The Peninsula Foundation

Category: TPF Analysis

  • Reality of India’s Performance as put Forth by the Environmental Performance Index (EPI)

    Reality of India’s Performance as put Forth by the Environmental Performance Index (EPI)

    India ranked 117 out of 180 countries as per the latest “The State of India’s Environment Report 2021” released by the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) in June 2021, while it ranked 87th out of 115 countries in the Energy Transition Index (ETI) released by the World Economic Forum in 2021

    Taking adequate measures to combat climate change and global warming has become a key priority of nation-states today. With a global understanding that reducing greenhouse gas emissions, achieving carbon neutrality, and switching to renewable sources of energy are the ways forward for sustainable development, countries around the world, including India, have made various pledges and commitments to achieve defined targets in respect of climate change and environmental protection. While developing countries have called for the adoption of the principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR–RC), India, as the third largest carbon emitter in the world, has considerable responsibility in enacting the much-needed changes. In the budget presented for 2022-23, the Indian government has pledged to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2070, and achieve a non-fossil fuel energy capacity of 500 GW by 2030. It further seeks to meet 50% of the energy requirements from renewable sources, while also reducing the total projected carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes and reducing the carbon intensity of the economy to less than 45%. These are stiff targets to achieve, maybe even impractical in the view of some analysts.

    While the Indian government has celebrated the inauguration of various policies and schemes which would contribute to these lofty goals, India’s performance according to global indices reveal an immediate need for a change of tactics.  India ranked 117 out of 180 countries as per the latest “The State of India’s Environment Report 2021” released by the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) in June 2021, while it ranked 87th out of 115 countries in the Energy Transition Index (ETI) released by the World Economic Forum in 2021. Similar positions have been held by the country in other notable indices like the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) where India was ranked 10th out of 60 countries and the European Union released by German Watch. Thus, India’s rank of 180 out of 180 countries in the Environment Performance Index came as a surprise to many. 

    The Environment Performance Index presents a data-driven summary of the state of sustainability around the world using 40 performance indicators based on climate change performance, environmental health, and ecosystem vitality. It is released biennially by the Yale Centre for Environmental Law and Policy and the Columbia University Centre for International Earth Science Information Network in partnership with the World Economic Forum. India’s position in the latest 2022 report is a step down from EPI-2020 where it ranked 168th with a score of 27.6. 

    India’s aggregate score according to EPI -2022 is 18.9 with the report stating that “India slips to the bottom of the rankings for the first time, with increasingly hazardous air quality and quickly rising greenhouse gas emissions.” Further, according to EPI, India also ranks poorly in terms of rule of law, corruption control, and government performance. On its release, the results have been contested by the Indian government which claimed that many of the indicators used are based on “unfounded assumptions” and that these were based on “surmises and unscientific methods”. 

    According to the concerns raised by the Indian government, Projected GHG Emissions Levels in 2050 which is the new indicator in the Climate Policy Objective,  is calculated in the Environment Performance Index using the average rate of change in emissions over the previous ten years rather than modelling that takes into account a longer time period and which considers other factors like the level of renewable energy capacity and usage, extra carbon sinks, energy efficiency and the like in the individual nations. While the principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibility and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR–RC) has been enshrined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) acknowledges the different capabilities and differing responsibilities of individual countries in addressing climate change, the EPI report’s emphasis on data and statistics have led to the overlooking of this principle in the course of its analysis. The time period used by the EPI of 10 years with regards to projected Greenhouse Gas emissions is unlike other indices like the CCPI (Climate Change Performance Index) which uses a timeframe of 5 years for its calculations (to take into consideration the new and renewed commitments made by countries at the 2015 Paris conference). The CCPI in comparison also uses a past trends indicator under the category of GHG emissions (with a 40 % weightage) where historical GHG emissions (Co2, Methane, Fluorinated gases, Nitrous Oxide) are considered with reference to the base year of 1990 as put forth by the Kyoto Protocol. The absence of acknowledgement of India’s historical emissions which have been minimal i.e.:  from 1870 to 2019, its emissions have added up to a minuscule 4 percent of the global total is also noticeable in the EPI findings. 

    The exclusion of the Indian Forest cover, which is far greater than many countries, as a vital carbon sink is a significant downfall of the EPI analysis

    Forests and wetlands have been globally acknowledged as vital carbon sinks with great effectiveness in controlling carbon levels. The world’s forests absorb a total of 15.6 gigatons of CO2 per year although these figures are threatened by threats like deforestation, natural disasters, and forest fires. According to the latest Forest Survey of India report, the total forest cover in India (2022) is 7,13,789 square kilometres which are 21.71% of the total geographical area. In comparison, Denmark, which topped the EPI rankings 2022, officially possesses  608,078 ha or 6080.78 square kilometres of forest corresponding to 14.1% of the land area. The exclusion of the Indian Forest cover, which is far greater than many countries, as a vital carbon sink is a significant downfall of the EPI analysis. 

    Wetland ecosystems have been scientifically proven as one of the most biologically productive areas on the planet. They provide a wide range of important services, such as food, water, groundwater recharge, water purification, flood moderation, erosion control, microclimate regulation and landscape aesthetics outside of being viable carbon sinks. According to the National Wetland Inventory and Assessment compiled by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), wetlands are spread over 1,52,600 square kilometres (sq. km) in India which is 4.63 percent of the total geographical area of the country. The difference in topography of the high-ranking countries in the index with India can mean that the effect of wetlands and forests can have a significant impact on India’s rankings as opposed to countries like Denmark where wetlands make up only 0.6 % of the land area where the impact is comparatively much lower. 

    The government further argues that the equity principle is given relatively little weightage in the form of statistics such as GHG emission per capita and GHG emission intensity trend which can be found to be grounded in the EPI’s disregard of the CBDR principle. The EPI rankings with regards to GHG emissions are also in contrast to other indices like the CCPI where seven G20 countries received a very low rating for their performance, including Russia (with 165 ranking with respect to GHG emissions and an overall ranking of 112), Australia (with 171 ranking with respect to GHG per capita and an overall rank of 17), the United States (with 167 ranking with respect to GHG per capita and overall rating of 43), and Canada (with 169 ranking with respect to GHG emissions and overall rating of 49). 

    While the EPI utilises indicators like Pesticides and N mgmt index under the category of agriculture and solid waste, recycling and ocean plastics under the category of waste management, other indicators such as agricultural biodiversity, soil health, food loss and waste are also not included in the report despite the fact that these are critical for developing nations with significant agrarian populations. Furthermore, the index computes the geographical distribution of various ecosystems but makes no mention of their efficiency and functioning with regard to climate change which can have a significant impact when gauging factors like biodiversity, waste management, air quality and fisheries. 

    India installed 15.4 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy projects in 2021 alone but operations of these projects remain a fraction of these capacities

    Thus, it can be found that certain critiques of the Environment Performance Index are well founded and must be acknowledged, and respective changes must be introduced to improve the reach, relevance, and functionality of the index. However, even with the addition of these factors, the fact remains that India’s performance on climate action is still underwhelming with significant gaps between capabilities and action in reality. India installed 15.4 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy projects in 2021 alone but operations of these projects remain a fraction of these capacities. Therefore, the government must concentrate on redoubling its efforts to meet its 2030 targets and use the reports of various indices including the Environment Performance Index as a gauge of the country’s closeness to achieving its promised goals. 

    Feature Image Credits: The New York Times

  • Declining Number of Tibetan Refugees in India

    Declining Number of Tibetan Refugees in India

    His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and his followers, were welcomed by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with open arms whose government helped them settle in India as they fled Tibet, following the Chinese invasion

    Introduction

    India is the largest democracy in the world, with a multi-party system, and a diverse set of cultures. It has a long tradition of hosting a large number of refugees. India has been particularly supportive of Tibetan refugees, right from the start of the Nehruvian era in the early 1950s. The number of Tibetan refugees living in India is estimated at well over 150,000 at any given time. However, a recent survey conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in India, in association with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), showed that only 72,312 Tibetans remain in the country.

    In India, Tibetans are considered to be one of the most privileged refugees unlike other refugees in the country. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and his followers, were welcomed by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with open arms whose government helped them settle in India as they fled Tibet, following the Chinese invasion. That period saw a large influx of Tibetans towards India as they sought asylum. The Tibetan refugees have been allotted settlements where they continue to live under the management of the MHA and the Tibetan government-in-exile, or the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA). These facilities have contributed to a sense of community-living and have enabled them to keep their culture alive till today. Tibetan refugees in India have enjoyed freedom, which was impossible in their own land under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. However, after residing in India for almost seven decades now, recent data estimates a large decline in the number of Tibetan refugees. Therefore, this study examines the theoretical concerns and empirical findings of refugee problems in general as well as distinctive features of the Tibetan refugee experience in India.

    The status of Tibetans in India is determined under the Passports Act 1967, Foreigner’s Act of 1946, and the Registration of Foreigners Act of 1939 which refer to Tibetans as simply “foreigners”. These provisions cover everyone apart from Indian citizens thus, restricting refugees’ mobility, property, and employment rights. Recognizing this, the Government of India sanctioned the Tibetan refugees with the 2014 Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy (TRP) which caters to the issues faced by them and promises a better life for Tibetans in India. An array of provisions under this policy include land leases, employment, trade opportunities such as setting up markets for handicrafts and handlooms, housing, etc. to all Tibetans in possession of the RC (Registration Certificate). Further, certain policies applicable to Indian citizens are extended to Tibetan refugees as well. For instance, the Constitution of India grants the right to equality (Article 14) and the right to life and liberty (Article 21), and India is obliged to provide asylum as outlined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Despite these facilities and the cordial relationship that has been built over 70 years between the Tibetans and Indians, the question raised by many, including Indian authorities is – why is the number of Tibetans migrating out of India increasing?

    With increased awareness about Tibetan refugees and their problems, many countries have opened their borders to Tibetans by introducing numerous favourable policies

    The various push and pull factors- motivation for migration

    The Tibetan Exit continues to grow with about 3000 refugees migrating out of India every year. The support and admiration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama gained worldwide has been partly due to the exhibition of the rich culture and traditions of Buddhism. With India being the birthplace of the religion, Tibetans in India caught the limelight in the global arena, leading many researchers to study their migration patterns to India. Attention is now being placed on Tibetans exiting India despite years of strong cultural and social bonding. General migratory trends of humans can be analyzed using eminent scholar Everett Lee’s comprehensive theory of migration of 1966. The term ‘migration’ is defined broadly as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. Many factors tend to hold people within the area or attract people towards it, and there are others that repel them from staying. This theory could also be applied to the Tibetan migratory trends by looking at the “Push and Pull” factors proposed by Lee. The ‘push theory’ here encompasses the aspects that encourage the Tibetans to emigrate outside India, and the pull theory is associated with the country of destination that attracts the Tibetans to emigrate. Ernest George Ravenstein, in his “Laws of Migration”, argues that ‘migrants generally proceed long distances by preference to one of the great centers of commerce and industry and that ‘the diversity of people defines the volume of migration’. Ravenstein’s laws provide a theoretical framework for this study, as Tibetans tend to migrate out of India with a special preference to Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia. With increased awareness about Tibetan refugees and their problems, many countries have opened their borders to Tibetans by introducing numerous favourable policies. For instance, with the Immigration Act of 1990, the Tibetan community in New York grew exponentially. The US Congress authorised 1000 special visas for Tibetans under the Tibetan Provisions of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1990, leading to the rampant growth of Tibetan migrants in the US. The first 10 to 12 Tibetan immigrants arrived in the U.S. in the 1960s, and then hundreds in the 1970s. Today, New York alone consists of roughly 5,000 to 6,000 Tibetan immigrants.

    Former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper agreed to resettle 1,000 Tibetans from Arunachal Pradesh in 2007 (CTA 2013) encouraging substantial migration. The fundamental intention of migration is to improve one’s well-being from the current state.

    The motivation for migration can be analysed by correlating origin and destination places with push and pull aspects. Push factors in the place of origin generally include lack of opportunities, religious or political persecution, genocide, hazardous environmental conditions, etc. The pull factors at the destination, on the other hand, are environment responsive to the push variables. The flow of migrants between the two points is hindered by intervening obstacles or intervening opportunities, which can also affect the motivations of individuals while migrating.

    Fig. 2 Lee’s (1966) push-pull theory in graphic form

    Fig.2 shows there are two points in the flow of migration – a place of origin and a destination, with positive and negative signs indicating the variables of pull and push factors with intervening obstacles between them. Both the origin and destination have pluses and minuses which means each place has its push and pull aspects. Every migrant is influenced by the positives of staying and the negatives of leaving a particular place. The factors to which people are essentially indifferent are denoted as zeroes. The logic of the push-pull theory is that if the pluses (pulls) at the destination outweigh the pluses of staying at the origin, as shown above, then migration is likely to occur.

    The three main pull factors or the aspects that pull Tibetans out of India are – economic opportunities, better policies for Tibetan refugees outside India, and world attention.

    Better opportunities and more earning capacity are the primary reasons for the migration of Tibetan refugees out of India. They claim that there are better options, job security, better facilities, and more accessible resources. All this put together expands their level of awareness. People outside treat them as equals which makes the living situation a lot easier, whereas in India, except for a handful who are well educated, Tibetans are mostly given very low-paid jobs such as servants, waiters, cleaners, etc.

    Second, concerning open policies in other countries, it can be argued that the migratory trend of Tibetans started in 1963 when Switzerland allowed 1,000 Tibetan refugees who were then the country’s first non-European refugees. Their population is now around 4,000. Further, in 1971, under the Tibetan Refugee Program (TRP), the original 240 Tibetans arrived in Canada, which now is a community of 5,000.

    Third, the migrants and His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s transnational travels have helped to promote Tibetan culture and give the West exposure to the richness and traditions of Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetans also migrate to spread awareness. Sonam Wang due, a young Tibetan activist from India who was the President of the Tibetan Youth Congress in Dharamshala, says that he moved to the U.S. to protest more effectively and freely. An important day known as the Tibetan Lobby Day is conducted annually in the U.S, where hundreds of Tibetans along with their supporters assemble to urge their respective governments and parliamentarians to continue their support for Tibet and the Tibetan people.

    Fig. 3 Tibetan Lobby Day in the U.S

    On the other hand, some factors tend to push people away from their origin country. Push factors from India are mainly restrictions and social reasons. There are many Tibetan schools and colleges in the subcontinent with a large number of Tibetan students. According to the Planning Commission’s data on Tibetan Demography 2010, there is growing unemployment among Tibetan youth, with levels as high as 79.4 percent. When students return to their settlements after graduation, only 5 percent of them get absorbed in employment in the Tibetan community, as jobs here are scarce with mediocre salaries. Finding a job in the Indian community is further restricted by the authorization issue which holds that they are not Indian citizens. Many of them join the Indian Army, work in call centers, or become nurses as these are a few employment opportunities in which they can earn reasonably to support their families. Those without RC are restricted while applying for business documents and procuring licenses, and the youths who have acquired education and skills are pushed out of India as they search for better job opportunities. The younger generation of Tibetans in India realizes the discrimination they face and are motivated to migrate elsewhere for a better life. Although there is Article 19 of the Indian Constitution for freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peacefully, when it comes to Tibetans’ protesting, they are restricted in every possible way. Tibetans must secure a legal permit before any protest outside Tibetan settlements. This varies from one region to another, for instance, Tibetans in Dharamshala can protest peacefully as that is their officially recognized place by the Central government. In spite of having authorized Tibetan settlement areas in Chandigarh, Delhi, Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka, etc., protests conducted in these states are not tolerated and require permits because the decision-making power is solely vested in each of the State governments.

    According to Mr. Sonam Dagpo, a spokesperson for the CTA, the main reason for the decline of refugees in India is because “Tibetans are recognized as ‘foreigners’, not refugees”. The Indian government does not recognize Tibetans as refugees primarily because India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention. This Convention relates to the status of refugees and is built on Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of people seeking asylum in other countries because of persecution in their own countries. Another important reason is the lack of awareness among Tibetan refugees that they are the stakeholders to benefit from the TRP. However, implementation of the policy is left to the discretion of the respective States, which makes it problematic. Many Tibetans use India as a transit spot. They enter India primarily to meet His Holiness the Dalai Lama and study here, after which in pursuit of a better life and the West’s influence, they tend to resettle abroad. Nepal in recent times, generously funded by the Chinese, started strictly patrolling the borders with India and are sending back Tibetans to their homeland. Therefore, this is also one of the reasons why Tibetans entering India have decreased drastically.

    The introduction of the Rehabilitation Policy (TRP) in India has decreased the burden on Tibetans. However, efforts are to be made to widen the level of awareness about the policy among the stakeholders and States

    Conclusion

    Egon F. Kunz (1981) theorized about refugee movements and formulated two categories of refugee migrants namely – ‘Anticipatory’ and ‘Acute’. Anticipatory migrants are people who flee in an orderly manner after a lot of preparation and having prior knowledge about the destination, the latter category of migrants is those who flee erratically due to threats by political or military entities and from persecution in their place of origin. Tibetans migrating out of India are largely Anticipatory refugee migrants well aware and seeking betterment. The introduction of the Rehabilitation Policy (TRP) in India has decreased the burden on Tibetans. However, efforts are to be made to widen the level of awareness about the policy among the stakeholders and States.

    Tibetans are mostly living and visiting India from abroad by and large because of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Considering his advancing age and the number of Tibetans migrating out of India on the rise, will there be a time when Tibetans will give away the hold of solidarity by living in large communities in India? This is the burning question that lies ahead in the future of India-Tibet relations.

    Feature Image Credits: Karnataka Tourism

    Fig. 1 Source: https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/2681

    Fig 2 Source: Dolma, T. (2019). Why are Tibetans Migrating Out of India? The Tibet Journal, 44(1), 27–52. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26921466

    Fig 3 Source: https://tibetlobbyday.us/testimonials/2020-photographs/

  • Roe overturned: What you need to know about the American Supreme Court abortion decision

    Roe overturned: What you need to know about the American Supreme Court abortion decision

    Despite the terminal decline of the American Empire or the Deep State, the American Republic still remains an inspiration for people across the world, for reasons of its vibrant democracy and peoples’ liberty ensured through robust institutions, law and order, and the strong constitutional process. To paraphrase Johan Galtung – ‘the US is a fabulous Republic but a terrible empire’. But even that seems to be changing as society’s democratic values, ethics, and morals are in serious decline.  The rise of right wing politics has led to a decline in the standards and values, and in the independence of institutions most notably the Judiciary. Separation of the Church and the State is a core tenet of the American Constitution and governance. That seems to be compromised as many judges bring their personal and religious beliefs in to their work. This was in demonstration in the American Supreme Court’s judgement that ends one of the most critical fundamental rights of women to their bodies and their choices for abortion. 

    After half a century, Americans’ constitutional right to get an abortion has been overturned by the Supreme Court.The ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization – handed down on June 24, 2022 – has far-reaching consequences. There is a strong religious influence to this judgement. This could influence many other countries, particularly in an environment where right wing politics, influenced by narrow religious overtones,  is on the upswing in many countries across the world, including the world’s largest Democracy, India. Fortunately, India’s abortion laws are governed by medical advice and womens’ safety (and so it is termed MTP – Medical termination of Pregnancy). The MTP Act of 1971 was further liberalised through an Amendment Act of 2021 wherein the gestation limit for abortions is raised from 20 to 24 weeks. While India’s laws are considerate by supporting abortion decision to rape and incest survivors, the American judgement will deny this freedom or choice to the victim women.

     Nicole Huberfeld and Linda C. McClain, health law and constitutional law experts at Boston University, explain what just happened, and what happens next. This article was published earlier in The Conversation. TPF is happy to republish this article under the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives 4.0-International (CC BY-ND 4.0).

    – TPF Editorial Team

    What did the Supreme Court rule?

    The Supreme Court decided by a 6-3 majority to uphold Mississippi’s ban on abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy. In doing so, the justices overturned two key decisions protecting access to abortion: 1973’s Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, decided in 1992.

    The court’s opinion, written by Justice Samuel Alito, said that the Constitution does not mention abortion. Nor does the Constitution guarantee abortion rights via another right, the right to liberty.

    The opinion rejected Roe’s and Casey’s argument that the constitutional right to liberty included an individual’s right to privacy in choosing to have an abortion, in the same way that it protects other decisions concerning intimate sexual conduct, such as contraception and marriage. According to the opinion, abortion is “fundamentally different” because it destroys fetal life.

    The court’s narrow approach to the concept of constitutional liberty is at odds with the broader position it took in the earlier Casey ruling, as well as in a landmark marriage equality case, 2015’s Obergefell v. Hodges. But the majority said that nothing in their opinion should affect the right of same-sex couples to marry.

    Alito’s opinion also rejected the legal principle of “stare decisis,” or adhering to precedent. Supporters of the right to abortion argue that the Casey and Roe rulings should have been left in place as, in the words of the Casey ruling, reproductive rights allow women to “participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.”

    The ruling does not mean that abortion is banned throughout the U.S. Rather, arguments about the legality of abortion will now play out in state legislatures, where, Alito noted, women “are not without electoral or political power.”

    States will be allowed to regulate or prohibit abortion subject only to what is known as “rational basis” review – this is a weaker standard than Casey’s “undue burden” test. Under Casey’s undue burden test, states were prevented from enacting restrictions that placed substantial obstacles in the path of those seeking abortion. Now, abortion bans will be presumed to be legal as long as there is a “rational basis” for the legislature to believe the law serves legitimate state interests.

    In a strenuous dissent, Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor faulted the court’s narrow approach to liberty and challenged its disregard both for stare decisis and for the impact of overruling Roe and Casey on the lives of women in the United States. The dissenters said the impact of the decision would be “the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens.” They also expressed deep concern over the ruling’s effect on poor women’s ability to access abortion services in the U.S.

    Where does this decision fit into the history of reproductive rights in the U.S.?

    This is a huge moment. The court’s ruling has done what reproductive rights advocates feared for decades: It has taken away the constitutional right to privacy that protected access to abortion.

    This decision was decades in the making. Thirty years ago when Casey was being argued, many legal experts thought the court was poised to overrule Roe. Then, the court had eight justices appointed by Republican presidents, several of whom indicated readiness to overrule in dissenting opinions.

    Instead, Republican appointees Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor and David Souter upheld Roe. They revised its framework to allow more state regulation throughout pregnancy and weakened the test for evaluating those laws. Under Roe’s “strict scrutiny” test, any restriction on the right to privacy to access an abortion had to be “narrowly tailored” to further a “compelling” state interest. But Casey’s “undue burden” test gave states wider latitude to regulate abortion.

    Even before the Casey decision, abortion opponents in Congress had restricted access for poor women and members of the military greatly by limiting the use of federal funds to pay for abortion services.

    In recent years, states have adopted numerous restrictions on abortion that would not have survived Roe’s tougher “strict scrutiny” test. Even so, many state restrictions have been struck down in federal courts under the undue burden test, including bans on abortions prior to fetal viability and so-called “TRAP” – targeted regulation of abortion provider – laws that made it harder to keep clinics open.

    President Donald Trump’s pledge to appoint “pro-life” justices to federal courts – and his appointment of three conservative Supreme Court justices – finally made possible the goal of opponents of legal abortion: overruling Roe and Casey.

    What happens next?

    Even before Dobbs, the ability to access abortion was limited by a patchwork of laws across the United States. Republican states have more restrictive laws than Democratic ones, with people living in the Midwest and South subject to the strongest limits.

    Thirteen states have so-called “trigger laws,” which greatly restrict access to abortion. These will soon go into effect now that the Supreme Court has overturned Roe and Casey, requiring only state attorney general certification or other action by a state official.

    Nine states have pre-Roe laws never taken off the books that significantly restrict or ban access to abortion. Altogether, nearly half of states will restrict access to abortion through a variety of measures like banning abortion from six weeks of pregnancy – before many women know they are pregnant – and limiting the reasons abortions may be obtained, such as forbidding abortion in the case of fetal anomalies.

    Meanwhile, 16 states and the District of Columbia protect access to abortion in a variety of ways, such as state statutes, constitutional amendments or state Supreme Court decisions.

    None of the states that limit abortion access currently criminalize the pregnant person’s action. Rather, they threaten health care providers with civil or criminal actions, including loss of their license to practice medicine.

    Some states are creating “safe havens” where people can travel to access an abortion legally. People have already been traveling to states like Massachusetts from highly restrictive states.

    The court’s decision may drive federal action, too.

    The House of Representatives passed the Women’s Health Protection Act, which protects health care providers and pregnant people seeking abortion, but Senate Republicans have blocked the bill from coming up for a vote. Congress could also reconsider providing limited Medicaid payment for abortion, but such federal legislation also seems unlikely to succeed.

    President Joe Biden could use executive power to instruct federal agencies to review existing regulations to ensure that access to abortion continues to occur in as many places as possible. Congressional Republicans could test the water on nationwide abortion bans. While such efforts are likely to fail, these efforts could cause confusion for people who are already vulnerable.

    The Supreme Court’s rolling back a right that has been recognized for 50 years puts the U.S. in the minority of nations, most of which are moving toward liberalization.

    What does this mean for people in America seeking an abortion?

    Unintended pregnancies and abortions are more common among poor women and women of color, both in the U.S. and around the world.

    Research shows that people have abortions whether lawful or not, but in nations where access to abortion is limited or outlawed, women are more likely to suffer negative health outcomes, such as infection, excessive bleeding and uterine perforation. Those who must carry a pregnancy to full term are more likely to suffer pregnancy-related deaths.

    The state-by-state access to abortion resulting from this decision means many people will have to travel farther to obtain an abortion. And distance will mean fewer people will get abortions, especially lower-income women – a fact the Supreme Court itself recognized in 2016.

    But since 2020, medication abortion – a two-pill regimen of mifepristone and misoprostol – has been the most common method of ending pregnancy in the U.S. The coronavirus pandemic accelerated this shift, as it drove the Food and Drug Administration to make medication abortions more available by allowing doctors to prescribe the pills through telemedicine and permitting medication to be mailed without in-person consultation.

    Many states that restrict access to abortion also are trying to prevent medication abortion. But stopping telehealth providers from mailing pills will be a challenge. Further, because the FDA approved this regimen, states will be contradicting federal law, setting up conflict that may lead to more litigation.

    The Supreme Court’s rolling back a right that has been recognized for 50 years puts the U.S. in the minority of nations, most of which are moving toward liberalization. Nevertheless, even though abortion is seen by many as essential health care, the cultural fight will surely continue.

    Featured Image Credit: Evening Standard

  • The Geopolitical Consolidation of Artificial Intelligence

    The Geopolitical Consolidation of Artificial Intelligence

    Key Points

    • IT hardware and Semiconductor manufacturing has become strategically important and critical geopolitical tools of dominant powers. Ukraine war related sanctions and Wassenaar Arrangement regulations invoked to ban Russia from importing or acquiring electronic components over 25 Mhz.
    • Semi conductors present a key choke point to constrain or catalyse the development of AI-specific computing machinery.
    • Taiwan, USA, South Korea, and Netherlands dominate the global semiconductor manufacturing and supply chain. Taiwan dominates the global market and had 60% of the global share in 2021. Taiwan’s one single company – TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co), the world’s largest foundry, alone accounted for 54% of total global revenue.
    • China controls two-thirds of all silicon production in the world.
    • Monopolisation of semiconductor supply by a singular geopolitical bloc poses critical challenges for the future of Artificial Intelligence (AI), exacerbating the strategic and innovation bottlenecks for developing countries like India.
    • Developing a competitive advantage over existing leaders would require not just technical breakthroughs but also some radical policy choices and long-term persistence.
    • India should double down over research programs on non-silicon based computing with a national urgency instead of pursuing a catch-up strategy.

    Russia was recently restricted, under category 3 to category 9 of the Wassenaar Arrangement, from purchasing any electronic components over 25MHz from Taiwanese companies. That covers pretty much all modern electronics. Yet, the tangibles of these sanctions must not deceive us into overlooking the wider impact that hardware access and its control have on AI policies and software-based workflows the world over. As Artificial Intelligence technologies reach a more advanced stage, the capacity to fabricate high-performance computing resources i.e. semiconductor production becomes key strategic leverage in international affairs.

    Semiconductors present a key chokepoint to constrain or catalyse the development of AI-specific computing machinery. In fact, most of the supply of semiconductors relies on a single country – Taiwan. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) manufactures Google’s Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), Cerebras’s Wafer Scale Engine (WSE), as well as Nvidia’s A100 processor. The following table provides a more detailed1 assessment:

    Hardware Type

    AI Accelerator/Product Name

    Manufacturing Country

    Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs)

    Huawei Ascend 910

    Taiwan

    Cerebras WSE

    Taiwan

    Google TPUs

    Taiwan

    Intel Habana

    Taiwan

    Tesla FSD

    USA

    Qualcomm Cloud AI 100

    Taiwan

    IBM TrueNorth

    South Korea

    AWS Inferentia

    Taiwan

    AWS Trainium

    Taiwan

    Apple A14 Bionic

    Taiwan

    Graphic Processing Units (GPUs)

    AMD Radeon

    Taiwan

    Nvidia A100

    Taiwan

    Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)

    Intel Agilex

    USA

    Xilinx Virtex

    Taiwan

    Xilinx Alveo

    Taiwan

    AWS EC2 FI

    Taiwan

    As can be seen above, the cake of computing hardware is largely divided in such a way that the largest pie holders also happen to form a singular geopolitical bloc vis-a-vis China. This further shapes the evolution of territorial contests in the South China Sea. This monopolisation of semiconductor supply by a singular geopolitical bloc poses critical challenges for the future of Artificial Intelligence, especially exacerbating the strategic and innovation bottlenecks for developing countries like India. Since the invention of the transistor in 1947, and her independence, India has found herself in an unenviable position where there stands zero commercial semiconductor manufacturing capacity after all these years while her office-bearers continually promise of leading in the fourth industrial revolution.

    Bottlenecking Global AI Research

    There are two aspects of developing these AI accelerators – designing the specifications and their fabrication. AI research firms first design chips which optimise hardware performance to execute specific machine learning calculations. Then, semiconductor firms, operating in a range of specialities and specific aspects of fabrication, make those chips and increase the performance of computing hardware by adding more and more transistors to pieces of silicon. This combination of specific design choices and advanced hardware fabrication capability forms the bedrock that will decide the future of AI, not the amount of data a population is generating and localising.

    However, owing to the very high fixed costs of semiconductor manufacturing, AI research has to be focused on data and algorithms. Therefore, innovations in AI’s algorithmic efficiency and model scaling have to compensate for a lack of equivalent situations in the AI’s hardware. The aggressive consolidation and costs of hardware fabrication mean that firms in AI research are forced to outsource their hardware fabrication requirements. In fact, as per DARPA2, because of the high costs of getting their designs fabricated, AI hardware startups do not even receive much private capital and merely 3% of all venture funding between 2017-21 in AI/ML has gone to startups working on AI hardware.

    But TSMC’s resources are limited and not everyone can afford them. To get TSMC’s services, companies globally have to compete with the likes of Google and Nvidia, therefore prices go further high because of the demand side competition. Consequently, only the best and the biggest work with TSMC, and the rest have to settle for its competitors. This has allowed this single company to turn into a gatekeeper in AI hardware R&D. And as the recent sanctions over Russia demonstrate, it is now effectively playing the pawn which has turned the wazir in a tense geopolitical endgame.

    Taiwan’s AI policy also reflects this dominance in ICT and semiconductors – aiming to develop “world-leading AI-on-Device solutions that create a niche market and… (make Taiwan) an important partner in the value chain of global intelligent systems”.3 The foundation of strong control over the supply of AI hardware and also being #1 in the Global Open Data Index, not just gives Taiwan negotiating leverage in geopolitical competition, but also allows it to focus on hardware and software collaboration based on seminal AI policy unlike most countries where the AI policy and discourse revolve around managing the adoption and effects of AI, and not around shaping the trajectory of its engineering and conceptual development like the countries with hardware advantage.

    Now to be fair, R&D is a time-consuming, long-term activity which has a high chance of failure. Thus, research focus naturally shifts towards low-hanging fruits, projects that can be achieved in the short-term before the commissioning bureaucrats are rotated. That’s why we cannot have a nationalised AGI research group, as nobody will be interested in a 15-20 year-long enterprise when you have promotions and election cycles to worry about. This applies to all high-end bleeding-edge technology research funding everywhere – so, quantum communications will be prioritised over quantum computing, building larger and larger datasets over more intelligent algorithms, and silicon-based electronics over researching newer computing substrates and storage – because those things are more friendly to short-term outcome pressures and bureaucracies aren’t exactly known to be a risk-taking institution.

    Options for India

    While China controls 2/3 of all the silicon production in the world and wants to control the whole of Taiwan too (and TSMC along with its 54% share in logic foundries), the wider semiconductor supply chain is a little spreadout too for any one actor’s comfort. The leaders mostly control a specialised niche of the supply chain, for example, the US maintains a total monopoly on Electronic Design Automation (EDA) software solutions, the Netherlands has monopolised Extreme UltraViolet and Argon Flouride scanners, and Japan has been dishing out 300 mm wafers used to manufacture more than 99 percent of the chips today.4 The end-to-end delivery of one chip could have it crossing international borders over 70 times.5 Since this is a matured ecosystem, developing a competitive advantage over existing leaders would require not just proprietary technical breakthroughs but also some radical policy choices and long term persistence.

    It is also needless to say that the leaders are also able to attract and retain the highest quality talent from across the world. On the other hand, we have a situation where regional politicians continue cribbing about incoming talent even from other Indian states. This is therefore the first task for India, to become a technology powerhouse, she has to, at a bare minimum, be able to retain all her top talent and attract more. Perhaps, for companies in certain sectors or of certain size, India must make it mandatory to spend at least X per cent of revenue on R&D and offer incentives to increase this share – it’ll revamp things from recruitment and retention to business processes and industry-academia collaboration – and in the long-run prove to be a lot more socioeconomically useful instrument than the CSR regulation.

    It should also not escape anyone that the human civilisation, with all its genius and promises of man-machine symbiosis, has managed to put all its eggs in a single basket that is also under the constant threat of Chinese invasion. It is thus in the interest of the entire computing industry to build geographical resiliency, diversity and redundancy in the present-day semiconductor manufacturing capacity. We don’t yet have the navy we need, but perhaps in a diplomatic-naval recognition of Taiwan’s independence from China, the Quad could manage to persuade arrangements for an uninterrupted semiconductor supply in case of an invasion.

    Since R&D in AI hardware is essential for future breakthroughs in machine intelligence – but its production happens to be extremely concentrated, mostly by just one small island country, it behoves countries like India to look for ways to undercut the existing paradigm of developing computing hardware (i.e. pivot R&D towards DNA Computing etc) instead of only trying to pursue a catch-up strategy. The current developments are unlikely to solve India’s blues in integrated circuits anytime soon. India could parallelly, and I’d emphatically recommend that she should, take a step back from all the madness and double down on research programs on non-silicon-based computing with a national urgency. A hybrid approach toward computing machinery could also resolve some of the bottlenecks that AI research is facing due to dependencies and limitations of present-day hardware.

    As our neighbouring adversary Mr Xi says, core technologies cannot be acquired by asking, buying, or begging. In the same spirit, even if it might ruffle some feathers, a very discerning reexamination of the present intellectual property regime could also be very useful for the development of such foundational technologies and related infrastructure in India as well as for carving out an Indian niche for future technology leadership.

    References:

    1. The Other AI Hardware Problem: What TSMC means for AI Compute. Available at https://semiliterate.substack.com/p/the-other-ai-hardware-problem

    2. Leef, S. (2019). Automatic Implementation of Secure Silicon. In ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI (Vol. 3)

    3. AI Taiwan. Available at https://ai.taiwan.gov.tw/

    4. Khan et al. (2021). The Semiconductor Supply Chain: Assessing National Competitiveness. Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
    5. Alam et al. (2020). Globality and Complexity of the Semiconductor Ecosystem. Accenture.

  • TPF Analysis Series on Russia – Ukraine Conflict #1

    TPF Analysis Series on Russia – Ukraine Conflict #1

    The Peninsula Foundation is releasing a series of analysis papers on the Ukraine-Russia conflict to help the public have a better understanding of the geo-political and security dimensions underlying the conflict. The first paper of the series will introduce you to an overview of the historical, political and humanitarian aspects of the ongoing conflict which is snowballing to be a major conflict and a turning point in Europe’s history since World War II.

    Russia – Ukraine History

    Russia and Ukraine have had a long interwoven history, since as early as the 18th century. One of the most contested territories, Crimea, was first annexed by the Russian empire in 1783 back when it was controlled by the Crimean Khanate. The territory then became a part of the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1921, to be later controlled by Nazi Germany for a brief period in 1942. Following the end of World War II, the autonomous status of Crimea was dissolved as it now became a province of the USSR, but was later handed over to Ukraine as a goodwill gesture by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 to mark the 300th anniversary of Ukraine’s reunification with the USSR.

    Crimea: White Russian refugees gathering at a Crimean port during the Russian Civil War.

    Image: Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

    With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, many had expected Boris Yelsten to take up the issue and bring back Crimea to Russia, but instead, the Crimean parliament proclaimed the independence of its territory in May 1992, a proclamation only to be annulled by Ukraine. Over twenty years later, a similar referendum, with most of the Crimean population voting to join Russia – a referendum declared illegal by Ukrainian and European governments alike. What followed next was a dramatic escalation with the deployment of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.

    Some have argued that NATO’s expansion towards the East is the primary cause of the war, since the organisation was formed primarily to counter the Soviet Union during the Cold War. While it must be acknowledged that such expansion was to be viewed by Russian officials as a provocation even back in the 1990s, the arguments, however, also take away the agency of states in Eastern Europe with most of them ‘demanding’ to join NATO, eager to reap the benefits of the West’s economic system. Over the years, several small states, including Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova, have seen their relationship with the West as a tool to bring regional stability, and increase their bargaining power against Russia.

    Events leading up to the war

    2021 was a year of security challenges that shook the world amid an ever-mutating Covid-19 pandemic. In October 2021, Russia started moving its troops and military equipment closer to the Ukraine border rekindling concerns of a potential invasion. By mid-December 2021, Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov released a set of security guarantees and assurances to be met by the U.S. and NATO in exchange for non-intervention in Ukraine. Putin also threatened unspecified ‘military technical’ measures if the West fails to accede to his demands. Putin’s major demands were; (i) Ban on Ukraine entering NATO, (ii) No further expansion of NATO in the Eastern European region, (iii) Withdrawal of any troops or weapons deployed in countries which entered NATO after 1997 (Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Balkan countries), (iv) No NATO drills to be conducted in Ukraine, Georgia and Central Asia without prior agreement with Russia. Although NATO was formed to counter the USSR during the Cold War,  it continued its expansion into Eastern Europe territories even long after the dissolution of the USSR. Putin was threatened by the continuous NATO expansionism, the security implications and the loss of the Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

    The U.S. and NATO immediately rejected these main demands warning if Russia invades Ukraine, there will be serious retaliation and Russia will be met with a ‘massive forceful package’ of economic sanctions. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kuleba had said that although they were expecting and already experiencing aggressive Russian cyber-attacks and destabilisation of the Ukrainian economy, the number of Russian troops on the border was ‘insufficient’ and the build-up was missing some key military indicators to execute an imminent ‘full-scale invasion’ of Ukraine. Many experts and theorists also opined that despite Putin’s bold demands and his game of brinkmanship, the reality of war was in question.

    On 21st February, in a televised address Putin said that ‘Ukraine is an integral part of Russia’s history’ and declared the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent Republic States and sent Russian troops into those regions for ‘peacekeeping’.

    The beginning of February showed some positive signs of diplomacy or at the least maintenance of the status quo between Ukraine and Russia despite the West’s declining Putin’s demands. However, it was only calm before the storm. On 21st February, in a televised address Putin said that ‘Ukraine is an integral part of Russia’s history’ and declared the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent Republic States and sent Russian troops into those regions for ‘peacekeeping’. As a response to this, the US and other NATO members imposed economic sanctions on Russian parliament members, banks and other assets and Germany decisively halted the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project.

    ‘Special Military Operation’

    On 24th February, Putin announced a ’special military operation’ and Russian forces launched missile and artillery attacks on major Ukrainian cities including Kyiv. Ukrainian Foreign Minister affirmed that Russia has launched a ‘full-scale invasion of Ukraine’, following which Ukraine shut down its entire airspace as a response to the Russian operation in Donbas. The West imposed further sanctions on Russia including but not limited to, removing select Russian banks from the SWIFT system, freezing the assets of the Russian Central Bank and curbing products exported to Russia.

    Zaporizhzhia is a vital asset in fulfilling Ukraine’s energy requirements with six nuclear reactors with a capacity of generating 950MW per reactor. Capturing Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant would have been a major plan of the invading forces given its strategic nature.

    Nearly four weeks since the Russian Federation launched a ‘special military operation’, the situation on the ground in Ukraine continues to remain dire. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) has been responsible for documenting civilian casualties in Ukraine since 2014. In the span of three weeks, Ukraine’s infrastructure and cultural heritage have suffered irreparable damage or been completely destroyed. The ceaseless shelling by Russian forces of cities and hospitals have exacerbated the human toll.

    According to a press briefing released by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), civilian casualties as of 26 March 2022 stand at 2,909 – 1,119 people killed and 1,790 injured.

    The OHCHR assesses that actual figures might be higher than what is currently being reported as they wait for figures to be corroborated. Most of the civilian casualties are reportedly caused by explosive weapons with a wide impact area. This includes shelling from heavy artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems and missile and air strikes.

    In a rather unexpected move, on 4th March, 2022 the Russian forces attacked and captured the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, located in Energodar, Ukraine. Zaporizhzhia is a vital asset in fulfilling Ukraine’s energy requirements with six nuclear reactors with a capacity of generating 950MW per reactor. Capturing Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant would have been a major plan of the invading forces given its strategic nature.

    The Russian attack on the nuclear plant raised alarm bells among nations and nuclear watchdogs. Intense shelling on the complex caused a fire in one of the training buildings. Reports have noted the damage to multiple locations within the complex. The Ukrainian government was quick to act and called it an “act of terror”. Contrary to Ukrainian claims, the Russian Ministry of Defence spokesperson Maj. Gen. Igor Konashenkov claimed that the entire event was a sabotage act by the Ukrainian forces. With Chernobyl captured very early in the invasion, the attack on Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant raises questions about the safety and security of nuclear infrastructures during times of crisis.

    On March 9, 2022, a hospital in Mariupol that also housed a maternity ward came under attack. It was reported that at least 4 people were killed in the bombing, including a pregnant woman. Presently, Mariupol is seeing some of the fiercest attacks, since the port city is a strategic target for Russia. It is estimated that some 300,000 people are trapped with supplies running low. The Russian Federation’s offer of safe passage out of Mariupol for the Ukrainian people has been summarily rejected by Ukraine’s Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk who was quoted saying, “There can be no question of any surrender, laying down of arms”.

    Other areas to have been hit include Kyiv, Kharkiv, Borodyanka, Ochakiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, Odessa etc. On March 1, the Central Freedom Square in Kharkiv was bombed that leaving both the administrative building and surrounding structures destroyed. On 14 March the Ukrainian health minister Viktor Liashko reported that nearly 100 hospitals had been damaged. As of 17 March, the World Health Organisation (WHO) has verified 44 instances of attacks on healthcare facilities in Ukraine. 

    West’s Sanctions

    The global media coverage of the invasion can be best described as a cacophony of partisanship. The western media has been charged with accusations of brushing off Russian security concerns and, of course, brazen racism. It has followed its own orientalist approach to present the crisis as a result of Russian imperialism.

    The West has swiftly responded by imposing sanctions; a course of action meant to deter and halt Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced halting final approval for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline following Russia’s recognition of two breakaway regions of Eastern Ukraine – Luhansk and Donetsk.

    On 8 March, President Biden, with bipartisan support, announced that the US would be banning imports of Russian oil, gas and energy. The UK also announced that it would phase out Russian oil imports by the end of 2022 on the same day. Both the US and the UK are working with their European counterparts to reduce dependency on Russian hydrocarbon imports. The European Commission responded to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine by stating that the EU countries would work to become independent of Russian energy imports “well before 2030”. Other economic deterrents imposed have been the ban on exports of luxury goods like vehicles, fashion and art to Russia by the UK and EU. The UK has also imposed a 35% tax on imports from Russia, including vodka. Russian oligarchs’ assets in the US, UK and the EU have been targeted. Sanctions have also been imposed on former Russian leaders, ministers and current members of the Russian Parliament.

    Russian flights and private jets have been banned from the US, UK, EU and Canadian airspaces. The G7 countries have also stripped Russia of its “most favoured nation” status; a move that will impact Russia’s trade. Assets of most Russian banks have been frozen and some of them have been removed from the international financial system SWIFT. Other countries to have imposed sanctions on Russia include Japan, Taiwan, New Zealand, Australia and Switzerland. Australia moved to ban exports of alumina and aluminium ore, including bauxite to Russia. Russia relies on Australia for 20% of its alumina requirements – aluminium being a major export for Russia. Several energy, automobile, tech, financial, food and fashion companies have also halted operations in Russia – Exxon, Shell, Apple, Alphabet, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Ferrari, Harley-Davidson, Nike, McDonald’s etc.

    Globally, the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war has been felt in oil markets as prices continue to surge to well over $100 per barrel. Russia’s response to being hit with global sanctions has been to ban the exports of over 200 products, including telecoms, electrical equipment, agricultural, medical goods etc. However, this list does not include energy and raw material resources. It has also banned and blocked interest payments to foreign investors and dividends to overseas shareholders and also banned the sale of Russian stocks and bonds held by foreign investors. It has also passed a decree suspending the IP rights of ‘unfriendly countries’.

    On 15 March, President Zelensky said that it must be accepted that Ukraine will not become a member of NATO, possibly appeasing one of Putin’s major security concerns. Additionally, on 15 March, Moscow announced its decision to withdraw from the Council of Europe after 26 years of membership, hours ahead of a formal decision taken by the Council to expel Russia over its aggression in Ukraine. The move also means that Russia will no longer be a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, depriving its citizens of the right to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights. A statement from the Russian foreign ministry cited that the EU and NATO had “destroyed” the Council of Europe and turned the organisation into an “anti-Russia policy tool”.

    Russia also made the decision to sanction President Biden, Prime Minister Trudeau and several top US officials. The list includes Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, CIA Director William Burns, WH Press Secretary Jen Psaki and former Secretary of State and Democratic Presidential candidate Hilary Clinton.

    The global media coverage of the invasion can be best described as a cacophony of partisanship. The western media has been charged with accusations of brushing off Russian security concerns and, of course, brazen racism. It has followed its own orientalist approach to present the crisis as a result of Russian imperialism. Popular Russian media channels such as RT and Sputnik have been banned by YouTube across Europe, essentially leading to the West dominating the information warfare, controlling the narrative and presenting a one-sided perspective to the world.  The Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, commonly known as the Roskomnadzor, released a statement informing media and other information sources that any publication regarding the ‘special military operation’ must only use the information received from Russian officials. Several independent Russian media outlets like Ekho Moskvy, InoSMI, Mediazona, New Times, Dozhd, Svobodnaya Pressa, Krym, Realii, Novaya Gazeta, Journalist, Lenizdat etc. were sent notifications by the Roskomnadzor on allegations of reporting false information regarding the actions of the Russian Army, shelling in Ukrainian cities and referring to the military operation as ‘war’, ‘invasion’ and ‘attack’. Nonetheless, some media houses have stood up to the pressure to report more appropriately.

    The war in Ukraine could also leave lasting environmental damage, being a highly industrialised state. The threat of radiation resulting from an attack on any one of Ukraine’s nuclear plants could have devastating consequences. Carcinogenic dust from bombed buildings, groundwater contaminations from spilled chemicals and attacks on industrial facilities will have a lasting impact on the health of the people in the country.

    UN Response

    As Russian troops continue to shell Ukrainian cities, the various United Nations bodies have called for emergency meetings, albeit with no successful outcome to halt the war. In February 2022, a Security Council meeting calling for a resolution to condemn the Russian military operations and demanding an end to Russian attacks had similarly failed with the resolution having been vetoed by Russia.

    Although Putin’s end may not justify his means, one needs to look at this crisis holistically and historically. Putin may have been the one to declare war, but the triggering and contributing events and actions by NATO and the US should also be taken into consideration while analysing this conflict.

    However, the United Nations has been swift with its humanitarian response, an effort visible with its coordinated appeals calling for the allocation of an estimated USD 1.7 billion to help the Ukrainians. Dividing the allocation of funds into two categories – one for people within Ukraine, and the other for its comprehensive response towards refugees coming from Ukraine, the United Nations’ relief efforts have seen one of the most generous responses to its funding appeal. Further, as fighting continues amidst multiple rounds of talks between Russia and Ukraine, UN Agencies, including UNICEF, continue to supply humanitarian aid, including medical supplies to the country. As part of its cash-response strategy, the UN agencies have additionally planned to implement its program of cash-for-rent assistance, where they seek to provide the affected population with the resources to find themselves an accommodation, in order to avoid large-scale displacement.

    Although Putin’s end may not justify his means, one needs to look at this crisis holistically and historically. Putin may have been the one to declare war, but the triggering and contributing events and actions by NATO and the US should also be taken into consideration while analysing this conflict. It seems to be that Putin has not entered into an all-out war yet, as his objectives and weaponry employed are limited. In the forthcoming series of analyses, The Peninsula Foundation delves into each of the facets of the conflict mentioned in this paper.

    Featured Image Credits: The Times

    NATO Expansion Image Credits: Statista

    Russian General Image Credits: Moscow Times

    UNSC Image Credits: Harvard Law Today

  • Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi: Yemen civil war and Regional Complexities

    Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi: Yemen civil war and Regional Complexities

    On 17th January, the Houthis conducted their first attack on Emirati soil in years. Carried out in the heart of the country– Abu Dhabi –with the help of a UAV, the attack killed three foreign nationals working in the city– two Indians and one Pakistani. In the aftermath of the attack, the Arab Coalition intensified the air bombings of key strongholds of the Houthis, leading to an increase in civilian casualties in a proxy war that has already caused several thousand civilians their lives. The attack has also underlined the capabilities of the Islamist political outfit in striking a distant country, and not just its northern neighbour. The attack has also rendered the UAE as a country susceptible to attacks from hostile groups in the region.

    Costs of UAE’s intervention strategy

    Importantly, the attack has led to a scrutiny of UAE’s policy vis-à-vis the hapless South Arabian country. Not long ago, in February 2020, the Emirati leadership, in an official ceremony addressing the recent returnee personnel deployed in Yemen, added an achievement to its touted ‘Peace First’ strategy in the country[1]. The gulf country had begun its troop withdrawal from the war-torn country in July of 2019[2]. This move, though remarkable, was hardly surprising by a country that was stopped in its tracks after finding itself as a part of the Arab Coalition[3] back in 2015. But the withdrawal of troops from Yemeni soil didn’t mean a dilution of its involvement in the Civil War. The move by the Emirates was seen as merely a shift from direct involvement to an indirect one.[4] The leadership of the country had utilized its presence in Yemen to cultivate and build a network of belligerents of the Civil War, such as the Sothern Transitional Council (STC), Security Belt Forces and the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite forces to name a few.[5] A withdrawn and non-aggressive UAE depends heavily both upon and sponsors such groups to keep its influence in the country afloat. It had reportedly trained some 90,000 South Yemenis during its stint in the country.[6] These militias have fought, in the past, against the Houthis, Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Islah and the ISIS. In December last year, one such group, the Giants Brigades, attacked Houthis, eventually defeating them in the Shabwah province. The Houthi attack in January is seen as a retaliation for this precise attack.

    In December last year, one such group, the Giants Brigades, attacked Houthis, eventually defeating them in the Shabwah province. The Houthi attack in January is seen as a retaliation for this precise attack.

    Another key takeaway from the attack on 17th January is associated with the Saudi Arabia-UAE partnership. The Emirates, which contributed the second-largest troops to the Arab Coalition, had virtually abandoned Saudi Arabia in its effort to bring the Hadi government back to Sana’a. Since 2016 up to the troops’ pull-out, the country had focused mainly on counter-terrorism operations, primarily targeting Islah.[7] The two partners were pitted against each other when, in 2019, the Emirati-backed STC pushed itself into the provinces of Shabwa and Abyan held by the Saudi-backed government. Now, with the Houthis becoming a potent threat to the security of the UAE, the stress between the two governments is set to cool down. The attack has made UAE substantially, if not equally vulnerable, when compared with Saudis, to Houthis’ aggression. But it is not likely that the country will put an end to its troop withdrawal strategy. Its focus is likely to be on strengthening its security apparatus, something already visible in French, American and Israeli assistance.

    Attacks boost UAE-Israel Strategic Partnership

    The Houthis conducted another failed attack on Abu Dhabi in late January during Israeli President Herzog’s visit. The day was chosen to deliver a message to both Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem. This, and other numerous attempts by the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia militia to attack the Emirates, is set to further firm up the already burgeoning ties between the two. Immediately after the January 17th attack, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett offered Israeli ‘security and intelligence support’ to the victim state[8]. He committed to partner with the UAE to defeat ‘common enemies’. Right after the signing of the Abraham Accords, both the countries embarked upon strengthening security-related ties[9], leading to the signing of a strategic agreement to develop unmanned military and commercial vessels in November last year. Both the countries have been susceptible to attacks by Iran’s proxies. It is Israel’s North-eastern neighbour Syria that has posed a threat to its security. Now, Houthis’ reach to the Emirati soil renders Israel vulnerable to similar attacks, with speculations already in works in Israel.[10] Additionally, Houthis’ ties with Lebanese Hezbollah could aggravate the situation further. Israeli-Emirati partnership seems to be the greatest benefactor of the attack.

    the UAE has been applauded for pursuing a balanced approach between Saudi Arabia and the US on one hand and Iran and its allies on the other[13]. But with the continuous attack on Abu Dhabi by Iranian proxies, the relations between the UAE and Iran are set to face road blocks

    Just as Emirates was coping with the deadly attack from Yemen, another Iraq-based armed group conducted a drone strike on Abu Dhabi. Known by the name Awliyat al-Waad al-Haq, or the True Promise Brigades, the Shia Islamist group is widely believed to have close ties with both Tehran and Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah. Though the Iranians have not publicly supported the attacks, they haven’t condemned them either. Moreover, the attacks on Abu Dhabi came just months after Emirati National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Tehran where he touted his visit as a ‘turning point’ for the two countries[11] and visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani to Abu Dhabi, declaring that the two countries had agreed to open ‘a new chapter’ in their bilateral relations[12]. Also, the UAE has been applauded for pursuing a balanced approach between Saudi Arabia and the US on one hand and Iran and its allies on the other[13]. But with the continuous attack on Abu Dhabi by Iranian proxies, the relations between the UAE and Iran are set to face road blocks.

    Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis

    Last year, in one of his first decisions regarding West Asia, President Biden revoked the Trump administration decision to recognize Houthis as a foreign terrorist group. After the recent attacks on Abu Dhabi and the al-Dhafra airbase, the Biden administration has been forced to reconsider its previous decision[14]. The US has, in response to the attacks, stepped up its naval deployment in the Gulf region, along with enhancing cooperation in intelligence and air defence with the Emirates. It also helped stave off other Houthi missile attacks on Abu Dhabi through US Patriot interceptors. The attacks also come at a crucial time when the talks between P5+1 and Iran regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal underway in Vienna. With eight rounds that have passed without any breakthrough, it remains to be seen how Houthi aggression impacts the JCPOA.

    The Civil War in Yemen is in its eighth year, with no signs of the end in near future. The casualties have reached as high as 377,000. It has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, pushing millions to the brink. According to a UNDP report, the war may cause more than 1.3 million casualties by 2030. Hence, we need to ask, has the international community failed to protect the Yemeni people?

    Notes

    [1] Jalal, I (2020, February 25), ‘The UAE may have withdrawn from Yemen, but it’s influence remains strong’ Middle East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong

    [2] Ibid

    [3] Salisbury, P. (2020, July 1), ‘Risk perception and appetite in UAE Foreign and national security policy’ Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/8-case-study-uae

    [4] Jalal, I (2020, February 25), ‘The UAE may have withdrawn from even, but it’s influence remains strong’ Middle East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Ibid

    [7] Salisbury, P. (2020, July 1), ‘Risk perception and appetite in UAE Foreign and national security policy’ Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/8-case-study-uae

    [8] TOI staff, (2022, January 18),’Bennett offers UAE security and intelligence support after attack by Houthis’ Times of Israelhttps://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-offers-uae-security-and-intelligence-support-after-attack-by-houthis/

    [9] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2021, August 6), ‘Restoring balance to UAE-Iran relations’ Doha Institute https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Restoring-Balance-to-UAE-Iran-Relations.aspx

    [10] Melman, Y. (2022, January 21),’After Abu Dhabi, is Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat next target for Houthi drone strike’ Haaretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-red-sea-eilat-target-houthi-iran-drone-strike-abu-dhabi-1.10553018

    [11] Hafezi, H. (2021, December 6), ‘UAE security official pays rare visit to Iran to discuss ties, regional issues’ Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-emirates-idAFKBN2IL0ME

    [12] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2021, August 6), ‘Restoring balance to UAE-Iran relations’ Doha Institutehttps://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Restoring-Balance-to-UAE-Iran-Relations.aspx

    [13] Ibid

    [14]  Landay, J (2022, January 20). ‘Biden says administration mulling re-designating Yemen’s Houthis a terrorist group’, Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-yemen-envoy-lenderking-visit-gulf-london-state-department-2022-01-19/

    Feature Image Credit: www.mirror.co.uk

    Image Credit: itv Times News

  • The Strategic Imperative of Developing Ladakh

    The Strategic Imperative of Developing Ladakh

    Abstract
    Following the Galwan valley clash in 2020, Ladakh has become the most important place of strategic and operational importance since it adjoins two adversarial neighbours who are strategically aligned with each other. China’s belligerence is taking many forms such as information warfare, land transgression, allegations of hacking, etc. The recent claim of unfurling of the Chinese flag supposedly in Galwan, which was later clarified to have been done in another location is a spoke of its information warfare against India. China’s construction activities enabling quick buildup of its troops and armaments are also a major cause of concern for India. While there are some initiatives launched by the Indian army and the Central government to strengthen the infrastructure in the Northern borders, special attention needs to be paid towards the holistic development of human resources and infrastructure in Ladakh.

     

    2022 began with a fresh show of Chinese belligerence in Ladakh, with a well-known Chinese media outlet putting out a tweet saying, “China’s national flag rises over Galwan Valley on the New Year Day of 2022“, following up with a short video of the event. The tweet further claimed that the flag was special, having flown earlier over Tiananmen Square in Beijing[i]. As Indian government sources confirmed that the ceremony did not occur in any disputed area, the Indian Army released photographs of soldiers hoisting the flag in the Galwan Valley on the occasion of the New Year[ii]. In other incidents across the rest of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), China suddenly ‘renamed’ 15 locations in Arunachal Pradesh, continuing efforts to undermine Indian sovereignty in that state. The Chinese embassy in Delhi wrote to counsel Indian MPs who had attended a reception hosted by the Tibetan government in exile in late December 2021[iii]. The frigid relationship between the two nations was underscored once again by the inconclusive outcome of the 14th round of Corps Commander’s talks held on the LAC on 12 Jan 2022[iv]

    Chinese activities have not been restricted to the information domain alone. Construction of a bridge across the Pangong Tso, starting 20 km east of Finger 8 to connect its North and South banks, has come to light, providing an additional approach for a quick build-up of troops and logistics. While the above actions by China, both in the realm of information warfare and otherwise, have been effectively countered by the Indian government[v], the overall situation across the entire LAC continues to be of significant concern. This is despite the much-publicized sharing of sweets between Indian and Chinese troops at ten border crossings across the LAC[vi] in January.

    Strategic Importance of Ladakh

    As compared to the rest of the LAC, the situation in Ladakh is serious. The killing of 20 Indian soldiers, including a Commanding Officer, in June 2020 has thrust the region into the nation’s collective consciousness. Galwan, Gogra, Daulet Beg Oldi, Pangong Tso, and Chushul are household names across the country and the public today is better educated about the sheer complexity of the border issue and our history of dealing with China on the matter. The importance of safeguarding national sovereignty has taken centre stage with issues such as the institution of ‘no patrolling zones’ and perceptions about the LAC being subjected to frequent debate in the media and elsewhere.

    In the aftermath of the Galwan events, the strategic importance of Ladakh, seen more through the lens of tourism in tranquil times, has acquired renewed relevance. It is the only borderland of India adjoining two hostile states, both of which have gone to war with India at different times for their own reasons. Ladakh abuts Gilgit Baltistan, which is under illegal occupation of Pakistan, and Tibet, which is under China’s forced occupation. As the likelihood of collusive action between these countries increasingly grows, Ladakh will remain primus inter pares amongst all the regions on our Northern borders for strategic and operational reasons. Accordingly, plans to bring about a qualitative change in capacity and capability in all aspects of the region’s development to meet security challenges and human aspirations acquire greater importance vis-a-vis other locations.

    The above aspect is well appreciated by the Central Government, which has taken many initiatives towards strengthening infrastructure development along the Northern borders in recent years. With regards to Ladakh, development has accelerated dramatically post creation of the Union Territory (UT) of Ladakh in 2019. A review of the UT Administrations’ activities after two years of its creation by the Lt Governor during a media interaction reveals the scale and scope of its achievements[vii]. Future plans are contained in a comprehensive ‘Vision Document,’ prepared on its behalf by a reputed consultancy, available on the internet[viii]. The Document is a comprehensive data-backed effort, listing the status of various developmental markers today and the desired end state. Achieving the vision would require effort, time, and planning for its translation into practical and prioritized implementables, after further considering risks, costs, benefits, and overall viability while adhering to timelines. Despite the progress made on many fronts and considering the constraints remaining, continued and focused long-term efforts by the administration are required here: equally important, the current and future security perspective has to be a key pillar of such plans.

    Development Issues and Imperatives

    A key priority that requires greater impetus is to accelerate the movement of locals for populating areas that, for reasons of geography and proven Chinese intent, have acquired strategic or operational significance. Page 9 of the Vision Document[ix] mentions that 65% of the total population is in and around Leh and Kargil cities. Though the paper has recommended setting up other population centres, enhanced hostile activity by China in and around places like Demchok on the LAC warrants that such areas also be included for consideration. In recent years, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has dramatically enhanced connectivity. Greater resources and manpower have constructed important roads and opened up East Ladakh and other parts of the UT[x]. The next step is to actualize a long-term plan with short and intermediate goals, which could see the setting up of small townships – after creating suitable infrastructure in housing, health, education, connectivity, and other civic amenities to support small-sized populations. Here the focus has to be on providing livelihood options other than the purely pastoral, with options explored for setting up Small Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs), which might take time to prove financially viable. In this respect, China has succeeded with the construction of border villages and resettlement of Tibetans in areas opposite the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh and its disputed border with Bhutan[xi]. Though the Indian experiment in that region, which commenced post-1962, has not been as successful, it has to be pushed through in Ladakh. Here, reconciling developmental cum security needs with genuine environmental concerns would be necessary, considering that the Army’s premier firing range in Ladakh in the Tangtse Chushul area was closed some years ago for such reasons.

    There is scope too for the military, as an essential stakeholder to assist in development in other spheres, such as preparation of dual-use facilities; helipads and Advanced Landing Grounds wherever feasible, are one example. Another option is to create infrastructure for specialized training in the Ladakh region – archives of the Press Trust of India mention an international training event, ‘Exercise Himalayan Warrior’ held in 2007 where Indian and British troops trained together in mountain warfare techniques in an area North of Leh[xii]. Training facilities of this nature would naturally benefit the local economy, though the fallout of such strategic signalling would have to be carefully weighed.

    A fourth option to enhance the military’s participation, albeit indirectly, is to increase local recruitment. While recruit balancing would be carried out at Army Headquarters, there is a need to examine the feasibility of expanding the number of Ladakh Scout battalions (either regular units or on the Territorial Army model), which are eminently suited for fighting in such terrain. Being a permanent measure, this would offset, to an extent, the expense on induction of at least a few units from outside Ladakh. Benefits accruing from deploying local sons of the soil can be easily appreciated.

    Harnessing through Civil-Military Engagement

    At the turn of the century, it was in Ladakh that the Indian Army launched Operation SADHBHAVNA. Displaying strategic foresight, then GOC 14 Corps, Lt Gen Arjun Ray, set a one-point aim – ‘To Forestall Militancy in Ladakh.’ The program, a runaway success, was adopted subsequently by other field formations of the Indian Army. A process of continued oversight, course correction, innovation, and streamlining at various levels has made it an effective tool for helping assimilate our border populations into the national fold by winning hearts and minds. Here, it must be emphasized that SADBHAVNA has not been conceptualized as a developmental program per se. Neither is such an approach being followed on the ground – the projects being small, community-based, and including aspects of human resource development. It has had very positive spinoffs, with Ladakh being a significant beneficiary. With major development programs like the Ministry of Home Affairs’ flagship Border Areas Development Program (BADP) and others at the state level already in place, it is worth examining if an interaction between the local administration (at the panchayat level, say) and local military garrisons, both working from the ground upwards can help further synergize efforts to achieve optimum results.

    Strategic contestation between India and China is a reality. The border issue will continue to influence many aspects of bilateral relations. Continued information warfare, a huge trade deficit, allegations of hacking, and now evidence of massive tax evasion by smartphone companies[xiii] are indicators of the need for a realistic appraisal of that country’s intentions and strengthening own capabilities. The development of Ladakh is an important factor in this regard.

    Notes

    [i] Free Press Journal, January 03, 2022.

    [ii] ‘LAC Standoff: India exposes China’s lies in Ladakh as Indian Army hoists tricolour in Galwan Valley’. Ajeyo Basu, News24, January 04, 2022.

    [iii] ‘China protests Indian MPs’ attending Tibetan reception, Tibet govt-in-exile fires back’. Geeta Mohan, India Today, January 01, 2022.

    [iv] ‘Joint Press Release of the 14th round of India-China Corps Commander Level Meeting’. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, January 13, 2022.

    [v] ‘Government breaks silence, hits back at China on letter to MPs, Pangong bridge’. Shubhajit Roy, Indian Express, January 07, 2022.

    [vi] ‘New Year: Indian, Chinese troops exchange sweets at Demchok and other border points’. Press Trust of India, January 01, 2022.

    [vii] ‘Major transformation in developmental profile of Ladakh UT in nearly 2 years: Lt Governor’. Mohinder Verma, Daily Excelsior, September 18, 2021.

    [viii] ‘Vision 2050 for UT of Ladakh’. Government of India.

    [ix] ibid

    [x] ‘Five Mega Road Infrastructure Projects Launched in Ladakh Amid Border Row With China’. PTI, October 01, 2021.

    [xi] ‘More evidence of China building villages in disputed areas along borders with India, Bhutan’. Hindustan Times, November 18, 2021.

    [xii] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. Ministry of Defence note, Exercise “Himalayan Warrior”. September 16, 2007.

    [xiii] ‘Xiaomi India under lens: DRI says evasion of customs duty of Rs 653 cr by Chinese smartphone maker’. Economic Times, January 05, 2021.

    Feature Image Credit: Bloomberquint

    Map Credit: Newschrome

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  • UAE’s industrialization drive and the potential for Sovereign Wealth Funds to unlock value

    UAE’s industrialization drive and the potential for Sovereign Wealth Funds to unlock value

    The United Arab Emirates has renewed its commitment to the fourth industrial revolution recently with an ambitious target of increasing the industrial sector’s contribution from AED133 billion to AED300 billion (US$ 81.7 billion) by 2031. The main objectives of this ten-year strategy are to leapfrog towards knowledge-intensive industries, apply technology-intensive solutions to retrofit current industries, and push manufacturing in industries like aerospace, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, etc. However, these objectives are not novel. While the early development plans of the emirates’ primarily focused on diversifying the economy from hydrocarbon revenues, the ultimate objective was to expand towards knowledge-intensive industries. In line with this, economic development plans as early as 1991 record the rulers’ interests in building a manufacturing-oriented economy, but the success is yet to materialize. Even in the case of the most diversified emirate – Dubai, the main drivers of the economy as of 2020 were entrepot activities like trade (26.5%), transportation and storage (12.5%), and financial services (9.7%), while manufacturing contributed to 8.8%. These statistics can be further appreciated by recollecting that from the early 1990s, development plans for Dubai were made under the assumption that the annual real growth rate in its manufacturing sector would meet 7%.[1]  As of 2020, the growth rate in manufacturing is only 0.3%. While manufacturing-oriented industrialization was to play a key role in the economy, there have been considerable challenges in realizing it. This article first briefly recalls the historical development efforts of the emirate, then discusses reasons which could have hindered the country’s trajectory towards knowledge-intensive manufacturing, and highlights a potential development instrument the country can utilize to realize its objectives in the present day.

    Federal Structure and overcoming the Inequalities

    Being a federation every emirate was offered autonomy which retained the control of resources of the respective emirates’ within respective ruling families. This resulted in vast inequalities amidst emirates with Abu Dhabi and Dubai becoming relatively well off compared to others. The remaining emirates were dependent on the budget provisions from oil-rich Abu Dhabi to maintain the social contract over their respective emirates. This internal dynamic resulted in different approaches being taken for economic development in the country. To briefly summarize some of them – Dubai invested in infrastructure to improve its entrepot facilities and industrialize in sectors associated with hydrocarbon resources, Abu Dhabi began focusing on renewable energy and clean technology from the early 2000s,  Ras al-Khaimah benefitted from its low-cost production environment (up to 25-50% lower than in other emirates) to become the country’s manufacturing base, and Fujairah developed a storage and bunkering expertise due to its geographical location beyond the chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz.[2] The developmental push from the emirates created a boom mainly in industries associated with hydro-carbon, real-estate, logistics, and finance. Although official data on sector-wise contribution to GDP remain unpublished, World Bank data confirms that as of 2019 about 16% of the UAE’s GDP is accredited to hydrocarbon sources. It also confirms that as of 2019, manufacturing value-added as a percentage of GDP stood at 8.7%.

    In the context of UAE, the viability of proceeding with labour-intensive industries as a starting point was low as the country has a small Emirati population. Second, while most late developing countries have resorted to wage suppression to make production costs competitive, the UAE is restricted from doing so owing to the social contract it shares with its citizens

    Despite the autonomy every emirate has enjoyed, the overarching approach the country has used for economic development is to invite foreign firms to the country by providing business-friendly infrastructure and environment.[3]For the emirate of Dubai, which was most successful in diversification, Singapore’s development model was an inspiration for implementing policies promoting business-friendly infrastructure and environment.[4] Among potential factors that explain the challenge in the uptake of knowledge-intensive manufacturing in the UAE, this article focuses on two – First, the inherent characteristic of firm relocation, and second, the existence of a twin labour market in the country with high wage levels. Helleiner argued that it is easier to scale to knowledge-intensive industries when labour-intensive production processes exist locally, this way, production activities can upgrade vertically. The logic was that direct relocation of knowledge-intensive functions of industries would imply high costs to the firm. His thesis was based on the development of the Asian tigers whose development process benefitted from the vertical up-gradation of industrial activity. In the context of UAE, the viability of proceeding with labour-intensive industries as a starting point was low as the country has a small Emirati population. Second, while most late developing countries have resorted to wage suppression to make production costs competitive, the UAE is restricted from doing so owing to the social contract it shares with its citizens. UAE nationals are instead offered much better employment packages in the public sector which deters their participation in the private sector.[5] As a result, the private sector across all skill levels is significantly dependent on expatriate labour. In addition to this, foreign talents are paid twice as much as their home countries across all skill levels. Tong and Al Awad demonstrate that this is true not only for low-skilled and semi-skilled jobs but also for high-skilled jobs by comparing the average wages of high-skilled expatriates from the US and the UK. They compare their wage levels at home and in Dubai, control for purchasing power parities, and find that the salaries are twice as that in their home countries. Competition for knowledge-intensive industries has predominantly arisen from the global North and as income levels in the UAE are twice as much as that in developed countries, there is an inherent risk on the price competitiveness of products on a global scale.

    Development model, SWF, and Top-down Approach

    A difference in the UAE’s late development model relative to others in the category is that while the latter was challenged in capital accumulation, it was easily accrued for the UAE. The difficulty for the UAE lies in using accumulated capital to break the dependency. Thus, the way forward for the UAE lies in a radical rethinking of its development model. Where vertical integration by first relocating labour-intensive industries demonstrates a bottom-up approach to development, the UAE is better positioned to approach development in a top-down model of vertical integration having accumulated capital. Although public sector investment and involvement in the economy is high, there exists scope to increase the synergies between industry-leading companies and local producers through the public sector. In this case, a policy instrument with the potential to push economic development is the state’s Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).

    The channelling of SWFs as a development policy instrument provides an opportunity for greater collaboration between international industry leaders and local businesses. Investing in the economic diversification of the country has been an important objective for the state’s SWFs. Some noticeable instances where the SWFs have built linkages between international companies and local businesses have been in the aerospace sector.[6] For instance, Mubadala entered into strategic partnerships with Airbus and Boeing in 2008 and 2009 respectively and launched Strata Manufacturing as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mubadala in 2009. Soon after Strata Manufacturing was launched, the company concluded agreements with both Airbus and Boeing to manufacture aircraft parts at its aerostructures manufacturing facility in Al-Ain. This further continued when Strata Manufacturing received a ten-year contract from Boeing for the manufacture of Boeing 777’s empennage ribs and vertical fin rib for Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner. This development model is novel because it demonstrates how embedded autonomy, a key feature in the East Asian development model, can be replicated while collaborating with established international companies for economic development at home. Sovereign Wealth Funds as an institutional investor demonstrate how the state can be at the forefront of national development efforts from a transnational level.

    This top-down model of economic development through SWFs is a novel use of the investment vehicle as a policy instrument. It allows the state to direct development from a transnational level, which is an important operational condition for developmental states in an era of globalization

    An important lesson from late developers in East Asia and Southeast Asia is that state-directed capitalism is important for economic development. This top-down model of economic development through SWFs is a novel use of the investment vehicle as a policy instrument. It allows the state to direct development from a transnational level, which is an important operational condition for developmental states in an era of globalization. Although the UAE has demonstrated the use of this instrument in some cases, there is great potential to further drive economic development towards the fourth industrial revolution through SWFs. There will likely be more linkages built between local businesses and international companies through SWFs as the UAE moves forward to a knowledge-intensive economy. As the article highlighted above, there will be challenges moving forward in ensuring price competitiveness at a global level when operating in a labour market with price distortions. To this end, the challenge remains in finding innovative financing mechanisms by state investors in the short run and for policymakers to introduce suitable policies for correcting the price distortions in the long run. This ongoing effort in the UAE requires a closer examination from researchers, development practitioners, and policymakers as it is a unique development model and has the potential to deliver promising developmental lessons.

     

    Notes

    [1] Euromoney; London”, Periodical, (1997), World Economic Analysis, United Arab Emirates Document no.:198889294, ProQuest One Business.

    [2] Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics And Policy-Making, p.87-129, Routledge, 2017.

    [3] Davidson, Christopher. The United Arab Emirates: A Study In Survival. 1st ed. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

    [4] Sampler, Jeffrey, and Saeb Eigner. Sand To Silicon. Dubai, UAE: Motivate Publ., 2008.

     

    [5] Davidson, Christopher. The United Arab Emirates: A Study In Survival. 1st ed. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

     

    [6] Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics And Policy-Making, p.103-108, Routledge, 2017.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Asharq AL-awsat

  • Democracy and Legislation: Lack of Parliamentary Debates negates the Constitution and accountability to the People

    Democracy and Legislation: Lack of Parliamentary Debates negates the Constitution and accountability to the People

    Democratic principles have long been accepted as the cornerstone of Free India. Reaching beyond a mere organizational setup, democracy has been treated as the ideal through which equality and justice are sought to be ensured for the people.

    Despite the well-recognised principles of equity and transparency in the practice of democracy, it is well established that various Governments, on many occasions in independent India’s history, have resorted to flouting constitutional democratic principles for personal gain; the widely criticized imposition of emergency under Indira Gandhi is one such example. It evident that the Indian people are once more confronted by a situation where the government of the day is guilty of flouting of democratic norms. This article examines various instances of current parliamentary practices in this context.

    60 per cent of proposals were referred to Standing or Select Committees during the United Progressive Alliance’s first term. During the UPA-II administration, this rose to 71 per cent. NDA’s first term from 2014-19 had a 27 per cent reference rate, while it’s second term, so far, has only 12 per cent rate.

    Institutional norms and parliamentary procedures in India, especially for legislation making are designed to ensure space for debate, discussion and dissent. This operates as a system where all decisions are subjected to scrutiny by the people’s representatives. To that end, whether a ruling party adheres to parliamentary procedure speaks volumes about the respect accorded to to the constitution and democracy at large. To analyse whether the current government is adhering to parliamentary procedures and by extension, if it is truly democratic, one must first ascertain what exactly constitutes the ideal parliamentary procedure.

    Parliamentary Procedure on Legislation Making: How Does A Bill Become An Act

    Acts usually start as bills which simply put, is the draft of a legislative proposal. This bill may be introduced by public members or private members and requires passing in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha as well as the president’s assent to become a law.

    There are three stages through which a bill is passed in the parliament: these are known as the first, second and third reading respectively.

    For the First Reading, the speaker puts forth the request for leave of the house, which if granted is used to introduce the bill. Following this stage is the second reading which entails general discussion. It is during this stage that the House may choose to refer the bill to a parliamentary committee for further input or even circulate it to gauge public opinion. During the second reading, parliamentary procedure states that a clause-by-clause reading must proceed and it is during this time amendments are moved. The second reading concludes with the adoption of ‘Enacting Formula’ and ‘Long Title of the Bill’. The next stage is the third and the last reading. At this Juncture, debates for and against the bill take place. For an ordinary bill, only a simple majority of the members present, and voting suffices, however for a constitutional amendment bill, in keeping with article 368 of the constitution, a majority of the house’s total members and at least 2/3rd members present and voting is deemed necessary. Once this process is complete, the bill is sent to the other house of the parliament and goes through the same stages after which it is referred to the president for his assent.

    Modi Government’s track-record of Passing of Bills

    Leaders of opposition and Journalist reports have alleged that the aforementioned procedure has been cast aside by the current regime in favour of bulldozing the bills without debates. This argument is not without merit and one can identify some central ways in which the ruling party has violated parliamentary procedure.

    The first and most grievous is the misuse of Article 123 also known as the Ordinance Route. Article 123 of the constitution permits the president to enact a temporary law in the event of urgent and unavoidable circumstances. It is clear that the Article 123 has been exploited by the current government.

    During the first 30 years of our parliamentary democracy, for every 10 bills in the parliament, one ordinance was issued. In the following 30 years, this number went to 2 ordinances per every 10 bills. During the period 2014-2019 of the BJP government, this number went up to 3.5 ordinances per every ten bills. For perspective, while 61 ordinanceswere issued under the UPA government spanning ten years, the government led by the BJP issued 76 ordinances in a time frame of 7 years spanning from May 2014 to April 2021. It is also useful to note that ten of these ordinances were issued right before the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.

    Astonishingly, as many as 11 ordinances have been passed since March 24th, 2020, which is when the lockdown was imposed. Five of these relate to covid 19, two to the health sector, every other ordinance such as the Banking Regulation Amendment and the Agriculture bills do not have anything to do with the coronavirus pandemic.

    States have also used ordinances to pass legislation. A non-BJP ruled state Kerala, for example, published 81 regulations in 2020, whereas Karnataka issued 24, and Maharashtra issued 21. Kerala has also re-promulgated ordinances: between January 2020 and February 2021, one ordinance to establish a Kerala University of Digital Sciences, Innovation, and Technology was promulgated five times.

    Although previous administrations have utilized ordinances to undermine the constitutional process, the problem is decidedly amplified under the present rule with regards to the number of ordinances produced per given period.

    This sort of rise in Ordinances being issued points to a trend of avoiding in-depth critical evaluation and discussion on proposals by rushing them into becoming acts.

    One of the most controversial ordinances in the recent past pertains to the three farm laws. The reason for not introducing these proposals in the parliament and instead enacting ordinances is unclear for there seems to be no urgent link to the covid 19 pandemic. Additionally, the farm bills not being subjected to any discussions nor being referred to parliamentary committees for any further report making has led to removing any possibility for amendment. These laws provide a useful avenue to assess why the bill was not passed through a proper parliamentary process and instead rushed through the ordinance.

    The ordinance culture has also extended to BJP run states, for instance, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat adopted ordinances weakening labour laws without consulting workers’ unions or civil rights organisations during the lockdown. Moreover, this was followed up on 15th March 2020, when colonial-era legislation was enacted as an Ordinance. This was the Uttar Pradesh Recovery of Damages to Public and Private Property Ordinance which would heavily fine any damage to property, public or private during a protest.

    Moreover, the current administration can be observed violating the parliamentary procedure for there is very little or no involvement of parliamentary committees. Parliamentary committees are key in assessing a proposal with necessary scrutiny and expertise.  These committees provide a place for Members to interact with subject experts and government officials while they are studying a bill.

    60 per cent of proposals were referred to Standing or Select Committees during the United Progressive Alliance’s first term. During the UPA-II administration, this rose to 71 per cent. Prime minister Modi’s first term from 2014-19 had a 27 per cent reference rate, while his second term so far has a 12 per cent rate. Not only is there a blatant and marked disregard for referring bills to parliamentary committees, but the administration has also actively worked to hinder committee work. A meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology on July 28, 2021, had to be cancelled owing to a lack of quorum when 15 BJP members refused to sign the attendance register, it is speculated this was to avoid the discussion on the Pegasus scandal.

    Monsoon Session of Parliament

    The most recent monsoon session of the Parliament is an apt depiction of how the administration has bypassed the norms and rules of parliamentary procedure, endangering the democratic processes that citizens invest faith in.

    A record number of 12 bills were passed by the parliament in the first 10 days of the monsoon session. All these bills were passed by a voice vote which is a tremendously inaccurate mechanism to assess supporters of a particular proposal. None of these 12 bills nor the overall 14 bills were referred to standing committees for in-depth analysis.  According to TMC leader Derek O’Brien, the government rushed through and passed 12 Bills at an average time of under 7 minutes per bill. In the same vein, BSP MP Danish Ali commented that the Essential Defence Services Bill was passed in less than 10 minutes.

    Be it the ordinance route, curtailing zero hour, the excessive use of voice vote or the bypassing of parliamentary committees, all point towards the same and devastating trend, the lack of adherence to parliamentary procedure. This must compel citizens to take stock of whether India needs a reminder on how democratic proceedings should proceed and accountability to the people be restored.

    Feature Image: medium.com

  • Environmental Impacts of the Belt And Road Initiative

    Environmental Impacts of the Belt And Road Initiative

    China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), initially known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), was first announced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping. It aims to interconnect Asia, Europe, and Africa through two interlinked projects: the Belt as the land route, and the Road as the maritime route. The BRI aims to contribute significantly to overall economic or monetary development, as well as in the power generation area, it can further develop energy access and unwavering reliability in regions with quickly developing energy demand. Nonetheless, the BRI’s financial advantages and development of power frameworks might come at the cost of significant  environmental degradation. The sheer size of the BRI has ignited increasing global concerns about the potential environmental damage. These concerns include ecologically sensitive areas, concern about the large amounts of raw materials needed, and locking in of various environmentally detrimental forms of infrastructure, for example, non-renewable energy (fossil fuel) related framework.

    The BRI projects are instrumental in meeting the global CO2 emission targets; if all the BRI member states fail to reach the CO2 emission targets, that would result in a 2.7° C increase in the average global temperature.

    There are numerous BRI projects which would pass through ecologically sensitive areas, thus compromising on such fragile regions. Some have even described BRI as the “riskiest environmental project in history”. The BRI has far-reaching influence, and it is estimated that the BRI investments are impacting over 60 per cent of the global population. The BRI projects are instrumental in meeting the global CO2 emission targets; if all the BRI member states fail to reach the CO2 emission targets, that would result in a 2.7° C increase in the average global temperature.

    Securing and protecting the environment while encouraging financial advancement under the BRI will be extremely difficult and challenging, as the initiative crosses a different scope of fragile and delicate environments. Biophysical conditions range from woods and steppes in Russia; to ice, snow, and permafrost across the Tibetan Plateau; and tropical rainforests in Malaysia. Observers are worried about the natural threat that the BRI presents. Infrastructure advancement, trade, and investment ventures under the BRI could bring negative ecological impacts that might offset its economic gains. The possible effects of the BRI are complex and manifold. Foundation projects affect biological systems and wildlife, yet in addition aberrant impacts like logging, poaching, and settlement, adding to deforestation and other land related changes. The BRI could result in biodiversity loss because of fragmentation and debasement of various habitats, and cause increment in greenhouse gas emission due to the development and upkeep of transportation infrastructures and further Chinese interest in coal-terminated power plants. It could likewise speed up extraction of natural resources, like water, sand, and ferrous metal minerals and ores in nations along the BRI.

    One such danger from BRI is the Russia–China Amur Bridge transport corridor, which takes apart two nature reserves with old growth forests. BRI framework will influence practically all of Eurasia’s biggest stream frameworks. Also, numerous BRI courses, for example the Karakoram Highway, go through geo-dynamically active regions. The Karakoram Highway linking the Xinjiang province in China to Gwadar Port in Pakistan, goes through Himalayan areas known for “extremely high geodynamic action” like seismic tremors, avalanches, frigid disintegration and erratic storms, but alternative pathways are even worse. In the Aral Sea, Central Asia, combined effects from the socio-ecological communications between misadministration, over-water system and serious contamination causing water shortage are amplified by truly dysfunctional transboundary management which can possibly result in armed conflicts. Heavily polluting Chinese concrete plants migrating to Tajikistan has been referred to as one illustration of this. Also, a logging ban in China’s Heilongjiang area caused spill-over impacts for forests overseas. Additionally, trade changes methods of production and utilization, changing income and along these lines contamination levels. As indicated by the Kuznets curve, pollution increments at first as income develops, yet over a defining moment, contamination falls as higher earnings bring innovative upgrades and expanding interest for ecological conveniences. Financial development might build the modern contamination base, known as scale effects. Negative scale effects and positive effects for the climate are hard to separate observationally, and quantitative examinations differ on whether the scale or procedure impact is bigger. Various toxins likewise respond diversely to exchange related changes. For instance, a Chinese report joining scale and method effects proposed that trade expanded SO2, and dust fall, however, decreased substance oxygen interest, arsenic and cadmium.

    Arranging and resolving natural issues related with the BRI is colossally complex and multi-scaled. Understanding the attributes of the effects of BRI on the environment is the initial step for conceiving strategy and plans for addressing its effects on guaranteed sustainable development. The main mechanism to achieve the sustainability objectives of the BRI is cooperation, “characterized by governance guidance, business commitment, and social participation”. In any case, environmental governance accompanies different difficulties, first, BRI specific and related approaches are not unyielding, but rather dependent on intentional and corporate self-administrative instruments. China’s vision of a “green BRI” is probably not going to be acknowledged without any stricter approaches that set out concrete and substantial set of activities. Second challenge, for the environmental governance of the BRI is to address tele couplings.

    The Chinese government is taking a functioning, yet delicate way to deal with the environmental governance of the BRI. China utilizes the BRI as a stage to introduce itself as the rule-maker/rule-taker in global ecological administration as it further mobilizes existing environmental governance organisations and assembles new ones. Be that as it may, the environmental stability of the BRI doesn’t just rely on the environmental governance endeavours of Chinese actors, however, strikingly on the implementation, checking, and authorization of environmental laws and guidelines in BRI host nations. Finally, and most importantly the most significant errand for future research is to exactly explore whether environmental standards or norms be subject to California or Shanghai effects.

     

    References

     

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    Cockburn , Henry. “China’s $8 Trillion ‘Silk Road’ Construction Programme ‘Riskiest Environmental Project in History’.” The Independent. Independent Digital News and Media, May 20, 2018. https://www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/china-belt-and-road-initiative-silk-route-cost-environment-damage-a8354256.html.

    “Decarbonizing the Belt and Road Initiative: A Green Finance Roadmap.” Vivid Economics. Accessed October 1, 2021. https://www.vivideconomics.com/casestudy/decarbonizing-the-belt-and-road-initiative-a-green-finance-roadmap/.

    Ascensão, F.; Fahrig, L.; Clevenger, A.P.; Corlett, R.T.; Jaeger, J.A.G.; Laurance, W.F.; Pereira, H.M. Environmental challenges for the Belt and Road Initiative. Nat. Sustain. 2018, 1, 206–209.

    Teo, Hoong C., Alex M. Lechner, Grant W. Walton, Faith K.S. Chan, Ali Cheshmehzangi, May Tan-Mullins, Hing K. Chan, Troy Sternberg, and Ahimsa Campos-Arceiz. 2019. “Environmental Impacts of Infrastructure Development under the Belt and Road Initiative” Environments 6, no. 6: 72. https://doi.org/10.3390/environments6060072

     

    Feature Image Credit: USC US-China Institute

    Map Credit: Brookings Institution