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  • India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    The satellite picture below brilliantly depicts the geographical separation of Arunachal Pradesh (called Lower Tibet by the Chinese) and Tibet. The McMahon Line more or less runs along the crest line of the Himalayas.

    The Chinese have never been quite explicit on how much of Arunachal they seek.  I once saw an official map displayed in a travel agents office in Lhasa that showed only the Tawang tract as Chinese territory. In other maps they have their border running along the foothills, which means all of Arunachal.

    The Chinese have based their specific claim on the territory on the premise that Tawang was administered from Lhasa, and the contiguous areas owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. Then the Chinese must also consider this. Sikkim till into the 19th century a vassal of Tibet and Darjeeling was forcibly taken from it by the British! By extending this logic could they realistically stake a claim for Sikkim and Darjeeling? Of course not. It would be preposterous. History has moved on. The times have changed. For the 21st century to be stable 20th century borders must be stable, whatever be our yearnings.

    At the crux of this issue is the larger question of the national identities of the two nations and when and how they evolved. The Imperial India of the Mughals spanned from Afghanistan to Bengal but did not go very much below the Godavari in the South. The Imperial India of the British incorporated all of today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but had no Afghanistan, not for want of trying. It was the British who for the first time brought Assam into India in 1826 when they defeated Burma and formalized the annexation with the treaty of Yandabo.

    It was only in 1886 that the British first forayed out of the Brahmaputra valley when they sent out a punitive expedition into the Lohit valley in pursuit of marauding tribesmen who began raiding the new tea gardens. Apparently the area was neither under Chinese or Tibetan control for there were no protests either from the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Soon the British stayed put.

    Tibet remained in self imposed isolation and the race to be first into Lhasa became the greatest challenge for explorers and adventurers in the second half of the 19th century. Not the least among these were the spies of the Survey of India, the legendary pundits. The most renowned of these was the Sarat Chandra Das whose books on Tibet are still avidly read today. As the adventurers, often military officers masquerading as explorers began visiting Tibet the British in India began worrying. Reports that the most well-known of Czarist Russia’s military explorers, Col. Grombchevsky was sighted in Tibet had Lord Curzon, the Governor General of India most worried.

    In 1903 Curzon decided to send a military expedition into Tibet led by Grombchevsky’s old antagonist, Col. Francis Younghusband. A brigade strong mixed force of Gurkhas and Tommies went over the Nathu La into the Chumbi valley and advanced unhindered till Shigatse. A Tibetan military force met them there but offered what can only be described as passive resistance. Not a shot was fired back as the British Indian troops rained bullets on them. It was a forerunner to Jallianwalla Bagh. From Shigatse Younghusband made a leisurely march into Lhasa. The British got the Tibetans to agree to end their isolation and having extracted trade concessions withdrew in 1904, the way they came.

    In 1907 Britain and Russia formally agreed that it was in their interests to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart.” It may be of interest to the reader to know that the Great Game nevertheless continued. In 1907 Col. Mannerheim then of the Russian Army, later Field Marshal Mannerheim and first President of Finland, led a horseback expedition from Kyrgyzstan to Harbin on China’s northeast to identify a route for the cavalry.

    The next important year was 1913 when the Tibetans declared independence after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a Republic in China under Sun Yat Sen. They attacked and drove the Chinese garrisons in Tibet into India over the Nathu La. Also in 1913 the British convened the Simla Conference to demarcate the India-Tibet border. The British proposed the 1914 McMahon Line, as we know it. The Tibetans accepted it. The Chinese Amban however initialed the agreement under protest. But his protest seemed mostly about the British negotiating directly with Tibet as a sovereign state and not over the McMahon Line as such.

    Things moved on then. In 1935 at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe ICS, then Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, the McMahon Line was notified. In 1944 JP Mills ICS established British Indian administration in NEFA, but excluding Tawang which continued to be administered by the Lhasa appointed head lama at Tawang despite the fact that it lay well below the McMahon Line. This was largely because Henry Twynam, the Governor of Assam lost his nerve and did not want to provoke the Tibetans. In 1947 the Dalai Lama (the same gentleman who is now in Dharamshala) sent the newly independent India a note laying claim to some districts in NEFA/Arunachal.

    On October 7, 1950 the Chinese attacked the Tibetans at seven places on their frontier and made known their intention of reasserting control over all of Tibet. As if in response on February 16, 1951 Major Relangnao ‘Bob’ Khating IFAS raised the India tricolor in Tawang and took over the administration of the tract. The point of this narration is to bring home the fact that India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh doesn’t rest on any great historical tradition or cultural affinity. We are there because the British went there. But then the Chinese have no basis whatsoever to stake a claim, besides a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China among some of the hangers-on in the Qing emperor’s court. The important thing now is that we have been there for over a hundred years and that settles the issue.

    Arunachal Pradesh has a very interesting population mix. Only less than 10% of its population is Tibetan. Indo-Mongoloid tribes account for 68% of the population. The rest are migrants from Nagaland and Assam. As far as religious affinities go Hindus are the biggest group with 37%, followed by 36% animists, 13% Buddhists. Recent census figures suggest a spurt in Christianity, possibly induced by pocketbook proselytizing. In all there are 21 major tribal groups and over 100 ethnically distinct sub-groupings, speaking over 50 distinct languages and dialects. The population of about a million is spread out over 17 towns and 3649 villages. With the exception of a few villages of Monpas who live north of the McMahon Line, it is an ethnically compact and contiguous area.

    In fact in future boundary negotiations India could make a case for inclusion of the few Monpa villages left behind north of the McMahon Line? Many knowledgeable observers suggest that the area south of the Huangpo/Brahmaputra from the Pemako gorge till it enters the Subansiri division of Arunachal would be a logical boundary as the raging and hence un-fordable and unbridgeable river ensures hardly any Chinese administrative presence in the area.

    It is true that historically India never had a direct border with Tibet till the British took Kumaon and Garhwal from Nepal in 1846 and extended its domain over Arunachal in 1886. On the other hand the formidable Himalayas were always culturally a part of India and formed a natural barrier against ingress from the north, whether Tibetan or Chinese. But times have moved and technology and mankind’s great engineering powers now make it possible for even the most hostile terrain to be subjugated. The Himalayas are no longer the barrier they once were. As China and India emerge as the world’s great economies and powers can India possibly allow China a strategic trans-Himalayan space just a few miles from the plains?

    The view from the Chinese side about what exactly constitutes China is no less confused. Apparently like the British, the Manchu’s who ruled China from the 17th to the early 20th century had a policy of staking claim to the lands that lay ahead of their frontiers in order to provide themselves with military buffers. In a recent article in the China Review magazine, Professor Ge Jianxiong, Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai writes: “to claim that Tibet has always been a part of China since the Tang dynasty; the fact that the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim.” Ge also notes that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China was established the idea of China was not clearly conceptualized. Even during the late Qing period (Manchu) the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Qing Empire. At other times it would be taken to refer to only the eighteen interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.

    Professor Ge further adds that the notions of “Greater China” were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the courts self-aggrandizement.” Ge criticizes those who feel that the more they exaggerate the territory of historical China the more “patriotic” they are. In this context I would like to recall a recent conversation I had with the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi. Ambassador Sun said that while he was soundly castigated in India for his unintended comment, he gained a major constituency in China. The mandarins in the Beijing would do well to take heed to Ge Jianxiong’s advice: “If China really wishes to rise peacefully and be on solid footing in the future, we must understand the sum of our history and learn from our experiences.” The same holds true for the babus in South Block and ‘the having writ move on’ media pundits. If we don’t then we know who will be laughing!

     

    Image Credit: Tawang Monastery

  • History – Thailand’s Golden Buddha

    History – Thailand’s Golden Buddha

    In the month of May 2007 I was invited to speak at the Mahidol University of Bangkok during the SSEASR Conference. I gave a talk on Yogachara Buddhism there. During this occasion, I had the opportunity to visit various Buddhist temples at Bangkok. They include the magnificent ones like Emerald Buddha, Golden Buddha, Buddha in his Maha nirvana time etc. It is very interesting to note that in the Sanctum Sanctorum of all Buddha temples, while the right side wall is covered with pictures depicting instances in Buddha’s life, the left side has paintings exclusively from Ramayana. For a Thai devotee, Hinduism is as important as Mahayana Buddhism.

    During the visit of one of the temple, I learnt this great truth about ignorance obscuring Reality.

    One of these famous temples has a Buddha icon nearly 17 feet tall, which is known till the beginning of 20th century as “Terracotta Buddha temple” . The temple was established in the 13th century with its huge icon of Buddha, for several centuries it was worshipped by the devotees as “Terracotta Buddha”. One day the authorities decided to shift the Terracotta Buddha image to a place several kilometers away, probably to do some repairs to the temple. They put the Terracotta Buddha on a truck and were moving it. When they were half way through, a heavy downpour started. The rain was so heavy that the clay image of Buddha started dissolving. They tried to protect the image with tarpaulins and umbrellas, but to no effect. There was a very heavy wind which blew away the tarpaulins and umbrellas. Due to the heavy rain, the Buddha icon in clay was dissolving fast. The devotees were grief-stricken. They were wondering whether it would have been wiser to have left the temple un-repaired rather than allowing the centuries old terracotta Buddha icon to get dissolved in the heavy downpour.

     

    Presto! A wonderful thing was happening. As the clay was dissolving, from within the clay was emerging a golden Buddha idol! as the idol there was of clay. After a short while all the clay, which was covering the idol got completely dissolved. The people were witnessing the presence of a resplendent “Golden Buddha” appearing before them in all its grandeur.

    What really happened? It was really a golden Buddha at the time of its installation in the 13th century. After some time Thailand was experiencing foreign invasions. Fearing that the invaders would take away the golden image, which was 5.5 tons of solid gold, the devotees covered the image with clay. Thinking that it was only a Terracotta Buddha, the invaders left it untouched. That generation knowing that it was a golden Buddha inside the clay, worshipped Buddha in that form. As many years passed by, the subsequent generations were not aware of this fact. They truly believed in what they saw externally and worshipped it as a Terracotta Buddha only. Thus their minds were conditioned by externalities. Once the clay dissolved what is truly inside came out with all its effulgence. It is today worshipped as the golden Buddha in Bangkok.

    It is happening to all of us everyday, we assume ourselves to be only a body-mind-intellect complex and nothing beyond it. We are conditioned by our awareness of our body, our thinking process and our analysis of the phenomena. These are only externalities within each one of us. It is only a clay that surrounds the wonderful Immanence within us. Within each one of us is the golden Buddha, the great immanent Lord who is also transcendent, he is the great Shiva, who is constantly performing his cosmic dance. In our hearts we not aware of it as our minds are conditioned by what we see, do and think. It is like the Thais seeing only the clay image and concluding it as only terracotta Buddha. As the rain dissolved the clay, the golden icon which is the true-one inside is revealed. Likewise when the spiritual sadhaha and devotion dissolves our mental conditioning, the Lord within ourselves is also revealed. This is the lesson we learn from the Golden Buddha temple.

    The same idea is beautifully explained in Thirumoolar’s Thirumantiram. A sculptor has carved out a beautiful elephant from a block of wood. When you see it as an elephant, you do not see the underlying reality of the wood. When you will be able to see the substratum, the underlying reality of the wood, with which all the objects of carving are made, you do not see the carved elephant; you see the substratum of the wood. Likewise, the ignorance enveloping our minds obscure the ultimate reality within us, when we are graded by the body-mind-intellect complex. When the revelation comes to us through god’s grace and gurus’ teachings coupled with our devotion to Him, the conditioning disappears. The phenomena abide in the ultimate. We experience the Divinity within us.

    Even in the area of management, the story of Golden Buddha has a great relevance. A competent Manager, with a penetrating mind, should be able to see what is the reality hidden in the numerous external information. The external covering only obscures the truth, which you will be able to get through. Once you see the substratum, the ultimate truth is revealed.

     

    Image Credit: Wikimedia Commons

  • (Part-II) Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination

    (Part-II) Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination

    I.   Reassessing Vulnerabilities During a Pandemic

    A general problem across all conventional models is their failure to understand that vulnerabilities during a pandemic are created and compounded by socio-economic factors too. Therefore, there is a need to adopt approaches that holistically assess the correlation between socioeconomic factors and vulnerability during a pandemic.[1]

    The Syndemics Approach

    Under this approach, pandemics are understood as an interaction of that disease with other diseases and the socio-economic and political factors that increase the risk of vulnerability.[2] All these factors synergistically interact to impact the health of individuals and society. Through these risk factors, it identifies the overlapping health and socio-economic problems that increase vulnerability (‘syndemic vulnerabilities’). The socio-economic risk factors are influenced by social determinants of health, i.e., the conditions of housing, food, employment, healthcare, and education.[3] Therefore, the utility of this approach lies in its holistic conception of socio-economic factors that impact the formation, clustering, and progression of diseases.[4] Using this approach, I argue that the COVID-19 pandemic has synergistically interacted and exacerbated the existing diseases and socio-economic conditions of marginalized groups across countries.

    Higher Risks of Infection, Transmission, and Mortality: Typically, due to historic discrimination and denial, marginalized communities have a greater number of pre-existing diseases like diabetes and asthma,[5] which in turn elevates their risk of infection and mortality. Moreover, there is unequal access to healthcare among marginalized communities due to the high costs of medical care and the absence of health insurance.[6] Marginalized communities are also disproportionately poor,[7] which affects their ability to mitigate the impact of the pandemic.

    Typically, marginalized communities are housed in crowded neighbourhoods with smaller houses that lack outside space.[8] They also have higher population densities, especially in urban areas, and lower access to communal green space.[9]Due to historic discrimination, marginalized communities are over-represented in essential services, including low-wage healthcare sectors and sanitation jobs.[10] This reduces their ability to work from home, and thus increases their risk of infection and transmission. Marginalized communities are more likely to take public transportation,[11] which further increases their risk of infection and transmission.

    These syndemic vulnerabilities have increased the risk of mortality among these marginalized communities. For instance, in America, the mortality rate of African-Americans and Indigenous/Latino communities is 3.4 times and 3.3 times higher than a non-Hispanic White person.[12] Evidence from past epidemics/pandemics shows that the rates of infection and mortality are always disproportionately higher among marginalized communities.[13]

    Greater Socio-Economic Disruption: Due to a lack of quality education, members of marginalized communities tend to work in lower-wage jobs in the informal sector, which has been worst hit by the pandemic.[14] The percentage fall in employment for marginalized communities has been far greater, indicating that education was a protective factor in the first wave of job losses.[15] Consequently, there has also been greater housing evictions among these communities.[16]The access to quality education for children in marginalized communities has also been severely impacted because they lack access to the internet,[17] affecting their ability to access education. Moreover, low literacy among adults in marginalized communities indicates their inability to assist their children with any form of home learning.[18]

    Therefore, the increased syndemic vulnerabilities of marginalized communities and the consequent disproportionate socio-economic disruptions of the pandemic on them necessitate a greater strive for their inclusion in distributing the vaccine. Early access to such vaccines allows these groups the opportunity to proportionately mitigate these vulnerabilities and disruptions.

    Intersectionality

    Presently, vulnerabilities among individuals are dominantly viewed from a single-axis framework. This ignores the multiple layers and experiences of vulnerability, resulting from an interplay of power structures and different social identities, held by one individual. This ignorance is avoided when using intersectionality, which is an analytical framework that explains how different social, economic, and political identities overlap to create different modes of discrimination and privilege.[19] Thus, it explains how certain individuals in the population are relatively more disadvantaged than others.[20] Intersectionality not only provides a multi-layered understanding of vulnerabilities during a pandemic but also helps prioritize distribution within an identified category, given the scarcity of vaccines.

     

    II.   Proposing a Multi-Value Ethical Framework

    Given its rational criteria, incorporating utilitarianism’s clinical risk factors is quite valuable. However, as argued, vulnerability during a pandemic is also determined by socioeconomic risk factors. Therefore, there is a need to adopt a multi-value approach that incorporates both clinical and socio-economic risk factors. I propose to do so by simultaneously prioritizing the values of ‘collective wellbeing’ and ‘justice’.

    Borrowed from utilitarianism is the value of ‘collective wellbeing’, which aims at maximizing benefits and minimizing harms. Flowing from a syndemic conception of COVID-19 is the value of ‘justice’, which aims at reducing health inequities and treats like people alike. These values are not necessarily always distinct, but their overlap over one parameter indicates a stronger justification. They can be operationalized using an ‘intersectional multi-parameter weighted framework’.

    Operationalizing Values

    The framework is constructed through three layers: (1) for each risk parameter, there is (2) a value-based justification, along with (3) its extent of weightage. The risk parameters are viewed from an intersectional power axis, with value justifications sourced from clinical and syndemic vulnerabilities. The weightage typically connotes a three-point scale, where 3 indicates the highest priority, and 1 indicates the lowest. The priority order is based on the greatness of one’s total score. The lottery method should only be used as a tie-breaker when the score is the same, and no more doses are presently available.

    Age:    Older people are at a significantly higher risk of infection and severe morbidity or mortality due to physiological changes associated with ageing. Globally, more than 95% of COVID-19 deaths were among individuals aged 60 and above. Even among older people, more than half of all deaths occurred in people aged 80 and above.[21]

    Therefore, in descending order, weightage must be given to individuals above 80 years, individuals between 60-80 years, and individuals between 40-59 years.

    Comorbidities:          Depending on the country, between 48-75% of COVD-19 deaths are associated with existing comorbidities. Those with comorbidities are also at moderately higher risk of infection.[22]

    The prioritization has to be categorized based on the severity of the comorbidity, in contracting the infection and causing death. Therefore, in descending order, higher weightage must be given to severe comorbidities, moderate comorbidities, and mild comorbidities. The severity in infection and mortality is different for countries due to distinct socio-economic realities and evolutionary biology. Therefore, this identification and classification need to be uniquely undertaken. However, as a general rule, it is almost universal for HIV, cancer, and most cardiovascular diseases to be severe comorbidities.[23]

    Profession:     Prioritizing frontline healthcare, sanitation, and defence workers are justified because they engage in services, whose absence has the greatest negative societal impact- whether on health, safety/security, or economy. They are also in constant contact with areas and people having the greatest risk of infection. Therefore, protecting them has a multiplier effect, in that their ability to remain uninfected protects the health of others and minimizes societal and economic disruption. Since the state obligates these workers to work in risk conditions, while everyone else is working from home, it is further obligated to protect them.

    Therefore, in descending order, priority must be given to frontline workers, workers in other essential sectors, and workers in non-essential sectors.

    Income:          One’s economic status affects their ability to access healthcare, thus results in higher rates of mortality and severe morbidity.[24] The syndemic approach reveals that poverty compounds one’s syndemic vulnerability.

    Therefore, in descending order, priority must be given to individuals with low-income, middle-income, and high-income.

    Ethnic Identity:         The syndemic approach reveals that marginalized communities are at a greater risk of infection, transmission, and mortality. They are also worst affected by the pandemic, which further compounds their vulnerability. Given these vulnerabilities, prioritized vaccine access to marginalized communities also helps reduce all three risks among the general population.

    The prioritization criteria would depend on the marginalized communities within a country and the extent of their syndemic vulnerabilities. For instance, in America, the syndemic vulnerabilities are greatest for African-Americans, followed by the Indigenous/Latinos communities, and then Pacific Islanders.

    Conclusion

    The conventional models of vaccine distribution are unethical towards disadvantaged groups. While neoliberalism completely ignores the distributive function of law, utilitarianism, lottery, and FCFS at least acknowledge this. However, their criterion of distribution ignores socio-economic vulnerabilities. This ignorance can be addressed using a syndemics approach and intersectionality.

    The syndemics approach explains the socio-economic risk factors that disproportionately disadvantage marginalized communities, both medically and socio-economically. Intersectionality provides a layered understanding of how vulnerabilities affect people, even those in the same group, differently. Using these approaches, I propose a multi-value ethical framework that balances the pragmatic considerations of medical utilitarianism with greater social inclusion. It operationalizes the values of these ethical systems through the priority order generated under an ‘intersectional multi-parameter weighted framework’.

     

    Notes:

    [1] While each country has different marginalized groups, the patterns of vulnerability explored are similar. Thus, marginalized groups have been generally analyzed hereinafter.

    [2] Merrill Singer, Nicola Bulled, et al, ‘Syndemics and the biosocial conception of health’ (2017) 389 Lancet 941, 941-943.

    [3] Clare Bambra, Ryan Riordan, et al, ‘The COVID-19 pandemic and health inequalities’ (2020) 1 J Epidemiol Community Health 964, 965.

    [4] Singer (n 23) 948.

    [5] Harleen Kaur, ‘Indirect racial discrimination in COVID-19 ethical guidance’ (BMJ Blog, 27 August 2020) <https://blogs.bmj.com/covid-19/2020/08/27/indirect-racial-discrimination-in-covid-19-ethical-guidance/> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [6] Bambra (n 24) 965-966.

    [7] Melanie Moses, ‘A Model for a Just COVID-19 Vaccination Program’ (Nautilus, 25 November 2020) <http://nautil.us/issue/93/forerunners/a-model-for-a-just-covid_19-vaccination-program> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [8] Tonia Poteat, ‘Understanding COVID-19 Risks and Vulnerabilities among Black Communities in America: Syndemics’ (2020) 47 Annals of Epidemiology 1, 3.

    [9] Bambra (n 24) 966.

    [10] National Academies (n 16) 30-31.

    [11] ‘Beyond the data: Understanding the impact of COVID-19 on BAME groups’ (2020) Public Health England Report, 22-23 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/892376/COVID_stakeholder_engagement_synthesis_beyond_the_data.pdf> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [12] Harald Schmidt, ‘Is It Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?’ (2020) 324 JAMA <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2771874> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [13] Bambra (n 24) 967.

    [14] Shruti Srivastava, ‘Millions Escaped Caste Discrimination. Covid-19 Brought It Back’ (Bloomberg Quint, 21 August 2020) <https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/millions-escaped-caste-discrimination-covid-19-brought-it-back> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [15] Ashwini Deshpande, ‘Differential impact of COVID-19 and the lockdown’ (The Hindu, 22 August 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/differential-impact-of-covid-19-and-the-lockdown/article32416854.ece> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [16] Schmidt (n 33).

    [17] Deshpande (n 36).

    [18] Ibid.

    [19] Olena Hankivsky, ‘An intersectionality-based policy analysis framework’ (2014) 13(119) Intl J Equity in Health 1, 2.

    [20] Ibid.

    [21] ‘Supporting older people during the COVID-19 pandemic’ (WHO, 3 April 2020) <https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/news/2020/4/supporting-older-people-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-is-everyones-business> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [22] Awadhesh Kumar, ‘Impact of COVID-19 and comorbidities on health and economics’ (2020) 14(6) Diabetes Metab Syndr 1625, 1626-1627.

    [23] Ibid.

    [24] National Academies (n 16) 68-77.

     

    Image Credit: One India

  • Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination [Part I]

    Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination [Part I]

    Introduction

    Distributing the COVID-19 vaccination has been touted as the biggest policy decision in 2021. This stems from the utility and efficacy of vaccines in immediately addressing pandemics. Specifically, the COVID-19 vaccination not only protects the injected person, with a 70%-95% efficacy[1] but also provides ‘herd immunity’.[2] That is, the non-injected population is also benefited due to a reduced risk of transmission and infection, so long as 70% of individuals in society are vaccinated. Therefore, access to the vaccine determines how much and for whom the adversity of the pandemic is mitigated.

    Currently, most vaccine developers are in the final two phases of clinical trials, with some, like Pfizer/BioNTech’s and Oxford University/AstraZeneca’s, already receiving ‘emergency use authorization’ from multiple countries. Most countries have prepared a ballpark action plan for distribution, while the United Kingdom has already vaccinated more than 3.5 million people.[3]

    In this paper, I evaluate the most ethical framework for distributing COVID-19 vaccinations, amongst the population of one country, by its government. I address this question from the perspective of marginalized communities, using the approaches of realism, syndemics, and intersectionality. In Part I of this article, I will evaluate the conventional models for vaccine distribution. In Part II, I will provide an alternative framework for reassessing vulnerabilities during a pandemic, and propose a multi-value ethical framework.

    1. Evaluating the Conventional Models for Vaccine Distribution

    The decision to distribute COVID-19 vaccines is inherently ethical because it involves allocating an important resource in a resource-scarce world. Thus, determining who can pre-maturely mitigate the pandemic’s adversity. There are four models in conventional discourse that have sought to answer the distribution question. In this section, under each model, I will critically evaluate the role of law in distribution and the ethical values that guide prioritized distribution.

    Neoliberalism

    Neoliberalism is characterized by a strict separation between the state, society, and the market.[4] The objective of all economic activity in the markets is wealth and efficiency maximization.[5] To this end, greater involvement of the private sector in the economy is justified because the market allocation of resources is more efficient. Any state intervention beyond a minimum supporting role is conceived as inefficient because rent-seeking, corruption, and capture by special interests are inevitable.[6]

    The diminished role of the state in securing redistribution means that individuals are responsible for their welfare and income. Therefore, individuals would themselves be responsible for ensuring access to the vaccination, notwithstanding their socio-economic status. They must attain this access by successfully competing in the “free market”, through instruments like price point discovery.[7] The underlying rules of competition create a level playing field where fair bargaining over market transactions can occur, so long as the requisite effort is made. This is because the rules are universal in their applicability, and create a distinct economic space, free from state coercion.[8] Therefore, access to the vaccine is determined by one’s ability to pay for it.

    State intervention is only justified when there is a market failure, but even then, preference is accorded to non-state solutions like direct public action or self-regulation.[9] Neoliberalism addresses equity concerns, like non-access to the vaccine, through safety nets and income transfers rather than through market regulation.[10] Otherwise, inefficiencies are introduced into the system, which distorts market incentives, and thus undermines the goal of economic growth.[11] This means that vaccine developers would lose the incentive to undertake expedient and mass production.

    Critique:         Neoliberalism denies that any redistribution to disadvantaged groups is covered by legal reforms. There is no focus on how economic gains are distributed, and the effect of reforms on vulnerable social groups.[12]Neoliberalism’s refusal to acknowledge the distributive function of legal regulation is flawed because rules necessarily always operate to distribute resources and powers to various groups and actors in particular ways.[13] The neoliberal machinery devises a particular allocation of risks, resources, powers, costs, burdens and benefits among different market actors. The effect is that the existing propertied class receive greater entitlement, whilst others are disadvantaged.[14] This perpetuates the inequalities already in status quo, impacting accessibility to the vaccine. Therefore, the relevant question is not whether distributive concerns must be considered, but rather their manner of incorporation in the process of market reform. To this end, the state, which guarantees the regulatory underpinnings of a market economy, must inherently play a greater role in regulating the distribution of economic gains from the market.

    The idea to distribute vaccines based on personal purchasing power is flawed because it ignores the fact that vaccines possess inelastic demand. Therefore, given short supply at short-term and medium-term levels, the price will continually go up to unaffordable rates. This increased price does not encourage new suppliers because the intellectual property rights and R&D is held only by a few developers.[15]

    Utilitarianism

    Utilitarianism assesses the morality of a decision based on its consequences, whether it maximizes benefits and/or minimizes harms. Under this rationale, priority is accorded based on the greatest clinical risks and greatest utility to social functioning. The clinical factors consider the risk of severe morbidity and mortality, risk of infection, and risk of transmission.[16] The greatest utility to society is measured in terms of the risk of negative societal impact, i.e., the public utility of one’s occupation/social role to society and other individuals’ lives and livelihood.[17]

    Therefore, in this pandemic, utilitarianism would prioritize age (above 50/60 years) and associated comorbidities (identified set of diseases) based on the risk of morbidity/mortality and infection, followed by occupation (healthcare and frontline workers) based on the risk of negative societal impact and risk of infection.[18]

    Critique:         Unlike neoliberalism, there is limited value in the utilitarian model because it recognizes the distributive role of law in allocating benefits. Moreover, it pursues this based on a rational objective criterion.

    However, its main problem lies in assessing vulnerabilities through only a clinical lens. It ignores that socio-economic factors also contribute to overall vulnerability during the pandemic, as I argue in the next section. Additionally, it doesn’t acknowledge that even within the identified categories, some are more vulnerable than others. Therefore, it has the effect of compounding existing socio-economic inequalities.

    Lottery

    This approach prioritizes distribution through a random selection of names. This is premised on the assumption that such selection is egalitarian and impartial, and also overcomes the inherent moral relativity/ambiguity of human reasoning.[19]

    Critique:         Random lotteries acknowledge the role of law in distributing benefits, but they lack any rational prioritization to effectively and immediately address the pandemic. While absolute objectivity is unattainable, avoiding moral reasoning altogether is merely “an easy method to avoid hard decisions”.[20] The assumption that everyone’s life is equally important fails to acknowledge the differential disparities that differentially threaten such lives.[21]

    First Come First Serve

    Like lotteries, this approach is premised on avoiding moral decisions and the assumption that everyone has an equal opportunity to access the vaccine.[22]

    Critique:         While this approach acknowledges the role of law in distributing benefits, it is completely blind to the socio-economic realities. Given scarcity, it is inevitable that access will be confined to those with better connections, access to information, communication, and transportation. All these factors are, in turn, tied to one’s socio-economic status. Thus, there is disproportionate denial to disadvantaged communities.

     

    References:

    [1] James Gallagher, ‘Covid vaccine update’ (BBC, 30 December 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-51665497> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [2] Rebecca Weintraub, ‘A Covid-19 Vaccine Will Need Equitable, Global Distribution’ (HBR, 2 April 2020) <https://hbr.org/2020/04/a-covid-19-vaccine-will-need-equitable-global-distribution> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [3] Lucy Rodgers & Dominic Bailey, ‘Covid vaccine: How will the UK jab millions of people?’ (BBC, 23 January 2021) <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-55274833> accessed 24 January 2021.

    [4] Manfred Steger & Ravi Roy, Neoliberalism (OUP 2010) 3-4.

    [5] Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring (Kluwer Law International 2002) 50-52.

    [6] Rittich (n 4) 55-59.

    [7] Sahil Deo, Shardul Manurkar, et al, ‘COVID19 Vaccine: Development, Access and Distribution in the Indian Context’ (2020) Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief No. 378, 6 <https://www.orfonline.org/research/covid19-vaccine-development-access-and-distribution-in-the-indian-context-69538/> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [8] Rittich (n 4) 131.

    [9] Rittich (n 4) 74-76.

    [10] Ibid.

    [11] Steger (n 4).

    [12] Rittich (n 4) 130.

    [13] Steger (n 11)

    [14] Rittich (n 4) 158-160.

    [15] Deo (n 7).

    [16] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine (National Academies Press 2020) 102-105.

    [17] National Academies (n 16) 8.

    [18] Ibid.

    [19] Richard Zimmerman, ‘Rationing of influenza vaccine during a pandemic’ (2017) 25 Vaccine 2019, 2023.

    [20] Ibid.

    [21] Erica Moser, ‘Many ethical questions involved in prioritizing groups for vaccine distribution’ (The Day, 13 December 2020) <https://www.theday.com/article/20201213/NWS01/201219766> accessed 8 January 2020.

    [21] Ibid.

    [22] Zimmerman (n 19).

     

    Image Credit: Crowd Wisdom 360

  • Chief of Defence Staff, a year later: Lack of Clarity and an ambiguous Mandate

    Chief of Defence Staff, a year later: Lack of Clarity and an ambiguous Mandate

    On 31st of Dec 2020 India’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Bipin Rawat, completed one-year in office.  With China recently unveiling its 14th Five Year Plan aiming to bring its military on par with the USA by 2027, it would be interesting to observe if the appointment of CDS has helped the Indian Military spruce up its structure and operational philosophy in any manner.

    Appointment of CDS was put on hold for almost two decades after the Kargil Review Committee made its recommendations.  Opinion among the strategic community has always been divided on the appointment of CDS. Those who argued in favour espoused that CDS would be the panacea for all ills while those who opposed, opined that the time-tested Higher Defence Organisation proposed by Lord Ismay has worked well over the years and hence, the western concept of CDS is unnecessary. Now that the CDS is in place, it is futile to revisit the debate but the functioning of CDS would be a subject of scrutiny for the next few years.

    In the last few months, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) headed by the CDS came for intense criticism for making proposals about the increase in retirement age and reduction in pensions. Previous proposals such as the closure of CSD canteens at peace stations, opening up of cantonment, doing away with Army Day parade etc, which are believed to have emanated from the DMA have been subjected to ridicule and disdain in the social media. It wasn’t exactly clear as to why the office of CDS was being used for such purely administrative issues, which are counterproductive in enhancing the morale and pride of the forces.

    Men in uniform yearned that CDS would play a vital role in bringing about the true integration of Services HQ with the MoD and expedite the process of defence modernisation. However, after one year, it is indeed of great concern that the office of CDS (read DMA) appears to be focussed on administrative and ceremonial issues with absolutely no strategic significance.

    When CDS assumed charge on 1st Jan 20, it was reported that the CDS would be the Principal Military Advisor to the Government (read Def Minister) and he would head the newly created DMA.  Additionally, he would assume charge of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), serve as the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Head the Tri-Service Commands, and be a member of the Defence Acquisition Council besides the Nuclear Command Authority. Quite a tall order indeed but doesn’t seem to be adequately equipped with a statutory mandate to perform effectively. Men in uniform yearned that CDS would play a vital role in bringing about the true integration of Services HQ with the MoD and expedite the process of defence modernisation. However, after one year, it is indeed of great concern that the office of CDS (read DMA) appears to be focussed on administrative and ceremonial issues with absolutely no strategic significance. One of the first initiatives announced by Gen Rawat was to create an Air Defence Command which is yet to materialise and creation of Theatre Commands seems to be a long haul.

    it is beyond comprehension to fathom what prompted the Government to create a Department of Military Affairs within the MoD when the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was already functioning since 2001 awaiting the appointment of a CDS.  As Service Chiefs continue to exercise Command over their respective Service, the CDS as the head of IDS would be rightly placed to promote joint training initiatives, validate joint operational plans and act as a catalyst in defence modernisation.  However, for all this to be achieved, the role and functioning of the CDS should be spelt out; particularly the role of CDS as the “Principal Military Advisor” to the Raksha Mantri, vis-à-vis the Defence Secretary who continues to be the “Principal Advisor” to the Defence Minister. Such vital aspects are never left to chance based on an individual’s equations with political leadership but need to be appropriately institutionalised, mandated and published.

    Currently, Defence Secretary functions as head of the Department of Defence and is additionally responsible for coordinating the activities of the five Departments in the Ministry, including the newly created DMA. The Defence Secretary draws his functional powers from the Cabinet Secretariat –Manual of Office Procedures (CS-MoP) which clearly states that the Secretary of the Department “is the principal adviser of the Minister on all matters of policy and administration within his Ministry/Department, and his responsibility is complete and undivided”. If Defence Secretary is coordinating the affairs of all the five departments including DMA as the Principal Advisor, what is the status of the four-star-CDS?

    The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 are made by the President of India under Article 77 of the Constitution for the allocation of business of the Government of India. The business of the Government is transacted in the Ministries/Departments, Secretariats and offices (referred to as ‘Department’) as per the distribution of subjects specified in these Rules. Allocation of Business Rules has not been revised since 2017 though DMA has been created one year ago.  As a result, the DMA is not listed in the First Schedule of the Allocation of Business.

    Transaction of Business (Rules) 1961 are made by the President of India for the convenient transaction of the Business of the Government of India. The disposal of business by various ministries, inter-departmental transactions and mandates of various committees are published in these rules. The significance of these rules can be gauged from the fact that the rules have been recently amended to deal with unprecedented challenges posed by Covid 19 pandemic. Cabinet Secretariat has amended Government of India Transaction of Business Rules, 1961 to widen powers of two committees to meet the economic crisis caused by Covid 19, using the powers under the Act. However, Transaction of Business Rules has not been revised clearly defining the role of CDS as the Principal Military Advisor to the Government.

    The organisation chart in the MoD has been removed possibly because it would only be too embarrassing to place the CDS under the Defence Secretary. There is an urgent need for the GoI to create a meaningful role for the CDS and empower him with a statutory mandate.

    A cursory glance at the website of the Ministry of Defence would reveal a lack of any sincerity in assigning specific responsibilities for DMA. It has been casually mentioned that DMA “deals with the armed forces of the Union….. and promotes jointness among the three services”. Were these objectives not met by the MoD in the past? So what value addition has the DMA provided? The organisation chart in the MoD has been removed possibly because it would only be too embarrassing to place the CDS under the Defence Secretary. There is an urgent need for the GoI to create a meaningful role for the CDS and empower him with a statutory mandate.

    Indian Military is not expeditionary. However, if there is a convincing need to create Theatre Commands in pursuit of joint operations and interoperability, replacing the existing 17 Service-specific Commands by fewer Theatre Commands would be the most challenging task for the CDS. If the experience of USA, UK and other major militaries is anything go by, such major military reforms could be pushed through only with steadfast backing from the government, taking all three services into confidence and aligning the entire military leadership with the desired outcomes of this humungous exercise which may eventually need constitutional validity through an Act of the parliament.

    For the appointment of CDS to make a meaningful purpose the following measures are imperative:

    • Abolish the DMA and facilitate the CDS to take complete control of the IDS, keeping its functioning outside the purview of Def Secretary
    • Revise the CS-MOP, Allocation of Business Rules, Transaction of Business rules and the Warrant of Precedence, clearly bringing out the role and responsibilities of CDS as the Principal Military Advisor to the Defence Minister, in contrast to the roles and responsibilities of the Defence Secretary which may also now need to be re-drafted.
    • Make CDS a permanent member of the Cabinet Committee on Security facilitating the single-point military advice to the National Security Council.
    • The cabinet should spell out a Defence Policy Guidance (DPG) with a 12 year to the 15-year horizon in the light of prevailing and forecasted geo-political scenario and assist the CDS in preparing a clear roadmap for Indian Military Modernisation

    To abrogate the stigma of “Attached Offices”, and to integrate the Services HQ with MoD, a beginning needs to be made by augmenting the IDS with officials from the MoD.

    • Currently, the budgeting and procurement plans are made in isolation and subject to scrutiny by the Ministry of Fin (Def) thereby losing time and effort. IDS needs to be adequately empowered by augmenting it with an integral wing of the Ministry of Fin (Def) headed by a Joint Secretary ranked officer.
    • A Defence Production Wing under the charge of an Additional Secretary ranked officer reporting directly to the CDS should be created with the long term objective of achieving complete integration of the department of defence production with IDS. This suggestion would certainly be the most unpopular with the bureaucracy but could turn out to be a game-changer if achieved.

    Kargil Review Committee had recommended the appointment of CDS to integrate the armed forces in their planning, procurement and functioning to transform the Indian Military as a unitary force to reckon with.  In the absence of a clear mandate and constitutional validity for the functioning of the CDS, the entire effort of instituting one, seems to be of little consequence, much less, competent of driving any significant reforms. The current arrangement needs a complete overhaul if that is to be achieved.

  • The South: Where the Chariots stopped in the Past

    The South: Where the Chariots stopped in the Past

    There is no apparent reason why Dr. John Jackson (1835-1911), a 19th-century Yorkshire-born British Psychologist should be of any interest to us in the 21st India. Yet, he is important in order to understand what is happening to the BJP’s misplaced ambitions in India south of the Vindhyas.

    First about Dr. Jackson. He was the first scientist to come up with the answer as to why mariners experience directional disorientation when they sail on vast seas. This navigational impairment, described by Jackson as ‘topological agnosia’ (literally, loss of knowledge about directions) was caused in his analysis by a distortion in an individual’s memory. An individual afflicted by this agnosia is found unable to remember to a destination known to him to be able to recall important landmarks seen a long time ago. Among the patients that Jackson studied were some women who knew where the London Bridge was, but they did not know how to go there from their homes. In their memory, the ‘little maps’ were forgotten, though the larger maps were inscribed in their brain. European colonial expansion was distinctly marked by this disorientation. When it was spreading south of Europe, the colonial powers thought of the south as ‘east’ and built a strong binary between the west and the east.

    Topological Agnosia is the term that can most accurately describe the BJP’s ‘Mission South.’ In order to understand why the party that feels so much at home in the Hindi heartland in the north should feel so unsure of its direction in the south, we need to look at the context within which its foundations were laid. Obviously, one has to refer to the shaping of the core ideas of the Hindutva ideology. It is not necessary to state that at its heart is the dubious and non-scientific theory of ‘Aryans as a Master Race’. This idea was in circulation among some of the 19th century European linguists. They imagined that what was initially proposed as the name of a language (‘Indo-Aryan’) was in fact the name of a community (or a race). Some of them went to the length of proving that the Aryans resided in remote ancient times in North Europe. Karl Plenka actually gave a homeland for this imagined master race, unquestioningly assuming that the master race was the master race of the pure Aryans.

    Besides, the traditions of spirituality and worship developed in the south for the last three millennia have their own distinct and syncretic trajectories which do not easily gel with the RSS-VHP idea of Hinduism. Besides, as Basavanna, Akkamma, Periyar, Phule, Shahu, and Ambedkar so ably demonstrate, a larger majority of the people south of the Vindhyas have reason to find the exclusionary and myopic social and cultural interpretations of history entirely repugnant.

    Adolf Hitler

    In the third decade of the 20th century, Adolf Hitler made these theories the foundation of his ‘National Socialism’ and the associated drive for ‘racial purification.’ The founders of the RSS in India were his contemporaries and shared his enthusiasm for the theory of Aryan supremacy. Though completely unscientific in terms of the history of the people of India, the RSS, and the BJP like to believe that someday in the future they will be able to establish the supremacy of the (imaginary) Aryans over the diverse peoples in the Indian subcontinent, the south included. To aid this wishful aspiration, the RSS has brought in a misconstrued idea of what constitutes being Hindu. However, the Indian sub-continent South of the Vindhyas has a long history of resistance to the domination from the north. Besides, the traditions of spirituality and worship developed in the south for the last three millennia have their own distinct and syncretic trajectories which do not easily gel with the RSS-VHP idea of Hinduism. Besides, as Basavanna, Akkamma, Periyar, Phule, Shahu, and Ambedkar so ably demonstrate, a larger majority of the people south of the Vindhyas have reason to find the exclusionary and myopic social and cultural interpretations of history entirely repugnant. It is not a surprise, therefore, that despite desperate efforts by the VHP and RSS throughout the twentieth century, their general support base in the southern states had remained nominal.

    This has changed since 2014. The current regime has displayed an unmatched zeal in intimidating political leaders by using the ED, the CBI, and troll gangs. It has displayed a skill in the use of post-truth and propaganda for generating popular opinion as never before. The erosion of media and the collapse of institutions that are expected to uphold constitutional values and constitutional arrangements to safeguard democracy has apparently increased the chance of success for BJP’s south mission. Besides, the use of funds for party-swapping is a trick that the BJP has mastered well. All these factors—the use of muscle, official machinery, money, intimidation, and propaganda—have made the south more vulnerable to the divisive, exclusionary, and myopic nationalism of the BJP.

    Yet, it would be naïve to believe that countering the Hindutva and Pseudo-Nationalism onslaught would be possible by mouthing our worn-out phrases and analysis related to class-based or caste-based understanding of India in the third decade of the 21st century.

    Countering the flawed ideas of nationalism and the exclusionary notion of dharma is an urgent need for the people, language-communities and the political parties south of the Vindhyas. Probably, it is them alone who are now left with the capacity to do so, since the ‘Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan’ tune has overpowered the people and the northern ‘heartland-states’. Yet, it would be naïve to believe that countering the Hindutva and Pseudo-Nationalism onslaught would be possible by mouthing our worn-out phrases and analysis related to class-based or caste-based understanding of India in the third decade of the 21st century. Also, being fiercely against any geographical, linguistic or social factionalism, we have to reinvent our politics and political terminology. Remaining entirely within the framework of the Constitution, one very powerful message that the Southern States and people can give to the rest of India is that of federalism.

    The Constitution describes the country as a union of states’ and its provisions are oriented towards keeping this union intact and integrated by respecting the difference and diversity.

    The Constitution describes the country as a union of states’ and its provisions are oriented towards keeping this union intact and integrated by respecting the difference and diversity. Hence, our insistence on the principle of federalism would also mean our insistence on constitutional values. It would reiterate the need for recognizing and respecting diversities and, therefore, rejecting the Hindutva agenda of the RSS-BJP. This understanding, if shared by the communities, movements, language groups, political parties, theological sects, and cultural-industries in the states south of the Vindhyas, can—together—stop the BJP where it should be stopped and reverse the fortunes of fascism in India. We all owe it to India, our sacred nation. We also owe it to the great tradition of civilization that the south has built over the past millennia.

    The opinions expressed are personal views of the author.

    This article was published earlier in gaurilankeshnews.com

  • Evaluating the Make in India Policy for Defence Manufacturing and Technology Acquisition

    Evaluating the Make in India Policy for Defence Manufacturing and Technology Acquisition

    Led by the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, the Make in India policy (“MII”) extends to 25 focused sectors. Among these is the defence sector, where the nature of the sector renders MII extremely important and relevant. This is outlined by India’s status as the second-largest standing army and third-largest military spender in the world.[1] Yet, it remains the second-largest arms importer and its exports merely amount to 0.2% of the global pie.[2] China is the fifth-largest arms exporter at 5.5% of the global share.[3] However, this is likely to fall in the post-pandemic world, where China’s credibility has been severely tainted.[4] This represents an opportunity for Indian defence manufacturers to attract present and future foreign investment.

    Against this background, MII was enacted with two objectives: (1) to increase domestic manufacturing of defence equipment; and (2) address the national security interest of self-sufficiency over key technologi. There are two ways in which technology up-gradation can happen: (1) indigenous efforts; and (2) transfer of technology, through international agreements. In this article, I flag the main challenges to argue that India has significantly underperformed in both. Subsequently, I propose macro-policy changes to address identified challenges.

    Evaluating technological upgradation in the Defence sector in india

    1. Evaluating ‘Indigenous Efforts’

    Indigenous efforts are confronted with three main challenges:

    • Inadequate Investment for Research & Development (R&D)

    Only 5.7% of the defence budget is allocated to R&D,[5] despite successive parliamentary committees recommending at least 10% to meet minimum requirements.[6] The average allocation among global rivals like USA, UK, France, and China is well above 15%.[7] Even private-sector players in India, like Tata, L&T, and Mahindra and Mahindra, invest less than 1% of their turnover in R&D, as against the average of 10% in the aforementioned countries.[8] The producer lacks the basic R&D required even for making marginal improvements in performance to the product, or altering it based on user-specifications.[9] The effect of this is that the resulting product is obsolete in an already disruptive market. Thus, a buyer, even if domestic, is unwilling to accept such an obsolete product at higher prices merely for the sake of indigenous production.

    • Shortage of Skilled Workforce

    A skilled workforce is the key to achieving self-sufficiency in defence manufacturing because of the highly specialized nature of this sector and the workforces’ vision and skills determine the efficacy of the produced/procured domestic technology. This shortage exists at both the research and procurement level.

    At the research level, there is a severe shortage of skilled human resources, in terms of quantity and quality, at R&D organizations like DRDO.[10] With more than 3,500 engineering colleges producing about 1.5 million engineering graduates annually, India has an unparalleled talent availability.[11] However, only 17.5% of these graduates are employable because colleges lack proper infrastructure and faculty,[12] along with current curriculum ignoring industry skills, defined career paths, and evolving technologies.[13] Thus, organizations are compelled to spend significantly in making fresh talent “employable”.

    While India has a decent pool of highly qualified low-cost engineers and scientists,[14] they are unwilling to work in the public sector due to limited opportunities and low growth potential,[15] where most defence R&D is undertaken. As the departure of 132 scientists in the last five years from DRDO shows,[16] even those employed mostly do not continue long-term due to better opportunities elsewhere.[17] The contribution of most of these scientists has been limited to the production of academic articles,[18] which hasn’t seen any significant and meaningful absorption in the policy. Therefore, the policy has been unable to capture the huge latent employment potential in this sector.[19]

    This position must be contrasted against global competitors like the US and China, where the highly skilled and employable workforce is significantly and routinely absorbed into the most impactful R&D organization, whether private or public.[20] Moreover, unlike other leading countries, India lacks any training and education infrastructure specialized for R&D personnel in the defence sector. These countries have developed specialist defence schools that have managed to produce large pools of exclusive talent. France itself has managed to produce 134,000 specialist employees.[21]

    At the procurement level, the asset acquisition process is not tasked to a dedicated cadre of the workforce.[22] Further, there are no educational or training programs for employees involved in this process.[23] Thus, there is the loss in terms of the benefits of specialization, especially in a sector where progress is characterized by specialization.

    • Limited Involvement of the Private Sector

    There is a significant lack of incentive for greater private sector involvement. The private sector is commercially motivated to establish its manufacturing base only when it has a good chance, or preferably guarantee, of getting frequent and sizeable orders.[24] However, the current manufacturing and procurement process has ignored this motivation but is also completely converse to it.

    As the BJP government’s Rafale fiasco indicates, the procurement processes lack transparency, and frequently fraught with allegations and counter-allegations.[25] This disincentivizes both domestic and global private sector players from conducting business.

    Despite unprecedented inclusion of the private sector, it is widely believed in the private sector that the government is biased towards public sector undertakings, denying a level-playing field for the private sector and even denying opportunities to bid.[26]

    The government’s Strategic Partnership Model, aimed at inviting world-class defence giants to collaborate with Indian entities, has unduly restricted autonomy. Under this program, the government chooses the Indian partner for the foreign OEM, without consulting them.[27] Global defence giants, like Airbus, Lockheed Martin, ThyssenKrupp, and Dassault, have shown interest in contracting with the Indian private sector.[28] However, it is a combination of these factors that this interest has largely failed to materialise into successfully concluded deals.

    Even where, despite these disincentives, the private sector has been involved, this has been in non-critical and less required areas. Most of India’s defence imports are in the category of major platforms such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, naval guns, and anti-submarine missiles.[29] However, the private sector initiatives are predominantly in the category of ammunitions (including rockets and bombs), and surveillance and tracking systems.[30]

    1. Evaluating ‘Transfer of Technology’

    There has been no transfer of technology (“ToT”) in the critical defence procurement process. All major contracts under MII have been “off the shelf”, and without any crucial ToT.[31] As per the CAG Report, between 2007 and 2018, the government concluded 46 offset contracts but failed to implement the ToT agreements in any of them.[32]

    The failure here can be attributed to successive governments unduly hoping that India’s status as a large arms importer would necessarily make international players compliant as regards sharing their intellectual property (“IP”). While foreign companies have shown interest in contracting with Indian players, the large purchase orders have been inadequate to incentivize foreign players to share their IP.[33]

    The government has also been overly ambitious of ToT as a means of technology upgradation. Even implementing the negotiated ToT is not the end because the more challenging issues of absorption of this technology and ownership of IP remain.[34] Moreover, the ToT route provides India only with the ‘know-how’, without any insight into the ‘know-why’.[35] As India’s acquisition of the Sukhoi Su-30 has shown, the public sector is critically dependent on the OEMs, here the Russians, for even minor systemic upgradations.

    Way Forward

    The government must increase allocation to defence R&D to at least 10% and must incentivize greater contributions from the private sector. Existing capabilities and services at training and diploma centres must be upgraded through public-private partnerships. There must be a separate and devoted institutional structure for all procurement-related functions. The procurement policy must also aim at buying talent, besides technology, to bridge technology gaps. The education curriculum at engineering universities needs to be modernized, with a focus on employability. Specialist defence schools must also be established. However, it is most important that the public sector aims at retaining its talent through unique and lucrative incentive structures.

    To incentivize the private sector through minimum order guarantees, the government must utilize ‘public procurement of innovation’. Under this policy tool, the government uses its exchequer to artificially generate demand for an emerging innovative solution, unavailable on a commercial scale.[36] The private sector can further be incentivized by streaming the procurement and dispute resolution process. As for procurement, a fast-track procedure with single-window clearances can be adopted.[37] As for dispute resolution a permanent arbitration tribunal must be established to expeditiously settle disputes with finality.[38]

    Conclusion

    Firstly, the indigenous efforts at technology up-gradation have failed due to limited R&D output, shortage of skilled workforce, and limited private sector involvement. The R&D budgetary allocation is way below the recommended and global standard. The shortage of skilled workforce is both at the research and procurement due to a lack of education and training infrastructure specific to the defence sector, low employability among most graduates, and unwillingness to work in the public sector among highly qualified graduates. The private sector has been disincentivized due to a lack of order guarantees, the unrealistic and retroactive manner of the procurement process, the constant allegations and counter-allegations, and the continued bias towards the public sector. Moreover, the private sector has been involved in non-critical and less required areas.

    Secondly, while the government has concluded ToT agreements, it has been inefficient in enforcing them. Moreover, even if this were to succeed, it has not established any action plan for absorbing this technology and addressing ownership of IP. It has also been overly ambitious of the utility of ToT.

     

     

    References

    [1] Kuldip Singh, ‘Yes, Indian Military Can Go the ‘Make in India’ Way – Just Not Yet’ (The Quint, 25 May 2020) <https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-armed-forces-defence-sector-military-expenditure-budget-technology-upgrade-make-in-india> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [2] Arjun Srinivas, ‘Private defence business gets one more nudge’ (LiveMint, 1 October 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/private-defence-business-gets-one-more-nudge-11601460654397.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [3] Snehesh Alex Philip, ‘China has become a major exporter of armed drones, Pakistan is among its 11 customers’ (The Print, 23 November 2020) <https://theprint.in/defence/china-has-become-a-major-exporter-of-armed-drones-pakistan-is-among-its-11-customers/549841/> accessed 4 January 2021.

    [4] Rajan Kochhar, ‘Preparing defence sector for post COVID-19 world: Time to treat private sector as equal partner’ (Economic Times, 5 May 2020) <https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/governance/opinion-make-in-india-a-dream-or-reality-for-the-armed-forces/75552970> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [5] Jayant Singh, ‘Industry Scenario’ (Invest India) <https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/defence-manufacturing> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [6] Prof (Dr) SN Misra, ‘Make in India: Challenges Before Defence Manufacturing’ (2015) 30(1) Indian Defence Rev <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/make-in-india-challenges-before-defence-manufacturing/2/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [7] ‘Government Expenditures on Defence Research and Development by the United States and Other OECD Countries: Fact Sheet’ (2020) Congressional Research Service R45441 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45441.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020; A Sivathanu Pillai, ‘Defence R&D’ in Vinod Misra (ed), Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms (Pentagon Press & IDSA 2015) 132-133.

    [8] Misra (n 6).

    [9] Amitabha Pande, ‘Defence, Make in India and the Illusive Goal of Self Reliance’ (The Hindu Centre for Public Policy, 11 April 2019) <https://www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/current-issues/article26641241.ece> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [10] Azhar Shaikh, Dr. Uttam Kinange, & Arthur Fernandes, ‘Make in India: Opportunities and Challenges in the Defence Sector’ (2016) 7(1) Intl J Research in Commerce & Management 13, 14-15.

    [11] Kishore Jayaraman, ‘How Can India Bridge The Skill Gap in Aerospace & Defence Sector?’ (All Things Talent, 24 September 2018) <https://allthingstalent.org/2018/09/24/how-can-india-bridge-skill-gap-in-aerospace-defence-sector/> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [12] Dr. JP Dash & BB Sharma, ‘Skilling Gaps in Defence Sector for ‘Make in India’’ (2017) 32(2) Indian Defence Rev <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/skilling-gaps-in-defence-sector-for-make-in-india/> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [13] Jayaraman (n 10); Dhiraj Mathur, ‘Unlocking defence R&D in India – Do we have the skill?’ (Firstpost, 6 April 2016)<https://www.firstpost.com/business/unlocking-defence-rd-in-india-do-we-have-the-skill-2715650.html> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [14] Mathur (n 13).

    [15] PR Sanjai, ‘Indian aerospace sector needs one million skilled workforce in next 10 years’ (Livemint, 20 February 2015) <https://www.livemint.com/Politics/hRJQjq7ZKVXQ5RFkzWbmAJ/Indian-aerospace-sector-needs-one-million-skilled-workforce.html> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [16] PTI, ‘132 scientists left DRDO on personal grounds in last 5 years: Govt’ (Economic Times, 12 March 2020) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/132-scientists-left-drdo-on-personal-grounds-in-last-5-years-govt/articleshow/74579857.cms?from=mdr> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [17] Dash (n 12).

    [18] PTI, ‘India is world’s third largest producer of scientific articles: Report’ (Economic Times, 18 December 2019) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/india-is-worlds-third-largest-producer-of-scientific-articles-report/articleshow/72868640.cms?from=mdr> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [19] ‘Make in India: An Overview of Defence Manufacturing in India’ (2015) Singhania & Partners LLP Report <https://www.gita.org.in/Attachments/Reports/Make-in-India-Defence-Manufacturing-in-India.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [20] Ranjit Ghosh, ‘Defence Research and Development: International Approaches for Analysing the Indian Programme’ (2015) IDSA Occasional Paper 41, 11-34 <https://idsa.in/system/files/opaper/OP41__RanjitGhosh_140815.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [21] Dash (n 12).

    [22] Shaikh (n 10) 15.

    [23] Ibid.

    [24] Rohit Srivastava, ‘New measures for self-sufficiency in defence – industry perspective’ (Indian Defence Industries, 19 May 2020) <https://indiandefenceindustries.in/defence-reforms-industry-perspective> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [25] Pradip R Sagar, ‘How ‘Make in India’ in defence sector is still an unfulfilled dream’ (The Week, 25 May 2019) <https://www.theweek.in/theweek/current/2019/05/25/how-make-in-india-in-defence-sector-is-still-an-unfulfilled-dream.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [26] Ibid; Lt. Gen. (Retd.) (Dr). Subrata Saha, ‘Execution key for defence manufacturing in India’ (LiveMint, 2 April 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Gx9NVPGvIsVbVzLTJ0VouK/Execution-key-for-defence-manufacturing-in-India.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [27] Prasanna Karthik, ‘India’s strategic partnership policy is counter-productive in its current form’ (Observer Research Foundation, 8 June 2020) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-strategic-partnership-policy-is-counter-productive-in-its-current-form-67511/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [28] Sagar (n 25).

    [29] Srinivas (n 3).

    [30] Ibid.

    [31] Singh (n 1); Sagar (n 25).

    [32] Joe C Mathew, ‘Defence offset policy performance dismal: CAG’ (Business Today, 24 September 2020) <https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/defence-offset-policy-performance-dismal-cag/story/416872.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [33] Lieutenant Commander L Shivaram (Retd), ‘Understanding ‘Make in India’ in the Defence Sector’ (2015) 145(601) J United Service Institution of India <https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/understandingmake-in-india-in-the-defence-sector/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [34] Lt Gen A B Shivane, ‘India needs outcome oriented defence reforms’ (Indian Defence Industries, 22 May 2020) <https://indiandefenceindustries.in/india-outcome-oriented-reforms> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [35] Misra (n 6).

    [36] E. Uyarra & J. Edler, ‘Barriers to Innovation through Public Procurement: A Supplier Perspective’ (2014) 34(10) Science Direct <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166497214000388> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [37] Kochhar (n 4).

    [38] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Dalip Bharadwaj, ‘‘Make in India’ in defence sector: A distant dream’ (Observer Research Foundation, 7 May 2018) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/make-in-india-defence-sector-distant-dream/> accessed 19 December 2020.

  • Performance-Based Pay for Teachers: A viable solution for Schools in India’s Rural Sector?

    Performance-Based Pay for Teachers: A viable solution for Schools in India’s Rural Sector?

    Over the last two decades, India’s education priorities have changed substantially. From a major focus on enrolment ratios and reducing drop-out rates, the priority is now on learning and skill outcomes and employability after education, thus stressing the importance of the development of ‘Human Capital’ for the country. The New Education Policy (2020)focuses majorly on this aspect of education, set in tune with the SDG4 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals that India adopted in 2015.  The SDG4 seeks to ‘Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all’, which forms a top priority in the 2030 Global Human Development agenda.

    While inequality between rural and urban schooling is vast and the learning outcome levels of students from such schools are dismal, and there is a need for reform in rural education policies, literature shows that simply adding resources and ‘Best Practices’ including comprehensive assessments, detailed ratings, and customised improvement plans have no proven impact on student learning

    Yet, things are gloomy for India in terms of education. According to ASER 2019 National Findings, while more than 90% of young children are enrolled in some type of educational institution, a huge proportion of them are unable to perform basic numeracy and early language.  Children from less advantaged homes are the worst affected. While inequality between rural and urban schooling is vast and the learning outcome levels of students from such schools are dismal, and there is a need for reform in rural education policies, literature shows that simply adding resources and ‘Best Practices’ including comprehensive assessments, detailed ratings, and customised improvement plans have no proven impact on student learning (K. Muralidharan, et al, 2020), (Pradhan et al. 2011). Evidence also shows that the right mix of teaching tools, pedagogy, and design can bring about an effective blended learning environment for students. ( M.J. Kintu, et al, 2017).

    But why are policies not getting implemented efficiently? The heart of the whole problem seems to be the poor delivery of teachers, especially public school teachers, who taught less, are less qualified, and deliver dismal outcomes. While on the other hand, evidence (E.A. Hanushek, et al., 2012) also highlights the importance of ‘Teachers’ in delivering better outcomes, and consequently students attend college and earn some revenue. Thus, the only viable solution to better rural education is the betterment of teacher quality.

    Teacher Pay and Job Satisfaction

    Teacher absenteeism and lack of job satisfaction among the teachers have been the most discussed agendas while analysing dismal student performances in the rural areas, especially those from public schools. Teachers’ pay is the major chunk of all expenditure made on education in India. Teachers’ salaries make up around 80% of total non-capital expenditure on education. Around 50% of them get paid regularly despite their irregular attendance and lack of teaching or even deserting schools forever.  While pay for teachers might seem like the right way to nudge them towards delivering better outcomes, that is certainly not the case with public schooling in India.

    The dismal performance of Public-School teachers, even after a handsome pay can be related to their satisfaction from job security. Research shows that Public School teachers who report high job satisfaction are more likely to not be in class, and thus there can be inferred a negative correlation between the pay and satisfaction a teacher reports and the likeness of him/her to attend school, and even if attending school, to teach or not teach. Increasing teacher pay, in this case, might seem absurd but it is primarily due to a lack of accountability. But evidence also shows an increase in teacher performance, and incentives in pay tend to be more effective when accountability is well addressed.

    The Public-Private Dichotomy

    While financial incentives seem like a good gimmick to increase teacher performance, and in-turn student output, things yet seem gloomy in the public education system. Private School teachers in fact overwork and are underpaid, according to reports. Though learning and teaching outcomes are far better in the private education scenario, Public School teachers are the ones that enjoy the most benefit out of the rest.

    Teacher pay in Public Schools across the country is higher than that of teachers from private schools. According to the Seventh Pay Commission, the basic salary of primary and high school teachers is between Rs. 29,900 and Rs. 100,000 with additional grade pay. While the teachers in various levels in Public Schools get paid their salary according to the scale, this is rarely the case with private school teachers. According to reports, 85% of private schools in Delhi don’t pay teachers as per the pay scale laid down by the commission. Non- Implementation of the seventh-pay commission recommendations, lack of balance between workload, outcome levels and pay disparity with the government or public schools haunt private school teachers, despite the various recommendations and policy amendments to correct the inequality.

    Long-standing debates on whether the ‘Minimum Wage’ rule applies to private schools or not continue to remain ambiguous. In the last decade, when private schools paid a pittance to their teachers, legislative wings have denied the availability of a ‘Minimum Wage’ system to teachers in Private Unaided Schools. Up until today, there’s no such legislation that specifies a salary structure for teachers employed in private schools, except for the non-teaching staff who have coverage under the ‘Minimum Wages Act’. Even if prevalent in certain states the ‘Minimum Wages Act’ is openly violated by schools. The Government of Kerala, in the year 2019 sought to bring legislation to ensure minimum wages for school teachers, which wasn’t very successful. Other states including Karnataka have stressed the importance of paying better salaries to the teachers, by fixing a stipulated minimum monthly salary for teaching and non-teaching staff, and this might bring in more burden to parents in the form of fees; several extra and co-curricular activities must be made optional for parents to be able to leverage their fee burden, alongside quality education to the children.

    While the private sector still stands as a model of performance-based pay, this is seen as a ubiquitous and powerful tool in the private sector. While teachers in public schools are already well paid, providing additional incentives would just weigh upon the already existing expenses on public education. This increased expenditure on teachers’ pay makes Public Schools more expensive than their private counterparts, with low teacher accountability. Interestingly, evidence shows that by implementing a performance-based policy, the government would have just saved under Rs. 2,000 Billion over the 25 years from 1987-2012.  This again brings us to the question of whether increased financial incentives to public school teachers are any good and feasible?

    Evidence on Performance-Based Pay

     A study by Barrera, O and Raju, D(2017) relating to the first three years of a randomised control trial of a government-administered pilot teacher performance pay program in Punjab and Pakistan proves yearly cash bonuses to teachers in a sample of 600 public primary schools with the lowest mean student exam scores is linked to an increase in schools’ average student exam scores, increase in school enrolment ratio and the level of student exam participation in the school. A long term study by K. Muralidharan (2012) shows that students who completed their primary school under the performance-based pay programme performed better than their peers in control schools by 0.54 standard deviation in Mathematics.

    However, interventions in the forms of performance pay had an impact neither on student performance nor on the teacher’s reported attitude or behaviour towards teaching and absenteeism. On the other hand, a study by Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) points out that performance-based pay might encourage ill practices such as cheating during exams, which doesn’t hold any good to both the entities. The cost-effectiveness of a performance-based pay model is studied by Muralidharan and Sundararaman(2011) and shows a relation between additional funds and performance-based pay.

    Pay Design and other Models

     The ‘Contract Teachers’ model can work well for public schools. In this Teachers employed for relatively shorter durations, bound by a contract that can be terminated easily, play an important role in extending education to an increased number of children in an affordable manner. Studies involving student learning in rural schools (Muralidharan and Sundararaman,2010) show that while contract teachers are relatively cheaper to acquire over the normal long-term teachers, their impact on students and their performance is comparatively better. While the evidence suggests that performance-based pay might be a difficult model to implement in the public education front, hiring ‘Contract Teachers’ might be the right way out. Recent trends emerging out of the pandemic suggests paying teachers based on the hours of work done. The pandemic disruption has given rise to online education but teaching online requires different skills. Additionally, paying teachers based on the number of hours they work on a day will also help in cutting costs and finances for the employer.

    Constraints in revenues and a need to increase student learning makes ‘Tenure-track for teachers’ a viable option for schools.

    On the other hand, an ideal model of performance-based pay would help in solving the basic problems and inequalities in the system. Constraints in revenues and a need to increase student learning makes ‘Tenure-track for teachers’ a viable option for schools. This model, largely in practice in the western universities, might just be what rural schools in India need. This model, somewhat similar to the ‘Performance Pay’ model, rewards teachers by extending their tenures based on their performance. Good on finances and learning, this model can be the next big thing in rural education, given the constraints in learning and teaching. On the contrary, the ‘Tenure-track’ model might only work in the presence of a good evaluation system to measure teacher and student performances. Given the state of public and rural education and evaluation in India, this might be daunting. Proper evaluation methods to measure and analyse teacher performance is imperative for this model to work in the country.

    A best-fit pay model, with proper tools to measure student performance alongside teacher’s accountability, would do well with teachers all over the country. Alongside, proper publicity of such a pay model would make people familiar with the options. A study by Leaver, et.al.,(2019) shows that the impact of such programmes is higher when it is well advertised and familiar with the ones falling in the bracket.

    Conclusion

     This finally brings us to the question of whether the performance-based pay model might be the best fit for schools in rural India, that are mostly run and maintained by states and district administrations. Performance-based pay, though proven in increasing student performance, also contains a major loophole. Teachers may resort to malpractices like – letting students cheat during exams to show better results and malpractices during evaluation. In Rural India, where proper systems to evaluate the performance of teachers is not in place, the Performance-based pay model may become counter-productive given the lack of accountability and implementation challenges.

    While performance-based pay models have earned good results in the developing nations alike, the remote corners of India might not be the best place for its implementation, until and unless the teachers and all the stakeholders are well-informed of its implementation and proper evaluation mechanism for both the teacher and the student. In India where most public schools are hampered by teachers’ absenteeism and dismal delivery, increasing the pay of the teachers would just result in increased risks of teachers staying at home, without actually resulting in any improvement in their commitment and work methodology. Besides, it may encourage malpractices to show improved performance of students.

    Making teachers accountable to their performance and delivery is the first step towards effective policy change.

    In conclusion, Performance-based pay models may not be a suitable model to increase teacher performance in public schools. Whereas, other methods, such as hiring contract teachers and tenure-tracking might work better in the long run, given a proper evaluation of teacher’s performance in schools. Making teachers accountable to their performance and delivery is the first step towards effective policy change. If proper mechanisms are in place, shifting to various effective models like – Tenure Tracking or Contract Teaching become easier and more effective.

    Image Credit: Poverty Action Lab

  • Revisiting India’s Renewable Energy Sector Policy and Limitations

    Revisiting India’s Renewable Energy Sector Policy and Limitations

    One of the most important results in India from the pandemic-driven lockdown that began in March 2020 was the reduction in carbon emissions and its beneficial impact on the environment. Travel restrictions and a decrease in industrial production have caused significant reductions in emissions. But these reductions were temporary. The results, however, highlights the need for India to reduce its dependence on carbon-emitting energy sources and shift the majority of its energy production to renewable sources that will better equip India towards achieving and even exceeding its  Paris Agreement targets.

    The Indian renewable energy sector is the world’s fourth-largest, after the US, China, and Germany. Its wind energy sector has the fourth-highest total installed capacity, 38.124 GW, in the world. Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Gujarat are the leading states in wind energy.  The solar energy sector has emerged as a significant player in the power generation capacity since the establishment of the National Solar Mission 2010. India achieved 5th global position in solar power distribution with an installed capacity of 35,739 MW as of August 2020.

    Yet, over the years, the wind energy sector faced several problems such as an imbalance between demand and supply, persistent energy shortages, insufficient funds, high-transmission and distribution losses, and poor institutional infrastructure. Thus, it is important to identify the exact causes and find solutions so that upcoming projects can be better planned. This article identifies and analyses a few important barriers faced by the renewable energy sector.

    Barriers to the sector

    First, India’s renewable energy infrastructure, despite its considerable growth over the decades, lacks consistent standards as compared to other countries. Wind energy technology has not kept pace with the modernisation achieved across the world.  Research, both in public and private sectors, is one way to mitigate the problem. Despite 80% of the technology being domestic, a significant quantity of manufactured components is imported from China. A mix of foreign and indigenous parts (with different quality and technical standards) results in inconsistency in the technology used which reduces the power plants’ overall efficiency. The Government, in a move to promote domestic manufacturers and “self-sufficiency”, has levied customs duty of 20-25% on solar cells imported from China.

    A 2019 study suggests that the country would require an investment of Rs 1.65-1.75 lakh crore per year to generate cheaper power.

    Second, the renewable energy sector is capital-intensive and requires high capital investment initially to set up the farms. One way to source funds is to increase private sector participation. With increased competition among the private sector to develop technology, the country would gain from the lower costs of power generation and higher employment opportunities. A 2019 study suggests that the country would require an investment of Rs 1.65-1.75 lakh crore per year to generate cheaper power. The Government needs to encourage companies like ReGen Powertech Pvt Ltd., through generation-based incentives and tax holidays, that will invest in renewable energy power plants for its long-term financial benefits, despite the risk factors involved. At a time when investments in the sector are growing, the Government’s move to rescind benefits, may not impact the big players but will certainly have an adverse impact on the volume of investments from small investors, who largely depend on the Government’s support.

    Another financial barrier the sector faces is the lack of proper reinvestment. As the benefits from this sector are usually accrued in the long-term, the Government invests revenue from power generation in short-term development projects instead of reinvesting in the energy sector. Thus, for new solar energy projects to succeed, the efficient allocation of funds is pertinent. Alternatively, India could also follow Germany’s path. In Germany, since the energy transition set off in 2000, tens of thousands began investing in solar panels on their houses and buying shares in wind turbine producing companies, thus increasing capital. The government has actively engaged people in small cooperatives to favour energy transition from fossils to renewable sources.

     According to a recent report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), the total hybrid capacity is at 148 MW and is expected to increase almost 80 times in the next three years.

    Third, the intensity of the wind and solar energy availability is unstable, and it restricts the total power generated. Additionally, the setting up of separate wind and solar power plants is expensive. Thus, the government’s National Wind Solar Hybrid Policy of 2018 is highly pertinent. According to the policy, the two sources of energy complement each other, since solar can fuel power in the day and wind at night. This also means that the solar panels and wind turbines can be set up on the same farm, thus reducing costs. According to a recent report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), the total hybrid capacity is at 148 MW and is expected to increase almost 80 times in the next three years.

    In relation, the renewable energy sector also faces the problem of storage. Although India has developed battery storage facilities, it lacks a central framework to control the use of energy storage systems. The technology available is not enough to store energy from all power grids. This implies that an equilibrium has to be maintained between the demand and supply of power from renewable energy to reduce wastage. But this is an onerous task. The Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI) has recently encouraged bids for designing, engineering, and constructing new solar projects with provisions for battery storage systems. The recent World Energy Outlook report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that India will become the largest market for utility-scale battery storage by 2040.

    The Government should treat PV waste separately and bring out recycling policies that will sustain the solar energy sector in the long run.

    Lastly, the sector faces disposal issues as there is no proper system in place to dispose of broken solar panels and wind blades. Broken solar panels emanate harmful chemicals that are detrimental to the environment and consequently, public health. Solar PV waste is by default considered e-waste and is therefore guided by the e-Waste Management Rules, 2016. According to this, manufacturers are liable for the disposal of PV waste. But this regulation is inadequate. The Government should treat PV waste separately and bring out recycling policies that will sustain the solar energy sector in the long run. Europe, for instance, has set up a recycling plant that separates the different parts of the panel and recycles them individually. Given the increasing pace at which the solar energy sector is growing in India, setting up a similar method of waste management will benefit the sector and ergo the country’s future.

    Conclusion

    While India is responsible for nearly 6.65% of total global carbon emissions, it is also leading in the renewable energy sector. Its share of coal-based power plants in new installations declined significantly from 62% in 2016 to just 19% in 2017, whereas solar power led with around 45% of total power capacity additions. But to maintain this development, the Central and State governments should make coordinated efforts and bring out policies that ensure that power is affordable to all people, and efficiently manage renewable energy waste to not only reach its energy targets but also to ensure its overall development and growth.

  • Examining the Policy Effectiveness of Negative Interest Rates: A Case Study on Japan

    Examining the Policy Effectiveness of Negative Interest Rates: A Case Study on Japan

    As a global health crisis ravages across the world, central bankers have rushed to lower rates to historic levels in an attempt to soften the economic blow of the pandemic. Since the crisis hit in early 2020, interest rates have been slashed across the globe on 37 separate occasions. Almost all major economies have cut their policy rates and many are at near-zero levels. In light of this economic climate, the debate on whether negative interest rates could prove effective in adverse conditions has come to the forefront again.

    As of today, 5 economies in the world follow a negative interest rate policy (NIRP).  In 2012, Denmark was the first country to announce negative rates, subsequently followed by the Eurozone, Switzerland, Sweden and Japan.

    The decrease in interest rates is not a new phenomenon, rates have been sliding globally for the last 30 years [1]. This trend has been more pronounced since the financial crisis of 2008. While many economies have reached the theoretical zero lower-bound of rates, some have even dared to venture below the surface into negative territory. As of today, 5 economies in the world follow a negative interest rate policy (NIRP).  In 2012, Denmark was the first country to announce negative rates, subsequently followed by the Eurozone, Switzerland, Sweden and Japan. While the very concept of negative rates may seem baffling, it’s even more shocking to note that over $15 trillion’ worth of bonds is traded at negative yields globally [2]. This means that over 30% of the world’s investment-grade securities are traded in a manner such that lenders pay borrowers to use their funds.

    Negative Interest Rates in Theory

    Interest rates have widely been regarded as the most powerful weapon in a central banker’s arsenal. Until very recently, their only limitation seemed to be the zero-lower bound beyond which bankers have had their hands tied. However, with Denmark’s policy rates going negative in 2012, this limit seems to have been breached. In theory, the NIRP is put in effect by central banks making the policy rate or repo rate (rate at which banks park their funds with the central bank) negative. While the negative rates directly apply only to banks, its effects are transmitted to the entire system by effectively lowering overall real interest rates. Central banks envisage that negative policy rates would induce increased spending and stimulate the economy in two ways – firstly, by forcing banks to hold lesser deposits with the central bank and channelling these funds into increased lending to households and businesses. Secondly, a cut in the policy rate would also lead to lower rates in the overall lending market, thus encouraging borrowing and spending.

    This policy, however, is riddled with several loopholes and works only under certain conditions. There has also been evidence of unwanted externalities associated with negative rates. The experience of the 5 economies which implemented the NIRP has been mixed and there is no consensus so far among economists and policymakers on the merits/demerits of the policy.

    Japan’s Tryst with Negative Rates: A Case Study

    In 2016 the Bank of Japan (BOJ), facing a relentless battle against deflation and a depreciating Yen, decided to venture into negative territory and has stayed there ever since.  The Japanese economy’s long downward spiral began with the real-estate asset bubble bursting in 1989-90. While Japan’s ‘lost decade’ is a widely known concept, many academics argue that Japan has lost more than a decade and has not fully recovered yet. The economy has been in first-gear ever since the crash – today, almost 30 years hence, the Nikkei 225 is still languishing at about 40% of its 1989 peak [3].

    Over the years, the BOJ has tried almost every trick in the trade – low rates, printing more money, rounds of quantitative easing, you name it and it has been done already. But much like a car stuck in the mud, the Japanese economy just seems to be spinning its wheels in one place. It is in this backdrop that the BOJ pulled out one last trick up its sleeve, announcing a negative interest rate regime.

    What Did Japan Hope to Achieve Through the NIRP?

    To combat deflation, the BOJ has long been involved in multiple rounds of aggressive bond-buying, hoping to inject more cash in the economy. According to data from the BOJ statistics portal, the central bank has been purchasing bonds worth 8-12 trillion Yen per month consistently. This has led to a mammoth increase in the bond holdings of the BOJ and also the monetary base of the Japanese economy. This has had two direct implications –

    • Japanese banks were now flush with money but this did not translate into increased lending activity. Rather banks were now parking this excess cashback with the central bank as reserves, thus defeating the purpose. It has been estimated that over 90% of the new money created by the BOJ since 2013 has ended up back with the central bank
    • The downside of this aggressive bond-buying policy was that Japan had now accumulated a mountain of debt. As of 2020, Japan was the most indebted nation in the world, with its debt accounting for over 234% of its GDP [4]

    The BOJ hoped that the NIRP would help address both these concerns. By announcing a 0.1% negative interest rate on excess reserves, it hoped to force banks to hold lesser reserves with the BOJ and use the money for lending purposes. On the other hand, negative rates would also help ease the burden of interest payments on the national debt.

    Reasons for Failure of NIRP in Japan

    While the NIRP did succeed in its immediate goal of reducing banks holdings with the BOJ, it has failed to stimulate bank lending. Instead, Japanese banks are now looking to park their funds elsewhere, to beat the low returns at home. With rates at historic lows in Japan and lacklustre borrowing sentiment from households and businesses, banks have turned to foreign investments to rake up profits. The NIRP, rather than stimulate the economy through increasing lending has instead spurred a massive outflow of funds in favour of overseas assets. As a result, Japanese banks hold nearly 20% of the world’s CLO’s (collateralized loan obligations) [5]. The foreign investments of the Japan Post Office Bank (owned by the government) alone stood at $630 billion as of 2020, showing glimpses into the outflow of reserves from the domestic economy.

    The NIRP, rather than stimulate the economy through increasing lending has instead spurred a massive outflow of funds in favour of overseas assets. As a result, Japanese banks hold nearly 20% of the world’s CLO’s (collateralized loan obligations).

    The failure of the NIRP to stimulate domestic spending and investments has shown that the Japanese economy faces several structural challenges that need to be addressed first. Given Japan’s ageing workforce, it will not be easy to discourage households from saving, especially in the current economic climate. Unless businesses and households are willing to spend or invest, the availability of cheap loans is redundant. No matter how low the BOJ pushes interest rates, the economy cannot be revived unless the structural bottlenecks subduing growth are addressed.

    Policy Shortcomings of the NIRP

    Japan’s case and the experiences of the other four economies have highlighted several loopholes in the NIRP. While it has been successful in reducing commercial bank holdings with central banks, it has not managed to translate this into lending activity. As in the case of Japan, banks can always find other ways to make use of excess funds. Even if banks manage to pass on the negative rates to the general public, households would continue to hoard cash in the form of mattress money, thus defeating the purpose of the policy. Take Sweden’s case for example – despite having negative rates, Sweden still has the 3rd highest household savings rate in the world.

    The NIRP has also been associated with several unwanted externalities –

    • Decreasing Bank Profitability

    Negative rates can destabilize the entire banking system by adversely affecting bank profits. In the Euro-zone alone, banks have transferred $24.2 billion to the European Central Bank (ECB) as negative fees in the five years since negative interest rates were introduced

    • Create asset bubbles

    A negative rate regime could also lead to the creation of property and other asset bubbles. Since rates are low (or negative) for cash holdings, people tend to invest in real estate or other tangible assets, thus driving up prices.

    • Erode Pension Funds

    Many academics believe that negative rates would hurt economies in the long run by eroding pension funds. This could potentially be a major cause for concern for countries like Japan which have an ageing population

    Is the NIRP here to stay?

    Despite its long list of flaws and potential side-effects, nations still seem to be sticking with the NIRP, with trends showing that even more may follow suit soon. Given the current economic climate, central bankers are left with no choice but to continue with low rates – that they do so despite its shortcomings speaks volumes of the precarious global economic conditions. The NIRP however, cannot be written off as a completely failed policy as it has shown that it can be successful under certain conditions. In Switzerland for example, the NIRP has been largely successful in helping depreciate the Franc (to keep exports competitive) and maintaining exchange rate parity in the face of large foreign inflows into the country. Switzerland’s experience is replicated in Sweden, with negative rates helping boost exports, although not substantially.

    Different nations have had different motives for venturing into negative territory – while countries like Japan wanted to stimulate inflation, others like Switzerland and Sweden were more interested in maintaining their exchange rates. Success or failure of the NIRP depends on the prevailing conditions of the economy and the desired end-goals that countries are after. Since it has been a relatively new policy, countries are still in the phase of experimenting with negative rates and it is too early to draw conclusions on their successes and failures.  On whether the NIRP is an effective policy tool, the jury is still out.

     

    References

    [1] Neufeld, D. (2020, February 4). Visualizing the 700-Year Fall of Interest Rates. Visual Capitalist. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/700-year-decline-of-interest-rates/

    [2] Mullen, C & Ainger, J. (2020, November 6). World’s Negative-Yield Debt Pile Has Just Hit a New Record. Bloomberg Quint. https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/negative-yielding-debt-hits-record-17-trillion-on-bond-rally#:~:text=The%20market%20value%20of%20the,it%20reached%20in%20August%202019.

    [3] Tamura, M. (2019, December 29). 30 years since Japan’s stock market peaked, climb back continues. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/30-years-since-Japan-s-stock-market-peaked-climb-back-continues

    [4] World Population Review. (2020). Debt to GDP Ratio by Country 2020. Retrieved from https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-national-debt

    [5] Japanese banks own 20% of collateralized loans market – survey. (2020, June 2). Reuters. https://in.reuters.com/article/japan-economy-boj-loans/japanese-banks-own-20-of-collateralised-loans-market-survey-idUSL4N2DF1LP

     

    Image Credit: www.gulftoday.ae