The Peninsula Foundation

Category: TPF Analysis

High expectations during Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN

Vietnam assumed ‘2020 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’ in November 2019 from Thailand in accordance with Article 31 of the ASEAN Charter under which the Chairmanship rotates annually. Hanoi announced the theme for its Chairmanship as ‘Cohesive and Responsive’, in which ‘Cohesive reflects the need to enhance ASEAN unity and solidarity, economic integration, ASEAN awareness and identity, and work toward a “people-centered” community’ and ‘Responsive underlines the importance of promoting ASEAN pro-activeness, creativity and capacity in response to opportunities and challenges brought about by rapid changes in regional and global landscape’.

Soon after taking over the 2020 Chairmanship, Vietnam was confronted with a ‘black swan’ event i.e. COVID-19. It delivered admirably by taking bold measures to control the spread of the virus in the country and announced that the ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC) will compile a report on the COVID-19 to be submitted to ASEAN leaders at the 36^th ASEAN Summit scheduled in Vietnam in April.

Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Quoc Dung, who is the Secretary-General of the 2020 ASEAN National Committee, has identified five key priorities for his country’s Chairmanship Year and it is not surprising to see reference to Hanoi’s commitment to ‘regional peace and stability amid strategic complexities’. Boundary and associated disputes including illegal occupation, reclamation and weaponization of islands and features in South China Sea are central to ASEAN, and as a corollary a major issue for Vietnam’s 2020 Chairmanship. There is now evidence of a push back against Beijing’s intimidation. This is evident from the forceful statements and credible operational initiatives in South China Sea by the claimant states against China which has deployed law enforcement and paramilitary vessels.

In this context there are expectations from Vietnam to vigorously pursue and make substantive contributions towards keeping the South China Sea less turbulent and more peaceful, and address issues that threaten regional peace and security. It would also be Hanoi’s endeavor to prevent any confrontation and further escalation in disputes in the South China Sea. However, this may not be the case as a number of incidents in the South China Sea over resources i.e. fishing and offshore energy exploration have begun rather very early in Vietnam’s ‘2020 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’.

First is about Indonesia and China. The former does not claim any island or features in the Spratly Islands and therefore does not have any dispute in South China Sea; but presence of Chinese coast guard vessel escorting Chinese fishermen to fish in Natuna, part of Indonesian waters, which China claims to be the traditional fishing ground, prompted political and military response from Jakarta. There was also a standoff between China and Vietnam in the Vanguard Bank involving 50 Vietnamese and 40 Chinese vessels over the operations of the drilling rig Hakuryu 5 operated by Russia’s Rosneft in Vietnam’s oil and gas Block 06-01.

Another three-way standoff over oil and gas operations is playing out between China and Malaysia in which the state-owned Petronas is exploring on the extended continental shelf of a ‘Malaysian oil and gas block in the area for which Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur had submitted a joint claim’. China has resorted to intimidation similar to the Vanguard Bank between China and Vietnam.

At another level, United States military response in support of Taiwan after Chinese military airplanes flew across the Taiwan Straits and the Bashi Channel is noteworthy. Likewise, US’ support has been forthcoming for Vietnam against China and could trigger enhanced defence and security cooperation between the two sides as also create new opportunities for Hanoi to inform Beijing about its confidence to deal with China on the South China Sea issue at its own terms.

However, the Philippines would be a different challenge for Vietnam after President Rodrigo Duterte announced annulment of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) notwithstanding the fact that the US has been the most important ally of the Philippines in countering China’s expansive claims in the disputed Philippines Sea. It is useful to mention that Philippines is critical for US’ Indo-Pacific strategy of a free and open oceans.

Second is the about the Code of Conduct (CoC), an upgraded document of the earlier Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC), which is under negotiation between China and ASEAN member states and is expected to be adopted in 2021.Vietnam must concentrate on the CoC. The onus will be on Vietnam to not only build consensus among the ASEAN , Hanoi will have to work hard to put in place a workable COC which can then be taken forward by Brunei Darussalam who would assume the ‘2021 Chairmanship of the ASEAN’.

Third is about the contestation between the US and China over freedom of navigation operation (FONOP). During the last three years, the US forces have routinely conducted FONOP which Washington claims to be in accordance with international law and that its military will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permits. Chinese reaction and response to the FONOP has been at the political, diplomatic and strategic levels. It has exercised coercion at sea through dangerous maneuvers and more recently a PLA Navy destroyer fired a military grade laser at a US P-8 surveillance aircraft.

ASEAN Chairmanship is a challenging position and attracts high expectations from the member countries. The position entails building upon the work done by the previous Chair as also pursue new regional issues that are always as challenging as the earlier ones. Besides, there are anticipations by regional and other global players to not only follow up the ongoing challenges but address new questions that confront the ASEAN. More often than not, the ASEAN countries have delivered and received appreciation from the international community.

By all counts Vietnam’s chairmanship of the ASEAN can be expected to be both challenging and rewarding. Hanoi is expected to live up to the expectations on the responsibilities enshrined in the ASEAN charter and deliver to the peoples of the ASEAN as also build upon the themes and priorities set by previous Chairmanship. Vietnam will also be under pressure to adopt a tougher line against China on the South China Sea issue in view of the recent spats between China and other claimant states. But Vietnamese leaders are known for their maturity and diplomatic skills and would play a pragmatic role to manage tensions in the region.

Image Credit: Vietnam Economic Times

March 6, 2020
The end of the liberal world order is not the end of the world – we just need to fight for freedom AND equality

The turmoil concerning Brexit, the Rise of the „Rest” (the fast developing countries), dramatic social inequality, the exclusion of ever larger parts of the populace (the decline of the „Rest“, which is excluded from globalization), the rise of radical Salafism, all these developments have contributed to worldwide emotions, that the promises of globalization have been disappointed and been revealed as illusions. When Juergen Habermas, the noted German philosopher judged in 1991 concerning the democratic revolutions in the former states of the Warsaw treaty, that Western modernity would now transcend into the Orient not only with its technical achievements, but also with its emancipatory and democratic principles he was hardly more than the prisoner of the idealism concerning Western modernity. Although being fully aware of the negative impact of two world wars, colonization and its exorbitant violence, Auschwitz and the Cold War, and fighting for his whole life against a repetition of these developments he still believed to be able to rely on a cleaned, purified Western modernity, an approach which his companions, Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck, labeled second modernity. Again, in the years starting with the Arab Rebellion or the Arab Spring it seemed as if the conceptions of democracy, human rights and freedom were transcending from the Western world to the Orient, and its final victory seemed to be plausible – a purified Western modernity would triumph in the end – and Francis Fukuyama wrote his second masterpiece by arguing that at the end of history still stands democracy. But now we are already discussing post-democracy and Paraq Khanna is labeling the current phase as devolution – struggles for a local or at least regional identity.

The liberal world order after 1991 was based on capitalism (centered on property as natural and human right), the assumption that worldwide free trade will finally lead to peace (economic globalization) and is accompanied by the orientation towards consumerism as a cultural norm. But consume does neither generate values nor identity. International organizations served the purpose of regulating conflicts between sovereign states and the military, political and economic hegemony of the United States secured this kind of liberal world order, or rather the United States payed the costs (this is the point Trump hangs up), both, out of their own interest or as being the trustee of the whole. This liberal world order now is tattered in fragments, not least because the US under Trump abandoned it willfully, whereas the Europeans are desperately trying to preserve it but don’t stand a chance, because they are relying on an idealized past which never existed in the developing and poor countries.

Contrary to the assumptions of the pundits of glo-calization (Robertson and Bauman), the local showed to be not only an amendment of neoliberal globalization, but a counter-movement to the process of globalization (IS, Trump, „Buy American“, Brexit, Marine Le Pen, Duterte, Bolsonaro, Salafism, the European radical right, populistic movements). In his notes on Nationalism, George Orwell already wrote, that emotion does not always attach itself to a nation. It can attach itself to a church or a class, or it may work in a merely negative sense, against something or other – we can add against anybody, who does not belong to “us”. In short: We against the Rest. But the “Rest” is not far away anymore, as in neoliberal globalization the regions in Sub-Saharan and Saharan Africa, in southern India, in the MENA-states, but they are within the West (either as excluded sub-proletarians, the precariat, or as refugees). Although being a counter-reaction, the current waves of struggles for local identities and advantages are as a negation bound to neo-liberal globalization, the globalization of liberalism without equality, which we label tribal globalization.

The advent of tribal globalization does not signify the end of globalization, but the end into the illusions into globalization, which nevertheless has its undisputed successes. But there is no way back to an idealized globalization before Trump, Salafism, or an idealized neo-liberal world-order, because these developments were exactly the result of which they are purporting to fight. The exclusion of the „superfluous“, the „Rest“, produced by neo-liberal globalization, the advent of precarious kinds of life and the liquidity of identity throughout the world must be understood as a double one: The “Rest” is excluded from the positive aspects of globalization and people who are belonging to the Rest are the arbitrarily used enemy-image to construct a fixed „We“-identity („We against the Rest”). And this “Rest” comprises roughly two third of the world’s populace. As the neo-liberal globalization has led to such a social acceleration of the transformation of the whole world, people, communities and polities of all kinds are trying to cope with this process by re-inventing age-old static identities, which are so old, that it is supposed that these will outdo even this transformation. Such seemingly fixed identities are: Race, ethnicity, religion, patriarchy, and – perhaps the oldest one, sex and gender (this can explain the terrible rise of violence against women); and of course, identity through the exercise of violence itself, which is reverting the feeling of being totally powerless into being almighty. Especially biological differences are re-actualized, because they seem to be not subject to change.

These seemingly fixed identities are those of the pluperfect, the far distant past, which can be viewed as being free from the failures of the simple past, and mainly free from the failure of the immediate fathers – as already was typically for the German Nazis. Tribal identity is a perfect construction, because it is transporting the ideal of being absolutely united against everybody who is not belonging – and the question: Do I belong is the most important question in tribal globalization. Whereas tribes throughout the world are vanishing, tribal thinking in terms of „We against the Rest“ is flourishing. Such a modern tribe could be based on ethnicity, religion, sex, nation or whatsoever, it is not the content, which characterizes a modern tribe, but having a tribal identity (typically is Trump’s crony capitalism and with relation to the IS, not their ideology is so much counting, but belonging to a previously powerful tribe). With the emergence of tribal globalization, the very understanding of local order and world order is at stake; order wars are arising, when our order or that of others is dissolving (either only in our perception or in reality); our own order is challenged by another concept or and another order is transgressing into our own (the refugee crisis in Europe). The fast developing countries are not immune concerning the accelerated transformation of societies and identities and the task to cope with this development. As the main problem of neo-liberal globalization is the dissolution of identities and the exclusion of ever growing parts of the populace, that of the emerging tribal globalization the re-invention of age-old fixed identities, which is leading to order wars, what might be a solution?

Based on the concept of the floating (Clausewitz) and developing (Hegel) balance and harmony (Confucius), we strongly advocate the position, that the West as well as the East is only able to hold on their order and values, if these are discursively balanced and harmonized by the contribution of all great civilizations of the earth. Although the liberal world had its undisputed advantages like the rise of the newly industrialized nations, the current developments are already indicating its end. To put it to the core: freedom as the basis of the liberal world order is turning into oppression or civil wars without equality– just in the name of freedom. Whereas in the 20^th century the colonized civilizations had to learn to live with the victorious West, in the twenty-first century the civilizations of the earth finally have to learn to live with one another. This task requires a floating balance (Clausewitz) between freedom and equality, a kind of harmony (Confucius: difference with unity and unity with difference) within societies and between states.

Image Credit: WikiImages from Pixabay

February 29, 2020
President Trump’s India Visit : Balancing Optics with Substance

As President Donald Trump arrives in India today, 24 February 2020,on his maiden official visit to India, there is significant level of discussions amongst the academics, strategists, and foreign policy experts about whether this visit is more about optics than substantive discussions on strategies and agreements to strengthen the US-India strategic partnership. On arrival the president’s first public engagement is a super spectacle, ‘Namaste Trump’ at the new Motera Stadium in Ahmedabad that will have more than 100,000 people, which is Prime Minister Modi’s way of reciprocating for ‘Howdy, Modi’ at Houston last year. Most opine that while Mr Trump’s visit will be packed with pageantry, it will be light on policy and therefore, unlike previous presidential visits this one may not yield many break-through agreements. There are, however, some important developments that are very unique to the Trump-Modi era when compared to the previous visits of American presidents. Both leaders excel in showmanship and also in projecting strong nationalistic orientation to each one’s domestic constituency. Trump, with his transactional and disruptive approach comes off as more unpredictable when it comes to foreign policy and strategic issues.

Politics and Showmanship

It has taken Mr Trump, more than three years since he assumed office to visit India. This could mean that India was not a high priority for the Trump regime in the initial years, or as it turned out India was not the target of Trump’s disruptive strategy that he employed against USA’s traditional allies, China, Russia, and others. The final year of a POTUS term is generally termed as the ‘lame duck year’, where very few presidents have had a good last year and many were hampered by major controversies. It is important to note that India is the first country that President Trump is traveling to after his impeachment trial. There is more to Mr Trump’s India relationship than just this visit. One must remember that he is a shrewd businessman, and even before he became the president, India was already home to the most Trump ventures outside of North-America. While India’s strategic importance is well recognised by all presidents since Bill Clinton, President Trump’s approach is considerably different than the others. His daughter Ivanka Trump made headlines when she visited Hyderabad, as White House Advisor, for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Nov 2017 and the prime minister broke protocol to host a dinner in her honour.

That the Trump administration has followed a calibrated strategy of recognising and enhancing PM Modi’s image for significant gains to the American defence industry in particular is evident. The current visit, therefore, focuses primarily on strengthening strategic partnership issues in areas such as defence trade, intelligence sharing, counter terrorism, and visa issues. American side may make a token mention about Trump’s offer to facilitate improvement of India-Pakistan talks, China and issues of religious freedom. However, these will get swamped by the more visible spectacle that will be on display at Ahmedabad and Agra.

Defence Relationship – the most substantive progress

India – US defence partnership has progressed significantly over the last decade and a half. The two militaries are exercising together more frequently than ever, and the strategic interactions are moving more towards equitable approach to various aspects. The Trump administration has covered significant ground in nudging India, despite its reluctance, towards partnerships such as the ‘Quad’ and moving towards interoperability by concluding various agreements including the foundational agreements through Defence-Trade-Technology relationship mechanisms.

Defence trade between the two countries has grown exponentially since 2007. Two major procurements are likely to be signed by the Indian government during this visit: acquisition of 24 Sea-Hawk naval multi-role helicopters (NMRH) from Lockheed Martin worth $ 2.6 billion for the Indian Navy and six AH-64E Apache attack helicopters from Boeing worth $ 930 million for the Indian Army. Both procurements will be through the FMS (Foreign Military Sales) route. Trump administration cleared the decks for enhanced defence cooperation with India by approving India as a major Non-NATO defence partner in 2019, thus smoothening the process for exporting or selling hi-tech weapon systems to India. This is often confused with India becoming a major Non-NATO ally, which is clearly not the case.

What is clear is that the US has secured major business deals with India to its great advantage, without India gaining much in terms of technology access or industrial production of hi-tech weaponry. The US objective is clearly to wean India away from its heavy dependence on Russian weaponry and secure much broader business relationship with American arms industry. The MIC (military industrial complex) of the USA is clearly focused on India now as its major avenue of business in the 21^st century. The Americans were clearly unhappy that India went ahead with S-400 purchase from Russia despite the threat of CAATSA. That India has decided to buy an air defence missile system from the US, again through FMS route, worth $ 1.9 billion seems to be a compensation for such a decision.

The US-India defence deal will scale $ 20 billion this year after the Trump visit. Many of these weapon system procurements, in terms of numbers, are not of a scale sufficient to create major industrial partnerships for manufacturing. India, however, will need to look at ways and means of acquiring significant technologies from the US through joint ventures, co-design and co-development. Otherwise, there lurks the danger of India being trapped in an all too familiar pattern of buyer-seller relationship rather than as strategic partners.

Strategic gains?

The visit’s focus is in areas of trade, defence, counter-terrorism, energy, and co-ordination on regional and global issues. These are areas in which considerable ground has been covered and is a continuing process. The agreement on trade deal, which was keenly expected, has been deferred. With President Trump accusing India of high tariffs and dashing all hopes of a deal before the visit, it is clear that the USA intends to push hard for favourable access to Indian markets for American companies. There are some positives that are emerging. The prospects for increased collaboration in space between ISRO and NASA looks bright.

The focus of the American side is primarily on Defence trade. Increase in investments in defence production may become a possibility with major projects in the pipeline. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin are pushing hard for IAF’s 114 aircraft order, which will be processed under the strategic partnership model of ‘Make in India’ program. This could expand the production run to over 200 aircraft. Similarly, the naval helicopter (NMRH) procurement has a possibility of expanding into ‘Make in India’ project for over 100 helicopters. Boeing’s S-76D is a contender for Navy’s utility helicopter procurement under ‘make in India’ program.

The spectacle of this visit will certainly contribute to both leaders’ constituencies, for President Trump’s re-election campaign and for PM Modi it may divert people’s attention from current issues of flagging economy, Delhi electoral reverses, the Kashmir issue and ongoing protests on CAA and NRC. India however, will need to negotiate hard and leverage the expanding defence business to address technology access and strengthen Indian industry by enabling them into global supply chain. For this the Indian establishment will need to see well beyond the optics to assess real gains.

Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (retd) is the President of TPF and a former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff.

February 24, 2020
The Art of Resistance: 440 shoes on a public wall highlight the chilling murders of Turkish women

Category : Gender/Violence against Women/Turkey

Title : The Art of Resistance: 440 shoes on a public wall highlight the chilling murders of Turkish women

Author : Matheswaran 09-02-2020

Turkish society has long grappled with the issue of domestic and sexual violence against women. Much like in India, the patriarchy is the main reason behind the loss of many lives. Ms Yamuna Matheswaran points to a very innovative display project by a Turkish artist Vahit Tuna in Istanbul that serves to capture the attention of people on the issue of violence against women.

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February 9, 2020
Local Protests: A New Status-Quo in Political Lifestyle?

Hong Kong and Chile convulse, Lebanon possibly spiralling into a civil strife, and sanctions induced discontent paralysing Iran, a pattern of global protests is increasingly evident. The global political landscape is currently marked by frequent mass protests, and this wave is geographically much broader and unfolding in countries at different stages of development. Unlike earlier protest movements that aimed at radical political change and revolutionising the existing order, the modern demands abandon this narrative of overthrowing the system instead aiming for democratisation of the established institutions. In other words, the anti-government protests cropping up in various parts are not trying to dismantle the democratic structures but to redefine its scope and depth.

New Wave of Protests – questioning inept governance

In contrast to the previous waves of uprising like the Pink Tide in Latin America or the Arab Spring, that was spreading in a particular region with similar agenda, the recent protests are occurring in different zones and is marked by the uniqueness of initial triggers and demands put forth by the protestors. In Lebanon, the discontent was sparked by regressive taxes proposed (mainly Whatsapp tax) but turned into massive demonstrations, transcending sects and classes, calling for a technocratic government in the backdrop of sectarian political regime, widespread corruption and mishandling of the economy. The Yellow Vest movement in France originally against the fuel tax snowballed into nationwide protests to address the socio economic inequalities, stemming from high unemployment and stagnating economy. Protests in Chile against hiked transport fares escalated to countrywide riots revealing the dissatisfaction with the pro rich growth, heavily privatised welfare system and pro market regime. On observation, these isolated protests by themselves can be a defining feature of the current wave of protests, different from the previous waves that were characterised by common contestations.

Despite being unrelated events with independent agendas, the countries undergoing mass protests share similar trends of inequality and economic downturns. Further scrutiny beyond the seemingly small initial triggers reveal an evident pattern of economic anger and insecurity in these nations. Experts have suggested that Hong Kong’s pro democracy movement is also fuelled by wide income inequality (highest among developed nations), especially in the last 45 years since its handover to the Chinese. The Latin American region, witnessing the most number of countries breaking into sustained protests, is the world’s most unequal zone. In addition to inequality, sustained unrest in states like Colombia, Catalonia to Iraq and Egypt, the protests are driven by slowing economic growth, mounting public debt and austerity measures. Even in populist and authoritarian regimes, citizens are demanding an end to corruption and restoration of democratic rule of law. For instance, long serving, extremely popular, leftist leader Evo Morales was forced to resign in Bolivia after protests erupted accusing him of undermining democracy to extent his rule. There are increasing clashes against repressive democracy in Russia, and revolts against autocrats in Slovenia and Czech Republic.

Leaderless or smart mobilization?

Interestingly, a majority of the modern protests are leaderless, led by students and youth. In Hong Kong, the protests are gaining momentum through the active involvement of the students while in Chile the unrest for systematic change was ignited after school students launched a campaign to end the 4 percent subway fare increase. Niall Ferguson noted that this demographic trend of the young leading the demonstrations is a repeat of the 1960s, which like the present had an excess of educated youth over the number of available jobs. Another similarity amongst the protests is the urban-centric mass unrest. According to migration theorists, uncontrolled urbanisation resulting in rural to urban movements is a major cause for the ongoing demonstrations. Pushed into informal settlements in cities, often ignored by authorities and without basic social coverage, the urban area becomes a ground for discontent. For instance, in Haiti the protests began due to gasoline and food scarcity. Therefore, the socio-economic marginalisation of the urban poor is a significant yet overlooked factor that drives people to the streets. This is also compounded by a lack of faith in the government. More than the poor state policies adopted and prevalent corruption, in some protesting nations, there is deep distrust among the citizens. Hong Kongers believe that their government does not have legitimate powers over Beijing, and in countries like Lebanon, Chile or Ecuador, reversal of the initial triggers did not stop the dissenters from demanding a new government.

The youth bulge and the shrinking economic opportunities only partly explains the global protests. The reach and accessibility of social media and free messaging apps have exploded in the past decade. In addition to acting as a medium to organise and sustain mass protests, these channels are also used to express political frustrations. Unlike before when media had a monopoly over mass reach, individuals and groups have the capacity to mobilise and garner support over specific issues. While the protests seem unconnected, it is possible to see a copycat element in the way protests are carried out. The coverage of news and faster reach makes it possible for protestors to adopt methods of action that were successful elsewhere. It is also harder for states to contain and repress dissenting voices. Thus, the spread of communicative technology and social platforms offer a conducive environment for protests.

Social Media enables activism

The ability of electronic media to break down physical barriers and bring more events to global audiences might be increasing the visibility of protests, which would have otherwise remained local. Data from GEDLT Project, which has been tracking protests around the world from the past 40 years, reveals that the frequency of protests has not significantly increased. However, the intensity and the length of protests have improved. Despite a spike in these political activities wherein citizens are actively mobilising to pursue their demands, there has been a decline in the success rate of protests. A recent study highlights the staggering decline in success rate of protests from 70 percent in 1990s to 30 percent in 2010. Some highlight the “smart” methods adopted by regimes to prevent and suppress clashes like reinforcing loyalty of the elite, infiltrating and dividing the opposition, etc. For instance, in Lebanon, the initially united protests has created anti protest groups that supports the Hezbollah. Governments are also adopting a strategy of blaming foreigners and outsiders to reinforce support from the public. For instance, China is building a narrative of US backed forces disrupting Hong Kong to get an advantage in the ongoing trade war, which has strengthened after US signed a Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy law. Iran’s authorities are also blaming outsiders, especially the US, for the violence that ensued after state raising gasoline prices by 50 percent.

Overall, there is an influx in political activism. Global unrests are now spreading and have significant implications for countries everywhere. With electronic media and its potential for mobilisation, it is now easier to bring issues to national discourse. However, while the willingness and ability of mass political activism to recur and cause disruptions have increased manyfold, its success rates have decreased. It may be said that the political frustrations and the current protests will not bring a major transformation in the political structures but rather it is a new status quo in the nature of political lifestyles.

Renuka Paul is a Research Analyst with TPF. She holds a masters in Public Policy.

Image: Aerial night shot of Beirut Downtown, Lebanon during protest against Government, Lebanese revolution – Phot by Ramzi – Licensed from www.stock.adobe.com

December 17, 2019
Deal or No Deal: The Future of Iran’s Nuclear Agreement

Iran’s nuclear program has been at the epicentre of most non-proliferation narratives since the beginning of 21^st century. From the initial stages of receiving nuclear assistance from US to being sanctioned for their nuclear activities, Iran has managed to remain at the centre of this discourse. In 2015, Iran signed the nuclear agreement with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – the US, Russia, France, China and U.K as well as Germany and the European Union. However, with the arrival of Trump presidency, this deal was reopened by the US and has remained controversial despite a wide consensus that Iran has largely abided by the clauses of the agreement.

The Iran Nuclear Deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is unique for a number of reasons. It is an amalgamation of years of negotiation process between countries of widely differing perceptions and interests. It is the coming together of the western powers with Iran in order to sign a deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme and ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over the course of fifty odd years, the series of discourses on Iran’s nuclear programme, since its genesis till the time the deal was signed has evolved significantly. These discourses have impacted and resulted in significant policy changes. Most importantly, it has also led to a process of rapprochement between Iran and the western states making it one of the landmark agreements in recent times. However, the deal also received criticism because the narratives portrayed that Iran got a better deal through lifting of sanctions while its part of the commitment to the non-proliferation requirements was much less.

Unlike the Obama administration that pushed for the deal, President Donald Trump has been clear about his dislike for the agreement and has been an advocate of how this could possibly be “the worst deal”. Owing to this, Trump unilaterally pulled out of the agreement on May 08, 2018 and stated that he would reimpose sanctions until a better deal could be worked out. While Trump’s decision to undo years of negotiation comes from various factors such as Israeli influence, Iran’s support for Hamas and its role in Syria to name a few, it is also due to the perception of the Republican hardliners that there was not enough pressure put on Iran and that the US managed to get a bad deal out of it, and this remains a large part of Trump’s narrative. The US strategy now is to push for a more hard-line agreement and ensure complete isolation of Iran if it refuse to fall in line. This however, has failed because more than two years later there are still no signs of Iran buckling under US pressure, although the economic impact of sanctions has started to bite.

Given the situation, there are four possible outcomes that can be observed – First, Iran is likely to play a victim card and protest to the Europeans for compensations against the unilateral sanctions that affect its economy despite Iran abiding to all the terms and conditions of the JCPOA. In another context, this could also push Iran to retaliate by threatening to pursue uranium enrichment and continue operations in its nuclear facilities while preventing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspections. Recent announcements by the Iranian government regarding its nuclear enrichment is a clear indication that they are choosing the latter option. Secondly, while the European countries are disappointed with USA’s withdrawal, there are high chances of the deal falling apart purely based on the fact that the European members of P5+1 are strategically and intimately tied to the US through much larger scope of mutual interests. However, the European countries will aim to renegotiate the deal because of the serious security concerns that might come into play if Iran is pushed towards becoming a nuclear power. Thirdly, lack of commitment from the P5+1 countries might force Iran to second guess about its decision to renegotiate a new deal. If Iran decides to abandon the agreement, there exists a high risk of nuclear proliferation in the region. However, this would only lead to further sanctions from the other European countries as well. Therefore, any decision taken by Iran will have to be done taking all these factors into consideration. Finally, Iran’s strategy going forward will largely depend on USA’s strategy and the increasing economic pressure as a result. While Trump has chosen to withdraw from the deal, he has also stated that he is open to further negotiations to ensure a better deal. It is unclear as to what a better deal entails and therefore, Iran will have to play its cards right yet again to not only stop itself from being isolated and ridden with sanctions but to also prevent its own population from revolting against its decisions.

Another aspect that comes into play with respect to the deal is the role of China and Russia as counter-weights to dealing with US pressure. Along with the European allies, both the countries are against Trump’s decision to leave the nuclear agreement, reintroduce sanctions and renegotiate the deal. Earlier, China and Russia’s involvement remained minimal in the JCPOA. This time around, both the countries won’t allow Iran to be isolated. China and Russia have had historical ties with Iran and therefore, have been reluctant participants in the sanctions regime. However, both the countries will now actively look to counter USA’s unilateral decisions regarding the deal and will support Iran weighing out the consequences.

Iran is currently amidst domestic protests due to hike in fuel prices and bad economic conditions. Despite being an oil rich country, it is unable to reap the benefits of it through exports, due to sanctions. The Iranian government is exactly in the same situation it was in 2015 (politically and economically) when it signed the JCPOA. Therefore, strategically, this could be the right time for the US to give a window of opportunity to Iran to renegotiate. However, given the circumstances, renegotiating this deal is not at the top of the priority list for any of the countries and therefore, the future of the deal still remains uncertain.

Looking ahead at the future possibilities

If the countries come together again at the negotiating table, there are a few things that has to be done differently this time around to ensure that a deal is signed and is followed through. Firstly, a fool-proof clause has to be added in order to ensure that there are no easy exit strategies for any country from the deal. Once the deal is signed, every signatory has to abide by the deal unless there are any violations made by a member country. Secondly, with respect to Iran, the deal should be such that, the benefits of staying in the deal should be far more important than threatening to quit. Thirdly, the P5+1 countries have to ensure that they all have the same goal and approach to the deal rather if they want this deal to succeed. Fourthly, opportunity to improve the nuclear facilities in Iran must be provided but the agreement should be designed to detect and prevent clandestine programs. Finally, any further delay in signing a new deal will only increase Iran’s breakout capabilities which is counter-productive given that it was the need for the deal in the first place. Therefore, the imperative of saving or renegotiating the JCPOA as acceptable to all is never more urgent, particularly in the context of the emerging humanitarian crisis in Iran as a result of back-breaking sanctions.

Swathi Kallur is a Research Intern with TPF. She holds a master’s in international relations from Symbiosis University, Pune. Views expressed are author’s own.

Image Credit: Commons.wikimedia.org

December 2, 2019
Greenhouse Gases and Dietary Changes

Vijay Sakhuja July 22, 2019/Commentary

The 21^stcentury has been rightly labelled the ‘Climate Century’ and there is visible urgency to contain global temperature rise to 2˚C or below. Among the many initiatives currently underway to achieve that, deep cuts in global emissions in greenhouse gases (GHG) have been suggested.

One of the major contributors of GHG is the livestock sector; in particular, beef and cattle milk production result in anthropogenic GHG and represent 65 percent of the sector’s emissions i.e. 41 and 20 per cent respectively totalling about 4.6 giga tonnes carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent. Meanwhile, pork, poultry and eggs contribute less than ten percent each. Besides, there are other closely associated producers of GHG in this sector such as cattle feed production and processing, enteric fermentation from ruminants, manure storage and processing, and the balance is attributable to the processing and sector supply chains.

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, nearly half of the global agriculture production is consumed by live stock and just 37 per cent is for humans. Another study by the American Oil Chemists’ Society (AOCS) provides some very alarming outcomes and notes that it takes about 7 kilogram of grain in dry weight to produce 1 kilogram of live weight for bovine, around 4 kilograms for 1 kilogram of live weight for pigs, and for poultry it is just over 2 kilograms. Furthermore, the United States Department of Agriculture notes that agriculture takes up 80 to 90 per cent U.S. water consumption, and the Environmental Working Group observes that one pound of eggs require 477 gallons of water and almost 900 gallons for one pound of cheese. If that be so, it is fair to argue that there is otherwise surplus plant-based food available for humans.

Livestock as a source of food is expected to grow in the coming years. This is driven by the projected increase in global population from 7.6 billion is expected to reach 8.6 billion in 2030, 9.8 billion in 2050 and 11.2 billion in 2100. Consequently, any strong growth in the livestock sector to support the protein requirements of the growing population would result in higher GHG emissions. This necessitates urgent interventions to reduce emissions and can be achieved through sizeable reductions in the production and consumption of beef and cattle milk and balancing it with higher production of pork and poultry. However, that may not be sufficient.

In recent times interesting and promising initiatives by both the public and private sectors to promote agro-vegetable based diet among the people has been noticed. For instance, in the US, the sale of dairy and related products witnessed eight per cent drop from $14.7 billion in 2017 to $13.6 billion in 2018. One of the reasons for this drop has been the consumer shift toward plant-based alternatives for milk from oats, cashew, almond and soy. The US market trends suggest that the plant based dairy alternatives are currently valued at $17.3 billion and could double by 2023. The current meat value chain is about $1,900 billion and the livestock economy is a promising domain. Nearly 1 billion people are involved in the rearing, processing, distribution and sale of livestock, with half of those reliant on livestock for their livelihood. Significantly, livestock sector constitutes only 40 per cent of the agriculture as a whole that makes up approximately 3 per cent of global GDP.

While vegetarianism has been in vogue for a long time, it is veganism which is fast gaining popularity particularly among the Western countries such as the U.S., Canada, the UK and some countries in Europe. The vegan diet is being prompted on at least three counts; first is the issue of human health and a number of scientific studies have confirmed the benefits of plant-based diet that reduces the risk of chronic illnesses and diseases; second is the issue of sustainability and the international community has come to realize the critical need to reduce GHG emissions; and third is the growing understanding among the humans of the sustainability of veganism. In fact the vegan food industry is investing in vegan fashion, vegan leather to replace animal hide footwear and numerous other such products are making debut in the international market and gaining popularity among people at large.

This has led to a war between meat industry and vegan lobbyists who are promising options such as vegan meats, cheeses, milks, and other products. For instance, global plant milk market is expected to grow from over $8 billion in 2016 to $21 billion by 2024 and would be led by soy and coconut milk.

Finally, consumers are increasingly concerned about the impacts that animal-based foods have on land and water use, human health and above all on the environment, particularly in the context of GHG.

Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Trustee, The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai.

Photo by Helena Lopes from Pexels

July 22, 2019
Strategic Autonomy and the Looming Oil Crisis

Kamal Davar May 31, 2019/Commentary

The new Modi government will have to speedily contend with a serious foreign policy challenge on its hands.

That this ordeal comes in the wake of some underplayed serious economy problems currently facing the nation will compound the problems for India which imports over 80 per cent of its burgeoning oil needs.

Thus, if the looming crisis in the Persian Gulf between an arrogant US and an equally defiant Iran does not get resolved peacefully, ominous ramifications await the region, the world and all those nations which import crude oil from Iran.

The genesis of the current crisis between the US and Iran has its roots in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) which was agreed upon by Iran and six western nations in 2015, led by the US, to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, which boils down to deterring Iran from developing nuclear weapons. But in May 2018, the US, under its mercurial President Donald Trump, chose to renege on this treaty as Trump felt that this was the “worst deal ever negotiated.”

It is also a fact that Iran did not violate any norms of the law as regards this agreement.

Meanwhile, the US allowed some nations, including India, which import oil from Iran a six-month waiver, which ended on May 2, 2019. As a consequence of the US action, oil prices the world over have jacked and soon its adverse effects will be felt in India as inflation will hit the already strained Indian economy. Over a 10 per cent hike in global oil prices has already taken place in the last one month and a crippling escalation in oil prices ahead is well on the cards.

Notwithstanding any US pressure on India, the unalterable fact of Iran’s strategic significance to India in the region remains beyond question. India imported 24 million metric tonnes of crude from Iran in the 2018-19. India was Iran’s second largest buyer of crude last year, while Tehran was the third largest supplier to India after Iraq and Saudi Arabia (11 per cent of a total of India’s oil imports).

Additionally, Iranian crude comes with a longer credit period and cheaper freight owing to Iran’s geographical proximity to India and, thus, Iranian oil remains the best option for India in more ways than one.

Higher oil prices also make the Indian rupee weaker, making imports to India costlier. Importantly, that Iran-India collaboration in the development in the vital Chabahar Port in Iran will give India vital ingress to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics cannot be understated.

Meanwhile, the US has rushed the formidable USS Abraham Lincoln carrier-borne Task Force to the Persian Gulf region and undertaken certain prophylactic steps in case war breaks out.

The Iranians, too, have mounted some small-range anti-ship missiles on their warships. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recently said that his nation is facing acute pressure from international sanctions, dubbing it a “war unprecedented in the history of the Islamic revolution.”

The US has also branded Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards as a foreign terrorist organisation. A war of words has broken out, with President Trump declaring that if “Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran. Never threaten the United States again.”

Replying back sternly, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif retorted that Iranians have stood tall for millennia against aggression and that “economic terrorism and genocidal taunts won’t end Iran.” He added that “never threaten an Iranian. Try respect it works.”

Importantly, even US allies have steered away from of taking any partisan positions with either the US or Iran. Meanwhile, oil-producing nations like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Mexico and the US itself have been requested to step up their oil production to cater for Iranian oil shortfalls.

How this oil crisis will shape up to meet global demands is anyone’s guess.

It is a strategist’s nightmare in conjuring up a scenario concerning the ramifications of a war between Iran and the US. The Persian Gulf is easily one of the world’s critically significant strategic waterways through which one-third of the world’s oil is transported.

In the event of a war, Iran will definitely close the vital Straits of Hormuz for commercial shipping purposes, throwing the region’s economy out of shape — an eventuality which, hopefully, should not ever take place.

Preoccupied with its General Election, India, as a major regional player, has so far not reached out to its strategic partner, the US, to impress upon it to defuse the crisis.

Recently, the Iranian Foreign Minister made a trip to India to explain their position to India on the current standoff.

India, however, need not succumb to any US pressures or take sides. India has an adequate financial standing and moral stature to play a peacemaker’s role. India must conscientiously follow the time-honoured policy of zealously guarding its strategic autonomy. Respect for India from nations even adversarial to each other — as in earlier decades — will follow automatically and some of India’s economic tribulations will also get simultaneously addressed.

Let the new government in New Delhi bear in mind Iran’s more than significant strategic value for India in the region.

The author, Lt Gen Kamal davar is a former DGDIA and is visiting Distinguished fellow at TPF.

This article was earlier published in The Tribune.

May 31, 2019
The Chinese diaspora in Europe: Serving the motherland from abroad

Andrei V Korobkov, Nikolaj A Sluka, and Pavel N Ivanov May 31, 2019/Analysis

Europe, one of the largest immigration systems of the world, is experiencing currently a test of strength under pressure coming from a powerful new wave of migrants from the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) caused to a large extent by the Arab Spring.

According to Eurostat, arrivals from the Middle East to the EU were estimated at 1.5 million in 2015 and 1.8 million, in 2016. With the accumulation of economic problems and the escalating ethnic tensions in many countries of the region, demands are intensifying for a strict limitation of immigration and the reorientation of migration policy towards the primary acceptance of highly qualified migrants while limiting simultaneously the admission of practically all other categories of immigrants, including refugees. During his term in office, Nicolas Sarcozi, the former President of France, spoke, in particular, of the need to switch from «suffered» to «chosen» immigration.

Regardless of the growing realization of the problem’s acuteness by political elites, no effective measures have been introduced yet to deal with it. As a result, criticisms of European migration policies are intensifying. The problem cannot be limited to migration and minorities issues. These are not synonymous with poverty, unemployment, social frustration, and aggression that the Brits, for example, view as the root causes of pogroms in their cities, while considering white youngsters (chavs) as their main perpetrators. The crises also hurt representatives of the middle class, deepening the gap between them and the rich. This does not resolve the problems related to the integration and adaptation strategies, multiculturalism, cluster and dispersed settlement, and the links of those with the issue of social mobility or the lack of the latter.

The challenge of multiculturalism still remains a headache for many Western European governments as well as for the supporters of tolerance and multiculturalism concepts in general.

The challenge of multiculturalism still remains a headache for many Western European governments as well as for the supporters of tolerance and multiculturalism concepts in general. Prior to the start of the June 2018 EU leaders’ emergency summit, dedicated to the issues of migration, the French President Emmanuel Macron stated that the EU migration crisis has been transformed into a political one.

With this background, immigration to Europe from China remains to a large degree an invisible one. This is explained partially by the different scale of the incoming migration flows as well as by their origins. In 2016, the Chinese comprised just 3% of 76 million international immigrants residing in Europe. While the huge potential scale of the Middle Kingdom’s population mobility is well understood, that country traditionally prefers to act «in the shadow zone.»

In contrast to Muslim immigration, caused to a large extent by the Arab Spring and thus having a forced, push character in the countries of emigration, the Chinese immigration could be characterized as a product of a merger of the ideologies of the receiving states, relying on the concept of multiculturalism, and the sending country, pursuing the «going out» policy.

With a relatively long history of Chinese immigration to Europe, experts concentrate their attention on its most recent wave, the so-called New Immigration that started at the inception of China’s economic reforms and the policies of Openness. This migration wave is marked by a balanced gender structure and high shares of younger age cohorts, well educated and highly qualified people, aiming at the assimilation within the European societies, allowing them to find a job within the prestigious segments of labor market. This migration wave has significantly boosted and qualititatively transformed the process of the ethnic diaspora formation in the region. Exactly this New Migration is defining the main quantitative parameters of the diasporaand is responsible for the formation of the «model ethnic minority» stereotype that has become deeply ingrained in American public consciousness.

There also exists another “shadow” component of this migration flow represented by the industrial workers and service personnel who as a group have quite different demographic parameters and are marked by the relatively low levels of educational achievement, well being, and language proficiency. This latter group also includes undocumented migrants. This is a different and quite poorly explored up to this point area of research.

The emergence of deep fracture lines separating the host countries’ native populations and the politically and socially deprived immigrants who differ in language and religion – the concept defined in classical Political Science as mutually reinforcing cleavages – is less likely in this situation, marked by quite heterogeneous structure of the immigration flow.

The fact that the main immigration flow is centered on a relatively narrow group of receiving states reinforces contrasts in the territorial distribution of the Chinese diaspora in Europe.

The fact that the main immigration flow is centered on a relatively narrow group of receiving states reinforces contrasts in the territorial distribution of the Chinese diaspora in Europe. Its overall numerical strength has an expressed meridian gradient, declining in the West-East direction, and nearly directly correlates to the geography of the economically developed and populous countries. More than 98% of the diaspora is located in just 10 countries, while 50% lives in the UK and France. Large Chinese communities have been formed in Germany and the Netherlands as well as in Italy and Spain — the latter being the countries that have relatively recently offered amnesties for illegal immigrants. On this background, less visible are the countries of Northern and, especially, Eastern Europe, that for the first time opened their borders for Chinese immigration just in the 1990s. The exception represent just Hungary and Romania, having a relatively higher share of the Chinese in their modern immigration flow structure.

The «Chinaization of Europe» issue is acquiring a partially local character in the context of escalating leadership struggle among the world’s major powers in the framework of transition to the third global integration cycle. It is important that China is viewing emigration in the context of its «going out» strategy and in combination with other «soft power» mechanisms, involving the cooperation with European states in various fields — economic, investment projects, research and development, educational, socio-cultural etc. More than that: official Beijing is incrementally cutting on the projects that were designed to promote migrants’ repatriation or aimed at the replenishment of the human capital reserves, and is transiting to a large scale «Serve the Motherland from Abroad» stategy. The main task is to form the China-centered interlayer as a factor of state influence in host countries with high levels of ethnic communities’ concentrations. In the future, the representatives of such influence groups are expected to become deeply ingraned into the social, political, and economic life of the receiving countries in order to be able to lobby China’s interests in case of necessity. Thus the main emphasis will be made on preserving and strengthening the diaspora’s national consciousness, promoting China’s future global political and economic superiority.

Andrei Korobkov is Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Middle Tennesse State University, USA. He is a non-resident, visiting Distinguished Fellow at TPF.

Nikolaj A Sluka is Professor of Geography at Moscow State University, Russia.

Pavel N Ivanov is pursuing his MS (Geography) at Fudan University, Shanghai, China.

This article is published earlier in BRE Review of University of TURKU.

Photo by Vladislav Vasnetsov from Pexels

May 31, 2019
Will Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections End the Deadlock?

Andrei Korobkov March 05, 2019/Analysis

The crisis in Venezuela grows more complex with each passing day. At first, President Nicolas Maduro declared that he was willing to consider the possibility of early parliamentary elections. But it is clear that this proposal is absolutely unacceptable for the opposition, which already wields a majority in the legislature and has the US firmly behind it. The opposition is urging the President to resign and takes a dim view of an early presidential election, no matter how rapidly it can be organized. The “interim president” appointed by parliament, Juan Guaido, is counting on the West’s financial and political support. He is feeling increasingly confident now that the US has frozen Venezuela’s government bank accounts and announced that the pretender president would be given control of them. This means that the government will immediately lose $7 billion deposited in US banks and another $11 billion in expected revenues from 2019 oil sales. Given that, Guaido, dizzy as he is with what he sees as his success, is unlikely to be willing to agree to serious talks or compromises, although he can suggest holding simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. Maduro, for his part, is not going to surrender and has already issued a warning that the growing confrontation and the mounting Western interference in his country’s internal affairs could lead to a civil war.

There are a number of reasons why the current crisis in Venezuela is of such great interest and may have far-reaching political consequences. The US has always regarded Latin America as its backyard where it is free to lay down the law and punish disobedient. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in effect, introduced a “limited sovereignty” model that became increasingly pertinent during the Cold War.

The United States has made huge investments in Latin American economies; Latin elites have been educated in the US for generations; the Americans have trained Latin militaries and supplied them with arms for centuries. The region is highly dependent on the US technologically. Besides, Venezuela is one of America’s main oil suppliers. The Americans are exasperated not only by the demonstrative independence of Venezuelan foreign policy but also by the 20 years of leftist reforms under the Chavez and Maduro governments. The same is true of the increasingly noticeable political, economic and military presence of Russia and China in the country. Of no small importance, too, is Venezuela’s good relationship with Cuba.After the Cold War, the Americans initially decided to at least formally follow the rules and refrain from toppling democratically elected governments in the region. Instead they used other, more flexible methods to influence the situation in individual Latin American countries. The exceptions were the abortive coup attempts in Honduras in 2009 and Venezuela (against Chavez) in 2002. From this point of view, the attempt to displace Maduro is relatively out of step with the new US policy in the region and may signal yet another revision of regional strategy.

One more specific feature of the current situation in Venezuela is that the US line consists of an eclectic array of approaches that the US has used in a number of Latin American countries over the last 60 years. The contras’ failed landing in the Bay of Pigs in 1961 is one notorious example. A more obscure aspect of the story is how the CIA thought about the operation. After all, no one expected that the team in question would be able to launch a large-scale operation and fight Fidel Castro’s government. The plan was for them to dig in on a limited territory, proclaim an alternative government that would be immediately recognized by Washington, and request US troops be sent in to “support the legitimate government.” The gambit was a scandalous failure, but the “alternative government” idea is still alive and being used in Caracas in the form of a constitutional coup.

Another precedent was set in Chile in 1973. Older people remember well the TV footage of well-fed and clearly not overworked housewives banging pots and pans at protests in Santiago and shouting that they were starving. The same tactics are being used today. The US has introduced economic sanctions and is intentionally destabilizing the economic situation in a country that has already been weakened by the government’s experiments with “Bolivarian socialism” to accuse Maduro of being an ineffective leader and to arouse popular disaffection. (But even today, Maduro’s opponents are failing to turn the lower strata that form the majority in that developing country against him: these people remember that it was Chavez and Maduro after him who gave them access to education and healthcare and enabled them to enjoy far better living standards).

A third model still in the works is based on the 1989 Panama operation. If the first two options don’t work, outbursts of violence will be provoked through assassination attempts against opposition leaders or assaults on US nationals. This would lay the groundwork for a US invasion under the pretext of restoring law and order and guaranteeing the safety of US citizens.

The first two models have been tested in Venezuela, without much success. The question is whether the third option will be attempted. This also raises two more interesting questions. Latin American coups usually become possible if military leaders turn on the government, but in Venezuela they continue to support Maduro. Moreover, it was the military who saved Hugo Chavez in 2002 and thwarted the coup masterminded from outside the country. The question is whether this support endures and whether the US succeeds in offering military leaders enough “carrots” for them to change their outlook.

The second question concerns the US president. Donald Trump took over two years ago with his coterie of right-wing political reformers determined to fundamentally alter both America’s domestic and foreign policy. In the foreign policy arena, this new approach was based on renouncing interventionism, shifting emphasis towards domestic growth, acknowledging that the center of the world system was migrating from the northern Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, and recognizing China as the major geopolitical threat to the United States. The last point implies that the US must create a new system aimed at containing China, which, in turn, requires better relations with Russia as a counterweight to China, the start of tariff wars against the PRC, and the destabilization of the WTO and the free trade system as a whole, which allegedly are more beneficial for China than for the United States. But, seen by the US elite (and not without reason) as a systemic threat, Trump is under continuous attack and unable to implement many of these ideas (with the greatest obstacles put in the way of his attempts to improve US-Russia relations). Gradually, the majority of the right-wing reformers left his administration (the biggest loss was the departure of Steve Bannon and Sebastian Gorka) to be replaced by traditional neocons and interventionists like John Bolton, the current national security advisor.

Along with the loss of Republican control of the House of Representatives in November 2018, the approach of the presidential primaries, growing stock market volatility, relatively low presidential approval ratings, and unending attacks on Trump from the political establishment and the “elite” press, this is strengthening the hand of those who are urging the president to stage a “small victorious war” of his own. After all, Trump is still the only US president in two generations who has not yet launched a single new military intervention. Meanwhile, Trump himself is between a rock and a hard place, as he is being pressured by both the traditional US right, who dream of the US flexing its military might and toppling the disobedient regime, and the Democrats, who hope to force the president to break his election promises, mire him in a protracted military conflict and thus discredit and politically weaken him ahead of his re-election campaign.

The current situation has yet another, broader international dimension. The international community is divided over Venezuela. The United States is supported by Canada, Brazil, and many European and Latin American countries. But that is a far cry from unity. Many right-wing governments in Europe, including Italy, whose government is very close to Trump ideologically, have been skeptical of attempts to give Venezuela away to a different suitor.

An even more important factor is that the new leftist president of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, is well aware of the possibility that Mexico will be the next target, if a constitutional coup is allowed to happen in Venezuela. Moreover, opposing Trump is a win-win for any Mexican politician amid the growing US-Mexican friction over immigration, tariffs, and much else. President Erdogan in Turkey is thinking along the same lines.

Most important, of course, is the stance taken by Russia and China. Both have actively cooperated with Venezuela in recent years, with Chinese investment in the Venezuelan economy exceeding Russia’s by almost 400 percent. Nevertheless, China is very cautious about its moves, as it is currently under pressure from the US and unwilling to furnish Trump with another pretext to accuse it of growing expansionism.

This is why the initiative in supporting President Maduro will most likely remain in Russian hands. Though inferior to China in terms of investment, Russia is the main arms supplier to Venezuela (with sales totaling $12 billion). Russia has also invested heavily in Venezuela’s oil industry and a number of other sectors.Thus, the current situation includes many unknowns linked to actors’ moves both in Venezuela and the United States, as well as Russia, China and a number of other countries. As such, both the course of the conflict and its outcome can be of global importance, influencing, among other things, the prospect of whether the US reverts to its traditional imperial interventionism or opts for a somewhat different policy.

The course of this crisis and its outcome may also have serious impact on the domestic political situation in the United States. The potential for a “controlled crisis” looms large in this situation, because the chances of a political provocation aimed at drawing the Trump administration into a military conflict are sufficiently high. Therefore, the dynamics of the Venezuelan drama may decide the fate of both Maduro and Trump himself in the long run.

Dr Andrei Korobkov is Professor of Political Science at the Middle Tennessee State University, and is Non-Resident Visiting Distinguished Fellow at TPF. This article is the English translation of the original published earlier in Valdai Discussion Club.

The views expressed are the author’s own.

March 5, 2019