The Peninsula Foundation

Category: TPF Analysis

  • Is MGNREGA a Sustainable Employment Option for Migrants?

    Is MGNREGA a Sustainable Employment Option for Migrants?

    Covid-19 certainly has kindled a renewed focus on healthcare systems, sanitation, and most importantly, employment in the rural areas of the country. The pandemic has thrown light on the huge inadequacies and challenges of our healthcare structure that the government and the citizens had not foreseen. Millions of skilled and unskilled migrants moved across the country in droves to their hometowns in the absence of income and work and means to sustain their life. Around 30 Million (3 Crore) or 15-20% of the total urban workforce left for their hometowns, accounting for the largest ever reverse migration trend in the country, exclusive of intra-state migration. The World Bank in its report mentioned that a whopping number of 40 million internal migrants were harshly affected by the lockdown. Now that the country is just a few steps from opening up in full, concerns about workers moving back in search of work remain in the air. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), which has a mixed track record in sustaining the livelihood of people in distress by providing guaranteed employment and considerate wages might be the only way out for the worst of the worst-affected. But, will the scheme be a viable and sustainable employment option for the days and years to come? This article aims to answer the question of efficiency, significance, and sustainability of MGNREGA in rural employment in the country.

    What is MGNREGA?

    MGNREGA, the world’s largest guarantee work programme, is the legitimised pioneer of the fundamental ‘Right to Work’. The scheme does that by providing a time-bound guarantee of work for 100 days a year, with considerate fixed wages. Workers under the scheme are assigned to agriculture and related capacity building projects thus ensuring sustainable development for all, as advocated by Gandhi. The scheme has reasonable success stories to its credit, all across the country. A study by Parida (2016) at Odisha proves that MGNREGA has played an important role in the agricultural off-season by providing work to the needy, the poor, and the socially marginalised communities. In various villages in Sikkim, families under MGNREGA were more self-reliant and less dependent on government programmes for a livelihood, according to the results of an evaluation conducted by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (2017).

    The Ministry of Finance announced Rs. 40,000 crore fund allocation to MGNREGA on the onset of the fourth phase of lockdown in May, while under the Atmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan, the government plans in creating jobs for 300 Crore persons, and the national average wages of workers also saw an increase from Rs. 182 per day per person to Rs. 202, with effect from April 1st, 2020. All of these might come off as a huge sigh of relief to the worst affected, but in many states, the scheme wage rates are lower than the minimum wages in the respective states. So, this increase in wages does not hold huge significance in reality.

    Unemployment and Work Allocation Concerns

    Reverse Migration Trends and Unemployment:      Unemployment has always been a perennial problem for a developing country like India, especially in times of crisis. The unemployment rate of the country reached an all-time high of close to 24% in April, while the rate of unemployment is expected to reach 8-8.5% in 2020-21, which may increase owing to the reverse migration trends. According to the Former Chief Statistician of India, rural unemployment is now a double-edged sword, given the impact of different migration trends. The reverse migration trends have altered the demand-supply dynamics in rural India significantly. Areas that previously had negative net migration rates are now expected to experience labour surplus, while the locations that may need workers might lack supply. The trends in reverse migration and its impact on local employment in states are visible, with Uttarakhand topping the charts in both the number of reverse migrants and the unemployment rate at around 22.3% as of September. The state is followed by Tripura at 17.4% and Bihar at 11.9%. Thus a strong correlation can be inferred between the amount of reverse migration and the unemployment rate in a given state.

    Putting together numbers of short-term and long-term vulnerable workers gives us a total of about 13 Crore (130 million) workers, who are deeply affected by the Covid-19 crisis.

    Another trend that is recognisable from literature is that migration is no longer a one-way street. Seasonal and circular migration continues to grow and take various forms (Conell et.al., 1976). Amongst these, vulnerable circular migrants are termed as the most distressed section of migrants, which include both Short-term seasonal and long-term occupationally vulnerable workers. Srivastava (2020) has estimated the number of 5.9 crore short-duration circular migrant workers in the year 2017-18. In the same study, vulnerable long-term circular migrants have been identified at 6.9 crores in the same period. Putting together numbers of short-term and long-term vulnerable workers gives us a total of about 13 Crore (130 million) workers, who are deeply affected by the Covid-19 crisis.

    Work Allocation Concerns:     Besides, The Taskforce for Eliminating Poverty constituted by Niti Aayog in the year 2015 (Occasional Paper,2016) has noted that most beneficiaries under the MGNREGS have been on an average get only 50 days of work. This shows that the scheme requires a better mechanism that recommends better targeting of the poorest of the poor and gets them guaranteed work for 100 days. Additionally, if 50-60% of the migrant workers in urban India (2018 above) return to their home destinations, then the scheme has to accommodate between 5.5 – 6.6 crore new workers, which will add 50 – 60% weight on people to be accommodated under the scheme. This exerts additional pressure on the already drying up state funds, which means catering to the huge number of migrants might not be economically sustainable for a long period.

    Wages and Work Efficiency under MGNREGA

    The wage rate in MGNREGA has been a huge concern for policymakers across India. While the recent increase in wages seemed quite positive at the onset, the wage hike is lesser than the minimum wage rate in certain states. Wage rates in the year 2019 seemed to be on the same trajectory, with the MGNREGA wage hike being lesser than the minimum wages in 33 states. Long payment delays also with meager wages add to the burden on workers under the scheme. Another important loophole in the scheme is the availability of work for such a huge number of workers seeking work under the scheme. In most cases, work is inadequate for such a huge number of workers. The standing committee report on rural development for the year 2012-13 also mentioned a significant decline in annual work completion rates (%). According to the report, work completion rates have taken a deep plunge consecutively in the years after 2011, with work completion rates of 20.25% for the year 2012, and 15.02% for the year ending 2013. Such dismal performances also throw light on the lack of productive allocation of work under the scheme. All of these certainly are results of the weakening of the act.

     CONCLUSION

     While MGNREGA fails in addressing a lot of important issues, COVID-19 certainly allows it to fit the dynamic changes in employment and work conditions. Making amendments to the act can be the only way out if the act needs to be sustainable in the long term. MGNREGA gives a rights-based framework to migrants seeking skilled and unskilled labour opportunities but lacks in giving enough benefits to the workers. Work under the scheme should be allocated efficiently, as per the project needs. While COVID-19 put a halt to a lot of existing projects, a lot of new projects are on the anvil. Catering to the needs arising on account of the pandemic including sanitation infrastructure building projects and infrastructure and rehabilitation projects can help the scheme diversify its project base, thus increasing employment opportunities to the migrants. Agriculture, the only positive contributor to the GDP of the country should be taken advantage of in the situation. A strong work evaluation setup should be made sure of, that would efficiently track work completion records thus giving opportunities for workers to complete the incomplete projects. This will yield benefits in both completion of a project and increased workdays and consequently increased wages for a worker.

    Cash-based transactions can be a game-changer in this scenario. Instead of reliance on Aadhar, the unbanked should be remunerated regularly by the means of cash.

    Need for Cash-Based Wage Transfer:      While cash crunch and plunging aggregate demand are looming over the country’s economy, MGNREGA can be used as a tool to put money in the hands of the needy. The propensity to consume of a rural worker is way higher than that of an urban employee. Cash-based transactions can be a game-changer in this scenario. Instead of reliance on Aadhar, the unbanked should be remunerated regularly by the means of cash. Bank and Post office ways of remunerating workers surely did have an impact on corruption, but irregular payments and lack of access to formal banking systems are a common testimony among the migrants. Reverse migration is also the beginning of people bringing themselves into the formal cycle of work, with their enrolment under MGNREGA. Tapping the untapped potential and better engagement and benefits to workers under the scheme will largely increase its base and efficiency. If states learn from their past mistakes and amend the working system of the act, then surely it may do wonders in rural employment in the country.

    Image Credit; The Quint

  • Comparing School Education in India and Singapore

    Comparing School Education in India and Singapore

    Introduction

    The United Nations has recognised the right to education as a basic human right, and in most countries, education is compulsory up to a certain age. In India education is primarily provides education in India by private schools, which run independently of the government, and public schools administered and funded by the government at three levels; central, state and local. Under the Indian Constitution, education is a fundamental right to children aged 6 to 14, however, there is no law in place that makes education compulsory. India has a literacy rate of 74.04%, and according to the world bank, Indian schools face challenges in primary enrollment, quality of teachers and application-based learning. Comparatively, Singapore has a literacy rate of 98.3% where education is primarily in the public sector and is fully controlled by the government. Under the Laws of Singapore, every child needs to complete at least 6 years of education, not doing so is a punishable offence. Though the education system in Singapore can be competitive, it ensures every child is well rounded and balanced and can apply their learnings critically. Through this paper, I will explore the fundamental difference between the education system in India and Singapore.

    Singapore has evolved from a third world into a first world country within 10 years, and one of the main attributes to this rapid growth has been education. The Singapore education system is one of the most advanced systems in the world.

    Importance of Education in Development

    Singapore has evolved from a third world into a first world country within 10 years, and one of the main attributes to this rapid growth has been education. The Singapore education system is one of the most advanced systems in the world. The country consistently ranks at the top of the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), a triennial test of 15-year-olds in dozens of countries, in the main three categories of maths, reading and science. Singapore also has very strict penalties for breaking the law. According to the Compulsory Education Act of 2000, all Singaporean students must attend 6 years of compulsory education, and it imposes a $5000 fine per year for failure to do so. According to the law, all local Singaporean students must attend schools run by the government to maintain equal education opportunities for all. Private schools in Singapore are predominantly for foreign students, while government schools are for the citizens, this incentivises the government to invest in public schools, which improves the overall quality of education.

    According to the Compulsory Education Act of 2000, all Singaporean students must attend 6 years of compulsory education, and it imposes a $5000 fine per year for failure to do so.

    India has a child labour rate of 3.9%, and yet there is no law in place that makes education compulsory. The Indian parliament passed the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act in 2009 (9 years after Singapore), wherein it’s a constitutional right for all children to attend school from ages 6 to 14, however, is not a law with penalties if not complied to. The lack of enforcement of education is one of the principal reasons India’s literacy rate, especially among women (65.5%), is so low. Local students can attend either public or private schools, however, government schools are usually considered predominantly for marginalized sections of the community. Hence, there is a lack of funding for public schools, which lacks in both quantity and quality. In 2018/19 India spent roughly 2% of its total GDP on education, which was US $72 billion, from a GDP of US $2.7 trillion, additionally one must take into consideration the high levels of corruption experienced in India. Comparatively, Singapore spent US $13 billion, which was 3.2% of its total GDP of US $372 billion, mostly spent on infrastructure development and updating the curriculum.

     

    Teachers: Quality, Training, Accountability, and Creativity

    The process of hiring teachers varies drastically in the two countries. Singapore has many regulations to hire teachers, for example, to become a primary school teacher one needs to be a graduate, with additional special teaching training given by the government. Subsequently, the government monitors their performances closely and continuously. The government also ensures that the teacher-student ratio is better than 1:20, to provide customised care and attention to each student. Teachers have strict rules on behaviour and etiquette, from the language they use to the style of teaching they adopt, the government monitors all teacher-student interactions. It also provides regular training to ensure they learn new skills to share with their students. A study by the Singapore Management University claims that the quality of teaching and teacher’s pay has a direct correlation. Thus, school teachers in Singapore are well paid where the average annual salary of a teacher is anywhere between US $31,539  to US $56,543. According to Imperial college, paying teachers more means more educated and talented people would want to become teachers, which improves the quality of education.

    According to the Indian NGO, Child’s Rights and You (CRY), the checks and surveys by the government to monitor the quality of education are very irregular, and teachers rarely face any consequences.

     India has no special requirements for becoming a government school teacher apart from having a graduate degree. The average teacher to student ratio in Indian government schools is 1:40, which is significantly higher than the recommended ratio suggested by the UN. According to the UN, the maximum teacher to pupil ratio should be around 1:30, to give each child the care and attention they need. According to the Indian NGO, Child’s Rights and You (CRY), the checks and surveys by the government to monitor the quality of education are very irregular, and teachers rarely face any consequences. The cases of child abuse by teachers i.e. hitting or sexual assault are reducing but the numbers are still quite high, because of lack of teacher accountability. This proves to be a major setback for government schools, since one of the principal reasons families do not send their kids to public schools is the fear of child abuse. Last, the average yearly salary of a teacher is anywhere between US $5,400 to US $7440, which is considerably low and can lead to teachers being frustrated and uninterested in the job. According to ‘The Hindu’, teachers being underpaid is one of the leading factors to the lack of quality in public education in India. Through this, it is clear why Singapore has a more advanced education system, not only is it well funded but also well monitored, the government ensures quality education for each child by investing in good teachers.

    Curriculum and Pedagogy

    According to Child physiology research by the University of California, which is more important than the curriculum itself, is the methods of teaching and the spirit in which the teaching is given. Singapore has moulded its curriculum to allow students to explore their interests through research-based projects and activities, rather than a strict textbook method of teaching. According to the Psychology department in UCL, project and research-based learning stimulates cognitive skills and boosts creativity and the ability for children to innovate, which is a much more effective way of education rather than traditional textbook-based learning. The government invests largely in labs and other technology to enable application-based learning to develop analytical skills in students, which is then paired with classroom theory-based learning. Singapore achieves application-based learning firstly through a flexible yet focused curriculum, wherein students may choose matters that interest them and are given a range of options on how they want to be tested. Second, through Pedagogy, which is most commonly understood as the approach to teaching, and to the theory and practice of learning, and how this process influences, and is influenced by the social, political and psychological development of learners. Examples would be where students and teachers produce work and learning together. The teacher becomes more of a mentor or coach helping students achieve the learning goal. Students also work together and use each other’s skills and expertise to accomplish a set of learning tasks. This enables students to feel like they are more involved in their education, which makes them more interested and invested in what they are learning and hence is one of the most effective methods of education. Lastly, by prioritising quality over quantity, which means that education is pedagogically and developmentally sound and educates the student in becoming an active and productive member of society. Quality education is not one that is measured purely by a test score or by how many words per minute a 5-year-old can read, but rather how many words it can understand. It involves critical thinking, learning to work with others independently and learning to face the realities of life applying the knowledge learnt in their academic life. Singapore does not require its students to take many subjects and activities, but rather focuses on a high standard of teaching and engagement, thus creating a more productive society.

    The fundamental difference between the Singaporean and Indian education system is creativity, while the creativity of children is barely given any importance in the Indian education system, Singapore cultivates the creative ability of its students.

    However, India has a system more focused on theory-based learning, rather than using the practical application. According to the Center for Child Research Singapore, the education system in India does not prepare most young adults for employability because of the lack of ability to critically think and solve unfamiliar problems. The system gives a disproportionate amount of importance to rote learning rather than creativity. The Indian education system hasn’t been updated in several years and thus seems extremely backward. The fundamental difference between the Singaporean and Indian education system is creativity, while the creativity of children is barely given any importance in the Indian education system, Singapore cultivates the creative ability of its students. According to former Singaporean Prime minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore could transition from the third world to a first world country within 10 years because of creativity. This creativity shows in new businesses, in groundbreaking policies, and even in city planning. Singapore is constantly innovating and adapting to better their standards of living, and research-based learning is extremely essential to produce an innovative community. The Indian system does not pay adequate attention to pedagogy, since there is a very rigid curriculum set in place with little room for students to mould according to their interests. Lastly, there is a lack of investment for technology-based learning which can help improve application and research-based teaching. For example, Singapore ensures laptops are available in all classrooms for research, they also use a cloud computing system with all the assignments and textbooks available for students to access even if they are unable to attend school.

    Education for Children with Special Needs

    Singapore has also invested in a speech to text option for blind students and ones who have any learning disabilities such as ADHD. Through these investments, every student has an equal opportunity to learn.

    Students with special needs often need more care and attention than the average student. Singapore ensures every school has a set of teachers specially trained to assist children with learning disabilities. However, Singapore still does not have enough public schools specialised for special needs students. According to the World Bank, 71% of children with autism still attend mainstream schools. Research has shown that mainstream schools are frequently neither fully educated nor equipped to deal with the needs of an autistic child and give them the support. There are over 2,500 schools for children with special needs in India some are run or supported by the government, while many are run by registered NGOs or private institutions. However, there are only 20 special needs schools in Singapore which offer different programmes that cater to distinct disability groups of children. However, Singapore has increased investment in building more schools and opportunities in the workplace for people with special needs or any learning disabilities.

    Conclusion

    In conclusion, one can argue that it is unfair to compare a city (Singapore) to a country like India, since Singapore is way smaller and has a higher GDP per capita. However, the comparison is mainly based on the methods of education. Through this paper, we understood the difference in teaching methods, which India could easily adopt by updating the curriculum. By updating the Indian system to enable kids to be more creative and research-oriented, India will produce generations of critical thinking and productive workforce that would eventually boost the Indian economy and the nation.

    Feature Image Credit: akshayapatrafoundation from pixabay
    Image Credit: A Singapore classroom  www.todayonline.com

  • International Institutions in post-Covid Era

    International Institutions in post-Covid Era

    Pandemic exposes inadequacies in the 21st century world

    At the Munich Security Conference 2020, the Indian External Affairs Minister stated that multilateralism has weakened, and attributed it to the inadequacy of international institutions, established seventy-five years ago, to cope with the challenges of 21st century. This was just before the coronavirus became a global pandemic. Today, among other aspects of society that are challenged by the pandemic, its impact on the world has exposed the inability of international organizations to develop a globally cooperative strategy. The September edition of the UNSC meeting held regarding the coronavirus pandemic saw the United States, China, and Russia fight bitterly over responsibility and responsiveness to the pandemic. Instead of building constructive solutions to face the challenge each country focused on accusing others. Similarly, although the Covid-19 global response pledging event secured 7.4 billion euros, their origins (whether new or retargeting of approved grants), method of fund application, proposed call for global research sharing platforms are either ambiguous or not yet set up. Hence, although international organizations have promoted dialogue, the jury is still out on their efforts towards alleviating the crisis or cushioning its impact. The pandemic thus leads to questions about their effectiveness and what post-covid international institutions might look like.

    Given the manner in which various nation-states represent, contribute to, and run international organizations it is definitive that the nature of international institutions is susceptible to change.

    Institutionalism and International Organisations

    International Organisations such as the United Nations and its predecessor the League of Nations mark the variety of multilateralism brought to life based on the theory of institutionalism. Institutionalism originated from the thought that if humans are fundamentally good but act otherwise it is because of anarchy in the international system, and through institutions fostering international cooperation anarchy can be countered to promote the fundamental good in human nature. The final goal of institutionalism stood to promote supranational organizations. However, there have been drawbacks in bringing practicality to this theory. These institutions are built on belief (an individual external factor to the institution itself brought by participants) and power in international institutions is extended when states surrender part of their sovereignty. The changes and differences in individual beliefs cause significant changes in institutions in both the way they operate and the consequences of their operations. Given the manner in which various nation-states represent, contribute to, and run international organizations it is definitive that the nature of international institutions is susceptible to change. Hence, better international coordination and responses to the past crisis such as the 2008 financial crisis, controlling the Ebola breakout in West Africa were also a result of the leftist individual beliefs of participants. However, with global politics inclining towards the right, with waves of hyper-nationalism sweeping across nations, efforts towards multilateralism have taken a back seat. Stephen Walt maintained that the pandemic will reinforce nationalism as the world retreats from hyper-globalization to reduce future vulnerabilities and will create a world that is ‘less open, less prosperous, and less free’. The pandemic has put the world on a trajectory towards the right with politicians becoming more authoritative, and thus multilateralism will see significant changes in the post-covid era.

    Rise of narrow Nationalism and Right Wing Politics

    Despite the rise of right-wing politics globally, the benefits of multilateralism cannot be foregone. Multilateralism in international institutions in past crises followed a model wherein the United States took the lead across various organizations and coordinated the world towards a united response. Since such leadership has been replaced with great power politics, multilateralism has taken an operational role instead of a supervisory role. The main difference between the two roles is that the latter had better potential to progress as a supranational organization while the former traverses as a platform offering supporting services to different countries. Examples of this are efforts led by NATO to use their airlifting capabilities to move vital medical equipment and food supplies, and WHO’s initiative to share guidelines and important research to countries who then took individual decisions. In the current trajectory, these changes in institutional consequences can lead towards three possibilities in the future of multilateralism:

    At the risk of sounding highly pessimistic, the institutional belief in multilateralism is likely to see a steep decline and sovereignty surrendered to international organizations will erode. The role of the UN and its organs may change focus on global data collection, analysis, and politically motivated discussions from the current (weakening) narrative of progress, development, conflict prevention, and resolution.

    • As Robert Kaplan argues, Coronavirus has become the watershed movement segregating the upcoming era as Globalisation 2.0 with the rise of autocracies, social and class divides, and new emerging global divisions. This image of globalization 2.0 can be used to reflect on what the next era of multilateralism will be. In the continuing trajectory with no clear international leadership, international institutions would reduce to becoming a platform of dialogue in great power politics with the initiative and effectiveness of resolutions substantially watered down. At the risk of sounding highly pessimistic, the institutional belief in multilateralism is likely to see a steep decline and sovereignty surrendered to international organizations will erode. The role of the UN and its organs may change focus on global data collection, analysis, and politically motivated discussions from the current (weakening) narrative of progress, development, conflict prevention, and resolution. For instance, the pandemic-induced embargo on the movement of people would in turn catalyse the degeneration of organs such as the UNHCR as the dialogue focuses on data collection and blame allocation instead of refugee crisis management. The international political narrative will shift from globalism to regionalism for effective conflict resolution.

     

    • As US-China rivalry hampers effective policymaking, relatively smaller powers will lead the narrative in these institutions. The foundations for this possibility are already evident. The United Kingdom and other European countries have been increasingly calling for global summits to promote multilateralism. Their efforts can be theorized to be an enmeshment strategy similar to that used by small states in ASEAN. The objective of this strategy is to alleviate the high risks of major powers directly competing by creating interdependence (if not directly between the great powers) among the various actors in the system through increased multilateral participation to an extent that great powers are tied down in this system and their interests are intertwined such that conflict would become costly. Thus smaller powers prevent the complete breakdown of international organizations by continuing to promote dialogue and ensure the persistence of multilateralism, albeit weaker, but prevent the division into two great-power blocs as with the first scenario. This approach where smaller states remain neutral to great power influences would in turn result in the latter’s effort to win over small states characterized by the exploitation of the cold war by small states. Although the US has so far managed to step away from this, with the oncoming elections it is likely that a change in administration would enable the enmeshment strategy to prevent an extreme global division.

     

    • Taking an optimistic view, the pandemic may catalyse the trajectory towards Ikenberry’s Multilateralism 3.0 where power in the institutions is more reflective of present-day world powers. Given the shift in American foreign policy and lack of initiative, the pandemic could become an important shaper for other Asian powers to get higher representation to balance China’s rise. Although this demonstrates an idealistic situation far from the rightist trajectory, Ikenberry concedes to the fact that in the short-run countries will be nationalistic but in the long run, democracies will break out from the authoritarian, nationalistic regimes to promote a pragmatic and protective internationalism. Ikenberry makes this interpretation based on the enlightenment world leaders had following the destruction and suffering from the world wars. Hence, the pandemic marks the starting point for the butterfly effect which will lead to wartime-like geopolitics, followed by enlightenment to build stronger international institutions with representations reflective of the new world order and better capable of dealing with issues the current institutions struggle to resolve.

    Conclusion

    Although international cooperation would be the sensible means to navigate through the pandemic and other crisis induced by the pandemic, due to factors external to the institution, such as domestically controlled participant change – multilateralism will see considerable weakening. Among the three possibilities identified for the future of international institutions, only time can tell which path the world will take. However, a combination of the second possibility in the short run progressing to the third over the long run is the most optimistic option to work upon for a better pathway to navigate through this crisis.

    Image: Pixabay

  • Vietnam: Economic Prospects in Post Second Wave Covid-19

    Vietnam: Economic Prospects in Post Second Wave Covid-19

    The global community is into the ninth month of the COVID-19 pandemic and international efforts to develop a vaccine are at advanced stages.  Meanwhile in Russia over 250 Moscow residents received a dose of Sputnik V[i] and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has announced that the vaccine will be ready by November this year.[ii]Similarly, many American, British, European, and Indian companies are developing the vaccine which is at different levels of trials.  While the above progress is very encouraging, the global COVID-19 infections continue to rise and as on 13 October, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the total confirmed cases of COVID-19 were 37,601,848 people including 1,077,799 deaths.[iii] The top four countries with the highest infections were the US, India, Brazil and Russia.

    Vietnam’s COVID response since 23 January 2020, when the first case was detected, has been noteworthy. It successfully contained the spread of the virus by instituting local quarantine measures in early stages, declaring a state of emergency in February, and banning flights to and from China. For the next two months, Vietnam maintained strict COVID related measures including national lockdown and it was only in late April that some restrictions were removed in localities if they had contained the virus; but non-essential public services remained suspended. The opening up continued slowly with the resumption of flights to select destinations and cross-border travel restrictions were lifted. Meanwhile, Vietnam registered to buy a Russian Covid-19 vaccine as also developing vaccine on its own.

    In August, the second largest COVID-19 outbreak (after Danang) was reported in Quang Nam Province. The ‘second wave’ has now been successfully controlled.

    However, in July, Danang, a tourist hotspot, reported several new cases and a massive evacuation of nearly 80,000 tourists was undertaken. In August, the second largest COVID-19 outbreak (after Danang) was reported in Quang Nam Province. The ‘second wave’ has now been successfully controlled. As of 15 September, in Vietnam (total population 95,540,000) there were 1063 cases; 35 deaths; 261,004 tests had been conducted, and 11cases per million was recorded.[iv]

    Vietnam’s economic outlook in the ‘post-COVID Second Wave’ is a mixed bag of opportunities and challenges. There are at least four issues which merit attention. First, the Vietnamese economy, like any other global economies, suffered due to the pandemic. The 2020 first-half growth was about 1.8% compared with 7% in 2019 (year-on-year), but the Vietnamese economy has shown enormous resilience when compared with major global economies who have recorded negative growth. This is due to the proficient handling of the pandemic and the country is now on a quick and steady recovery path. The HSBC has revised Vietnam’s 2020 growth forecast from 1.6% to 3.0%.[v]

    It is also important to mention that the Vietnamese government has offered attractive incentives to multinational investors to help them “move up the value chain” and build supply chains in the country.

    Second, there are clear signs that Vietnam continues to be an attractive destination for foreign investments. This trend is not only due to global conglomerates moving out of China and seeking new destinations with attractive options for setting up of their businesses, but Vietnamese handing of the pandemic has provided them enormous business confidence in the country. According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment, total foreign investment in the first half was worth US$18.47 billion.[vi] Japanese (Panasonic), South Korean (LG Electronics), US (Foxconn; Apple) and the European (Heineken) companies moved to Vietnam. It is also important to mention that the Vietnamese government has offered attractive incentives to multinational investors to help them “move up the value chain” and build supply chains in the country.

    Third, is about renewable energy. Vietnam’s current energy generation mix is skewed towards coal (18,516 MW) and hydrocarbons (8,978 MW). Notwithstanding the COVID-19, the country’s average electricity consumption per day during the first few months of 2020 was 615 million KWh, an increase of 7.5 per cent compared with 2019.[vii] It is estimated that “Vietnam’s energy demand will increase by over 10 per cent by the end of 2020, followed by an eight per cent growth per year in 2021 to 2030.” The “government wants to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by eight per cent by 2030” for which investments in renewable sources of energy such as solar and wind would have to be made,

    Fourth, is about immersion in Industry 4.0 technologies. There are now clear trends of widespread digital transformation across the globe and is impacting every aspect of the industry from commercial operations, technology management, use in fintech to support banking and financial services, new business models through analytics, and human resource management.  These technologies can potentially boost productivity and improve Vietnam’s GDP. For that innovative national policies for growth are needed. Also, the human resource would require ‘up-skilling, reskilling and retooling’ to embrace these technologies.  The industry leaders too have to recognize the importance of educating themselves and using new technologies as also adopting innovative models for their operations.

    Vietnam should build upon its successes of handling the COVID-19 pandemic and ‘build back better’ by offering long-term stimulus for investments and accord high priority to zero-carbon technologies to spur inclusive and resilient growth.

    Finally, Vietnam should build upon its successes of handling the COVID-19 pandemic and ‘build back better’ by offering long-term stimulus for investments and accord high priority to zero-carbon technologies to spur inclusive and resilient growth. It must adopt strategies for investments in technologies, products and services as also create new jobs tailored for Industry 4.0.

     

    Notes

    [i] “Russia Covid-19 vaccine: Over 250 people in Moscow get inoculated, says report”, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/russia-covid-19-vaccine-over-250-people-in-moscow-get-inoculated-says-report-11600085464168.html  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [ii] “China coronavirus vaccine may be ready for public in November: Official”, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-coronavirus-vaccine-may-be-ready-for-public-in-november-official/story-1DzVCBrdOwleJXxuw0wvyI.html  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [iii] “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard”, https://covid19.who.int/?gclid=CjwKCAjwzIH7BRAbEiwAoDxxTlG5T6XZYiHVHBesW5cmAa9DKUytaVgH01haDH10TpmFA3OP-2s_phoCk9sQAvD_BwE  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [iv] “Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker”, https://www.csis.org/programs/southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0#National%20Responses  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [v] “Vietnam’s positive growth in Q2 defies market expectations: HSBC”, http://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-positive-growth-in-q2-defies-market-expectations-hsbc-313035.html  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [vi] “Vietnam expects imminent new wave of foreign investment”, https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30392781?utm_source=homepage&utm_medium=internal_referral  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [vii] “Assessing Vietnam’s Economic Prospects for Foreign Investors After COVID-19”, https://www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/assessing-vietnams-economic-prospects-foreign-investors-after-covid-19.html/  (accessed 15 September 2020).

    Image: Ho chi-min City

  • UAE-Israel Deal: An Analysis of its Regional Impact

    UAE-Israel Deal: An Analysis of its Regional Impact

    Introduction

    The recently brokered Abraham Accords Peace Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Israel marks the beginning of the potential shift in West Asia’s existing power relations. Driven by their security interests, and in an attempt to amplify their power projections in the region, the two countries have come together, in what is being seen, as an opposition to the Iranian axis of influence. Although the normalization of relations with Israel marks a huge setback for the possibility of a Palestinian Statehood, several Arab countries are expected to jump on the bandwagon, with Bahrain having already concluded a treaty after UAE. This article highlights the eclectic mix of reactions from various players in West Asia and the potential opportunities and setbacks it brings with itself.

    Palestine

     Several countries held strongly pro-Palestine policies during the Cold War and decolonization period. However, in the last few decades, many have established ties with Israel; Egypt in 1979, and Jordan in1994 and now UAE and Bahrain in 2020. That being said, majority of the Arab and Gulf countries still officially do not recognize Israel. The United Arab Emirates announced its decision to normalize relations with Israel on 12th August 2020. There are many reasons why UAE and Bahrain decided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel; according to some analysts it is to counter Iran’s influence in the region, but for some it is also to establish trade and business contacts.

    However, do these developments indicate that countries in the Arab world are moving gradually into accepting Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands as ‘fait accompli’? A significant development that needs to be recognised is the fact that many West Asian countries no longer demand the return of Palestinian lands as a precondition to normalizing ties with Israel.

    The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have strongly criticised the deal and see it as betrayal of their rights and cause by the international community.

    It is long-known that Israel will not return to pre-1967 boundaries; in May 2020 Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly stated his plan to annex the West Bank. He has, however, postponed the implementation of his decision, probably indefinitely, in the interests of the deal that is likely to benefit Israel greatly.

    The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have strongly criticised the deal and see it as betrayal of their rights and cause by the international community.  Banners  displaying “Treason” and “No to normalization with the occupier’ have come up across the region.  The Palestinian Authority, in very obvious response, have rejected the deals. These accords, as they rightly fear, affect the future of Palestinian sovereignty and legitimize Israel’s occupation.

    Turkey  

     President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sees himself as the champion of Muslims ever since he came to power in 2002. Under Erdogan, Turkey has pursued a clear pro-Palestinian stance. Turkey has indeed provided aid to Palestine at various times, including during COVID-19. It has criticized Trump’s peace plan for the Israel-Palestine conflict, for ignoring Palestinians’ legitimate rights. Not surprisingly, Turkey is clearly unhappy with UAE’s and Bahrain’s steps to normalize ties with Israel. Turkey has threatened with the option of halting diplomatic relations with UAE over the deal.

    However, for Palestinians Turkey’s statements ring hypocritical and hallow. Turkey was one of the earliest and the first Muslim majority state to recognize Israel in 1949. Turkey and Israel have a long history of intelligence cooperation. Even in the current situation, Turkey is focused more on dealing with the UAE on this issue, rather than Israel. Nevertheless, speaking for Palestinian rights in the international forum is equally important. In that respect, Turkey’s voice in support of the Palestinian cause is an important one.

    Saudi Arabia

     Saudi Arabia, long seen as the champion of Islamic nations, particularly in view of the fact that it is home to the two holiest shrines of Islam. Therefore, this peace agreement is a shock to the conservatives who form the majority in the Kingdom. This move by the UAE is seen as going along with the Jewish regime that denies the rights of the Palestinian Muslims. However, the Foreign Minister, Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said the deal could be seen as positive, but his country will not normalize relations until peace is signed with the Palestinians,  within the framework of the Arab Peace Initiative.  Saudi Arabia’s track record of its unwavering support to the Palestinian cause from the days of the Yom Kippur war, also known as Ramadan War, makes the nation’s stance on the ‘Abraham Accords’ more influential than any other Gulf country. The advocacy for Palestinian state runs deep in the Saudi people. As a result, Saudi leadership’s slightest inclination towards the agreement could spark unrest among its citizens.

    The current regime under the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who is a very capable leader compared to his predecessors because of his broader outlook to mend diplomatic ties with the regional enemies, yields an element of uncertainty as he may be inclined towards the accord. The political and ideological differences between the people of Saudi and their leader might spark cynicism towards the government; hence, support for the accord is implausible in the short term.

    Israel, which shares the Red Sea coastline with the country and is a major player in technology innovations in the region, makes it an ideal ally for the Kingdom.

    The idea, however, is not wholly inconceivable because of MBS’s Vision 2030. Upon ascending the throne, the Crown Prince has constructed an elaborate plan to detach the Kingdom’s dependence on its natural resources and focus on bringing in diverse investments into the country. One of the main plans is to develop the Red Sea Coastline by exploiting its tourism prospects by building a smart city. Israel, which shares the Red Sea coastline with the country and is a major player in technology innovations in the region, makes it an ideal ally for the Kingdom. One of the other factors that could generate a coalition between Saudi Arabia and Israel is their common enemy, Iran.

    If MBS does accept the accord, it may not come as a surprise, but that does not warrant the fact that there is a high possibility of the decision shocking many conservative and religious establishments.  In retrospect, that could give birth to the “new” Saudi Arabia that the crown prince has promised to build.

    Qatar

    Qatar, which is considered the most developed state in the Gulf region, is in the middle of a diplomatic standoff with the regional players. Its dispute with the two major states, Saudi Arabia and UAE, has made the state go out of its way to establish diplomatic ties with parties that are not particularly approved by the GCC. The state has not given any official statement on the accord, but it’s closeness with Iran may be taken as an unofficial veto to the accord in itself. Qatar’s close relationship with the US and Iran has been a subject of debate ever since the Gulf crisis, but the state has somehow managed not to let the relationship cut across each other. This particular agreement with Israel orchestrated by the Trump government could pressure Qatar to push and resolve its issues with the UAE.

    Like any other Arab country, Qatar has advocated for the Palestinian state. It took it a little further by investing in the Gaza Strip, funding welfare payments to the coastal territory. One can suspect that the Emirati’s decision to form a coalition with the Israeli state will only deepen the ties between Qatar and Palestine.

    Though the Qatar government has been silent about the accord, Doha based news media, Al Jazeera has not shied away from raising concerns regarding the agreement. It even went to the extent of calling the accord ‘PR stunt’ initiated by the UAE. It’s support to Palestine and capitalisation of the hashtag ‘normalization as betrayal’ have received a lot of criticism from those countries that support the agreement. Qatar has always been hostile to Israel’s treatment towards the Palestinian state but has managed to have practical relations with Israel.

    Iran  

    As the world witnesses the coming together of the United Arab Emirates and Israel, two of the former adversaries, it comes as no surprise that Iran has been aggressively lashing out against the deal. With Iran still reeling under the economic pressure of the US sanctions, President Rouhani has called the deal a ‘betrayal’, aimed at satisfying the United States at a time when President Trump prepares himself to run in the national election in November. The leader of Iran-backed Hezbollah has also condemned the deal on similar grounds. Iran’s disapproval stems from two main factors – first, from its support for the Palestinian statehood; and second, more realistically, due to the increasing influence of Israel-United States nexus in the region and consequently its declining axis of influence. Iran’s insecurity is speculated to have stemmed from the confluence of actors that oppose the Islamic Republic’s attempts to establish its hegemony in the region. The confluence opens up the possibility of shifting the regional balance of power in favour of Israel, and Saudi Arabia, under the shadow of the United States. While Saudi Arabia and Israel do not yet have an official diplomatic relationship, various reports suggesting backdoor diplomacy between the two countries have surfaced over the years. The common factor bringing the two countries together has most often been assumed as the perceived threat from Iran.

    Iran and UAE, on the other hand, while maintaining a meaningful trade relationship, continue to have persistent sources of bilateral tension.

    On the other hand, while Iran and Israel have often been engaged in rhetoric of bellicose jingoism towards one another, it is essential to note that both the countries maintained a friendly relationship before the Iranian revolution of 1979, with Iran being the second Muslim country recognizing the state of Israel.

    Iran and UAE, on the other hand, while maintaining a meaningful trade relationship, continue to have persistent sources of bilateral tension, one of which is the unresolved territorial dispute over the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, which lie near the critical Strait of Hormuz, providing access to key shipping lanes. Despite UAE’s historical claims over their sovereignty, the islands that were forcefully occupied by Iran continue to be a strain in the relationship between the two countries. A second irritant is a growing relationship between UAE and the United States, with the former becoming one of the largest importers of US weapons and providing the US with military bases and intelligence on Iran. Worried about the growing Iranian aggression, the country has maintained a strong security relationship with the United States and has often supported the UNSC resolutions to bar sensitive materials and technology to Iran.

    Yemen

    The conflict in Yemen that began to unravel with the spread of Arab Spring in 2011 has resulted in an unprecedented loss of civilian lives across the country, making Yemen one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The Israel-UAE deal, which reflects the beginning of normalization of ties between Arab countries and Israel, cannot be seen in isolation from the region’s larger volatile landscape. The Peace Treaty, as it is being termed, brings with itself a plethora of threats that seek to shift the existing power relations, without aiming at the cessation of violence. UAE’s increasing outreach must be looked at in the context of its increasingly interventionist policies, especially in Yemen. The deal may ultimately lead to more interference and militarization in Yemen, prolonging the prospects for conflict resolution, and sustaining hostile conditions.

    Varied responses to the deal can be seen with the Yemeni government, and the Houthis, an armed group championing Yemen’s Zaidi Shia Muslim minority, coming out in opposition to the deal in a bid to continue their support for Palestine. On the other hand, it comes as no surprise that members of the Southern Transitional Council (southern separatists), which gets its support from the UAE, have applauded the treaty to build cooperation between UAE and Israel.

    Interest and interference in Yemen are of tremendous strategic significance to both Israel and UAE.

    Interest and interference in Yemen are of tremendous strategic significance to both Israel and UAE. In a show of its strengthening military projection, UAE seized control of the Yemeni island of Socotra, located in the Indian Ocean,allegedly allowing Israel to establish its presence in the region. The archipelago sits at a crucial strategic position en-route to Bab el-Mandeb, providing access to key shipping lanes.

    On the other hand, while there exists no diplomatic relationship between Yemen and Israel, the latter has often been seen intervening in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, “under the pretext of defending its interests in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab-El-Mandeb”. With a military base already constructed at Emba Soira in Eritrea, Israel continues to increase its strategic presence across the Strait. Further, as speculations about the possible Houthi-Iran cooperation spread across the region, Israel’s surveillance centres continue to monitor the armed group’s actions and other actors in Yemen.

    Conclusion

    Palestine is a very sensitive and rousing issue for most of the citizens in West Asia. It is a shared memory of betrayal and expulsion; indeed, many politicians in West Asia use Palestine as an element in their speech and citizens also use it during slogans referring to Palestine protests.

    That being said, these deals are coming at a time when Israel is increasing its hawkish behaviour towards the Palestinians. Once the annexation happens, one cannot help but wonder how it could change the landscape of West Asia. Thus far, the progress made is the mild indication of some major players in the region favouring the accord.  Analysts suspect that the support for the accord will gain momentum in the long-term side-tracking religious, cultural and social identities to maintain diplomatic relations for economic growth.  If all countries, therefore, become friendly with Israel, will the annexation only receive loud threats with no actions?

    This study is put together by Dharika Athray, Rupal Anand, and Vrinda Aiyaswamy. All of them are Research Interns at TPF.

  • Chinese Economic Sops over the South China Sea: A Mixed Bag of Successes

    Chinese Economic Sops over the South China Sea: A Mixed Bag of Successes

    The South China Sea is a resource-rich sea space and its net worth is estimated to be US$ 2.5 trillion.[i]  The proven oil reserves are around 7.7 billion barrels and natural gas reserves could be around 266 trillion cubic feet.[ii] The Chinese strategy in the South China Sea against other claimant States is a mix of aggressive posturing including the threat of use of force as also offering economic incentives and sops such as ‘joint development of resources’ in the contested waters.

    Deng preferred a “moderate approach” i.e. “sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development.

    The idea of joint development can be attributed to Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader and author of market-economy reforms in the 1980s that earned him the title of ‘Architect of Modern China’. Deng preferred a “moderate approach” i.e. “sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development.”[iii]

     

    Map Credit: The Australian Naval Institute

    China’s current thinking on joint development of resources in South China is built around at least seven policy choices i.e. (a) promote good faith in the South China Sea; (b) limit unilateral activities in disputed areas; (c) focus on less-sensitive areas of the South China Sea; (d) reach joint development arrangements by establishing relevant working mechanism; (e) begin the process in areas where there are only two claimants; (f) define sea areas for the joint development by seeking consensus, and (g) discuss the feasibility of setting up a Spratly Resource Management Authority (SRMA) with supranational character.[iv] Further, it has been argued that the ASEAN-China Single Draft Negotiating Text of the Code of Conduct (COC) is “conducive to creating benign bilateral relations, which serves as a prerequisite to joint development”.[v]

    The general belief among the claimants is that China thinks ‘what is mine [Chinese] is of course mine, but what is your [claimants] is also mine’

    However, the above policy choices for joint development and intention are flawed and dismissed by the aggrieved claimants of the South China Sea. The general belief among the claimants is that China thinks ‘what is mine [Chinese] is of course mine, but what is your [claimants] is also mine’; i.e.  Chinese joint development initiatives are based on the wrong assumption that what belongs to China is for China only to develop, and what belongs to other claimants is for development.

    In 2018, China and the Philippines signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation on Oil and Gas Development. President Xi Jinping urged President Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte to “set aside disputes, eliminate external interference, and concentrate on conducting cooperation, making pragmatic efforts and seeking development”; furthermore, “both sides can take a ‘bigger step’ in the joint development of offshore oil and gas”.[vi] The Philippines proposed a “60-40 sharing arrangement in its favour” and both sides could then develop the “Reed Bank, the main site of the oil and gas reserves, despite the arbitration award declaring that Manila had sovereign rights to exploit them”.[vii]

    Similarly, Brunei has an ongoing arrangement with China on bilateral joint development/cooperation in the South China Sea. Economic and strategic considerations are Brunei’s twin drivers; it has been “pushing hard to diversify its economy away from the oil and gas industry” for a long time and the “unstable oil market, a slow foreign investment growth (especially in non-oil and gas sector) and a contracting national GDP” has acted as a catalyst to diversify and “joint development” is an integral part of Brunei’s wider economic diversification strategy. [viii]

    Unlike the Philippines and Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have shied away from joint development of resources with China in the South China Sea.

    Unlike the Philippines and Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam have shied away from joint development of resources with China in the South China Sea. This is despite the March 2005 China, the Philippines and Vietnam Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Scientific Research in Certain Areas in the South China Sea by respective national oil companies.

    Malaysia is not averse to joint development with other claimants except China and at least four such projects were undertaken i.e. (a) Malaysia-Thai Joint Development Authority in the Gulf of Thailand based on the 1979 MOU; (b) 1992 MOU which designates overlapping continental shelf claims (about 2000km square) in the Gulf of Thailand as Commercial Arrangement Area (CAA); (c) the 2009 CAA between Brunei and Malaysia; and (d) Fisheries MOU between Malaysia and Indonesia, quasi-joint exploitation of fisheries resources, in overlapping claim area of about 14,300 square kilometres in the Straits of Malacca.[ix]

    Vietnam’s boundary and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea including clashes over the Parcels have resulted in mistrust and preclude joint development with China. In essence, Vietnam does not accept joint development in areas that belong to Vietnam according to the UNCLOS 1982.

    Vietnam promotes international cooperation on resource development and has a rich body of laws to support such initiatives such as the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea, the Petroleum Law (Article 3, No. 12), the Navigation Law, Fisheries Law, the Law on Natural Resources and Environment of Sea and Islands (Article 4, No. 5), the Tourism Law, and the Mineral Law. However, its boundary and territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea including clashes over the Parcels have resulted in mistrust and preclude joint development with China. In essence, Vietnam does not accept joint development in areas that belong to Vietnam according to the UNCLOS 1982.

    The US rejects Chinese maritime claim in the South China Sea and proclaimed “any PRC action to harass other states’ fishing or hydrocarbon development in these waters – or to carry out such activities unilaterally – is unlawful.”[x]Furthermore, while extending help to Vietnam on the matter, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced that “America stands with our South-East Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law.”

     
     
    Notes

    [i] “China Escalates Coercion against Vietnam’s Longstanding Oil and Gas Activity in the South China Sea”, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/china-escalates-coercion-against-vietnams-longstanding-oil-and-gas-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/  (accessed 15 September 2020).

    [ii] “South China Sea: Beijing has a major natural advantage in the geopolitical power game”, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/south-china-sea-beijing-has-a-major-natural-advantage-in-the-geopolitical-power-game/articleshow/76423659.cms (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [iii] “Xi Jinping and China’s Maritime Disputes”, https://taylorfravel.com/2013/08/xi-jinping-and-chinas-maritime-disputes/  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [iv] “Joint development in the South China Sea: China’s incentives and policy choices”,https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24761028.2019.1685427  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [v] Ibid.
    [vi] “China Focus: Xi, Duterte meet on pushing forward ties”, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-08/30/c_138350348.htm  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [vii] “China’s Xi sees bigger role for joint energy exploration with Philippines”, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines/chinas-xi-sees-bigger-role-for-joint-development-of-offshore-oil-gas-with-philippines-idUSKCN1VK00M  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [viii] “Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development in the South China Sea: Incentives, Policies & Ways Forward”, http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/9f/21/992faf20465fae26c23ccce1ecc6/f003a68f-eb6a-4b09-a506-3c00897b0862.pdf  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [ix] “Cooperative Research Report on Joint Development in the South China Sea: Incentives, Policies & Ways Forward”, http://www.iis.fudan.edu.cn/_upload/article/files/9f/21/992faf20465fae26c23ccce1ecc6/f003a68f-eb6a-4b09-a506-3c00897b0862.pdf  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [x] “China pressurizes Vietnam to cancel, compensate offshore firms operating in South China Sea”, https://energy.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/oil-and-gas/china-pressurises-vietnam-to-cancel-compensate-offshore-firms-operating-in-south-china-sea/77189060  (accessed 15 September 2020).
     
    Image Credit: nbcnews.com

  • US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

    US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

     The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    A recent US government-funded study has noted that in 2019 China held back large amounts of water upstream in dams on the Mekong River which caused a  severe drought in the downstream countries,[1] prompting a US ambassador in the region accusing China of “hoarding” water and “harming the livelihoods of millions of people in downstream countries”.[2] Likewise, another report by Stimson Centre, a Washington-based think tank, has corroborated the above and pointed that in 2019 “upstream dams at Nuozhadu and Xiaowan had restricted around 20 billion cubic meters of water between July and November” and that current “satellite images show those dams are once again poised to restrict a similar amount of water from July 2020 through the end of this year … Portions of the Mekong mainstream are once again dropping to historically low levels,”[3]

    China has dismissed the reports and the Global Times in an article cited a report by the Tsinghua University and clarified that the “river dams in China [instead] helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong”; furthermore, in November 2019, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) had concluded that “the drought was caused by insufficient rainfall during the wet season with a delayed arrival and earlier departure of the monsoon rain and an El Niño event that led to abnormally high temperatures and high evapotranspiration”.[4]

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.  The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    China has been reluctant to share hydrological data particularly during the dry seasons and releases water during rainy seasons causing flooding in lower riparian countries. This is despite the 2002 MoU under which China had agreed to provide daily river flow and rainfall data from two monitoring stations in Yunnan Province during the wet season, and the periodic MRC Heads of Government meeting over a Summit which is held every four years.

    Earlier this year, the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had assured that his country would “give positive consideration to share the full-year hydrological information with Mekong countries and enhance cooperation under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework to ensure reasonable and sustainable use of water resources”.[5]

    Perhaps a recent statement by the MRC may temporarily obviate suspicions over China not sharing hydrological information on the Lancang-Mekong River which notes that it welcomes China’s sharing of data “ throughout the year” as also for the “ establishment of an information-sharing platform for water resources cooperation led by China and Myanmar”.[6] Also, during the 3rd Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Leaders’ Meeting, the Global Center for Mekong Studies (GCMS) has been tasked to study the potential benefits from “aligning and synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor with a vast market”.[7]

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement.

    In 1995, the upper and lower riparian countries had adopted Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin which lays out “principles and norms of regional cooperation in managing the river basin”. A formal dialogue process under the MRC was instituted to address issues relating to Mekong River and the Member States agreed to “promote common procedures and practices throughout the region for data collection, storage and analysis to support data sharing and integration of existing data management systems based on the voluntary participation of countries and institutions.”[8] In 2001, they adopted the “Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing,” or PDIES to enable the Member States to share data ‘to provide real-time water level information and more accurate flood forecasting.

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement. The conflict resolution mechanism is also not clearly stipulated”.[9] This is one of the many reasons for discord among the Parties which needs to be addressed by the MRC whose mandate includes dispute resolution.

    Be that as it may, the lower Mekong countries have set up the Mekong Water Data Initiative, and at the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2017 to ‘create a robust, integrated, and transparent platform for collecting, sharing, and managing data on the Mekong River system.’[10]

    there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea.

    At another level, there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea; and the current situation is being described as “becoming a geopolitical issue, much like the South China Sea, between the United States and China,”[11] Perhaps the biggest worry is that the Lancang-Mekong River should not attract contestation between the US and China which surely is going to make the region more turbulent. It would thus be prudent that ASEAN and China work on a Code of Conduct to manage the river affairs or add more robustness in the existing dialogue mechanism over the Lancang-Mekong River.

     
    End Notes
    [1] “China could have choked off the Mekong and aggravated a drought, threatening the lifeline of millions in Asia”, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/28/china-choked-off-the-mekong-which-worsened-southeast-asia-drought-study.html  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [2] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [3] “The next US-China battleground: Chinese dams on the Mekong River?”,https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3095581/next-us-china-battleground-chinese-dams-mekong-river  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [4] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [5] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [6] “Lancang-Mekong cooperation provide stronger impetus for regional development and prosperity”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/hzdt_1/t1812281.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020)
    [7] “Full text of Co-chairs’ Statement on Cooperation of Synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor of the Third MLC Leaders’ Meeting”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/zyxw_5/t1808947.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [8] “Joint Statement To Strengthen Water Data Management and Information Sharing in The Lower Mekong”,
    https://www.lowermekong.org/news/joint-statement-strengthen-water-data-management-and-information-sharing-lower-mekong (accessed 14 April 219)
    [9] “Code of Conduct for the Mekong”,https://vannarithchheang.com/2018/04/04/code-of-conduct-for-the-mekong/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [10] “Mekong River Commission keen to improve data sharing and management in the Lower Mekong Basin”, https://mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-keen-data-management-in-mekong-basin/  (accessed 12 September 2020.
    [11] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
     
    Image: Mekong Riverside, Phnom Penh-Cambodia

  • The DNA Bill And State Capacity

    The DNA Bill And State Capacity

    Aristotle suggested that transmission of heredity was essentially the transmission of information. And this information was used to build an organism from scratch inside the female womb. Although the science is primitive, he was right in how information is transmitted from parents to their offspring. Modern genetics is built on studying such information, which has been coded into each cell as DNA. Scientists can now sequence the DNA and extract valuable information about each individual and the human species. They have been able to use such information to understand humans better; for example, the identification of BRCA mutation responsible for cancer has nudged great strides in cancer biology. Another important application which has varied implications in society is the use of DNA in forensics. Although already in use since its discovery in 1995, the exponential rise in the significance of information extracted using DNA Profiling warrants regulation.

    All major nations which use DNA Profiling have legislation in place to regulate the use of the technology. However, in India, the technology is unregulated even though successive governments have worked on such legislation since 2003.

    DNA Technology Bill

    All major nations which use DNA Profiling have legislation in place to regulate the use of the technology. However, in India, the technology is unregulated even though successive governments have worked on such legislation since 2003. If global examples are not enough, the 2017 Puttaswamy judgement has made such legislation necessary. The judgement asserted that privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Indian Constitution and that the right to privacy includes protection over the physical body. Therefore, for the State to collect or store DNA data, a legislative mechanism principled on necessity and proportionality is requisite.

    DNA testing is being done on a very limited scale in India. About 30-40 DNA experts are working in 15-18 laboratories. They can process only about 2-3% of the total need, and even such limited testing is unregulated and unmonitored. According to the NCRB data for 2018, although 85% of rape accused have been charge-sheeted, the conviction rate for rape is just 27.2%. This technology, however, has an excellent record of increasing conviction rates; for example, a 2006 UK parliamentary report suggested that detection of crime increased from a mere 26% to a healthy 40% after they loaded DNA samples into a national database. Apart from crime detection, the technology will also help in the identification of over six million missing persons in India. Thus, legislation facilitating DNA technology to help expedite justice is long overdue.

    The DNA Technology (Use and Application) Bill 2019 is the latest form of the DNA bill and is at the parliamentary committee stage for further deliberations. The bill talks of a national DNA data bank and a DNA regulatory board to store DNA data and regulate DNA technology used in criminal and civil cases. The bill in its current form has raised many concerns including privacy issues concerning the use of DNA data, the ‘perfunctory consent’ clause which makes it hard for an individual to deny permission to collect his/her data, ethical issues in collecting and storing DNA data in DNA banks, the fear of caste-based criminal profiling because of the endogamous nature of Indian society and so on. But the biggest concern is one of state capacity, which in a way umbrellas other concerns.

    The bill in its current form has raised many concerns including privacy issues concerning the use of DNA data, the ‘perfunctory consent’ clause which makes it hard for an individual to deny permission to collect his/her data, ethical issues in collecting and storing DNA data in DNA banks, the fear of caste-based criminal profiling because of the endogamous nature of Indian society and so on.

    Problems with State Capacity

    In young nations like India, the State, although large and bloated, is not highly efficient. This may cause even government interventions with noble intentions to backfire. Therefore, it is necessary to identify places where a lack of state capacity could cause worry for the legislation to work effectively.

    We could sum three basic concerns up from the DNA Technology bill concerning state capacity. First, the high cost of technology and the lack of basic technical training regarding data collection in a crime scene. Second, the backlog burden in the Justice system. And finally, the lack of clarity in the bill as to what is being collected and stored.

    The India Justice Report 2019 published by Tata Trusts reveal important information on the Justice system in India. Over the last five years, only 6.4% of the police force has been provided in-service training. For advanced technology like DNA fingerprinting, frontline police should have basic training and knowledge of the technology. It starts with how to read and deal with the crime scene. And without awareness, the technology cannot be exploited desirably. To go from training 6.4% to at least half the police force will be a herculean task which should be contemplated before implementing the legislation. The DNA bill gives the responsibility of developing training modules to the DNA Regulatory Board, which will be set up. But it does not provide a realistic road map to reach the desired level of training to better use the technology.

    The report also suggests that on average, per capita police spending in 2017 was Rs 820. No big or medium-sized state has spent more than Rupees 1160 per person, and Bihar has spent as low as Rupees 498. Only one state has made 100% use of the modernization funds allocated for capital expenditure and technology up-gradation. But DNA fingerprinting technology is a costly affair. Each test could cost as much as Rupees 10,000. Even if only high-profile cases use DNA tests, a robust database of DNA has to be present for effective identification from the three indices mentioned in the bill. And such collection and storage of DNA samples could become another strain in the public exchequer. The bill also mandates the use of DNA testing for criminal as well as civil cases, which could again flood the system.

    Second, DNA technology could increase the backlog burden of the already burdened system. In the US, with relatively strong state capacity, DNA backlogs are in the thousands. The National Institute of Justice (USA) reports that the current backlog of rape and homicide cases is 350,000. It also estimates that there are ‘between 500,000 to 1 million convicted offenders’ samples that are owed but not yet collected’. The FBI has a backlog of approximately 18,000 convicted offender samples. Therefore, in India with an already strained Justice system, DNA backlogs could cause worry. Also, because of the significance of DNA information, backlogs could also invoke privacy concerns.

    Finally, there is a lack of clarity. This concern, however, is not one of lack of state capacity but one of potential overreach by the State.

    The lack of strong data protection legislation in place couples such concern. As the parliamentary committee suggests, the bill can also be termed ‘premature’ regarding data protection.

    Non-coding DNA is used for identification. The bill, however, does not restrict DNA Profiling to only use non-coding DNA which cannot be used for determining personal and medical characteristics. Given that the bill mandates data from all criminal and civil cases to be stored in the National data bank, concerns of privacy impingement cannot be hushed away. The lack of strong data protection legislation in place couples such concern. As the parliamentary committee suggests, the bill can also be termed ‘premature’ regarding data protection.

    Although the bill is creating a strict code of ethics regarding collection, storage and accessibility of DNA information, it is ambiguous on the removal of data. Clause 31(3) says that DNA data will be removed if a person requested in writing to the DNA bank, given that such a person is ‘neither an offender nor a suspect or an under-trial’ and whose DNA information has entered the bank ‘through crime scene index or missing persons’ index’. But it is not clear on what will happen if they do not remove such data. It is important to answer these questions due to the significance of DNA information and the fact that the bill does not restrict banks to store only non-coding DNA. Also, these questions could raise concerns about state capacity in safeguarding important data of its citizens.

    Conclusion

    To address these concerns, building state capacity is the key. A staggered implementation of DNA technology could help in building capacity and credibility for the technology. For example, if the bill provides a roadmap of implementation- say, starting with addressing the identification of missing persons and further developing capacity for criminal and civil investigation, the allocation of resources could be streamlined. This limited implementation could also help in addressing additional issues that could arise during implementation. These details cannot be let out to be decided by a regulatory body because of the importance of DNA data and the breach of fundamental rights in collecting and storing it.

    It is said that one has to cross the river by feeling the stones. The stable rule of law and a robust data protection regime which will make sure the technology is used judicially are basic requisites for technology with societal implications. Even though DNA profiling has huge potential to expedite justice, implementation of such complex technology has to be step by step. The Parliamentary Committee on Science and Technology has been scrutinizing the bill rigorously, contemplating the varied problems that might befall the implementation of the bill. But it remains to be seen if the government will heed to such advice and not dismiss them altogether; that is if it will feel the stones or deep dive into the river without contemplating the consequences.

     
    Image Credit: DNA Helix Material – Gerd Altmann from Pixabay

  • What Triggered Recent Chinese Naval Exercises in the South China Sea?

    What Triggered Recent Chinese Naval Exercises in the South China Sea?

    During the last few months, the PLA Navy along with the PLA Air Force conducted several exercises in the South China Sea. China used these maneuvers to deter Taiwan against its growing relationships with the US, and as a tool of “strategic communication” to signal to the US of its military capabilities to project power and defend its national interests. There are at least five important reasons that could have triggered such aggressive posturing by China.

    First is COVID-19. After Wuhan was designated as the source-destination of COVID-19 in January this year and over 80,000 of its residents were reported to have been infected by the virus, the Chinese leadership sought to boost its image among its people who had been struggling by lockdowns.[i] In the first half of February, China chose to divert international attention away from the pandemic by deploying fighter jets and bombers to intimidate Taiwan which had been critical of China over its handling of the virus. This prompted Taipei to advise authorities in Beijing to “focus on preventing the spread of the epidemic” and admonished it for “inciting nationalism at home to shift public focus away from challenges at hand” and labelled it as a “game not worth the candle”.[ii]

    the PLA Navy, led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, conducted naval exercises and the taskforce sailed through the Miyako Strait, Bashi Channel and the South China Seaostensibly to display its military readiness during the pandemic. 

    Also, while the global community struggled to combat the pandemic and at least three US Navy carriers afflicted by COVID-19 virus, the PLA Navy, led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, conducted naval exercises and the taskforce sailed through the Miyako Strait, Bashi Channel and the South China Sea[iii] ostensibly to display its military readiness during the pandemic. The PLA Air Force too showcased it combat readiness and fighter jets intruded into Taiwan’s air space. However, the US responded by three-carrier deployment including dual-carrier operations; B-52 Stratofortress bombers operated from Guam and the nuclear submarines were forward-deployed to conduct “contingency response operations.”[iv]

    Second, China was rattled after the US turned the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act into law to show that “it has the support of both branches of government, which is required for a strong and effective U.S. foreign policy”.[v] Similarly, it also introduced a new Bill ‘Taiwan Defence Act’ in the US Congress[vi] which requires the Department of Defense to provide weapons to Taipei. The Trump administration also announced a military package worth US$ 180 million to improve Taiwan’s capability against “regional threats and to strengthen homeland defense,” [vii]

    Third, is about the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) which entails fiscal support for military activities and associated infrastructure investment plans[viii] in the Pacific Ocean. The PDI is similar to the 2014 European Deterrence Initiative (targeted against Russia) and is meant to advance US priorities in the Indo-Pacific region. It aims to “focus resources on key capability gaps to ensure U.S. forces have everything they need to compete, fight, and win in the Indo-Pacific” is conspicuously targeted against China.

    India, in response to Chinese posturing in the Himalayas, deployed its naval ship in the South China Sea. This unexpected Indian posturing challenging China in its own backyard and operating in close cooperation with the US Navy, has caused alarm bells in Beijing.

    Fourth, China is concerned about the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), a grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US, which China believes is meant to contain it. Since 2018, India has been hosting the Malabar series of naval exercises which include Japan and the US; but this is being expanded to include Australia. The geographic focus of the Malabar exercises had so far remained in the Bay of Bengal or the Pacific Ocean (around Guam and Japanese waters), could now shift to the South China Sea. India, in response to Chinese posturing in the Himalayas, deployed its naval ship in the South China Sea. This unexpected Indian posturing challenging China in its own backyard and operating in close cooperation with the US Navy, has caused alarm bells in Beijing.

    Chinese worries about the Quad are further aggravated after Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, amid rising tensions between Taiwan and China around the South China Sea region, has called for a joint alliance of democratic nations to uphold “a strategic order that encourages cooperation, transparency and problem-solving through dialogue, not threats of war”.[ix]

    Fifth, is related to Code of Conduct (CoC) for South China Sea between China and the ASEAN. The Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit has “emphasised the need to maintain and promote an environment conducive to the COC negotiations”[x] and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has urged China to accelerate talks on an effective and efficient COC in line with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.[xi] China has in the past disregarded the urgency over the finalization of the CoC and has dragged the issue far too long, but now appears to have realized that there is high degree of unity among the Member States over the South China Sea issue and attempted to reassure ASEAN of its intentions to pursue the issue hopefully in right earnest.

    Among other political, diplomatic and economic toolkits to appease the ASEAN Member States, it also chose to conduct military exercises to intimidate Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam.

    Among other political, diplomatic and economic toolkits to appease the ASEAN Member States, it also chose to conduct military exercises to intimidate Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam. It relented only after Philippines Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr denounced as ‘illegal provocations’ Chinese air patrols over the South China Sea and threatened if “something happens that is beyond incursion but is in fact an attack on say a Filipino naval vessel … [that] means then I call up Washington DC,”

    China’s attempts to dominate the regional security affairs, non-adherence to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea, coercion of other claimants to the disputed features in South China Sea and its intimidation of Taiwan has not gone well among the ASEAN Member States. ASEAN sees US’ formidable capabilities and above all its commitment to keep the Indo-Pacific ‘free and open’ against any attempts by China, as reassuring.

    In his recent remarks at the 10th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,[xii] Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo assured his counterparts from 17 countries that the US shares and supports the “principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, and respect for international law contained in the US’ Indo-Pacific vision, ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo Pacific, and the visions of many other EAS Member States”.

     
    Image Credit: The Globe and Mail and VoA
     
     
    References

    [i] “China Sends Ships, Planes over Disputed Seas to Show Strength after COVID-19 Outbreak”, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/china-sends-ships-planes-over-disputed-seas-show-strength-after-covid-19-outbreak  (accessed 08 September 2020).

    [ii] “The ROC Firmly Defends its Sovereignty: The CCP Should Immediately Stop its Military Provocations and not Misjudge the Situation”, https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=37838322A6DA5E79&s=3AF953C12D84A525  (accessed 08 September 2020).
    [iii] “   Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning conducts exercises in South China Sea: PLA Navy spokesperson”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185471.shtml  (accessed 08 September 2020).
    [iv] “Pacific Fleet Submarines: Lethal, Agile, Underway”, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=112909 (accessed 06 July 2020).
    [v] “Trump and the TAIPEI Act”, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/trump-and-the-taipei-act/  (accessed 08 September 2020).
    [vi] Under the 1978 Taiwan relations Act the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capabilities”;
    [vii] “Trump administration approves arms sale to Taiwan amid China tensions”, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/21/politics/us-taiwan-arms-sale/index.html (accessed 20 June 2020).
    [viii] “Investments in theater missile defense, expeditionary airfield and port infrastructure, fuel and munitions storage, and other areas will be key to America’s future force posture in the Indo-Pacific.” See “The Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Peace through Strength in the Indo-Pacific”, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/the-pacific-deterrence-initiative-peace-through-strength-in-the-indo-pacific/ (accessed 20 June 2020).
    [ix] “Fed-Up of Chinese Threats, Taiwanese President Urges ‘Coalition of Democracies’ to Confront Beijing”, https://eurasiantimes.com/fed-up-of-chinese-threats-taiwanese-pm-urges-coalition-of-democracies-to-confront-beijing/ (accessed 09 September 2020).
    [x] “Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit 26 June 2020” https://asean.org/storage/2020/06/Chairman-Statement-of-the-36th-ASEAN-Summit-FINAL.pdf (accessed 14 July 2020).
    [xi] “Pompeo: China cannot be allowed to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire”, https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/pompeo-china-cannot-be-allowed-to-treat-the-south-china-sea-as-its-maritime-empire-21832.html (accessed 14 July 2020).
    [xii] “Secretary Pompeo’s Participation in the 10th East Asia Summit Virtual Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/secretary-pompeos-participation-in-the-10th-east-asia-summit-virtual-foreign-ministers-meeting/  (accessed 10 September 2020).

  • Poverty, Inequality, and Marginalisation as Forms of Structural Violence in Pre-Conflict Syria

    Poverty, Inequality, and Marginalisation as Forms of Structural Violence in Pre-Conflict Syria

    The injustice and inequality built into the structural institutions of the Syrian society can be referred to, what has been called as the ‘structural violence’, by the well-known Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung.  

    The ongoing civil war in Syria that has resulted in large-scale loss of lives, and forced displacement of millions across the region, is being seen as one of the bloodiest conflicts of this century. While countries continue to witness the horrors of visible atrocities and war crimes, the underlying layers of structural and cultural violence continue to buttress the egregious brutality which is often more direct, and physical.

     

    Although the war is often seen as a result of the outburst of pro-democracy protests in 2011, a close examination of the country’s socio-economic structures would enable one to get a detailed insight into the underlying layers of frustration caused due to large-scale poverty, inequality, and marginalisation. One would also find that the relatively peaceful structure, which existed before the protests of 2011, was held intact largely due to the existence of single-party dominance, where one actor (Hafez al-Assad, and later Bashar al-Assad) held all power and authority, while those existing in lower ranks of society continued to lack resources, as well as opportunities to challenge the dominant power.

    The Syrian economic crisis has existed long before the commencement of the civil war.

    The injustice and inequality built into the structural institutions of the Syrian society can be referred to, what has been called as the ‘structural violence’, by the well-known Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung.  The violence, here, is reflective of a position “higher up or lower down in a hierarchy of exploitation-repression-alienation”, where the parties involved are determined either to keep the hierarchy intact or to completely obliterate it. In the case of Syria, the deprivation of the most basic and non-negotiable needs, which threatened the citizens’ need for survival, has been the primary cause for aggression to come into existence. The factors that, thus, led to the conflict in Syria can be seen rooted in years of repression, poverty, and lack of representative institutions, which manifested in the form of protests, or the Arab Spring of 2011.

    The Syrian economic crisis has existed long before the commencement of the civil war. Since the beginning of the economic crisis, Syria’s institutional structures have failed to meet the rising needs and rights of its population. In the 1980s, the country was trapped in a downward spiral of a fiscal crisis, as a result of large-scale drought, and due to both, domestic and external factors. The crisis led to high food deficit, and an increase in the cost of living, leading to a rise in patronage networks which provided small circles of elites with profitable businesses. These networks became increasingly popular in real estate and land management, leaving out large sectors of Syria underdeveloped.

    While the country witnessed a decreasing overall debt and a noticeable rise in the GDP in the 2000s, large sections of the population were excluded from benefitting from these growth rates due to differences in wage rates and declining job opportunities. Increasing inequality was reflected in a paper published by the UNDP, which claimed that 65.6% of all labour in Syria belonged to the informal sector in 2010, with Aleppo and Idlib ranking first with over 75% of their workforce belonging to the informal sector. Further, the four years of drought between 2006 and 2011, and the consequent failed economic policies led to a significant decline in the agricultural sector’s output, forcing 2 million to 3 million Syrians into abject poverty.

    Additionally, the oil revenues fell from more than 14% of GDP in the early 2000s to about 4% in 2010 due to depleting reserves. According to a report, overall poverty in Syria in 2007 impacted 33.6% of the population, of which 12.3% were estimated to be living under extreme poverty. Noting the degree of inequality in Syria in 1997, the report found out that the lower 20% of the population had a share of only 8% in expenditure, while the richest 20% of the population share about 41% of the expenditure. The degree of inequality further decreased in 2004. Moreover, the widely disputed region of North-Eastern Syria witnessed highest levels of inequality in 2007, in addition to deprivation of living standards, and worst levels of illiteracy, and access to safe water, just four years before the outbreak of the civil war. The unequal access to resources was also starkly reflected in the housing situation of the country before the war, where over 40% of the population lived under informal housing conditions, – through squatting, or on lands obtained without legal contracts.

    In addition to the economic crisis, Syrians have been the victims of decades-long political repression, in the form of restrictions on freedom of expression, torture, and enforced disappearances. The political institutions have historically been unstable, with three military coups taking place in 1949 alone, followed by one more in 1954, in addition to the Ba’athist-led coups of 1963 and 1966. The Syrian security forces (Mukhabarat) are known to have detained citizens without proper warrants even before 2010, many of whom have reportedly been tortured in prisons. In their attempts to keep the hierarchy of power relations intact, the centralised institutions are known to clamp down on any public demonstrations, with frequent arrests and employment of state violence.

    The conflict which started with citizens demanding their basic needs and rights has been sustained over the years by the involvement of foreign states, and increased state brutality which has been responded to by an increasingly similar, if not equal, force by the rebellion groups.

    Years of conflict have exacerbated the economic crisis, pushing both the state and its citizens, into chaos, with more than 80 per cent of the Syrian population living below the poverty line, with an unemployment rate of at least 55 per cent in 2018. With most of the business networks now being controlled by the selected few elites, the population at large continues to suffer the brunt of both structural, and direct violence.

    The conflict which started with citizens demanding their basic needs and rights has been sustained over the years by the involvement of foreign states, and increased state brutality which has been responded to by an increasingly similar, if not equal, force by the rebellion groups. The country, now, witnesses itself entangled in a cycle of conflict, where the war has led to steep economic deterioration, political repression, and physical violence, which in turn has led to further widespread cataclysm.

    Image Credit: Photo – Aleppo-Syria destruction in 2019 and  Syria Map – Adobe Stock