The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: USA

  • The Cold War that Wasn’t

    The Cold War that Wasn’t

    US President Joe Biden has repeatedly cast his country’s rivalry with China as a battle between democracy and autocracy, an ideological clash reminiscent of the Cold War. This narrative is inaccurate – the United States and China are locked in a competition for strategic dominance – and all but precludes resolution. Whereas demands related to tangible assets and security concerns can be accommodated, ideological struggles typically end one way: with the unconditional defeat of one of the parties

    The US should not be attempting to “defeat” China, as it did the Soviet Union, because, first and foremost, China is not on a quest to spread “socialism with Chinese characteristics” around the world. When Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in 2017 that “war without the smoke of gunpowder in the ideological domain is ubiquitous, and the struggle without armament in the political sphere has never stopped,” he was mainly demanding that outsiders respect China’s institutions and cultural traditions.

    The US is an exhausted power, and it is now being challenged by a rising one. To ensure that this well-known geopolitical dynamic does not end in war, the US must abandon jingoistic rhetoric and replace megaphone diplomacy with wise and creative statesmanship.

    This partly reflects Chinese nationalism, fed by historical narratives, especially the memory of the “century of humiliation” (1839-1949), during which China faced interventions and subjugation by Western powers and Japan. But it is also pragmatic: The Communist Party of China recognizes that some domestic trends could destabilize the country and eventually even undermine the CPC’s rule.

    For example, China’s economic rise has produced an educated, well-connected, and fast-growing middle class. If these increasingly powerful consumers rejected restrictions on private-sector activity or limits to free expression, the CPC would have trouble on its hands. Given this, the CPC views US advocacy of political freedom and human rights in China as an effort to subvert its rule.

    Even America’s drive to export liberal democracy to Asia and Africa has been less an ideological problem for China than a strategic one. Functioning democracies are likely to be harder bargaining partners for China and might even be brought into US-led anti-Chinese alliances.

    On this front, China’s fears have probably been assuaged by recent developments. With the from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s quick reconquest of the country, America’s democratic “crusade” – to borrow the language of former US President George W. Bush – seems to have reached an ignominious conclusion.

    But even if the US is not bringing new countries into the democratic fold, its existing alliance system is formidable, and Biden is committed to strengthening it further. For example, he has worked to resuscitate NATO; created , a new defense and technology alliance with the United Kingdom and Australia; and deepened security cooperation among key democracies in the Indo-Pacific (Australia, India, Japan, and the US, known as the “Quad”).

    This focus on alliances is probably the biggest difference between Biden’s China policy and that of his predecessor, Donald Trump, who spearheaded the shift toward confrontation. (Prior to Trump, recent US presidents largely attempted to maintain good working relations with China, not least because they clung to the assumption that the country’s economic rise would gradually bring about political change.)

    For China, this difference is worrying. Though the US cannot contain China alone, it can apply strong diplomatic pressure if it has other powers on its side, and China is in no position to create an alliance system that can match that of the US. Far from stabilizing the situation, however, this imbalance could fuel China’s insecurity, making constructive engagement all the more difficult

    America’s position is hardly unassailable, either. Biden’s touted exposed the limits of ideology as a mobilizing tool for a global anti-China coalition. It does not help that America’s own democracy is plagued by polarization, paralysis, and discontent. Add to that the world’s highest numberof COVID-19 deaths, and the “shining city on a hill” has lost its luster, to say the least.

    While the US is no ancient Rome – not least because it retains extraordinary advantages in crucial areas, from defense and diplomacy to technology and finance – it is suffering from what the historian Edward Gibbon described as “the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness.” It has failed to adapt its democratic institutions to meet the needs of its population and its responsibilities as a world power.

    Ultimately, the US is an exhausted power, and it is now being challenged by a rising one. This dynamic is as longstanding as it is dangerous. As the ancient historian Thucydides explained, the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, made the catastrophic Peloponnesian War inevitable. Harvard’s Graham Allison notes that there have been 16 similar cases in the last 500 years. War broke out in 12 of them.

    To avoid what Allison calls the Thucydides Trap, the US must abandon jingoistic rhetoric and Manichean thinking, replacing megaphone diplomacy with wise and creative statesmanship. The choice is not between capitulating to China and crushing it. The US must recognize China’s legitimate concerns and aspirations, and it must be prepared to negotiate accordingly. (Sooner or later, it will have to do the same with regard to the West’s current showdown vis-à-vis Russia over Ukraine and NATO’s expansion.)

    The US must accept that the days of American hegemony are over. In today’s multipolar world, different political cultures and systems will have to learn to coexist. The ideological defeat of the Soviet Union did not exactly usher in a liberal democracy. Perhaps more important, even if China somehow suddenly became a liberal democracy, its historical grievances and territorial aspirations would remain, as is the case with Russia today. In this sense, ideological competition is beside the point.

    This article was originally published by Project Syndicate.

    Feature Image Credit: The Hill

  • Are we on the path to World War III? The rise of Asia and lessons from World War I

    Are we on the path to World War III? The rise of Asia and lessons from World War I

    Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of State during the Cuban Missile Crisis, famously noted that it was sheer luck, not rationality, that prevented the escalation of this crisis into a world war.

    The rise of East Asia and South-East Asia is inevitable – unless there would be World War III in this region. Whereas World War I was fought by the powers located at the shore of the North-Atlantic, World War II by those of the North-Atlantic and North-Pacific, World War III would be fought by those powers solely at the North-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Are there lessons to be learned from the devastating conduct and outcome of World War I for our times? Is there only one lesson to be learned – that you can learn nothing from history? Or are we doomed to repeat history if we don’t learn anything from it? History will not repeat itself precisely, but wars repeatedly occur throughout history, even great wars. We are living in an age in which a war between the great powers is viewed as unlikely because it seems to be in no one’s interest, as the outcome of such a war would be so devastating that each party would do the utmost to avoid it. Rationality seems to dominate the assumptions and way of thinking in our times. But no war would have been waged if the losing side, or even both sides, would have known the outcome in advance.

     

    But what if conflicts in Asia would not be fought to pursue national interests so much as recognition? What would this mean: to be accepted as equal again after the humiliation in the course of European colonization and subsequent American hegemony? Indeed, acknowledgement of past suffering seems to be a trauma in the conscience of many Asian nations. Are those desires only irrational or a different kind of rationality, which we have to take into account?

     

    There are striking similarities between the Pre-World War I era and the current developments in Asia: World War I signifies the danger, not the inevitability, of a new world war in the decades to come. World War I is a symbolic representation of the risk that war amongst the great powers could erupt although nobody would benefit from it. It is a writing on the wall, that rationality is not a guarantee for avoiding self-destruction. All reckonings regarding the repetition of World War I in Asia are based on the assumption that it would be in no one’s interest to fight a large-scale war, even with WMD, which could lead to the destruction of great parts of Asia. But what if conflicts in Asia would not be fought to pursue national interests so much as recognition? What would this mean: to be accepted as equal again after the humiliation in the course of European colonization and subsequent American hegemony? Indeed, acknowledgement of past suffering seems to be a trauma in the conscience of many Asian nations. Are those desires only irrational or a different kind of rationality, which we have to take into account? At present, we have apparently a conflict between democracies in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean on one side and authoritarian China on the other. But during my few visits I got the impression that the trauma of colonization and the non-recognition of the Asian civilizations is more counting in the cultural memory of the Asian nations. And especially India should be wary to be instrumentalised by the US in their conflict with China.

     

    During her last visit to Beijing in September 2012, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton held a press conference in which she stated that the world would soon see, but for the first time in history, that a rising power and an established power would not engage in a war. Of course, her statement was related to China and the US. Additionally, she even compared the competition between China and the US with that of the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens – authoritarian Sparta against democratic Athens. Athens, the strongest city-state in Greece before the war, was reduced to a state of near-complete subjection, while Sparta became established as the leading power. Thucydides, the chronicler of the Peloponnesian War and one of the ancient world’s most important historians, saw the initial cause of this war in the growth of Athenian power: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

    Unlike Plato, though, Thucydides argues that it was not the striving for power in itself but rather fear of loss of power and, in the long term, fear of being oppressed, robbed of one’s freedom, and enslaved that caused the escalation leading to war. In Thucydides’ account, fear was the cause of war on both sides. Sparta was afraid of the growth of Athenian power, and Athens was afraid of what might happen if it gave in to an escalating series of demands and threats, the result of which could not be foreseen.

    The Europeans who went to war assumed they would be home by Christmas 1914. We know now, of course, that World War I not only happened but that it also resulted in the self-destruction of the European powers in two world wars. World War I is foremost a lesson that a limited conflict could escalate into a nightmare of millions of deaths and unspeakable suffering, for which no rational explanation could be found.

     

    No one wanted World War I to happen. Or, at least, no one wanted the kind of war that actually took place. The general assumption was that the conflict would be very limited. The Europeans who went to war assumed they would be home by Christmas 1914. We know now, of course, that World War I not only happened but that it also resulted in the self-destruction of the European powers in two world wars. World War I is foremost a lesson that a limited conflict could escalate into a nightmare of millions of deaths and unspeakable suffering, for which no rational explanation could be found. Military aims and strategies gained priority above meaningful political purposes. Although the generals of the German empire believed that they were relying on Clausewitz’s theory, in fact, they perverted him. Tactics replaced strategy, strategy substituted politics, politics gained momentum above policy, and policy was militarized. It was as if everybody was saying: being at war would mean a stop to thinking.

     

     

    This does not mean a simple equation of rising China with the then rising German Empire. Although the actors then and today seem to be quite different, the dynamics generated by the conflict between emerging, rising and declining powers are strikingly comparable.

     

    Perhaps the deepest and hidden reason for this escalation was that no war party could admit neither defeat nor failure. Striking evidence for this assumption is that the proclaimed war aims of the German Empire got momentum the more they got unrealistic and irrational. The pride, honour and identity of the German Reich prohibited the acknowledgement of defeat and failure. This was the same with Russia, France, England and the Habsburg Empire – and the Turk Empire too. Perhaps especially these Empires knew that their rule wouldn’t survive if they would have had to acknowledge military defeat or failure. Military defeat or failure would have humiliated their identity and their “face”: their social recognition within their society and community. A military defeat would signal their “symbolic death” – and so, the empires fought a war for life and death. This does not mean a simple equation of rising China with the then rising German Empire. Although the actors then and today seem to be quite different, the dynamics generated by the conflict between emerging, rising and declining powers are strikingly comparable.

    Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of State during the Cuban Missile Crisis, famously noted that it was sheer luck, not rationality, that prevented the escalation of this crisis into a world war. In 1983 the world did even need twice more than a great fortune to avoid a nuclear disaster. In current times all great powers are using military means to pursue their political and economic interests. But we just should not allow ourselves to bet in a casino-like style that military conflicts and strategies could not lead to the escalation of limited conflicts into great power wars. The path to World War III would not be similar to that leading to World War II, but comparable to the pre-World War I era.

    This article is an amended version of the Introduction in his book “Lessons from World War I for the Rise of Asia” by Stuttgart:Ibidem Publishers.

    Feature Image Credit: www.express.co.uk 

    Article Images: www.fr21news.com , www.bloomberg.com , L’EXPRESS

  • The US retreat from Afghanistan: Looking back on an ill-conceived peace deal and a hasty withdrawal

    The US retreat from Afghanistan: Looking back on an ill-conceived peace deal and a hasty withdrawal

    Under an agreement signed on February 29, 2020, between Qatar, The US and the Taliban, the US agreed to withdraw all its troops within 14 months of signing the accord. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent any terrorist group from operating in Afghanistan against the US and its allies. The pact also envisaged a prisoner swap, the start of intra-Afghan dialogue and sanction removals against the Taliban. But, as we have seen, the peace deal accelerated the collapse of the Afghan state on which the US spent trillions of dollars.

    Trump also permitted the US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad to place the withdrawal of US forces on the negotiating table with the Taliban, throwing away their biggest bargaining chip. The Taliban themselves seemed surprised that the US put the withdrawal of US troops on the negotiating table.

    The US started the peace talks with four specific goals. An end to violence by declaring a ceasefire, an Intra-Afghan political settlement, Taliban renunciation of Al-Qaeda and long-term presence of intelligence assets and special operation forces in Afghanistan for counterterrorism operations, and a timeline for US troops withdrawal[1]. However, with the presidential elections approaching in 2020, Trump was being increasingly restless and wanted a quicker exit. So, to accelerate talks, the long-standing demand for the presence of special operation forces in a counterterrorism mission along with inter-Afghan led peace talks were jettisoned. Trump also permitted the US chief negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad to place the withdrawal of US forces on the negotiating table with the Taliban, throwing away their biggest bargaining chip. The Taliban themselves seemed surprised that the US put the withdrawal of US troops on the negotiating table.

    The US committed itself to a set of measurable commitments, while the Taliban did not. The idea was to create an environment of good faith. However, the Taliban never reciprocated the ‘good faith’ shown by the US, except to ensure safe passage for the retreating US troops. Once the deal was struck, violence increased in the country.

    The Taliban never agreed to a ceasefire or a political settlement. While the intra-afghan dialogue was a part of the deal struck between the Taliban and the US, there was a lack of progress, with the Afghan government and the Taliban blaming each other for the impasse. Violence escalated by almost 50% after the start of the intra-afghan dialogue.

    The peace deal also included a prisoner swap agreement where the Taliban would release up to 1000 prisoners and the Afghan government release up to 5000 prisoners. The Afghan government asked the Taliban prisoners for a written guarantee that they would not return to the battlefield. However, thousands immediately rejoined the insurgency. The Taliban commander, Maulawi Talib, who led a Taliban assault on the capital of Helmand, Lashkargah, was one among the 5000 prisoners released. There was an uptick in violence after the prisoner swap was completed. Afghan officials said the agreement went through only because of pressure from Washington.

    The Taliban proved reluctant to break ties with Al-Qaeda, too, according to a UNSC report. Under the peace deal, the Taliban agreed not to allow al-Qaeda or any other extremist group to operate in areas under their control. However, the Taliban needs allies and Al-Qaeda is one reliable ally. Further, the Haqqani network, an integral part of the Taliban, is known to harbour close links with Al-Qaeda. While stopping a future terrorist attack emanating from Afghanistan will be in the Taliban’s interests, it is unlikely they will break relations with Al-Qaeda after years of close collaboration.

    It was clear from the beginning that the viability of the agreement depended on the US willingness to call off the withdrawal in the future if the Taliban renegade on their promises. But that decision fell to president Biden, who has always made it clear that Afghanistan is a lost cause.

    When Biden came to power, the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating. The choice he had, according to Biden himself, was to either expand US presence or follow through with the agreement. The dilemma was a result of poor policies pursued during the trump era. The US has been bogged down in Afghanistan for 20 years, and the resolve of president Biden to not escalate meant that the US followed through with the agreement. The peace talks became a cover for complete US disengagement.

    The US withdrawal accelerated the collapse of the Afghan state. The uncertainty of the Doha talks demoralized the Afghan military, who saw it as a deal between the Taliban and the US that guaranteed Taliban victory.

    With the collapse of morale, everything that was rotting started collapsing as well.  Around 30000 troops existed on paper, but the numbers were inflated due to a phenomenon called ‘ghost’ soldiers – soldiers on the official payroll but who never showed up for fighting. There were reports that the soldier was not paid and there were not enough supplies.

    Jack Watling, a research fellow for land warfare and military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute in London, said that the Afghan military collapse was not a reflection of military capability, but a reflection of a collapse in the will to fight.

    In truth, ever since the surge in troops authorized by the Obama administration right after coming to power, what every successive US President wanted was an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan. The most baffling thing is that the US resorted to negotiation when its leverage was the weakest. Perhaps, in hindsight, greater efforts could have been made during the time of President Obama to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.

    In the end, it was more of a retreat than a withdrawal. The US made concrete measurable commitments while the Taliban made promises, which they can now afford to renegade on.

    The scenes in Kabul airport was anything but orderly. More than 2000 marines had to be brought in to secure the Kabul airport as the Taliban rolled into Kabul for the first time since 2001. “The past 17 days have seen our troops execute the largest airlift in U.S. history, evacuating over 120,000 U.S. citizens, citizens of our allies, and Afghan allies of the United States,” the US president said in the statement. An attack by the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) on Kabul airport killed 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans.

    In the end, it was more of a retreat than a withdrawal. The US made concrete measurable commitments while the Taliban made promises, which they can now afford to renegade on.

     

    [1] Pg. 667, carter

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.npr.org

  • The Fall of Kabul and dealing with the Taliban 2.0

    The Fall of Kabul and dealing with the Taliban 2.0

    The debacle of the democratic apparatus in Afghanistan was inevitable. After pumping billions in aid and significant bloodshed, the US government ended its longest war in defeat, the war in Afghanistan under the euphemism of ‘Global War on Terror’. Right after occupying the White House, the Biden administration has followed the path of its predecessors and commanded the complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The 2020 – Doha peace agreement between the US government and the Taliban brought a scant number of outcomes. Even during the presence of international forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban leaders disrespected the peace agreement and violated significant features of the agreement – that is a ceasefire. Following the agreement, over 5000 prisoners belonging to the separatist groups- were released by the Afghan government, under pressure from the US. Quite naturally, these prisoners were back with their militant outfits, thus strengthening the Taliban’s fighting capability.

    As of now, India has not taken any part in the peace negotiations with the Taliban. One of the major reasons is in the past the Indian government has never recognised the Taliban as a legitimate actor and vouched for a peace negotiation that should be Afghan-led, Afghan controlled and Afghan-owned. Currently, there are speculations about the likely power structure and composition of the government in Afghanistan, but it is quite clear the Taliban will govern the country by Sharia law. At this time of fast transition, the countries in South Asia are seeking to gain diplomatic leverage in the situation.

    India has a huge stake in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. In 2016 Indian Prime Minister and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani inaugurated the Salma dam project in Afghanistan. This 200 million dollar project is part of the larger developmental approach of the Indian government to Afghanistan. But recently, the equipment of the Salma dam was captured by the Taliban. In this scenario, it is unlikely that the Dam project will receive further Indian logistical support in future. Similarly, uncertainty beleaguers the Chabahar Project. India was one of the largest bilateral donors to Afghanistan during the war on terror. It ranges from infrastructure building to the promotion of democracy and small development projects. Almost $3 billion has been invested in and on Afghanistan in capacity building, education, infrastructure and security counts. This developmental commitment has made India the most dependable country and strategic partner for Afghanistan so far. However, now that the Taliban is in full control, the Indian government needs to find a diplomatic solution on how to go ahead with the various projects and commitments in Afghanistan.

    Except for Panjshir province, the entire country is under Taliban control. The president, head of the state, has left the country. Led by interim President Amrullah Saleh and Ahamad Masoud, the Resistance Force from Panjshir Valley is fiercely fighting against the Taliban. Under such circumstances, the conservative approach of the Indian government, as it has begun to talk to the Taliban, could ruin the decades’ long reputation and developmental efforts in Afghanistan. India has legitimate concerns in Afghanistan and should protect its interests carefully. The absence of the US forces and elected Afghan government makes the task very difficult for the government of India. In the past, the Indian government cooperated with the elected Afghan government based on their shared interests and values of democracy, freedom, rule of law and respect for human rights. But the past approach may not work anymore under the Taliban leadership. In the past, the Ministry of External Affairs stated that it is in touch with ‘various stakeholders’ in Afghanistan and other regional countries. Indian officials believe that a ‘double’ peace’ i.e. one within Afghanistan and around the country is necessary for the region. To ensure safety for the Indians living in Afghanistan, the government has already evacuated all Indians employed by the Indian embassy. India has also started emergency E-visa facilities for Afghan citizens. With regard to the diplomatic relationship with the Taliban, the government is following a ‘wait and watch policy with its extended neighbour. The Taliban leadership has announced that they would like to have good relations with the Indian government and access to the Indian market through Pakistan. The Taliban also wants these two countries to resolve their issues as its interests are linked to the two countries. The government of India is yet to respond. The Afghan media personnel, translators, performance artists, civilians are being hunted down by the Taliban soldiers. In this scenario, India will carefully assess the situation and the reliability of the Taliban to make its further move.

    While India is still on the horns of a dilemma over the direct dialogue with the Taliban, India’s arch-rival Pakistan is busy re-establishing its hold and is trying to isolate India diplomatically from the region. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognise the Taliban as a legitimate actor in the 90s. Last year, the government of Pakistan welcomed an Afghan Taliban delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. In the meeting, Pakistan showed their support for peace and blamed India as a spoiler of peace in the war-torn country. But reports suggest otherwise. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Pakistan harbours Taliban leaders along with other insurgent groups such as the Haqqani network, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Laskar-e-Taiba. Such groups have the potential to disrupt the security and stability in South Asia. The report also says that the strategic objective of the Pakistan government is to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan. In a recent interview, Pakistan foreign affairs minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that the violence in Afghanistan led to a refugee exodus to Pakistan but they cannot take more refugees. Last year, the High Council for National Reconciliation leader Abdullah Abdullah said that Pakistan holds the key role in the Afghan peace process and India should keep their profile low in the Afghan situation.

    As the Taliban emerges in its second avatar while reframing its extremist Islamic ideology, China is poised to become the critical player in the region.  Under a slew of conditions negotiated with the Taliban, China will enhance its role through rapid investments and enabling Afghanistan to integrate into its Belt and Road Initiative. An unstable, dry and war-torn Afghanistan doesn’t offer any attractive economic proposition at the moment. As the economic challenges loom on the Taliban government, it can’t simply sustain on drugs. The Taliban have to rely on China, Pakistan and some Central Asian republics to rebuild its economy. Afghanistan’s unexploited mineral wealth, worth a trillion or more, is a great opportunity for the Taliban to leverage economic gains by engaging China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. An alliance of China, Pakistan, Iran or Turkey may lead to the marginalisation of India’s role and effectiveness in Afghanistan.

    Whether India will recognize the Taliban is not clear yet but India can’t simply meditate either. Under India’s presidency, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2593 on Afghanistan. Chairing a session India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh V Shringla has clarified that India won’t tolerate if Afghan territory turns into a sanctuary of terrorists and threat for the neighbouring states. Apart from human rights, Shringla emphasized Women’s participation in society.

    India along with its all partners should advocate for strict observation of the Taliban led governance. Having invested over $3 billion over the last two decades in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India’s considerable contribution cannot be ignored. The recent meeting between India’s envoy Deepak Mittal and the Taliban’s foreign minister-designate Stanekzai at the Taliban’s request signals a possibility for a changed approach and environment from that of the Taliban 1.0. India’s immediate priority should be the safe evacuation of the Indian origin people and stranded Afghans.

     

    Image Credit: www.dawn.com

  • US Policy in the South China Sea since 2016 PCA Ruling

    US Policy in the South China Sea since 2016 PCA Ruling

    In the foreseeable future, ASEAN will become more divided over South China Sea issues in the Biden era. The conflicts brought about by geopolitical competitions and maritime disputes in the South China Sea will become more challenging and uncertain

     

    The US does not lay any territorial claim in the South China Sea and had not taken any position on sovereignty over islands, reefs, and features in the South China Sea. Its 2010 policy was of not taking “sides on the competing territorial disputes over land features in the South China Sea, we believe claimants should pursue their territorial claims and accompanying rights to maritime space in accordance with the UN convention on the law of the sea”. Towards that end, the US had consistently urged the contesting parties to settle disputes based on international law and without intimidation-coercion. Even in 2016, the US had encouraged claimants to resolve their disputes “free from coercion or the use or threat of force” after endorsing the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) award to the Philippines.

    However, in July 2020, the US revised its South China Sea policy through a Position Paper titled “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea”. The Paper questioned China’s “claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea” and categorically stated that these are “completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them,” This was in sharp contrast to the 2010 policy articulations.

    Since the publication of the Position Paper, South China Sea has appeared in Statements by respective US political leaders. For instance, at the G 7 summit on 11-13 June 2021, President Joe Biden was able to rally the leaders of the grouping and succeeded in a consensus over the critical necessity of a free and open Indo-Pacific and the G7 leaders also expressed concerns about the “situation in the East and South China Seas” and strongly opposed “any unilateral attempts to change the status quo and increase tensions”.

    There is continuity in US policy on the South China Sea since President Trump’s administration and the issue has figured prominently in US’ statements particularly in the context of coercion and intimidation of its smaller neighbours by China.  Secretary of State Mike Pompeo drew attention to the “trampling” of the “sovereign rights of its neighbours” and “destabilizing the region” as also causing “untold environmental devastation” of 3,000 acres of the sea space in the South China Sea; furthermore, “the United States will act until we see Beijing discontinue its coercive behaviour in the South China Sea, and we will continue to stand with allies and partners in resisting this destabilizing activity.” Also, he was uncompromising on US’ commitment to its ASEAN partners in safeguarding sovereign rights to “offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law.”

    President Biden’s Administration has continued to pursue a similar policy as that of the predecessor. For instance, in his conversation with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on 1 July 2021 with Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh, they discussed the South China Sea, including the United States’ support for the 2016 arbitral tribunal award.

    It is not surprising that a Chinese commentator has observed that “Biden administration’s South China Sea policy has attached great importance to US allies within and outside the region, this precisely reflects its Cold War mentality” and is reflected in the US-Philippine Mutual Defence Treaty, which now applies to the South China Sea and freedom of navigation operations (FONOP)  in the South China Sea continues unabated. For instance, in 2017 there was one FONOP by the US, in 2018 there were three incidents, nine in 2019; 15 in 2020; and then this year four FONOPs have been reported. There is also a new emphasis on mini multilateralism in the form of Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) to support its “traditional strategy of relying on allies and partners” to “establish a new regional order dominated by the US”.

    The Chinese commentator’s assertion that “in the foreseeable future, ASEAN will become more divided over South China Sea issues in the Biden era. The conflicts brought about by geopolitical competitions and maritime disputes in the South China Sea will become more challenging and uncertain” merits attention.

    Last week, while speaking in a forum on global security issues at Tsinghua University in Beijing, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that the US’ Indo-Pacific strategy is aimed at countering Beijing and the strategy “should be dumped at a trash heap.” Wang also observed that China would oppose any framework of cooperation to “fuel rivalry” and “an action to accelerate division” ostensibly referring to Taiwan.

    Finally, a continuous war of words between political leaders of the US and China over the South China Sea can be expected to continue. Notwithstanding that ASEAN Member States can be expected to continue to engage China for a legally binding Code of Conduct and at the 19th Senior Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) held on June 7, 2021, in Chongqing, all “parties agreed to resume as soon as possible the second reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text and strive for the early conclusion of negotiations”.

    Feature Image: USS Ronald Reagon in the South China Sea. Credit: asiatimes.com

  • The Modernisaton of the PLA during a Time of Crises and Plague

    The Modernisaton of the PLA during a Time of Crises and Plague

    Since the days of Sun-Tzu, China’s military leaders have always been aware that to defeat an enemy at the nation’s gates, you have to maintain a communal armed force: that is, a military force that is an integral part of ordinary peoples’ lives.   However, since the time of the Han dynasty, the military power of the Chinese people has always been intimately associated with the idea of living harmoniously within the realm of Heaven (t’iem). The people have also needed to be willing to accept the authority of the “Son of Heaven” (t’iem-tzu), which means ultimately a supreme personality that will guide the Chinese masses in times of peace and war. In the early twenty-first century, the concept of “Heaven” in the People’s Republic of China is the embodied in the Communist Party of China (CPC) and its current economic power and military influence is well beyond the shores of mainland China and even of east Asia; it can be felt, for example, in South America and in Africa.  Its polar star, Xi Jinping, has emerged as an undisputed, authoritative leader, just as Mao Zedong was – who pioneered China’s modern military theory.  What Xi has done is to take Mao’s theory of warfare and transformed it into a modern conception of a military machine that is both Chinese in concept and Westernized in its pragmatism, military readiness and its deployment.

    From my perspective as a military historian, I would state that the Communist Party of China with its Central Military Commission is a sophisticated parallel to the command and control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is under the operational control of the Central Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee—the Party’s CMC. The overall Chinese leadership have been aware since the Persian Gulf War of the prowess of the American armed forces against the Iraqi army. It understood then, during that momentous time in history, the urgent need to modernize the Chinese armed forces – much as the Stalin-era Soviet military and political leadership were both impressed with and fearful of the modernization of the emergent Nazi armed forces, which included the army, air force and navy echelons. It can be said unequivocally that Stalin saw the need to prepare for a major regional war with fascist Germany, just as the Chinese leadership is aware that eventually, it will have to wage war against the United States. Unless their American adversary implodes from within, leaving disparate fiefdoms across its landscape, or a new military leadership develops within the United States due to a sophisticated insurrection or military coup and a Second American Civil War ensues, there remains a danger of war between the two nation-states. An America with a fascist government and military hierarchy whose ultimate political desire is to destroy socialist China, despite the possibility of a thermo-nuclear war, is still a possibility.

    The Chinese leadership were undoubtedly grim in their early analysis of what awaited them: if they were not prepared to solidify their armed forces with the capability to withstand violent dissent within their borders as well as to fight a war beyond the Great Wall of China, then their demise or ruin was inevitable. The Chinese leadership, I am sure, has looked closely at the decisions made prior to World War II by Stalin and the Soviet political leadership.  Although eager to strike first against the armies of Hitler, Stalin found himself unable to undertake a “first strike” as Lenin had advocated, and tragedy ensued with the loss of 29 to 30 million Soviet military and civilian lives during the Great Patriotic War. The Chinese leadership is more than aware of what almost mortally wounded the USSR: namely the failure of the Soviet military leadership to prepare quickly enough by modernizing the armed forces in time and by creating a defensive border force that could have blunted more quickly the Nazi tanks and the thousands of German fascist troops that crossed the Minsk or Pripet Marshes through Poland and which tore through the heart of Soviet Russia. The Communist leadership of China know that if it is not ready to confront the United States, let alone its secondary adversary, India, then it is gambling with its very existence. Xi and his military council members are not gamblers when it comes to war; they are strategists who know that to keep Heaven you have to fight for it.

    In my analysis of the contemporary military prowess of the People’s Republic of China, I will address the issues not through a dogmatic application of military theory but instead by looking at recent essays or articles that have arrived at certain conclusions or made particular observations regarding the Chinese military infrastructure, while nevertheless understanding that even the observations in these journals or periodicals that I cite are not facts set in stone. I remember in my youth that Mao Zedong would quote authors, philosophers and poets in his military theory and allude to them in his poetry when writing about military periods in his own life, without losing the inner core of his final analysis of the art of war as it he perceived it during and after the Chinese Revolution.

    In terms of the substance of the Chinese army, it is undergoing a creative build-up, meaning that its military commanders are more focused on quality troops than on simple numbers of servicemen and servicewomen on the battlefield. An essay, written for the Council on Foreign Relations, titled “China’s Modernizing Military”, states:

    “The army is the largest service and was long considered the most important, but its prominence has waned as Beijing seeks to develop an integrated fighting force with first-rate naval and air capabilities. As the other services expanded, the army shrunk to around 975,000 troops, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Reforms have focused on streamlining its top-heavy command structure; creating smaller, more agile units; and empowering lower-level commanders. The army is also upgrading its weapons. Its lightweight Type 15 tank, for example, came into service in 2018 and allows for engagement in high-altitude areas, such as Tibet.” [1]

    The author of the essay implies that the Chinese military command is more concerned with smaller infantry units and creating lighter tanks (bringing to mind the light French tanks that could outrun the heavier German tanks during the invasion of 1940, but which lacked their firepower). But such light tanks will not necessarily be a powerful weapon against the more powerful American, technologically advanced tanks.  These light tanks are not on par with the modern Russian T-14 Armata, which is “based on a modular combat platform, which can also serve as a basis for other armoured variants such as heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and armoured personnel carrier (APC)”.[2]  However, the PLA has a powerful heavy tank that is equal in fighting power to the T-72 or the American M1A2 SEP Abrams tank, in that “In comparison to older Chinese-made tanks, the MBT has improved capabilities in terms of protection, power and mobility. It has a crew of three. ZTZ 99 was made to compete with western tanks, while its technology is used to improvise the more economical ZTZ 96. Regiments in China’s Shenyang and Beijing military areas currently deploy the MBT Z”.[3]What is factual in terms of actual combat experience is that the T-72 has seen major combat just as the American Abrams tank has, while the Russian T-14 Armata and the Chinese ZTZ 96 have not been properly put to the test yet on the world’s battlefields. I, therefore, observe that the decisive factor will be the readiness of the PLA, with its modernized air force and navy giving support both in retreat and offensive attacks, depending on what the context requires at a given moment.

    Just over a year ago, the American Department of Defense was quoted by the Brookings Institute recalling its report of twenty years earlier:

    “DoD’s 2000 report assessed that the PLA was slowly and unevenly adapting to the trends in modern warfare. The PLA’s force structure and capabilities focused largely on waging large-scale land warfare along China’s borders. The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Its conventional missiles were generally of short-range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cyber capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its nominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day.”[4]

    In this description of the capabilities of the PLA, there was almost a complete dismissal of the fighting ability of the Chinese infantrymen, which should have included an evaluation of its Marine Special Forces. The report had implied that the PLA was basically a mainland Chinese army whose mission was to defend or wage war along its borders and went on to belittle the PLA further by stating with a certain arrogance that:

    “Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The report assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressed they would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force[5].”

    However, Brookings notes, the latest DoD report acknowledges that:

    “The PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect[6].”

    Benjamin Brimelow likewise acknowledges the reforms and writes, with less bellicose language and more precision:

    “China’s 11 military regions were restructured into five, the ballistic-missile force became its own branch of the armed forces, and the PLA marine corps, which had been disbanded in 1957, was reestablished.

    “Xi also created the PLA’s Strategic Support Force to support the PLA’s cyber warfare, space warfare, and electronic warfare operations, and the Joint Staff Department, which acts as a commanding organ between all branches of the PLA and the Central Military Commission.

    “Xi has increased the PLA’s budget in an effort to create a world-class military by the year 2050. China is now the second-biggest spender on defence in the world, behind the US, and the largest in Asia.”[7]

    What the author implies in the above quote is that China’s Communist Party leadership and its military leadership is not standing by idly waiting to be destroyed by outside or indeed enemies from within. It is instead advancing – slowly but steadily – in creating an army, air force and navy that will equal and eventually exceed the present United States armed forces in their sophistication and in their deadliness.  While the American army, air force and navy comprise volunteers, the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are conscripted and are doctrinally trained so that they have a serious commitment to the health and sovereignty of the Chinese motherland. The history of the Chinese Armed Forces is still imbued with the aspirations of the military virtues of the era of Mao although the principles have been changed in accordance with the context of the present period of world history. It would be naïve to think that Chinese troops have the same divisions, disunity and deep racism that exist in the modern United States Army, even though there are thousands of American military servicemen men and women who are sincerely dedicated to the preservation of the United States, despite dissent within the ranks as revealed by the attempted insurrection on January 6th. There were active and former military men and women involved in the violent acts at the Capitol, a clear signal of disunity within the American army as well, although the National Guard seemed committed to preventing the Trump regime from gaining the initiative in creating a populist fascist government.

    It is with caution that I make an observation about China’s navy, which although it has now assumed ascendancy as the world’s largest navy is not necessarily totally capable of defending mainland China or defeating its adversaries on the high seas. However, the American newspaper, The New York Times, has been calm in its assessment of Chinese naval power, explaining it in a balanced way:

    “A modernization program focused on naval and missile forces has shifted the balance of power in the Pacific in ways the United States and its allies are only beginning to digest. While China lags in projecting firepower on a global scale, it can now challenge American military supremacy in the places that matter most to it: the waters around Taiwan and in the disputed South China Sea. That means a growing section of the Pacific Ocean — where the United States has operated unchallenged since the naval battles of World War II — is once again contested territory, with Chinese warships and aircraft regularly bumping up against those of the United States and its allies.”[8]

    I would say that although the Chinese navy has carried out great improvements in the bolstering of its anti-missile ships and nuclear submarines, it still lags seriously behind the United States Navy in terms of quality naval ships, partly because it has yet to achieve strike capabilities comparable to the Seawolf and Virginia class submarines that the United States has not only in the Pacific region but in other far-off oceans and seas as well.  I would suggest that perhaps the strategic goal of the Chinese navy high command is to create large quantities of submarines so as to defeat a potential adversary with more advanced submarine technology. I am reminded in this instance of how Soviet tank designers were able to create and mass-produce T-34 tanks which moved faster on the battlefield and were able to withstand enemy shell hits because of their unique cup-turret design. Although the T-34 was not as sophisticated as the Panzerkampfwagen V or Panther and Tiger tanks created by the German military engineers during World War II, Soviet engineers – like modern China’s military engineers – were pragmatic in their weapon designs.  In any case, the two nations, the United States and the People’s Republic of China, may engage as naval powers in a battle of wills over the disputed islands in the Paracels, and a major naval battle there in the future will decide who not only controls the South China Sea but all the Pacific Ocean territories as well.

    I have attempted in this essay to cover the probabilities or capabilities of the People’s Republic of China’s emerging military strength, which I would more modestly call military maturity rather than “world-class”. It is her modern missile capabilities that I think will be the major deciding factor should a Third World War break out. The American journalist that I mentioned earlier in this essay, Brimelow, said this about Chinese missile capabilities:

    “The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has become one of the most intimidating missile forces in the world. China never signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and was never subject to its limits, so it has been free to invest heavily in ballistic missiles.”[9]

    It is the powerful and continual growth of high-velocity and long-range ballistic missiles within the Chinese arsenal, including the in-depth deployment of intercontinental missiles across mainland China, that the United States, as well as her allies, should actually fear because it is missile firepower with nuclear warheads that will be the deciding factor should a Third World War emerge on the world’s stage.

    The contest for military ascendancy or military parity is not simply a competition between the United States and China, as there are multiple other rivalries across the world’s continents. As China, Russia and other nation-states in the Middle East and South America continue to resist the United States’ hegemonic project for economic and military superiority, political and military tensions will increase between these two multi-polar major competing forces.  Also, because of various other international social factors, including the breakdown of cultural and economic structures that the pandemic in 2020 destroyed on a worldwide basis, there will be a desire to assert the hitherto hidden agenda for emerging nation-states’ independence rather than submitting to the status quo of the self-destructive imperialist powers.  A boldness will emerge in which these nation-states will no longer want to be second-best to Western Europe or to North America.

    Since the Long March, in which the nucleus of the People’s Liberation Army emerged under the guidance of Chairman, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China, there have been at times both steps forward and reversals in terms of the qualitative and quantitative achievements that China’s military strength represents. China showed its resilience and determination in fighting American military forces during the Korean War, revealing that its troops were not intimidated by American troops; during the Vietnam War, Chinese military advisers played a major role in strategy and tactics in helping General Giap and his field commanders to fight a sophisticated war of independence against the United States military armies, particularly at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.  In 2014, a retired Vietnamese professor, Dao Nguyen Cat, was interviewed by the Xinhua news agency, and “on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Vietnam’s victory in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Cat said that with the rare support of Chinese forces, the Vietnamese troops were able to successfully drive away the French colonial forces from the province of Dien Bien Phu, 300 km northwest of the capital Hanoi”.[10]  Professor Cat, who served as an official of Vietnam’s Central Propaganda Committee at Dien Bien Phu Campaign, Cat was quoted as saying: “Definitely without China’s support, we would have failed to defeat the French colonial masters… They not only gave training courses from the command posts but also went directly to the battlefield to talk with our soldiers. They supplied Vietnam not only weapons but also with food…”[11]  The military advisers and military supplies given by the leadership of the PLA at that time in history, regarding the Vietnam War, known by the Vietnamese people as The American War, reveal that Chinese leadership were moving forward in honing their military skills beyond their borders.

    The reversal of military progress came during the nineteen sixties and late seventies in the form of territorial disputes. First, in March 1969, there was a military clash between the Soviet Union and China: a seven-month undeclared military conflict that occurred near Zhenbao (Damansky) Island on the Ussuri (Wusuli) River, near Manchuria. The conflict between the two Communist nation-states would eventually result in a ceasefire, which led to a return to the status quo; however, a balanced history is yet to be written on how the two parties view each other as ideological threats, all this taking place during the period of the Culture Revolution.  Secondly, the Sino-Vietnamese War was a border war fought between China and Vietnam in early 1979. Rightly or wrongly, China created an offensive attack in response to Vietnam’s actions against the Khmer Rouge in 1978, ending the dominance of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge. What is regrettable but not surprising is that two socialist nation-states were unable through diplomacy to decide how to end their dispute regarding the Khmer Rouge’s various mistakes in its destruction of thousands of lives that could have contributed to the Communist cause in Southeast Asia.  However, China then began to gain influence, sending economic aid and military advisors to Africa, including Cuba and Venezuela – which reveals the wise and ancient observation by Sun Tzu who said “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”  The Chinese Communist Party know how to achieve a military strategy without going to war.

    In May 2020 there was an actual hand-to-hand struggle between Chinese and Indian troops at locations along the Sino-Indian border, including near the disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and near the border between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region. During the last days of May 2020, Chinese forces objected to Indian road construction in the Galwan river valley, and there then ensued violent verbal exchanges between the two military camps, resulting in deaths and taking of prisoners on both sides. Although I will not attempt to describe in any detail how each side viewed the territorial dispute, I will say that the complexities between China and India, only reinforce why China is so protective of its borders and why India has chosen the United States as its major ally.  We have read similar accounts in ancient historical texts: Thucydides wrote about it in The War of The Peloponnesians And The Athenians, therefore we should not be surprised that in our own day, these small conflicts can lead to greater military build-up and to territorial jealousies which ensnare two parties or various parties into an eventual war that cannot be quelled, but which rather leads to disaster.

    In closing, I would like to quote the eminent Marxist historian, Domenico Losurdo, who wrote about the People’s Republic of China that “The foundations of the People’s Republic of China, following an epic national liberation struggle, certainly did not result in an immediate end to the situation of danger. To the end… the Korean War… challenged US hegemony in Asia, a memorable lesson…”[12].  This makes clear to me that the epic struggle of the modern Chinese people and the People’s Liberation Army has not yet reached its zenith in world history.

     

    References:

     

    [1]  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military

    [2] https://www.army-technology.com/projects/t-14-armata-main-battle-tank/

    [3] https://www.army-technology.com/projects/type99chinese-main/

    [4] https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/04/what-the-pentagons-new-report-on-china-means-for-u-s-strategy-including-on-taiwan/

    [5] Ibid.

    [6] Ibid.

    [7] https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-military-is-improving-but-us-has-more-combat-experience-2020-7

    [8] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html

    [9]  https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-military-is-improving-but-us-has-more-combat-experience-2020-7

    [10] http://www.china.org.cn/world/2014-05/07/content_32317279.htm

    [11]  Ibid.

    [12] Domenico Losurdo, War and Revolution, trans. By Gregory Elliott. New York & London: Verso Books,2015, 257.

     

    Image Credit: ecns.cn

  • Economic prospect of Vietnam under new leadership

    Economic prospect of Vietnam under new leadership

    The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has projected a positive outlook for the post-pandemic global economic recovery for 2021. This is notwithstanding the uncertainty associated with numerous mutations of the Coronavirus emerging in different parts of the world and successes with the vaccine which is now into full-fledged production to meet global demands. Furthermore, according to the IMF, the world economy could grow by 6% in 2021, up from the 5.5% forecast in January 2021. Another significant development in the post-pandemic economic recovery would be a “generational shift towards higher government spending” with projections of over US$ 10 trillion being allocated by the governments across the world to absorb the “shock of the COVID pandemic”. In this context, the Vietnamese government can be expected to make significant post-Pandemic investments.

    Prime Minister Chinh who was an earlier member of the national steering committee for anti-corruption also announced that the government would “drastically and persistently push for anti-corruption.”

    Earlier this month, the Vietnamese National Assembly elected Pham Minh Chinh as the new Prime Minister of the country. In his inaugural speech, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh said that his administration’s economic policies would continue as hitherto i.e. “socialism with a market orientation” and will centre on “economic reforms, developing digital economy and focusing on solving difficulties for industries and businesses.” Prime Minister Chinh who was an earlier member of the national steering committee for anti-corruption also announced that the government would “drastically and persistently push for anti-corruption.”

    There is a strong element of continuity in the Vietnamese government policies concerning economic reforms, investments, and addressing the bottlenecks in economic growth since the last five-year plan. The projections for economic growth during 2021-2025 are high and pegged at 6.5%-7%. This compares well with the last five-year plan which witnessed 5.9% growth. The per capita GDP is also projected to improve from US$ 2,750 at the end of 2020 to $4,700-$5,000 by 2025.

    While these are indeed very promising economic indicators, according to risk consultancy Eurasia Group, Prime Minister Chinh will also have to deal with additional challenges such as reforms required for “new trade deals” necessitating additional infrastructure, respond to existing bottlenecks impacting on the manufacturing sector as also sustained and reliable energy requirements.

    Prime Minister Chinh would have to skillfully manoeuvre Vietnam’s relations with the US and China who are among its top trading partners.

    At another level, Prime Minister Chinh would have to skillfully manoeuvre Vietnam’s relations with the US and China who are among its top trading partners. As far as the US is concerned, US imports from Vietnam increased to $64.8 billion in the first 10 months of 2020, and the trade deficit increased to $56.6 billion in 2020. Hanoi has now won over the US in the context of being labelled as a “currency manipulator”. The Biden Administration’s first foreign-exchange policy report has removed Vietnam from the list of countries that are known to prevent “effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade”. This suggests that the US is not taking a confrontationist approach.

    Similarly, Vietnam’s trade with China is an inescapable part of its economic growth. China is its top trading partner and the bilateral trade in 2020 was US$ 133 billion. The future projections for Vietnam –China bilateral trade are quite promising given that China would continue to be the strongest economy in the coming years which will have numerous spinoffs for Vietnam. Perhaps it merits attention that China is the seventh-largest foreign investor in Vietnam.

    By all counts, Prime Minister Chinh would continue to pursue the national mantra of “socialism with a market orientation” and engage and promote pragmatic economic policies, open the national economy to global markets and importantly balancing relations with China and the US. The US-China trade war has been a trigger for a large number of countries particularly Japan shifting businesses into Vietnam. This has led to Vietnam being labelled as a “mini-China” and is best represented by the fact that Vietnam’s “factory-heavy growth model, sizable population, low labour and land costs, rapid gross domestic product and geographical placement” make it the preferred destination for setting up a business and attracting investments.

    While that may be so, Vietnam would have to diversify from manufacturing cheap goods for exports to investing in its service industry as also in innovation and tech startups. Vietnam is likely to witness a surge in the digital economy and this segment could expand to US$52 billion by 2025. In particular, e-commerce and digital banking are significant growth sub-sectors.

    it is not unthinkable to anticipate Chinese companies too making a beeline and moving production to Vietnam to lessen the risks of the US-China trade war which has now taken a very strong geopolitical and geostrategic turn.

    Today, Vietnam can boast of three comprehensive strategic partnerships, fourteen strategic partnerships, and 13 comprehensive partnerships with different countries. Besides, the conditions are ripe for Vietnam to attract investors beyond Asia and the EU-Vietnam FTA is an important trigger for encouraging European firms to explore investment opportunities in Vietnam. Also, it is not unthinkable to anticipate Chinese companies too making a beeline and moving production to Vietnam to lessen the risks of the US-China trade war which has now taken a very strong geopolitical and geostrategic turn. Under the circumstances, Vietnam would have to diversify its strategic relations and not be left hostage to one partner.

    Featured Image: Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh

  • Calling Putin a ‘killer’ with ‘no soul’ is not exactly diplomatic finesse

    Calling Putin a ‘killer’ with ‘no soul’ is not exactly diplomatic finesse

    Category: External Article – ‘Responsible Statecraft’

    Title: Calling Putin “a killer” is not exactly diplomatic finesse

    Author: Anatol Lieven

    The Biden administration has created an completely unnecessary confrontation with Russia at a time when reasonable working relations with Moscow are extremely important for achieving two immediate and key administration goals: rejoining the nuclear agreement with Iran, and a peace settlement in Afghanistan facilitating U.S. military withdrawal from that country and an end to America’s longest war.


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  • What Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny is, and what he is not

    What Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny is, and what he is not

    Anatol Lieven highlights America’s blundering tendency to view world personalities in typically American lens, ignoring the realities of them being citizens of their countries and focusing on their national interests . He uses the examples of Russia’s Navalny and Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi to make his point emphatically. His analysis is relevant to other countries as well. 

    This article was published earlier in Responsible Statecraft. 

    It is very human and natural to admire courage and resolution — these are qualities that Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny possesses to a quite remarkable degree. It is also natural to sympathize with suffering — and Navalny has suffered and very nearly died for his beliefs and goals. And of course it is natural to feel disgust with the increasingly criminal behavior of the Putin administration in Russia.

    However, admiration, sympathy and disgust are emotions, not arguments or analysis, and should be employed with great caution in the formulation of state policy.

    In his confirmation hearings, now-Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pledged Biden administration support for Navalny and called him “a voice for millions and millions of Russians.” Statements by the U.S. embassy in Moscow on the Navalny movement have come very close to calling for the end of the present Russian government.

    Recent weeks have seen a tremendous outpouring of American sympathy for Navalny and his movement against the Putin administration. In his confirmation hearings, now-Secretary of State Anthony Blinken pledged Biden administration support for Navalny and called him “a voice for millions and millions of Russians.” Statements by the U.S. embassy in Moscow on the Navalny movement have come very close to calling for the end of the present Russian government. The semi-official American Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is openly and passionately supportive of Navalny’s movement. Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, proposed that Navalny be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

    Such overt U.S. support is not wise. In the first place, it may actually hurt the cause of progressive reform in Russia. The Russian government, like those of Iran and China, has relentlessly propagated the idea that the opposition is being backed if not bankrolled by Washington in order to weaken their countries; and indeed, Russian liberals have done themselves terrible damage by allowing themselves to be cast as representatives of the West, not of the Russian people.

    The second, very familiar problem is the hypocrisy involved. In the latest volume of President Obama’s memoirs, “A Promised Land,” he describes how Hillary Clinton — who relentlessly presented herself in public as an advocate of spreading democracy — argued that Washington should support Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s brutal 2011 crackdown on Arab Spring opposition protests on the grounds that he was a U.S. ally and his fall would lead to chaos and Islamist revolution. In her early public statements, as well, she warned against hastening Mubarak’s exit.

    In proposing Navalny for the Nobel Peace Prize, Haas seems to have forgotten the last time the honor was given to an opposition politician.

    An even greater problem presents itself when one looks at the actual politics of some of the opposition figures who draw such waves of American and Western enthusiasm. In proposing Navalny for the Nobel Peace Prize, Haas seems to have forgotten the last time the honor was given to an opposition politician. The award to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 was supposed to be for “her non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights… one of the most extraordinary examples of civil courage in Asia in recent decades.”

    After Suu Kyi joined the government in Myanmar she’s been damned in the West for her failure to prevent or condemn the savage state persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, and most of her human rights awards (though not the Nobel prize itself) have been revoked.

    After Suu Kyi joined the government in Myanmar she’s been damned in the West for her failure to prevent or condemn the savage state persecution of Myanmar’s Rohingya minority, and most of her human rights awards (though not the Nobel prize itself) have been revoked. What her previous Western admirers are not doing — what they almost never do — is to ask themselves why they so completely misunderstood her before.

    But she is a Burmese politician, not a Western democratic leader, and in building her up as a liberal heroine, the Western media and activists willfully ignored not just the political realities of Myanmar, but her own Burmese nationalist antecedents.  

    (Just in the last 48 hours, Suu Kyi has been detained in an apparent military takeover of her democratically elected government and Biden is predictably mulling over his options for reviewing sanctions and taking “appropriate action.”)

    Like Navalny, Suu Kyi is indeed an exceptionally brave and determined human being and in her way a fine leader; just as Navalny might make a fine Russian president. But she is a Burmese politician, not a Western democratic leader, and in building her up as a liberal heroine, the Western media and activists willfully ignored not just the political realities of Myanmar, but her own Burmese nationalist antecedents.

    There are two factors at work here. The first is a basic human one. Courage, like hard work and self-sacrifice, is a quality that it is humanly impossible not to admire, but the possession of it says absolutely nothing at all about the goals to which they are put. All the leaders of the ghastly totalitarian revolutions of the 20th century were exceptionally brave and determined men.

    The second factor relates to some enduring and seemingly incorrigible flaws in most Western reporting and analysis. One of them is the tendency to personalize issues, whereby “Putin” is used as a synonym for the whole Russian state, and “Navalny” is now being presented as a synonym for the entire, enormously disparate Russian opposition. The merest glance at the groups represented at the pro-Navalny demonstrations reveals that together with genuine liberal democrats, there are also numerous Communists and extreme nationalists whose anti-Western positions are much more extreme and reckless than those of Putin himself. As Aleksandr Baunov of the Carnegie Moscow Centre has written:

    “Saturday’s protests were undeniably anti-regime, anti-elite and anti-corruption but not necessarily liberal, pro-Western and pro-democracy. It’s not surprising that such protests frighten not only the authorities, but also successful members of society: even those who don’t consider themselves supporters of the regime.”

    In their blind demonization of Putin, and consequent sanctification of Navalny, Western commentators seem to be implicitly assuming that should Navalny win power (which he almost certainly will not), Russia’s foreign policy would change radically in a pro-Western direction. This is nonsense. Navalny’s supporters are backing him out of (entirely justified) fury at Russian state corruption, lawlessness, and economic failure, not to change foreign policy. Every independent opinion poll has suggested that Putin’s foreign and security policies have enjoyed overwhelming public support; and above all, there is very little in Navalny’s own record to suggest that he would change them.

    As a 2013 essay by Robert Coalson in The Atlantic documented, Navalny supported the Russian war with Georgia in 2008. He has expressed strongly ethno-nationalist attitudes towards the Caucasian minorities in Russia, and previously made opposition to illegal immigration a key part of his platform. In October 2014 he suggested to a reporter that if he became president he would not return Crimea, which was annexed by Russia earlier that year, to Ukraine (though he also said in that same interview that, “It’s not in the interests of Russians to seize neighboring republics, it’s in their interests to fight corruption, alcoholism and so on — to solve internal problems.”

    Rather like Donald Trump concerning American interventionism, Navalny has strongly condemned Russian military intervention in the Middle East on the grounds of cost and irrelevance to real Russian interests; but (as with Trump), that does not necessarily say much about what he would actually do if in power. Apart from anything else, Russia, like the U.S., has a foreign and security establishment “Blob” with firmly established and deeply held collective views on Russia’s vital interests.

    It is to remind Americans that he is a Russian politician, not an American one; that he will respond to Russian realities, not Washington fantasies; and that in the end, U.S. administrations will have to deal with whatever government is in power in Moscow.

    To recall this is not to condemn Navalny. It is to remind Americans that he is a Russian politician, not an American one; that he will respond to Russian realities, not Washington fantasies; and that in the end, U.S. administrations will have to deal with whatever government is in power in Moscow. Russian governments will defend Russian interests, along lines that are mostly quite predictable if one knows Russian history and culture. The sooner we realize this, and stop setting up plaster saints in the hope that they will perform miracles, the better for U.S. foreign policy overall.

     

    Feature Image – Protesters gather near a monument of Russian playwright Alexander Griboyedov during a protest against the jailing of opposition leader Alexei Navalny in St. Petersburg, Russia, Sunday, Jan. 31, 2021. www.arabnews.com
    Image –     Navalny and Putin: www.hilltimes.com
    Image – Aung San Suu Kyi: www.mmtimes.com

  • Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    China’s GDP expanded from USD 6 trillion in 2010 to USD 14.3 trillion in 2019. It has had exponential growth over the last three decades, with an average GDP growth rate of 9.23% from 1989 to 2020. Although the impact of the COVID pandemic pushed its GDP into decline and negative (-6.80%) in the first quarter of 2020, it has rebounded with a growth of 5% in the third quarter. It’s military spending, officially, is more than three times that of India, unofficially maybe five times or more. China has become one of the key players in the Indo-Pacific as a significant part of its economic activities depend on this region.

    The Indo-Pacific has replaced the Trans-Atlantic as the epicentre of global politics. Its importance to the global order is multifarious. In economic terms, one half of the world’s commercial influx goes through the Indo-Pacific sea routes and the Indian Ocean carries two-thirds of global oil shipments. Besides, a few of the biggest military spenders are part of the region. China’s hostile actions and policies have agitated the US, Japan, Australia and India. A shared concern over the expansion of China’s political and military clout was fundamental to the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad 2.0), on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila, in 2017.

    Quad is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific

    There is growing speculation over what the re-emergence of the Quad means. On the one hand, it is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific; on the other, a strategic alliance towards keeping China’s assertive actions in check.

    The Quad: Overcoming Intransigence

    The Quad is a mechanism that enables a dialogue on regional security issues between the four countries. Its revival, this year, reflects an intersection of strategic interests: that of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order. The Quad came together in November for the naval exercise – Exercise Malabar – in two phases, in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The exercise, in its 24th edition, is the biggest so far and has sent significant strategic signalling to China.

    The Quad should be considered less as a formal alliance and more as a mechanism built on existing bilateral and trilateral partnerships between the four countries. It first emerged as a cooperative response to the 2004 tsunami, when the four navies were involved in providing humanitarian and disaster relief. Despite strong support from Japan and the US to formalise the group, it disbanded with Australia and India backing out in 2007, due to concerns about China’s reaction to the grouping. This gave rise to multilateral partnerships among the four countries.

    Between the four democracies, there are three trilateral and six bilateral partnerships. Trilaterally, Japan, India and Australia first came together in 2015 to discuss shared concerns over maritime security in the Indo-Pacific Region and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. More recently, the three countries agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific Region amid growing recognition of their excessive, economic reliance on China.

    Bilaterally, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) on October 27 that gives India access to American geospatial intelligence that will be useful for precision guidance of its missiles. Further, India-Australia ties have strengthened over the last few years with their initial 2+2 dialogue in 2017 and with Australian participation in India’s Milan exercise in 2018, focusing on interoperability between navies in the region.

    China and the Quad

    Over the years, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a region of strategic importance. As China expands into the region, its actions have created tensions with the Quad members.

    Sino-Indian relations:  India-China relations have touched rock-bottom since the clashes on the LAC in Ladakh.  China’s intrusions and violations along the LAC have been backed up by significant massing of PLA forces, for the first time in 40 years. India’s strong actions at the LAC and subsequent sanctions and banning of Chinese IT applications have signalled that India is not shy of escalating its response. China’s actions are seen as part of its coercive strategy to India’s refusal to back China on BRI, and its vehement opposition to CPEC. It sees India’s closeness to the USA and its coordination in the Quad as a threat to China’s strategic interests.

    China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has raised India’s concerns. It has always been wary of ties between Beijing and Islamabad, which intensified with the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2013. The Chinese-operated Gwadar port off the Arabian Sea in Pakistan, which can be used by the Chinese navy to establish a submarine presence in the region, did not rest well with India. Such a port would also help China with its ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Other ports of such concern are Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar. Though China claims these ports are of economic significance, these are also militarily strategic ports that give it an advantage in the IOR.

    In light of these issues, a revived and active Quad will benefit India’s strategic interests. The partnership could affect China in two ways. First, China would face increased competition in the IOR from India that now works with strong allies. Second, with the recent imposition of the technology ban, China stands to lose a large market for its products.

     Japan-China relations: Over the past few years, the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) has worsened with China’s land reclamation activities and militarisation of islands. Japan sees the South China Sea as key to its security because of its crucial sea lanes vital to its trade and economic health. It is also wary of China’s ability to influence the energy supply chains, which East Asia is dependent on, and the PLA’s movement in the Indo-Pacific region that could affect regional security.

    Despite its renewed trade with China and the recent signing of the RCEP, increased tensions in the SCS has forced Japan to support revival of the Quad. China’s increased naval and air activities in the South China Sea makes the Quad and its possible expansion into Quad Plus even more relevant for Japan.

    China-Australia relations: Australia backed out of the Quad in 2007 primarily because it was concerned about how China would view it, and the possible impact it might have on their bilateral trade. By 2017, China became Australia’s top export destination, and this trend has continued through 2019, pushing Australia into a dangerous economic dependency with China. Further, Australia’s 2016 White Paper called out China for its coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, identifying the South China Sea and the Southern Pacific as vital strategic regions.

    Australia’s economic dependence on China is high and this is unlikely to change despite the strong statements from prime minister Morrison.  Australia’s strong stand against China is also seen as emanating from American pressure. Australia actively supports Quad as it sees an increasingly powerful China working to change the world order. Australia is also a member of the newly signed RCEP, the new economic grouping that will be dominated by China. While Australia has hedged its economic interests by signing the RCEP, its strategic and security priorities are linked to the Quad.

    China-US relations:  China’s rising military power is now seen as a threat to American power and the liberal world order. Since 2011, American strategies and policies have focussed more on the Indo-Pacific. This shift in focus has strengthened its ties with Japan, Australia and India. Tensions between the US and China have increased since then and the 2018 trade war not only aggravated their relations but also kept the rest of the world on an edge.

    With a strong Quad partnership, the US expects to regain and strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific. For China already hit hard by the US trade war, more setbacks will accentuate the problems. Moreover, with a more focused Quad led by the US, China’s efforts to project its power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region will come under pressure.

     Conclusion

     A few aspects about the Quad remain unclear. First, its intent is still uncertain because the respective countries have to evaluate their relations with China if they want to make the bloc official. Second, if it were to be official, to what extent would it serve the interests of the member countries? Third, is the Quad a concert of democracies to contain China? Last, will it coordinate with other members in the Indo-Pacific region, that is will Quad translate into Quad Plus?

    China’s actions have managed to bring the four countries closer.  China, however, has scored a success when the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), the world’s largest plurilateral trade agreement was signed on November 15th. Both Japan and Australia are members of the RCEP. Many see this as a setback for India and America, and an important building block in a new world order, in which China calls the shots all over Asia. It puts in doubt the viability of SCRI (Supply Chain Resilience Initiative), an effort by Quad members to create an alternative to Chinese domination of supply chains.

    The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    While security and military cooperation will help in checking China’s aggressive approach, it must be recognised that this alone will be an incomplete strategy. The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    The conclusion of RCEP maybe China’s gain, but it is important to recognise the fact that ASEAN is the main driver of RCEP. In attempting to balance China, ASEAN and Japan have kept the door open for India to re-join the RCEP. It is possible that the US, under the Biden presidency, may revive the TPP (now proposed by Japan as CATPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership), which could balance the RCEP. The Quad, in this context, will continue to be very relevant for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.