health and pandemic issues are conspicuously absent in the AIOP and SAGAR, but these are surely part of the broader thematic issues contained therein.

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea.

    On November 04, 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) at the East Asia Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand.[vi] It is an “ an open global initiative” and “ draws on existing regional cooperation architecture and mechanisms to focus on seven central pillars conceived around Maritime Security; Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources; Capacity Building and Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity and Maritime Transport.”

    Cooperation, Dialogue and Trust Building

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea. India’s Foreign Minister has stated that India is working in conjunction with Vietnam and “responses to that (CoC) are being handled by the Vietnamese and that is the way it should be,” [vii]

                Finally, it has been noted that “as we come out of this pandemic, let us be clear on one fact. The world will never be the same again. That means new thinking, fresh ideas, more imagination and greater openness. We need to go beyond orthodoxies, whether of trade, politics or security. These are domains that all of you debate regularly and I am sure today you will have a very productive discussion.”[viii]  It is useful for ASEAN and India to explore commonalities and convergences in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI). In this context, Vietnam has the unique opportunity to further expand, deepen and strengthen the ASEAN India Strategic Partnership.

     

    Notes

    [i] “ASEAN, India strengthen cooperation”, https://asean.org/asean-india-strengthen-cooperation/ (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [ii] “ASEAN, Indian senior officials gather at online 22nd meeting”, https://www.asean2020.vn/xem-chi-tiet1/-/asset_publisher/ynfWm23dDfpd/content/asean-indian-senior-officials-gather-at-online-22nd-meeting (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    [iii] “Cooperation among select countries of the Indo-Pacific in fighting COVID-19 pandemic”, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32691/Cooperation+among+select+countries+of+the+IndoPacific+in+fighting+COVID19+pandemic (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [iv] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT(accessed 20 August 2020).

    [v] “ASEAN Outlook On The Indo-Pacific” https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [vi] “Ministry of External Affairs Indo-Pacific Division Briefs”, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf (accessed 20 August 20200.

    [vii] “Incident between Indian, Chinese militaries was ‘not skirmish but face-off’: Jaishankar”,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/incident-between-indian-chinese-militaries-was-not-skirmish-but-face-off-  (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [viii] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    Image Credit: Asia Times

  • The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction

    The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction

    Introduction

    Syria’s territories are controlled by a variety of actors – Al Assad’s regime (with Russia and Iran as its supporters); Kurdish dominated self-administration (with a small number of US troops supporting them); Turkey and its affiliated militias; and the Syrian Salvation Government affiliated to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaida offshoot.

    Fragmentation of the state’s territories, as the state lost control of its territories, resulted in the emergence of a network of localised war economies with numerous local and foreign actors being involved. War economies emerged in territories held by Assad’s regime as well as those under the control of various other opposition parties, characterised by an increase in smuggling of goods (among which essential goods, crude oil and arms were popular), extortion, rent seeking for essential services, and taxation of goods at checkpoints established by the warring parties, including local warlords, opposition armed groups or regime’s militias. The Syrian Arab army is also reported to have engaged in rent seeking behaviour through the establishment in recaptured territories (Hinnebusch, 2020).

    Another area of priority for armed opposition groups is the border crossings with Turkey whose access they have sought to control. The Ahrar-Al Sham group, established control over the Bab al-Hawa crossing between 2015-16, and earned around $5 million per month. Armed opposition groups have been involved in conflict with each other over control for border crossings, particularly conflict between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahrar al-Sham in 2017 (al-Kattan, 2017).

    The Syrian army (that was cross-sectarian) is in crisis of its reducing force size as it is hampered by resistance to conscriptions and many desertions. The Alawite sect was co-opted into the state’s army, political and security apparatus, resulting in tensions along sectarian lines. Another significant development was that those among the pre-war elite who advocated for a political solution based on power sharing were expelled from it, resulting in the contraction of the core to comprise of individuals along sectarian lines. Further, pro-regime militias emerged as pro-government communities were forced to rely on themselves for their defence, leading to a widespread localisation of power to fiefdoms (al-Kattan, 2017).

    The political, economic and security dimensions of the conflict which led to the emergence of war economies has been accompanied by shift of composition of the economy marked by the emergence of ‘war commanders’ and a decentralised elite, who capitalised on evading sanctions, served as middlemen between the armed groups of the state and opposition and established monopoly upon the supply of goods and services.

     These developments further led to the emergence of new centres of power which existed alongside the existing regime that consolidated its power by strengthening its relations with the new elite, army and security sector.

    The domestic dynamics of the Syrian conflict are closely related to a wider geopolitical struggle among regional and external actors who act as patrons for the domestic actors.

    In addition, by portraying itself as a bulwark against radical Islamism and strengthening its relations with influential individuals in minority communities and providing them with disproportionate authority within their societies, the regime’s efforts have redefined existing social hierarchies and co-opted pro-regime minority leaders to power. The regime’s policies, throughout the war, have not only strengthened the neo-patrimonial nature of the State and its relations with its multiple networks but lead to the decentralisation of a system of neo-patrimonialism (Middle East Institute & Etana Syria, 2020).

    The domestic dynamics of the Syrian conflict are closely related to a wider geopolitical struggle among regional and external actors who act as patrons for the domestic actors. The Syrian conflict that began as an internal conflict emerged into a proxy conflict where regional struggle for influence played out between the ‘resistance axis’ comprising of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, and Sunni dominated ’moderate’ states comprising of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The latter wished replace the Assad regime that was aligned towards the ‘resistance axis.’ Iran considers the Syrian conflict as threat to its survival and its ability to support Hizbollah against Israel.  The rival axes instrumentalised sectarianism as a part of their discourse and in their support for proxies. However, the interests of those within the Sunni camp clashed (with Turkey and Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia and UAE against the Muslim Brotherhood and its version of political Islam) resulting in division of the Sunni camp further leading to the division of their proxies (Aita, 2020).

    The global struggle for power between the US and Russia, with the former promoting a liberal world order and advance its hegemonic interests, and the latter interested in increasing its sphere of influence, limiting US intervention while emphasising on state sovereignty. Russian intervention in Syria in support of the Assad regime tilted the power balance in its favour allowing the regime to gain control of its lost territories.

    Image Credit: Al Araby

    US sought to limit direct intervention in Syria while relying on proxies and financial sanctions (that it pursued along with the EU) to pressurise Assad’s regime to compromise to a solution that would promote its interests. Assad’s regime, due to its connection Iran, Shia militas in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon, was able to manage despite the external pressure it faced. US attention and efforts were diverted to controlling ISIS. In 2019, while US withdrew from Northern Syria due Turkish intervention against the Kurdish forces, it announced it would redeploy its forces to the energy reserves in Deir ez-Zor to prevent Assad’s forces or ISIS from gaining control over them (Hinnebusch, 2020).

    The geo-political struggle for influence in the Syrian conflict among regional and global actors, has also transcended into efforts to capitalise on Syria’s post-war reconstruction efforts and business.

    With diversion of US efforts towards constraining ISIS, Russian intervention, growing differences between Saudi and Qatar, Saudi and UAE intervention in Yemen, have all resulted in a gradual withdrawal of the GCC, leading to a rise in the role played by Turkey, Iran and Russia. Turkey’s role and interests evolved from installing a Brotherhood government and targeting the regime to controlling the Syrian Kurdish PYD, which it views as a terrorist organisation. The threat of a confrontation with Moscow in Syria allowed it to participate in the Astana Process and a gradual realignment of its policy with that of Russia’s policy. More recently, Turkey and Russia have brokered a ceasefire deal in Idlib.

    The geo-political struggle for influence in the Syrian conflict among regional and global actors, has also transcended into efforts to capitalise on Syria’s post-war reconstruction efforts and business.

    This paper explores the local, regional and international dimensions of reconstruction and development Syria while analysing the impact the war has had on the political economy of Syria.

    Internal dynamics of Syria’s reconstruction

    The internal dynamics of Syria’s reconstruction are characterised by conflict among Syrian actors (supported by external actors) for resources and instruments that would lead them to strengthen their control. The regime views reconstruction efforts as a means to consolidate its authority and power over the country.

    Image Credit: NYT

    While the efforts made by the regime to consolidate its power and authority served its objectives and reduce the costs of governance, they have led to the decentralisation of political and security apparatus at the local levels. In addition, Iran and Russia continue to establish relations based on patronage with several Syrian clients. The integration of Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’i militias and Iran’s revolutionary guards, have further loosened the control the regime holds over the security apparatus and strengthened sectarianism.

    The efforts of Assad’s regime have been directed at satisfying its loyalist elite on whom it is vitally dependent to legitimise its authority and power, and to a lesser extent the public.

    The regime sought to prevent local security apparatus from capitalising on their autonomy by incorporating them into the newly established units under centralised defence forces as in the case of the 5th Army Corps, although this was only partially successful. Russian intervention and participation in the conflict allowed it to establish order in the army.  The paucity of manpower further prevents the regime from extending its authority over the entire country, forcing it to continue to depend on its relations with tribal leaders and local warlords (Hinnebusch, 2020).

    The efforts of Assad’s regime have been directed at satisfying its loyalist elite on whom it is vitally dependent to legitimise its authority and power, and to a lesser extent the public. It encouraged its loyalists to participate and reap benefits off the war economies during the war as its authority over its local proxies declined, while the threat of being targeted by the opposition has ensured that the elites remain loyal. With the localisation of war, the regime has strengthened its relations with the elite while consolidating its power by encouraging investment of income and revenues earned through illicit means into the formal economy. The elite, the warlords, who are partners in the conflict are increasingly participating in the formal economy by setting up formal companies and businesses. However, there remains much to be done to fully integrate them into the productive economy, discourage involvement in rent seeking, and to promote the revival of a productive economy (Sinjab, 2017).

    One of the major effects of the conflict and its resulting socio-economic and political patterns has been the lawlessness, that serves as a deterrent to socio, economic and political cohesion, further preventing the investments required for reconstruction.

    Legislation aimed at Reconstruction

    The regime’s economic strategy for reconstruction namely the ‘National Partnership’, enforced in 2016, allows public bodies to form private investment companies while supporting the establishment of private firms.

    Image Credit: BBC

    Private investors are encouraged to investing in the remaining public property allowing the government to retain its influence on the economic movements. This serves the purpose of attracting new investors to invest in lucrative opportunities while the investments serve to support regime’s prime customers and clients. The legislation also enables them to obtain and secure public sector properties at the cost of the state treasury’s finances, thereby raising a doubt regarding the ability of the ‘new elite’ to alter the nature of the enterprise. Another significant measure taken by the regime as part of its reconstruction repertoire are property and urban reconstruction laws, including the Law 66 of 2012 and Law No 10 of 2018, that expropriate land and property from displaced opposition supporters in substandard living conditions and reallocate them to new upscale housing. This is meant to gather the support of the regime’s loyalists. The regime by creating uncertainty about the security of the property could discourage all investors with the exception of a few capitalists (Daher, 2018).

    Despite the fact that restrictions on capital movement makes it very difficult to attract investments into Syria, the Syrian government is implementing policies and schemes to attract financial aid from outside. It intends to tax finance inflows ranging from money sent by expatriates into Syria for humanitarian aid, which must be channelled through NGO’s funded by the regime. It also intends to attract $100 billion worth Syrian currency held outside Syria through tax concessions and by launching the Syrian International Business Association (SIBA) under the auspices of World Bank. Analysts warn about the difficulties associated with investments from other nations. They suspect that given the dispersion of investments, diaspora would find it difficult to compete with loyalists for reconstruction contracts and there may be issues with fraudulent officials and widespread corruption. The assets of those businessmen who left the state have been frozen. Lastly, the US and EU-imposed multilateral sanctions led to Syria being cut off from the international banking system(Aita, 2020).

    The Syrian Government has declared that reconstruction contracts will be granted to its supporters and not countries who supported its opposition. It has also offered concessions in order to attract investments from Russia and Iran, but this may jeopardize Syria’s financial independence in the coming years.

    Reconstruction of Syria would lead to stronger relations with Iran and Russia followed by simultaneous decline in relations with the West (to whoom it exported a major portion of its oil ) and the Arab Gulf. Previous economic partners may engage in reconstruction in areas where there is negligible regime-control. The reconstruction parameters are bound to affect Syria’s social fabric. The gap between the rich and the poor has widened due to the war economy. The rigged economy will put the interests and benefits of the common people in peril.

    Geopolitical Dynamics of Reconstruction

    The geopolitical struggle over reconstruction among competing players at the regional level is centred around increasing one’s own influence, either through direct intervention or proxies. Considering that different parts of Syria is under the control of different parties there is every chance that Syrian reconstruction effort may not be an integrated effort across the nation but rather take the form of parallel reconstruction initiatives across the many different areas of Syria.

    The global geo-economic factors influence whether resources become available for reconstruction and on what terms. Because the powers that are geopolitically strongest on the ground in Syria (Russia, Iran) are geo-economically weaker than those who lost the geopolitical conflict (US, EU, Gulf), the latter are using the capital that they can withhold and obstruct or seek to leverage their contribution to effect the looming winding down of the military conflict on their terms. They, together with the World Bank, are making their participation conditional on a political settlement. Specifically, this will affect whether the regime will be able to reconstitute authority over the country’s territory and its reconstruction, or will be forced into some sort of power-sharing/territorial confederation or, these failing, reconstruction deepens fragmentation. If the parties do not reach a compromise the outcome could be a frozen conflict consolidated by separate and minimalist reconstruction tracks.

    Further, regional and global actors that have not participated in the conflict happen to be economically stronger and have the means to mobilise resources. Their support and resources to fund the reconstruction and development of Syria remain contingent on the ability of Assad’s regime to fulfil their conditions of a political settlement.

    Russia’s Reconstruction Support

    Russia’s role in Syria’s reconstruction have been driven by the benefits a stable Syria could provide it. It has provided Assad’s regime with support in economic and military terms and settled Syria’s debt. Russia also seeks to renew and recoup its pre-war investments in infrastructure and energy sector, and establish new contracts in geo-strategic areas. Assad’s regime has been granted a preferential role in redevelopment of its energy and infrastructure sectors. The state of the Russian economy has made lesser resources available for investment. The risk of investing in Syria due to the political and security climate and the threat of being targeted by US sanctions have led to minimal investment into Syria. The entities that have invested are operated/owned by oligarchs close to Putin, and those under sanctions, for instance, Gennady Tim-Chenko’s construction company (Van Veen, 2020).

    Russia has realised that it lacks the resources to actively finance Syria’s reconstruction effort and instead focussed its efforts on building the state institutions necessary to provide adequate security infrastructure, which is an important pre-condition for any reconstruction effort.

    Russia has realised that it lacks the resources to actively finance Syria’s reconstruction effort and instead focussed its efforts on building the state institutions necessary to provide adequate security infrastructure, which is an important pre-condition for any reconstruction effort. Simultaneously it tried to seek support from the European Union and international organisations to create the necessary infrastructure required to facilitate the return of refugees based out of Europe while ensuring the attainment of a political settlement that helps Bashar Al Assad to stay in power (Daher, 2018).

    Image Credit: NYT

    Russia has also worked with the Assad regime to implement policies aimed at the return of refugees thereby addressing some of the requirements and requests of the European Union. However, Bashar Al Assad has so far only paid lip service to such requests.  For instance a law intended to promote reconstruction projects has been amended under Russian pressure but without any major changes to its provisions and was used to expropriate the property of Syrians who fled abroad.

    Iran’s Role

    Iran has provided Assad’s regime around $16billion worth of financial aid since 2012.It has provided an additional $3.5 million in 2013 which was further extended by $1 billion in 2015 and $6.4 billion and $700million to pro-Iran militias in Syria.   It has expressed its interests in participating in the reconstruction of Syria. Iranian entities were awarded numerous contracts worth millions of dollars to initiate redevelopment of the electricity infrastructure by the central government as well as local governments but are yet to be implemented. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who have considerable experience in participating in the reconstruction of Iran after the Iran-Iraq war and own vast construction companies in Iran, have entered into agreements in the sectors of mining and communications. While Iran has stated it would offer $1 billion for reconstruction, the amount it pledged is a minuscule amount of the total funds required. Iran’s participation in Syria’s reconstruction is also likely to be limited due to the impact of US sanctions on its own economy(Van Veen, 2020).

    Diminished role of US, EU and Arab States

    As for regime controlled parts of Syria, Washington moved to block reconstruction funding in these areas. US pundits argued that the regime would inevitably be empowered by reconstruction and should not be rewarded for its brutal repression of the uprising; anti-regime interest groups moved not only to preclude US funding but also to erect obstacles to others participating in reconstruction. In April 2018 the US Congress passed the No Assistance for Assad Act (NAAA) which was designed to prevent any drift from humanitarian assistance to reconstruction stabilization, and according to Faysal Itani, had the effect of ‘killing any World Bank dreams to get funding to operate in Syria’. Indeed, the US has a long history of directing the flow of world financial capital via sanctions, conditionality, etc. for its geopolitical purposes; in Syria, it seeks to manipulate money (geo-economics) to obtain what it could not achieve via geopolitics: specifically, keeping Syria a failed state that would make it a resource-draining burden for Russia and its allies.

    The US has used its influence in North-Eastern Syria, to counter efforts by the Assad regime to consolidate its power over Syria which is a precursor to a “nationally integrated” reconstruction. Establishing control over energy reserves is essential for Assad’s regime to pursue its reconstruction efforts successfully. The US, by controlling reserves in the North-East Syria, has been able to deprive Syria’s access to essential resources.

    US efforts in reconstruction have been motivated by its interests to deter any reconstruction efforts sponsored by the regime through geo-economics measures such as sanctions, when its geo-political efforts have had limited success in motivating Syria and its allies in pursuing a political solution in line with US policy interests.

    The US campaign against ISIS devastated Raqqa but reconstruction there has remained limited to stabilization measures. The Trump administration tried to get the Saudis to assume the burden of reconstruction (asking for $4 billion). The US goal was to start enough reconstruction to deter any move in the area to join regime sponsored reconstruction efforts (Alaaldin et.al., 2018; Burcher, 2018; Harris, 2018; US Congress, 2018;). US efforts at convincing Saudi Arabia to undertake reconstruction efforts have not been successful as the latter offered relatively smaller amount (al-Khateb, 2020).

    US efforts in reconstruction have been motivated by its interests to deter any reconstruction efforts sponsored by the regime through geo-economics measures such as sanctions, when its geo-political efforts have had limited success in motivating Syria and its allies in pursuing a political solution in line with US policy interests.  It simultaneously blocked reconstruction funding directed towards territories under the control of the regime. The Caesar Act, now incorporated into the National Defence Act of 2020, targets investment into Syria, through individuals and businesses coming into the ambit of the UN sanctions (Hinnebusch, 2020).

    While the EU has provided substantial aid to Syrian refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries, it has made its aid and participation in reconstruction contingent on efforts to reach a political solution that is in accordance with ‘UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communique’

    The EU has been affected by the Syrian Conflict due to the influx of refugees and large-scale migration of its citizens to partake in terrorist activities. While the EU has provided substantial aid to Syrian refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries, it has made its aid and participation in reconstruction contingent on efforts to reach a political solution that is in accordance with ‘UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communique’ (Van Veen, 2020).

    Russia is making efforts to broker a political settlement of sorts, with Turkey’s support, to convince EU to invest in reconstruction to enable refugees to return. While the EU seems to be relying on the inability of Syria’s allies to support its funding and thus force Assad to agree to the EU’s conditions, the regime does not seem to be interested in accepting EU conditions and give up its power in return for support of its reconstruction. However, individuals EU states have participated in reconstruction efforts in a limited manner in both the regime-held as well as opposition-held areas.

    Turkey continues to be one of Syria’s top trading partners. Numerous Syrian businessmen who have been exiled have invested in Turkey, around 26% of foreign investment in Turkey in 2014 originated from Syrian businessmen, particularly in its border regions with Syria. While a number of exiled Syrian businessmen supported the opposition, their investment would be instrumental, if mobilised, in territories held by Turkey and its militias at a time when refugees are returning to the region. While the Syrian government is against the participation of Turkey in the reconstruction of Aleppo, Russia’s efforts in mediation would lead Turkey to participate in the reconstruction process. Turkey has invested significantly in establishing institutions facilitating the governance of areas under its control and also in building economic infrastructure in these areas (Daher, 2018).

    While Jordan and Lebanon have expressed interest in participating in the reconstruction of Syria, the resources they can mobilise are limited.  The Gulf countries have, no doubt the resources required for reconstruction, but have made their role in Syria’s reconstruction contingent on withdrawal of Iran and its proxies and in case of some countries, a regime change. The UAE as expressed its interest in participating in Syria’s reconstruction so as to limit Iran’s influence. However, Yazigi (2017) states that reconstruction efforts, in the case of  Lebanon, were contingent on a solution that emphasised upon power-sharing, backed by regional and international actors and substantial financial aid from Saudi Arabia. It is unlikely that either of the two scenarios would play out in the case of Syria.

    China: A Possible Contender?

    the Chinese state considers Al Assad’s regime as a bulwark against terrorism and its relations with the regime an asset in combating Uighurs who are participating on the behalf of terrorists.

    China has expressed its interest in participating in the reconstruction of Syria to advance its interests through investments in economy and geo-strategic areas such as the maritime sector, and to develop and connect its Belt and Road Initiative in the region. Given China’s interests, size and nature of China’s capital, China becomes a viable partner in the reconstruction of Syria.  China conducted a trade fair in 2018, which was attended by 1,000 Chinese companies and witnessed an investment of $2 billion for the reconstruction and development of Syria’s industrial sector. Private investors have been concerned about the widespread corruption in Syria and the threats of being targeted by US sanctions. Moreover, the Chinese state considers Al Assad’s regime as a bulwark against terrorism and its relations with the regime an asset in combating Uighurs who are participating on the behalf of terrorists.

    Conflict Resolution vs Conflict Management

    Given that the warring parties consider the conflict to be more-or-less of a zero-sum game, territorial and social fragmentation of Syria, it would be extremely difficult for them to pursue means to resolve the conflict through creating the need for the conflict to be managed and downsized (Dacrema, 2020). The non-recognition of certain non-state actors by the rival sides and questions regarding the participation of non-state actors in negotiations, which would only serve to legitimise them further, complicates the process of negotiating a solution.

    Temporary Arrangements

    A strategy that would allow for the management of the conflict would be to negotiate temporary agreements and deals. Turkey and Russia have been able to broker temporary ceasefires at multiple instances, throughout the conflict, in the Idlib region. Temporary arrangements would help build confidence among the warring parties in the long run, and reduce the possibility of escalation of war (Dacrema, 2020).

    Conclusion

    Given that the warring parties prefer a status quo in comparison to the resolution of a conflict and value their geo-political and economic interests, it is highly unlikely that parties would push for resolution of the conflict. In consideration of a political stalemate, reconstruction efforts among the warring parties are likely to take place parallelly, as they have played out with the localisation of the conflict. While resources in the territories held by the regime are being diverted to areas that have remained loyal during the conflict and/or areas of strategic importance with areas formerly occupied by opposition forces receiving relatively lesser attention; territories under Turkish control and those held by the Kurdish forces have witnessed efforts aimed at stabilising the territories.

    Russia and EU have the potential and the leverage required to emerge as power brokers in the reconstruction and initiate the process in a manner that promotes social, economic and political cohesion in the long run.

    Russia and EU have the potential and the leverage required to emerge as power brokers in the reconstruction and initiate the process in a manner that promotes social, economic and political cohesion in the long run. The likelihood of being able to convince themselves that the possibility of achieving one’s interests alongside the other is a far better option in comparison to its alternative of a failed state, which threats both their interests. However, their ability to convince their allies and their clients (in this instance, Assad regime is Russia’s client) and the mistrust between both the parties as well as between their allies poses a challenge.

    Russia’s efforts in brokering a constitutional committee for Syria under the aegis of the UN is an indicator of a compromise. Hinnebusch (2020) suggests that “it is not impossible to move incrementally toward a minimalist sort of political settlement that might acquire enough international legitimacy to open the door to some reconstruction funding.” While the likelihood of this occurrence is difficult amid conflicting interests, it cannot be overruled.

    The humanitarian aspects of the conflict and urgent need for reconstruction to alleviate tangible and intangible costs of the conflict have largely been ignored. The warring parties have been preoccupied with advancing and fulfilling their interests at the cost of ordinary Syrians. There is a need for parties to acknowledge and make efforts towards the realisation of the urgency of reconstruction that is vital for securing the social and economic interests of ordinary Syrians. The likelihood of the same, however, is questionable.

     

    References

    Aita, S. (2020). Reconstruction as a political-economy issue: The case of Syria. Retrieved 28 June 2020, from https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/reconstruction-as-a-political-economy-issue-the-case-of-syria/

    al-Kattan, R. (2017). Retrieved 25 June 2020, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-economic-case-for-syria-s-stabilisation/

    al-Khateb, K. (2020). US outsources Syria aid to Gulf. Retrieved 4 July 2020, from https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/us-outsources-syria-aid-gulf.html

    Dacrema, E. (2020). Three Concepts to Understand the Future of Syria. Retrieved 25 June 2020, from https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/what-future-for-postwar-syria

    Daher, J. (2018). The political economic context of Syria’s reconstruction : a prospective in light of a legacy of unequal development. Retrieved 3 July 2020, from https://core.ac.uk/display/162303203

    Hinnebusch, R. (2020). The Battle over Syria’s Reconstruction. Retrieved 1 July 2020, from https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/articles/development-inequality-and-poverty/battle-over-syrias-reconstruction

    Human Rights Watch. (2019). Rigging the System. Retrieved 25 June 2020, from https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/06/28/rigging-system/government-policies-co-opt-aid-and-reconstruction-funding-syria#_ftn114

    Middle East Institute, & Etana Syria. (2020). Manufacturing Division: The Assad Regime and Minorities in South-west Syria. Retrieved 2 July 2020, from https://www.mei.edu/publications/manufacturing-division-assad-regime-and-minorities-south-west-syria

    Sinjab, L. (2017). How Syria’s War Economy Propels the Conflict. Retrieved 25 June 2020, from https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/how-syrias-war-economy-propels-the-conflict

    Veen, E. (2020). The geopolitics of Syria’s reconstruction: a case of matryoshka. Retrieved 27 June 2020, from https://www.clingendael.org/publication/geopolitics-syrias-reconstruction-case-matryoshka

    Yazigi, J. (2017). Analysis: No Funds to Foot Syria’s Reconstruction Bill. Retrieved 1 July 2020, from https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/community/2017/12/04/analysis-no-funds-to-foot-syrias-reconstruction-bill

     

    Main Image Credit: Palmyra before its destruction by ISIS – www.citymetric.com 

     

  • Living Next to China: India’s Economic Challenge

    Living Next to China: India’s Economic Challenge

    Abstract

    Hampered by declining economic growth, India needs to take bold and practical economic measures to overcome the adverse impact of the coronavirus pandemic, compounded by past economic blunders such as the demonetisation and the haphazard implementation of the GST regime. Mohan Guruswamy analyses that the seeds of the current economic slide were sown by the UPA II regime by its populist measures that were wasteful, unproductive, and reduced capital expenditure. Non action by the NDA governments on these issues has made it worse. He argues that India must not shy away from recourse to deficit financing to overcome the current unprecedented challenges faced by the economy on account of the Covid-19 disruption. India needs to increase its stimulus package from a mere 0.3% of the GDP to at least 10% to boost economic revival and growth. India’s reserves of $490 billion ($530 billion as of recent figures) is available to be tapped for economic revival. The measures must focus on addressing the severe impact on weaker sections of the society such as the poor, lower middle-class, and the farmers.

    The Covid2019 shock hit all world economies and has caused a serious contraction in all of them. Ironically, in the advanced economies like the USA, UK, Japan, and others, it exposed their intrinsic strengths with highly evolved social security systems by and large being able to absorb the labor displacement and the ability to quickly put together a fiscal fight back plan. Even China has been able to quickly recover its pole position as the worlds leading exporter and industrial production center. In India, Covid2019 exposed our co-morbidities, and has further opened the traditional faultlines, with the large unorganized labor cohort bearing the brunt of the costs. At last count the CMIE estimates over 130 million daily wagers in the urban centers being rendered jobless and homeless.[i] India’s economy which has been in distress for most of the last decade in now seriously stricken.

    When India’s economic history is written in some future date, and when a serious examination is done of when India lost its way to its ‘tryst with destiny’, the decade of 2010-20 will be highlighted.

    When India’s economic history is written in some future date, and when a serious examination is done of when India lost its way to its ‘tryst with destiny’, the decade of 2010-20 will be highlighted. The facts speak for themselves. India’s real GDP growth was at its peak in March 2010 when it scaled 13.3%.  The nominal GDP at that point was over 16.1%. The nominal GDP in September 2019 was at 6.3%, it’s lowest in the decade. Since then the downward trend is evident and we are now scraping the bottom at about a real GDP growth rate of 4.5%, this too with the push of an arguably inflationary methodology. Our previous CEA, Arvind Subramaniam, estimated that India’s GDP growth is overestimated by at least 2.5%. BJP MP and economist Subramaniam Swamy was even more pessimistic. He estimated it to be 1.5%.

    The decline in the promise is amply evident by the change in the make up of the economy during this decade.  In 2010 Agriculture contributed 17.5% of GDP, while Industry contributed 30.2% and Services 45.4%.  In 2019 that has become 15.6%, 26.5% and 48.5% respectively.  The share of industry has been sliding.  This is the typical profile of a post-industrial economy.  The irony of India becoming post-industrial without having industrialized must not be missed.

    Decline in Capital Investment

    The most significant cause for the decline of growth is the decline in capital investment.  It was 39.8% of GDP in 2010 and is now a good 10% lower.  Clearly without an increase of capital investment, one cannot hope for more industrialization and hence higher growth.  What we have seen in this decade is the huge increase in Services, which now mostly means increase in Public Administration and informal services like pakora sellers.

    In 2010 it seemed we were well on track.  But now we are struggling to get past $3 trillion, and the $5 trillion rendezvous that Modi promised by 2024 will have to wait longer.

    At the turn of the century, as China’s GDP began its great leap forward (from about $1.2 trillion in 2010 to $14.2 trillion in 2019), was also a heady moment for India whose GDP of $470 billion began a break from the sub 5% level of most of the 1990’s to the rates we became familiar with in the recent past (to hit a peak stride of 10.7% in 2010). At that point in time, if growth rates kept creeping up, we could have conceivably gone past $30 trillion by 2050. But for that the growth rate should consistently be above 7%. It seemed so feasible then.  In 2010 it seemed we were well on track.  But now we are struggling to get past $3 trillion, and the $5 trillion rendezvous that Modi promised by 2024 will have to wait longer.

    To be fair to Modi and the NDA, the decline began early in the second term of the UPA when capital expenditure growth had begun tapering off.  Dr. Manmohan Singh is too canny an economist to have missed that.  But UPA II also coincided with the increasing assertion of populist tendencies encouraged by the Congress President and her extra-Constitutional National Advisory Council. The decline in the share of capital expenditure was accompanied by a huge expansion in subsidies, most of them unmerited.  Instead of an increase in expenditure on education and healthcare, we saw a huge expansion in subsidies to the middle and upper classes like on LPG and motor fuels. Even fertilizer subsidies, which mainly flow to middle and large farmers with irrigated farmlands, saw a great upward leap.  Clearly the money for this came from the reduction in capital expenditure.  Modi’s fault in the years since 2014 is that he did nothing to reverse the trend, and only inflicted more hardship by his foolish demonetization and ill-conceived GST rollout.

    The realities are indeed stark.  The savings/GDP ratio has been in a declining trend since 2011 and Modi has been unable to reverse it.  Consequently, the tax/GDP ratio and the investment/GDP ratio have also been declining.  The rate of economic growth has been suspect and all objective indicators point to it being padded up. The drivers of economic growth such as capital expenditure is dismal.  Projects funded by banks have declined by over half since 2014 to less than Rs.600 billion in 2018-19.  Projects funded by the market have dropped to rock bottom.  Subsequently the manufacturing/GDP ratio is now at 15%.  Corporate profits/GDP ratio is now at a 15-year-old low at about 2.7%.  You cannot have adequate job creation if these are dipping.  Declining rural labor wage indices testify to this.

    Between October 2007 and October 2013 rural wages in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors grew at 17% and 15%, respectively.  Since November 2014, however, agricultural and non-agricultural sector wages grew at only 5.6% and 6.5%, respectively. In 2019 average rural wage growth has further fallen to 3.1%.[ii]

    Bharat and India Divide

    It is very clear now that the urban lane has been moving well in India.  Indeed, so well that an Oxfam study revealed that that as much as 73% of the growth during the last five years accrued to just 1% of the population.[iii] This does not mean it is just the tycoons of Bombay and Delhi who are cornering the gains.  Government now employs close to 25 million persons, and these have now become a high-income enclave.  The number of persons in the private and organized sector is about another ten million. In all this high-income enclave numbers not more than 175-200 million (using the thumb rule of five per family).  Much of the consumption we tend to laud is restricted to just these.

    The simple fact that the share of Agriculture is now about 15.6% of GDP and falling, while still being the source of sustenance for almost 60% of the population reveals the stark reality.  A vast section of India is being left behind even as India races to become a major global economy.

    Agriculture is still the mainstay of employment.  Way back in 1880 the Indian Famine Commission “had observed that India had too many people cultivating too little land”.  This about encapsulates the current situation also.  While as a percentage the farmers and farmworkers have reduced as a part of the work force, in absolute terms they have almost tripled since 1947.  This has led to a permanent depression in comparative wages but has also led to a decline in per farmer production due to fragmentation of holdings.  The average farm size is now less than an acre and it keeps further fragmenting every generation.[iv] The beggaring of the farming community is inevitable.  The only solution to this is the massive re-direction of the workforce into less skilled vocations such as construction.

    The simple fact that the share of Agriculture is now about 15.6% of GDP and falling, while still being the source of sustenance for almost 60% of the population reveals the stark reality.  A vast section of India is being left behind even as India races to become a major global economy.

    As the decade ends, the Bharat and India divide have never been more vivid.  Our social scientists are still unable to fix a handle to this because the class, cultural and ethnic divides still eludes a neat theoretical construct.  Yet there can be little disagreement that there are two broad parts to this gigantic country and one part is being left behind.  The distance between the two only increased from 2010 to 2020.  This is indeed the lost decade.  Recovering from this will take long and will be painful.  If we take too long, we might have used up a good bit of the ‘demographic dividend’ and the demographic window of opportunity.  The ageing of India will be upon us by 2050[v].

    Covid-19 Impact – Increasing Economic Disparities 

    In the recent months the onslaught of the Covid2019 induced lockdown has been quite relentless.  From 2004-2014 India’s GDP grew at an average of 7.8%.  At its peak it went past 10% in 2010-11 Then it started slowing down.  The new government was unable to return to the old growth rates because it did not care to learn from the experiences of the previous regime, which began to spend more on giveaways, misguidedly thinking it was welfare economics, and took the accelerator off capital expenditure.  Even though capital expenditure is driven in India by government spending, this government spending is very different from subsidies and giveaways.  Subsidies generally tend to be misdirected with the already well-off garnering most of it.  Minimum Support Prices (MSP) are a huge annual subsidy[vi]and 90% of it accrues to the states of Punjab, Haryana, and the coastal region of Andhra Pradesh.  Fertilizer subsidies tend to accumulate to the advantage of large and medium farmers or to about a quarter of all land holdings.  Ditto for free power.  The only welfare expenditure to benefit farmers is investment in irrigation, rural infrastructure, and social welfare like education and health.  Unfortunately, this has been on the decline.  This has exacerbated disparities, both local and regional.  With capital expenditures declining, job creation suffered and the inevitable slowdown of GDP growth happened.  As we started diving, the government inflicted the so-called Demonetization adding to our woes.  Just as things began to look up, the Covid2019 pandemic overtook us.

    Now the only dispute on national income is how much will be the contraction.  The Finance Ministry hopes there won’t be any. The IMF has officially said it will be 4.5%.  The rating agencies predict a contraction of 6.8%, while many more are suggesting something closer to 10%.  How do we deal with is now?  The government of India has tended to be “conservative” in its outlook and has made no serious suggestion on economic stimulus.  What it calls a stimulus is actually not a stimulus. The problem is more philosophical.

    The divide between the Keynesians and the Chicago school is as intense and often antagonistic as the Sunni-Shia, Catholic-Protestant or Thenkalai-Vadakalai Iyengar divides.

    Keynesian economics is a theory that says the government should increase demand to boost growth. Keynesians believe consumer demand is the primary driving force in an economy.  As a result, the theory supports expansionary fiscal policy.  The Chicago School is a neoclassical economic school of thought that originated at the University of Chicago in the 1930s.  The main tenets of the Chicago School are that free markets best allocate resources in an economy and that minimal or zero government intervention is best for economic prosperity.  They abhor fiscal deficits.

    Inadequate Stimulus Package 

    The instruments used to beat countries like India into submission are ratings agencies such as Moody’s, which just downgraded India.  We shouldn’t lose too much sleep over it.  India is a hardly a borrower abroad and is more of a lender holding $490 billion as reserves.

    The only reason why the actual stimulus package is only Rs.63K crs is the obsession with fiscal deficits by Chicago economists such as Raghuram Rajan and his former student the hapless Krishnamurthy Subramaniam, the present CEA. They are true disciples of the Washington Consensus to judge countries like India by the fiscal deficit size.  The instruments used to beat countries like India into submission are ratings agencies such as Moody’s, which just downgraded India.  We shouldn’t lose too much sleep over it.  India is a hardly a borrower abroad and is more of a lender holding $490 billion as reserves.

    That is why the CEA when asked about a big stimulus said: “There are no free lunches!” That’s exactly what Milton Friedman said. But they quite happily ignore the biggest deficit financed economy in the world is the USA.  Raghuram Rajan told Rahul Gandhi on his videoconference that a stimulus of Rs.65K crores would suffice in the present situation[vii]. The Nobel Laureate Abhijit Bhattacharya and former CEA Arvind Subramaniam suggest a stimulus package like the USA or Japan[viii].  The USA has just announced a stimulus of over $3.5 trillion or over 15% of GDP.  Modi’s stimulus is a mere 0.3% of GDP.

    What is ‘Fiscal Deficit?’ A fiscal deficit occurs when a government’s total expenditures exceed the revenue that it generates, excluding money from borrowings.  Deficit differs from debt, which is an accumulation of yearly deficits.

    Many serious economists regard fiscal deficits as a positive economic event.  For instance, the great John Maynard Keynes believed that deficits help countries climb out of economic recession.  On the other hand, fiscal conservatives feel that governments should avoid deficits in favor of balanced budgets.

    India’s debt/GDP ratio is by contrast a modest 62% and yet it intends to pump in a mere 0.3% of GDP as stimulus.

    The fastest growing economies in the world, and now its biggest – USA, China, Japan and most of Western Europe – have the highest debt/GDP ratios.  Japan’s debt/GDP is over 253% before the latest stimulus of 20% of GDP.  China’s debt is now over 180% of its GDP.  The USAs debt/GDP is close to 105% yet it is raising $3 trillion as debt to get it out of the Covid2019 quagmire.  India’s debt/GDP ratio is by contrast a modest 62% and yet it intends to pump in a mere 0.3% of GDP as stimulus.

    Pump priming the economy by borrowing per se is not bad.  It is not putting the debt to good use that is bad.  Nations prosper when they use debt for worthwhile capital expenditure with assured returns and social cost benefits.  But we in India have borrowed to give it away as subsidies and to hide the high cost of government.  To give an analogy, if a family has to make a choice of borrowing money to fund the children’s education or to support the man’s drinking habit, the rational choice is obvious. The children’s education will have a long-term payback, while the booze gives instant gratification. But unfortunately, our governments have always been making the wrong choices.

    If borrowed money is used productively and creates growth and prosperity, it must be welcomed.  What we want to hear from the government is not about fiscal deficit targets, but economic growth, value addition, employment, and investment targets.  Our governments have hopelessly been missing all these targets.

    Modi’s Options – Need for Bold Decisions

    So, what can Modi do now to get us out of this quagmire?  If the regime abhors a stimulus financed by deficit financing there are other options that can be exercised.  But he is hamstrung with a weak economic management team with novices as the two key players, the Finance Minister and RBI governor.

    India has over $490 billion nesting abroad earning ridiculously low interest.  Even if a tenth of this is monetized for injection into the national economy, it will mean more than Rs.3.5 lakh crores.  At last count the RBI had about Rs.9.6 lakh crores as reserves.  This is money to be used in a financial emergency.  We are now in an emergency like we have never encountered or foresaw before. Even a third of this or about Rs.3.2 lakh crores is about five times the present plan.

    There is money in the trees, and all it needs is a good shake up to pick the fruits. The pain of the lockdown must not be borne by the poor alone.  The government can easily target 5% of GDP or about Rs.10L crores for the recovery fund as an immediately achievable goal.

    There are other sources of funds also, but tapping these will entail political courage and sacrifices. Our cumulative government wages and pension bill amounts to about 11.4% of GDP.  After exempting the military and paramilitary, which is mostly under active deployment, we can target 1% of GDP by just by cancelling annual leave and LTC, and rolling back a few DA increases.

    The government can also sequester a fixed percentage from bank deposits, say 5% of deposits between Rs.10-100 lakhs and 15-20% from bigger deposits for tax-free interest-bearing bonds in exchange.  The ten big private companies alone have cash reserves of over Rs.10 lakh crores[ix].

    There is money in the trees, and all it needs is a good shake up to pick the fruits. The pain of the lockdown must not be borne by the poor alone.  The government can easily target 5% of GDP or about Rs.10L crores for the recovery fund as an immediately achievable goal.

    This money can be used to immediately begin a Universal Basic Income scheme, by transferring a sum of Rs.5000 pm into the Jan Dhan accounts for the duration of the financial emergency; fund GST concessions to move the auto and engineering sectors in particular; begin emergency rural reconstruction projects to generate millions of new jobs and get our core infrastructure sectors like steel, cement and transportation moving again.

    Getting money to move India again is not a huge problem.  What comes in between are the philosophical blinkers.  Call it Chicago economics or the Gujarati mindset.

    Notes

    [i] https://www.businesstoday.in/sectors/jobs/india-unemployment-rate-hits-26-amid-lockdown-14-crore-lose-employment-cmie/story/401707.html

    [ii] https://www.financialexpress.com/economy/farm-wages-growth-fell-to-a-four-quarter-low-in-q3-fy-20/1789235/

    [iii] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/wealth-of-indias-richest-1-more-than-4-times-of-total-for-70-poorest-oxfam/articleshow/73416122.cms?from=mdr#:~:text=Wealth%20of%20India’s%20richest%201%25%20more%20than%204%2Dtimes%20of,total%20for%2070%25%20poorest%3A%20Oxfam&text=The%20Oxfam%20report%20further%20said,particularly%20poor%20women%20and%20girls.

    [iv] https://www.prsindia.org/policy/discussion-papers/state-agriculture-india

    140 million hectares of land is used as agricultural area, as of 2012-13.  Over the years, this area has been fragmented into smaller pieces of land.  As seen in Table 3, the number of marginal land holdings (less than one hectare) increased from 36 million in 1971 to 93 million in 2011.  Marginal and small land holdings face several issues, such as problems with using mechanization and irrigation techniques.

    [v] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/demographic-time-bomb-young-india-ageing-much-faster-than-expected/articleshow/65382889.cms

    [vi] https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/all-you-wanted-to-know-about-minimum-support-price/article7342789.ece

    [vii] https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/in-video-conversation-with-rahul-rajan-suggests-65k-crore-aid-for-poor/story-CtrtvW6HErR16L9m1t9wHP.html

    [viii] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/rahul-gandhi-in-conversation-with-abhijit-banerjee-india-needs-a-bigger-stimulus-package-like-us-japan-to-revive-economy/videoshow/75549770.cms

    [ix] https://www.screener.in/screens/2551/Cash-Rich-Companies/

     

    Image credit: Adobe Stock

  • Vietnam: Bright Economic Outlook post-COVID

    Vietnam: Bright Economic Outlook post-COVID

    COVID-19 is truly a ‘Black Swan’ event and its impact is being felt across the globe. There is widespread worry about the future of economic growth in the post-pandemic period and the World Bank has observed that the pandemic caused the deepest global recession since Second World War. [i] There are at least three reasons which triggered and added to the current crisis. First, it has involved the US and China in a trade war since July 2018, when US President Donald Trump imposed wide-ranging tariffs on China for its alleged unfair trade practices. In August 2019, Trump ordered U.S. companies to “immediately start looking for an alternative to China, including bringing your companies home and making your products in the USA.”[ii] China responded in a similar manner with counter tariffs on US goods. Since then numerous negotiations between them have been held, the last in June 2020 at Hawaii, did not yield any breakthrough. This revengeful tariff war has now blown into a full-fledged trade war and President Trump aggravated with the renewed threat of a “complete decoupling from China.”

    There is widespread worry about the future of economic growth in the post-pandemic period and the World Bank has observed that the pandemic caused the deepest global recession since Second World War.

    Second, amid the trade war, the Corona-19 pandemic made matters worse for the two protagonists. The US accused China of withholding information about the Wuhan virus which was detected in December 2019 and Beijing did not make public the information till January 2020 after which it spread across the globe from Europe to the US. The pandemic has caused massive disruptions in supply chains and some countries have decided to shift businesses out of China. For instance, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe government announced US $2.2 billion stimulus package to help companies shift production out of China back to Japan or elsewhere.[iii]

    Third, the new security law in Hong Kong has triggered an exodus by several companies to move out of China. The Law “targets acts of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces, with life in prison for those committing the most serious offences”[iv] has scared common people. Many technology companies, startups, entrepreneurs are now confronted with uncertainty and are exploring alternative destinations.[v]

    many companies are being forced to shut down their operation in China and rethink-reevaluate-reinvest in new destinations to remain buoyant for the time being and slowly make their networks more resilient across sectors for the future.

    Furthermore, the pandemic exposed the weaknesses and susceptibilities of many organizations, business houses and industries particularly those that are intimately connected and dependent on China to fulfil their need for raw materials or finished products. Consequently, many companies are being forced to shut down their operation in China and rethink-reevaluate-reinvest in new destinations to remain buoyant for the time being, and slowly make their networks more resilient across sectors for the future. According to a leading business research and advisory company, “tariffs imposed by the U.S. and Chinese governments during the past years have increased supply chain costs by up to 10% for over 40% of organizations” and “popular alternative locations are Vietnam, India, and Mexico.” [vi]

    Vietnam and Thailand have a very good scorecard in their fight against COVID-19 and are rearing to attract investments and kick start the economy.

    Even before COVID-19 pandemic crisis, in 2019, five Asian countries i.e. Malaysia, India, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam (MITI-V) or “Mighty Five” had been identified as “up-and-coming players” with high potential for being world’s next manufacturing hubs.[vii] Among these, Vietnam and Thailand have a very good scorecard in their fight against COVID-19 and are rearing to attract investments and kick start the economy.

    According to the World Economic Forum, Vietnam’s economic rise is marked by trade liberalization, domestic reforms through deregulation, lowering the cost of doing business and investments made in human resource development.[viii] During the first six months of the current year, FDI commitments was at over US$15 billion which is a positive outlook for the country. In fact, Vietnam has attracted FDI from 136 countries and territories with nearly 32,000 projects with a combined value of US$378 billion. Among these Japan is the second largest investor with over US$60 billion. Last month, Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Investment, Embassy of Japanese at Hanoi, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) held a virtual conference to explore FDI investments “especially in the context of Japanese government providing a US$2.3 billion aid package for Japanese firms to diversify their supply chains”.[ix]

    Vietnam has many common export products from China such as broadcasting equipment, and could emerge as the “top exporter of broadcasting equipment to developed countries” but is constrained by “smaller GDP and workforce”; but its   progresses in infrastructure could potentially make it a more appealing option.[x]

    Vietnam has attracted FDI from 136 countries and territories with nearly 32,000 projects with a combined value of US$378 billion. Among these Japan is the second largest investor with over US$60 billion.

    Besides, there are other contenders such as Thailand and India to attract FDI and these two countries offer attractive FDI policies and manufacturing infrastructure. In mid-2019, as many as 200 American companies were planning to move their manufacturing base from China and were looking at India.[xi] Similar trends have been reported from South Korea [xii] and Japan [xiii] who could migrate to “production-conducive economies like India, Vietnam and Thailand”.[xiv]

    According to one estimate, FDI “across the globe may decline by 40% this year due to the Covid-19 crisis”[xv], but by all counts and accounts, Vietnam is a resounding success story.  It is a stable economy, possesses necessary infrastructure and facilities, and above all it enjoys “multilateral and bilateral agreements with foreign countries”[xvi], which makes it a popular destination in the post-COVID economic revival outlook.

    Notes

    [i] “Global Economic Prospects”, https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects (accessed 16 July 2020).
    [ii] “Trump says he’s ordering American companies to immediately start looking for an alternative to China”, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/23/trump-says-hes-ordering-american-companies-to-immediately-start-looking-for-an-alternative-to-china.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [iii] “Coronavirus Impact: Japan to offer $2.2 billion to firms shifting production out of China”, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/world/coronavirus-impact-japan-to-offer-22-billion-to-firms-shifting-production-out-of-china/story/400721.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [iv] “Hongkongers contemplate a second exodus”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3093517/home-and-away-after-national-security-law-hongkongers (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [v] “Tech Firms Begin to Abandon Hong Kong over Security Law”, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:tmQW3Yjx5vcJ:https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-20/tech-firms-begin-to-abandon-hong-kong-because-of-security-law+&cd=13&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=in (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [vi] “Gartner Survey Reveals 33% of Supply Chain Leaders Moved Business Out of China or Plan to by 2023”, https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2020-06-24-gartner-survey-reveals-33-percent-of-supply-chain-leaders-moved-business-out-of-china-or-plan-to-by-2023 (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [vii] “5 China Sourcing Alternatives In Asia”, https://www.intouch-quality.com/blog/5-alternatives-to-sourcing-from-china (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [viii] “Vietnam races ahead of China in economic growth: opportunities and challenges for Vietnam in the post-COVID- 19 period”, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/vietnam-races-ahead-of-china-in-economic-growth-opportunities-and-challenges-for-vietnam-in-the-post-covid-19-period/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [ix] Ibid.
    [x] “COVID-19: Developing countries and shrouded opportunities”, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/covid-19-developing-countries-and-shrouded-opportunities/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xi] “About 200 US firms aim to move manufacturing base from China to India post-general election: USISPF”, https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/about-200-us-firms-aim-to-move-manufacturing-base-from-china-to-india-post-general-election-usispf/story/341011.html ( 30 July 2020).
    [xii] “Korean companies keen to move out of China to India”, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/75130387.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst (30 July 2020).
    [xiii] “Global firms look to shift from China to India”, https://www.livemint.com/industry/manufacturing/global-firms-look-to-shift-from-china-to-india-11587494725838.html  (30 July 2020).
    [xiv] “India isn’t ready yet for foreign companies that want to quit China”, https://theprint.in/opinion/india-isnt-ready-yet-for-foreign-companies-that-want-to-quit-china/415040/ (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xv] “1,000 Japanese firms looking for investment opportunities in Vietnam”, http://hanoitimes.vn/1000-japaneses-firms-looking-for-investment-opportunities-in-vietnam-313133.html (accessed 30 July 2020).
    [xvi] “Vietnam races ahead of China in economic growth: opportunities and challenges for Vietnam in the post-COVID- 19 period”, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/ChanakyaCode/vietnam-races-ahead-of-china-in-economic-growth-opportunities-and-challenges-for-vietnam-in-the-post-covid-19-period/ (accessed 30 July 2020).

     

    Image: Ho Chi Minh city and Saigon River – Credit: Adobe Stock

  • Trade during the Sangam Age: Exploring the Sangam literature and Keezhadi excavations

    Trade during the Sangam Age: Exploring the Sangam literature and Keezhadi excavations

    The sculpted marvels which bejewel the ancient temples all across Tamil Nadu stand testimony to the magnificence of Sangam age (3rd century BC to 3rd century AD) and the prolific artistic innovations which are characteristic of that period. But that’s not all there is to it. Matching the artistic and cultural fervour, trade activities were also at an all-time high during the Sangam age. Evidentiating this claim, the Sangam literature chronicles details of all the fine merchandise which were produced in Ancient Tamilakam. Building up on their strengths, the Tamils ventured into lands far and wide, establishing trading associations in foreign countries, some of which till date retain imprints of their existence. Coupled with manifest cultural similarities, archaeological and inscriptional evidence add on to the credibility of Sangam literature by making a strong case for the existence of an extensive trade between Tamilakam and the rest of the Old World.

    Sangam Literature: Valuable source of Information on Trade

    Pattinappalai, one of the poems (301 lines in ‘Vanji’ meter and Asiriyapa/Akaval meter) in Pattuppāṭṭu which is a corpus of ten poems, talks in great detail about Kaveripoompattinam, the capital city of the Early Cholas.

    Even though only half of what is claimed to have been created remains, the Sangam literature is too big a chunk to be thoroughly studied in a short time. There might still be parts of it that are waiting to be looked into. But of what has been discovered, the details pertinent to trade can predominantly be found in three major literary works, namely Pattuppāṭṭu, Silappatikaram and its sequel Manimekalai. Pattinappalai, one of the poems (301 lines in ‘Vanji’ meter and Asiriyapa/Akaval meter) in Pattuppāṭṭu which is a corpus of ten poems, talks in great detail about Kaveripoompattinam, the capital city of the Early Cholas. The port of Puhar / Kaveripoompattinam had ” an abundance of horses brought over the seas, sacks of black pepper brought overland in carts, gemstones and gold from the northern mountains, and sandalwood and eaglewood from the Western hills, pearls from the southern seas and coral from the eastern seas, grains from the regions of Ganga and Kaveri, food grains from Eelam (Sri Lanka) and products from Burma and other rare and great commodities.”

    A description of the port warehouses of Kaveripoompattinam in Pattuppattu is revealing of the flourishing trade – “Like the monsoon season when clouds absorb ocean waters and come down as rains on mountains, limitless goods for export come from inland and imported goods arrive in ships. Fierce, powerful tax collectors are at the warehouses collecting taxes and stamping the Chola tiger symbols on goods that are to be exported.”

    Silappatikaram and Manimekalai, on the other hand, talk about the cities of Madurai, Puhar and Kanchipuram, which served as major centres for cloth weaving, from whence fine quality fabrics were manufactured and exported through the Coromandel Coast. Silk, cotton and wool are some of the fabrics which are mentioned to have been exported from the coast. The epics also present a vivid description of the urban market scenes. The details paint the picture of a buzzing market where trade was carried out in a variety of supreme quality products, starting from agricultural products like black pepper, food grains, areca nuts, white sugar, eaglewood to luxury commodities like gold, pearls, gems, jewels, coral and silk, among other things. In fact, the urban markets are said to have had a separate street dedicated to food grains alone. So high was the demand for food grains that despite having close to eighteen indigenous varieties, grains also had to be imported from other countries in exchange for white salt. Likewise, the demand for aromatic products were too high to be met by home-gown eagle woods and sandalwoods, resulting in the import of the same from South East Asian countries, particularly from China and Indonesia.

    Tamilakam: Maritime Trade hub-centre between the East and the West

    Both literary and archaeological evidence have time and again reaffirmed one another; the merchants of Tamilakam had traded with the East and the West with equal flair. While there is a substantial amount foreign and native literature, and archaeological findings to assert the latter, there is relatively less evidence to support the former. And not only did Tamilakam engage in direct trade with the West, but because all products from Southeast Asia had to be sent through ports along the coast of South India, Tamilakam also acted as the hub-centre for the trade between the East and the West.

    Commodities from Tamilakam had a great demand in Rome. Black pepper, cardamom, pearls and gemstones, especially Beryl which was mined from sites in Kodumanal, Padiyur and Vaniyampadi, were highly sought after in Rome.

    With regard to the West, Tamil merchants have had a long-standing trade relationship with the Egyptians and the Romans. Beginning from the period when Alexandria was the centre of Mediterranean commerce, trade with the West extended well into the time when Rome assumed dominance and became the centre-stage of Mediterranean economy. Trade with Tamilakam was in fact a deciding factor in the question of dominance in sea trade. The Arabs held ground against the competing Romans by monopolizing the knowledge regarding direct sea route to India and information about the source markets in India. Nevertheless, eventually the Romans established direct trade links with India and Rome became the largest market ground for Indian products. Commodities from Tamilakam had a great demand in Rome. Black pepper, cardamom, pearls and gemstones, especially Beryl which was mined from sites in Kodumanal, Padiyur and Vaniyampadi, were highly sought after in Rome.

     

    Picture: Interpretation map from ‘The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea”.

    In the interpretations of a historical document called ‘The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, originally authored by a Greek Navigator in the 1st century, there is said to have been  mentions of a marketplace called Poduk’e in the historical text . G.W.B. Hunting Ford, a historian, has postulated that this place might have been Arikamedu, a location two miles away from modern day Pondicherry.  Hunting Ford also notes that Roman pottery have been excavated in Arikamedu and that these evidence point at the possibility that this region might have been a trading centre for Roman goods in the 1st century AD. Arikamedu, known as Poduk’e in the Greco-Roman world was a manufacturing hub of textiles particularly of Muslin clothes, fine terracotta objects, jewelleries from beads of precious and semi-precious stones, glass and gold. The city had an extensive glass bead manufacturing facilities and is considered as “mother of all bead centres” in the world. Most of their production were aimed for export.

    Picture: Arikamedu – credit: Wikipedia

    Arikamedu, known as Poduk’e in the Greco-Roman world was a manufacturing hub of textiles particularly of Muslin clothes, fine terracotta objects, jewelleries from beads of precious and semi-precious stones, glass and gold. The city had an extensive glass bead manufacturing facilities and is considered as “mother of all bead centres” in the world.

    Descriptions of Puhar, Korkai, Muziris and Arikamedu in Sangam literature indicate extensive presence of Yavanas’ (foreigners) settlements in port cities on account of trade. Pattinapalai describes the port activities and the Chola customs revenue system in detail.

    Keezhadi: Evidences of  Industrial and Trade Centre

     In addition to these, the Keezhadi excavation, conducted by the Archaeological Survey of India in 2016, has unearthed around 13000 antiquities like shells, glass beads, rusted old coins, weapons, pottery of various kinds and iron tools, belonging to the Sangam age. Among the fine quality red and black ware bowls excavated in the region, are the Roman roulette wares which evidentiate the existence of trade links between the Tamils and Romans. Moreover, seven furnaces were discovered at the site and these, according to the archaeologists, are an indication of the possibility that the site might have been a textile unit and settlers in the region might have been involved in industrial activities.

    Keezhadi findings places the Sangam age to an even earlier period starting from 6th century BC. As per Amarnath Ramakrishna, who led the first two phases of excavations, Keezhadi site was one among the 100 sites of possible human habitation shortlisted for excavation. Discovery of Tamil Brahmi inscriptions and graffiti that date back to earliest times as compared to any other findings in India. Quite obviously, Keezhadi points to the potential of a huge trading and manufacturing habitation and a distinct civilization – the Tamil Vaigai River Valley Civilisation. The Sangam literature is rich and a huge treasure trove of information that needs to be researched extensively.

     

    Picture: Australian seaboard, Statue of Garuda and Tamil Inscriptions, symbolising maritime culture – Credit: ancient-origins.net

    Maritime Trade in Tamilakam: A Core Activity

    Several artefacts with Tamil Brahmi inscriptions have been excavated in foreign countries as well. In Thailand, potsherd with Brahmi inscriptions were unearthed. Likewise, Cheena Kazhakam ( Chinese gold coins) were discovered in Srivijaya (modern day Sumatra in Indonesia) and Kadaram (modern day Kedah in Malaysia), places which were under the occupation of the Cholas.

    The aforementioned evidence when correlated with the inscriptional evidence, found in foreign lands about Tamil trading settlements, will help in the historical reconstruction of the maritime trade links of Ancient Tamilakam and will attest to the extensive nature of trade carried out by the Tamils during the Sangam age.

     

    References

     Mukund, Kanakalatha. The Trading World of the Tamil Merchant: Evolution of Merchant Capitalism in the Coromandel. Orient Blackswan, 1999. https://books.google.co.in/books?id=tjXdDYChdGsC&lpg=PP1&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false.

    Mukund, Kanakalatha. The World of the Tamil Merchants. Portfolio Books Limited, 2015. https://books.google.co.in/books?id=Bha2eLqMPWcC&lpg=PT6&ots=tw2qDuzDlf&dq=trade during sangam age kanakalatha mukund&pg=PT5#v=onepage&q=trade during sangam age kanakalatha mukund&f=false.

    “Roman Trade with India.” Roman Trade with India – New World Encyclopedia. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Roman_trade_with_India#cite_ref-31.

    Kannan, Gokul. “Keezhadi Excavation Points to Vaigai River Civilisation in Sangam Period.” Deccan Chronicle. October 1, 2016. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.deccanchronicle.com/amp/nation/in-other-news/011016/keezhadi-excavation-points-to-vaigai-river-civilisation-in-sangam-period.html.

    Annamalai, S. “Uncovered: Pandyas-Romans Trade Link.” The Hindu. May 16, 2017. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.thehindu.com/news/national/tamil-nadu/archaeological-excavation-in-sivaganga-uncovers-pandya-roman-trade-links/article10879282.ece/amp

    Saju, M.T. “Tamil Trade Ships That Sailed to Foreign Shores.” Times of India. March 29, 2018. Accessed June 24, 2020. https://www.google.com/amp/s/timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/tracking-indian-communities/tamil-trade-ships-that-sailed-to-foreign-shore

    Main Image: Keezhadi Excavation Site – Credit – ASI

  • The Catalysing Effect of Covid-19 on the Changing World Order

    The Catalysing Effect of Covid-19 on the Changing World Order

    Contrary to the realist belief, international states co-exist in a world order of hierarchy rather than anarchy. Ikenberry presents this hierarchical world order and the cyclical rise and fall of hegemonic powers. Early 20th century witnessed the shift from Pax-Britannica to Pax-Americana that was complete by 1945, from which point the US defended its position during the Cold War with the erstwhile USSR. It exercised its hegemonic influence even more aggressively after the Cold War. However, US dominance of the world order has been diminishing owing to the Trump administration’s isolationist approach to foreign policy, and the increasing influence of China in world politics. This article examines the catalysing effect of Covid-19 and the rise of China on the current World Order.

    Trump’s policy of disregarding multilateralism and imposing its unilateralism on the world has catalysed into an involuntary retreat, protectionism, and isolationism for the USA with dire consequences for its foreign policy effectiveness.

    Trump’s policy of disregarding multilateralism and imposing its unilateralism on the world has catalysed into an involuntary retreat, protectionism, and isolationism for the USA with dire consequences for its foreign policy effectiveness. The net result is that the world is witnessing an abdication of leadership by America in a world disrupted by the Covid-19 pandemic. A clear pattern of isolationism can be seen in various actions of the Trump Administration since it’s assumption of the Office. In 2017, the US withdrew from the Paris Agreement, in 2018 it unilaterally reneged from the JCPOA, re-imposed sanctions on Iran and threatened sanctions on allies who supported Iran. In 2019, it withdrew troops from Syria, which led to subsequent Turkish incursion on Rojava Kurds, and in early 2020 it negotiated with the Taliban to enable withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. With the onset of Covid19 global pandemic, the Trump administration has accused the WHO of protecting China. In a unilateral action not endorsed by its allies, USA first stopped its funding for WHO and then terminated its relationship with the UN institution. This comes as a blow to multilateralism since the US was WHO’s largest donor, contributing about $440 million yearly. In addition to this, the US has failed to provide the lead in the global response to tackle the virus despite its initiatives in the past pandemics such as H1N1, Ebola and the Zika virus. The US was absent from the WHO initiative – Global Coronavirus Response Summit (before its withdrawal from the association). In addition, the US has been unable to provide external aid to combat the virus due to domestic shortages, which explains its restraint to guide an international response in the absence of a coherent domestic plan of action. Thus, the coronavirus pandemic has acted as a catalyst in increasing the pace of US isolationism from world politics.

    China has turned the tide on its previous missteps in containing the virus by publicising its governance model as the most effective way to combat the pandemic.

    Meanwhile, the pandemic has established firmly China’s rise in the international stage. Though China is facing backlash for suppressing details about the virus, it is battling to overcome this criticism by providing international aid and stepping up to lead a global response using Beijing’s success as a template to overcome the novel virus. China has contributed significantly to the global response by providing materials such as ventilators, respirators, masks, protective suits and test kits to Italy, Iran, Serbia, and the whole of Africa. Grabbing its opportunities to lead international responses, China hosted Euro-Asia conference, participated in the Global Coronavirus Summit where it pledged an emergency funding of $20 million to WHO, and pledged $ 2 billion to the WHO (equalling its annual budget) to be disbursed over the next two years, thus contrasting sharply with the US behaviour of withdrawing from the WHO. China has turned the tide on its previous missteps in containing the virus by publicising its governance model as the most effective way to combat the pandemic. It continues to highlight the inadequacies and shortfalls in healthcare systems of the western world as against the success of its governance model, Beijing Consensus, and variations of it in East Asia. It is clear that China has seized the Covid-19 pandemic as a huge opportunity to establish its global leadership.

    Taking advantage of the global disarray due to the pandemic, China has taken strong actions to deflect global criticism of its initial handling of the virus. Two prominent examples of this being, European Union watering down the report on Covid19 disinformation owing to pressure from Beijing, and the passing of the controversial Hong Kong security law. While the US has taken initiative in cracking down on China by repealing the special privileges to Hong Kong, other countries were cautious in retaliating against China significantly and limited their actions to sympathetic support for pro-democracy protestors. The exception to this was Britain, which offered UK citizenship to British National Overseas Passport holders in Hong Kong, despite seriously offending China. Despite the global backlash against Chinese diplomacy in the form of generous aids, international actors have expressed limited concerns through action against Chinese domination. This is due to the circumstantial mismatch in global balancing against China’s rise. The US uses unilateral actions and ‘expects’ its allies to follow, while its allies despite their serious concern over China’s rise, remain vary of following in the American footsteps. This is because US allies treat coronavirus as an immediate threat as opposed to China’s rise. The US being a status quo power is more threatened by China’s rise since it posits as a revisionist state. However, in view of China’s proactive efforts in leading global contributions to battle the coronavirus, US allies remain tolerant of China’s dominance.

    The passive and fractured response to China’s aggressive exploitation of the pandemic to establish its global leadership is a concern for India. The recent setting up of Chinese military camps in Indian controlled territory of Ladakh is a manifestation of China’s complex strategy. India has, true to its traditional policy, opted out of involving the United Statesin the ‘bilateral issue. However, it would be beneficial to be united in balancing against China’s rise. While it is necessary to work together to utilise Global Supply Chains (GSC) during the pandemic to battle the coronavirus pandemic, it is equally important to look at global balancing against China to ensure its compliance to rules-based world order. Since China’s power is derived from its economic strength, balancing strategy against China should focus on trade and economy. Chinese foreign policy depicts a pattern of economic coercion to reward or punish its counterparts. This can be tackled through concerted global action. India is, as one of the largest producer of pharmaceuticals, playing a crucial role in global efforts to fight the pandemic by providing Hydroxychloroquine globally. However, given that most raw materials are sourced from China, balancing against China requires a favourable movement of GSC diversification. US-China trade war has, encouraged companies to move production out of China and into Asian countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan. As a result of the coronavirus crisis and the global backlash, companies look to further diversify their resources and supply chains. India and other Asian countries could benefit from this if they adapt their policies suitably.

    Global backlash against China’s handling of the virus in Wuhan is still a challenge for China’s geopolitical strategy. Its foreign policy is seen more as displaying aggressive and coercive approach than persuasive diplomacy.

    It is difficult to estimate whether China would aspire for hegemonic leadership. Global backlash against China’s handling of the virus in Wuhan is still a challenge for China’s geopolitical strategy. Its foreign policy is seen more as displaying aggressive and coercive approach than persuasive diplomacy. Given the current volatile scenario most countries have, in the absence of US leadership, increased their dependence on China as it is now the largest provider of aid. While all this tips the scale in China’s favour, it’s hegemonic ambitions can be countered through trade strategies as its weakness stems from the fact that it is a hugely export driven economy. Global diversification of supply chains would reduce the world’s increasing dependency on Chinese manufacture and products. The world will need to be cautious as the pandemic has provided China an opportunity to tighten its grip on the global economy as the world’s workshop and technology provider. Here on, international efforts to bandwagon or balance will become a decisive factor in determining China’s rise to apex position in the world order.

     

  • Freedom of Speech and Right to Information amidst the Covid-19 Pandemic

    Freedom of Speech and Right to Information amidst the Covid-19 Pandemic

    The global pandemic hit India in March 2020 and Prime Minister Modi announced a 21 day lockdown beginning on 25th March 2020. Since then the lockdown has been extended multiple times as the country grapples with a major public health crisis. Media houses have been on their feet, both literally and metaphorically, as they cover new stories, cases and most importantly, the state response towards the pandemic. The citizenry relies on news reportage to learn more about their government’s approach towards handling this unconventional situation. Media is often regarded as the fourth pillar of democracy meaning it is a supporting figure for democracy to persist and flourish. The pandemic has exposed some paramount inadequacies in the government’s handling of the situation such as lack of a robust public health infrastructure and other issues. The reportage on such instances has often faced backlash from the government resulting in legal notices against the journalists and media houses. India also dropped two places in the World Press Freedom Index making it 142nd in position citing the curfew in Jammu and Kashmir. The watchdog has also issued a warning about the implications of the pandemic, “the looming health crisis could serve as an excuse for governments to take advantage of the fact that politics are on hold, the public is stunned and protests are out of the question, in order to impose measures that would be impossible in normal times” (Scroll Staff, 2020).

    Media is often regarded as the fourth pillar of democracy meaning it is a supporting figure for democracy to persist and flourish.

     Two patterns can be observed with regards to media freedom in India during a time like this; furthering a certain narrative through misinformation and misrepresentation and carrying out state-sponsored propaganda. In this lockdown, the state wants a narrative which eulogizes their efforts during the lockdown and overall handling the situation. However, there are major loopholes in the measures taken by the government which has led to the system failing its most vulnerable class of individuals; the marginalized and the poor. The state has also taken this time to strike upon certain civil liberties and advance their propaganda by curbing dissent.

     Misinformation and misrepresentation of certain communities has been rampant during this time. Nabeela Khan, in an article called Trends in Covid19 misinformation in India for Health Analytics Asia categorizes the spread of misinformation in four waves. First, misinformation about the origin of the virus, this has been debated not just in India but worldwide where they have accused China of producing this virus in a lab and spreading it to use to its advantage. There have also been multiple other theories available online related to consumption of certain meats in China. Second circulation of old images and videos to create fear, in this case the Tablighi Jamaat incident was highlighted immensely and videos from before the pandemic were used to show that ‘Muslims’ in India spread the virus. Third, on ‘cures’ and prevention techniques which is particularly famous on several WhatsApp groups where home-made remedies of lemon, honey, turmeric or any other ‘Ayurvedic’ cures are posted every day. And fourth, on lockdowns in India, where the news of lockdown being extended were spread even before the official announcements were made. Increasingly, there has been excess confusion over the surging numbers in India and whether or not governments give out the exact figures. Additionally, there is no clarity about government aid and funding towards the poor such as the internal migrants in the country.

    Kaye makes an important point as he says that the governments are using the pandemic as a smokescreen to carry forward their agenda and take actions that they have wanted to take for a long time.

    The UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye, talks to The Lawfare Podcast about his latest UN report Disease, pandemics and the freedom of opinion and expression. Kaye makes an important point as he says that the governments are using the pandemic as a smokescreen to carry forward their agenda and take actions that they have wanted to take for a long time. He gives an example from Hungary where the Press is under strict scrutiny of the government. Since the coronavirus is a recent occurrence, there is not a very large body of information available on it. The information keeps changing as cases increase or decrease, as there are multiple waves of it so the orders issued by the government are subject to change. He also particularly criticizes India for its treatment of Jammu and Kashmir since August 2019 and calls it “a real misuse of the situation”.

     Journalists and activists across the world have been arrested during this lockdown and India is no exception to this trend of suppressing free speech. Siddharth Varadarajan, Gautam Navlakha, Anand Teltumbde, Safoora Zargar, Umar Khalid, Dhaval Patel, Supriya Sharma among many others have either been arrested or served notice by the government during the lockdown. These journalists have either been arrested on the grounds of their reportage of the pandemic, during the pandemic or incidents that took place before the pandemic.

     An FIR was lodged against Siddharth Varadarajan, one of the founding editors of The Wire, an acclaimed media house, on the grounds of making unverifiable claims. Varadarajan tweeted on March 31st saying that UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath had given a go-ahead for the Ram Navami festival to be held from March 25th to April 2nd, in the middle of the lockdown and Yogi also said that “Lord Rama would protect the devotees from coronavirus”. As a matter of fact, it was Acharya Paramhans who gave out this statement and not CM Adityanath and Varadarajan tweeted a clarification the following day. On April 10, police from Ayodhya showed up at his doorstep in Delhi to serve him notice and his wife Nandini Sundar explained this instance elaborately in her tweets. However, this act only suggests the government’s misuse of power and tactics to pursue a culture of intimidation. It could be argued that the journalist was peddling unverified claims but CM Adityanath in fact supported the decision to have a Ram Navami mela. The Wire has published an elaborate FAQs list on this matter explaining every detail of it. It has also been condemned by the Editors’ Guild of India who have called this episode “an overreaction and an act of intimidation”.

     Journalists and activists such as Gautam Navlakha, Anand Teltumbde, Safoora Zargar, Umar Khalid, Sharjeel Imam etc. have been booked under the UAPA, Unlawful Activities Prevention Act. This Act was formulated as a law in 1967 to prevent any ‘unlawful’ activities or any measures which threatened the integrity and sovereignty of India. In 2004, the UPA government expanded on it further to target terrorist outfits or any organizations harming the state but not individuals. The 2019 Amendment of the Act has entrusted the government with identifying individuals who might be harming the integrity of the state, the definition of which the government decides. The contemporary term used for such people on social media and other platforms is ‘urban naxals’. Student activists and journalists have been booked under this act for protesting against oppressive government laws which promotes a narrative that dissent is by its very nature, ‘anti national’. There have also been cases where activists have been arrested, then granted bail and arrested again based on some other complaint. Safoora Zargar’s case is a particularly complex one in this regard where she was arrested after she was granted bail and was granted bail again recently on humanitarian grounds. Zargar is five months pregnant which was the basis of her bail but the discourse around this has been to release her not because of her pregnancy because dissent is a fundamental right.

    The moment we no longer have a free press, anything can happen. What makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; how can you have an opinion if you are not informed? If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer. This is because lies, by their very nature, have to be changed, and a lying government has constantly to rewrite its own history – Hannah Arendt

     Praveen Swami makes a compelling argument in a FirstPost article about hate speech and freedom of speech. He opines that the response to hate speech is not censorship but plurality where opinions are allowed to coexist. In India, a large part of the Press is controlled and supported by the government leading them to produce streamlined biased news. According to him, alternatives need to come up for hate speech where the dominant narrative does not remain unchallenged.

     To conclude, Hannah Arendt’s cautioning words on freedom of press and misinformation are very relevant today and sounds the alarm bells:

    “The moment we no longer have a free press, anything can happen. What makes it possible for a totalitarian or any other dictatorship to rule is that people are not informed; how can you have an opinion if you are not informed? If everybody always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies, but rather that nobody believes anything any longer. This is because lies, by their very nature, have to be changed, and a lying government has constantly to rewrite its own history”

     

    Reference

    Bakshi, Asmita (2020, May 31) From Pinjra Tod to Kashmiri Journalists: What’s the Deal with UAPA?. Livemint. Retrieved from https://www.livemint.com/mint-lounge/features/from-pinjra-tod-to-kashmiri-journalists-what-s-the-deal-with-uapa-11590915249625.html

     

    Chakma, Suhas (2020, June 22) FIR Against Supriya Sharma is Emblematic of how the Law is Abused to Throttle Press Freedom. The Wire. Retrieved from https://thewire.in/media/supriya-sharma-fir-abuse-law-press-freedom

     

    Goldsmith, J (Host) (2016, May 16). The Lawfare Podcast: David Kaye on Free Speech During a Pandemic. (Audio podcast episode). In Lawfare. Retrieved from https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-david-kaye-free-speech-during-pandemic

     Khan, Nabeela (2020, June 12) Trends in Covid19 misinformation in India. Health Asia Analytics. Retrieved from https://www.ha-asia.com/trends-in-covid-19-misinformation-in-india/

     Scroll Staff (2020, April 21) Covid-19: India drops 2 places on World Press Freedom Index, as watchdog warns of pandemic impact. Scroll.in. Retrieved from https://scroll.in/latest/959816/covid-19-india-drops-2-places-on-world-press-freedom-index-as-watchdog-warns-of-pandemics-impact

     Scroll Staff (2017, December 4) Top ten things that Hannah Arendt said that are eerily relevant in today’s times. Scroll.in. Retrieved from https://scroll.in/article/856549/ten-things-hannah-arendt-said-that-are-eerily-relevant-in-todays-political-times

     Swami, Praveen (2020, April 27) Hate speech in the time of a pandemic: Answer to malevolent incendiary language is plurality, not censorship. Firstpost. Retrieved from https://www.firstpost.com/india/hate-speech-in-the-time-of-a-pandemic-answer-to-malevolent-incendiary-language-is-plurality-not-censorship-8295271.html

     The Wire Analysis (2020, April 19) FAQ: What are the UP Police FIRs Against The Wire Actually about? The Wire. Retrieved from https://thewire.in/media/faq-up-police-fir-siddharth-varadarajan

     

    The views expressed are the author’s own.

    Image Credit: Rhy Design and medium.com

     

  • India-China Border Stand-Off

    India-China Border Stand-Off

    On the 5th and 6th May 2020, Chinese incursions were reported at a very large frontage along the Line of Actual Control (LAC); starting from Naku La in north Sikkim, in Finger area of Pangong Tso, in Galwan Valley, Hot springs and Gogra heights located north-east of Galwan Valley. These incursions were a little different from all previous border standoffs. This time the Chinese incursion has been at multiple places and also, they had come prepared with weapons, vehicles and tents. They had come in large numbers with an intent to dig in.
    The issue came to light when scuffles were reported by the media on 10 May that some Chinese had intruded into the Muguthang Valley at Naku La and asked Indians to vacate the area as they claimed that it was their land. A scuffle ensued . According to PTI, the incident involved 150 soldiers. During the incident, the two sides threw stones at each other.

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