The Peninsula Foundation

Category: India

  • How Representative is the Representative Democracy in India?

    How Representative is the Representative Democracy in India?

    India’s transition from an erstwhile British colony to an independent, sovereign state meant, for her people, a change in their status from being mere subjects to citizens bestowed with adult suffrage. The ultimate authority, therefore, now rests with the citizens. India’s large and complex population made it impossible for this authority to be discharged directly and therefore, the citizens elect their ‘representatives.’ This act of electing their representatives is called ‘elections’ and the set of rules that determine how the elections are conducted and the results ascertained is called the ‘electoral system.’ The electoral system adopted by the Constituent Assembly, through the debates on the constitution for the adoption of the parliamentary democracy, is a variant of the majoritarian system known as the ‘First Past The Post System.’ The fundamental principle underlying the system is that for the candidate, to cement his/her electoral victory, does not need a majority of the votes polled, but only a plurality of votes would suffice. The basis for the decision of the Constituent Assembly members to opt for the FPTP system lies in its simplicity and its promise of producing a stable government. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar when speaking in the assembly said, “Now, I have not the least doubt in my mind that whatever else the future government provides for, whether it relieves the people from the wants from which they are suffering now or not, our future government must do one thing, namely, it must maintain a stable government and maintain law and order. I am therefore very hesitant in accepting any system of election which would damage the stability of the government.”

    Legislative bodies aren’t merely law-making authorities, they are mini societies in themselves that reflect and react to the issues plaguing the citizenry at large. Labelling legislative bodies as mini societies emphasizes the fact that the composition of the representatives reflects the diversity of social groups and shades of opinion present within the country. The divisions and prejudices that exist in the Indian subcontinent based on caste, class, and religion were a primary point of reference for the members of the constituent assembly when debating over whether the various provisions of the constitution would be functional in the country. In this sense, the decision to choose the FPTP system over other electoral formulas signifies an attempt to alleviate the fears of the members of a further divided subcontinent. Yet, as we enter the 75th year of our freedom with entrenched unresolved issues, it brings us back to the question that the constituent members struggled with: how efficient and representative is the present electoral formula?

    Loksabha Elections – 2019

    Regional representation

     A post-election analysis by IndiaVotes showed that the two major alliances – National Democratic Alliance and United Progressive Alliance won 45.2% and 27.5% of votes respectively and the rest was shared among parties including All India Trinamool Congress, Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party, Biju Janata Dal, Bahujan Samaj Party, Telangana Rashtra Samithi and so on. With 45.2% votes, the NDA led by the BJP satisfied the requirements laid down by the FPTP allowing it to take charge of the government formation. However, what the vote percentage implies is that the current regime isn’t exactly a popular choice given more than fifty percent of the voters chose to vote against them. In their paper ‘Minoritarian Rule: How India’s Electoral System Created The Illusion of a BJP Landslide’, Macdonald and Moussavi call India a “minoritarian” democracy wherein ‘ a plurality of voters selects the majority of representatives in Parliament.’

    Furthermore, the success was concentrated within the states of central and western India which includes- Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, and Jharkhand. These are also few of the states with the highest number of Lok Sabha seats- Gujarat (26), Uttar Pradesh (80), Rajasthan (25), Madhya Pradesh (29), Bihar (40), Chhattisgarh (11), Maharashtra (48) and Jharkhand (14). Given how diverse the country is culturally and linguistically, how do we compensate for the lack of the same in the union government?

    Minority representation

     The total minority representation in the 2019 Lok Sabha stands at 9.2%, including Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and other religious minorities. This means over 90% of the MP’s are Hindus in a country where the minorities make up 19.3% of the total population (Census 2011).

    Kazi Syed Karimuddin when speaking against the efficacy of the FPTP system in the constituent assembly had feared the dilution of minority representation and had said, “Therefore my submission is that the present system as it stands does not guarantee a majority rule as people commonly suppose and does not guarantee a representation to minorities, not necessarily religious, even the political minorities.”  To this Dr. B.R.Ambedkar felt that while the country may not be ready for a complex electoral formula but to ensure minority representation he suggested reserved constituencies for the minorities as an alternative and in this regard, he said, “If any particular minority represented in this House said that it did not want any reservation, then it would be open to the House to remove the name of that particular minority from the provisions of article 292. If any particular minority preferred that although it did not get a cent percent deal, namely, did not get a separate electorate, but that what it has got in the form of reservation of seats is better than having nothing, then I think it would be just and proper that the minority should be permitted to retain what the Constituent Assembly has already given to it.”

    The Constituent Assembly finally decided on reserved constituencies for the communities of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes only.

    Reserved constituency

     The constitution has reserved 131 out of 543 seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (84 for SC’s and 47 for ST’s). In the present Lok Sabha out of the 543 MP’s, 138 come from SC/ST communities implying that only 7 MP’s from SC/ST communities have been elected in unreserved constituencies. The situation would have been grimmer had their representation not been secured through reserved constituencies.

    The major loophole in the practice of securing representation through reserved constituencies with the use of FPTP is that it is the Non-SC/ST communities that majorly get to decide who the representative for the SC/ST communities would be. Given SC/ST populations are spread across regions rather than being concentrated in a few, it is then the dominant communities with their muscle and money power that decide on where the votes go. This keeps outspoken and assertive leaders from marginalized communities outside legislative bodies and in a way excludes these communities and their issues from mainstream political discourse. Hence, Macdonald and Moussavi observe, “District boundaries are therefore fundamentally important. Their shape determines the population size and ideological composition of the electorate facing each party.”

    Mainstream political discourse

     With FPTP’s ‘winners take all’ formula, it so happens that political parties restrict their discourse and activities to the interests of the dominant communities as they become the deciding factor in the contestants getting the plurality of votes. Douglas Amy in her paper ‘Proportional Representation: Empowering Minorities or Promoting Balkanization’ says, “The claim that winner-take-all elections are inherently more capable of bridging political divides does not bear up under scrutiny. For example, the requirement that winning candidates appeal to the majority of voters has done little to discourage factionalism. Indeed, it has merely encouraged candidates to attack minority groups to win over the majority.”

    This has not only further marginalized the already marginalized but also hinders the Socio-Economic and Political progress of the country as spaces for discussing “actual” issues shrink and real development can’t be equated to the progress and well-being of a minute population.

    Effect on voters

    Wastage of votes, a definite consequence of the FPTP system as it often discourages voters from turning up to vote. Furthermore, voters indulge in ‘tactical voting’ wherein instead of voting for a candidate/party who aligns with their values and ideals, they end up voting for one of the major parties or the lesser of the two evils whom they think have more chances of winning. In a way, the voter is making no real impact in the making of the government (Singh & Sharma, 2019).

    Conclusion

    The Law Commission, in their reports in the year 1999 and then again in the year 2015, had recommended that the government look into alternative electoral methods and examine how well they’d work out for the country. However, this has remained a recommendation only on paper with governments taking no active interest in the same. Carles Boix in his paper ‘Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies’ (1999) states that “as long as the electoral arena remains the same, and favours the ruling parties, the electoral system is not changed. If there is a change in electoral dynamics due to the coming of new voters or alterations in voter’s preference, then the ruling party reshapes the electoral setup to suit their choices.” Hence, we still do not see electoral reforms being a part of the mainstream political discourse. However, to make our political system more inclusive, diverse, and efficient, it is about time we give electoral reforms a serious thought.

     

    References

    Amy, D. J. (1995). Proportional Representation: Empowering Minorities or Promoting Balkanization? The Good Society, 5(2).

    Boix, C. (2000). Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. SSRN Electronic Journal. Published. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159213

    Macdonald, G., & Moussavi, B. (2015). Minoritarian Rule: How India’s Electoral System Created The Illusion of a BJP Landslide. Economic and Political Weekly. Published.

    https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/7/1949-01-04?paragraph_number=186%2C185%2C12%2C176%2C33%2C189%2C170%2C11%2C7%2C5%2C215%2C196%2C195%2C180%2C179%2C177%2C172%2C122%2C102%2C99%2C98%2C97%2C58%2C57%2C54%2C34%2C6%2C4

    https://www.indiavotes.com/alliance/partyWise/17

    https://scroll.in/latest/924583/elections-2019-bjp-alone-got-more-than-half-the-votes-in-13-states-and-union-territories

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_constituencies_of_the_Lok_Sabha

    https://www.hindustantimes.com/lok-sabha-elections/from-faith-to-gender-and-profession-to-caste-a-profile-of-the-17th-lok-sabha/story-Mnp5M4pRX3aUji1UFFVy2N.html

    https://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/MsDP%20%28FAQs%29.pdf

    https://www.indiaspend.com/governance/reservation-scheduled-castes-tribes-representation-social-justice-755256

    https://theprint.in/opinion/17th-lok-sabha-looks-set-to-confirm-ambedkars-fears-no-vocal-dalits-in-parliament/232383/

     

    Image Credit: www.aa.com.tr 

     

  • Lest We Forget: The Forgotten Army

    Lest We Forget: The Forgotten Army

    Military history records the fighting at Nyaung U, Irrawaddy as in the words of Slim himself, “the longest opposed river crossing of World War 2”. Dhillon and his men, despite being hugely outnumbered, with no air cover or artillery, held their ground from February 4th to February 11th, 1945.

     

    Mt. Popa (Photo on left) is in the heart of Myanmar (old Burma). It is like a largish pimple on an otherwise smooth cheek. It is the only hill, steep from all sides in an otherwise flat terrain. It is now an extinct volcano.

    My wife and I arrive at Mt. Popa from Yangon (Rangoon) after an interesting plane ride on a rickety old aircraft to Nyaung U, the airport of the ancient capital city of Bagan (two Photos as below) the city of the four thousand Pagodas).  We then take a taxi (non A/C) ride over a terribly bumpy road partially running alongside a massive pipeline being laid by the Chinese to transport oil from the Myanmar coast to South China.

    Bagan

    We are not at Mt. Popa as the regular tourist or as pilgrims to the holy sites around. We do however go and seek blessings from the deity (Photo as below) at the base of the mountain. The deity is much like some in India – it seeks offerings only in the form of liquor.

    Deity at Mt Popa

    The blessings we seek, hopefully will enable us to find an elusive little place called LEGYI. It is in the region nearby but sadly is not marked on a map. The tourist office in Yangon do not know about it. I, fortunately, had some idea about its whereabouts gleaned from the records of my late Uncle (Col. Prem Sahgal) and late Aunt (Capt. Lakshmi Sahgal) of the INA –  Indian National Army (Azad Hind Fauj). Their home in Kanpur was called ‘Legyi House’.

    We drive on from Mt. Popa on a small road in the general direction of the Irrawaddy River and Mandalay. Our guide makes the driver stop every few kilometres to ask about Legyi but in vain. Finally at the crossroads of a small village the guide talks to a little old lady. Amazingly the old lady (Photo on the left) knows where the place is. It is right next to her ancestral home. It is the place, as the old lady said, ‘where this great battle took place many years ago’. She asks where we are from. On being told that we are from India she castigates us. The Japanese come regularly bearing the favourite foods and music of their soldier ancestors but no Indians. Apparently we are the first Indians there after the ‘big battle’ in February 1945!

    Legyi (Photos as below) is the small knoll of a battleground where one of the battalions of  INA’s  2nd Infantry Regiment (under the command of Col. Prem Sahgal) troops valiantly held their ground for days against repeated attacks by formations of the overwhelming might of (then) General Slim’s massive 14th Army. With no Air Force cover or artillery, and with an almost non – existent supply line, they should have been easily wiped out in a matter of hours. Yet they held ground for over a week. They fought valiantly and inflicted huge casualties, largely with the use of guerrilla tactics making Legyi arguably the INA’s most successful battle action.

    Author at Legyi

    Just before the ferocious fighting took place at Legyi, some 50 kilometers north east, just beyond modern day Nyaung U airport, another notable encounter took place.  Two battalions of the INA were tasked to delay and frustrate the imminent attempt by Gen. Messervy’s 7th Indian Division, part of Slim’s 14th Army, to make the crossing of the Irrawaddy River. With 1200 men these battalions, under the Command of Col. Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon, had the daunting task of stalling to the absolute limit the crossing of the river by some 30,000 troops amassed on the river’s western bank. Military history records the fighting at Nyaung U, Irrawaddy as in the words of Slim himself, “the longest opposed river crossing of World War 2”. Dhillon and his men, despite being hugely outnumbered, with no air cover or artillery, held their ground from February 4th to February 11th, 1945.

    Lest it be forgotten the INA, starting from Farrer Park Race Course in Singapore went all the way up and crossed the Indian border fighting to plant the National Flag at Imphal, much as the British tried to deride this valiant army.

    When we, on our visit, reached the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy at Nyaung U (Photo on left) from Legyi we could visualise what a herculean task Dhillon and his men had performed. The river there is enormous in width. It is rapid flowing, almost torrential. The massive Brahmaputra at Guwahati is not even half that. How did the small force manage to fight back all the frontal and outflanking assaults?

    The INA actions at Legyi and Nyaung U are perhaps the best examples of what a truly secular force comprising Hindu, Muslim, Sikhs, Christians, the lot under the command of Indian officers can achieve when they fight for the cause of the country – in this case, Independence. Lest it be forgotten the INA, starting from Farrer Park Race Course in Singapore went all the way up and crossed the Indian border fighting to plant the National Flag at Imphal, much as the British tried to deride this valiant army.

    Let us recall, it was on February 17, 1942, that the Indian officers and men of Lt General Arthur Percival’s army in the then Malaya marched into Farrer Park Stadium under the command of the senior most Indian officer, Col Zaman Kiani. There were no British officers and men with them. Gen Percival and his army had ceded Singapore to the conquering Japanese two days earlier. The British officers decided that they would surrender separately at Changi. The Indians troops were ordered to surrender by themselves at Farrer Park, pretty much abandoned to their own fate by their British colleagues. After their surrender, they were separately incarcerated at Neesoon Camp in Seletar. Peter Ward Fay writes in The Forgotten Army: India’s Armed Struggle for Independence: “Much later, in the chorus of anger and embarrassment that rose among Englishmen on the subject of the INA, no one was heard to suggest that Percival should have refused to let himself and his colleagues be separated from their brothers in arms, the Indian officers.” This was to be a crucial factor in what ensued.

    For their valiant stand against Slim’s 14th Army, Sahgal and Dhillon along with their superior officer, Gen. Shah Nawaz Khan were placed under arrest. They were to be made examples of for their audacity! After the termination of hostilities at the end of the war the three were brought to Delhi and incarcerated in a remote part of the Red Fort awaiting a Court Martial to be held within the premises of the Fort.

    This, for the usually astute British, was quite a blunder. First to select for trial a Hindu, a Sikh and a Muslim (exemplifying INA’s secular make up and credentials) and then to hold the trial in Delhi’s Red Fort, the very icon that Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, the Supreme Commander, had projected as the goal to be attained. Worse, the trial would be held in the same premises where India’s last Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar was tried, sentenced and deported to Rangoon where he died. The symbolism perhaps had somehow escaped the colonial rulers.

    Also that independent undivided India’s first Government, with Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose having taken his oath as its first Prime Minister had been formed in Singapore. News now came in that the National flag had already been hoisted at Imphal and at Port Blair in the Andamans. Free India’s first currency notes and stamps had been issued. The nation was in uproar!

    When the curtain of secrecy was finally lifted and the ‘INA Red Fort Trial’ began, the populace finally got to know about the INA, the extraordinary fight by its men as well as women. Also that independent undivided India’s first Government, with Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose having taken his oath as its first Prime Minister had been formed in Singapore. News now came in that the National flag had already been hoisted at Imphal and at Port Blair in the Andamans. Free India’s first currency notes and stamps had been issued. The nation was in uproar!

    Many of the then leading politicians with legal backgrounds volunteered to lead the legal defence team – Nehru, Katju, Patel et al. My grandfather, a sitting Judge of the Punjab High Court, applied and received leave of absence to supervise the legal defence arrangements for the ‘Lal Qila 3’. He rejected the offers by the politico lawyers. Instead he opted for the one he thought was quite simply the best legal mind of the country – Bhulabhai Desai. He would be the lead attorney.

    The then Advocate General, Sir Nowshirman Engineer for the prosecution argued that the three accused had committed treason by violating the oath they had taken on being inducted as officers into the British Indian Army. Bhulabhai Desai in defence argued for some ten hours over a period of two days. Firstly, he claimed, the so called oath of office became invalid when Gen. Percival and the British Officers decided to surrender separately at Changi in Singapore and ordered all Indians to go to the surrender ceremony at the Farrer Park Race Course.

    Equally importantly Bhulabhai Desai argued (1) that an enslaved nation had the legal right to engage in military action to free itself from a foreign coloniser (2) That the INA fought on the behalf of a properly constituted Government of free India recognised by other international governments, and (3) That the INA was a properly constituted disciplined army, managed entirely be competent Indian Officers with this army having its own uniforms, ranks, ethos, and ‘regalia’.

    To put it succinctly what Bhulabhai Desai told the Court Martial was that it was as a sovereign nation with a recognised Government in place, that India had declared war on Britain and sent its Army i.e. the INA, to fight.

    To put it succinctly what Bhulabhai Desai told the Court Martial was that it was as a sovereign nation with a recognised Government in place, that India had declared war on Britain and sent its Army i.e. the INA, to fight. Hence under International Law the Indian National Army had the status of a legitimate ‘belligerent’. Accordingly the defendants could in no case be tried for treason or other offences under a Penal Code based on British ‘Municipal Law’, as Desai put it.

    To quote from Bhulabhai’s arguments, he stated “….The position now is that international law has reached this stage that if liberty and democracy are to have any meaning all over the world, and not merely just for a part of it, and this is not politics, it is law – any war made for the purpose of liberating oneself from foreign yoke is completely justified by modern international law. And it will be a travesty of justice if we were to be told as a result of any decision arrived at here or otherwise, that the Indian may go as a soldier to fight for freedom of England against Germany, for England against Italy, for England against Japan, and yet a stage may not be reached when a free Indian State may not wish to free itself from any country including England itself.”[1]

    Whether these lucid arguments had any real effect on the senior British Officers sitting on the Court Martial Bench and influenced their decision, we do not quite know. The final sentence against the three defendants whilst finding them guilty of treason did not go as far as delivering death sentences. The three brave officers were dismissed from service and forfeited any pay and allowances due.

    At the news of the release of Shah Nawaz Khan, Prem Saghal and Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon from their detention cells in the Red Fort there were massive and jubilant countrywide celebrations. The colonial administration, we now know, took due notice – not only of the exploits of the INA, the nationwide consternation during the Red Fort trial and jubilations at its end, but also of the Naval Mutiny at (then) Bombay and the Air Force Mutiny at Karachi around the same time.

    “…..Gandhi is not a problem. We can deal with him and handle him. The Congress is also not a problem. We can easily deal with them. But now that India and Indians know about the INA as also about the mutinies in the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force, the Indians know that we have lost the love of the Indian Armed Forces. It is time to leave India!” …. note to the Viceroy, Field Marshal Wavell from the then Commander-in-Chief in India, Field Marshal Sir Claude Achinleck 

    Deep down in the 4th basement level in a temperature and humidity controlled hall of the British Library near Euston Station, London are stored the ‘India Office Records’. These records are pretty nearly everything that the British colonial rulers had with them in India and transported them back ‘in toto’ before Aug. 15th, 1947. Amongst these records is a document penned by the Commander in Chief in India – Field Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck. It is a Memo to the then Viceroy – Field Marshall Wavell. The purport of this extraordinary memorandum is that “…..Gandhi is not a problem. We can deal with him and handle him. The Congress is also not a problem. We can easily deal with them. But now that India and Indians know about the INA as also about the mutinies in the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force, the Indians know that we have lost the love of the Indian Armed Forces. It is time to leave India!” As Alex von Tunzelmann writes in his excellent book[2] “… neither Gandhi nor Congress party agitations forced British hands. It was…. the possibility of full scale military revolt due to the influence of Subhas Bose (and the INA) which led to the British exit from India.

    And yet generations of young Indian students in schools and colleges are still being taught that it was Gandhi and the Congress that got India’s independence!! They are still being taught that Nehru was India’s first Prime Minister. Yes he was but that of ‘DIVIDED INDIA’. The record shows that it was Subhash Chandra Bose – Netaji, who was the first Prime Minister – OF AN UNDIVIDED INDIA.

    JAI HIND!

     

     References

    [1] “Two Historic Trials in Red Fort” – Moti Ram; Roxy Print Press, 1946.

    [2] “Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire”; Alex von Tunzelmann;

     

    All colour photos by the author. 

  • Marginalised among the invisible: The case of female migrant domestic workers

    Marginalised among the invisible: The case of female migrant domestic workers

    The Pandemic, lockdown, and the chain of events that followed made the country wake up to the state of the most unfortunate group of the labour force; the migrant workers. They have always remained invisible to the development agenda of the government and only the catastrophe of a pandemic could shed light on their woes. Among this invisible workforce, there remains yet another marginalised group of female migrants.

    In India, female migration was initially considered insignificant by equating their movement merely as associational or followers of men.  However, this has certainly changed in the last decade. Marriage was seen as the central motive behind female migration, though lately more women are seen to enter the labour market post-migration as their labour demand rose in sectors of so-called “female occupations” of domestic work, care-work and certain informal labour requirements in sectors such as in construction, garment work, food services and as coolies and vendors.  As family migration from rural to urban abodes saw a rise in the country, both male and female migrants were required to join the labour force to meet their mere subsistence needs. Lack of employment, low income and other economic reasons pushed females, especially from rural areas, to migrate to urban zones of the country (Singh et al., 2015). While in urban areas, the migrants especially females and children are exposed to extreme vulnerabilities with regard to their dismal conditions of work in the informal sector, urban policies are deeply flawed in omitting migrant welfare and the sheer denial of their civil rights and entitlements.

    Precarious domestic work and female migrants

    Domestic work is often regarded as an invisible and insignificant addition to the social and economic values of a country. The work is increasingly feminised with over 80% of the world’s domestic work occupied by women (International Labour Organisation [ILO], 2013a). And this mirrors the traditional notions of domestic work being a woman’s task. These tasks include traditional housework such as cleaning, cooking, washing clothes or utensils etc. or care-work such as a child or elderly care. Female migrants with low skills, low levels of education and migrating from rural abodes in search of employment form a predominant part of the labour pool. With no recognition and regulation of work, the female domestic workers are subject to unequal power dynamics at the workplace, making their lives precarious in terms of wages, security and wellbeing.

    In India, domestic work employment among females saw an upsurge, especially in urban areas. This surge is mainly accounted for by the increasing need for care work given the changing demography, lack of work opportunities in other sectors and the gender constructions moulded by the society (Chandrashekar & Ghosh, 2012). According to the National Sample Survey (NSSO-2011-2012, 68th round), 39 lakh (3.9 million) people are occupied in domestic work, among which 26 lakh (2.6 million) are females. Micro-level surveys suggest a predominant concentration of female migrants in domestic work, especially in urban areas (Mazumdar et al., 2013).  There are two forms of workers: live-in workers, who are accommodated in the household and live-out workers, who return to their respective houses after work and may be involved in work with multiple households. As there is no relevant national data on migrant workers involved in the sector, micro-level surveys or sector-based studies are the only sources in understanding the conditions of these migrants in domestic work. Studies have stated that migrants with low vocational qualifications and often seen as unregulated and undocumented cheap labour, work under low wages for long hours and in dismal working conditions affecting their health and safety. Live-in domestic workers are more prone to the dangers of sexual and physical abuse. Live-out domestic workers migrating to a new city, struggle with the inaccessibility of social security schemes and entitlements. Exploitation by private placement agencies in terms of wages and work conditions is another area among their hassles.

    The domestic work arena, already an unregulated and unorganised sector, puts female migrants with low bargaining power on a higher vulnerability scale. The task of identifying domestic work hinders the formulation of a sound regulatory mechanism to confront such vulnerabilities.

    Barriers to effective Regulation

    Regulating domestic work is impeded by cultural and structural barriers. The traditional notion and disregard of domestic work by women in households is extended to the understanding of paid domestic work as unproductive and hence, making it undervalued. The structural barriers relate to the unusual workplace in private spheres, which makes it difficult in enforcing labour laws and any form of scrutiny against the privacy norms of a household. The informality of work and its complexities aggravates the barriers in regulation. The employment relationship is uncertain as it is without any legal titles of employee and employer, making the relation very personalised and often not under any form of contract or agreement. Even if labour laws are made inclusive of domestic work, implementation and assurance of compliance of these laws in households are challenged until the household is recognised as a ‘workplace’ and the person hiring as an ‘employer’ in the legal framework (Chen, 2011).

    Even though these barriers existed, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) convention 2011 attempted in ensuring decent work to domestic workers and this is recognised as the most important landmark in identifying domestic work under a legal framework. ILO defines domestic work as “work performed in or for a household or households” and domestic worker as “any person engaged in a domestic work within an employment relationship”. The convention specified a comprehensive labour standard for domestic workers in areas of their wages, hours of work, occupational safety and health and social security. The convention addressed and standardized the various concerns in the sector regarding child labour, migrant workers, trafficking, live-in domestic labourers and private recruitment agencies (C189 – Domestic Workers Convention, 2011). Even after the completion of 10 years of the convention and 32 ILO member countries enforcing the landmark treaty, India is yet to ratify the convention.

    As domestic work remains undefined in the country, no significant statistical standard in estimating domestic workers exist. In the ILO policy brief on “Global and regional estimates of domestic workers” (ILO, 2013b), ambiguous nature of data on domestic workers were noticeable from the widely distributed figures, ranging from 2.5 million estimates from a household survey, 4.5 million workers estimated from official statistics (NSSO 2004-05) to an exaggerated figure of 90 million in news media. This difference in estimation is related to the difference in the identification of domestic work among different establishments (Mahanta & Gupta, 2015). With no clarity in identifying domestic workers inclusive of its peculiarities, these figures could be heavily underestimated too. Being a female migrant in the sector aggravates the problem of estimation as National statistics narrows down female migration patterns merely as associational. And thus failing to understand the true motives behind female migration and the subsequent scale of occupations they reside in (Indu et al, 2012).  Macro data narrows down domestic female labour into regular workers based on their duration in employment and disregarding the conditions of low wages and other insecurities, while the temporary and casual nature of work goes unrecognised (Neetha & Indrani, 2020). The informality of work is another area that India has failed to regulate. Labour laws for industrial labour often disregard informal workers. This is evident in the isolation of migrant workers, especially female migrants in domestic work (Poddar & Koshy, 2019).

     Lacunae in the legal framework

    Domestic work and most feminised occupations, in general, in unorganised sectors, are isolated from the legal framework given their unique characterisation of workplace and employment relationships and not to mention the challenges in recognising their work given the cultural and structural barriers. For female migrants in domestic work or any other informal activity, the situation is similar.

    There were certain positive steps in attempting to recognise the domestic workforce in the country. First of such attempts were their inclusion in the Unorganised Workers Social Security Act 2008 which gave hope, but failed to be implemented across different states (Agrawal & Agarwal,2018). Subsequently, the government also set up a task force to recommend a framework for policymaking and after 10 years, in 2019, we see a draft on National policy on domestic work formulated by the government covering their recognition, access to civil rights and social security schemes, skill development, regulating private placement agencies and a grievance redressal system (“National Policy for Domestic Workers”, 2019). Upon the recommendations of the task force, the domestic workers were to be included under the National Health insurance scheme – Rashtriya Bhima Yojana (RSBY). But the limited awareness of the scheme, its functioning and benefits, coupled with corruption reduced the domestic worker’s accessibility of the same (Mahanta & Gupta, 2015). The suggestion of the task force to include domestic worker rights in existing legislations, pertaining to industrial or organised labourers, was widely criticised because it does not adapt to the peculiarities of the feminised domestic work (Poddar & Koshy, 2019). Ensuring minimum wages to the domestic worker through the Minimum Wages Act 1948 with a task-based approach, while ignoring the aspect of personalised nature of employment completely, puts the live-in workers whose tasks are not quantifiable, out of the ambit of the act’s provisions. Similarly, the inclusion of domestic workers in the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act (2013), Employees’ State Insurance Act (1948) and Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act 2008 is considered inadequate. Even though such inclusion is appreciated, these legislations fail to cater to the rights of a domestic worker if they are based on organised sector labour standards and without understanding the complexities of the domestic work (Poddar & Koshy, 2019).

    Private placement agencies, one of the main recruitment channels of domestic work, remain unregulated. This has led to the rise in exploitation in terms of payment and working conditions. The Delhi government drafted a Delhi Private Placement Agencies (Regulation) Bill in 2012 which was widely rejected by the domestic workers’ unions and groups. The proposed bill was criticised to be ineffective as it does not include the registration of the employers and lacks clarity in the process of inspection of these agencies (Chigateri et al., 2016). A study on one of the frequently travelled migrant routes, which is from Jharkhand to Delhi, reveals that migrants were subjected to conditions of exploitation and forced labour under such placement agencies. Conditions of forced labour are witnessed mainly among live-in domestic workers, who have to work under the agent for the stipulated period. The Inter-State Migrant Workmen’s (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1978 fails to address this issue as placement agencies relating to domestic work do not come under the ambit of the act. The act considers only those labour contractors who are registered at the origin state. Placement agencies involved in domestic work function through several sub-agents and mostly are unregistered (ILO, 2015)

    There were some positive responses from state governments. The state of Tamil Nadu set up the Tamil Nadu domestic workers welfare board.  Similarly, Maharashtra set up a domestic worker welfare board under Maharashtra Act (Agrawal & Agarwal, 2018) in 2008 while Kerala adopted a domestic worker bill in 2009. States like Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Rajasthan have set the minimum wage rate (Madhav, 2010). Neetha and Palriwala (2011) analysed the state legal framework on domestic workers and pointed out the same inadequacies noted over and over again, that is of not recognising the intricacies of domestic work, workplace, its several sub-categories, unregulated placement agencies and its unique employment relation. With no data on domestic workers and at the same time their numbers continuing to increase, these loose legislations and provisions go unnoticed by the workers.

    In 2019, with the view to improving compliance and bringing about uniformity of laws, 29 labour laws were consolidated into 4 labour codes: a) code on wages, b) code on industrial relation c) code on social security and d) code on occupational health and working conditions (“Overview of Labour Law Reforms”, n.d.). While the notion was to make the labour laws more transparent and such consolidation was expected to increase the coverage of different workers under the law, these codes remain ambiguous when it comes to certain sectors of informal work. Neetha and Indrani (2020) analyse these codes through a gender lens focusing on domestic and migrant workers. Code on wages does not incorporate private households as an entity hiring employees and thus domestic workers who struggled to attain minimum wages under the previous Minimum wages act (1948) have no mention, leaving them ambiguous. Code on industrial relations dealing with collective bargaining and industrial disputes, do not mention freedom of association in unorganised sectors and curbs the right to strike which has serious implications of registration of domestic workers under trade unions and their right to collective bargaining. Code on social security (CSS) has consolidated the unorganised workers’ social security act 2008, which was the first attempt towards the recognition of domestic workers and the new code puts the functioning of such acts and provisions for the unorganised sector under the discretion of the government, leaving out legislative scrutiny. Hence, there is uncertainty of the efficient functioning of these acts under CSS. Under the code, maternity benefits were applied only to the registered establishment of work. And domestic workers with no recognition of the workplace become ineligible for the same. Code on occupational health and working conditions is also seen to have not recognised the need for laws based on different sectors of work. It has again failed to include private households as a workplace, leaving the conditions of domestic work unregulated. Another failure relates to ignoring the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) 2013, which further leaves out the scrutiny of abuse or exploitation of domestic workers. The fact of being migrants among domestic workers isolates them even further from these labour codes.

    The lacunae in existing legislation in recognising domestic work and migrant labour continues to be beset in ambiguities with the new labour reforms.

    Present scenario: Covid-19 adding to the vulnerabilities

    The onset of the Covid-19 and the resultant lockdowns have led to massive disruptions of normal life resulting in the shocks of sudden unemployment, financial strain and increased burden for workers in the unorganised sector. The migrant workers bore the highest brunt. In such a scenario, female migrants in an unregulated and isolated sphere of work such as domestic workers have been subject to severe distress. The lockdown and reduced mobility left the workers unemployed and without income. Live-in migrants faced increased workload but no change in wages. Even with the slow revival of the economy, they are under threat of being infected or being carriers, given their precarious work and living conditions. Sudden dismissals and financial strain have forced many to the situation of borrowing money for subsistence and eventually ending up in debt. Workers struggle to meet the basic needs of health, food, education of the family with lower income and savings (Sumalatha et al., 2021). With dismal employment relations and working conditions, coupled with the exclusion from the legal framework and social protection, Covid-19 has expanded the existing inequalities.

    Government intervention:  The need of the hour

    Government intervention both in ensuring basic rights and providing for the welfare of the domestic workers have been negligible. The cultural and structural barriers are not the only challenges in regulating domestic work. There is a lack of political will in acknowledging domestic workers and their woes. As they remain scattered and invisible, the domestic workers are not seen as potential vote banks and hence remain without any political influence. The sector which is comprised largely of female migrants is devoid of any political voice and agency in their origin or host states since there are barriers in pursuing their voting rights given the nature of their migration. Their interactions with civic authorities and politicians in the host state are marginal and hence, their issues do not come to the fore (Bureau, 2018). There is a lack of awareness among the migrant workers on their voting rights. They are largely unaware as to who should be approached in the host state to resolve their problems. Even a migrant worker, well aware of his/her political rights and agencies, refrain from pursuing any form of interaction as they have either lost faith in the system or are disillusioned by the long time and effort spent pursuing the cases with no results to show. This highlights the need for effective political inclusion of migrant workers and the generation of political and electoral awareness among them (Bureau, 2018).

    Further, identification and protection are the two essentials in creating an inclusive environment for female migrants in domestic work. The feminized nature of domestic work in the country, concentrated predominantly among poor and marginalised migrant workers, need to be recognised as dignified “work” and households they work in as “workplace”. Only separate comprehensive legislation on domestic work can incorporate the varied complexities of the sector, rather than a mere extension of organised sector legislations. Such separate legislation would provide the domestic worker with an identity that can ensure them their rights and entitlements (Sharma & Kunduri, 2015). The legislation should address the working conditions, violations and exploitations, provisions for mobilisation, illegal channels of private placement agencies and establishing basic civil rights from a gender perspective to incorporate the differential experience of females in the sector. Efficient implementation and scrutiny of the same require statistically significant data, the absence of which is another flaw in the system.

    Domestic worker’s inaccessibility of social protection is the result of the lack of recognition. Migrant workers in the sector without any identity proof or formal registration are excluded from social protection schemes. Agrawal and Agarwal (2018) suggest setting up an independent welfare board in every district responsible for registering, ensuring availability of social security benefits, conducting dispute resolution, dissemination of information and providing skill development and training for domestic workers. The provision of financial incentives can help in coping with sudden unemployment situations during any form of crisis such as the pandemic. Allowing for the organisation of domestic workers into unions and cooperatives can also be beneficial in attaining social and legal protection. Domestic worker groups such as SEWA and National Domestic Workers Movement (NDWM) in the country have been attending to the woes of the domestic workers by providing a platform for collective bargaining and assertion of rights.

    The introduction of the draft on National Policy on Domestic workers can be seen as a positive development, however, the policy still remains in consideration. Vulnerabilities of the domestic workers, exacerbated by the pandemic, highlight the urgent necessity for the ratification of the ILO convention on domestic workers. There is an urgent requirement in increasing the government’s sensitivity towards domestic workers and their precarious existence.

    References

    1. Agrawal, U., & Agarwal, S. (2018). Social Security for Domestic Workers in India. Socio-Legal Rev., 14, 30
    2. Bureau, A. (2018). Political Inclusion of Seasonal Migrant Workers in India: Perceptions, Realities and Challenges.
    3. C189 – Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189). (n.d.). Retrieved July 15, 2021, from https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C189
    4. Chandrasekhar, C. P., & Ghosh, J. (2012, November 12). Changing patterns of domestic work. @businessline. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/c-p chandrasekhar/changing-patterns-of-domestic-work/article22985402.ece
    5. Chen, M. A. (2011). Recognizing domestic workers, regulating domestic work: Conceptual, measurement, and regulatory challenges. Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 23(1), 167-184.
    6. Chigateri, S., Zaidi, M., & Ghosh, A. (2016). Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other103. Retrieved July 18, 2021, from http://www.unrisd.org/indiareport-chapter4
    7. Chigateri, S. (2021). Labour Law Reforms and Women’s Work in India: Assessing the New Labour Codes From a Gender Lens. Institute of Social Studies Trust.
    8. Indu, A., Indrani, M., & Neetha, N. (2012). Gender and migration: Negotiating rights, a women’s movement perspective. Delhi: Centre for Women’s Development Studies.
    9. International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2013a). Who are domestic workers? Ilo.Org. https://www.ilo.org/global/docs/WCMS_209773/lang–en/index.htm
    10. International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2013b). Global and Regional Estimates on Domestic Workers.
    11. International Labour Organisation (ILO), (2015). Indispensable yet unprotected: Working conditions of Indian domestic workers at home and abroad. Retrieved July 19, 2021, from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—declaration/documents/publication/wcms_378058.pdf
    12. Klemm, B., Däubler, W., Beimin, W., Lai, A., Min, H., & Sinha, S. (2011). Protection for Domestic Workers: Challenges and Prospects. Briefing Paper Special Issue, May, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
    13. Madhav, R. (2010). Legal Recognition of Domestic Work. Labour File, 8, 41.
    14. Mahanta, U., & Gupta, I. (2015). Road ahead for domestic workers in India: legal and policy challenges.
    15. Mazumdar, I., Neetha, N., & Agnihotri, I. (2013). Migration and gender in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 54-64.
    16. National policy for domestic workers. (2019, February 13). Retrieved July 18, 2021, from https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1564261
    17. Neetha, N. (2004). Making of female breadwinners: Migration and social networking of women domestics in Delhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 1681-1688.
    18. Neetha, N., & Palriwala, R. (2011). The absence of state law: Domestic workers in India. Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 23(1), 97-120.
    19. Neetha N., & Indrani, M. (2020, June 01). Crossroads and Boundaries : Labour Migration, Trafficking and Gender. Retrieved July 19, 2021, from https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/20/review-womens-studies/crossroads-and-boundaries.html
    20. Overview of Labour Law Reforms (n.d.) Retrieved from https://prsindia.org/billtrack/overview-of-labour-law-reforms#_edn2
    21. Poddar, M., & Koshy, A. (2019). Legislating for Domestic’Care’Workers in India-An Alternative Understanding. NUJS L. Rev., 12, 67
    22. Shanthi, K. (2006). Female labour migration in India: Insights from NSSO data(Vol. 4, p. 2006). Chennai: Madras School of Economics.
    23. Sharma, S., & Kunduri, E. (2015). Of Law, Language, and Labour: Situating the Need for Legislation in Domestic Work. Economic and Political Weekly, 50(28).
    24. Singh, N., Keshri, K., & Bhagat, R. B. (2015). Gender dimensions of migration in urban India. In India Migration Report 2015(pp. 200-214). Routledge India.
    25. Srivastava, P., & Shukla, P. (2021). Crisis behind closed doors domestic workers’ struggles during the pandemic and beyond. Economic and Political Weekly, 17-21.
    26. Sumalatha, B. S., Bhat, L. D., & Chitra, K. P. (2021). Impact of Covid-19 on Informal Sector: A Study of Women Domestic Workers in India. The Indian Economic Journal, 00194662211023845.

     

    Image Credit: ucanews.com 

  • Climate Change: A Review of the Rural Electrification Policies and Barriers to adopting Renewable Energy in Rural India

    Climate Change: A Review of the Rural Electrification Policies and Barriers to adopting Renewable Energy in Rural India

    Energy is crucial for a country’s growth and sustainable development. But over one-third of the world’s population, mostly consisting of people in rural areas of developing countries, do not have access to clean, affordable energy.

    The climate crisis is a battle that countries have been fighting for decades now. The policies and strategies developed by different countries have helped in small ways in achieving their energy and climate goals. One strategy among all countries is the development and improvement in the use of renewables. Various studies, across different fields, have shown us the need for countries to shift to this alternative set of energy sources that will sustain life in the long run. The use of renewable energy in both urban and rural areas should be monitored and developed to achieve the sustainable development goals that countries have vowed to achieve.

    Energy is crucial for a country’s growth and sustainable development. But over one-third of the world’s population, mostly consisting of people in rural areas of developing countries, do not have access to clean, affordable energy. This is an important factor contributing to the low standards of living in rural areas of developing countries.

    In India, more than two-thirds of the population live in rural areas whose primary source of income is agricultural activities. But a large proportion of the rural population does not have consistent access to energy. To this population, new alternative sources of energy remain unaffordable and inaccessible due to poverty and lack of adequate infrastructure, respectively. Hence, we find that the rural populations continue to use traditional sources of energy such as coal, fuelwood, agricultural waste, animal dung, etc. Not only do these cause pollution and quick erosion of natural resources, but they impact negatively on people’s health. The need for transitioning to the use of renewable energy, especially in the country’s rural areas is of prime importance. But, to achieve this, the government must bring out policies that will guide this transition. Moreover, it is important that the government positively supports companies – both private and public – that generate the required technology and research that transforms the available renewable energy sources into energy that the public can consume.

    Rural Electrification in India

    The Electricity Act of 2003 enabled the building of electricity infrastructure across the rural and remote regions of the country and thus, easy access to electricity for most of the people. The Indian Government launched the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) in 2005, to extend electricity to all unelectrified villages. The programme focused largely on developing electrification infrastructure across villages in India and providing free connections to all rural households living below the poverty line. Further, state governments received a 90% grant from the central government which aided in extending electrification infrastructure to over one lakh villages during the period 2005–2013. Moreover, the central government worked towards increasing implementation efficiencies by engaging central PSUs in some states.

    In 2015, the NDA Government launched the Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) under which, the villages that remained un-electrified under the RGGVY, were electrified. The scheme has also been significant in supporting distribution networks in rural areas, largely concerning metering distribution transformers, feeders, and consumers in rural areas (Gill, Gupta, and Palit 2019).

    The central government further introduced standalone mini-grids programs, under the DDUGJY in 2016. Guided by the National mini-grid policy, State governments also contributed through various mini-grid policies to promote decentralised renewable energy solutions. Further, the Unnat Jyothi Affordable LEDs for All was introduced to encourage the efficient use of energy and under this scheme, LED bulbs were distributed to all households with a metered connection at subsidised rates. The Ujwal DISCOM Assurance Yojana was also introduced under the DDUGJY to allow a financial turnaround and operational improvement of Discoms. According to the UDAY scheme, discoms were expected to improve operational efficiency and bring AT&C losses down to 15%.

    While the schemes were successfully implemented then, the rate of rural household electrification was still slow. Evaluations of the schemes found various limitations, such as high upfront connection costs, poor quality of supply, poor maintenance services, to name a few. Additionally, some states had also started initiating their electricity-access programmes to accelerate the electrification process, such as the West Bengal Rural Electrification Programme, the Har Ghar Bijli scheme in Bihar, the Bijuli Bati mobile-based app to enable last-mile connectivity and household connections in Odisha (Gill, Gupta, and Palit 2019). To address this issue, the central government then launched the Pradhan Mantri Sahaj Bijli Har Ghar Yojana (PM Saubhagya) in September 2017, with the ambitious target of providing electricity connections to all un-electrified rural households by March 2019. Under this scheme, the government has electrified all of 597,464 census villages in the country (Bhaskar 2019).

     Barriers to adopting Renewable Energy in Rural Areas

    This section focuses on the issues that restrict the efficient adaptation of renewable energy in rural areas. As the government continues to promote renewable energy in rural communities, it should keep in mind these following limitations and develop mechanisms to overcome them as and when they arise. While employing renewables to supply electricity, the problem of grid integration arises. Most electricity grids and the technology used, are designed and placed around fossil fuels. However, when they transition now to more non-conventional forms of energy such as wind and solar, the designs and placements of power generation systems have to change rapidly. Thus, heavy emphasis should be placed on improving the research and infrastructure required to make this transition as smooth as possible. That is, the government should research the most optimal locations for wind turbines and solar panels, as not all lands in rural areas can be employed for this purpose. Otherwise, it may negatively impact the quality of agricultural lands. Upon conducting the required research, the infrastructure to connect all areas to the electricity grids must be developed and well-financed by the government to satisfy the energy demands of the rural population. For instance, in Germany, while the wind power potential is in the northern regions, major demand for it is in the southern region. Thus, the country’s energy transition process emphasizes upgrading the electricity grid infrastructure that would make it possible for power to flow from north to south (UNCTAD 2019). Further, the planning should also focus on balancing the energy mix in the power grid. The transition to renewables will not be a quick one, which implies that for the short term the power grid will be a mix of different sources of energy. Thus, the plans should design the grids in such a way that the proportion of each energy source balances one another so that there is no leakage or wastage in the system, especially given the fact that energy storage technology is still underdeveloped in the country.

    For many years now, there has been an emphasis on the potential of decentralised electricity comprising off-grid or mini-grid systems to help with rural electrification. The government introduced a national mini-grid policy in 2016 to promote decentralised renewable energy. With the increase in the use of solar energy, solar-powered mini-grid systems were found to be more economical and accessible to rural households (Comello et al. 2016). These systems could substantially improve the people’s standard of living and eliminate the use of harmful fuels such as kerosene oil for simple household appliances such as lamps and cooking stoves. However, an IEA report found evidence that this potential is limited, and would not be beneficial for large, productive, income-generating activities. Thus, mini-grids are often considered a temporary solution, until grid connectivity is achieved (IEA 2017).

    Whether a grid system or an off-grid system is implemented, high connection charges will automatically limit the rural population’s ability to connect to the grid.

    A major challenge that the government must keep in mind is affordability. Whether a grid system or an off-grid system is implemented, high connection charges will automatically limit the rural population’s ability to connect to the grid. On the one hand, better access to electricity will increase productivity and lead to the growth and development in the region but on the other hand, most of the rural communities live below the poverty line and will not be able to afford the connection, even if they have access to it. While decentralised energy sounds economical and sounds like an obvious solution, it is also limited in capacity.

    Another factor that the government must keep in mind for the adaptation of renewable energy in rural areas is the situation of state and private distribution companies (discoms) in India that play a pivotal role in the rural electrification process. While the government set the goals and adopted a strategy to electrify all rural households under the Saubhagya scheme, it was the discoms’ responsibility to implement these strategies and achieve the goals. A TERI report found that the discoms had difficulty carrying out the electrification process because the strategy adopted by the government had not considered the difference in demographics in the rural areas (Gill, Gupta, and Palit 2019). That is, each area differs in population size, density, and topography and the discoms found it hard to implement a similar strategy to all places alike. Moreover, the financial status of many state-run discoms has been stressed over the past year due to increasing losses and lack of adequate support from the respective State governments. Over the past year, dues to power generators have increased to Rs 1.27 trillion (Economic Times 2021). The annual 2021 budget’s outlay of over Rs 3 trillion, to be spent over five years, to improve the viability of state-run discoms, is a step in the right direction. The TERI report also found that discoms face institutional burdens in the electrification process (Gill, Gupta, and Palit 2019). The companies are most often strapped for time and must deal with huge amounts of paperwork. Simultaneously, they have to be physically present to install the necessary infrastructure and manage the labour employed in different states. In the end, it remains to be seen how the discoms will manage to monitor and review the electricity infrastructure in the rural areas, especially given the huge amounts of debt that they are trapped in.

    The government must also work towards increasing and incentivising private sector participation. While the private companies were interested in taking up tenders for the production of electricity through renewable energy sources in the past, the recent withdrawal of benefits such as accelerated depreciation has been a cause for concern. Companies like Suzlon Energy Ltd. face lower returns on their investment, thus deterring them from investing in future projects. Removal of benefits also discourages smaller companies that are looking to invest in this sector as it increases not only the cost but uncertainty about the government’s policies. Companies will refrain from investing if they do not anticipate a high return in the future. For grid connection systems to be successful and efficient in the long term, the government must ensure a strong governance structure, and a stable and enabling policy environment that constantly encourages fresh private sector participation. Concerning the rural electrification process, the government must encourage private sector participation because it would complement the public sector companies thus sharing the burden of production, installations, and technology as well as the process of maintenance and regular checks once the grid connection is complete.

    A shift to renewable energy in rural areas will no doubt have a positive impact on the health and well-being of the population. It will also improve the standard of living and in most cases, the productivity of the people. But the change has to be a gradual process. Even if renewable energy and electricity are affordable and accessible to the people, alternative cooking fuels and technology will take time to be accepted in practice as they may not have the same performance quality as traditional stoves and appliances that the people are used to. To overcome this hurdle, the government must ensure that the policies formed will guide the adjustment to renewables for many years to come. Moreover, the government must spread knowledge and awareness about the benefits of shifting to appliances that are sourced through renewable sources of energy. Besides, some rural households collect firewood for not just individual consumption but also to sell it (IEA 2017). This is a source of income for these households hence, the government should tread carefully when they implement programs that seek to reduce the collection and use of firewood. For years now, the government has promoted and subsidised the use of LPG within rural communities, as an alternative for other harmful sources of energy. While it has helped improve people’s health to some extent, it would be beneficial for the government to gradually nudge the decrease in the use of LPG and increase the use of renewable alternatives. Apart from the definite benefits to the environment, such a change would serve to reduce the rural-urban energy gap in India.

    The shift to renewable energy sources holds huge amounts of risks and uncertainty. But, despite this, there is a need to make long-term, accurate forecasts of energy demand and develop drafts of policies beforehand that would guide the process of supplying energy to satisfy the demand. Energy supply projects necessitate this because they have long gestation and implementation periods. With the climate crisis advancing rapidly, it would serve the government well to be prepared.

    International Collaboration

     International cooperation can play a crucial role in expanding the distribution of renewables. It can help countries benefit from shared infrastructure, technology, and lessons. The challenge thus lies in designing policies that will facilitate this technology and infrastructure transfer, especially in countries where the renewable energy sector is emerging. International organizations such as the Commission on Science and Technology for Development can play an important role in supporting such collaborations. Policies should also facilitate mechanisms that will help improve the current capabilities in developing countries.

    For instance, the Indo-German Energy Programme – Access to Energy in Rural Areas was signed to create a favourable environment for rural renewable energy enterprises so that they can provide easily accessible energy services to the rural population.

    The bilateral collaboration brought in local and international professional expertise to support private sector development, to identify and improve viable sources of finance, and to help design government schemes to achieve sustainable energy security and provide clean cooking energy solutions to the rural population. The GIZ – the German Corporation for International Cooperation – worked closely with India’s Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) to successfully implement the program. The program succeeded in training more than 10,000 professionals to qualify as energy auditors. It has also helped increase private sector investment and develop a calculation to determine the CO2 emissions for the Indian electricity supply grid.

    Way Forward

     Research and innovation are essential to improve renewable options for producing clean cooking fuel. There is also a need for location-based research to produce appropriate workable technologies. Long-term policies and outcomes are important to consider. So, conducting significant research will not only help understand the present conditions but will also help policymakers make informed decisions in the future. It is also important to educate and communicate to the rural population about the relative advantages of using modern energy sources over traditional sources. For instance, consumers may be unaware of the health impacts of using traditional sources of energy for cooking. Moreover, they may distrust conventional alternatives due to their unfamiliarity with them. Thus, the responsibility falls on the government to properly inform them of the need for the shift to renewables and curb the spread of misinformation.

    Further, alternative solutions will only succeed if they are established in cooperation with the local users. “The women in rural areas play an important role when it comes to energy transition” (IEA 2017). Several initiatives such as the Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, SEforALL, and ECOWAS address the joint issues of gender empowerment, energy poverty, health, and climate (IEA 2017). Training and capacity building are key to the shift to renewable sources of power. And in rural energy applications, this can be improved by taking into account the gender issues that plague society. There is a high possibility that rural engineers, once trained, might migrate to urban areas in search of more lucrative work. In response to this, the Barefoot College International Solar Training Programme takes a different approach to capacity-building in rural areas and trains the grandmothers in villages who are more certain to stay and help develop the community.

    a shift to clean energy in rural areas that houses the section of the population that lives below the poverty line will be more successful if it is seen as a strategy to broaden community development.

    Thus, a shift to clean energy in rural areas that houses the section of the population that lives below the poverty line will be more successful if it is seen as a strategy to broaden community development. This includes higher employment, better infrastructure, roads, and telecommunications.  This process requires careful design of policies and the establishment of a supportive environment that includes not just innovative business models but also maintenance systems that will sustain the development in the long run.

    Conclusion

     To summarize, rural electrification and the transition to renewable energy in rural areas have been a part of the government’s agenda for many years now, irrespective of the ruling party at the centre. Necessary policies have been introduced to guide the process. While it is great that the government recently achieved universal electrification, it remains to be seen whether the quality of power provided to these villages meets the needs of the population. Further, in this process, state-owned discoms have taken a serious financial hit and it is a tough road to recovery from here. Adding on, the COVID pandemic has slowed down the development and recovery of these discoms. The government should first increase budget outlays in the following years and create a system to monitor the use of these finances. Second, it could turn to privatisation. Privatising discoms on a larger scale would reduce the financial and risk burden on the government and ensure efficient functioning of the companies. Additionally, it is important that while policies are being designed, the deciding parties have a complete understanding of the socio-economic situation of the communities within which they will make changes. To do this, experts who have studied the layout of these rural areas extensively should be involved in the process, along with leaders from the respective districts who are bound to be more aware of the situation and the problems in their areas. More importantly, the government should keep the process of the transition to alternative energy sources transparent and keep an open line of communication with the rural population to earn their trust before they make significant changes. Finally, India is one of the largest consumers of different renewable sources of energy. While it is important to make changes to the policies in this sector, it is also imperative that the government tries to maintain stability in policies that support the companies which help satisfy the growing energy demand in the country.

     

    References

    1. Bhaskar, Utpal. 2019. “All villages electrified, but last-mile supply a challenge.” mint, December 29, 2019. https://www.livemint.com/industry/energy/all-villages-electrified-but-last-mile-supply-a-challenge-11577642738875.html.
    2. Comello, Stephen D., Stefan J. Reichelstein, Anshuman Sahoo, and Tobias S. Schmidt. 2016. “Enabling Mini-grid Development in Rural India.” Stanford University. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IndiaMinigrid_Working_Paper2.pdf
    3. Economic Times. 2021. “Discom debt at Rs 6 trillion; negative outlook on power distribution: ICRA.” The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/discom-debt-at-rs-6-trillion-negative-outlook-on-power-distribution-icra/articleshow/81431574.cms?from=mdr.
    4. Gill, Bigsna, Astha Gupta, and Debajit Palit. 2019. “Rural Electrification: Impact on Distribution Companies in India.” The Energy and Resources Institute. https://www.teriin.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/DUF%20Report.pdf.
    5. IEA. 2017. “Energy Access Outlook: From Poverty to Prosperity.” International Energy Agency. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-access-outlook-2017.
    6. UNCTAD. 2019. “The Role of Science, Technology and Innovation in Promoting Renewable Energy by 2030.” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/dtlstict2019d2_en.pdf.

    Feature Image: The Better India 

    Image 1: www.alliancemagazine.org

    Image 2: indiaclimatedialogue.net

  • New ‘Drone Rules’ is set to transform Drone business in India

    New ‘Drone Rules’ is set to transform Drone business in India

    Not many would know that Goldman Sachs has predicted that in the next five years the drone market will be worth over a hundred billion US dollars. India became an IT hub in the 1990s and Indian programmers were sought-after during the dot-com boom. This was not because of some great policy decisions that we took at that time but rather it was because of no policy on the subject. There were times when computers gathered dust in some ministries because the minister felt computers are sinister equipment that could take away people’s livelihood.

    ‘Drones’ are said to be the next big thing that the world has ever seen since IT and Dotcom in terms of technology disruption and touching the lives of people in all spheres. Traditional modes of transportation of goods, surveillance, survey, and foraying into newer areas like agriculture, marine et cetera are some areas where the drone is already making waves.

    The recent ‘Draft Drone Rules’, released for public comments by the civil aviation ministry, is a welcome change from the previous one which gave the impression that obtaining a license would be a herculean task. Some companies like AutomicroUAS Aerotech Pvt ltd and many others did obtain a license using provisions of the previous policy. The new draft policy is a more user and business-friendly drone policy. This is a very good and the first decision by the new civil aviation minister, Jyotiraditya Scindia, after assuming office.  Some of the highlights of the new drone policy are: –

    • Up to 500 kgs of drone Aircraft Rules, 1937 is no more applicable. This is a significant change because the Aircraft rules 1937 is specifically applicable for airplanes that carry humans and therefore, have been made with that purpose.
    • There are a significant number of people who fly nano and micro drones in India. Including operators of model aircraft. Ubiquitous drones include drones flying at marriage parties and increased use of drone shots in the entertainment field. These people now can fly these drones/model aircraft without having a drone pilot license. This singular step itself will bolster not only self-employment but also reduce unemployment in the country. Being a drone pilot is also looked at as one of the coolest things today.
    • Drone imports will still be controlled by DGFT (director-general foreign trade). This currently could be looked at as a bit of an impediment for those entrepreneurs who are dependent on imports of certain drone parts. However, in the long run, this provision could bolster making those parts in India and selling them abroad. Easing of import of drones/drone parts currently and bringing in stricter rules as time goes by would have been a better option. This aspect could be looked at by the government to promote innovators and children who are looking to learn, for who importing certain critical drone components is vital. It is highly recommended that drone imports controlled by DGFT be done away with for the time being.
    • The creation of a drone corridor is likely to change the face of the Indian Economy. Logistics Operation, last-mile connectivity, the short haul of goods between two towns, and the cost of connectivity between places are set to change dramatically. This change alone, in my opinion, is likely to bring a significant impact in times to come. Not many have realized the power of creating drone corridors and all that remains to be seen is how this rule is taken forward by the government in improving logistics connectivity and creation of drone highways in times to come.
    • The drone research and development Organisation as a provision in the rule is futuristic and is likely to change the face of the drone industry in India. Correctly harnessed and nurtured, this rule could enable the development of many centres of excellence of drones. The government needs to create an equivalence of ‘Silicon Valley’ for the drones so that organisations dealing with hardware, software, artificial intelligence et cetera can come together and take this endeavour forward.
    • There are several companies across the world that are working on unmanned traffic management (UTM) including an Indian company called Avianco. These companies now could collaborate with the government of India in providing unmanned traffic information and could work as a service provider for tracking of drones as well as providing drone operators with simple NPNT permission, which is one of the provisions in the new drone policy.
    • Third-party drone insurance could be adequate as specified in the rules. However, drones are costly equipment. Readers would be surprised to know that most of these drones are costlier than small hatchback cars. Therefore, owners of these drones may want to go for comprehensive insurance. This is a huge opportunity for insurance and insurance facilitation companies like TropoGo, in the area of drone insurance. In times to come, the number of drone insurance policies may well overtake the number of vehicle insurance policies in the world. Since drones are set to replace many of the traditional workforce and industries.
    • ‘Drone promotion Council’ as specified in these rules should have come up as of yesterday, but it’s never too late. Those countries who missed this ‘Drone-Bus’ may get left behind in the overall economic progress in times to come. Therefore, setting up the ‘drone promotion council’ is the need of the hour.
    • Highlights of the new ‘Draft Drones Rules’ are shown below:

     

    The new drone policy of India is a welcome change. It is a well-thought-out, simplified policy that India has seen in recent times. This policy aligns with Prime Minister Modi‘s vision for India in terms of reducing unemployment, improving ease of doing business, self-employment, making India go digital, and becoming a technology leader in the world. What the future holds will entirely depend on how these rules are interpreted and implemented efficiently without the usual horrors of the red-tapism of the past.

     

    Image Credit: www.geospatialworld.net

     

  • To Become Atmanirbhar, Bharat Needs Strong R&D

    To Become Atmanirbhar, Bharat Needs Strong R&D

    India has gone full circle from Gandhi’s days of Swadeshi to Nehru’s vision of self-reliant India to New Economic Policies of indiscriminate opening of the economy to Atmanirbhar Bharat. In between lip service was paid to Swadeshi in 1998 but the government continue with the indiscriminate opening up of the economy. Even agriculture was not left untouched with the opening up of 1400 commodities after the Seattle round of negotiations in 1999.

    What is Atmanirbharta?

    What do we understand by atmanirbhar – is it at the narrow level of producing most things that we need ourselves or at the wider philosophical level? If the latter, it implies independence of thought and development of socially relevant knowledge. It could lead to an alternate vision of development and prosperity for the nation.

    In an open economy people will then buy the foreign produced cheaper goods. So, the more important aspect of atmanirbharta is the philosophical aspect.

    The idea of producing most things ourselves runs into a contradiction in a globalizing world which is premised on marketization. Most things are being produced cheaper and better somewhere else, including our cultural symbols such as gulal, diyas and ganesh statue. In an open economy people will then buy the foreign produced cheaper goods. So, the more important aspect of atmanirbharta is the philosophical aspect.

    Opening up the Economy

    In 1991, with the New Economic Policies we gave up the idea of ourselves producing most things that we need. Our global trade increased dramatically with the percentage of export plus import of goods and services in GDP rising from around 17% in 1991 to about 55.8% by 2013. In 2019 it is down to about 40%.

    With the evolution of Washington Consensus in the 1980s, based on the idea of marketization, the world started to integrate in the 1990s with all countries showing a sharp rise in trade to GDP ratio. China captured a large share of the world markets and built a huge trade surplus. Its foreign exchange reserves rose to over $3.5 trillion. This gave it enormous clout globally not only with developing countries but also with the developed countries.

    The idea of atmanirbharta or self-reliance underwent a change. It became a matter of global competition to gain market share globally. One imported more to export more. Growth was supposed to depend on this. South East Asia and China were given as examples of success of such openness and rapid improvement in the living standard of the population. China post-Mao successfully adopted such a strategy. It was a large economy so it could not even be said that India cannot do what Singapore can do.

    Globalization is all about development of technology and India has lagged behind in that.

    Lessons from China

    What are the lessons India can learn from China’s achievements in the last thirty years? Apart from the fact that it is an authoritarian state with a strong sense of nationalism, its advances in research are stupendous.

    China has invested huge sums in building a strong infrastructure and research base in Universities, Institutions and Industry. It has one of the highest investment and savings rate in the world at 44 per cent in 2019. India’s comparative figure for 2019 is around 30%. It has developed the 5G technology faster than others and is willing to provide it cheaper than its competitors. This is also the case with many other lines of production such as, electronics, pharmaceuticals, automobiles and toys. It has moved rapidly in various fields such as development of artificial intelligence and applications of internet for commerce and financial sectors.

    Globalization is all about development of technology and India has lagged behind in that.

    China has had the long term vision to develop this rapidly by investing heavily in Research and Development. After getting technology from foreign companies, it has advanced the same by mastering it. Unfortunately, India has not done so and has repeatedly imported the next level of technology.

    Need for strong R&D

    India’s investment in R&D has been minimal. The private sector has been investing little in technology development. And, the public sector has been hamstrung in technology development by lack of autonomy, bureaucratization and corruption.

    Global competitiveness requires rapid development of technology. It requires massive investment in both absorption and development of technology. Instead, India’s investment in R&D has been minimal. The private sector has been investing little in technology development. And, the public sector has been hamstrung in technology development by lack of autonomy, bureaucratization and corruption.

    Research and Development require autonomy for researchers and a long term vision. Of course resources are also required but autonomy and vision are crucial and these have been weak in India. The same Indian researchers are able to do well in foreign lands but when in India they are not able to deliver. Our research establishment are rather feudal in approach and work within rigid hierarchies so that often talent gets suppressed.

    a culture of promoting independent and critical thinking is largely missing and that reacts back on research and generation of new ideas.

    Universities are the places where autonomy is greater and a long term vision can flourish away from the immediate profit motive. But unfortunately most of our universities are also bureaucratized and do not give autonomy to the academics. The authorities largely with bureaucratized and feudal mindset see independent thinking as a threat to themselves and, therefore, put up road blocks in the path of the independent thinkers thereby frustrating them and making their functioning difficult. Often the independent minded are seen as trouble makers and a challenge to the domination of the authorities. This is true not only in social sciences but also in the case of sciences in most universities. Thus, a culture of promoting independent and critical thinking is largely missing and that reacts back on research and generation of new ideas.

    Imperatives of Strengthening R&D

    Atmanirbharta in the present day world does not imply closing the economy but having the strength to face the challenge from other nations. This has to be based on a long term vision and cannot be achieved in the short run or by ad hoc measures.

    It requires high quality education right from the school stage. Thus, the education budget has to be expanded and teaching paid much higher attention than given at present. The status of teachers has to be enhanced so that talented people come in to academia.

    The world has been globalizing for thousands of years with trade and exchange of knowledge across nations and across continents. But earlier it was a slow two way process. Colonization turned into a one way process with western knowledge and thought establishing its hegemony globally and more so in India. That killed the internal dynamism of Indian society. It reinforced feudalism in India and decimated the quest for socially relevant knowledge generation.

    There has to be a continuum in knowledge generation but with an Indian perspective. India has to have the self-confidence that it can move ahead without denying the last few hundred years. Denial is only a sign of weakness.

    As Gandhi suggested, there is need for Indian modernity. Achieving that is crucial. Can it be based on denying what has happened over the last 250 years and going to what existed prior to that? Such a gap would undermine our understanding of social developments in India. That would be a recipe for repeating our mistakes. There has to be a continuum in knowledge generation but with an Indian perspective. India has to have the self-confidence that it can move ahead without denying the last few hundred years. Denial is only a sign of weakness.

    Denial would prevent us from understanding the nature of globalization we are undergoing and therefore we would not be able to work out any correctives that are needed. It would lead to much confusion in society. For instance, we would not be able to understand why consumerism is sweeping the world, including the poor in India or why our research lacks dynamism. In brief, Atmanirbharta requires India to move with self-confidence and not be in denial.

     

  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first ‘focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    The satellite picture below brilliantly depicts the geographical separation of Arunachal Pradesh (called Lower Tibet by the Chinese) and Tibet. The McMahon Line more or less runs along the crest line of the Himalayas.

    The Chinese have never been quite explicit on how much of Arunachal they seek.  I once saw an official map displayed in a travel agents office in Lhasa that showed only the Tawang tract as Chinese territory. In other maps they have their border running along the foothills, which means all of Arunachal.

    The Chinese have based their specific claim on the territory on the premise that Tawang was administered from Lhasa, and the contiguous areas owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. Then the Chinese must also consider this. Sikkim till into the 19th century a vassal of Tibet and Darjeeling was forcibly taken from it by the British! By extending this logic could they realistically stake a claim for Sikkim and Darjeeling? Of course not. It would be preposterous. History has moved on. The times have changed. For the 21st century to be stable 20th century borders must be stable, whatever be our yearnings.

    At the crux of this issue is the larger question of the national identities of the two nations and when and how they evolved. The Imperial India of the Mughals spanned from Afghanistan to Bengal but did not go very much below the Godavari in the South. The Imperial India of the British incorporated all of today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but had no Afghanistan, not for want of trying. It was the British who for the first time brought Assam into India in 1826 when they defeated Burma and formalized the annexation with the treaty of Yandabo.

    It was only in 1886 that the British first forayed out of the Brahmaputra valley when they sent out a punitive expedition into the Lohit valley in pursuit of marauding tribesmen who began raiding the new tea gardens. Apparently the area was neither under Chinese or Tibetan control for there were no protests either from the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Soon the British stayed put.

    Tibet remained in self imposed isolation and the race to be first into Lhasa became the greatest challenge for explorers and adventurers in the second half of the 19th century. Not the least among these were the spies of the Survey of India, the legendary pundits. The most renowned of these was the Sarat Chandra Das whose books on Tibet are still avidly read today. As the adventurers, often military officers masquerading as explorers began visiting Tibet the British in India began worrying. Reports that the most well-known of Czarist Russia’s military explorers, Col. Grombchevsky was sighted in Tibet had Lord Curzon, the Governor General of India most worried.

    In 1903 Curzon decided to send a military expedition into Tibet led by Grombchevsky’s old antagonist, Col. Francis Younghusband. A brigade strong mixed force of Gurkhas and Tommies went over the Nathu La into the Chumbi valley and advanced unhindered till Shigatse. A Tibetan military force met them there but offered what can only be described as passive resistance. Not a shot was fired back as the British Indian troops rained bullets on them. It was a forerunner to Jallianwalla Bagh. From Shigatse Younghusband made a leisurely march into Lhasa. The British got the Tibetans to agree to end their isolation and having extracted trade concessions withdrew in 1904, the way they came.

    In 1907 Britain and Russia formally agreed that it was in their interests to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart.” It may be of interest to the reader to know that the Great Game nevertheless continued. In 1907 Col. Mannerheim then of the Russian Army, later Field Marshal Mannerheim and first President of Finland, led a horseback expedition from Kyrgyzstan to Harbin on China’s northeast to identify a route for the cavalry.

    The next important year was 1913 when the Tibetans declared independence after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a Republic in China under Sun Yat Sen. They attacked and drove the Chinese garrisons in Tibet into India over the Nathu La. Also in 1913 the British convened the Simla Conference to demarcate the India-Tibet border. The British proposed the 1914 McMahon Line, as we know it. The Tibetans accepted it. The Chinese Amban however initialed the agreement under protest. But his protest seemed mostly about the British negotiating directly with Tibet as a sovereign state and not over the McMahon Line as such.

    Things moved on then. In 1935 at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe ICS, then Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, the McMahon Line was notified. In 1944 JP Mills ICS established British Indian administration in NEFA, but excluding Tawang which continued to be administered by the Lhasa appointed head lama at Tawang despite the fact that it lay well below the McMahon Line. This was largely because Henry Twynam, the Governor of Assam lost his nerve and did not want to provoke the Tibetans. In 1947 the Dalai Lama (the same gentleman who is now in Dharamshala) sent the newly independent India a note laying claim to some districts in NEFA/Arunachal.

    On October 7, 1950 the Chinese attacked the Tibetans at seven places on their frontier and made known their intention of reasserting control over all of Tibet. As if in response on February 16, 1951 Major Relangnao ‘Bob’ Khating IFAS raised the India tricolor in Tawang and took over the administration of the tract. The point of this narration is to bring home the fact that India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh doesn’t rest on any great historical tradition or cultural affinity. We are there because the British went there. But then the Chinese have no basis whatsoever to stake a claim, besides a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China among some of the hangers-on in the Qing emperor’s court. The important thing now is that we have been there for over a hundred years and that settles the issue.

    Arunachal Pradesh has a very interesting population mix. Only less than 10% of its population is Tibetan. Indo-Mongoloid tribes account for 68% of the population. The rest are migrants from Nagaland and Assam. As far as religious affinities go Hindus are the biggest group with 37%, followed by 36% animists, 13% Buddhists. Recent census figures suggest a spurt in Christianity, possibly induced by pocketbook proselytizing. In all there are 21 major tribal groups and over 100 ethnically distinct sub-groupings, speaking over 50 distinct languages and dialects. The population of about a million is spread out over 17 towns and 3649 villages. With the exception of a few villages of Monpas who live north of the McMahon Line, it is an ethnically compact and contiguous area.

    In fact in future boundary negotiations India could make a case for inclusion of the few Monpa villages left behind north of the McMahon Line? Many knowledgeable observers suggest that the area south of the Huangpo/Brahmaputra from the Pemako gorge till it enters the Subansiri division of Arunachal would be a logical boundary as the raging and hence un-fordable and unbridgeable river ensures hardly any Chinese administrative presence in the area.

    It is true that historically India never had a direct border with Tibet till the British took Kumaon and Garhwal from Nepal in 1846 and extended its domain over Arunachal in 1886. On the other hand the formidable Himalayas were always culturally a part of India and formed a natural barrier against ingress from the north, whether Tibetan or Chinese. But times have moved and technology and mankind’s great engineering powers now make it possible for even the most hostile terrain to be subjugated. The Himalayas are no longer the barrier they once were. As China and India emerge as the world’s great economies and powers can India possibly allow China a strategic trans-Himalayan space just a few miles from the plains?

    The view from the Chinese side about what exactly constitutes China is no less confused. Apparently like the British, the Manchu’s who ruled China from the 17th to the early 20th century had a policy of staking claim to the lands that lay ahead of their frontiers in order to provide themselves with military buffers. In a recent article in the China Review magazine, Professor Ge Jianxiong, Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai writes: “to claim that Tibet has always been a part of China since the Tang dynasty; the fact that the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim.” Ge also notes that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China was established the idea of China was not clearly conceptualized. Even during the late Qing period (Manchu) the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Qing Empire. At other times it would be taken to refer to only the eighteen interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.

    Professor Ge further adds that the notions of “Greater China” were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the courts self-aggrandizement.” Ge criticizes those who feel that the more they exaggerate the territory of historical China the more “patriotic” they are. In this context I would like to recall a recent conversation I had with the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi. Ambassador Sun said that while he was soundly castigated in India for his unintended comment, he gained a major constituency in China. The mandarins in the Beijing would do well to take heed to Ge Jianxiong’s advice: “If China really wishes to rise peacefully and be on solid footing in the future, we must understand the sum of our history and learn from our experiences.” The same holds true for the babus in South Block and ‘the having writ move on’ media pundits. If we don’t then we know who will be laughing!

     

    Image Credit: Tawang Monastery

  • (Part-II) Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination

    (Part-II) Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination

    I.   Reassessing Vulnerabilities During a Pandemic

    A general problem across all conventional models is their failure to understand that vulnerabilities during a pandemic are created and compounded by socio-economic factors too. Therefore, there is a need to adopt approaches that holistically assess the correlation between socioeconomic factors and vulnerability during a pandemic.[1]

    The Syndemics Approach

    Under this approach, pandemics are understood as an interaction of that disease with other diseases and the socio-economic and political factors that increase the risk of vulnerability.[2] All these factors synergistically interact to impact the health of individuals and society. Through these risk factors, it identifies the overlapping health and socio-economic problems that increase vulnerability (‘syndemic vulnerabilities’). The socio-economic risk factors are influenced by social determinants of health, i.e., the conditions of housing, food, employment, healthcare, and education.[3] Therefore, the utility of this approach lies in its holistic conception of socio-economic factors that impact the formation, clustering, and progression of diseases.[4] Using this approach, I argue that the COVID-19 pandemic has synergistically interacted and exacerbated the existing diseases and socio-economic conditions of marginalized groups across countries.

    Higher Risks of Infection, Transmission, and Mortality: Typically, due to historic discrimination and denial, marginalized communities have a greater number of pre-existing diseases like diabetes and asthma,[5] which in turn elevates their risk of infection and mortality. Moreover, there is unequal access to healthcare among marginalized communities due to the high costs of medical care and the absence of health insurance.[6] Marginalized communities are also disproportionately poor,[7] which affects their ability to mitigate the impact of the pandemic.

    Typically, marginalized communities are housed in crowded neighbourhoods with smaller houses that lack outside space.[8] They also have higher population densities, especially in urban areas, and lower access to communal green space.[9]Due to historic discrimination, marginalized communities are over-represented in essential services, including low-wage healthcare sectors and sanitation jobs.[10] This reduces their ability to work from home, and thus increases their risk of infection and transmission. Marginalized communities are more likely to take public transportation,[11] which further increases their risk of infection and transmission.

    These syndemic vulnerabilities have increased the risk of mortality among these marginalized communities. For instance, in America, the mortality rate of African-Americans and Indigenous/Latino communities is 3.4 times and 3.3 times higher than a non-Hispanic White person.[12] Evidence from past epidemics/pandemics shows that the rates of infection and mortality are always disproportionately higher among marginalized communities.[13]

    Greater Socio-Economic Disruption: Due to a lack of quality education, members of marginalized communities tend to work in lower-wage jobs in the informal sector, which has been worst hit by the pandemic.[14] The percentage fall in employment for marginalized communities has been far greater, indicating that education was a protective factor in the first wave of job losses.[15] Consequently, there has also been greater housing evictions among these communities.[16]The access to quality education for children in marginalized communities has also been severely impacted because they lack access to the internet,[17] affecting their ability to access education. Moreover, low literacy among adults in marginalized communities indicates their inability to assist their children with any form of home learning.[18]

    Therefore, the increased syndemic vulnerabilities of marginalized communities and the consequent disproportionate socio-economic disruptions of the pandemic on them necessitate a greater strive for their inclusion in distributing the vaccine. Early access to such vaccines allows these groups the opportunity to proportionately mitigate these vulnerabilities and disruptions.

    Intersectionality

    Presently, vulnerabilities among individuals are dominantly viewed from a single-axis framework. This ignores the multiple layers and experiences of vulnerability, resulting from an interplay of power structures and different social identities, held by one individual. This ignorance is avoided when using intersectionality, which is an analytical framework that explains how different social, economic, and political identities overlap to create different modes of discrimination and privilege.[19] Thus, it explains how certain individuals in the population are relatively more disadvantaged than others.[20] Intersectionality not only provides a multi-layered understanding of vulnerabilities during a pandemic but also helps prioritize distribution within an identified category, given the scarcity of vaccines.

     

    II.   Proposing a Multi-Value Ethical Framework

    Given its rational criteria, incorporating utilitarianism’s clinical risk factors is quite valuable. However, as argued, vulnerability during a pandemic is also determined by socioeconomic risk factors. Therefore, there is a need to adopt a multi-value approach that incorporates both clinical and socio-economic risk factors. I propose to do so by simultaneously prioritizing the values of ‘collective wellbeing’ and ‘justice’.

    Borrowed from utilitarianism is the value of ‘collective wellbeing’, which aims at maximizing benefits and minimizing harms. Flowing from a syndemic conception of COVID-19 is the value of ‘justice’, which aims at reducing health inequities and treats like people alike. These values are not necessarily always distinct, but their overlap over one parameter indicates a stronger justification. They can be operationalized using an ‘intersectional multi-parameter weighted framework’.

    Operationalizing Values

    The framework is constructed through three layers: (1) for each risk parameter, there is (2) a value-based justification, along with (3) its extent of weightage. The risk parameters are viewed from an intersectional power axis, with value justifications sourced from clinical and syndemic vulnerabilities. The weightage typically connotes a three-point scale, where 3 indicates the highest priority, and 1 indicates the lowest. The priority order is based on the greatness of one’s total score. The lottery method should only be used as a tie-breaker when the score is the same, and no more doses are presently available.

    Age:    Older people are at a significantly higher risk of infection and severe morbidity or mortality due to physiological changes associated with ageing. Globally, more than 95% of COVID-19 deaths were among individuals aged 60 and above. Even among older people, more than half of all deaths occurred in people aged 80 and above.[21]

    Therefore, in descending order, weightage must be given to individuals above 80 years, individuals between 60-80 years, and individuals between 40-59 years.

    Comorbidities:          Depending on the country, between 48-75% of COVD-19 deaths are associated with existing comorbidities. Those with comorbidities are also at moderately higher risk of infection.[22]

    The prioritization has to be categorized based on the severity of the comorbidity, in contracting the infection and causing death. Therefore, in descending order, higher weightage must be given to severe comorbidities, moderate comorbidities, and mild comorbidities. The severity in infection and mortality is different for countries due to distinct socio-economic realities and evolutionary biology. Therefore, this identification and classification need to be uniquely undertaken. However, as a general rule, it is almost universal for HIV, cancer, and most cardiovascular diseases to be severe comorbidities.[23]

    Profession:     Prioritizing frontline healthcare, sanitation, and defence workers are justified because they engage in services, whose absence has the greatest negative societal impact- whether on health, safety/security, or economy. They are also in constant contact with areas and people having the greatest risk of infection. Therefore, protecting them has a multiplier effect, in that their ability to remain uninfected protects the health of others and minimizes societal and economic disruption. Since the state obligates these workers to work in risk conditions, while everyone else is working from home, it is further obligated to protect them.

    Therefore, in descending order, priority must be given to frontline workers, workers in other essential sectors, and workers in non-essential sectors.

    Income:          One’s economic status affects their ability to access healthcare, thus results in higher rates of mortality and severe morbidity.[24] The syndemic approach reveals that poverty compounds one’s syndemic vulnerability.

    Therefore, in descending order, priority must be given to individuals with low-income, middle-income, and high-income.

    Ethnic Identity:         The syndemic approach reveals that marginalized communities are at a greater risk of infection, transmission, and mortality. They are also worst affected by the pandemic, which further compounds their vulnerability. Given these vulnerabilities, prioritized vaccine access to marginalized communities also helps reduce all three risks among the general population.

    The prioritization criteria would depend on the marginalized communities within a country and the extent of their syndemic vulnerabilities. For instance, in America, the syndemic vulnerabilities are greatest for African-Americans, followed by the Indigenous/Latinos communities, and then Pacific Islanders.

    Conclusion

    The conventional models of vaccine distribution are unethical towards disadvantaged groups. While neoliberalism completely ignores the distributive function of law, utilitarianism, lottery, and FCFS at least acknowledge this. However, their criterion of distribution ignores socio-economic vulnerabilities. This ignorance can be addressed using a syndemics approach and intersectionality.

    The syndemics approach explains the socio-economic risk factors that disproportionately disadvantage marginalized communities, both medically and socio-economically. Intersectionality provides a layered understanding of how vulnerabilities affect people, even those in the same group, differently. Using these approaches, I propose a multi-value ethical framework that balances the pragmatic considerations of medical utilitarianism with greater social inclusion. It operationalizes the values of these ethical systems through the priority order generated under an ‘intersectional multi-parameter weighted framework’.

     

    Notes:

    [1] While each country has different marginalized groups, the patterns of vulnerability explored are similar. Thus, marginalized groups have been generally analyzed hereinafter.

    [2] Merrill Singer, Nicola Bulled, et al, ‘Syndemics and the biosocial conception of health’ (2017) 389 Lancet 941, 941-943.

    [3] Clare Bambra, Ryan Riordan, et al, ‘The COVID-19 pandemic and health inequalities’ (2020) 1 J Epidemiol Community Health 964, 965.

    [4] Singer (n 23) 948.

    [5] Harleen Kaur, ‘Indirect racial discrimination in COVID-19 ethical guidance’ (BMJ Blog, 27 August 2020) <https://blogs.bmj.com/covid-19/2020/08/27/indirect-racial-discrimination-in-covid-19-ethical-guidance/> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [6] Bambra (n 24) 965-966.

    [7] Melanie Moses, ‘A Model for a Just COVID-19 Vaccination Program’ (Nautilus, 25 November 2020) <http://nautil.us/issue/93/forerunners/a-model-for-a-just-covid_19-vaccination-program> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [8] Tonia Poteat, ‘Understanding COVID-19 Risks and Vulnerabilities among Black Communities in America: Syndemics’ (2020) 47 Annals of Epidemiology 1, 3.

    [9] Bambra (n 24) 966.

    [10] National Academies (n 16) 30-31.

    [11] ‘Beyond the data: Understanding the impact of COVID-19 on BAME groups’ (2020) Public Health England Report, 22-23 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/892376/COVID_stakeholder_engagement_synthesis_beyond_the_data.pdf> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [12] Harald Schmidt, ‘Is It Lawful and Ethical to Prioritize Racial Minorities for COVID-19 Vaccines?’ (2020) 324 JAMA <https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2771874> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [13] Bambra (n 24) 967.

    [14] Shruti Srivastava, ‘Millions Escaped Caste Discrimination. Covid-19 Brought It Back’ (Bloomberg Quint, 21 August 2020) <https://www.bloombergquint.com/politics/millions-escaped-caste-discrimination-covid-19-brought-it-back> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [15] Ashwini Deshpande, ‘Differential impact of COVID-19 and the lockdown’ (The Hindu, 22 August 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/differential-impact-of-covid-19-and-the-lockdown/article32416854.ece> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [16] Schmidt (n 33).

    [17] Deshpande (n 36).

    [18] Ibid.

    [19] Olena Hankivsky, ‘An intersectionality-based policy analysis framework’ (2014) 13(119) Intl J Equity in Health 1, 2.

    [20] Ibid.

    [21] ‘Supporting older people during the COVID-19 pandemic’ (WHO, 3 April 2020) <https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/news/2020/4/supporting-older-people-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-is-everyones-business> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [22] Awadhesh Kumar, ‘Impact of COVID-19 and comorbidities on health and economics’ (2020) 14(6) Diabetes Metab Syndr 1625, 1626-1627.

    [23] Ibid.

    [24] National Academies (n 16) 68-77.

     

    Image Credit: One India

  • Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination [Part I]

    Proposing a Legal Framework for Distribution of the COVID-19 Vaccination [Part I]

    Introduction

    Distributing the COVID-19 vaccination has been touted as the biggest policy decision in 2021. This stems from the utility and efficacy of vaccines in immediately addressing pandemics. Specifically, the COVID-19 vaccination not only protects the injected person, with a 70%-95% efficacy[1] but also provides ‘herd immunity’.[2] That is, the non-injected population is also benefited due to a reduced risk of transmission and infection, so long as 70% of individuals in society are vaccinated. Therefore, access to the vaccine determines how much and for whom the adversity of the pandemic is mitigated.

    Currently, most vaccine developers are in the final two phases of clinical trials, with some, like Pfizer/BioNTech’s and Oxford University/AstraZeneca’s, already receiving ‘emergency use authorization’ from multiple countries. Most countries have prepared a ballpark action plan for distribution, while the United Kingdom has already vaccinated more than 3.5 million people.[3]

    In this paper, I evaluate the most ethical framework for distributing COVID-19 vaccinations, amongst the population of one country, by its government. I address this question from the perspective of marginalized communities, using the approaches of realism, syndemics, and intersectionality. In Part I of this article, I will evaluate the conventional models for vaccine distribution. In Part II, I will provide an alternative framework for reassessing vulnerabilities during a pandemic, and propose a multi-value ethical framework.

    1. Evaluating the Conventional Models for Vaccine Distribution

    The decision to distribute COVID-19 vaccines is inherently ethical because it involves allocating an important resource in a resource-scarce world. Thus, determining who can pre-maturely mitigate the pandemic’s adversity. There are four models in conventional discourse that have sought to answer the distribution question. In this section, under each model, I will critically evaluate the role of law in distribution and the ethical values that guide prioritized distribution.

    Neoliberalism

    Neoliberalism is characterized by a strict separation between the state, society, and the market.[4] The objective of all economic activity in the markets is wealth and efficiency maximization.[5] To this end, greater involvement of the private sector in the economy is justified because the market allocation of resources is more efficient. Any state intervention beyond a minimum supporting role is conceived as inefficient because rent-seeking, corruption, and capture by special interests are inevitable.[6]

    The diminished role of the state in securing redistribution means that individuals are responsible for their welfare and income. Therefore, individuals would themselves be responsible for ensuring access to the vaccination, notwithstanding their socio-economic status. They must attain this access by successfully competing in the “free market”, through instruments like price point discovery.[7] The underlying rules of competition create a level playing field where fair bargaining over market transactions can occur, so long as the requisite effort is made. This is because the rules are universal in their applicability, and create a distinct economic space, free from state coercion.[8] Therefore, access to the vaccine is determined by one’s ability to pay for it.

    State intervention is only justified when there is a market failure, but even then, preference is accorded to non-state solutions like direct public action or self-regulation.[9] Neoliberalism addresses equity concerns, like non-access to the vaccine, through safety nets and income transfers rather than through market regulation.[10] Otherwise, inefficiencies are introduced into the system, which distorts market incentives, and thus undermines the goal of economic growth.[11] This means that vaccine developers would lose the incentive to undertake expedient and mass production.

    Critique:         Neoliberalism denies that any redistribution to disadvantaged groups is covered by legal reforms. There is no focus on how economic gains are distributed, and the effect of reforms on vulnerable social groups.[12]Neoliberalism’s refusal to acknowledge the distributive function of legal regulation is flawed because rules necessarily always operate to distribute resources and powers to various groups and actors in particular ways.[13] The neoliberal machinery devises a particular allocation of risks, resources, powers, costs, burdens and benefits among different market actors. The effect is that the existing propertied class receive greater entitlement, whilst others are disadvantaged.[14] This perpetuates the inequalities already in status quo, impacting accessibility to the vaccine. Therefore, the relevant question is not whether distributive concerns must be considered, but rather their manner of incorporation in the process of market reform. To this end, the state, which guarantees the regulatory underpinnings of a market economy, must inherently play a greater role in regulating the distribution of economic gains from the market.

    The idea to distribute vaccines based on personal purchasing power is flawed because it ignores the fact that vaccines possess inelastic demand. Therefore, given short supply at short-term and medium-term levels, the price will continually go up to unaffordable rates. This increased price does not encourage new suppliers because the intellectual property rights and R&D is held only by a few developers.[15]

    Utilitarianism

    Utilitarianism assesses the morality of a decision based on its consequences, whether it maximizes benefits and/or minimizes harms. Under this rationale, priority is accorded based on the greatest clinical risks and greatest utility to social functioning. The clinical factors consider the risk of severe morbidity and mortality, risk of infection, and risk of transmission.[16] The greatest utility to society is measured in terms of the risk of negative societal impact, i.e., the public utility of one’s occupation/social role to society and other individuals’ lives and livelihood.[17]

    Therefore, in this pandemic, utilitarianism would prioritize age (above 50/60 years) and associated comorbidities (identified set of diseases) based on the risk of morbidity/mortality and infection, followed by occupation (healthcare and frontline workers) based on the risk of negative societal impact and risk of infection.[18]

    Critique:         Unlike neoliberalism, there is limited value in the utilitarian model because it recognizes the distributive role of law in allocating benefits. Moreover, it pursues this based on a rational objective criterion.

    However, its main problem lies in assessing vulnerabilities through only a clinical lens. It ignores that socio-economic factors also contribute to overall vulnerability during the pandemic, as I argue in the next section. Additionally, it doesn’t acknowledge that even within the identified categories, some are more vulnerable than others. Therefore, it has the effect of compounding existing socio-economic inequalities.

    Lottery

    This approach prioritizes distribution through a random selection of names. This is premised on the assumption that such selection is egalitarian and impartial, and also overcomes the inherent moral relativity/ambiguity of human reasoning.[19]

    Critique:         Random lotteries acknowledge the role of law in distributing benefits, but they lack any rational prioritization to effectively and immediately address the pandemic. While absolute objectivity is unattainable, avoiding moral reasoning altogether is merely “an easy method to avoid hard decisions”.[20] The assumption that everyone’s life is equally important fails to acknowledge the differential disparities that differentially threaten such lives.[21]

    First Come First Serve

    Like lotteries, this approach is premised on avoiding moral decisions and the assumption that everyone has an equal opportunity to access the vaccine.[22]

    Critique:         While this approach acknowledges the role of law in distributing benefits, it is completely blind to the socio-economic realities. Given scarcity, it is inevitable that access will be confined to those with better connections, access to information, communication, and transportation. All these factors are, in turn, tied to one’s socio-economic status. Thus, there is disproportionate denial to disadvantaged communities.

     

    References:

    [1] James Gallagher, ‘Covid vaccine update’ (BBC, 30 December 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-51665497> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [2] Rebecca Weintraub, ‘A Covid-19 Vaccine Will Need Equitable, Global Distribution’ (HBR, 2 April 2020) <https://hbr.org/2020/04/a-covid-19-vaccine-will-need-equitable-global-distribution> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [3] Lucy Rodgers & Dominic Bailey, ‘Covid vaccine: How will the UK jab millions of people?’ (BBC, 23 January 2021) <https://www.bbc.com/news/health-55274833> accessed 24 January 2021.

    [4] Manfred Steger & Ravi Roy, Neoliberalism (OUP 2010) 3-4.

    [5] Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring (Kluwer Law International 2002) 50-52.

    [6] Rittich (n 4) 55-59.

    [7] Sahil Deo, Shardul Manurkar, et al, ‘COVID19 Vaccine: Development, Access and Distribution in the Indian Context’ (2020) Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief No. 378, 6 <https://www.orfonline.org/research/covid19-vaccine-development-access-and-distribution-in-the-indian-context-69538/> accessed 8 January 2021.

    [8] Rittich (n 4) 131.

    [9] Rittich (n 4) 74-76.

    [10] Ibid.

    [11] Steger (n 4).

    [12] Rittich (n 4) 130.

    [13] Steger (n 11)

    [14] Rittich (n 4) 158-160.

    [15] Deo (n 7).

    [16] National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Framework for Equitable Allocation of COVID-19 Vaccine (National Academies Press 2020) 102-105.

    [17] National Academies (n 16) 8.

    [18] Ibid.

    [19] Richard Zimmerman, ‘Rationing of influenza vaccine during a pandemic’ (2017) 25 Vaccine 2019, 2023.

    [20] Ibid.

    [21] Erica Moser, ‘Many ethical questions involved in prioritizing groups for vaccine distribution’ (The Day, 13 December 2020) <https://www.theday.com/article/20201213/NWS01/201219766> accessed 8 January 2020.

    [21] Ibid.

    [22] Zimmerman (n 19).

     

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