The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Regions

  • Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    The Indian Air Force celebrates its 86th anniversary on this October 8th, making it one of the oldest and large air forces of the world. Despite many challenges, most of which relate to inefficiencies of political decision making and inadequate financial support to modernisation, the IAF has come out with flying colours to continue to demonstrate its operational capabilities and strategic reach. The recent ‘Gaganshakti’ high intensity exercise  is an outstanding example. While the IAF continues to grapple with its huge problems of obsolescence, the last decade and a half has also been testimony to some major transformations underway in the IAF. As the 21st century dawned, the IAF began a rapid transformation from being largely a tactical air force to a strategic force, with significant expeditionary capability.

    Isolation to Outward Engagement

                 For more than half a century, outward engagement of the three services was limited to participation in UN peace-keeping missions. As India began its transformation with economic liberalisation in 1991, it began to dismantle its inward looking licence raj, and with it a global outlook started to emerge. As Indian economy accelerated into an overdrive by the late 1990s, and as India’s strategic image strengthened with  the overt declaration of its nuclear weapon status, the government encouraged military to military interactions and defence diplomacy. IAF’s international engagement expanded significantly from the 2000s. Major bilateral exercises were carried out on regular basis with major air forces – USA, UK, France, Singapore, South Africa, Oman, and Malaysia. Also, the IAF became a regular participant in USAF’s multinational exercises such as Cope Thunder and Red Flag. Recently the IAF has expanded its international exercises to involve Israel, Russia, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. For over a decade, the Singapore Air Force carries out its two month long annual training from one of IAF bases on the eastern coast. Joint exercises for humanitarian assistance, involving multinational forces, is now a regular feature. These interactions and engagements have highlighted IAF’s high quality operational expertise, its global standing, and in turn, has contributed immensely to IAF’s growth in its international understanding. Today, the world sees the IAF as the sharp edge of India’s military power as well as the primary instrument of its humanitarian assistance capability worldwide.

    Enhancing its Reach

                 Although the IAF inducted the Jaguar from 1979, its air-to-air refuelling capability was kept inactive. Induction of Mirage 2000 in 1985 met the same fate. The importance of aerial refuelling in extended range operations by the USA in its Libyan strike, Osirak nuclear reactor strike by Israel, and Falklands operations by the UK was not lost on the IAF, and it decided in favour of this force multiplier in the late 1990s. Although the IAF was one of the last major air forces to induct the aerial refueler, its pace of operationalisation was probably the fastest. In less than a decade IAF fighters were flying across Atlantic Ocean to participate in international exercises like the ‘Red Flag’ and ‘Cope Thunder’. Within the last decade the IAF has demonstrated its extended operational reach through all its major exercises. Aerial refuelers form critical component of IAF’s operational capability in terms of reach and penetration. An expansion of this fleet is now long overdue.

    Technological and Operational Transformation

                 Airpower, by its very nature is technology intensive. The IAF embarked on major operational reorientation through induction of major technologies from the early 2000s. This began with induction of precision weapons, UAVs, electro-optical systems, and sensors. The IAF initiated its first upgrade program in the mid 1990s, for 125 MiG-21 Bis aircraft, by stitching together a complex avionics upgrade involving three nations – Russia, France, and Israel. The success of this program has established an irreversible upgrade culture as a cost-effective strategy for sustaining its force structure. This upgrade strategy has also contributed immensely to  indigenisation capability of Indian industry. The Jaguar fleet went through a series of comprehensive upgrades, giving rise to significant expansion of its capabilities. The Su-30 MKI is an excellent result of IAF’s conceptualisation and implementation of avionics suites and mission optimisation. Between 2004 and now, the IAF’s upgrade strategies have given fresh lease of life to various aircraft fleet and weapon systems: AN-32, MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000, and air defence missile systems. More programs involving upgrades of Su-30 MKI fighters and IL-76 transport aircraft are likely to be taken up soon.

    The IAF moved to transform its air defence operations through the induction of AWACS platforms. Selecting the proven IL-78 platform, the IAF again masterminded a complex three nation development program to evolve a modern, state-of-the art AWACS platform by 2009. The three AWACS platforms inducted in phase I have been utilised extensively to bring in major operational transformation of its air defence operations in a very short time-frame. The AWACS has certainly given the IAF a significant operational edge vis-à-vis the PLAAF challenge across the Himalayas. Simultaneously, the IAF has supported the indigenous program of AEW aircraft development based on Embraer-145 platform.

    Indo-US strategic partnership manifested itself in significant transformation in IAF’s airlift capability. By 2012, the IAF inducted and operationalised C-130J Hercules aircraft for special operations, which is also the IAF’s first 20 tonne airlift aircraft; and C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft. These are going to be joined by Chinook heavy lift helicopters and Apache attack helicopters. By 2012 large numbers of Russian Mi-17 1V helicopters entered service. With these inductions, the IAF’s airlift capability has truly attained transcontinental proportions.

    The air defence missile segment, afflicted by long delays and overruns in terms of cost and time, has finally started showing results. The IAF, inducted its first squadrons of LLQRM (short range air defence missiles) based on Israeli systems, while simultaneously inducting indigenous Akash missile systems. This still indicated huge gaps, which is sought to be filled by the long-delayed MRSAM, jointly developed by India and Israel. With the projected signing of the contract for the Russian S-400 long-range SAMs the air defence will be on stronger operational capability.

    The most significant operational and technological capability of the IAF is its net-work centric warfare capability, which is underway for more than a decade. The IAF is the most significantly networked military force amongst the three services. It first established its primary communication grid, AFNET (Air Force Network), and  simultaneously established its air defence network inclusive of vital command and control network, IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System). The IACCS integrated all its ground based radar sensors and other inputs to create a common operational picture for real-time command and control to become effective. This was a pioneering transformation. The culminating transformation is its ‘airborne network’, which involved evolving NCW concepts based on  futuristic ‘self-organising, master-less, node-less, architecture’. The concepts were validated through a three-year long pilot project in 2013. Centred on the SDR (Software Defined Radio) the IAF is focused on indigenous solution. However, interim acquisition of limited numbers of SDR to kickstart operationalisation has stalled for nearly four years due to our infamous acquisition procedural delays. NCW operationalisation is a huge challenge that involves significantly large number of legacy aircraft and systems.

    The transformation of the IAF as an aerospace force began in the aftermath of Kargil war. IAF has been at the forefront of transforming the ISR domain through its operational strategies involving various ISR assets – UAVs, tactical and strategic reconnaissance systems, and satellites. It has played a stellar  role in defining the roadmap for developing and deploying space assets. It is matter of time before the IAF leads the tri-service aerospace command in true measure to formalise and operationalise India’s Space security strategy.

    IAF as the instrument of India’s Global Power

                 The rise of India and China is the major transformative process of the 21st century international system. That India aspires to be a global power is well known and well founded. India’s march to global power status in the 21st century will be a challenging and arduous task. Rise to great power status is not one of just prestige and power but comes with huge responsibilities. These responsibilities come with significant costs. A great power should be willing to share and shoulder the costs of providing public goods to the global community. This is precisely what the USA is now complaining about, as it finds the costs of sustaining itself as a hegemon is becoming prohibitively expensive. The USA is clearly signalling that aspiring great powers should share the costs of global public goods albeit without upsetting an international order crafted to its advantage. This is where India must rise to the challenge by rising as a benign power with the right balance of hard and soft power to influence the course of emerging power politics.

    The IAF, on its 86th anniversary, is at the cross roads of evolving as the instrument of India’s global power. As the 21st century progresses, the centrality of aerospace power in the national power of major countries has become unquestionable. Joint or integrated warfare has been necessitated by the critical role of aerospace power in all domains, be it precision, reach, rapidity of application, and intelligence through ISR. The viability of conventional deterrence comes from aerospace power’s ability to deter through the fear of precise punishment. It becomes obvious that the IAF has to be the cutting edge instrument of India’s hard military power. This obviously calls for the right combination of force structure with cutting edge technologies and weapon systems with significantly long reach. A serious introspection would reveal that the IAF, as it enters its 87th year, faces daunting challenges of building and sustaining the requisite force structure.

    IAF’s Force Structure Challenges

     IAF has been grappling with problems of obsolescence and dwindling force structure for more than two decades. Long drawn out and unending MMRCA acquisition process is an example of leaving operational capability gaps unactioned as well as loss of opportunities to enhance industrial and technological capabilities. Time and cost overruns in the indigenous Tejas-LCA program is again an operational shortfall for the IAF. The IAF today is at an all-time low of 32 fighter squadrons. An analysis of the history of IAF’s force structure would reveal a story of crisis management to sustain minimum force levels. Much of the blame must go to the political leadership for failure to grasp the importance of sustaining credible conventional force structures, while part of the blame must certainly fall on services themselves.

    JRD Tata committee, set up in the aftermath of 1962 humiliation against China, recommended an IAF force structure of 65 combat squadrons. This was accepted by the government but was pruned down to 39.5 squadrons as an interim measure on account of resource constraints. This figure has remained more or less permanent, till the government approved a figure of 42 squadrons in 2005. Even though the IAF has enhanced its combat capability with the induction of force multipliers, and networked air defence capability, its approved force structure may fall short of meeting India’s requirements of functioning effectively as a global player. In the modern, net-centric aerospace environment, the IAF will be India’s main instrument of conventional deterrence. Tata committee recommendations look more apt for India, given India’s emerging stature and global responsibilities expected of it. However, the immediate requirement is to get IAF’s force structure back to the approved 42 combat squadron strength. Given the large number of aircraft that need to be replaced, this would take at least 15 years if only done on war-footing.

    Modernisation and Indigenisation Imperatives

    As it celebrates its 86th anniversary the IAF would do well to do some serious introspection. Modernisation processes for all militaries in all countries face the challenges of timely resource availability, particularly for capital-intensive service like the Air Force. In India the problem is compounded by inadequate aerospace industrial and technology base. Indian military power, and IAF in particular, is heavily import dependent. Despite more than 70 years of indigenisation efforts, not much has changed in critical areas. A major cause for this state of affairs is the lack of adequate involvement of the user service in project management and technology development. The IAF will have to take a leaf out of the USAF model to make a major impact on indigenisation. This will need the following to be done on a time bound basis:

    • IAF needs to create a cadre of research personal. It also needs to operate aerospace research laboratories. These will focus on research and development of aerospace technologies. Ideally the IAF needs to exercise command and control over laboratories such as ADE, DARE, CABS, etc.
    • Programs like the Tejas-LCA should have been managed by the user service, the IAF, after the technology demonstration phase. Program management by the user service is an absolute must as it will be driven by operational needs balancing technology, cost, and time factors. As a corollary, it becomes obvious that the IAF must create the necessary expertise to manage its programs.
    • IAF’s involvement in DRDO driven programs must clearly define them as those that are technology development oriented and those that are user driven weapon system development. The latter programs must clearly be managed by the IAF while the former must be enabled by IAF support.
    • The IAF must clearly lay down a 20 year strategic roadmap for the government wherein all aircraft and major weapon systems are made completely free of foreign OEM dependence.

     

    Conclusion

                India’s security environment cannot be viewed simply as just border and territorial disputes with Pakistan and China. Its strategic challenges in a fast changing 21st century world are increasing by the day. China’s aerospace capability has leapfrogged significantly over the last two decades, and it poses a major challenge to India. The IAF will need to spearhead India’s aerospace capability to balance China’s dominance.

    IAF’s long-term force structure strategy could revert to its earlier ‘auxiliary air force’ format, albeit in a new form. Indian government wound up the auxiliary air forces post 1962, while it retained the ‘Territorial Army’ model. The benefits of this scheme is well established. It provides huge opportunities to a large segment of qualified young people to do military service, provides a ready reserve, and forms an important component of second rung security structure. With slight modification this could be created as Air National Guards, much like the US system. The objective should be to achieve one squadron of Air National Guards for each state in a defined time period based on financial and technical resources. These squadrons should be equipped with Tejas aircraft. Over a period of time this could become a win-win situation for the IAF, civil society, and the country as a whole. A comprehensive approach to force structure could see the IAF as the foremost air force in Asia and a major powerful force in the world by 2032, that will be IAF’s centenary year.

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     The author, Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (Retd) is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy, Plans & Force Development).

  • The San Juan Incident

    The San Juan Incident

    K N Sushil   December 08, 2017

    The ARA San Juan disappeared a few hundred kilometers off Argentina’s coast on November 15, and despite an extensive air and sea search no sign of the sub has been found. Eight days after the sub vanished, the Vienna-based Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation said that it had detected hydro-acoustic anomaly” about 30 nautical miles (60km) north of the sub’s last-known position at 10:31 (13:31 GMT) few hours after the sub’s last contact. The analysis of the acoustic incident was reported as follows.

    The acoustic signal associated with the loss of the Argentina Submarine ARA SANJUAN confirms the following:

    That acoustic signal originated near 46-10S, 59-42W at 1358Z (GMT) on 15 November 2017. It was produced by the collapse (implosion) of the ARA SAN JUAN pressure-hull at a depth of 1275-feet. Sea pressure at the collapse depth was 570 PSI. The frequency of the collapse event signal (bubble-pulse) was about 4.4Hz. The energy released by the collapse was equal to the explosion of 12,500 pounds of TNT at the depth of 1275-feet. That energy was produced by the nearly instantaneous conversion of potential energy (sea-pressure) to kinetic energy, the motion of the intruding water-ram which entered the SAN JUAN pressure-hull at a speed of about 1800 mph.
    The entire pressure-hull was completely destroyed (fragmented/compacted) in about 40 milliseconds (0.040s or 1/25th of a second), the duration of the compression phase of the collapse event which is half the minimum time required for cognitive recognition of an event. Although the crew may have known collapse was imminent, they never knew it was occurring. They did not drown or experience pain. Death was instantaneous.
    The SAN JUAN wreckage sank vertically at an estimated speed between 10 and 13 knots. Bottom impact would not have produced an acoustic event detectable at long range

    The ARA San Juan was an IKL(German) designed type 1700 submarine built by TKMS in their Essen yard in 1985 at about the same time the Indian type 1500 was being built at HDW(Kiel). Both the submarines have great deal of similarities. Therefore, having commanded two type 1500s I will venture to hazard a guess on what could have afflicted the submarine.

    Facts as gleaned from various reports.

    15 Nov 0030Hrs. Submarine surfaced to report Water ingress through snort system causing a short circuit in the forward battery group. The forward battery group was isolated. The submarine charged her batteries on surface

    At 0600 The message is transmitted through normal communication channels.

    At 0730 the Captain informs base that he intend to continue his passage dived (Presumably because the sea was rough) At 1031, according to the CTBT report the submarine imploded at a depth of 1275 ft.

    From the above it would appear that the submarine was snorting before she surfaced at 0030hrs. If there was water ingress through the snort mast that caused a short in the forward battery group then the submarine was unable to maintain snorting depth, because the sea may have been too rough and the “head valve” (that prevents water from coming into the mast, when the mast dips even momentarily) was not functioning. As part of the SOP the snort induction drain, which drains into the bilges is kept open for the duration of the snort.  In any case during the snorting, the diesel engines are used to create the suction that draws all the foul air from all over the submarine. The fresh air coming from the snort mast merely spreads to fill the vacuum. Therefore flooding through the snort system would normally have no effect on the battery groups.

    The submarine remained on surface for seven hours post an incident of fire and smoke, which was attributed to short circuiting of the forward battery group. The crew, it seems, did not see any fire but managed to clear the smoke after isolating the forward battery group.

    A fire in a battery group is one of the most dreaded emergencies on board any submarine. Therefore the damage control actions and subsequent analysis would have been painstakingly thorough. If there was a fire in the battery pits the firefighting system would have been activated (manually or automatically). Once the system is activated the battery pits are to be kept in a sealed condition for at least one hour. Thereafter the pit is ventilated for at least an hour before inspecting it. In these types of submarines one has to lie down on a trolley and manoeuvre manually over the batteries. If the sea is rough it becomes extremely difficult and dangerous.  It may therefore be possible that they may have dispensed with the inspection whilst on surface.

    In the seven hours on surface the crew must have thoroughly examined the power distribution network and come to the conclusion that the problem was contained, and the submarine was reasonably safe to continue dived with a single battery group. They may even have considered that it would be safer and easier to inspect the battery pit while the submarine is underwater.

    The submarine dived at 0730 hrs. After 3 hours it appears to have imploded at a depth of 388 Meters. 388 Meters is of course below the normal operating depth but well above the crushing depth. If the submarine did indeed implode at that depth the inescapable inference is that there were severe structural problems that had weakened the pressure hull. The Argentinean Navy must have known if any structural limitations were reported or imposed.

    If the structural problems were not severe enough then some event that occurred in the 3 hours she was submerged must have been responsible. That event was so catastrophic that the submarine was unable to prevent an uncontrolled descent. Given the background situation the captain would have ordered the submarine to dive to 50 Meters. As soon as he settled down to that depth, he would have ordered the inspection of the battery pit. Unless there are clear tell tale signs, it is possible to miss some things which may have the potential to cause damage. Anyhow the inference and action post this inspection is not known. Did they reconnect the forward group? We will never know. The inspection would have taken about 45 minutes to an hour. The fact that they did not surface immediately after the inspection indicates that they did not notice anything alarming.

    In the three hours that the submarine was under water, if there had been a gradual flooding, the crew would have taken action to mitigate the effects, and would have ample reaction time to surface. Therefore loss of control must have been triggered by a sudden event. A pressure hull breech and flooding that must have cause to rapidly lose depth. The most immediate response is to use speed to create dynamic vectors to aid depth control. Since the submarine had only one battery group connected the speed of the submarine would be restricted to about 8 Knots ahead and about 4 Knots astern.  This would not be sufficient to delay the descent so that de-ballasting and pumping out capacities can effectively annul or reduce the rate of flooding. The rate of flooding keeps on increasing with depth.

    Now we have a situation where the submarine with the forward (or all) ballast tank probably blown going down. At depths greater than 180 meters the effect of blowing ballast with High Pressure air (250Bar)is painstakingly slow. The next stage is when the submarine crosses 15 meters more than the operational depth the Hydrazine emergency de-ballasting system will be triggered. This system is designed to clear the forward and aft main ballast tanks in 12 seconds at any depth. The problem would be if the Ballast tanks already contain air the Hydrazine will cause an explosion in the ballast tanks. If that happens there is nothing left to create positive buoyancy.

    The Next question is why did the submarine implode at 388 meters? As brought out earlier it clearly points to structural weakness in the pressure. If such a situation did not pre-exist then it may be possible that the battery pit event may have cause massive spillage of acid into the pit causing the pit to corrode in the almost 10 hours this corrosion may have weakened the hull sufficiently to cause a substantial breech in the pressure hull. The flooding of the pits could an explosion as the water level reaches to short the terminal connectors.  This is only a conjecture.

    San Juan went down without a trace. The crew did not even have the time or opportunity to release the systems and tell tale indicators that were meant tell the outside world that the submarine is in distress.

    It is said what goes up must come down. Submariners know that what goes down need not necessarily come up. San Juan RIP.

    In the language of the submarine community San Juan is on eternal patrol.

    Vice Admiral K N Sushil (retd) is a Indian Navy Veteran, and the former Flag Officer commanding-in-Chief of Southern Naval Command.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]

  • China: A Colossus in Asia?

    China: A Colossus in Asia?

    Vidya Nadkarni December 10, 2017
    China today is moving out of the shadows.  After decades of following Deng Xiaoping’s advice to “hide our capacities” and “bide our time,” Xi Jinping in his long address to the CCP’s 19th Party Congress in October announced that his country “has stood up, grown rich, and is becoming strong” and would move “closer to center stage.”  Xi celebrated the “steady progress” in China’s construction on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea—a self-back-patting that has disregarded the concerns of Southeast Asian claimants to the Paracel and Spratly island chains and troubled the United States. China, in Xi’s words is a “great nation,” and he implied a prominent global role for the country when he noted that history looked “kindly on those with resolve, with drive and ambition, and with plenty of guts.”  He could not have offered a clearer message to the world that China was claiming its proper due on the global stage.

    China’s assertiveness is coming at a time when American allies and partners are increasingly questioning U.S. resolve and interest in global leadership.  President Trump’s “America First” strategy appears to many as a clarion call for a foreign policy strategy of retrenchment.  While the rhetoric of Trump administration officials continues to support US global engagement, the President’s position has been far less clear.  For instance, early in his administration Trump unceremoniously withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Climate accord.  He decertified the Iran nuclear deal but stopped short of suspending the multilaterally negotiated agreement. Predicting the depth and steadfastness of US commitment to a global presence is therefore difficult.

    Specifically with respect to the Asian theater, while Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Admiral Harry B. Harris of the US Navy’s Pacific Command (PACOM) have underscored US interest in a strong presence in the Indo-Pacific region, President Trump, in a speech at a November 2017 gathering of Asia-Pacific CEOs in Danang, Vietnam that White House officials had billed as highlighting the US commitment to a “free and open Indo-Pacific region,” inveighed instead against the unfair trade practices of other countries and insisted that he would put America first and not let the United States be taken advantage of anymore.  Trump’s fiery defense of nationalism and sovereignty was followed immediately by President Xi’s vigorous defense of open trade and globalization.  Upon his return to Washington, however, President Trump in debriefing remarks on his trip to Asia touted his accomplishment of three goals: uniting the world against the North Korean menace; strengthening America’s alliances and economic partnerships in a free and open Indo-Pacific; and insisting on fair and reciprocal trade deals. His interlocutors in Asia, however, heard him emphasize the third objective.

    Trump’s November trip to five Asian countries—Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines—thus did little to reassure US allies who are caught between the Scylla of economic reliance on China and the Charybdis of an uncertain protection from the US security umbrella. China dominates the economic scene in Asia.  To get a picture of what this means, consider the degree of dependence on China in Australasia.  China has superseded the United States as the largest trading partner of Australia, Japan, India, and the ASEAN countries.  International Monetary Fund (IMF) trade statistics for 2016 show that Australia and the countries of ASEAN collectively ran trade surpluses with China, making access to the large Chinese market enormously important, particularly to Australia and the smaller countries in Southeast Asia.  India and Japan ran trade deficits, although Japan’s deficit is small.  India is the exception here with a trade imbalance ratio of 1:5 in China’s favor fueling fear of Chinese goods flooding the Indian market.  Beijing is investing in much-needed infrastructure projects in countries from Asia and Europe to Africa.  Xi Jinping’s signature Belt/Road Initiative (BRI), which was unveiled to much pomp in May’s Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, has behind it the promise of $124 billion in funding.  China’s economic aid is attractive despite market rate loans because Beijing is unhampered by transparency issues as well as environmental and human rights concerns that are part and parcel of projects funded by the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank. In the long term, however, many of these investments saddle politically volatile countries with massive debt burdens making them vulnerable to strategic manipulation.

    Recognizing that BRI is as much a geostrategic as an economic initiative, Australia, Japan, and India have been cautious about participation.  Australia has nominally agreed to set up a working group to discuss possible cooperation, but Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has so far refused to link BRI with the Northern Australian Infrastructure scheme.  Perhaps reacting to Trump’s protectionist instincts, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a June speech offered a paean to free trade and spoke favorably about BRI in the context of the economic virtues of linking the Pacific to Eurasia.  But, in an indirect message to the Chinese leadership, Abe noted the international community’s expectations that it was critical for any infrastructure projects to be “open to use by all” and “be developed through procurement that is fair and transparent.”  India’s concerns arise from the BRI’s lack of transparency and from New Delhi’s objection to the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, which links the Chinese province of Xinjiang with Pakistan through contested territory in Kashmir.  Recognizing the importance of having India on board, the Chinese leadership has sought to placate New Delhi.

    China’s rise is unlikely to be smooth unless Beijing can neutralize the worries of India, long-standing US allies in Australasia, and smaller countries in Southeast Asia.  Many of these countries are hedging their bets by engaging with China economically but also by investing in military hardware to shore up their security.  Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea regularly hold military exercises with their favored security partner—the United States.  India and Japan have cemented a strong partnership.  Australia has expressed interest in joining the annual Malabar naval exercises that bring together the United States, India, and Japan.  The first time that a quadrilateral naval exercise among these four democracies occurred was in 2007.  While New Delhi has not responded favorably to Australia’s recent request, either to avoid upsetting China or due to doubts over the extent of China’s influence in Australia, an overweening China is likely to propel security countermeasures in all these countries.

    Beijing’s challenge is how best to balance its economic lure with what are seen by many of its Asian neighbors as provocative military moves in the East and South China Seas and the Indian Ocean Region. If China looms large in Asia militarily, the formation of an anti-China alliance may quickly follow.  The problem for great powers is that economic influence is seldom sufficient to override measures that countries are likely to take in the face of security threats.

    Dr Vidya Nadkarni is a Professor and Head of Political Science at the University of San Diego, California. She is a Trustee of TPF.

  • PLA Navy and Robotics

    PLA Navy and Robotics

    Vijay Sakhuja December 03, 2017

    Early this year, the UK Royal United Services Institute announced that by 2020 China’s naval order of battle would be 500 ships comprising aircraft carriers, nuclear and conventional submarines, frigates and destroyers, amphibious ships and logistic vessels. Further, the Chinese defence spending would increase from US $ 123 billion in 2012 to US $ 233 billion by 2020. Surely, China is on its way to build a large and powerful navy and in the last eight years Chinese naval shipyards built 83 ships. The speed of production has been characterized as ‘making dumplings’.

    One of the significant features of this naval build-up is investments in science and innovation led by digital technologies. Among these, the ‘robotic revolution’ merits attention. Till about 2013, China was the top importer accounting for 20 per cent of industrial robots produced globally (36,560 units as compared to Japan’s 26,015 units, and US in third place with 23,679 units). Since then Chinese demand for robots has increased, and in 2016, it installed 90,000 imported units nearly a third of the global total, which is expected to increase to 160,000 units by 2019.

    While import substitution has proved useful, the Chinese government has invested in the development of indigenous robots to support the country’s US $11 billion robot market. The plans aim to ensure that China-branded robots constitute over 50 per cent of total sales by 2020 from 31 per cent in 2016. The country plans to produce 100,000 robots annually by 2020, compared with 33,000 in 2015. This is in line with the country’s “Made in China 2025” strategy led by industrialization and informatization focused on innovation, smart technology, the mobile Internet, cloud computing,  big data and the Internet of Things.

    No doubt the robot led industrialization has boosted China’s production and export competitiveness in a number of sectors such as car manufacturing, electronics, appliances, logistics, and food industry, but its use in the military has not lagged behind. In June 2017, the state-owned China Electronic Technology Group demonstrated 119 tiny propeller aircraft (X-6 Skywalker, a commercial model) loaded with software and sensors capable of communicating with the other drones in the swarm.

    There are nearly 1,300 drones currently in operation with the PLA and the PLA Air Force, but use of robots in the naval domain is more recent. Perhaps it was the discovery in 2015 of a torpedo-like spy device off Hainan province provided the requisite impetus to invest in unmanned platforms. The spy device of US origin was confirmed as an intelligence gathering system to obtain information on the Chinese naval operations in the South China Sea.

    China’s advancements in underwater platform technology has been demonstrated by the indigenously built Haiyi-7000 (Chinese for “sea wings”) unmanned platform which dived to a depth of 5,751 meters in the Mariana Trench, western Pacific. Apparently, the technology for the platform was obtained from the US.

    The PLA Navy’s has been quite enthusiastic about using unmanned platforms. In 2016, a naval exhibit showcased Chinese plans to build an Underwater Great Wall comprising of sensors moored to the ocean bed 3,000 meters deep, to work in tandem with autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (AUV’s) launched from torpedo tubes, surface ships, missiles and aircraft, to monitor underwater vessel movements including tracking enemy submarines particularly those of the US and Japan. Although China is yet to develop a mature technology for underwater drones, Chinese scientists are working to build swarms of 3D-printed and cheap autonomous underwater robots connected through underwater communication and datalink technologies, as well as precise navigation systems and multiple sensor payloads.

    Another noteworthy Chinese demonstration of its interest in robot ships is validated by the development of a stealthy robotic trimaran warship D3000. According to China Aerospace and Science Technology Corporation, a Chinese defense contractor, this vessel is designed to operate autonomously for months, or as part of a larger task force with manned ships. The D3000 can serve as a mothership for other unmanned systems and pass the data of targets or unfriendly objects to ships and aircraft to work out firing solutions.

    China is offering to foreign customers new unmanned systems that are still undergoing testing or have just entered service in the Chinese military. For instance, China showcased a 42-foot trimaran High Speed Intercept Boat in 2016 in Malaysia. The vessel can be armed, achieve speeds of 80 knots, and can ‘potentially operate in unmanned swarms.

    The concept of operations for the USVs involve undertaking various missions and tasks “including escort, interdiction of civilian freighters, patrolling offshore assets and working in a system of systems with other unmanned systems, including drones and submersibles”.

    In 2014 President Xi Jinping during a speech to the Chinese Academy of Sciences called for a “robot revolution”’ to raise industrial productivity and it is fair to argue that Chinese shipyards, naval research centers and the PLA Navy  are ‘certainly not going to sit the robotic revolution out”.  The Chinese government has characterized the robotic industry as the “jewel in the crown of manufacturing”. This is best demonstrated by the importance of robotics in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), the Made in China 2025 program, Robotics Industry Development Plan and Three-Year Guidance for Internet Plus Artificial Intelligence Plan (2016-2018). In essence, China is exhibiting a high degree of confidence in its ability to develop modern unmanned naval technologies.

    Dr Vijay Sakhuja is a co-founder and trustee of TPF.

  • India needs a Space Security Architecture

    India needs a Space Security Architecture

    Ajay Lele December 12, 2017

    In the 21st century Space Security is rapidly emerging as a critical component of the National Security architecture. Today, space has emerged as a major instrument for the human survival. Very many activities associated with humans day to day leaving are depending on the satellite technologies directly or indirectly. Owing to increasing emphasis on space technologies space industry is also found making rapid growth. At the same time space has obvious utilities for the militaries too for the smooth and fast conduct of their various operations. Unfortunately, space is also emerging as a potential battleground with the possibility of confrontations both on the earth and also in the outer space. Naturally, for the states with significant amount of assets positioned in space as well as for the states having dependence on space technologies, it becomes imperative to evolve a specific policy structure to address issues concerning space security. This article attempts to discuss a need of such framework for India.

    Necessity

    Indian space programme is civilian in nature and existing space structures has been evolved essentially to cater for such requirement. Presently, Space Commission is responsible for growth, development, sustenance and furtherance of India’s space programme. There is no specific defence element involved with this structure. Hence, appreciating the military needs and also to allow ISRO to continue with its civilian mandate, it has become necessary to have a separate commission for handling strategic requirements. For this purpose a Military Space Commission needs to be established.

    Such commission could oversee all space security aspects. Under this commission a specific agency could be established for coordinating activities of various stakeholders and liaise with various agencies of (civilian) Space Commission. Such agency could suggest modifications in exiting policy architecture as found necessary from time to time and also establish an experts group. This is important because human resources having an understanding about strategic requirements in respect of outer space issues may not be readily available. Hence, to address modern day threats it is inessential to have human resource of specialists with multidisciplinary vision. Such group should consist of military personnel, space scientists, cyber experts, AI/robotic experts, strategic technologists, technology managers, lawyers, academicians, disarmament & arms control experts and diplomats.

    Military Space Command, a tri-service organisation should be the main implementation agency for this commission. This agency should have a larger mandate encompassing various issues. In coming years, Indian Army, Navy, Air force and other services like the Coastguard, Border Security Force etc are likely to increase their reliance on satellites for the purposes of intelligence gathering, communication, navigation, and operations of various weapon systems. Over last couple of years is has been noticed that the need for I-S-R capacities in space to support network centric strategies is significantly increasing. Space command should be tasked to administer various military and para military related aspects of satellite technologies. This command should directly liaise with the Military Space Commission to project its requirements. For operational purposes this command could be put under the CDS/IDS. Home Ministry representative could a single point source amongst para military forces to liaise with this command. The command should have an exclusive research wing. Also, special focus should be given to issues related to Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Meteorology.

    India has no intent to weaponize the space. However, India needs to develop (not necessarily test) certain offensive technologies, from ASAT to jamming to cyber tools. Today, the idea of weapons in space is more theoretical in nature. However, this could become a reality in coming few years. From deterrence perspective it is important for India to have a mechanism in place which could address such issues. The policy perspective in this regard should be developed by the Military Space Commission and Space Command should be the implementation agency. Legal and foreign policy related issues would play a major role towards evolving any space security architecture. In regards to these matters, it is important for Military Space Commission to liaise with the Space Commission and evolve an India specific view.

    Context

    Indian space programme is civilian in nature and existing space structures has been evolved essentially to cater for such requirement. Presently, Space Commission is responsible for growth, development, sustenance and furtherance of India’s space programme. There is no specific defence element involved with this structure. Hence, appreciating the military needs and also to allow ISRO to continue with its civilian mandate, it has become necessary to have a separate commission for handling strategic requirements. For this purpose a Military Space Commission needs to be established.

    Such commission could oversee all space security aspects. Under this commission a specific agency could be established for coordinating activities of various stakeholders and liaise with various agencies of (civilian) Space Commission. Such agency could suggest modifications in exiting policy architecture as found necessary from time to time and also establish an experts group. This is important because human resources having an understanding about strategic requirements in respect of outer space issues may not be readily available. Hence, to address modern day threats it is inessential to have human resource of specialists with multidisciplinary vision. Such group should consist of military personnel, space scientists, cyber experts, AI/robotic experts, strategic technologists, technology managers, lawyers, academicians, disarmament & arms control experts and diplomats.

    Military Space Command, a tri-service organisation should be the main implementation agency for this commission. This agency should have a larger mandate encompassing various issues. In coming years, Indian Army, Navy, Air force and other services like the Coastguard, Border Security Force etc are likely to increase their reliance on satellites for the purposes of intelligence gathering, communication, navigation, and operations of various weapon systems. Over last couple of years is has been noticed that the need for I-S-R capacities in space to support network centric strategies is significantly increasing. Space command should be tasked to administer various military and para military related aspects of satellite technologies. This command should directly liaise with the Military Space Commission to project its requirements. For operational purposes this command could be put under the CDS/IDS. Home Ministry representative could a single point source amongst para military forces to liaise with this command. The command should have an exclusive research wing. Also, special focus should be given to issues related to Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Meteorology.

    India has no intent to weaponize the space. However, India needs to develop (not necessarily test) certain offensive technologies, from ASAT to jamming to cyber tools. Today, the idea of weapons in space is more theoretical in nature. However, this could become a reality in coming few years. From deterrence perspective it is important for India to have a mechanism in place which could address such issues. The policy perspective in this regard should be developed by the Military Space Commission and Space Command should be the implementation agency. Legal and foreign policy related issues would play a major role towards evolving any space security architecture. In regards to these matters, it is important for Military Space Commission to liaise with the Space Commission and evolve an India specific view.

    In closing

    It is important to note that Military Space Commission is not an attempt to evolve a parallel architecture to Space Commission and ISRO. Duplication of assets is not advisable and all necessary assistance (and advise) should be taken from ISRO to organise range of activities. There sould be horizontal and vertical interaction with various departments of ISRO and also with Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO). Today, the rapidly changing global space order is posing different type of challenges to national security. As one of the leading space-faring states in the world and also being a major military power and possessor of nuclear weapons, it is important for India to have well-thought-of policy of using space for military and deterrence purposes.

    References: Author has referred various Internet based sources

    Dr Ajay Lele is a Senior Fellow at the IDSA.