The Peninsula Foundation

Category: TPF Analysis

  • Will Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections End the Deadlock?

    Will Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections End the Deadlock?

    Andrei Korobkov                                                                                   March 05, 2019/Analysis

    The crisis in Venezuela grows more complex with each passing day. At first, President Nicolas Maduro declared that he was willing to consider the possibility of early parliamentary elections. But it is clear that this proposal is absolutely unacceptable for the opposition, which already wields a majority in the legislature and has the US firmly behind it. The opposition is urging the President to resign and takes a dim view of an early presidential election, no matter how rapidly it can be organized. The “interim president” appointed by parliament, Juan Guaido, is counting on the West’s financial and political support. He is feeling increasingly confident now that the US has frozen Venezuela’s government bank accounts and announced that the pretender president would be given control of them. This means that the government will immediately lose $7 billion deposited in US banks and another $11 billion in expected revenues from 2019 oil sales. Given that, Guaido, dizzy as he is with what he sees as his success, is unlikely to be willing to agree to serious talks or compromises, although he can suggest holding simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. Maduro, for his part, is not going to surrender and has already issued a warning that the growing confrontation and the mounting Western interference in his country’s internal affairs could lead to a civil war.

    There are a number of reasons why the current crisis in Venezuela is of such great interest and may have far-reaching political consequences. The US has always regarded Latin America as its backyard where it is free to lay down the law and punish disobedient. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in effect, introduced a “limited sovereignty” model that became increasingly pertinent during the Cold War.

     The United States has made huge investments in Latin American economies; Latin elites have been educated in the US for generations; the Americans have trained Latin militaries and supplied them with arms for centuries. The region is highly dependent on the US technologically. Besides, Venezuela is one of America’s main oil suppliers. The Americans are exasperated not only by the demonstrative independence of Venezuelan foreign policy but also by the 20 years of leftist reforms under the Chavez and Maduro governments. The same is true of the increasingly noticeable political, economic and military presence of Russia and China in the country. Of no small importance, too, is Venezuela’s good relationship with Cuba.After the Cold War, the Americans initially decided to at least formally follow the rules and refrain from toppling democratically elected governments in the region. Instead they used other, more flexible methods to influence the situation in individual Latin American countries. The exceptions were the abortive coup attempts in Honduras in 2009 and Venezuela (against Chavez) in 2002. From this point of view, the attempt to displace Maduro is relatively out of step with the new US policy in the region and may signal yet another revision of regional strategy.

    One more specific feature of the current situation in Venezuela is that the US line consists of an eclectic array of approaches that the US has used in a number of Latin American countries over the last 60 years. The contras’ failed landing in the Bay of Pigs in 1961 is one notorious example. A more obscure aspect of the story is how the CIA thought about the operation. After all, no one expected that the team in question would be able to launch a large-scale operation and fight Fidel Castro’s government. The plan was for them to dig in on a limited territory, proclaim an alternative government that would be immediately recognized by Washington, and request US troops be sent in to “support the legitimate government.” The gambit was a scandalous failure, but the “alternative government” idea is still alive and being used in Caracas in the form of a constitutional coup.

    Another precedent was set in Chile in 1973. Older people remember well the TV footage of well-fed and clearly not overworked housewives banging pots and pans at protests in Santiago and shouting that they were starving. The same tactics are being used today. The US has introduced economic sanctions and is intentionally destabilizing the economic situation in a country that has already been weakened by the government’s experiments with “Bolivarian socialism” to accuse Maduro of being an ineffective leader and to arouse popular disaffection. (But even today, Maduro’s opponents are failing to turn the lower strata that form the majority in that developing country against him: these people remember that it was Chavez and Maduro after him who gave them access to education and healthcare and enabled them to enjoy far better living standards).

    A third model still in the works is based on the 1989 Panama operation. If the first two options don’t work, outbursts of violence will be provoked through assassination attempts against opposition leaders or assaults on US nationals. This would lay the groundwork for a US invasion under the pretext of restoring law and order and guaranteeing the safety of US citizens.

    The first two models have been tested in Venezuela, without much success. The question is whether the third option will be attempted. This also raises two more interesting questions. Latin American coups usually become possible if military leaders turn on the government, but in Venezuela they continue to support Maduro. Moreover, it was the military who saved Hugo Chavez in 2002 and thwarted the coup masterminded from outside the country. The question is whether this support endures and whether the US succeeds in offering military leaders enough “carrots” for them to change their outlook.

    The second question concerns the US president. Donald Trump took over two years ago with his coterie of right-wing political reformers determined to fundamentally alter both America’s domestic and foreign policy. In the foreign policy arena, this new approach was based on renouncing interventionism, shifting emphasis towards domestic growth, acknowledging that the center of the world system was migrating from the northern Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, and recognizing China as the major geopolitical threat to the United States. The last point implies that the US must create a new system aimed at containing China, which, in turn, requires better relations with Russia as a counterweight to China, the start of tariff wars against the PRC, and the destabilization of the WTO and the free trade system as a whole, which allegedly are more beneficial for China than for the United States. But, seen by the US elite (and not without reason) as a systemic threat, Trump is under continuous attack and unable to implement many of these ideas (with the greatest obstacles put in the way of his attempts to improve US-Russia relations). Gradually, the majority of the right-wing reformers left his administration (the biggest loss was the departure of Steve Bannon and Sebastian Gorka) to be replaced by traditional neocons and interventionists like John Bolton, the current national security advisor.

    Along with the loss of Republican control of the House of Representatives in November 2018, the approach of the presidential primaries, growing stock market volatility, relatively low presidential approval ratings, and unending attacks on Trump from the political establishment and the “elite” press, this is strengthening the hand of those who are urging the president to stage a “small victorious war” of his own. After all, Trump is still the only US president in two generations who has not yet launched a single new military intervention. Meanwhile, Trump himself is between a rock and a hard place, as he is being pressured by both the traditional US right, who dream of the US flexing its military might and toppling the disobedient regime, and the Democrats, who hope to force the president to break his election promises, mire him in a protracted military conflict and thus discredit and politically weaken him ahead of his re-election campaign.

    The current situation has yet another, broader international dimension. The international community is divided over Venezuela. The United States is supported by Canada, Brazil, and many European and Latin American countries. But that is a far cry from unity. Many right-wing governments in Europe, including Italy, whose government is very close to Trump ideologically, have been skeptical of attempts to give Venezuela away to a different suitor.

    An even more important factor is that the new leftist president of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, is well aware of the possibility that Mexico will be the next target, if a constitutional coup is allowed to happen in Venezuela. Moreover, opposing Trump is a win-win for any Mexican politician amid the growing US-Mexican friction over immigration, tariffs, and much else. President Erdogan in Turkey is thinking along the same lines.

    Most important, of course, is the stance taken by Russia and China. Both have actively cooperated with Venezuela in recent years, with Chinese investment in the Venezuelan economy exceeding Russia’s by almost 400 percent. Nevertheless, China is very cautious about its moves, as it is currently under pressure from the US and unwilling to furnish Trump with another pretext to accuse it of growing expansionism.

    This is why the initiative in supporting President Maduro will most likely remain in Russian hands. Though inferior to China in terms of investment, Russia is the main arms supplier to Venezuela (with sales totaling $12 billion). Russia has also invested heavily in Venezuela’s oil industry and a number of other sectors.Thus, the current situation includes many unknowns linked to actors’ moves both in Venezuela and the United States, as well as Russia, China and a number of other countries. As such, both the course of the conflict and its outcome can be of global importance, influencing, among other things, the prospect of whether the US reverts to its traditional imperial interventionism or opts for a somewhat different policy.

    The course of this crisis and its outcome may also have serious impact on the domestic political situation in the United States. The potential for a “controlled crisis” looms large in this situation, because the chances of a political provocation aimed at drawing the Trump administration into a military conflict are sufficiently high. Therefore, the dynamics of the Venezuelan drama may decide the fate of both Maduro and Trump himself in the long run.

    Dr Andrei Korobkov is Professor of Political Science at the Middle Tennessee State University, and is Non-Resident Visiting Distinguished Fellow at TPF. This article is the English translation of the original published earlier in Valdai Discussion Club.

    The views expressed are the author’s own.

  • The state of Bihar!?

    The state of Bihar!?

    The Prime Minister in the run up to the Bihar assembly elections announced a Rs.50,000 crores package for the state. Just as he announced a Rs.100,000 crores package for Jammu and Kashmir that July. Bihar has a population of over 103 million and J&K has a population of 12.5 million.

    This is not a new story. Bihar has been systematically exploited by denying it its rightful and deserved share of central funds from the First Plan.

    That Bihar is India’s poorest and most backward state is undeniable. The facts speak for themselves. But what makes its situation truly unique is that Bihar is the only state in India where the incidence of poverty is uniformly at the highest level (46-70%) in all the sub-regions. The annual real per capita income of Bihar of Rs. 3650 is about a third of the national average of Rs.11, 625. Bihar is also the only Indian state where the majority of the population – 52.47% – is illiterate.

    But Bihar has its bright spots also. Its infant mortality rate is 62 per 1000, which is below the national average of 66 per 1000. But what is interesting is that it is better than not just states like UP (83) and Orissa (91), but better than even states like Andhra Pradesh and Haryana (both 66).

    Even in terms of life expectancy, the average Bihari male lives a year longer (63.6 yrs.) than the average Indian male (62.4 yrs) and the state’s performance in increasing life spans has been better than most during the past three years.

    Bihar has 7.04 mn. hectares under agriculture and its yield of 1679 kgs. per hectare, while less than the national average of 1739 kgs. per hectare is better than that of six other states, which include some big agricultural states like Karnataka and Maharashtra.

    Despite this, in overall socio-economic terms, Bihar is quite clearly in a terrible shape.

    As opposed to an All-India per capita developmental expenditure during the last three years of Rs.7935.00, Bihar’s is less than half at Rs.3633.00. While development expenditure depends on a bunch of factors including a state’s contribution to the national exchequer, no logic can explain away the per capita Tenth Plan size, which at Rs. 2533.80 is less than a third of that of states like Gujarat (Rs.9289.10), Karnataka (Rs.8260.00) and Punjab (Rs.7681.20).

    Simple but sound economic logic tells us that when a region is falling behind, not just behind but well behind, it calls for a greater degree of investment in its progress and development. It is analogous to giving a weak or sick child in the family better nutrition and greater attention. Only in the animal kingdom do we see survival of the fittest with the weak and infirm neglected, deprived and even killed.

    But instead of this we see that Bihar is being systematically denied, let alone the additional assistance its economic and social condition deserves, but also what is its rightful due.

    From the pitiful per capita investment in Bihar, it is obvious that the Central Government has been systematically starving Bihar out of funds. Quite obviously Bihar has also paid the price for being politically out of sync with the central government for long periods. The last one was for a dozen years from 1992 to 2004. For the last one year Bihar had a government in New Delhi that was supposed to be favorably disposed to the regime in Patna.

    Quite clearly states that are in political sync do much better in terms of central assistance. Lets take a look at how Andhra Pradesh, a state that has stayed largely in political sync with New Delhi, has fared in the past few years. In terms of grants from the Central Government (2000 to 2005), Bihar fared poorly receiving only Rs. 10833.00 crores while AP got Rs. 15542.00 crores.

    Bihar has also been neglected as far as net loans from the center are concerned. It received just Rs.2849.60 as against Rs.6902.20 received by AP from 2000-02. It’s only in terms of per capita share of central taxes do we see Bihar getting its due. This gross neglect by the central government is reflected in the low per capita central assistance (additional assistance, grants and net loans from the center) received by Bihar in 2001. While AP received Rs.625.60 per capita, Bihar got a paltry Rs.276.70.

    The results of the economic strangulation of Bihar can be seen in the abysmally low investments possible in the state government’s four major development thrusts. Bihar’s per capita spending on Roads is Rs.44.60, which is just 38% of the national average, which is Rs.117.80. Similarly for Irrigation and Flood Control Bihar spends just Rs.104.40 on a per capita basis as opposed to the national average of Rs.199.20.

    Now the question of how much did Bihar “forego”? If Bihar got just the All-India per capita average, it would have got Rs. 48,216.66 crores for the 10th Five Year Plan instead of the Rs.21,000.00 crores it has been allocated.

    This trend was established in the very first five-year plan and the cumulative shortfall now would be in excess of Rs. 80,000.00 crores. That’s a huge handicap now to surmount. Then it would have got Rs. 44,830 crores as credit from banks instead of the Rs. 5635.76 crores it actually got, if it were to get the benefit of the prevalent national credit/deposit ratio.

    Similarly Bihar received a pittance from the financial institutions, a mere Rs.551.60 per capita, as opposed to the national average of Rs.4828.80 per capita. This could presumably be explained away by the fact that Bihar now witnesses hardly any industrial activity. But no excuses can be made for the low investment by NABARD. On a cumulative per capita basis (2000 to 2002) Bihar received just Rs.119.00 from NABARD as against Rs.164.80 by AP and Rs.306.30 by Punjab. It can be nobody’s argument that there is no farming in Bihar.

    If the financial institutions were to invest in Bihar at the national per capita average, the state would have got Rs.40, 020.51 crores as investment instead of just Rs.4571.59 crores that it actually received.

    Quite clearly Bihar is not only being denied its due share, but there is a flight of capital from Bihar, India’s poorest and most backward state. This is a cruel paradox indeed. The cycle then becomes vicious. This capital finances economic activity in other regions, leading to a higher cycle of taxation and consequent injection of greater central government assistance there. If one used harsher language one can even say that Bihar is being systematically exploited, and destroyed by denying it its rightful share of central funds.

    To even make a dent on the abysmal state that Bihar is now in, Bihar will need at least twice what it gets from the Centre, as of yesterday.

     

    Mohan Guruswamy is a prolific commentator on politics, economics, development and governance. He is a trustee of TPF. The views expressed are the author’s own.

  • Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    The Indian Air Force celebrates its 86th anniversary on this October 8th, making it one of the oldest and large air forces of the world. Despite many challenges, most of which relate to inefficiencies of political decision making and inadequate financial support to modernisation, the IAF has come out with flying colours to continue to demonstrate its operational capabilities and strategic reach. The recent ‘Gaganshakti’ high intensity exercise  is an outstanding example. While the IAF continues to grapple with its huge problems of obsolescence, the last decade and a half has also been testimony to some major transformations underway in the IAF. As the 21st century dawned, the IAF began a rapid transformation from being largely a tactical air force to a strategic force, with significant expeditionary capability.

    Isolation to Outward Engagement

                 For more than half a century, outward engagement of the three services was limited to participation in UN peace-keeping missions. As India began its transformation with economic liberalisation in 1991, it began to dismantle its inward looking licence raj, and with it a global outlook started to emerge. As Indian economy accelerated into an overdrive by the late 1990s, and as India’s strategic image strengthened with  the overt declaration of its nuclear weapon status, the government encouraged military to military interactions and defence diplomacy. IAF’s international engagement expanded significantly from the 2000s. Major bilateral exercises were carried out on regular basis with major air forces – USA, UK, France, Singapore, South Africa, Oman, and Malaysia. Also, the IAF became a regular participant in USAF’s multinational exercises such as Cope Thunder and Red Flag. Recently the IAF has expanded its international exercises to involve Israel, Russia, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. For over a decade, the Singapore Air Force carries out its two month long annual training from one of IAF bases on the eastern coast. Joint exercises for humanitarian assistance, involving multinational forces, is now a regular feature. These interactions and engagements have highlighted IAF’s high quality operational expertise, its global standing, and in turn, has contributed immensely to IAF’s growth in its international understanding. Today, the world sees the IAF as the sharp edge of India’s military power as well as the primary instrument of its humanitarian assistance capability worldwide.

    Enhancing its Reach

                 Although the IAF inducted the Jaguar from 1979, its air-to-air refuelling capability was kept inactive. Induction of Mirage 2000 in 1985 met the same fate. The importance of aerial refuelling in extended range operations by the USA in its Libyan strike, Osirak nuclear reactor strike by Israel, and Falklands operations by the UK was not lost on the IAF, and it decided in favour of this force multiplier in the late 1990s. Although the IAF was one of the last major air forces to induct the aerial refueler, its pace of operationalisation was probably the fastest. In less than a decade IAF fighters were flying across Atlantic Ocean to participate in international exercises like the ‘Red Flag’ and ‘Cope Thunder’. Within the last decade the IAF has demonstrated its extended operational reach through all its major exercises. Aerial refuelers form critical component of IAF’s operational capability in terms of reach and penetration. An expansion of this fleet is now long overdue.

    Technological and Operational Transformation

                 Airpower, by its very nature is technology intensive. The IAF embarked on major operational reorientation through induction of major technologies from the early 2000s. This began with induction of precision weapons, UAVs, electro-optical systems, and sensors. The IAF initiated its first upgrade program in the mid 1990s, for 125 MiG-21 Bis aircraft, by stitching together a complex avionics upgrade involving three nations – Russia, France, and Israel. The success of this program has established an irreversible upgrade culture as a cost-effective strategy for sustaining its force structure. This upgrade strategy has also contributed immensely to  indigenisation capability of Indian industry. The Jaguar fleet went through a series of comprehensive upgrades, giving rise to significant expansion of its capabilities. The Su-30 MKI is an excellent result of IAF’s conceptualisation and implementation of avionics suites and mission optimisation. Between 2004 and now, the IAF’s upgrade strategies have given fresh lease of life to various aircraft fleet and weapon systems: AN-32, MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000, and air defence missile systems. More programs involving upgrades of Su-30 MKI fighters and IL-76 transport aircraft are likely to be taken up soon.

    The IAF moved to transform its air defence operations through the induction of AWACS platforms. Selecting the proven IL-78 platform, the IAF again masterminded a complex three nation development program to evolve a modern, state-of-the art AWACS platform by 2009. The three AWACS platforms inducted in phase I have been utilised extensively to bring in major operational transformation of its air defence operations in a very short time-frame. The AWACS has certainly given the IAF a significant operational edge vis-à-vis the PLAAF challenge across the Himalayas. Simultaneously, the IAF has supported the indigenous program of AEW aircraft development based on Embraer-145 platform.

    Indo-US strategic partnership manifested itself in significant transformation in IAF’s airlift capability. By 2012, the IAF inducted and operationalised C-130J Hercules aircraft for special operations, which is also the IAF’s first 20 tonne airlift aircraft; and C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft. These are going to be joined by Chinook heavy lift helicopters and Apache attack helicopters. By 2012 large numbers of Russian Mi-17 1V helicopters entered service. With these inductions, the IAF’s airlift capability has truly attained transcontinental proportions.

    The air defence missile segment, afflicted by long delays and overruns in terms of cost and time, has finally started showing results. The IAF, inducted its first squadrons of LLQRM (short range air defence missiles) based on Israeli systems, while simultaneously inducting indigenous Akash missile systems. This still indicated huge gaps, which is sought to be filled by the long-delayed MRSAM, jointly developed by India and Israel. With the projected signing of the contract for the Russian S-400 long-range SAMs the air defence will be on stronger operational capability.

    The most significant operational and technological capability of the IAF is its net-work centric warfare capability, which is underway for more than a decade. The IAF is the most significantly networked military force amongst the three services. It first established its primary communication grid, AFNET (Air Force Network), and  simultaneously established its air defence network inclusive of vital command and control network, IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System). The IACCS integrated all its ground based radar sensors and other inputs to create a common operational picture for real-time command and control to become effective. This was a pioneering transformation. The culminating transformation is its ‘airborne network’, which involved evolving NCW concepts based on  futuristic ‘self-organising, master-less, node-less, architecture’. The concepts were validated through a three-year long pilot project in 2013. Centred on the SDR (Software Defined Radio) the IAF is focused on indigenous solution. However, interim acquisition of limited numbers of SDR to kickstart operationalisation has stalled for nearly four years due to our infamous acquisition procedural delays. NCW operationalisation is a huge challenge that involves significantly large number of legacy aircraft and systems.

    The transformation of the IAF as an aerospace force began in the aftermath of Kargil war. IAF has been at the forefront of transforming the ISR domain through its operational strategies involving various ISR assets – UAVs, tactical and strategic reconnaissance systems, and satellites. It has played a stellar  role in defining the roadmap for developing and deploying space assets. It is matter of time before the IAF leads the tri-service aerospace command in true measure to formalise and operationalise India’s Space security strategy.

    IAF as the instrument of India’s Global Power

                 The rise of India and China is the major transformative process of the 21st century international system. That India aspires to be a global power is well known and well founded. India’s march to global power status in the 21st century will be a challenging and arduous task. Rise to great power status is not one of just prestige and power but comes with huge responsibilities. These responsibilities come with significant costs. A great power should be willing to share and shoulder the costs of providing public goods to the global community. This is precisely what the USA is now complaining about, as it finds the costs of sustaining itself as a hegemon is becoming prohibitively expensive. The USA is clearly signalling that aspiring great powers should share the costs of global public goods albeit without upsetting an international order crafted to its advantage. This is where India must rise to the challenge by rising as a benign power with the right balance of hard and soft power to influence the course of emerging power politics.

    The IAF, on its 86th anniversary, is at the cross roads of evolving as the instrument of India’s global power. As the 21st century progresses, the centrality of aerospace power in the national power of major countries has become unquestionable. Joint or integrated warfare has been necessitated by the critical role of aerospace power in all domains, be it precision, reach, rapidity of application, and intelligence through ISR. The viability of conventional deterrence comes from aerospace power’s ability to deter through the fear of precise punishment. It becomes obvious that the IAF has to be the cutting edge instrument of India’s hard military power. This obviously calls for the right combination of force structure with cutting edge technologies and weapon systems with significantly long reach. A serious introspection would reveal that the IAF, as it enters its 87th year, faces daunting challenges of building and sustaining the requisite force structure.

    IAF’s Force Structure Challenges

     IAF has been grappling with problems of obsolescence and dwindling force structure for more than two decades. Long drawn out and unending MMRCA acquisition process is an example of leaving operational capability gaps unactioned as well as loss of opportunities to enhance industrial and technological capabilities. Time and cost overruns in the indigenous Tejas-LCA program is again an operational shortfall for the IAF. The IAF today is at an all-time low of 32 fighter squadrons. An analysis of the history of IAF’s force structure would reveal a story of crisis management to sustain minimum force levels. Much of the blame must go to the political leadership for failure to grasp the importance of sustaining credible conventional force structures, while part of the blame must certainly fall on services themselves.

    JRD Tata committee, set up in the aftermath of 1962 humiliation against China, recommended an IAF force structure of 65 combat squadrons. This was accepted by the government but was pruned down to 39.5 squadrons as an interim measure on account of resource constraints. This figure has remained more or less permanent, till the government approved a figure of 42 squadrons in 2005. Even though the IAF has enhanced its combat capability with the induction of force multipliers, and networked air defence capability, its approved force structure may fall short of meeting India’s requirements of functioning effectively as a global player. In the modern, net-centric aerospace environment, the IAF will be India’s main instrument of conventional deterrence. Tata committee recommendations look more apt for India, given India’s emerging stature and global responsibilities expected of it. However, the immediate requirement is to get IAF’s force structure back to the approved 42 combat squadron strength. Given the large number of aircraft that need to be replaced, this would take at least 15 years if only done on war-footing.

    Modernisation and Indigenisation Imperatives

    As it celebrates its 86th anniversary the IAF would do well to do some serious introspection. Modernisation processes for all militaries in all countries face the challenges of timely resource availability, particularly for capital-intensive service like the Air Force. In India the problem is compounded by inadequate aerospace industrial and technology base. Indian military power, and IAF in particular, is heavily import dependent. Despite more than 70 years of indigenisation efforts, not much has changed in critical areas. A major cause for this state of affairs is the lack of adequate involvement of the user service in project management and technology development. The IAF will have to take a leaf out of the USAF model to make a major impact on indigenisation. This will need the following to be done on a time bound basis:

    • IAF needs to create a cadre of research personal. It also needs to operate aerospace research laboratories. These will focus on research and development of aerospace technologies. Ideally the IAF needs to exercise command and control over laboratories such as ADE, DARE, CABS, etc.
    • Programs like the Tejas-LCA should have been managed by the user service, the IAF, after the technology demonstration phase. Program management by the user service is an absolute must as it will be driven by operational needs balancing technology, cost, and time factors. As a corollary, it becomes obvious that the IAF must create the necessary expertise to manage its programs.
    • IAF’s involvement in DRDO driven programs must clearly define them as those that are technology development oriented and those that are user driven weapon system development. The latter programs must clearly be managed by the IAF while the former must be enabled by IAF support.
    • The IAF must clearly lay down a 20 year strategic roadmap for the government wherein all aircraft and major weapon systems are made completely free of foreign OEM dependence.

     

    Conclusion

                India’s security environment cannot be viewed simply as just border and territorial disputes with Pakistan and China. Its strategic challenges in a fast changing 21st century world are increasing by the day. China’s aerospace capability has leapfrogged significantly over the last two decades, and it poses a major challenge to India. The IAF will need to spearhead India’s aerospace capability to balance China’s dominance.

    IAF’s long-term force structure strategy could revert to its earlier ‘auxiliary air force’ format, albeit in a new form. Indian government wound up the auxiliary air forces post 1962, while it retained the ‘Territorial Army’ model. The benefits of this scheme is well established. It provides huge opportunities to a large segment of qualified young people to do military service, provides a ready reserve, and forms an important component of second rung security structure. With slight modification this could be created as Air National Guards, much like the US system. The objective should be to achieve one squadron of Air National Guards for each state in a defined time period based on financial and technical resources. These squadrons should be equipped with Tejas aircraft. Over a period of time this could become a win-win situation for the IAF, civil society, and the country as a whole. A comprehensive approach to force structure could see the IAF as the foremost air force in Asia and a major powerful force in the world by 2032, that will be IAF’s centenary year.

    =====xxx=====

     The author, Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (Retd) is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy, Plans & Force Development).

  • US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    Vijay Sakhuja September 02, 2018

    There is a sense of urgency among the militaries of United States and China to gain ascendency in the field of artificial intelligence and machine learning. The United States Department of Defence has set upJoint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) that will help the US military to “preserve and expand military advantage” as also pursue “AI applications with boldness and alacrity while ensuring strong commitment to military ethics and AI safety.” The JAIC will costan estimated $1.7 billion over the next six years. It will work on nearly 600 AI projects in partnershipwith the industry, academia and allies, and will have oversight over almost all service and defense agency AI efforts.

    Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has urgedPresident Donald Trumpto consider formulating a national strategy for artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, the US Army has establishedan AI Task Force and given itself three months to identify “specific skill sets that we’re going to need to be relevant and to thrive in this environment that will include AI and machine learning.”

    Likewise, the Chinese government is pursuing an aggressive policy for the development of artificial intelligence at the national level. In December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology through Circular No. 315called on all agencies under the Central Government to implement ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ and ‘ accelerate the development of artificial intelligence industry, promote the deep integration of artificial intelligence and real economy” It also laid out a ‘Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry ( 2018 – 2020).

    According to a reporttitled “China’s AI Development Report 2018” released by Tsinghua University, the China’s artificial intelligence (AI) market touched 23.7 billion yuan ($3.5 billion) in 2017, with the growth rate expected to reach 75 percent in 2018. Further, China emerged as the ‘most attractive country for AI investment and financing’ and in the last five years since 2013 the Chinese AI industry accounted for 60 percent of the world’s total including 18,232 AI technology research experts  accounting ‘for 8.9 percent of the world’s total and was second only to the United States, which accounted for 13.9 percent’.

    In China, AI is used in a number of sectors like robotics, drones, autonomous vehicles such as cars and trucks, in manufacturing white goods including marketing services. Perhaps what merits attention is that China is investingin AI-related devices and systems that range from the anodyne to the dystopian wherein the military is looking to the technology to work in concert with its military strategy? Further, experts believethat the Chinese are “making their machines more creative” and “A little bit of automation gives the machines a tremendous boost” which can be characterized as “remote warfare”.

    The US is visibly concerned about losing military edge to China in the field of artificial intelligence. The PLA Navy presents different challenges with significant investments made in weapons such as the Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG), Solid State Lasers (SSLs) and other systems and sensors.As noted earlier, AI technologies are also being incorporated into a new generation of anti-ship missiles through autonomous targeting capabilities. Similarly, autonomous air and underwater drones and miniaturized assault boats would soon be part of its force structure It is quite plausible that the PLA Navy may have begun to conduct exercises based on AI and ML and assimilated commonly used and commercially available communication devices such as smart phones, tablets and hybrid devices into its naval strategy.

    AI is surely adding to the war fighting tool kit of both the US Navy and the PLA Navy through stealthy ‘robotic trimaran’(Sea hunter and D3000 respectively)thatcould result in a dangerous escalations of a new kind of competition between the two navies. Similarly, China is developing autonomous robotic submarines which are likely to be ready for operations by the early 2020s and supplement regular human-operated submarines. This is sure to pose another set of challenge to the US Navy.

    Dr Vijay Sakhuja is a Trustee of TPF.