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  • A step closer to N-triad deterrent

    A step closer to N-triad deterrent

    PM Modi announced with justifiable national pride on November 6 that India’s first nuclear-propelled submarine, INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, was now operational as an integral part of its nuclear deterrent. India earlier had the capabilities to launch nuclear weapons from the air, mounted largely on its Mirage 2000 and Jaguar, and by land-based missiles, ranging from Agni 1 (700-900 km) to Agni 5 missiles (5,500 km). Its aim has been to develop a ‘credible nuclear deterrent’, with capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons from multiple locations to strategic areas in its nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Pakistan.

    Arihant provides India with a capability to hit either neighbour from 300 m under the sea. The sea-based missiles envisaged for this purpose are Sagarika (750 km range) and K-4 (3,500 km). While land-based missile sites can be destroyed, a submarine-based deterrent is virtually impregnable against a missile attack. India is the only country with a sea-based N-deterrent, which is not a Permanent Member of the UNSC. India will soon operationalise a second nuclear submarine (Arighat), and is expected to have a fleet of four by 2022.

    According to US Federation of Nuclear Scientists, India currently possesses 130-140 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has 140-150 and China 280. While India tested its first nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan’s first test was in 1990, on Chinese soil.

    In a recent book, Thomas Reed, a US nuclear weapons designer and former Secretary of the US air force, stated that China’s ‘Pakistan nuclear connection’ can be explained in the following words: ‘India was China’s enemy and Pakistan was India’s enemy. The Chinese did a massive training of Pakistani scientists, brought them to China for lectures, even gave them the design of the CHIC-4 device, which was a weapon that was easy to build — a model for export.’ Gary Milhollin, another expert, remarked: ‘Without China’s help, Pakistan’s bomb would not exist.’ China has also provided Pakistan the designs of its nuclear weapons, upgraded its ‘inverters’ for producing enriched uranium in Kahuta and provided it with plutonium reactors to build tactical nuclear weapons in Khushab and Fatehjang. Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles are replicas of Chinese missiles.

    India’s N-doctrine stated that its weapons would only be used in retaliation against a major attack on Indian territory, or on its forces anywhere, in which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are used. But Pakistan does not have a formal doctrine. The long time head of its Nuclear Command Authority, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, however, said over a decade ago that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were ‘aimed solely at India’ and Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquered a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroyed a large part of its land and air forces. He also held out the possibility of the use of weapons if India tried to ‘economically strangle’ it, or pushed it to political destabilisation. Pakistan’s statements in recent years have, however, indicated that it would not be averse to using tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with India.

    China, like India, also had proclaimed that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. But it has been ambiguous if this applied to India. China has maintained a measure of ambiguity on its ‘no-first-use’ pledge. This became evident when China’s foreign ministry spokesman (in 2004) rejected a suggestion from External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh that both countries should adopt a ‘common’ nuclear doctrine. Subsequent discussions between Indian and Chinese experts have suggested that China maintains deliberate ambiguity on its doctrine when it comes to dealing with India. Many ask if this is meant to signal to Pakistan that China will come to its aid in any nuclear exchange Pakistan may have with India, even if initiated by Pakistan. This ambiguity adds to India’s determination to strengthen its ‘triad’ of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons. Agni 5 missiles can target China’s populous east coast. Within the next four years, we would have an adequate sea-based deterrent to deter China from holding out credible nuclear assurances to Pakistan that it would intervene should India choose to respond to use, or threats of use, of tactical weapons by Pakistan.

    While India has a streamlined nuclear command structure headed by the PM and Cabinet Committee on Security, it needs to revamp the archaic structure of its Ministry of Defence (MoD). The key military figure in the command structure is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who generally holds office for less than a year; hardly enough time for him to become familiar with the complexities of the command. Repeated proposals, including from defence committees and task forces, recommending the appointment of a full-time Chief or Defence Staff, or Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, who will hold charge of the command and report to the political authority, have gathered dust in the offices of the MoD bureaucracy.

    The MoD needs to be reorganised. Recommendations for such change, even from the Parliament Standing Committee of Defence, lie unimplemented. We recently acquired our desperately needed first batch of artillery guns after the ’80s’ Bofors controversy. This happened even as detailed designs for 155 mm Howitzers provided by Sweden were gathering dust for two decades. There is also surely something wrong if it takes over a decade to acquire fighter aircraft, even as the IAF is facing a shortage of around 30 per cent in the sanctioned strength.

    Ambassador G Parthasarathy  IFS (Retd) is the former High Commissioner to Pakistan and is a trustee of TPF. 

    This Op-Ed was published earlier in ‘The Tribune’ on November 15th.

  • Pakistan continues to support terrorism

    Pakistan continues to support terrorism

    Kamal Davar                                                                                                     November 30, 2018/Op-Ed

    As India observes the 10th anniversary of the ghastly Mumbai terror attack on 26 November 2008, which resulted in 166 fatalities including of foreign tourists and over 600 injuries, certain misgivings continue to agitate the minds of its concerned citizens and the security establishment alike.

    For decades, India has been the target of deliberate, well-planned Pakistani sponsored terrorism. Though India’s financial capital, Mumbai, has been a chosen destination for terror acts earlier too in 1993 and the Mumbai train massacres in 2006, those four horrific days of 26-29 November 2008 shook the nation and many civilized countries around the world. In matters of counter-terrorism endeavours, India woke up from its traditional languorous slumber, to a large extent, as it laboured to counter its own version of the infamous 9/11 terror strike on the American homeland. Was it a failure of intelligence, inadequate response mechanisms or, importantly, a systemic failure of the Indian security establishment? The candid answer lies in a combination of all these factors which resulted in this attack.

    In today’s increasingly troubled world, terrorism remains an ever burgeoning scourge outwitting advanced nations and their security forces time and again. Terrorism has explicitly developed into a rabidly dangerous reality with an expanding footprint, both regional and globally. The South Asian region, thanks to the original perpetrator of global terror, Pakistan, remains a hotbed of this plague, with no end in sight owing to continuing Pakistani machinations in India and Afghanistan. To Pakistan, the employment of terror as an extension of state policy appears to be more than a productive stratagem. Regrettably, Pakistan persists with its myopic and self-destructive terror policies in the region, continuing to foment terror in J&K, parts of the Indian hinterland through Nepal and, to some extent, in the north-east via Bangladesh.

    To successfully ward off cataclysmic events, a hard-nosed study and detailed addressal of the many professional and preparedness shortcomings which contribute to the likelihood of such occurrences is an imperative which security agencies can only disregard at the nation’s peril. It is the considered view of many security analysts that Indian commercial, public, military and other iconic, high-value institutions and infrastructure—perennial and lucrative targets for Pakistan-sponsored terror—have to have their security preparedness of the desired order to be vastly buttressed.

    Global problems beckon global solutions. With terrorism now a common threat confronting like-minded nations, intelligence sharing between friendly nations is sine qua non. To a large extent, especially after 26/11, the US intelligence community has established professional links with their Indian counterparts. Though some level of intelligence sharing does exist with certain friendly nations, India must forge far more deliberate intelligence cooperation with intelligence agencies of terror-afflicted nations like the UK, France, Russia, Afghanistan, Iran, Bangladesh and the Central Asian Republics. Though it is not a simple affair to develop seamless coordination resulting in speedy sharing of hard, actionable intelligence with foreign agencies, the criticality of effective counter-terrorism interoperability requires the same. Thus, India must take the lead with like-minded security outfits to get them on the same page. UN protocols on counter-terrorism and agencies like Interpol and the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force must endeavour towards greater cooperation to combat the common enemies of humanity.

    Looking inwards, it is endemic with some intelligence agencies in India to try and be ‘one up’ on each other by not fully sharing their inputs with sister institutions. This malaise, where existing, must be rooted out by the NSA. In addition, it is common knowledge that terrorists today are not merely in rag-tag outfits but with advanced technology and continually improving modern weaponry and tools to support their nefarious designs. Thus, security agencies have to keep abreast of all technological innovations taking place. As the nation endeavours to improve its technical intelligence capabilities in its myriad applications, human intelligence capabilities need also to be sharpened.

    A large number of terror outfits are labelled as ‘non-state’ actors which is a stark misnomer as some of the nations they are located in are supporting these terror conglomerates. In the case of Pakistan, its notorious spy agency, the ISI, funds, trains and equips a large number of these terror ‘tanzeems’ such as the Hafiz Saeed-led Lashkar-e-Taiba which carried out the Mumbai attacks under its watchful eye, the Jaish-e-Mohd, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Sipaha-e-Sahaba, among others. US President Donald Trump’s recent imposition of financial sanctions on Pakistan for its duplicity in the war on terror was a long overdue measure. Similarly, Indian financial intelligence set-ups must keep a hawk’s eye on suspicious financial transactions from abroad to accounts in India.

    As Pakistan displays no signs of mending its ways, the Indian security establishment must factor in its preparedness the ever-looming and innovative terror threats from Pakistan and its proxies. Thus, for India, eternal vigilance and security upgrades remain the price to pay to fire-wall itself from terrorism.

    Lt Gen Kamal Davar is an Indian Army veteran and is former chief of India’s Defence Intelligence Agency. He is a visiting distinguished fellow at the TPF.

    This article was published earlier on November 25th, 2018 on Livemint.

  • Changing Paradigms of Political Canvas in Sri Lanka

    Changing Paradigms of Political Canvas in Sri Lanka

    The intransigent ethno-political emotional divide amongst the Sri Lankan society of 1980s manifested into a bloodiest insurgency with the Tamil separatists almost succeeding in carving out a separate Tamil Elam in the North and Eastern regions of the island nation. The political divide at that juncture was result of a racial cleavage between the Sinhala majority and oppressed Tamil minority which prompted the later to rebel in the face of socio-economic denials of all kinds.

    It was India who came to rescue of the Sri Lankan government of the day in 1987 to ensure territorial integrity of the country even at the cost of negative political repercussions within India. The India had to pay the price of this political outreach to Sri Lanka with life of Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister who went out of way to help them in their hour of crisis. The deeply indebted Sinhala dominated Sri Lanka of 80s seem to be chartering a different trajectory now with self serving opportunist afflictions due to inducements of easy money from extra regional players, especially China.

    While encashing the apparent Chinese benevolence, the gullible Sri Lankan politicians seem to have ignored the basic dictum that ‘there are no free lunches’ in this world. And the slip is showing wherein the Sri Lankan political dispensation seems to have compromised on their territorial integrity by leasing out Habantota port and 15000 acres of land in lieu of repayment of Chinese loans. A precedence has been set for more such sovereign compromises in times to come for which India had fought a bloody battle against their own co ethnic insurgents.

    The motive of the ongoing political drama appears to be focused on facilitating the Chinese cause even if it amounts to tempering with the constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, there is a paradigm shift in political thinking with its doctrine of development through Chinese support which has obvious inherent centrifugal tendencies as against focus on internal economic consolidation. Instead of reclaiming the lost politico-economic ground to China post Habantota episode, a major part of Sri Lankan polity seem to be under compulsion to toe the Chinese lines due to debt diplomacy so cleverly orchestrated by the Chinese.

    The close scrutiny of Sri Lankan political conduct in the past hinges on the non accommodation of rival ethnic, social or political groups within the Sri Lankan society which seem to continue even today in some form or other. Earlier it was based on ethnic rivalry between Sinhala and Tamils, and now it is intra Sinhala dispensation vying for more political and money power in a political set up with opportunist tendencies. Despite a vibrant democratic political dispensation to take care of well being of its subjects, the island nation has witnessed spells of changing political priorities and concomitant societal upheavals in the recent times. The military driven turbulent ethno- political complexion of 80s gave way to consolidation of socio-political synergies alongside resolving the internal security issues for almost three decades.

    Subsequently, in the aftermath of subjugation of Tamil insurgency in 2009, the priorities changed to the much needed economic development of the nation. However, the tourist predominant economy had woeful inadequacies of infrastructure and public conveniences to tap the potential of the nation at par with other international tourist destinations close by. To do that, there was no money due to prolonged war effort which in turn prompted Sri Lankan polity to look outwards paving way for externally influenced politico-economic opportunism.

    Chinese concept of BRI suited both China as well as the Sri Lanka as a mutually beneficial mechanism to take care of each other’s interests. The BRI concept envisages development of communication and transportation net work, industrial and power corridors as part of Chinese grand game for their global economic expansion. As far as China is concerned all the countries in the Indian Ocean are important for Chinese geo political matrix as a response mechanism for the security of her economic interests. Chinese conduct when hyphenated with their ‘’String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean’’, and their defiant politico-military stance in the South China Sea speaks of their seriousness and sensitivities of their interest in the Indo Pacific region. Sri Lanka happens to be in a pivotal position to serve the Chinese geo political interests.

    In the given circumstances, close affiliation with the China is a win -win situation for Sri Lanka for their economic buoyancy and a politically strong anchor to stand by their side in the time of crisis. However, there are also apprehensions of negative fallouts of new found political bonhomie with an outsider with prospects of disturbing existing stable regional political equilibrium fully aligned with socio- cultural emotional bind of Indian legacy. Accordingly, there is an emerging pattern of an internal political divide amongst Sri Lankan parties and individuals believing in encashing the pragmatic opportunism as against continuation of stability through India centric regional cohesiveness.

    The Mahindra Rajpaksha during his premiership was given loans worth $ 6 billion for various infrastructural projects including Hambantota port. Later the dept trap diplomacy of China got highlighted in their demand of ownership of the port plus land adjacent to it. It, surely, has exposed the dubious ways of China which has prompted number of recipients of Chinese benevolence to revisit their commitments with them as regards to BRI scheme. Sri Lankan civil society is ceased with this Chinese conduct and there is a resistance to encouraging Chinese intrusion into Sri Lankan affairs beyond a point.

    The opponent Ranil Wickremasinghe, is known to be a proponent of the Indian lobby who had, recently , cancelled housing project of more than 50,000 houses in North and Eastern Tamil areas given earlier to China in favour of Indian companies. The Rajapaksha was brought back as the prime minister by the president through an untenable political move leaving the country in a political chaos. The parliament was dissolved paving way for fresh elections. However, the Supreme Court ruled against this unconstitutional move by the president. It was probably done as Rajapakshe, like his previous tenure, would facilitate better relationship with the China looking at their current political compulsions and national interests.

    What is happening in the Sri Lankan political canvas seem to have imprints of pro India vs pro China lobbies. The fact that there is an outstanding loan of almost $ 5 billion despite handing over the Hambantota port to them, China may be pulling the strings to bring in a political dispensation favourable to them to do their bidding. The way the democratic norms are being flouted do indicate a desperate situation precipitated by the looming economic catastrophe waiting to happen.

    The military geography of Sri Lanka has bestowed her with a unique location to take care of the most vulnerable security concerns of China with 70% of trade and 90% of energy supplies passing through the Indian Ocean. Therefore, it is obvious that China is here to stay as a permanent feature and to do that they seem to have acquired a substantial political space in the Sri Lanka. Whereas, the Sri Lanka seem to have lost out on her autonomy to some extent as there is a probability of China dictating their terms when they find the policies are not in sync with Chinese interests.

    The likely Chinese naval presence at Hambantota port barely few hundred miles from Indian shores is a security concern for India. The Chinese politico-military afflictions in Sri Lanka is likely to prompt the western powers also to further enhance their military presence closer to the Indian shores. It, obviously, would impact the Indian security matrix with the extra regional players milling around in the areas of Indian influence all this time. The new nomenclature of ‘Indo Pacific ‘ referring to erstwhile IOR and Asia Pacific is manifestation new US maritime doctrine as a response mechanism to Chinese geo political expansion. The increase in the US sponsored military diplomacy in the region and revival of Quad are all indicative of new global strategic grand games being unfolded closer to the Indian shores.

    India has no choice but to upgrade her military capabilities to take care of the inimical developments around her periphery both on land as well as maritime domain. It warrants looking beyond defensive doctrines and acquire offensive capabilities for optimum power projection in the areas of concern, besides defence of the island territories and international maritime obligations. Given the distances from the main land and bottle necks for shipping, China would always be militarily vulnerable in the Indian Ocean. It stands to an advantage for India which need to be factored in the design of the military doctrine and its political strategic outreach.

    The Sri Lanka needs to recall that they stand integrated today due to unflinching support by India in their hour of crisis and sacrifices made by the Indian soldiers to hold their country together. They should also appreciate that the India continues to be the stabilizing factor for Sri Lanka and a friend in need. China on other hand is here to exploit the Sri Lankan geographical space for their geo political motives sans any benevolent emotional connect. In fact, China has already usurped their strategically located land through their manipulative ways. If the Sri Lankan polity has not understood their game plan then they should be prepared for more such disintegrating moves as part of their dubious debt diplomacy. The Sri Lanka is in economic crisis and stands vulnerable which is reflective in their recent political conduct. In that, there seem to be tell tale signs of Chinese complicity in the ongoing happenings in the Sri Lankan political space which is not a good news.

    India, obviously, has not been pro active enough to sense the aspirations of her neighbours and propensity of China to exploit the political deficit on the strength of her deep pockets and liberal military outreach. The Sri Lanka has a great significance for Indian security and we need to take all the possible measures to neutralize the Chinese foot prints in the island nation. India fortunately has a large influence in the Sri Lankan society and reckonable political leverages which needs to be nurtured and exploited in our national interests. India as a responsible regional country need to go all out to extend a helping hand to Sri Lanka in her testing times as their political stability is essential to the Indian strategic interests.

    Lt Gen Rameshwar Yadav is an Indian Army veteran and former Director General, Infantry. The views expressed are his own. This article was published earlier in https://cenjows.gov.in/article-detail?id=122

  • Avoiding the Ideology trap: Learning from History

    Avoiding the Ideology trap: Learning from History

    Deepak Sinha                                                                                       November 23, 2018: Commentary

    Alexandre Dumas once wrote that “all generalizations are dangerous, even this one.” While there is much wisdom in his words, there are also circumstances when sweeping generalizations are not only unavoidable, but also simply reflect the truth. The widespread prevalence of social media and 24 x 7 news channels have empowered individuals by ensuring that not only is information, analysis and opinion available at the click of a button but also that his or her voice is heard, sometimes with telling effect, as the ongoing ‘#MeToo’ movement has shown, both in India and abroad. While empowerment of the individual is a positive development for our democracy, it has also upended governance structures, as it allows unelected individuals and groups to stall progress or any attempt to change the status quo.

    Moreover, unprincipled and unaccountable elements have used such channels to spread vicious lies and propaganda that allows them to organize and indulge in bullying, intimidation and even violence to achieve their own nefarious ends. Political parties too have seen this as a useful tool to dominate the public narrative and occupy mind space. A perfect example is what we were witness to in Gujarat recently where large number of innocent labourers from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh were threatened with violence and hounded out, ostensibly by a local politician, because of an alleged heinous criminal act on the part of one unidentified individual.

    While what we saw in Gujarat was at the extreme end of the spectrum, and was clearly criminal in nature, a more insidious and harmful impact of social media is the constant attempt to question and vilify decision makers and leaders, without necessarily being fully aware of all the facts. Such criticism, apart from creating fissures and uncertainty within an organization, also tends to severely constrain leaders from taking initiatives that fall within their ambit and are necessary if progress is to be made.

    Interestingly, one group who appear to be the torch bearers at the forefront of this “criticism tsunami”, if one can call it that, are military veterans. There are those among them who are extremely critical of the manner in which this government has treated the Armed Forces, with some justification one may add, and are appalled by the seeming subservience of the top brass. There are also those, in fairly substantial numbers, who tend to be extremely conservative in their outlook and view all issues through the prism of nationalism and, for all intents and purposes, are allied to the present governments’ ultra- nationalistic plank. Indeed, there are many among them who have taken the plunge into politics and are members of the BJP, with one former Chief reportedly having even joined the RSS. When you add to this the fact that our adversaries spare no effort at feeding misinformation aimed at polarizing the military community and civil society, there is little doubt that the military finds itself a veritable minefield of clashing ideologies and attitudes through which it has to tread exceedingly cautiously.

    To be fair, much of the criticism against the Forces has been brought on by patently silly attempts of those at the helm to grab headlines and credit to inveigle themselves into the good books of the governing dispension, probably in the hope of post- retirement sinecures. This is not something new, though what differentiates it from earlier times is this governments’ ill-concealed and voracious appetite to take advantage of these officers to politicize much of what the military does in the hope of deriving advantage against its political opponents. Sadly, it has also got into the habit of appropriating military infrastructure for use by the public to win votes, without bothering about the impact of such a step on the military. For example, while military veterans are barred from using military hospitals except in some circumstances, and are therefore covered by the Ex Servicemen Health Scheme, the Government has recently permitted all those covered by CGHS to utilize facilities at Service Hospitals. With an additional 50 Crores personnel to be catered for where will all serving personnel and their dependents go?

    The recent celebration of “Parakram Parv”, a three day commemoration of the cross-border punitive strikes in retaliation to the terror attack against the Uri military camp in which 17 soldiers were killed and scores injured, is another recent example. Without downplaying the significance of the cross-border strikes, probably a far more appropriate manner of honouring the forces, if the Prime Minister indeed genuinely appreciates their contribution, would have been for him to have taken the initiative to get back home the fifty four soldiers still held as Prisoners of War by Pakistan since the 1971 Indo-Pak War. Their continued incarceration, with no attempts by successive governments or civil society for their release, is a matter of national shame that reflects poorly on each and every one of us.

    This brings us to the elephant in the room that must be seen for what it is. It is well known fact that our military’s exemplary record of remaining apolitical is what differentiates it from all other militaries in the region. Individual ideologies and beliefs just have no place in the military’s firmament and politicians of all persuasions have been kept at arms- length, though one must also admit that most political parties have reciprocated similarly and kept their distance from the military as well. Unfortunately, the unsubtle attempt by the current dispensation to foist its ideology amongst the military rank and file, attempting to use “deep selection” among the higher ranks and indirectly through the veteran community that is enamoured of its ultra – nationalistic agenda, and all that it implies, appears to be showing nascent signs of putting down roots. This is an extremely dangerous trend that needs to be dealt with ruthlessly if we are to maintain our military’s neutrality and inclusive character. It seems the time has now come for including a provision within the Service Rules for an appropriate “cooling off” period before any soldier can join either a political party or involve himself in politics. This is particularly so for those leaving in the higher ranks.

    The unedifying manner in which this government has dealt with the Armed Forces over the past four years, whether it be in its dealings with veterans or its refusal to adhere to long standing norms, customs and traditions, has led to increasing antipathy among the rank and file that is clearly reflected in some of their actions that have embarrassed the senior hierarchy and the MOD and shown them in poor light. Seven hundred personnel individually petitioning the Supreme Court on their apprehensions of being victimized while deployed in operations, serving officers publicly criticizing policy directions issued by Army Headquarters on social media and the non-implementation of policy directions issued by the MOD, as has happened in nearly all military cantonments with regard to providing open access to the public, are examples that should be cause for worry. All of this has adversely affected morale, which can also be gauged from the most telling example of an officer having reportedly applied for premature retirement on grounds that his conditions of service have been violated by the down- gradation of the military. That his application was rejected is no cause for optimism.

    The situation is hardly likely to improve given the reported fact that the government is once again attempting, surreptitiously and without appropriate consultation with the military leadership, to look for a method by which it can prevent the Cantonment Boards from taking back bungalows from their present owners on expiry of the 99 year lease period, as required vide the Cantonment Act 2006. One reported solution being considered is to replace the ex officio appointment of the Local Military Authority as President of the Cantonment Board by an elected representative to supposedly further its “democratization” A move that would be violative of the Cantonment Board Act, not that such statutory provisions have stopped it before, especially keeping in mind that some extremely influential people have obtained ownership of these leased bungalows.

    Finally, it should be a matter of great concern that amongst a host of other issues, the Service Chiefs have also quietly acquiesced to the appointment of Mr. Doval, the National Security Advisor, as the de-facto Commander-in-Chief, despite lacking both the constitutional authority and the credentials to hold such an appointment. The irony cannot be missed given that the Services themselves seem reluctant to accept the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff fearing loss of power.

    By conceding their authority the Chiefs have placed the Services in a very tenuous position which can impact their professional standing and functioning in the future. They would do well to study the case of the German Armed Forces, the Reichswehr, formed post the First World War, as an apolitical and professional force. However it rapidly deteriorated after it was ideologically suborned and converted into the Wehrmacht, the unified armed forces of Nazi Germany. This happened largely in part due to the acquiescence of the High Command to orders that were wholly unconstitutional and undemocratic and partly due to the fierce loyalty of some to Nazi ideology. Our hierarchy must not let themselves be lulled into a state of complacency but hold firm on retaining customs and traditions that have allowed our military to occupy the preeminent position that it does in the hearts and minds of our citizens.

    This article was published earlier in Times of India.

    Brigadier Deepak Sinha is a Visiting Senior Fellow at TPF. The views expressed are his own.

  • The Economics Nobel: From the Esoteric to the Practical

    The Economics Nobel: From the Esoteric to the Practical

    Mohan Guruswamy                                                                                   October 15, 2018 : Commentary

    The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel was instituted in 1968 by the Swedish central bank, and laureates are selected by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. It is commonly called the Nobel Prize in Economics, though the Nobel Endowment has nothing to do with it. It has mostly tended to go to scholars doing esoteric research in economics. Much of economic research has tended to be quite remote from influencing public policy. My professor at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Professor Thomas Schelling who taught me “game theory” used in nuclear strategy, and only sometimes in economics, got an Economics Nobel for just that in 2005. Now the trend from the esoteric and philosophical is moving towards the practical.

    This year two American economists, William Nordhaus and Paul Romer, were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics for their work in two diverse areas, but current concerns. Nordhaus won it for his warning policymakers during the first stirrings of concern about climate change in the 1970s that their economic models were not properly taking account of the impact of global warming and he is seen as one of the pioneers of environmental economics.

    The co-winner – Romer – is seen as the prime mover behind the endogenous growth theory, “the notion that countries can improve their underlying performance if they concentrate on supply-side measures such as research and development, innovation and skills”. This simply means developing nations that want to get out of their rut, like India, must invest in quality education and R&D. Instead our bureaucratic centralism has created a huge system whose outcomes are so low grade, that mediocrity passes off as brilliance. The fact that Indian students and scholars have to go abroad to fully harness their brilliance and gain recognition tells us what has gone wrong with our system.

    Paul Romer has argued, “Technological change can be accelerated by the targeted use of state interventions in areas such as R&D tax credits and patent regulation”. He called it “post colonial endogenous growth theory”. This famously inspired the an Oxford don, the economist Derek Morris, to write an odd to it. Its the history of economic theory in verse and is very witty and clever. The relevant verse for us is:

    “Only inventions seemed to have any effect
    And from where these arose everyone was quite bereft
    So people then began to get rather weary
    Of the once almighty neoclassical growth theory

    A new explanation arrived,
    over which there was quite a fuss
    Technical progress – innovation, ideas – were “endogenous”

    Invention was crucial but needed embodiment
    In people – in skills – and in capital investment
    So these were important to make growth shine
    Although others had known this for a very long time.”

    But how does one nurture invention without a national mood? For it is now well understood that how we do as a nation depends a great deal on how we perceive ourselves? This psychological factor is now understood to be critical to sustained economic growth.

    Classical economics was linked closely with psychology. Adam Smith’s other great work was “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” and dealt with the psychological principles of individual behavior. Smith emphasized the concept of empathy, the capacity to recognize feelings that are being experienced by another being. Jeremy Bentham described “utilitarianism as the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong” and is considered by many as the father of the welfare state. Classical economic theory, also known as laissez faire, claims that leaving individuals to make free choices in a free market results in the best allocation of resources. Since individuals made choices the emphasis was on understanding human beings and their behavior as individual and as groups.

    Neo-classical economists based their thinking on the assumptions that people have rational preferences; individuals maximize utility and firm’s profits; and people act independently. Consequently neo-classical economists distanced themselves from psychology and sought explanations for economic analysis heavily based on the concept of rational expectations. For most of the last century economics became increasingly mathematical. Much of economic theory came to be presented as mathematical models, mostly calculus, to clarify assumptions and implications.

    It is not as if the switch was complete. Many great economists like Vilfredo Pareto, John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Schumpeter continued to base their analysis on psychological explanations.

    In more recent times this school of economics has been given greater importance and is reflected in the award of Nobel Prizes to behavioral economists like Daniel Kahneman of Princeton University and last year to Richard Thaler. Making the announcement Nobel Committee said: “His empirical findings and theoretical insights have been instrumental in creating the new and rapidly expanding field of behavioral economics, which has had a profound impact on many areas of economic research and policy.”

    There is a delicious irony in the award of the Nobel to Richard H. Thaler. He works in the University of Chicago, the nursery of classical economics, where he is the Ralph and Dorothy Keller Distinguished Service Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics at the Booth School of Business. Incidentally Raghuram Rajan who is also an economics professor is a colleague, was reported to also being considered for the Nobel for his “contributions illuminating the dimensions of decisions in corporate finance”.

    The dominance of the classical school on the world of economics can be gauged by the fact that since the relatively recent inception of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1968, the Chicago economics department faculty have won the Nobel as many as twelve times, twice as many as MIT, which has six Nobel laureates. Seen from Harvard University’s ivory tower even MIT is considered as leaning more towards classical economic theory. Recent Harvard winners for economics such as Oliver Hart (2016), Alvin Roth (2012) and Eric Maskin (2007) were rewarded for their work based on mathematical empiricism than behavioral speculation. Amartya Sen (1998) was one of the few who broke this mold and won it in recognition of his work and abiding interest in welfare economics.

    Every politician worth his salt knows that national mood and perceptions are decisive in determining national outcomes. And often people do not always make rational choices, something that marketers of diverse products such as automobiles and soap, and political dreams know. But economists took their time recognizing this, and the Nobel Committee even longer. Better late than never.

     

    Mohan Guruswamy is a well known political and economics commentator. He is a Trustee of TPF.

  • Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    The Indian Air Force celebrates its 86th anniversary on this October 8th, making it one of the oldest and large air forces of the world. Despite many challenges, most of which relate to inefficiencies of political decision making and inadequate financial support to modernisation, the IAF has come out with flying colours to continue to demonstrate its operational capabilities and strategic reach. The recent ‘Gaganshakti’ high intensity exercise  is an outstanding example. While the IAF continues to grapple with its huge problems of obsolescence, the last decade and a half has also been testimony to some major transformations underway in the IAF. As the 21st century dawned, the IAF began a rapid transformation from being largely a tactical air force to a strategic force, with significant expeditionary capability.

    Isolation to Outward Engagement

                 For more than half a century, outward engagement of the three services was limited to participation in UN peace-keeping missions. As India began its transformation with economic liberalisation in 1991, it began to dismantle its inward looking licence raj, and with it a global outlook started to emerge. As Indian economy accelerated into an overdrive by the late 1990s, and as India’s strategic image strengthened with  the overt declaration of its nuclear weapon status, the government encouraged military to military interactions and defence diplomacy. IAF’s international engagement expanded significantly from the 2000s. Major bilateral exercises were carried out on regular basis with major air forces – USA, UK, France, Singapore, South Africa, Oman, and Malaysia. Also, the IAF became a regular participant in USAF’s multinational exercises such as Cope Thunder and Red Flag. Recently the IAF has expanded its international exercises to involve Israel, Russia, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. For over a decade, the Singapore Air Force carries out its two month long annual training from one of IAF bases on the eastern coast. Joint exercises for humanitarian assistance, involving multinational forces, is now a regular feature. These interactions and engagements have highlighted IAF’s high quality operational expertise, its global standing, and in turn, has contributed immensely to IAF’s growth in its international understanding. Today, the world sees the IAF as the sharp edge of India’s military power as well as the primary instrument of its humanitarian assistance capability worldwide.

    Enhancing its Reach

                 Although the IAF inducted the Jaguar from 1979, its air-to-air refuelling capability was kept inactive. Induction of Mirage 2000 in 1985 met the same fate. The importance of aerial refuelling in extended range operations by the USA in its Libyan strike, Osirak nuclear reactor strike by Israel, and Falklands operations by the UK was not lost on the IAF, and it decided in favour of this force multiplier in the late 1990s. Although the IAF was one of the last major air forces to induct the aerial refueler, its pace of operationalisation was probably the fastest. In less than a decade IAF fighters were flying across Atlantic Ocean to participate in international exercises like the ‘Red Flag’ and ‘Cope Thunder’. Within the last decade the IAF has demonstrated its extended operational reach through all its major exercises. Aerial refuelers form critical component of IAF’s operational capability in terms of reach and penetration. An expansion of this fleet is now long overdue.

    Technological and Operational Transformation

                 Airpower, by its very nature is technology intensive. The IAF embarked on major operational reorientation through induction of major technologies from the early 2000s. This began with induction of precision weapons, UAVs, electro-optical systems, and sensors. The IAF initiated its first upgrade program in the mid 1990s, for 125 MiG-21 Bis aircraft, by stitching together a complex avionics upgrade involving three nations – Russia, France, and Israel. The success of this program has established an irreversible upgrade culture as a cost-effective strategy for sustaining its force structure. This upgrade strategy has also contributed immensely to  indigenisation capability of Indian industry. The Jaguar fleet went through a series of comprehensive upgrades, giving rise to significant expansion of its capabilities. The Su-30 MKI is an excellent result of IAF’s conceptualisation and implementation of avionics suites and mission optimisation. Between 2004 and now, the IAF’s upgrade strategies have given fresh lease of life to various aircraft fleet and weapon systems: AN-32, MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000, and air defence missile systems. More programs involving upgrades of Su-30 MKI fighters and IL-76 transport aircraft are likely to be taken up soon.

    The IAF moved to transform its air defence operations through the induction of AWACS platforms. Selecting the proven IL-78 platform, the IAF again masterminded a complex three nation development program to evolve a modern, state-of-the art AWACS platform by 2009. The three AWACS platforms inducted in phase I have been utilised extensively to bring in major operational transformation of its air defence operations in a very short time-frame. The AWACS has certainly given the IAF a significant operational edge vis-à-vis the PLAAF challenge across the Himalayas. Simultaneously, the IAF has supported the indigenous program of AEW aircraft development based on Embraer-145 platform.

    Indo-US strategic partnership manifested itself in significant transformation in IAF’s airlift capability. By 2012, the IAF inducted and operationalised C-130J Hercules aircraft for special operations, which is also the IAF’s first 20 tonne airlift aircraft; and C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft. These are going to be joined by Chinook heavy lift helicopters and Apache attack helicopters. By 2012 large numbers of Russian Mi-17 1V helicopters entered service. With these inductions, the IAF’s airlift capability has truly attained transcontinental proportions.

    The air defence missile segment, afflicted by long delays and overruns in terms of cost and time, has finally started showing results. The IAF, inducted its first squadrons of LLQRM (short range air defence missiles) based on Israeli systems, while simultaneously inducting indigenous Akash missile systems. This still indicated huge gaps, which is sought to be filled by the long-delayed MRSAM, jointly developed by India and Israel. With the projected signing of the contract for the Russian S-400 long-range SAMs the air defence will be on stronger operational capability.

    The most significant operational and technological capability of the IAF is its net-work centric warfare capability, which is underway for more than a decade. The IAF is the most significantly networked military force amongst the three services. It first established its primary communication grid, AFNET (Air Force Network), and  simultaneously established its air defence network inclusive of vital command and control network, IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System). The IACCS integrated all its ground based radar sensors and other inputs to create a common operational picture for real-time command and control to become effective. This was a pioneering transformation. The culminating transformation is its ‘airborne network’, which involved evolving NCW concepts based on  futuristic ‘self-organising, master-less, node-less, architecture’. The concepts were validated through a three-year long pilot project in 2013. Centred on the SDR (Software Defined Radio) the IAF is focused on indigenous solution. However, interim acquisition of limited numbers of SDR to kickstart operationalisation has stalled for nearly four years due to our infamous acquisition procedural delays. NCW operationalisation is a huge challenge that involves significantly large number of legacy aircraft and systems.

    The transformation of the IAF as an aerospace force began in the aftermath of Kargil war. IAF has been at the forefront of transforming the ISR domain through its operational strategies involving various ISR assets – UAVs, tactical and strategic reconnaissance systems, and satellites. It has played a stellar  role in defining the roadmap for developing and deploying space assets. It is matter of time before the IAF leads the tri-service aerospace command in true measure to formalise and operationalise India’s Space security strategy.

    IAF as the instrument of India’s Global Power

                 The rise of India and China is the major transformative process of the 21st century international system. That India aspires to be a global power is well known and well founded. India’s march to global power status in the 21st century will be a challenging and arduous task. Rise to great power status is not one of just prestige and power but comes with huge responsibilities. These responsibilities come with significant costs. A great power should be willing to share and shoulder the costs of providing public goods to the global community. This is precisely what the USA is now complaining about, as it finds the costs of sustaining itself as a hegemon is becoming prohibitively expensive. The USA is clearly signalling that aspiring great powers should share the costs of global public goods albeit without upsetting an international order crafted to its advantage. This is where India must rise to the challenge by rising as a benign power with the right balance of hard and soft power to influence the course of emerging power politics.

    The IAF, on its 86th anniversary, is at the cross roads of evolving as the instrument of India’s global power. As the 21st century progresses, the centrality of aerospace power in the national power of major countries has become unquestionable. Joint or integrated warfare has been necessitated by the critical role of aerospace power in all domains, be it precision, reach, rapidity of application, and intelligence through ISR. The viability of conventional deterrence comes from aerospace power’s ability to deter through the fear of precise punishment. It becomes obvious that the IAF has to be the cutting edge instrument of India’s hard military power. This obviously calls for the right combination of force structure with cutting edge technologies and weapon systems with significantly long reach. A serious introspection would reveal that the IAF, as it enters its 87th year, faces daunting challenges of building and sustaining the requisite force structure.

    IAF’s Force Structure Challenges

     IAF has been grappling with problems of obsolescence and dwindling force structure for more than two decades. Long drawn out and unending MMRCA acquisition process is an example of leaving operational capability gaps unactioned as well as loss of opportunities to enhance industrial and technological capabilities. Time and cost overruns in the indigenous Tejas-LCA program is again an operational shortfall for the IAF. The IAF today is at an all-time low of 32 fighter squadrons. An analysis of the history of IAF’s force structure would reveal a story of crisis management to sustain minimum force levels. Much of the blame must go to the political leadership for failure to grasp the importance of sustaining credible conventional force structures, while part of the blame must certainly fall on services themselves.

    JRD Tata committee, set up in the aftermath of 1962 humiliation against China, recommended an IAF force structure of 65 combat squadrons. This was accepted by the government but was pruned down to 39.5 squadrons as an interim measure on account of resource constraints. This figure has remained more or less permanent, till the government approved a figure of 42 squadrons in 2005. Even though the IAF has enhanced its combat capability with the induction of force multipliers, and networked air defence capability, its approved force structure may fall short of meeting India’s requirements of functioning effectively as a global player. In the modern, net-centric aerospace environment, the IAF will be India’s main instrument of conventional deterrence. Tata committee recommendations look more apt for India, given India’s emerging stature and global responsibilities expected of it. However, the immediate requirement is to get IAF’s force structure back to the approved 42 combat squadron strength. Given the large number of aircraft that need to be replaced, this would take at least 15 years if only done on war-footing.

    Modernisation and Indigenisation Imperatives

    As it celebrates its 86th anniversary the IAF would do well to do some serious introspection. Modernisation processes for all militaries in all countries face the challenges of timely resource availability, particularly for capital-intensive service like the Air Force. In India the problem is compounded by inadequate aerospace industrial and technology base. Indian military power, and IAF in particular, is heavily import dependent. Despite more than 70 years of indigenisation efforts, not much has changed in critical areas. A major cause for this state of affairs is the lack of adequate involvement of the user service in project management and technology development. The IAF will have to take a leaf out of the USAF model to make a major impact on indigenisation. This will need the following to be done on a time bound basis:

    • IAF needs to create a cadre of research personal. It also needs to operate aerospace research laboratories. These will focus on research and development of aerospace technologies. Ideally the IAF needs to exercise command and control over laboratories such as ADE, DARE, CABS, etc.
    • Programs like the Tejas-LCA should have been managed by the user service, the IAF, after the technology demonstration phase. Program management by the user service is an absolute must as it will be driven by operational needs balancing technology, cost, and time factors. As a corollary, it becomes obvious that the IAF must create the necessary expertise to manage its programs.
    • IAF’s involvement in DRDO driven programs must clearly define them as those that are technology development oriented and those that are user driven weapon system development. The latter programs must clearly be managed by the IAF while the former must be enabled by IAF support.
    • The IAF must clearly lay down a 20 year strategic roadmap for the government wherein all aircraft and major weapon systems are made completely free of foreign OEM dependence.

     

    Conclusion

                India’s security environment cannot be viewed simply as just border and territorial disputes with Pakistan and China. Its strategic challenges in a fast changing 21st century world are increasing by the day. China’s aerospace capability has leapfrogged significantly over the last two decades, and it poses a major challenge to India. The IAF will need to spearhead India’s aerospace capability to balance China’s dominance.

    IAF’s long-term force structure strategy could revert to its earlier ‘auxiliary air force’ format, albeit in a new form. Indian government wound up the auxiliary air forces post 1962, while it retained the ‘Territorial Army’ model. The benefits of this scheme is well established. It provides huge opportunities to a large segment of qualified young people to do military service, provides a ready reserve, and forms an important component of second rung security structure. With slight modification this could be created as Air National Guards, much like the US system. The objective should be to achieve one squadron of Air National Guards for each state in a defined time period based on financial and technical resources. These squadrons should be equipped with Tejas aircraft. Over a period of time this could become a win-win situation for the IAF, civil society, and the country as a whole. A comprehensive approach to force structure could see the IAF as the foremost air force in Asia and a major powerful force in the world by 2032, that will be IAF’s centenary year.

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     The author, Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (Retd) is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy, Plans & Force Development).

  • US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    Vijay Sakhuja September 02, 2018

    There is a sense of urgency among the militaries of United States and China to gain ascendency in the field of artificial intelligence and machine learning. The United States Department of Defence has set upJoint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) that will help the US military to “preserve and expand military advantage” as also pursue “AI applications with boldness and alacrity while ensuring strong commitment to military ethics and AI safety.” The JAIC will costan estimated $1.7 billion over the next six years. It will work on nearly 600 AI projects in partnershipwith the industry, academia and allies, and will have oversight over almost all service and defense agency AI efforts.

    Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has urgedPresident Donald Trumpto consider formulating a national strategy for artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, the US Army has establishedan AI Task Force and given itself three months to identify “specific skill sets that we’re going to need to be relevant and to thrive in this environment that will include AI and machine learning.”

    Likewise, the Chinese government is pursuing an aggressive policy for the development of artificial intelligence at the national level. In December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology through Circular No. 315called on all agencies under the Central Government to implement ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ and ‘ accelerate the development of artificial intelligence industry, promote the deep integration of artificial intelligence and real economy” It also laid out a ‘Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry ( 2018 – 2020).

    According to a reporttitled “China’s AI Development Report 2018” released by Tsinghua University, the China’s artificial intelligence (AI) market touched 23.7 billion yuan ($3.5 billion) in 2017, with the growth rate expected to reach 75 percent in 2018. Further, China emerged as the ‘most attractive country for AI investment and financing’ and in the last five years since 2013 the Chinese AI industry accounted for 60 percent of the world’s total including 18,232 AI technology research experts  accounting ‘for 8.9 percent of the world’s total and was second only to the United States, which accounted for 13.9 percent’.

    In China, AI is used in a number of sectors like robotics, drones, autonomous vehicles such as cars and trucks, in manufacturing white goods including marketing services. Perhaps what merits attention is that China is investingin AI-related devices and systems that range from the anodyne to the dystopian wherein the military is looking to the technology to work in concert with its military strategy? Further, experts believethat the Chinese are “making their machines more creative” and “A little bit of automation gives the machines a tremendous boost” which can be characterized as “remote warfare”.

    The US is visibly concerned about losing military edge to China in the field of artificial intelligence. The PLA Navy presents different challenges with significant investments made in weapons such as the Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG), Solid State Lasers (SSLs) and other systems and sensors.As noted earlier, AI technologies are also being incorporated into a new generation of anti-ship missiles through autonomous targeting capabilities. Similarly, autonomous air and underwater drones and miniaturized assault boats would soon be part of its force structure It is quite plausible that the PLA Navy may have begun to conduct exercises based on AI and ML and assimilated commonly used and commercially available communication devices such as smart phones, tablets and hybrid devices into its naval strategy.

    AI is surely adding to the war fighting tool kit of both the US Navy and the PLA Navy through stealthy ‘robotic trimaran’(Sea hunter and D3000 respectively)thatcould result in a dangerous escalations of a new kind of competition between the two navies. Similarly, China is developing autonomous robotic submarines which are likely to be ready for operations by the early 2020s and supplement regular human-operated submarines. This is sure to pose another set of challenge to the US Navy.

    Dr Vijay Sakhuja is a Trustee of TPF.

  • The Centrality of MADness in Nuclear Doctrine

    The Centrality of MADness in Nuclear Doctrine

    Mohan Guruswamy August 24, 2018

    It has been reported that the defence acquisitions council (DAC), chaired by defence minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, has approved the “acceptance of necessity (AoN) for the acquisition of the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II (NASAMS-II) worth around $1 billion from the US. However, in 2002 the USA had vetoed India’s bid to acquire the Israeli Arrow-2 missile interceptor system. Consequently, DRDO began developing the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD), which will provide long-range high-altitude ballistic missile interception during an incoming missile’s midcourse phase as well as interception during the terminal phase. At various times these systems had different monikers like ballistic missile defence (BMD) or anti-ballistic missile system (ABM).

    The people who decide on such things reside in New Delhi and understandably their safety gets priority. So it is the NCR that will get the expensive and exaggerated sense of protection such systems tend to generate. But no air defence system can be deemed impenetrable. The Americans and Russians realized much before the Cold War ended that the costs involved will be prohibitive, even for them and made a virtue of necessity. But the idea was seductive. Even as the Cold War was waning, Ronald Reagan toyed with the idea of a strategic defence initiative (SDI), which envisaged an ABM systems stationed deep in space that will launch on picking up a launch. It seemed far-fetched and futuristic that commentators took to calling it Star Wars.

    This thought has been high on the minds of our security establishment ever since it learned that on May 26, 1990 China tested a Pakistani derivative of its CHIC-4 design at the Lop Nor test site, with a yield in the 10 to 12 kiloton (kt) range. That yield estimate accords with recorded yields of Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests, which are somewhere between 5 and 12 kt. Refinements in boosting and efficient plutonium use are the normal next steps in weapon improvement, along with miniaturization of the warheads to fit into smaller and lighter reentry vehicles. Pakistan has done all of these to arm its cruise and ballistic missiles with lighter payloads. Once India deploys the PAD system around its capital, we can be assured that Pakistan too will deploy an ABM around Islamabad. We can also rest assured that China will assist it in “developing” such a capability.

    The International Panel on Fissile Materials has estimated that Pakistan has an inventory of approximately 3,100 kilograms (kg) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and roughly 170kg of weapon-grade plutonium This is enough to potentially produce 200 to 300 warheads. Pakistan has also frequently tested the ranges of about a dozen Chinese derived missiles from the Hatf (50 km) to Shaheen III (2750 km). There is little doubt that Pakistan has planned for all eventualities, from local battlefield use and to feed its desire to have a credible “Islamic” bomb capability, and for that its reach must include Tel Aviv.

    Long after the Cold War has ended, nuclear deterrence is still based on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This simply means that any sneak decapitating or debilitating first strike will be responded with a massive retaliation, the fear of which should instill good sense. That after almost three quarters of a century when the nuclear genie was uncorked from the bottle, we have not had a nuclear war or weapon use is living proof of its robust common sense. So much so, that when developments in ABM or BMD capability reached fruition, the two Cold War protagonists, the USA and now defunct USSR, had a treaty restricting these systems. Ironically even well before they had a treaty on reducing the number of nuclear bombs.

    The MAD doctrine was made painfully credible, by the development of nuclear arsenal survivability by widespread deployment (at the peak of the Cold War America and Russia each had over 30,000 nuclear bombs.) This credibility got its biggest boost when submarines, initially diesel and then nuclear powered, capable of firing nuclear armed missiles (SSBN) from the impenetrable dark recesses of the oceans were introduced. The first of these submarines was the Russian Zulu Class submarine capable of firing from underwater an early Scud missile (1955). The Americans were the first to deploy a long endurance, deep diving and very silent nuclear powered submarine – George Washington – in 1959. Since then MAD was ensured by the highly accurate missiles in the bellies of such submarines operated by the US, Russian, British, French, Chinese and India navies. Pakistan too is now reportedly testing nuclear capable missiles fired from underwater on modified diesel submarines.

    We need to learn from how nuclear weapons strategies evolved during the Cold War, instead of mimicking USA and Soviet follies. The notion of deterrence between the USA and USSR was based on no escape from MAD. The march of the Cold War follies peaked with the two protagonists together deploying almost 70,000 warheads each aimed at a specific target. At the height of this madness almost every open ground was targeted as possible tank marshaling or military logistics areas. The last thing we hence want is getting into a numbers game with Pakistan or China. Credibility depends on reducing the uncertainty of use from the opposite perspective. The Indian PAD missile defence system only increases them. India and Pakistan have ensured a modicum of confidence by not mating the warheads and delivery systems, giving a vital period to rollback the unleashing of Armageddon. But now both countries will have to evolve a launch on warning doctrine.

    Clearly, the two South Asian nuclear powers too have a local version of MAD in place. The Pakistani doctrine “commits itself” to use battlefield nuclear weapons if an Indian conventional assault threatens its essential nationhood and hence it has steadfastly refused to accept the notion of “no first use” (NFU). The Indian doctrine emphasizes NFU but also makes it explicit that any Pakistani use of nuclear weapons on India or its forces will be responded with a massive retaliation. India may have less nuclear weapons, not because it cannot make more, but what it has is enough to ensure the complete annihilation of Pakistan, which is geographically too a much smaller country. China has moved on from NFU to a doctrine now called “credible minimum deterrence”. But how much is credible?

    Mercifully, nuclear doctrines these days are couched in such abstractions as MAD requires a degree of predictability, ironically ensured by opacity. The USA’s “single integrated operational plan” (SIOP) began with the ominous words that its objective, after the outbreak of a general war with the then Soviet Union to turn it into a “smoking radiating ruin.” It was written by its the certifiable USAF chief, Gen. Curtis Lemay Jr., based on whom the character played by George C. Scott in the Stanley Kubrick classic “Dr. Strangelove” was created. But people like Lemay who gave MAD credibility. Since no one of a sane frame of mind would even contemplate the enormity of the disaster of a nuclear war, uncertainty of use was a key element of MAD. It has been written that Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev used to have sleepless nights thinking of a man like Richard Nixon with his finger on the button.

    India’s nuclear strategy documents in detail as to who the nuclear command would devolve to in the unlikely event of a decapitating first strike on New Delhi with the aim of eliminating its national leadership. It is said that chain of nuclear command keeps descending downwards to a Major General, a modern day Raja Parikshit so to say who will perform the final obsequies. At last count India had over 600 military officers at that level. Decapitating all of them is a near statistical and physical impossibility. It will take tens of thousands to precision nuclear weapons to annihilate India’s military chain of command, and it can be speculated whether even America or Russia can achieve that, let alone Pakistan?

    Ironically, the evocative acronym MAD doctrine is eminently sensible. Good sense should tell us that enough of this madness and leave MAD alone.

    This Op-Ed was originally published in Asian Age.

    Mohan Guruswamy is a Trustee of TPF.

  • Women In Indian Armed Forces

    Women In Indian Armed Forces

    Center for Women’s Studies & Department of History
    Women’s Christian College, Chennai
    & The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai

    cordially invite you to the Inauguration of the

    National Seminar

    Women in Indian Armed Forces:
    Changing Contexts and Transformations

    On 8th March 2018 at 9.00 a.m.

    at the Auditorium (Centenary Building)

    Inaugural Address

    Dr. C. Joshua Thomas

    Coordinator, ASEAN Studies Centre &, Deputy Director,

    ICSSR North Eastern Regional Centre, NEHU Campus, Meghalaya

    Keynote Address

    Air Marshal (Retd.) Dr. M. Matheswaran

    Former Deputy Chief, Integrated Defence Staff (Air),

    South Block, Govt of India, New Delhi

    Chairman The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai

    Special Address

    Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Vinod G. Khandare

    Former Director General Defence Intelligence Agency, New Delhi

    Sponsored by

    Indian Council for Social Science Research,

    New Delhi & Southern Regional Centre, Hyderabad

    Events Snaps

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  • The Military Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership – Panel Discussion at Stimson Centre

    The Military Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership – Panel Discussion at Stimson Centre

    Past Events July 24, 2018 The Military-Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership
    JULY 24, 2018 | 12:15 PM
    Please join the Stimson South Asia program for a conversation with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, the former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff in the Indian Ministry of Defence, who will talk about the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership. Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School, and Benjamin Schwartz, Head of the Aerospace and Defense Program at the U.S.-India Business Council, will serve as discussants. Sameer Lalwani of the Stimson Center will moderate.
    WHAT: An on-the-record discussion with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran on the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership.
    WHERE: The Stimson Center, 1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 8th Floor, Washington DC, 20036
    WHEN: Tuesday, July 24 from 12.15 to 2 pm. Lunch will be served at 12.15 and the discussion will begin at 12.30.
    RSVP: Click here to RSVP for the event.
    FOLLOW: @StimsonCenter on Twitter for event news and use #StimsonNow to join the conversation
    Featuring:
    Sameer Lalwani, Senior Associate and Co-Director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center (moderator)
    Sameer Lalwani is a Senior Associate and Co-Director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center where he researches nuclear deterrence, inter-state rivalry, and counter/insurgency. He is also an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School and a Contributing Editor to War on the Rocks.
    Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff, Indian Ministry of Defence
    Air Marshal M. Matheswaran retired from the Indian Air Force in 2014 after nearly 39 years of military service. In his last appointment, he was the Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff for 23 months at the tri-service headquarters in the Ministry of Defence, India. Since then, he has held defense and aerospace consulting positions at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Reliance Defence. He is the Founder, Chairman, and President of the Peninsula Foundation, a think-tank for security policy research.
    Benjamin Schwartz, Head, Aerospace & Defense, U.S.-India Business Council
    Benjamin Schwartz leads the U.S.-India Business Council’s Defense and Aerospace program where he advocates for pro-trade policies before officials in the Indian and American governments. He previously served in a range of positions within the U.S. national security community, including at the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense, where he was Director for India in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University.
    Joanna Spear is Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the FAO Regional Sustainment Initiative at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Her areas of focus include U.S. and UK arms sales policies, U.S. counter-proliferation policies, and transatlantic relations. In 2012, she was a Senior Visiting Fellow at Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses New Delhi, working on India’s arms import policies and offset strategies.
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