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Category: India

  • The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The port of Chabahar is a seaport in south-eastern Iran, located on the Gulf of Oman, at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is situated in Sistan-va-Baluchestan, one of Iran’s least developed provinces. Contrary to Bandar Abbas, the busiest port in Iran, Chabahar is a deep-water port with direct access to the Indian Ocean that is outside the Hormuz Strait. It is Iran’s only seaport and consists of two separate ports called Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari. The last Shah of Iran proposed the port’s development in 1973. Work in Chabahar began when the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, was in power. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 hindered the development of this port. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, US firms involved in various infrastructure investments fled the country. The new government took on these projects. The port of Chabahar grew in importance during the Iran-Iraq war of 1983 when ships were hesitant to enter the Strait of Hormuz. The port’s first phase opened during the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran began shifting maritime trade up the east coast toward the Pakistani border to reduce the reliance on Persian Gulf ports which were susceptible to attack by the Iraq Air Force. Chabahar is substantial for its fishing industry and will serve as a major trade hub designed to connect South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Chabahar can emerge as a potential global trading hub – and an arena for geopolitical competition. Chabahar is vital for both India and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Suez Canal for transporting cargo to Europe. Chabahar is a strategic port from an Indian perspective. Apart from being easily accessible from India’s western coasts, it serves several important functions. For starters, by having access to the port, India can reduce its commute time to Central Asia by one-third. Second, a link between Afghanistan and India could be built without going through Pakistan and this could help the already established diplomatic, security and economic relationship between New Delhi and Kabul. Third, India gains road access to four cities in Afghanistan via Chabahar: Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif. This will help India strengthen its trade with Afghanistan (“Chabahar and Beyond” 2016). However, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 gives rise to a certain level of uncertainty. The current geopolitical environment, both regional and global, creates opportunities for India to overcome possible uncertainties.

    New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets.

    Being one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, expansion of trade relations and access to new markets is a necessity for India. As an investor, New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets. Pakistan’s Gwadar port is one possible route for India to access Central Asian markets, India has long aimed for alternative routes due to its adversarial relationship with Pakistan (“Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan,” n.d.). Additionally, the port will strengthen relations between India and Iran, which may help counterbalance strong Sino-Pakistani cooperation. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MEA), India and Iran share close historical and civilizational ties, “Our bilateral relations are marked by strong linkages across institutions, cultures and people-to-people ties,” the MEA said in a statement. Afghanistan also seeks to explore new trade routes to reach international markets. It aims to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, which handles most of the Afghan trade due to the country’s landlocked status. 

    Afghanistan is crucial for India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ strategy. India assisted Afghanistan in becoming a full member state of SAARC in 2007. It signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with Kabul in 2003 following the establishment of the interim government post the US’s intervention in 2001. Under the North-South Transport Corridor framework, India, Afghanistan, and Iran signed the Chabahar port agreement in 2003, allowing all three countries to use the Chabahar port as a trade hub. India is working on constructing the Chabahar port primarily to compete with the Gwadar port project and to connect it to Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). India has already built a 218-km-long road from Delaram to Zaranj (“India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan” 2008) and now plans to connect this road to Chabahar port and deliver goods through this route. India is also keen on using the Chabahar port to connect the oil-rich Central Asian countries by road connectivity via the Milak (Iran) and Zaranj-Dilaram (Afghanistan) roads. For India, the port, which is only 940 kilometers from Mundra in Gujarat, is about more than just facilitating the flow of trade with Afghanistan. Rather, the development of Chabahar is a crucial component of the country’s grand strategy to connect with Central Asia. India’s justification for wanting to develop the Chabahar Port goes beyond its interest in Afghanistan. Enhancing regional trade and connectivity as well as thwarting China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean are other top priorities for Indian foreign policy (“What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses,” n.d.).

    Geopolitical Challenges

    The port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    The competition for regional dominance between India and China can be seen in the development of ports in the regions. Indian involvement in the Chabahar port is important in securing India’s interest in the region. A calculative China will seize any opportunity that India might present in the port facility. If China moves in, Indian investments in the Chabahar port may be unfavorably affected (Pant and Mehta, 2018). A significant barrier is the complex nature of India-Iran relations, in which the former does not hold a privileged position. Given India’s priorities in the Middle East, it is unlikely that the relationship with Iran could compete with the comprehensive partnership that China and Pakistan share, which includes a strong defence and security arrangement. Iran may find it challenging to ignore or exclude China, its largest foreign investor, from the Chabahar project. Additionally, China has successfully completed several infrastructure projects in Iran, including the Tehran Metro, and has allocated US$ 1.5 billion through its EXIM Bank for the electrification of the Tehran-Mashhad railway line (“$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project” 2017).

    Peace and stability in Afghanistan will also impact the performance of the Chabahar Port. The tumultuous security situation in Afghanistan could jeopardise trilateral efforts between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to operate the Chabahar Port facility. And finally, the port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    References

    “$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project.” 2017. Financial Tribune. July 25, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/68986/update-15b-china-loan-for-iranian-rail-project.

    Amirthan, Shawn. 2016. “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement?” Strategic Analysis 41 (1): 87–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1249184.

    “Chabahar and Beyond.” 2016. Www.thehindubusinessline.com. May 25, 2016. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/chabahar-and-beyond/article8646239.ece.

    “Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan.” n.d. Thediplomat.com. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/chabahar-port-a-step-toward-connectivity-for-india-and-afghanistan/.

    “India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan.” 2008. Development News from Afghanistan, August 24, 2008. https://afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2008/08/24/india-completes-zaranj-delaram-highway-in-afghanistan/.

    Pant, Harsh V., and Ketan Mehta. 2018. “India in Chabahar.” Asian Survey 58 (4): 660–78. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.4.660.

    “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.” n.d. Idsa.in. https://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/40_1/india-iran-and-afghanistans-benefits-from-the-chabahar-port-agreement.

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  • India’s Self-Inflicted Economic Catastrophe

    India’s Self-Inflicted Economic Catastrophe

    Noted economist Jayati Ghosh reviews India’s economic recovery from the impact of the pandemic. She asserts that the major economic problems of unemployment, poverty, and inadequate healthcare are due to poor strategies and policies implemented by the government. In her analysis, COVID-19’s devastating impact on India has been compounded by the BJP government’s disastrous decision to impose nationwide lockdowns without providing any support to workers. Instead, the BJP used the pandemic to consolidate its power and suppress dissent. Even with existing socio-political constraints, she says India can do much better as there is scope for different economic strategies.

    This article was published earlier in Project Syndicate. The views expressed are the author’s own.

                                                                                                                                                                          -TPF Editorial Team

    Nearly 80% of the estimated 70 million people around the world who fell into extreme poverty at the onset of COVID-19 in 2020 were from India, a recent World Bank report has revealed. But even this shocking figure could be an underestimate, as the lack of official data makes it difficult to assess the pandemic’s human costs.

    What accounts for this alarming rise in Indian poverty? COVID-19 was undoubtedly India’s worst health calamity in at least a century. But the pandemic’s economic and social consequences go beyond the direct effects on health and mortality. As I argue in my recent book, The Making of a Catastrophe: The Disastrous Economic Fallout of the COVID-19 Pandemic in India, very significant policy failures – owing to government action and inaction – were responsible for widespread and significant damage to Indian livelihoods and for the country’s decline in terms of many basic indicators of economic well-being.

    But the devastating impact of the pandemic on India has been compounded by economic policies that reflected the country’s deeply-embedded inequalities.

    This judgment may seem excessively harsh. After all, India’s government did not cause the pandemic, and many other countries experienced economic setbacks after they failed to control the virus. But the devastating impact of the pandemic on India has been compounded by economic policies that reflected the country’s deeply-embedded inequalities.

    To be sure, the pandemic did not create India’s many economic vulnerabilities. But it did highlight India’s many societal fissures and fault lines. And while the country already suffered from glaring inequalities of income, wealth, and opportunities long before COVID-19, the government’s pandemic response has taken them to unimaginable extremes.

    Even as Indian workers faced poverty, hunger, and ever-greater material insecurity due to the pandemic, money and resources continued to flow from the poor and the middle class to the country’s largest corporations and wealthiest individuals. The intersecting inequalities of caste, gender, religion, and migration status have become increasingly marked and oppressive. The result has been a major setback to social and economic progress.

    At the beginning of the pandemic, the central government imposed a prolonged nationwide lockdown with little notice. It then adopted containment strategies that were clearly unsuited to the Indian context, with immediately devastating effects on employment and livelihoods.

    The grim state of affairs reflects the priorities of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) response. At the beginning of the pandemic, the central government imposed a prolonged nationwide lockdown with little notice. It then adopted containment strategies that were clearly unsuited to the Indian context, with immediately devastating effects on employment and livelihoods.

    Instead of using the breathing space provided by the lockdown to bolster local health systems, the central government left state authorities to manage as best they could with minimal and inadequate resources. And when the resulting economic disaster threatened to spiral out of control, the government eased restrictions to “unlock” the economy even as the number of cases mounted, thereby putting more people at risk.

    At a time when governments worldwide were significantly increasing public spending to fight the pandemic and mitigate its economic impact, the Indian government preferred to control expenditures (after adjusting for inflation) as its revenues declined.

    But at the heart of India’s self-inflicted economic catastrophe is the government’s decision to provide very little compensation or social protection, even as COVID-19 lockdowns deprived hundreds of millions of their livelihoods for several months. At a time when governments worldwide were significantly increasing public spending to fight the pandemic and mitigate its economic impact, the Indian government preferred to control expenditures (after adjusting for inflation) as its revenues declined.

    But in a country where median wages are too low to provide more than the most basic subsistence, losing even a week’s income could lead millions to the brink of starvation. Given that more than 90% of all workers in India are informal – without any legal or social protection – and that around half of those are self-employed, the effect was immediate and devastating.

    The government’s decision not to increase spending aggravated the shock of the lockdown, generating a humanitarian crisis that disproportionately affected women and marginalized groups, including millions of migrant workers who were forced to return home under harrowing conditions.

    But the effects of the official response to the pandemic are only one side of the story. COVID-19 safety measures have been a natural fit for the country’s still-pervasive caste system, which has long relied on forms of social distancing to enforce the socioeconomic order and protect those at the top. It also further entrenched India’s persistent patriarchy.

    Instead of taking appropriate countermeasures, like providing greater support to the population, the BJP used the pandemic to consolidate its power and suppress dissent. This, in turn, limited the central government’s ability to generate the widespread social consensus and public trust needed to contain the virus.

    Even within India’s deep-seated social and political constraints, there is scope for a different economic strategy that would enable a just, sustainable, and more equitable recovery.

    None of this was inevitable. Even within India’s deep-seated social and political constraints, there is scope for a different economic strategy that would enable a just, sustainable, and more equitable recovery. To ensure that most Indians, not just the stock market or large companies, benefit from growth, India’s voters must reject the BJP’s policies, which threaten to impoverish them further.

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  • Right to Work: Feasible and Indispensable for India to be a Truly Civilized and Democratic Nation

    Right to Work: Feasible and Indispensable for India to be a Truly Civilized and Democratic Nation

    Executive Summary of
    Report of People’s Commission on Employment and Unemployment
    Set up by Desh Bachao Abhiyan

    Introduction

    When society faces a problem and is unable to resolve it, it implies that something basic is wrong. One needs to look for its basic causes to solve the problem. The causes may lie in the system that has evolved over time and which conditions the dominant social and political thinking in society. The onus of finding the solution and rectifying the problem is on the rulers. Their failure to do so over time implies a lack of motivation/commitment to solve the problem.

    All this applies to the issue of employment generation and unemployment in India which has been growing over time and affects the vast majority of the citizens.

    The Basic Issue

    Gandhi said that India is the only country capable of giving a civilizational alternative. The time has come to take this seriously since unemployment has become a critical issue that needs to be urgently tackled. The issue is multi-dimensional since it is a result of multiple causes and has widespread implications. It impacts the growth of the economy, inequality, poverty, etc. It has a gender dimension and impacts the marginalized sections adversely reflecting a lack of social justice. It is entrenched among the youth. The more educated they are greater the unemployment they face. Consequently, it has political and social implications, like, social relations.

    The rapidly growing incomes of the top 1% in the income ladder indicate that the economy has the resources but they are mal-distributed. The rich at the top has created a system that enables them to capture most of the gains from development with little trickling down to the rest.

    This Report presents a framework that spells out the causes, consequences, and possible remedies. Further, it looks at the historical process underlying the evolution of policies so as to understand how they can be changed.

    If any form of distortion persists over a long period, as unemployment in India, its origins lie in society’s perceptions and priorities. In India, these can be traced to the adoption of state capitalism and persisting feudal tendencies of the elite policy makers who in their own self-interest adopted a trickle-down model of development.

    Further, Capitalism has globally taken the form of marketization which promotes `profit maximisation’. But is it then legitimate to keep workers unemployed? It implies loss of output and therefore reduces the size of the economy which leads to a lower level of profits. So, by the logic of individual rationality, the system should create productive employment for all.

    The market’s notion of `efficiency’ is status quoist since it seeks to perpetuate the historical injustice in society. `Consumer sovereignty’ implies that individuals should be left free to do whatever they wish. The collectivity should not intervene in their choices no matter how socially detrimental they may be. It promotes the notion that if I have the money I can do what I like. The ratio of incomes is 10,000 times and more between the big businessmen and the poor workers. The market sees nothing wrong in this; in fact, society has come to celebrate it.

    Marketization is determining society’s choices through its principles penetrating all aspects of society. One of these principles is the `dollar vote’. The policy makers accept it and prioritize the choices of the well-off over those of the marginalized. The well-off dictate the social judgments of policy makers. Consequently, not only equality is not on the agenda even equity is not.

    With marketization stripping off the social aspect of life, individuals become automatons. Their individual distress and situation in life are no one’s or society’s concern. Unemployment becomes just a switching off of a machine. No social concern need to be attached to it. In fact, capitalists welcome unemployment as an efficient’ device to discipline labour and neo-classical economics considers it as natural. Inflation further weakens large numbers of workers as they lose purchasing power.

    In essence, whether or not society should aim to give productive employment to all reflects its view of individuals. Society needs to choose what is more important – profits or the welfare of the marginalized majority. The Gandhian view, largely rejected by the Indian elite, was `last person first’ which defined what the priority should be.

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    Disclaimer:

    The views represented herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Peninsula Foundation, its staff, or its trustees.

    The report’s executive summary is republished with the permission of the author.

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  • Ghosts in the Machine: The Past, Present, and Future of India’s Cyber Security

    Ghosts in the Machine: The Past, Present, and Future of India’s Cyber Security

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    Introduction

    When the National Cybersecurity Policy was released in 2013, the response from experts was rather underwhelming [1], [2]. A reaction to a string of unpalatable incidents, from Snowden’s revelations [3] and massive compromise of India’s civilian and military infrastructure [4] to the growing international pressure on Indian IT companies to fix their frequent data breaches [5], the 2013 policy was a macro example of weak structures finding refuge in a haphazard post-incident response. The next iteration of the policy is in formulation under the National Cybersecurity Coordinator. However, before we embark upon solving our cyber-physical domain’s future threat environment, it is perhaps wise to look back upon the perilous path that has brought us here.  

    Early History of Electronic Communications in India

    The institutional “cybersecurity thinking” of post-independence Indian government structures can be traced to 1839 when the East India Company’s then Governor-General of India, Lord Dalhousie, had asked a telegraph system to be built in Kolkata, the then capital of the British Raj. By 1851, the British had deployed the first trans-India telegraph line, and by 1854, the first Telegraph Act had been passed. Similar to the 2008 amendment to the IT Act which allowed the government to intercept, monitor and decrypt any information on any computer, the 1860 amendment to the Telegraph Act too granted the British to take over any leased telegraph lines to access any of the telegraphs transmitted. After all, the new wired communication technology of the day had become an unforeseen flashpoint during the 1857 rebellion.

    Post-independence, under the socialist fervour of Nehruvian politics, the government further nationalised all foreign telecommunications companies and continued the British policy of total control over telecommunications under its own civil service structure, which too came pre-packaged from the British.

    Historians note that the telegraph operators working for the British quickly became targets of intrigues and lethal violence during the mutiny [6], somewhat akin to today’s Sysadmins being a top social engineering priority for cyber threat actors [7]. One of the sepoy mutineers of 1857, while on his way to the hangman’s halter, famously cried out at a telegraph line calling it the cursed string that had strangled the Indians [8]. On the other side of affairs, after having successfully suppressed the mutiny, Robert Montgomery famously remarked that the telegraph had just saved India [9]. Within the telegraph system, the problems of information security popped up fairly quickly after its introduction in India. Scholars note that commercial intelligence was frequently peddled in underground Indian markets by government telegraph clerks [10], in what can perhaps be described as one of the first “data breaches” that bureaucrats in India had to deal with. 

    British had formulated different rules for telecommunications in India and England. While they did not have the total monopoly and access rights over all transmissions in Britain, for the purpose of maintaining political control, in India they did [11]. Post-independence, under the socialist fervour of Nehruvian politics, the government further nationalised all foreign telecommunications companies and continued the British policy of total control over telecommunications under its own civil service structure, which too came pre-packaged from the British.

    The Computer and “The System”

    Major reforms are often preceded by major failures. The government imported its first computer in 1955 but did not show any interest in any policy regarding these new machines. That only changed in 1963, when the government under the pressure to reform after a shameful military defeat and the loss of significant territory to China, instituted a Committee on Electronics under Homi Jehangir Bhabha to assess the strategic utilities that computers might provide to the military [12].  

    In 1965, as punitive sanctions for the war with Pakistan, the US cut off India’s supply of all electronics, including computers. This forced the government to set up the Electronics Committee of India which worked alongside the Electronics Corporation of India (ECIL), mandated to build indigenous design and electronic manufacturing capabilities. But their approach was considered highly restrictive and discretionary, which instead of facilitating, further constrained the development of computers, related electronics, and correspondingly useful policies in India [13]. Moreover, no one was even writing commercial software in India, while at the same the demand for export-quality software was rising. The situation was such that ECIL had to publish full-page advertisements for the development of export-quality software [12]. Consequently, in the early 1970s, Mumbai-based Tata Consultancy Services managed to become the first company to export software from India. As the 1970s progressed and India moved into the 1980s, it gradually became clearer to more and more people in the government that their socialist policies were not working [14]. 

    In 1984, the same year when the word ‘Cyberspace’ appeared in a sci-fi novel called Neuromancer, a policy shift towards computing and communications technologies was seen in the newly formed government under Rajiv Gandhi [12]. The new computer policy, shaped largely by N. Sheshagiri who was the Director General of the National Informatics Centre, significantly simplified procedures for private actors and was released within twenty days of the prime minister taking the oath. Owing to this liberalisation, the software industry in India took off and in 1988, 38 leading software companies in India came together to establish the National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) with the intent to shape the government’s cyber policy agendas. As we are mostly concerned about cybersecurity, it should be noted that in 1990, it was NASSCOM that carried out probably the first IT security-related public awareness campaign in India which called for reducing software piracy and increasing the lawful use of IT [5].   

    Unfortunately, India’s 1990s were mired by coalition governments and a lack of coherent policy focus. In 1998, when Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the Prime Minister, the cyber policy took the most defining turn with the development of the National IT Policy. The IT Act, thus released in 2000 and amended further in 2008, became the first document explicitly dealing with cybercrime. Interestingly, the spokesman and a key member of the task force behind the national IT policy was Dewang Mehta, the then president of NASSCOM. Nevertheless, while computer network operations had become regular in international affairs [15], there was still no cyber policy framework or doctrine to deal with the risks from sophisticated (and state-backed) APT actors that were residing outside the jurisdiction of Indian authorities. There still is not.  

    In 2008, NASSCOM established the Data Security Council of India (DSCI), which along with its parent body took it upon itself to run cybersecurity awareness campaigns for law enforcement and other public sector organisations in India. However, the “awareness campaign” centric model of cybersecurity strategy does not really work against APT actors, as became apparent soon when researchers at the University of Toronto discovered the most massive infiltration of India’s civilian and military computers by APT actors [4]. In 2013, the Snowden revelations about unrestrained US spying on India also ruffled domestic feathers for lack of any defensive measures or policies [3]. Coupled with these surprise(?) and unpalatable revelations, there was also the increasing and recurring international pressure on Indian IT to put an end to the rising cases of data theft where sensitive data of their overseas customers was regularly found in online underground markets [16].  

    Therefore, with the government facing growing domestic and international pressure to revamp its approach towards cybersecurity, MeitY released India’s first National Cybersecurity Policy in 2013 [17]. Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) also released detailed guidelines “in the wake of persistent threats” [18]. However, the government admitted to not having the required expertise in the matter, and thus the preparation of the MHA document was outsourced to DSCI. Notwithstanding that, MHA’s document was largely an extension of the Manual on Departmental Security Instructions released in 1994 which had addressed the security of paper-based information. Consequently, the MHA document produced less of a national policy and more of a set of instructions to departments about sanitising their computer networks and resources, including a section on instructions to personnel over social media usage. 

    The 2013 National Cybersecurity Policy proposed certain goals and “5-year objectives” toward building national resilience in cyberspace. At the end of a long list of aims, the 2013 policy suggested adopting a “prioritised approach” for implementation which will be operationalised in the future by a detailed guide and plan of action at national, sectoral, state, ministry, department, and enterprise levels. However, as of this writing the promised implementation details, or any teeth, are still missing from the National Cybersecurity Policy. As continued APT activities [19] show, the measures towards creating situation awareness have also not permeated beyond the technical/collection layer.

    In 2014, the National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) was established, with the primary aim of building situational awareness of cyber threats in India. Given the underwhelming response to the 2013 policy [1], [2], the National Cybersecurity Policy was surmised to be updated in 2020, but as of this writing, the update is still being formulated by the National Cybersecurity Coordinator who heads the NCCC. The present policy gap makes it an opportune subject to discuss certain fundamental issues with cyber situation awareness and the future of cyber defences in the context of the trends in APT activities. 

    Much to Catch Up

    Recently, the Government of India’s Kavach (an employee authentication app for anyone using a ‘gov.in’ or ‘nic.in’ emails-id) was besieged by APT36 [20]. APT36 is a Pak-affiliated actor and what one might call a tier-3 APT i.e., what they lack in technical sophistication, they try to make up for that with passion and perseverance. What makes it interesting is that the malicious activity went on for over a year, before a third-party threat observer flagged it. Post-pandemic, APT activities have not just increased but also shown an inclination towards integrating online disinformation into the malware capabilities [21]. APT actors (and bots), who have increasingly gotten better at hiding in plain sight over social networks, have now a variety of AI techniques to integrate into their command and control – we’ve seen the use of GANs to mimic traffic of popular social media sites for hiding command and control traffic [22], an IoT botnet that had a machine-learning component which the attacker could switch on/off depending upon people’s responses in online social networks [21], as well as malware that can “autonomously” locate its command and control node over public communication platforms without having any hard-coded information about the attacker [23]. 

    Post-pandemic, APT activities have not just increased but also shown an inclination towards integrating online disinformation into the malware capabilities.

    This is an offence-persistent environment. In this “space”, there always exists an information asymmetry where the defender generally knows less about the attacker than the opposite being true. Wargaming results have shown that unlike conventional conflicts, where an attack induces the fear of death and destruction, a cyber-attack generally induces anxiety [24], and consequently, people dealing with cyber attacks act to offset those anxieties and not their primal fears. Thus, in response to cyber-attacks, their policies reflect risk aversion, not courage, physical or moral. It need not be the case if policymakers recognise this and integrate it into their decision-making heuristics. Unfortunately, the National Cybersecurity Policy released in 2013 stands out to be a fairly risk-averse and a placeholder document. Among many other, key issues are: 

    • The policy makes zero references to automation and AI capabilities. This would have been understandable in other domains, like poultry perhaps, but is not even comprehensible in present-day cybersecurity.   
    • The policy makes zero references to hardware attacks. Consequently, developing any capability for assessing insecurity at hardware/firmware levels, which is a difficult job, is also overlooked at the national level itself. 
    • There are several organisations within the state, civilian and military, that have stakes and roles of varying degrees in a robust National Cybersecurity Policy. However, the policy makes zero attempts at recognising and addressing these specific roles and responsibilities, or any areas of overlap therein.
    • The policy does not approach cyber activity as an overarching operational construct that permeates all domains, but rather as activity in a specific domain called “cyberspace”. Consequently, it lacks the doctrinal thinking that would integrate cyber capabilities with the use of force. A good example of this is outer space, where cyber capabilities are emerging as a potent destabiliser [25] and cybersecurity constitutes the operational foundation of space security, again completely missing from the National Cybersecurity Policy.   
    • The policy is also light on subjects critical to cybersecurity implementation, such as the approach towards internet governance, platform regulation, national encryption regime, and the governance of underlying technologies. 

    A Note on the Human Dimension of Cybersecurity

    There exist two very broad types of malicious behaviour online, one that is rapid and superficial, and another that are deep and persistent. The present approaches to building situation awareness in cyberspace are geared towards the former, leading to spatiotemporally “localised and prioritised” assessments [26], matters pertaining to the immediate law and order situations and not stealthy year-long campaigns. Thus, while situation awareness itself is a psychological construct dealing with decision-making, in cybersecurity operations it overwhelmingly has turned into software-based visualisation of the incoming situational data. This is a growing gap that must also be addressed by the National Cybersecurity Policy. 

    The use of computational tools and techniques to automate and optimise the social interactions of a software agent presents itself as a significant force multiplier for cyber threat actors.

    In technology-mediated environments, people have to share the actual situation awareness with the technology artifacts [27]. Complete dependence on technology for cyber situation awareness has proven to be problematic, for example in the case of Stuxnet, where the operators at the targeted plant saw on their computer screens that the centrifuges were running normally, and simply believed that to be true. The 2016 US election interference only became clearer at the institutional level after several months of active social messaging and doxing operations had already been underway [28], and the story of Telebots’ attack on Ukrainian electricity grids is even more telling – a powerplant employee whose computer was being remotely manipulated, sat making a video of this activity, asking his colleague if it could be their own organisation’s IT staff “doing their thing” [29].

    This lack of emphasis on human factors has been a key gap in cybersecurity, which APTs never fail to exploit. Further, such actors rely upon considerable social engineering in initial access phases, a process which is also getting automated faster than policymakers can play catchup to [30]. The use of computational tools and techniques to automate and optimise the social interactions of a software agent presents itself as a significant force multiplier for cyber threat actors. Therefore, it is also paramount to develop precise policy guidelines that implement the specific institutional structures, processes, and technological affordances required to mitigate the risks of malicious social automation on the unsuspecting population, as well as on government institutions.  

    Concluding Remarks

    There is a running joke that India’s strategic planning is overseen by accountants and reading through the document of National Cybersecurity Policy 2013, that does not seem surprising. We have had a troubling policy history when it comes to electronics and communications and are still in the process of shedding our colonial burden. A poorly framed National Cybersecurity Policy will only take us away from self-reliance in cyberspace and towards an alliance with principal offenders themselves. Notwithstanding, an information-abundant organisation like NCCC has undoubtedly to make some choices about where and what to concentrate its attentional resources upon, however, the present National Cybersecurity Policy appears neither to be a component of any broader national security strategy nor effective or comprehensive enough for practical implementation in responding to the emerging threat environment. 

    References

    [1] N. Alawadhi, “Cyber security policy must be practical: Experts,” The Economic Times, Oct. 22, 2014. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2022. [Online]. Available: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/cyber-security-policy-must-be-practical-experts/articleshow/44904596.cms

    [2] A. Saksena, “India Scrambles on Cyber Security,” The Diplomat, Jun. 18, 2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/india-scrambles-on-cyber-security/ (accessed Sep. 18, 2022).

    [3] C. R. Mohan, “Snowden Effect,” Carnegie India, 2013. https://carnegieindia.org/2013/06/19/snowden-effect-pub-52148 (accessed Sep. 18, 2022).

    [4] R. Dharmakumar and S. Prasad, “Hackers’ Haven,” Forbes India, Sep. 19, 2011. https://www.forbesindia.com/printcontent/28462 (accessed Sep. 18, 2022).

    [5] D. Karthik and R. S. Upadhyayula, “NASSCOM: Is it time to retrospect and reinvent,” Indian Inst. Manag. Ahmedabad, 2014.

    [6] H. C. Fanshawe, Delhi past and present. J. Murray, 1902.

    [7] C. Simms, “Is Social Engineering the Easy Way in?,” Itnow, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 24–25, 2016.

    [8] J. Lienhard, “No. 1380: Indian telegraph,” Engines Our Ingen., 1998.

    [9] A. Vatsa, “When telegraph saved the empire – Indian Express,” Nov. 18, 2012. http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/when-telegraph-saved-the-empire/1032618/0 (accessed Sep. 17, 2022).

    [10] L. Hoskins, BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA. ROUTLEDGE, 2020.

    [11] D. R. Headrick, The invisible weapon: Telecommunications and international politics, 1851-1945. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1991.

    [12] B. Parthasarathy, “Globalizing information technology: The domestic policy context for India’s software production and exports,” Iterations Interdiscip. J. Softw. Hist., vol. 3, pp. 1–38, 2004.

    [13] I. J. Ahluwalia, “Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation Since the Mid-Sixties,” J. Asian Stud., vol. 48, pp. 413–414, 1989.

    [14] R. Subramanian, “Historical Consciousness of Cyber Security in India,” IEEE Ann. Hist. Comput., vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 71–93, 2020.

    [15] C. Wiener, “Penetrate, Exploit, Disrupt, Destroy: The Rise of Computer Network Operations as a Major Military Innovation,” PhD Thesis, 2016.

    [16] N. Kshetri, “Cybersecurity in India: Regulations, governance, institutional capacity and market mechanisms,” Asian Res. Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 64–76, 2017.

    [17] MeitY, “National Cybersecurity Policy.” Government of India, 2013.

    [18] MHA, “NATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY AND GUIDELINES.” Government of India, 2014.

    [19] S. Patil, “Cyber Attacks, Pakistan emerges as China’s proxy against India,” Obs. Res. Found., 2022.

    [20] A. Malhotra, V. Svajcer, and J. Thattil, “Operation ‘Armor Piercer:’ Targeted attacks in the Indian subcontinent using commercial RATs,” Sep. 23, 2021. http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/operation-armor-piercer.html (accessed Sep. 02, 2022).

    [21] NISOS, “Fronton: A Botnet for Creation, Command, and Control of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior.” May 2022.

    [22] M. Rigaki, “Arming Malware with GANs,” presented at the Stratosphere IPS, Apr. 2018. Accessed: Oct. 19, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.stratosphereips.org/publications/2018/5/5/arming-malware-with-gans

    [23] Z. Wang et al., “DeepC2: AI-Powered Covert Command and Control on OSNs,” in Information and Communications Security, vol. 13407, C. Alcaraz, L. Chen, S. Li, and P. Samarati, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022, pp. 394–414. doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-15777-6_22.

    [24] J. Schneider, “Cyber and crisis escalation: insights from wargaming,” 2017.

    [25] J. Pavur, “Securing new space: on satellite cyber-security,” PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 2021.

    [26] U. Franke and J. Brynielsson, “Cyber situational awareness – A systematic review of the literature,” Comput. Secur., vol. 46, pp. 18–31, Oct. 2014, doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2014.06.008.

    [27] N. A. Stanton, P. M. Salmon, G. H. Walker, E. Salas, and P. A. Hancock, “State-of-science: situation awareness in individuals, teams and systems,” Ergonomics, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 449–466, Apr. 2017, doi: 10.1080/00140139.2017.1278796.

    [28] “Open Hearing On The Intelligence Community’s Assessment on Russian Activities and Intentions in the 2016 U.S. Elections.” Jan. 10, 2017. Accessed: Dec. 22, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-intelligence-communitys-assessment-russian-activities-and-intentions-2016-us#

    [29] R. Lipovsky, “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of the World’s Most Dangerous Attackers,” presented at the Microsoft BlueHat 2020, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LAFV6XDctY

    [30] D. Ariu, E. Frumento, and G. Fumera, “Social engineering 2.0: A foundational work,” in Proceedings of the Computing Frontiers Conference, 2017, pp. 319–325.

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  • The Bridge on River Chenab

    The Bridge on River Chenab

    “The only way to discover the limits of the possible is to go beyond them into the impossible”

    -Arthur C. Clarke

    Introduction

    On 13 Aug 2022, the bridge on the River Chenab in the Reasi District of J&K was finally completed. It was a case of the impossible becoming possible. It all happened because of a very high degree of self-belief of those who planned it and the sincerity of thousands of those who worked hard for the last 18 years.   Indeed, it was the best gift the Indian Railway in general and Indian Engineers, in particular, could give to India on the 76th Independence Day of India. It is also highly symbolic that it is located in the State of J&K and in a way appeared to be a giant step towards the integration of J&K with the rest of the country.

    The Bridge over the River Chenab is part of the Jammu-Udhampur-Baramulla Railway line, which is being constructed. While Sections of Jammu-Udhampur, Udhampur-Katra and Banihal-Baramulla are already completed and opened for traffic, section Katra- Banihal is still not complete. The degree of difficulty in this section is enormous. Besides this Bridge on Chenab (more about it a little later), the Bridge on Anji Khad (which is under construction) and a total of 35 tunnels and 37 bridges make this section of 111 km in the mountainous terrain extremely challenging and an engineering marvel in the making.

    Progress of the Project –  It is a 356 km railway project, starting at Jammu and going up to Baramulla. It was started in 1983 with the objective of connecting Jammu Tawi to Udhampur.  Construction of the route faced natural challenges including major earthquake zones, extreme temperatures and inhospitable terrain.  Finally, in 2005  The 53 km long Jammu–Udhampur section opened after 21 years with 20 tunnels and 158 bridges. The cost of the project had escalated to ₹515 crores from the original estimated cost of ₹50 crores.  In 1994 The railway accepted the necessity to extend the track to Baramulla. However, at that point it was thought that the project will have two disconnected arms; one from Jammu to Udhampur and the second from Qazigund to Baramulla. In 2002 the GoI declared this project to be a national project. This means hereafter, the entire funding will be from the Central Budget. At that time the necessity was also accepted to connect the two disconnected arms. The estimated cost of the project assessed then was   ₹6,000 crore.  In 2008 the 66 km section between Anantnag and Manzhama (outside Srinagar) was opened for traffic. In 2009 this Service was extended to Baramulla. During the same year, the line from Anantnag was extended to Qazigund.

    Also  Around the same time, an extension of the track from Baramulla to Kupwara was proposed, and its survey got completed in 2009. In 2009 itself, work on the section between Katra and Qazigund resumed after a review based on geotechnical studies. In 2011, an 11.215 Km long Banihal Qazigund tunnel across the Pir Panjal Range was completed.  This paved the way for a trial run in Dec 2012 from Banihal to Qazigund. In 2014 the train route from Udhampur to Katra was also operationalised. Now the only missing link in this nationally vital rail line was Katra-Banihal. Finally, in 2018 the GoI approved the extension of the railway line to Kupwara.

    Degree of Difficulty in Katra- Banihal Section – This is a 111 km long stretch. 97.34 km of this stretch will be through tunnels. There are 20 Major (including the bridge across the Chenab river and a bridge on Anji Khad) and 10 minor bridges on this stretch. 

    Bridge Across Chenab

    Location: The Chenab Rail Bridge is a steel and concrete arch bridge between Bakkal and Kauri in the Reasi district of J&K, India.  It needs to be noted that it is the highest railway bridge in the world. After many hick-ups, finally in 2012 excavation of the foundation of the bridge commenced. The tender was with Afcons Infrastructure Limited. The alignment crosses a deep gorge of the Chenab River, which necessitates the construction of a long-span railway bridge with a viaduct for approaches on either side. 

    Details: It is a 785 meters long single arch bridge where the main arch is 467 meters. The total span of the bridge is 1315 meters including a viaduct of 650 meters on the Northern side, Deck height is 359 meters above the river bed and 322 meters above the water surface which is 35 meters more than the height of the Eiffel Tower. The project also entails the construction of 203 km of access roads.  The deck is 13.5 meters wide, where two rail tracks will be available. The total cost of the Bridge is Rs 1486 Crores.

     

    Design: The steel arch has been planned because the construction of the pillar was difficult and the load had to be distributed. Chords have been provided to cater for the swaying load. The steel structures of the bridge were manufactured in workshops built in the mountains. The workshops had been moved to the building site because there is no proper road network in the challenging terrain. The longest building parts that could be delivered to the site were 12 meters in length. Therefore, four workshops were established in the mountains. Workshops and paint shops were built on both sides of the valley. All steel materials, except for the smallest rolled profiles, were delivered to the mountains as steel boards. The insufficient infrastructure of the area caused additional problems. There was no electricity and the water of the river was not suitable for manufacturing concrete. All electricity had to be produced at the site and the water was delivered from further away in the mountains. The job was also challenging because the track had a curvature in the approach bridge. In this section, the construction stage bearings had been designed in such a way that it was possible to launch the steel deck in the curvature portion as well. The bridge consists of about 25000 tonnes of steel structures, the main portion of which was used for the arch bridge section. It is a unique design and as such none of the Indian codes fully catered for the design validation. Therefore it was decided to follow the BS Code. The design also caters for wind load effects as per wind tunnel tests. It can cater for wind pressure of 1500 Pa. It is a blast resistance design. The design of the decking has been checked for fatigue as per the BS Code. The most important aspect is that it caters for redundancy within the structure, for a lower level of operation during mishaps and against collapse in extreme cases of one-pier failure. The area has high seismicity and the design was planned to withstand earthquakes of the severity of 8 on the Richter Scale. The bridge design is for a rail speed of 100 kmph. This means it can withstand very high-intensity of vibrations. The designed life of the bridge is 120 years and to take care of assessed steel fatigue the fatigue design selected is BS:5400 Part-10. The bridge will be able to withstand a temperature of minus 200C and a wind speed of 266 kmph.

    Team: The viaduct and foundation have been designed by M/s WSP(Finland) and the Arch design has been made by M/s Leonhart, Andra and Partners (Germany), the foundation protection has been designed by IISc Bangalore. The executing agency has been M/s Konkan Railway Corporation Limited.

    Status of Katra-Banihal project

    Although, the construction of Chenab Bridge is a major milestone in the progress of the project, however, still many more landmarks are required to be crossed before the completion of the project. Foremost of them is the Anji Khad bridge which is expected to be ready only by Dec 2022. It is expected that this rail Section will finally be operational by the middle of 2023.

    Conclusion

    The Jammu-Udhampur-Katra-Banihal-Srinagar-Baramulla Rail project is a vital national project which has a major bearing on national security and nation building. It is a matter of pride that Indian Engineers have achieved what at one point had appeared impossible. It will help in the integration of J&K with the rest of the country and will help strategically in many ways. The completion of the project will also give confidence to expeditiously complete other projects of national importance like; the railway line to Leh and the Railway line to Tenga in the North-East.

    End Note:

    1. Conceptual Design of the Chenab Bridge in India by Pekka Pulkkine WSP Finland, S Hopf and A Jutila. Available on Research Gate: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/257725212_Conceptual_Design_of_the_Chenab_Bridge_in_India.

    2. An internet upload: https://byjus.com/current-affairs/chenab-bridge/

    3. A Report by OT Staff, “Once the bridge is completed, it will provide all-weather connectivity between Kashmir and the rest of India” reported on 07 Apr 2021 and uploaded on https://www.outlookindia.com/outlooktraveller/travelnews/story/71397/all-about-the-chenab-bridge

    4. An internet upload: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jammu–Baramulla_line

    5. An internet upload: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chenab_Rail_Bridge

    6. An internet upload: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1709652

    7. Zee Media Bureau, “Indian Railways: Delhi-Kashmir, Katra-Banihal train route to open soon, project nears completion” dated 08 Aug 2022 and uploaded on https://zeenews.india.com/railways/indian-railways-delhi-kashmir-katra-banihal-train-route-to-open-soon-project-nears-completion-2494827.html

    Image 1 Credits: Arun Ganesh

    Image 2 Credits: Indian Railways

    Image 3 Credits: Indian Express

    Image 4 Credits: Indian Railways

    Feature Image Credits: The Indian Express

  • Indian Economy at 75: Trapped in a Borrowed Development Strategy

    Indian Economy at 75: Trapped in a Borrowed Development Strategy

    In 1947, at the time of Independence, India’s socio-economic parameters were similar to those in countries of South East Asia and China. The level of poverty, illiteracy, and inadequacy of health infrastructure was all similar. Since then, these other countries have progressed rapidly leaving India behind in all parameters. ‘Why is it so?’ should be the big question for every Indian citizen in this time of our 75th anniversary celebrations.

     

    Introduction

    India at 75 is a mixed bag of development and missed opportunities. The country has achieved much since Independence but a lot remains to be done to become a developed society. The pandemic has exposed India’s deficiencies in stark terms. The uncivilized conditions of living of a vast majority of the citizens became apparent. According to a report by Azim Premji University, 90% of the workers said during the lockdown that they did not have enough savings to buy one week of essentials. This led to the mass migration of millions of people, in trying conditions from cities to the villages, in the hope of access to food and survival.

    Generally, technology-related sectors, pharmaceuticals and some producing essentials in the organized sectors have done well in spite of the pandemic. So, a part of the economy is doing well in spite of adversity but incomes of at least 60% of people at the bottom of the income ladder have declined (PRICE Survey, 2022). The great divide between the unorganized and organized parts of the economy is growing. The backdrop to these developments is briefly presented below.

    Structure and Growth of the Economy

    In 1947, at the time of Independence, India’s socio-economic parameters were similar to those in countries of South East Asia and China. The level of poverty, illiteracy, and inadequacy of health infrastructure was all similar. Since then, these other countries have progressed rapidly leaving India behind in all parameters. So, India has fallen behind relatively in spite of improvements in health services and education, diversification of the economy and development of the industry.

    In 1950, agriculture was the dominant sector with a 55% share of GDP which has now dwindled to about 14%. The share of the services sector has grown rapidly and by 1980 it surpassed the share of agriculture and now it is about 55% of GDP. The Indian economy has diversified production `from pins to space ships’.

    Agriculture grows at a trend rate of a maximum of 4% per annum while the services sector can grow at even 12% per annum. So, there has been a shift in the economy’s composition from agriculture to services, accelerating the growth rate. The average growth rate of the economy between the 1950s and the 1970s was around 3.5%. In the 1980s and 1990s, it increased to 5.4% due to the shift in the composition. There was no acceleration in the growth rate of the economy in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. This rate again increased in the period after 2003 only to decline in 2008-09 due to the global financial crisis. Subsequently, the rate of growth has fluctuated wildly both due to global events and the policy conundrums in India.

    There was the taper tantrum in 2012-13 which cut short the post-global financial crisis recovery. Demonetization in November 2016 adversely impacted growth. That was followed by the structurally flawed GST. These policies administered shocks to the economy. Then came the pandemic in 2020. The economy’s quarterly growth rate had already fallen from 8% in Q4 2017-18 to 3.1% in Q4 2019-20, just before the pandemic hit.

    1980-81 marked a turning point. Prior to that, a drought would lead to a negative rate of growth in agriculture and of the economy as a whole. For instance, due to the drought in 1979-80, the economy declined by 6%. But, that was the last one. After that, a decline in agriculture has not resulted in a negative growth rate for the economy. The big drought of 1987-88 saw the economy grow at 3.4%. After 1980-81, the economy experienced a negative growth rate only during the pandemic which severely impacted the services sector, especially the contact services.

    Employment and Technology Related Issues

    Agriculture employs 45% of the workforce though its share in the economy (14%) has now become marginal. It has been undergoing mechanisation with increased use of tractors, harvester combines, etc., leading to the displacement of labour. Similar is the case in non-agriculture. So, surplus labour is stuck in agriculture leading to massive disguised unemployment.

    India is characterized by disguised unemployment and underemployment.Recent data points to growing unemployment among the educated youth. They wait for suitable work. The result is a low labour force participation rate (LFPR) in India (in the mid-40s) compared to similar other countries (60% plus).The gender dimension of unemployment and the low LFPR is worrying with women the worst sufferers.

    India’s employment data is suspect. The reason is that in the absence of unemployment allowance, people who lose work have to do some alternative work otherwise they would starve. They drive a rickshaw, push a cart, carry a head load or sell something at the roadside. This gets counted as employment even though they have only a few hours of work and are underemployed. So, India is characterized by disguised unemployment and underemployment.

    Recent data points to growing unemployment among the educated youth. They wait for suitable work. The result is a low labour force participation rate (LFPR) in India (in the mid-40s) compared to similar other countries (60% plus). It implies that in India maybe 20% of those who could work have stopped looking for work. No wonder for a few hundred low-grade government jobs, millions of young apply. The gender dimension of unemployment and the low LFPR is worrying with women the worst sufferers.
    These aspects of inadequate employment generation are linked to automation and the investment pattern in the economy. New technologies that are now being used in the modern sectors are labour displacing. For instance, earlier in big infrastructure projects like the construction of roads, one could see hundreds of people working but now big machines are used along with a few workers.

    Further, the organized sectors get most of the investment so little is left for the unorganized sector. This is especially true for agriculture. Thus, neither the organized sector nor agriculture is generating more work. Consequently, entrants to the job market are mostly forced to join the non-agriculture unorganized sector, which in a sense is the residual sector, where the wages are a fraction of the wages in the organized sector. The unorganized sector also acts as a reserve army of labour keeping organized sector wages in check

    Lack of a Living Wage

    To boost profits, the organized sector is increasingly, employing contract labour rather than permanent employees. This is true in both the public and private sectors. So, not only the workers in the unorganized sector, even the workers in the organised sector do not earn a living wage. Thus, most workers have little savings to deal with any crisis. They are unable to give their children a proper education and cannot afford proper health facilities. Most of the children drop out of school and can only do menial jobs requiring physical labour. They cannot obtain a better-paying job and will remain poor for the rest of their lives.

    The Delhi socio-economic survey of 2018 pointed to the low purchasing power of the majority of Indians. It showed that in Delhi, 90% of households spent less than Rs. 25,000 per month, and 98% spent less than Rs. 50,000 per month. Since Delhi’s per capita income is 2.5 times the all India average, deflating the Delhi figures by this factor will approximately yield all India figures. So, 98 per cent of the families would have spent less than Rs.20,000 per month, and 90 per cent less than Rs.10,000 per month. This effectively implies that 90 per cent of families were poor in 2018, if not extremely poor (implied by the poverty line). During the pandemic, many of them lost incomes and were pauperized and forced to further reduce their consumption.

    Unorganized Sector Invisibilized

    In the unorganized sector, labour is not organized as a trade union and therefore, is unable to bargain for higher wages, when prices rise. It constitutes 94% of the workforce and has little social security. No other major world economy has such a huge unorganized sector. No wonder when such a large section of the population faces a crisis in their lives, the economy declines, as witnessed during the pandemic. India’s official rate of growth fell more sharply than that of any other G20 country.

    The micro sector has 99% of the units and 97.5% of the employment of MSME and is unlike the small and medium sectors. The benefits of policies made for the MSME sector do not accrue to the micro units.

    Policymakers largely ignore the unorganized sector. The sudden implementation of the lockdown which put this sector in a deep existential crisis points to that. The micro sector has 99% of the units and 97.5% of the employment of MSME and is unlike the small and medium sectors. The benefits of policies made for the MSME sector do not accrue to the micro units.

    Invisibilization of the unorganized sector in the data is at the root of the problem. Data on this sector become available periodically, called the reference years. In between, it is assumed that this sector can be proxied by the organized sector. This could be taken to be correct when there is no shock to the economy and its parameters remain unchanged.

    Demonetization and the flawed GST administered big shocks to the economy and undermined the unorganized sector. Its link with the organized sector got disrupted. Thus, the methodology of calculating national income announced in 2015 became invalid.

    The implication is that the unorganized sector’s decline since 2016 is not captured in the data. Worse, the growth of the organized sector has been at the expense of the unorganized sector because demand shifted from the latter to the former. It suited the policymakers to continue using the faulty data since that presented a rosy picture of the economy. This also lulled them into believing that they did not need to do anything special to check the decline of the unorganized sector.

    Policy Paradigm Shift in 1947

    Growing unemployment, weak socio-economic conditions, etc., are not sudden developments. Their root lies in the policy paradigm adopted since independence.
    In 1947, the leadership, influenced by the national movement understood that people were not to blame for their problems of poverty, illiteracy and ill-health and could not resolve them on their own. So, it was accepted that in independent India these issues would be dealt with collectively. Therefore, the government was given the responsibility of tackling these issues and given a key role in the economy.

    Simultaneously, the leadership, largely belonging to the country’s elite, was enamoured of Western modernity and wanted to copy it to make India an ’advanced country’. The two paths of Western development then available were the free market and Soviet-style central planning. India adopted a mix of the two with the leading role given to the public sector. This path was chosen also for strategic reasons and access to technology which the West was reluctant to supply. But, this choice also led to a dilemma for the Indian elite. It had to ally with the Soviet Union for reasons of defence and access to technology but wanted to be like Western Europe.

    Both the chosen paths were based on a top-down approach. The assumption was that there would be a trickle down to those at the bottom. People accepted this proposition believing in the wider good of all. Resources were mobilized and investments were made in the creation of big dams and factories (called temples of modern India) that generated few jobs. They not only displaced many people trickle down was minimal. For instance, education spread but mostly benefitted the well-off.

    The Indian economy diversified and grew rapidly. An economy that for 50 years had been growing at about 0.75% grew at about 4% in the 1950s. But, the decline in the death rate led to a spurt in the rate of population growth. So, the per capita income did not show commensurate growth, and poverty persisted. Problems got magnified due to the shortage of food following the drought of 1965-67 and the Wars in 1962 and 1965. The Naxalite movement started in 1967, there was BOP crisis and high inflation in 1972-74 due to the growing energy dependence and the Yom Kippur war. Soon thereafter there was political instability and the imposition of an Emergency in 1975. The country went from crisis to crisis.

    Planning failed due to crony capitalism. The prevailing political economy enabled the business community to systematically undermine policies for their narrow ends by fueling the growth of the black economy.

    The failure of trickle-down and the cornering of the gains of development by a narrow section of people led to growing inequality and people losing faith in the development process. Different sections of the population realized that they needed a share in power to deliver to their group. Every division in society — caste, region, community, etc. — was exploited. The leadership became short-termist and indulged in competitive populism by promising immediate gains.

    The consensus on policies that existed at independence dissipated quickly. Election time promises to get votes were not fulfilled. For instance, PM Morarji Desai said that promises in the Janata Dal manifesto in 1977 were the party’s programme and not the government’s. Such undermining of accountability of the political process has undermined democracy and trust and aggravated alienation.

    Black Economy and Policy Failure

    The black economy has grown rapidly since the 1950s with political, social and economic ramifications. Even though it is at the root of the major problems confronting the country, most analysts ignore it.

    So, the black economy controls politics and to retain power it undermines accountability and weakens democracy.

    It undermines elections and strengthens the hold of vested interests on political parties. The compromised leadership of political parties is open to blackmail both by foreign interests and those in power. When in power it is willing to do the bidding of the vested interests. So, the black economy controls politics and to retain power it undermines accountability and weakens democracy.

    The black economy controls politics and corrupts it to perpetuate itself. The honest and the idealist soon are corrupted as happened with the leadership that emerged from the anti-corruption JP movement in the mid-1970s. Many of them who gained power in the 1990s was accused of corruption and even prosecuted. Proposals for state funding of elections will only provide additional funds but not help clean up politics.

    The black economy can be characterized as ’digging holes and filling them’. It results in two incomes but zero output. There is activity without productivity with investment going to waste. Consequently, the economy grows less than its potential. It has been shown that the economy has been losing 5% growth since the mid-1970s. So, if the black economy had not existed, today the economy could have been 8 times larger and each person would have been that much better off. Thus, development is set back. In 1988, PM Rajiv Gandhi lamented that out of every rupee sent only 15 paisa reaches the ground. P Chidambaram as FM said, `expenditures don’t lead to outcomes’.

    The black economy leads to the twin problem of development. First, black incomes being outside the tax net reduce resource availability to the government. If the black incomes currently estimated at above 60% of GDP could be brought into the tax net, the tax/GDP ratio could rise by 24%. This ratio is around 17% now and is one of the lowest in the world. Further, as direct tax collections rise, the regressive indirect taxes could be reduced, lowering inflation.

    India’s fiscal crisis would also get resolved. The current public sector deficit of about 14% would become a surplus of 10%. This would eliminate borrowings and reduce the massive interest payments (the largest single item in the revenue budget). It would enable an increase in allocations to public education and health to international levels and to infrastructure and employment generation.

    In brief, curbing the black economy would take care of India’s various developmental problems, whether it be lack of trickle-down, poverty, inequality, policy failure, employment generation, inflation and so on. It causes delays in decision-making and a breakdown of trust in society.

    Due to various misconceptions about the black economy, many of the steps taken to curb it have been counterproductive, like demonetization. Dozens of committees and commissions have analysed the issues and suggested hundreds of steps to tackle the problem. Many of them have been implemented, like reduction in tax rates and elimination of most controls but the size of the black economy has grown because of a lack of political will.

    Policy Paradigm Shift in 1991

    Failure of policies led to crisis after crisis in the period leading up to 1990. The blame was put on the policies themselves and not the crony capitalism and black economy that led to their failure. The policies prior to 1990 have been often labelled as socialist. Actually, the mixed economy model was designed to promote capitalism. At best the policies may be labelled as state capitalist and they succeeded in their goal. Private capital accumulated rapidly pre-1990. The Iraq crisis of 1989-90 led to India’s BOP crisis and became the trigger for a paradigm change in policies in favour of capital. The earlier more humane and less unequal path of development was discarded.

    Marketization has led to the ’marginalization of the marginals’, greater inequality and a rise in unemployment.

    In 1991, a new policy paradigm was ushered in. Namely, ’individuals are responsible for their problems and not the collective’. Under this regime, the government’s role in the economy was scaled back and individuals were expected to go to the market for resolving their problems. This may be characterized as ’marketization’. This brought about a philosophical shift in the thinking of individuals and society.

    Marketization has led to the ’marginalization of the marginals’, greater inequality and a rise in unemployment. These policies have promoted ’growth at any cost’ with the cost falling on the marginalized sections and the environment, both of which make poverty more entrenched. So, the pre-existing problems of Indian society have got aggravated in a changed form.

    Poverty is defined in terms of the ’social minimum necessary consumption’ which changes with space and time. Marketization has changed the minimum due to the promotion of consumerism and environmental decay imposing heavy health costs.
    The highly iniquitous NEP is leading to an unstable development environment. The base of growth has been getting narrower leading to periodic crises. Additionally, policy-induced challenges like demonetization, GST, pandemic and now the war in Ukraine have aggravated the situation. These social and political challenges can only grow over time as divisions in society become sharper.

    Weakness in Knowledge Generation

    Why does the obvious not happen in India? No one disagrees that poverty, illiteracy and ill health need to be eliminated. In addition to the problems due to the black economy and top-down approach, India has lagged behind in generating socially relevant knowledge to tackle its problems and make society dynamic.

    Technology has rapidly changed since the end of the Second World War. It is a moving frontier since newer technologies emerge leading to constant change and the inability of the citizens to cope with it. The advanced technology of the 1950s is intermediate or low technology today.

    Literacy needs to be redefined as the ability to absorb the current technology so as to get a decent job. Many routine jobs are likely to disappear soon, like, driver’s jobs as autonomous (self-driving) vehicles appear on the scene. Most banking is already possible through net banking and machines, like, ATMs. Banks themselves are under threat from digital currency.

    So, education is no more about the joy of learning and expanding one’s horizon. No wonder, the scientific temper is missing among a large number of the citizens.

    India’s weakness in knowledge generation is linked to the low priority given to education and R&D. Learning is based substantially on `rote learning’ which does not enable absorption of knowledge and its further development. So, education is no more about the joy of learning and expanding one’s horizon. No wonder, the scientific temper is missing among a large number of the citizens. Dogmas, misconceptions and irrationalities rule the minds of many and they are easily misled. This is politically, socially and economically a recipe for persisting backwardness.

    In spite of policy initiatives regarding education, like, the national education policy in 1968 and 1986, there is deterioration. This is because the milieu of education is all wrong. Policy is in the hands of bureaucrats, politicians or academics with bureaucratized mindsets. So, policies are mechanically framed. Like the idea that ’standards can be achieved via standardization’.

    Learning requires democratization. So, institutions need to be freed from the present feudal and bureaucratic control. Presently, institutions treat dissent as a malaise to be eliminated rather than celebrated. Courses are sought to be copied from foreign universities. JNU is told to be like Harvard or Cambridge. This is a contradiction in terms; originality cannot be copied. Courses copied from abroad tend to be based on the societal conditions there and not Indian conditions. Gandhi had said that the Indian education system is alienating and for many it still is.

    The best minds mostly go abroad and even if they return, they bring with them an alien framework not suited to India. So, as a society, we need to value ideas, prioritize education and R&D and generate socially relevant knowledge.

    Learning is given low priority because ideas are sought to be borrowed from abroad. So, the rulers have little value for institutions that could generate new ideas and inadequate funds are allotted to them. The best minds mostly go abroad and even if they return, they bring with them an alien framework not suited to India. So, as a society, we need to value ideas, prioritize education and R&D and generate socially relevant knowledge.

    Conclusion

    The growth at any cost strategy has been at the expense of the workers and the environment. This has narrowed the base of growth and led to instability in society — politically, socially and economically.

    India is a diverse society and the Indian economy is more complex than any other in the world. This has posed serious challenges to development in the last 75 years but undeniably things are not what they were. The big mistake has been to choose trickle-down policies that have not delivered to a vast number of people who live in uncivilized conditions. Poverty has changed its form and the elite imply that the poor should be grateful for what they have got. They should not focus on growing inequality, especially after 1991, when globalization entered the marketization phase which marginalizes the marginals.

    The growth at any cost strategy has been at the expense of the workers and the environment. This has narrowed the base of growth and led to instability in society — politically, socially and economically. The situation has been aggravated by the recent policy mistakes — demonetization, flawed GST and sudden lockdown. The current war in Ukraine is likely to lead to a new global order which will add to the challenges. The answer to ’why does the obvious not happen’ in India is not just economic but societal. Unless that challenge is met, portents are not bright for India at 75.

    This paper is based substantially on, `Indian Economy since Independence: Persisting Colonial Disruption’, Vision Books, 2013 and `Indian Economy’s Greatest Crisis: Impact of Coronavirus and the Road Ahead’, Penguin Random House, 2020.

    This article was published earlier in Mainstream Weekly.

    Feature Image Credit: Financial Express

    Other Images: DNA India, news18.com,  economictimes, rvcj.com

  • The Tamils Are The Original Inhabitants Of Sri Lanka

    The Tamils Are The Original Inhabitants Of Sri Lanka

    Many of history writing across the world is heavily influenced by nationalist narratives, religion, mythologies, and dominant accounts. However, it is now possible to re-establish past histories with the assistance of modern science through the use of anthropology, genetics, linguistics, etc. Sri Lanka’s history is intimately tied to that of the subcontinent, more particularly the Peninsula and Tamilnadu. Justice C M Wigneswaran provides a very incisive analysis of the island nation’s origins.

    Ruwanwalisay Temple at Anuradhapura – Image Credit: M Matheswaran

    Someone asked me; We read in the press your response to a question recently. You seem to be making sweeping statements about the Sinhalese. As far as we know the Sinhalese were the original inhabitants of this Island and the Tamils came in the 10th Century AD after the Chola Conquest. What proof have you about what you say?

    My response was; Professor Wijeyanayake from London like many other Sinhala Scholars wrote in the Sunday Observer of 17th November 1996 as follows- “The Origin of the Sinhala Race is in Lanka. There is no scientific evidence of Indians originating in India who spoke Sinhala”. Sinhalese are those who speak the Sinhala Language. Of course these days there are Sinhalese who have forgotten their mother language and have embraced other languages like English and French in their countries of emigration. But in early times the Sinhalese would have been those who spoke the Sinhala Language mainly. Without the Sinhala Language, there could have been no Sinhalese.

    When did the Sinhala Language come into being?

    The earliest Sinhala work was Siyabaslakara around 848 CE (9th Century AD). The next was Dhampiya-atuva Gatapadayo which came out around 918 CE (10th Century AD). Pali words are used both in a modified and pure form quite heavily in this latter work. The first Sinhala grammar Sidath Sangaraya belongs to the 13th Century AD. The inscriptions before the 7th Century AD do not mention Sinhala as a language and ethnicity of the people. The term “Sihala” (Lion in Pali) occurs for the first time in the Dipawansa (5th Century AD). Only once is the term coming up to say the Island was known as Sihala on account of the presence of Lions.

    In the Mahawansa the term Sihala appears twice. But there is no reference to the people called Sinhalese nor the Language called Sinhala. R.A.L.H. Gunawardana in his book “The People of the Lion: The Sinhala Identity and ideology in History and Historiography” (Sri Lanka Journal of the Humanities Vol V:1-2 (1979)) claims that before the 12th Century AD the Sinhala identity did not cover a whole people in Sri Lanka but only a small ruling class. This meant even by the 12th Century AD Sinhala had not become a full-fledged people’s language yet. What you have been fed to believe as per your question is pseudo-history created before the 1970s.

    After the 1970s even Sinhala historians have begun to doubt the story of Sri Lanka’s history starting with the coming of Vijaya from North India. Now our history books do not start with the coming of Vijaya as before. They start with the Stone Age civilization which was long prior to (the fictitious) Vijaya landing in Sri Lanka. Our history books now accept that permanent settlements, agriculture, use of skills, use of iron, urbanisation etc took place in this Island before the coming of (the fictitious) Vijaya. It is interesting to note that none of the books on the ancient history of any of the States in North India refers to the emigration of a person called Vijaya with 700 followers from their shores at any time in their ancient history. So now we start history from dates anterior to the coming of (the fictitious) Vijaya. Historically it is more plausible to believe that Mahawamsa written in Pali was a fiction written for the glorification of Buddhism. In fact, the author mentions so at the end of every stanza.

    But so far our Sinhala historians have not officially identified who these people who lived in this country before the coming of (the fictitious) Vijaya were. This is because any attempt, to tell the truth, will be beneficial to the Tamils and the pseudo-history of the Sinhalese hitherto purveyed would get exposed! I am told there was pressure recently to prevent the author of “Demala Baudhayo” bringing out a reprint of his book.

    The importance of the 1970s and the post-1970s period lies in the fact that scientific archaeological research began to take place here from then on. Not only that, our local researchers were helped by erudite foreign archaeologists from France, Germany, Britain and USA together with UNESCO experts. The pseudo-Sinhala Buddhist historians found it difficult to make progress due to this.

    A view of the Twin tanks: Archaelogical site at Anuradhapura – Photo Credit: M Matheswaran

    There is now archaeological evidence that pre-historic Stone Age people lived on this Island from over 125000 years ago according to excavations made in Iranaimadu in Kilinochchi District and in certain areas in Southern Sri Lanka. Dr Siran Deraniyagala brought these matters out, through his researches.

    The Stone Age could be generally divided into three periods 1. Paleolithic (Old Stone Age) (Before 10000 BC) 2. Mesolithic (Middle Stone Age) (Between 10000 BC and 8000 BC) 3. Neolithic (New Stone Age) (from 8000 BC to 3000BC). (Greek – lithos – Stone). But in certain regions, the Mesolithic period may have started even before 10000 BC.

    There is evidence that from 30000 years ago the Mesolithic people lived in our Hill Country as well as the Low Lands. About 75 evidences have been unearthed. Also, there is evidence to show that majority of these Mesolithic people lived mainly in the Northern and Eastern parts of Sri Lanka. They led a nomadic life. Their advancement in civilization is perceivable from the findings in caves, hills and on level ground.

    Thus the idea that the early inhabitants of Sri Lanka came from North India is now not accepted. It is agreed that long before the time of Mahawamsa, Sri Lanka enjoyed a culture similar to South India and those ancients were the progenitors of the present Sinhalese and Tamils.

    They attribute close similarities in lifestyle between these people and those who lived in the South of present Tamil Nadu. These are confirmed by experts in the fields of archaeology, humanities, philology and history. About 200 words found in the Tamil Language spoken by these people were taken into the Sinhala language later.

    It has been authoritatively said that the stone implements used by our Mesolithic people were the same as those used in Thirunelveli District in South India. According to Professor Indrapala, this civilization spread from South India to North Sri Lanka and thereafter spread to other parts of Sri Lanka.

    Around 3000 years ago early Iron Age was introduced to this Island. There too we see very close similarities between what was found in Southern Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka. Vimala Begley who conducted researches in Kantharodai in the 1970s concluded that those who inhabited the Jaffna Peninsula in ancient times had very close relationship with the Southern part of present Tamil Nadu.

    Their cultural affinity in Sri Lanka extended from Kantharodai up to Puttalam. Pomparipu in the Puttalam District especially had very close resemblance to what is found in Kantharodai. Professor Sudarshan Seneviratne too has confirmed this finding. Professor Indrapala too confirms that the culture of the Stone Age people in Sri Lanka came within the ambit of the South Indian cultural ambience of that time.

    Thus the idea that the early inhabitants of Sri Lanka came from North India is now not accepted. It is agreed that long before the time of Mahawamsa, Sri Lanka enjoyed a culture similar to South India and those ancients were the progenitors of the present Sinhalese and Tamils. Professor Senaka Bandaranayake has said that these ancients had no ethnic differences but only cultural differences. These differences he says could have existed even before the time of the visit of the so-called Vijaya to the Island. If we examine the culture and life habits of the ancient Stone Age people they had a habit of inscribing their name or the names of those who shaped the clay pots and utensils, on them. This habit is seen to have existed both in South India and Sri Lanka during that period. This habit is not visible in any other part of India. These writings on clay pots have been unearthed in Tamil Nadu and in Anuradhapura. Anuradhapura pots belong to a period over 2750 years ago. The writings on pots have been identified as Tamil letters in the Tamil Language. Writing started in North India only about 2300 years ago. But both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka these writings have been found to exist much earlier. Now historians believe that the art of writing went from the South to North India.

    Recent Keeladi excavations in Madurai, South India has shown evidence of a civilization anterior to all others in India. Thus, before the introduction of Buddhism to Sri Lanka, the fact that the progenitors of the present Sinhalese and the Tamils lived here, has been accepted scientifically. The recent DNA tests confirmed this.

    When we examine the writings in Sinhala, Professor Fernando, Professor Saddha Mangala Karunaratne and Professor Ariya Abeysinghe have said that before the North Indian Prakrit was introduced with Buddhism into Sri Lanka, the Script similar to the South Indian Script was available in Sri Lanka. We could gather from their researches that Tamil Script and Tamil Language and Dravidian words were in use in Sri Lanka before Sinhala Language came into use. That is why I boldly said the language of our ancients was Tamil and the original indigenous population of Sri Lanka were Tamil.

    Buddhism spread in this Island from the 3rd Century BC onwards. Over 1500 identified inscriptions confirm this. These inscriptions have Brahmi script from North India plus Tamil Script inscribed on them. There was no Sinhala script nor Sinhala language nor Sinhalese people then. Thus it is clear that the Tamil Language was in use in Sri Lanka prior to the introduction of Buddhism and before the introduction of the North Indian Brahmi Script.

    Even though Professor Paranavithana tried to identify the North Indian Prakrit as an old Sinhala Script and tried to show wherever Prakrit was in use the Sinhalese lived there, this statement of the Professor is now not accepted because with the spread of Buddhism, the Prakrit script too spread all over South and South East Asia and was in use for over 700 years as the script of inscriptions. Prakrit was not old Sinhala. If it was, the Sinhala language should have been spoken in other South East Asian countries too.

    But in Tamil Nadu the language of the Buddhist inscriptions was Tamil. If we examine the 1500 Brahmi inscriptions in Sri Lanka even though Northern Brahmi was generally used, in addition, many Tamil words were also used. Specially the names of individual Tamils were referred to in Tamil. Relationships among individuals were referred to in the Tamil Language. Place names have been written in Tamil. Even titles of Tamil rulers were written in Tamil. This shows the existence of the Tamil language in Sri Lanka before the introduction of Buddhism and hence Tamils were the original inhabitants of this Island at the time Buddhism was introduced.

    If we examine the evolution of the Sinhala language we have a parallel in the evolution of Malayalam. The present Kerala was part of Tamil-speaking regions in Tamil Nadu. They were ruled by Chera Kings. The transformation of Tamil to Malayalam took place due to the heavy influence of Sanskrit from the 10th  Century AD on the Tamil language. Tamil plus Sanskrit brought in Malayalam. Hence I referred to a new language in the offing in Chennai today. Tamil plus English might produce Tamilish in 25 to 50 years.

    Similarly, the introduction of the Pali language in Sri Lanka as the language of Buddhism when it mixed with the local Tamil language it developed into a new language called Sinhalese around the 6th or 7thCentury AD.

    The evidence for this could be found in Sigiriya. Sigiriya inscriptions of 5th Century AD portray early Sinhalese not yet developed into a proper language. Thus there is no evidence that the Sinhala language existed before the 7th Century AD. The Sinhala Script has developed due to the mixing of Brahmi letters with the Pallava period grantha letters.

    The Sinhala literature like Rajavaliya and Poojavaliya belongs to the 13th Century AD.

    Your question contains a reference to the Tamils coming here only during the Chola conquest in 10thCentury. There had been Tamils living on this Island from a long, long time ago. May be from the time of the Lemurian Continent which is now under the Indian Ocean. The earliest Tamil Sangam period and the Second Sangam period (Muthal Sangam and Idai Sangam) have been referred to in the last Sangam period (Kadai Sangam) literature and the literary works of the earlier Sangam Periods are referred to in the Kadai Sangam literature. Tamil is one of the earliest languages of this World if not the earliest. There have been Pandya, Pallava, and Chola conquests of Sri Lanka from ancient times. Thus there have been waves of Tamil intrusions. But the original Tamils of Sri Lanka have been occupying this Country from over 3000 years ago. The present tendency to refer to Buddhism as that of the Sinhalese and Hinduism as that of the Tamils is erroneous. When religions are introduced into a Country they are not introduced to be followed only by particular races. When Buddhism was introduced into this Island there were no Sinhalese. Thus the Tamil King Devanampiya Theesan got converted to Buddhism.

    There is considerable evidence to show the existence of Tamil Buddhists in Pali literature and Brahmic inscriptions. Tamil Kings were given the titles Buddha thasan and Buddhadevan when they supported Buddhism and Buddhist causes.

    Up to 15 th or 16 th  Century there were Tamil Buddhists according to Pali literature. The inscriptions of Nainatheevu in North Sri Lanka refer to Tamil Buddhists. Professor Sunil Ariyaratne in his “Demala Baudhayo” refers to Tamil Buddhists.

    In recent times Sinhalese portraying themselves as Buddhists and Tamils as Hindus have brought about polarization says Professor Pushparatnam. This could have been avoided he says.

    When I was living in the old Anuradhapura Town in the 1940s there were Tamils who owned lots of lands around Nuwara Wewa who were more or less Demala Baudhayos. Even I used to go to Ruwanwelisaya and Mahabodhi to worship with my parents (both Hindus). We joined the Buddhists who came from nearby villages to do “Pongal” during Poson. Buddhist philosophy influenced me considerably. Together with Dr Adikaram and others, we were votaries of Philosopher J. Krishnamurthi whose teachings were close to Buddhist philosophy. Of course, later, Hindu Saints were able to point out the limitations of the Buddhist philosophy to me.

    Professor Pushparatnam has said even the Mahawansa is a useful reference Book to prove the existence of Tamils at the time of the arrival of Vijaya.

    Mahawansa refers to 700 Tamil Brides from Madurai together with 1000 Tamil families employed in 18 professions being brought down to Sri Lanka on Vijaya’s request. That means more Tamil families came into the Country from Madurai than the 701 who came from elsewhere! This is according to the Mahawansa!

    Even the so-called statement of Dushta Gamini that the Tamils are on one side and the sea on the other side refers to the existence of a large amount of Tamils in the country at that time says Professor Pushparatnam. Ellalan was a Tamil King thus how could anyone say Tamils for the first time arrived at the time of the Chola conquest in the 10th century AD?

    Finally a word about Homeland of the Tamils. Before the Bakthi Cult was born in Tamil Nadu there is evidence of Tamils living outside the North and East as well. Pali Literature and certain inscriptions refer to the presence and influence of Tamils in Anuradhapura.

    Before Independence, the influence of Tamils in Anuradhapura was considerable in the Old Town. The new Town was constructed, one is forced to deduce, to reduce and negate the Tamil influence in Anuradhapura.

    Mahawansa refers to 32 Petty Tamil Kings Dutugemunu had to overcome before reaching Ellalan’s Capital. Coins of that period have been unearthed which point to Tamil presence from South to North. There are Tamil letters in those Coins. Names of Tamil Petty Kings are found in some of them. After the Bakthi Cult prospered in the North and East many Tamils living in other parts of Sri Lanka preferred to go to the North and East since the famous Hindu Temples lay there. This was a time when Jainism and Buddhism were beginning to go out of vogue due to the re-emergence of Saivaism consequent to the Bakthi Cult. The Thevarams of Nayanmars in South India referred to Thiruketheeswaram and Thirukoneswaram in Sri Lanka.

    Especially there is reference to Trincomalee being a full-fledged Saivite Tamil City. When the Cholas were ruling from Polonnaruwa their commercial outlet was Trincomalee. The North and East were distinct areas of Tamil habitation during the Chola Rule. The Jaffna Kingdom was consequent and subsequent to the Chola Rule. From the 13th Century to the 17th Century the Jaffna Kingdom existed. Puttalam came under the rule of the Jaffna King. Udapu is still a Tamil Village.

    When the Dutch during their rule brought out Coins they referred to the North and East separately and had them minted in Tamil. Thus the North and East were the homelands of the Tamils.

    To conclude – the Tamils were the Original inhabitants of this Island and there have been several waves of Tamil conquest but they only added to the Original indigenous Tamils who continued to live here from pre-historic times. Chola conquest was only one such intrusion from South India. Sinhala Language and Sinhala Race are very recent chronologically though the Sinhalese and the Tamils have had common progenitors from ancient times.

    Feature Image: Kandy Temple Precincts – Photo Credit: M Matheswaran

    This article was published earlier in Colombo Telegraph.

  • Economic Relevance of Quad as a Regional Strategic Forum

    Economic Relevance of Quad as a Regional Strategic Forum

    The QUAD, a grouping of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, began as a “Tsunami Core Group,” an impromptu group formed in response to the devastating Boxing Day tsunami of 2004. This core group brought together the four nations to swiftly mobilise and coordinate multilateral disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. The first meeting of the initial QUAD took place in May 2007 during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Manila. The meeting was characterised as an “informal grouping” that discussed themes of mutual interest to the dialogue participants (Buchan & Rimland, 2020). The group was established to deal with the immediate challenges posed by the tsunami and was never intended to become permanent. However, early cooperative efforts sparked a debate about QUAD’s overarching goal. When Australia withdrew from the QUAD in 2008, it ceased to exist. It was revived in 2017 against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive Chinese posture, and the emergence of the idea of the Indo-Pacific as a single maritime zone.

    The first QUAD meeting, after its revival, happened on 12 November 2017, when the four ‘like-minded’ partners discussed seven key issues: the rules-based order in Asia; freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime commons; respect for international law; enhancing connectivity; maritime security; the North Korean threat and non-proliferation; and terrorism (Jain, 2022). The QUAD aims to bring diverse perspectives together in a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, and it strives for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, and anchored in democratic values.

    Economic Potential

    There are numerous reasons to increase economic engagement within the QUAD nations—the four countries, with a combined population of over 1.8 billion people, represent a quarter of the world’s population and over $30 trillion in GDP. In 2018, trade between the four countries totalled more than $440 billion, with nearly $6 trillion in trade with the rest of the world. QUAD intends to use both public and private resources to construct high-quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region. According to the MEA’s website, since 2015, QUAD partners have invested more than $48 billion in regional infrastructure development. The commitment of the QUAD to regional infrastructure development can be strengthened by integrating India into the existing ‘Australia-Japan-US Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership’ and by broadening their reach into the Indo-Pacific region (“Fact Sheet: QUAD Leaders’ Summit,” n.d.). Except for India and the United States, the remaining two countries are also Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) members. This shows that, notwithstanding territorial and security differences, trade and commerce are still the primary focus (“Economic Dimension Key to QUAD Success”, 2021). Further, the Covid-19 pandemic has harmed the global economy, including the QUAD nations, in areas ranging from employment to investment. Thus, by bolstering their economic ties for greater freedom and cooperation, the group will facilitate a faster recovery from the pandemic’s effects.

    The Indian Ocean, not the Indo-Pacific, is central to India’s vision. In the short term, India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific framework will be primarily diplomatic and economic and will be constrained by the Indian Ocean’s strategic primacy and constraints on its sea-power projection

    QUAD and the Indian Economy

    India’s strong economic ties with the QUAD economies are reflected in its bilateral trade volume with each member. During 2019-2020, these three economies accounted for 15% of India’s total trade. The United States contributes the most with 11%, followed by Japan and Australia, with 2.15 and 1.6 per cent, respectively. Further, India already has a free-trade agreement with Japan, which was implemented in 2011, and negotiations with Australia and the United States are ongoing. India can now use this critical multilateral forum to help facilitate trade negotiations and increase economic activity with member economies (“Economic Dimension Key to QUAD Success” 2021).

    According to Lunev and Shavlay (2018), the emergence of China, the expansion of India’s economic and strategic clout, and, most importantly, the growing importance of the Indian Ocean as a strategic trade route carrying nearly two-thirds of global oil shipments and a third of bulk cargo, have entailed a shift in the security architecture from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific. These factors have contributed to the rise of regional stakeholders advocating for a free and open Indo-Pacific, resulting in the re-establishment of the QUAD. However, India’s maritime interests and strategies are at odds with those of the other QUAD members. The Indian Ocean, not the Indo-Pacific, is central to India’s vision. In the short term, India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific framework will be primarily diplomatic and economic and will be constrained by the Indian Ocean’s strategic primacy and constraints on its sea-power projection.

    The South and East China Seas, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean are of particular concern to the United States and Japan. Unless and until these disagreements are resolved, QUAD’s effectiveness as an entity will be called into question

    Tokyo Summit 

    The Tokyo Summit is the QUAD Leaders’ fourth interaction since their first virtual meeting in March 2021, in-person Summit in Washington DC in September 2021, and virtual meeting in March 2022. The Tokyo Summit took place against the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and its repercussions. The joint statement issued following the QUAD summit in Tokyo on May 24, 2022, is more comprehensive than the first three summits. It has attempted to clarify the broad framework for cooperation by outlining eight specific areas. These include Peace and Stability; Covid-19 and Global Health Security; Infrastructure; Climate; Cybersecurity; Critical and Emerging Technologies; QUAD Fellowship; Space; and Maritime Domain Awareness and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) (Luthra, n.d.). A comprehensive QUAD joint statement and the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are key developments of the Tokyo summit. QUAD leaders also announced a maritime initiative to combat illegal fishing at the Tokyo summit, and a pledge to invest $50 billion in infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific to combat China’s growing power (“QUAD Joint Leaders’ Statement”, 2022).

    The QUAD has long been criticised for lacking a common purpose or a substantive agenda. Furthermore, none of the objectives cited as reasons for bringing the four states together are unique to the QUAD. Other actors and institutions in the region already exist for these purposes.  Thus, there is a need for QUAD partners to better articulate their distinct rationale for cooperation and collaborative efforts.

    India is a key player due to its naval power and strategic location, and should thus be an active participant. However, there are differences in areas of interest among the QUAD nations, complicating its effectiveness. The South and East China Seas, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean are of particular concern to the United States and Japan. Unless and until these disagreements are resolved, QUAD’s effectiveness as an entity will be called into question. While India is frequently portrayed as the holdout — and has recently been the most vocal — objections have come from other countries as well. The potential impact on Sino-Australian relations continues to make some in Australia nervous. Beijing’s reaction has factored into American caution as well, as has the preference for a trilateral format (Madan, 2017).  

    India requires investment, attractive financing for infrastructure, technology, and access to key raw materials, particularly rare earth elements, among the QUAD nations. QUAD’s other members are looking for market access and dependable investment destinations. Broadening QUAD’s current strategic focus to strengthen economic ties under the partnership’s auspices would be a win-win situation for all countries involved in such a scenario.

    Bibliography

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    Luthra, Girish. n.d. “Forward from the Tokyo Quad Summit and IPEF.” ORF. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/forward-from-the-tokyo-quad-summit-and-ipef/.

    Madan, Tanvi. 2017. “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad.’” War on the Rocks. November 16, 2017. https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/.

    “Quad Joint Leaders’ Statement.” 2022. The White House. May 24, 2022. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/24/quad-joint-leaders-statement/.

    Rahman, Mohammad Masudur, Chanwahn Kim, and Prabir De. 2020. “Indo-Pacific Cooperation: What Do Trade Simulations Indicate?” Journal of Economic Structures 9 (1). https://doi.org/10.1186/s40008-020-00222-4.

    Feature Image Credits: Resilinc

  • Reality of India’s Performance as put Forth by the Environmental Performance Index (EPI)

    Reality of India’s Performance as put Forth by the Environmental Performance Index (EPI)

    India ranked 117 out of 180 countries as per the latest “The State of India’s Environment Report 2021” released by the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) in June 2021, while it ranked 87th out of 115 countries in the Energy Transition Index (ETI) released by the World Economic Forum in 2021

    Taking adequate measures to combat climate change and global warming has become a key priority of nation-states today. With a global understanding that reducing greenhouse gas emissions, achieving carbon neutrality, and switching to renewable sources of energy are the ways forward for sustainable development, countries around the world, including India, have made various pledges and commitments to achieve defined targets in respect of climate change and environmental protection. While developing countries have called for the adoption of the principle of ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR–RC), India, as the third largest carbon emitter in the world, has considerable responsibility in enacting the much-needed changes. In the budget presented for 2022-23, the Indian government has pledged to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2070, and achieve a non-fossil fuel energy capacity of 500 GW by 2030. It further seeks to meet 50% of the energy requirements from renewable sources, while also reducing the total projected carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes and reducing the carbon intensity of the economy to less than 45%. These are stiff targets to achieve, maybe even impractical in the view of some analysts.

    While the Indian government has celebrated the inauguration of various policies and schemes which would contribute to these lofty goals, India’s performance according to global indices reveal an immediate need for a change of tactics.  India ranked 117 out of 180 countries as per the latest “The State of India’s Environment Report 2021” released by the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) in June 2021, while it ranked 87th out of 115 countries in the Energy Transition Index (ETI) released by the World Economic Forum in 2021. Similar positions have been held by the country in other notable indices like the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) where India was ranked 10th out of 60 countries and the European Union released by German Watch. Thus, India’s rank of 180 out of 180 countries in the Environment Performance Index came as a surprise to many. 

    The Environment Performance Index presents a data-driven summary of the state of sustainability around the world using 40 performance indicators based on climate change performance, environmental health, and ecosystem vitality. It is released biennially by the Yale Centre for Environmental Law and Policy and the Columbia University Centre for International Earth Science Information Network in partnership with the World Economic Forum. India’s position in the latest 2022 report is a step down from EPI-2020 where it ranked 168th with a score of 27.6. 

    India’s aggregate score according to EPI -2022 is 18.9 with the report stating that “India slips to the bottom of the rankings for the first time, with increasingly hazardous air quality and quickly rising greenhouse gas emissions.” Further, according to EPI, India also ranks poorly in terms of rule of law, corruption control, and government performance. On its release, the results have been contested by the Indian government which claimed that many of the indicators used are based on “unfounded assumptions” and that these were based on “surmises and unscientific methods”. 

    According to the concerns raised by the Indian government, Projected GHG Emissions Levels in 2050 which is the new indicator in the Climate Policy Objective,  is calculated in the Environment Performance Index using the average rate of change in emissions over the previous ten years rather than modelling that takes into account a longer time period and which considers other factors like the level of renewable energy capacity and usage, extra carbon sinks, energy efficiency and the like in the individual nations. While the principle of ‘Common But Differentiated Responsibility and Respective Capabilities’ (CBDR–RC) has been enshrined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) acknowledges the different capabilities and differing responsibilities of individual countries in addressing climate change, the EPI report’s emphasis on data and statistics have led to the overlooking of this principle in the course of its analysis. The time period used by the EPI of 10 years with regards to projected Greenhouse Gas emissions is unlike other indices like the CCPI (Climate Change Performance Index) which uses a timeframe of 5 years for its calculations (to take into consideration the new and renewed commitments made by countries at the 2015 Paris conference). The CCPI in comparison also uses a past trends indicator under the category of GHG emissions (with a 40 % weightage) where historical GHG emissions (Co2, Methane, Fluorinated gases, Nitrous Oxide) are considered with reference to the base year of 1990 as put forth by the Kyoto Protocol. The absence of acknowledgement of India’s historical emissions which have been minimal i.e.:  from 1870 to 2019, its emissions have added up to a minuscule 4 percent of the global total is also noticeable in the EPI findings. 

    The exclusion of the Indian Forest cover, which is far greater than many countries, as a vital carbon sink is a significant downfall of the EPI analysis

    Forests and wetlands have been globally acknowledged as vital carbon sinks with great effectiveness in controlling carbon levels. The world’s forests absorb a total of 15.6 gigatons of CO2 per year although these figures are threatened by threats like deforestation, natural disasters, and forest fires. According to the latest Forest Survey of India report, the total forest cover in India (2022) is 7,13,789 square kilometres which are 21.71% of the total geographical area. In comparison, Denmark, which topped the EPI rankings 2022, officially possesses  608,078 ha or 6080.78 square kilometres of forest corresponding to 14.1% of the land area. The exclusion of the Indian Forest cover, which is far greater than many countries, as a vital carbon sink is a significant downfall of the EPI analysis. 

    Wetland ecosystems have been scientifically proven as one of the most biologically productive areas on the planet. They provide a wide range of important services, such as food, water, groundwater recharge, water purification, flood moderation, erosion control, microclimate regulation and landscape aesthetics outside of being viable carbon sinks. According to the National Wetland Inventory and Assessment compiled by the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), wetlands are spread over 1,52,600 square kilometres (sq. km) in India which is 4.63 percent of the total geographical area of the country. The difference in topography of the high-ranking countries in the index with India can mean that the effect of wetlands and forests can have a significant impact on India’s rankings as opposed to countries like Denmark where wetlands make up only 0.6 % of the land area where the impact is comparatively much lower. 

    The government further argues that the equity principle is given relatively little weightage in the form of statistics such as GHG emission per capita and GHG emission intensity trend which can be found to be grounded in the EPI’s disregard of the CBDR principle. The EPI rankings with regards to GHG emissions are also in contrast to other indices like the CCPI where seven G20 countries received a very low rating for their performance, including Russia (with 165 ranking with respect to GHG emissions and an overall ranking of 112), Australia (with 171 ranking with respect to GHG per capita and an overall rank of 17), the United States (with 167 ranking with respect to GHG per capita and overall rating of 43), and Canada (with 169 ranking with respect to GHG emissions and overall rating of 49). 

    While the EPI utilises indicators like Pesticides and N mgmt index under the category of agriculture and solid waste, recycling and ocean plastics under the category of waste management, other indicators such as agricultural biodiversity, soil health, food loss and waste are also not included in the report despite the fact that these are critical for developing nations with significant agrarian populations. Furthermore, the index computes the geographical distribution of various ecosystems but makes no mention of their efficiency and functioning with regard to climate change which can have a significant impact when gauging factors like biodiversity, waste management, air quality and fisheries. 

    India installed 15.4 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy projects in 2021 alone but operations of these projects remain a fraction of these capacities

    Thus, it can be found that certain critiques of the Environment Performance Index are well founded and must be acknowledged, and respective changes must be introduced to improve the reach, relevance, and functionality of the index. However, even with the addition of these factors, the fact remains that India’s performance on climate action is still underwhelming with significant gaps between capabilities and action in reality. India installed 15.4 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy projects in 2021 alone but operations of these projects remain a fraction of these capacities. Therefore, the government must concentrate on redoubling its efforts to meet its 2030 targets and use the reports of various indices including the Environment Performance Index as a gauge of the country’s closeness to achieving its promised goals. 

    Feature Image Credits: The New York Times

  • Declining Number of Tibetan Refugees in India

    Declining Number of Tibetan Refugees in India

    His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and his followers, were welcomed by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with open arms whose government helped them settle in India as they fled Tibet, following the Chinese invasion

    Introduction

    India is the largest democracy in the world, with a multi-party system, and a diverse set of cultures. It has a long tradition of hosting a large number of refugees. India has been particularly supportive of Tibetan refugees, right from the start of the Nehruvian era in the early 1950s. The number of Tibetan refugees living in India is estimated at well over 150,000 at any given time. However, a recent survey conducted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in India, in association with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), showed that only 72,312 Tibetans remain in the country.

    In India, Tibetans are considered to be one of the most privileged refugees unlike other refugees in the country. His Holiness the Dalai Lama, and his followers, were welcomed by then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru with open arms whose government helped them settle in India as they fled Tibet, following the Chinese invasion. That period saw a large influx of Tibetans towards India as they sought asylum. The Tibetan refugees have been allotted settlements where they continue to live under the management of the MHA and the Tibetan government-in-exile, or the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA). These facilities have contributed to a sense of community-living and have enabled them to keep their culture alive till today. Tibetan refugees in India have enjoyed freedom, which was impossible in their own land under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. However, after residing in India for almost seven decades now, recent data estimates a large decline in the number of Tibetan refugees. Therefore, this study examines the theoretical concerns and empirical findings of refugee problems in general as well as distinctive features of the Tibetan refugee experience in India.

    The status of Tibetans in India is determined under the Passports Act 1967, Foreigner’s Act of 1946, and the Registration of Foreigners Act of 1939 which refer to Tibetans as simply “foreigners”. These provisions cover everyone apart from Indian citizens thus, restricting refugees’ mobility, property, and employment rights. Recognizing this, the Government of India sanctioned the Tibetan refugees with the 2014 Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy (TRP) which caters to the issues faced by them and promises a better life for Tibetans in India. An array of provisions under this policy include land leases, employment, trade opportunities such as setting up markets for handicrafts and handlooms, housing, etc. to all Tibetans in possession of the RC (Registration Certificate). Further, certain policies applicable to Indian citizens are extended to Tibetan refugees as well. For instance, the Constitution of India grants the right to equality (Article 14) and the right to life and liberty (Article 21), and India is obliged to provide asylum as outlined in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Despite these facilities and the cordial relationship that has been built over 70 years between the Tibetans and Indians, the question raised by many, including Indian authorities is – why is the number of Tibetans migrating out of India increasing?

    With increased awareness about Tibetan refugees and their problems, many countries have opened their borders to Tibetans by introducing numerous favourable policies

    The various push and pull factors- motivation for migration

    The Tibetan Exit continues to grow with about 3000 refugees migrating out of India every year. The support and admiration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama gained worldwide has been partly due to the exhibition of the rich culture and traditions of Buddhism. With India being the birthplace of the religion, Tibetans in India caught the limelight in the global arena, leading many researchers to study their migration patterns to India. Attention is now being placed on Tibetans exiting India despite years of strong cultural and social bonding. General migratory trends of humans can be analyzed using eminent scholar Everett Lee’s comprehensive theory of migration of 1966. The term ‘migration’ is defined broadly as a permanent or semi-permanent change of residence. Many factors tend to hold people within the area or attract people towards it, and there are others that repel them from staying. This theory could also be applied to the Tibetan migratory trends by looking at the “Push and Pull” factors proposed by Lee. The ‘push theory’ here encompasses the aspects that encourage the Tibetans to emigrate outside India, and the pull theory is associated with the country of destination that attracts the Tibetans to emigrate. Ernest George Ravenstein, in his “Laws of Migration”, argues that ‘migrants generally proceed long distances by preference to one of the great centers of commerce and industry and that ‘the diversity of people defines the volume of migration’. Ravenstein’s laws provide a theoretical framework for this study, as Tibetans tend to migrate out of India with a special preference to Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia. With increased awareness about Tibetan refugees and their problems, many countries have opened their borders to Tibetans by introducing numerous favourable policies. For instance, with the Immigration Act of 1990, the Tibetan community in New York grew exponentially. The US Congress authorised 1000 special visas for Tibetans under the Tibetan Provisions of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1990, leading to the rampant growth of Tibetan migrants in the US. The first 10 to 12 Tibetan immigrants arrived in the U.S. in the 1960s, and then hundreds in the 1970s. Today, New York alone consists of roughly 5,000 to 6,000 Tibetan immigrants.

    Former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper agreed to resettle 1,000 Tibetans from Arunachal Pradesh in 2007 (CTA 2013) encouraging substantial migration. The fundamental intention of migration is to improve one’s well-being from the current state.

    The motivation for migration can be analysed by correlating origin and destination places with push and pull aspects. Push factors in the place of origin generally include lack of opportunities, religious or political persecution, genocide, hazardous environmental conditions, etc. The pull factors at the destination, on the other hand, are environment responsive to the push variables. The flow of migrants between the two points is hindered by intervening obstacles or intervening opportunities, which can also affect the motivations of individuals while migrating.

    Fig. 2 Lee’s (1966) push-pull theory in graphic form

    Fig.2 shows there are two points in the flow of migration – a place of origin and a destination, with positive and negative signs indicating the variables of pull and push factors with intervening obstacles between them. Both the origin and destination have pluses and minuses which means each place has its push and pull aspects. Every migrant is influenced by the positives of staying and the negatives of leaving a particular place. The factors to which people are essentially indifferent are denoted as zeroes. The logic of the push-pull theory is that if the pluses (pulls) at the destination outweigh the pluses of staying at the origin, as shown above, then migration is likely to occur.

    The three main pull factors or the aspects that pull Tibetans out of India are – economic opportunities, better policies for Tibetan refugees outside India, and world attention.

    Better opportunities and more earning capacity are the primary reasons for the migration of Tibetan refugees out of India. They claim that there are better options, job security, better facilities, and more accessible resources. All this put together expands their level of awareness. People outside treat them as equals which makes the living situation a lot easier, whereas in India, except for a handful who are well educated, Tibetans are mostly given very low-paid jobs such as servants, waiters, cleaners, etc.

    Second, concerning open policies in other countries, it can be argued that the migratory trend of Tibetans started in 1963 when Switzerland allowed 1,000 Tibetan refugees who were then the country’s first non-European refugees. Their population is now around 4,000. Further, in 1971, under the Tibetan Refugee Program (TRP), the original 240 Tibetans arrived in Canada, which now is a community of 5,000.

    Third, the migrants and His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s transnational travels have helped to promote Tibetan culture and give the West exposure to the richness and traditions of Tibetan Buddhism. Tibetans also migrate to spread awareness. Sonam Wang due, a young Tibetan activist from India who was the President of the Tibetan Youth Congress in Dharamshala, says that he moved to the U.S. to protest more effectively and freely. An important day known as the Tibetan Lobby Day is conducted annually in the U.S, where hundreds of Tibetans along with their supporters assemble to urge their respective governments and parliamentarians to continue their support for Tibet and the Tibetan people.

    Fig. 3 Tibetan Lobby Day in the U.S

    On the other hand, some factors tend to push people away from their origin country. Push factors from India are mainly restrictions and social reasons. There are many Tibetan schools and colleges in the subcontinent with a large number of Tibetan students. According to the Planning Commission’s data on Tibetan Demography 2010, there is growing unemployment among Tibetan youth, with levels as high as 79.4 percent. When students return to their settlements after graduation, only 5 percent of them get absorbed in employment in the Tibetan community, as jobs here are scarce with mediocre salaries. Finding a job in the Indian community is further restricted by the authorization issue which holds that they are not Indian citizens. Many of them join the Indian Army, work in call centers, or become nurses as these are a few employment opportunities in which they can earn reasonably to support their families. Those without RC are restricted while applying for business documents and procuring licenses, and the youths who have acquired education and skills are pushed out of India as they search for better job opportunities. The younger generation of Tibetans in India realizes the discrimination they face and are motivated to migrate elsewhere for a better life. Although there is Article 19 of the Indian Constitution for freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peacefully, when it comes to Tibetans’ protesting, they are restricted in every possible way. Tibetans must secure a legal permit before any protest outside Tibetan settlements. This varies from one region to another, for instance, Tibetans in Dharamshala can protest peacefully as that is their officially recognized place by the Central government. In spite of having authorized Tibetan settlement areas in Chandigarh, Delhi, Arunachal Pradesh, Karnataka, etc., protests conducted in these states are not tolerated and require permits because the decision-making power is solely vested in each of the State governments.

    According to Mr. Sonam Dagpo, a spokesperson for the CTA, the main reason for the decline of refugees in India is because “Tibetans are recognized as ‘foreigners’, not refugees”. The Indian government does not recognize Tibetans as refugees primarily because India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention. This Convention relates to the status of refugees and is built on Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of people seeking asylum in other countries because of persecution in their own countries. Another important reason is the lack of awareness among Tibetan refugees that they are the stakeholders to benefit from the TRP. However, implementation of the policy is left to the discretion of the respective States, which makes it problematic. Many Tibetans use India as a transit spot. They enter India primarily to meet His Holiness the Dalai Lama and study here, after which in pursuit of a better life and the West’s influence, they tend to resettle abroad. Nepal in recent times, generously funded by the Chinese, started strictly patrolling the borders with India and are sending back Tibetans to their homeland. Therefore, this is also one of the reasons why Tibetans entering India have decreased drastically.

    The introduction of the Rehabilitation Policy (TRP) in India has decreased the burden on Tibetans. However, efforts are to be made to widen the level of awareness about the policy among the stakeholders and States

    Conclusion

    Egon F. Kunz (1981) theorized about refugee movements and formulated two categories of refugee migrants namely – ‘Anticipatory’ and ‘Acute’. Anticipatory migrants are people who flee in an orderly manner after a lot of preparation and having prior knowledge about the destination, the latter category of migrants is those who flee erratically due to threats by political or military entities and from persecution in their place of origin. Tibetans migrating out of India are largely Anticipatory refugee migrants well aware and seeking betterment. The introduction of the Rehabilitation Policy (TRP) in India has decreased the burden on Tibetans. However, efforts are to be made to widen the level of awareness about the policy among the stakeholders and States.

    Tibetans are mostly living and visiting India from abroad by and large because of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Considering his advancing age and the number of Tibetans migrating out of India on the rise, will there be a time when Tibetans will give away the hold of solidarity by living in large communities in India? This is the burning question that lies ahead in the future of India-Tibet relations.

    Feature Image Credits: Karnataka Tourism

    Fig. 1 Source: https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/2681

    Fig 2 Source: Dolma, T. (2019). Why are Tibetans Migrating Out of India? The Tibet Journal, 44(1), 27–52. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26921466

    Fig 3 Source: https://tibetlobbyday.us/testimonials/2020-photographs/