Category: Democracy & Governance

  • Elections and Democracy: Germany’s Mixed Member Proportional System

    Elections and Democracy: Germany’s Mixed Member Proportional System

    It is now well-established that the First Past The Post system of elections followed in Indian democracy is thoroughly unsuited to Indian conditions, as it is more feudal and less of democracy. The German mixed system is better suited to India to ensure a more representative system of elections and accountability.   

    When it comes to choosing an electoral formula, the world often takes extreme positions which range between any variant of the Majoritarian System or that of the Proportional Representation. Proportional representation, to a great extent, has been an apt choice for ethnically divided societies with scholars such as Arend Lijphart asserting that it would strengthen the consociational approach in the political system. Yet, it has been criticized for the unstable governments it may produce and its inability to connect a voter with its representative. On the other hand, Majoritarian systems while praised for their simplicity and ability to produce stable governments, lack inclusivity, and induce tactical voting due to wastage of votes. However, the Parliamentary Council of Germany structured a mid-point for the two extremes to meet, which was initially considered provisional but has remained unchanged. It follows the Mixed-Member Proportional System.

    The Mixed-Member Proportional System combines First Past The Post (FPTP) system (Majoritarian System) with Closed-Party List System (Proportional Representation) and thereby, enables the formation of a Government that is inclusive, stable, and remains connected with the voters.

    Understanding how MMP works in Germany

     The Bundestag (the German Parliament), elected for a four-year term, has 598 seats, distributed among the 16 federal states in proportion to the states’ voting population. Out of the 598 seats, 299 seats are filled through the FPTP system and the other 299 through the Closed-Party List System. This means that every voter has two votes on the day of the election: a constituency vote and a party-list vote. The first vote of electors decides the 299 representatives to be elected through the FPTP system, won based on a plurality of votes, and the second vote decides the proportional number of seats each party would get in the national assembly.

    Once the FPTP seats are filled, the second votes are totalled. Those parties that obtained 5% of votes at the national level or have three representatives elected directly through the single-member constituencies are considered for the allocation of PR seats. The PR seats are allotted in proportion to each party’s vote share using the Sainte-Laguë formula.

    The Sainte-Laguë formula divides the parties’ total votes using a series of divisors (i.e., 1,3,5,7,9….) to form a table of averages. The seats are then allotted to the parties with the highest averages in the table.

    source: Washington university

    Furthermore, these allotted seats are then subtracted from the respective party’s FPTP seats, and the remaining seats are the actual number of party-list seats allocated in the Bundestag. Often, the number of seats allocated to a party through FPTP is greater than those allocated through the Party List and these surplus seats are then kept by the party leading to an increase in the number of seats in the Bundestag for that governing year.

    Implications of the electoral formula

    • Electoral participation

    Over the years, scholars have suggested that Proportional Representation tends to increase the voter turnout in a country. This is said to stem from the fact that the disproportionality between the number of votes received and seats allotted is significantly lower thereby reducing vote wastage, which encourages more voters to go and vote. Unlike FPTP’s ‘winner takes all’ formula, PR provides a chance to even smaller parties to secure their representation in the legislative council. This encourages their support base to vote and at the same time provides an incentive to the party to not limit their campaigning to specific areas (Blais & Carty, 1990). Germany’s electoral participation was 78.5% in 1949 and escalated to 86%, 87.8%, 86.8%, 91%… in successive elections. The lowest turnout was in 2009 with 70.8% and escalated slightly to 76.2% in 2017.

    • Gallagher index

    The Gallagher index created by Michael Gallagher is a statistical analysis methodology used to measure an electoral system’s relative disproportionality between votes received and seats allotted in a legislature. While countries following the PR system do generally tend to do well, Arend Lijphart points out that the German system, which is a mixed system, does exceedingly well compared to pure PR variants.

    Germany scored an average of 1.95 in the 2017 national elections and has consistently maintained a low average in terms of disproportionality in comparison to others. Their highest average was 7.83 for the year 2013. On the other hand, countries that continue to use FPTP such as Canada, Bangladesh, and India record pretty averages of 12.01 (2015), 21.38 (2001), and 16.06 (2019) respectively.

    • Representation

     PR systems generally enable conditions for a more representative legislative council because political parties no longer restrict their discourse and activities to the interests of the dominant communities, given winning a plurality of votes is no longer a deciding factor in their pursuit to secure a seat in the parliament. This provides an incentive for them to look appealing to a larger voter base.

    Germany has seen a steady increase in the percentage of women representatives in the Parliament, starting from 7% in 1949 to 31% in 2017. The need to encourage ethnic minorities to cast a vote provides an incentive to political parties to field candidates who are non-German in origin, and this has enabled the participation of candidates originating from Turkey, Poland, Austria, Romania, and so on.

    • Effects on the Far-Right

    Lisa Harrison in her paper ‘Maximizing Small Party Potential: The Effects of Electoral System Rules on the Far Right in German Sub-National Elections’ writes that far-right or extremist parties see limited success at the national level elections, but they may play a significant role at the sub-national level elections. A major hindrance that keeps these far-right parties away from the Bundestag is Germany’s minimum threshold of votes policy, which allows only those parties that have won 5% votes or 3 FPTP seats to claim representation in the parliament.

    This however changed in 2017 when Alternative for Germany became the first nationalist far-right party to secure seats in the German Parliament since World War II. They received 12.6% of votes, translating into 94 seats in the Bundestag. The rise of the party coincides with the rise of hate crimes against immigrants. In March 2021, it was reported that Germany’s domestic intelligence forces have kept the party under surveillance on the suspicion of trying to undermine the democratic constitution.

     Conclusion

    Electoral systems don’t come up in a vacuum. Rather, they are selected and implemented within the socio-political conditions of a particular nation. This implies that there is no electoral system that is universally applicable. Depending upon the suitability, countries could either side with the Majoritarian system or the Proportional Representation system or could apply both, as in the case of Germany. Germany’s Mixed-Member Proportional System catered to the needs of a constituent assembly which was divided over the question of an apt electoral system and at the same time has continued to do the two things that the constituent members hoped for, maintain stability and remain inclusive.

    As India enters the 75th year of its independence, and as the world’s largest democracy, its electoral experiences of the last seven decades point to the unsuitability of the present FPTP system. Given the large population and the diversity of India, the FPTP system has proved to be a complete failure. The FPTP system does not truly reflect the principle of “one person one vote”, according to which each ballot should have ‘equal force’ in the sense of the share of seats in the parliament. Indian elections system has resulted in a skewed system of vote-bank politics, endemic corruption, and the feared majoritarian tyranny in the name of democracy.  The German model of a mix of Proportional Representation and the FPTP system is what India needs at this to revive and strengthen its democracy.

     

    References:

    Gallagher, M., & Mitchell, P. (2008). The Politics of Electoral Systems (Illustrated ed.). Oxford University Press.

    Zittel, T. (2017). Electoral systems in context: Germany. Oxford Handbooks Online. Published.

    https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190258658.013.37

    https://www.statista.com/statistics/753732/german-elections-voter-turnout/

    https://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/people/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf

    https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/09/21/measuring-the-diversity-of-each-partys-candidates-in-the-german-election/

    https://www.statista.com/statistics/753494/seat-distribution-bundestag-germany/

    https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/how-serious-is-germanys-far-right-problem/article30952770.ece

    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-afd-idUSKBN2AV1M3

     

    Feature Image: angusreid.org

  • Viability of Universal Healthcare in India: Case Study of Sonipat

    Viability of Universal Healthcare in India: Case Study of Sonipat

    The Covid-19 pandemic is a global catastrophe that has disrupted the economies and national health of countries and the livelihood millions across the world. In India, the impact in 2020 was presumably well controlled, and the beginning of 2021 saw the Indian government projecting prematurely the return of normalcy. This sense of normalcy led to a lowering of the precautions, and the month of April saw the rise of the second wave. The second wave was vicious, crippling the healthcare system and resulting in a huge number of deaths, primarily attributed to the shortage of oxygen supply in most states. This crisis exposed the shortcomings of the Indian healthcare system and the wide disparities that exist in access to healthcare between different sections of the society, a result of the shockingly low investment in healthcare and human resources. The catastrophe has led many to question the efficacy of the healthcare system and the level of expenditure incurred on it, and whether universal healthcare would have allowed the country to tackle these events. Analysis of the impact of universal healthcare requires insight into the structure and efficacy of healthcare in India, given our history and experiences.

    The principle behind universal healthcare states that every individual who is a citizen of the country must have access to essential health services, without the obstruction of financial hardship. Among the most efficient methods of ensuring that this principle is adhered to is bringing it under the constitutional mandate. Although the Supreme court has, in its various judgements, recognized health as a fundamental right, it is not yet recognized in the constitution. Article 21 of the constitution reiterates the right to life, with the landmark judgment of Maneka Gandhi v The Union of India specifying that the article also includes the right to live a dignified life and access to all basic amenities to ensure the same. This statement has been given a new context in light of the recent crisis, in which most of the fatalities caused were due to respiratory problems caused by the virus where providing oxygen availability became an essential requirement for the cure. In such a scenario, the oxygen availability constitutes part of basic amenities, which the government failed to supply in adequate quantity. The government fulfils its obligation towards healthcare in the form of government hospitals and healthcare centres, but their situation was synonymous with the private sector. The government claims that the hospitals under their control are sufficient, but the recent predicament has proven that the aforementioned claim is not true. The healthcare services provided by the government will be meaningful only if access to such hospitals is convenient for the common people and the hospitals are well-endowed with investment and human resources. An analysis of our constitution, especially Article 21, which guarantees protection of life and personal liberty, makes it evident that the principles on which our democracy is founded dictate that healthcare is one of the most important obligations of the government, and the most efficient method for fulfilling said obligation is the introduction of Universal healthcare in India.

    An attempt at examining the applicability of universal healthcare was made by the Planning Commission through the 12th Five-Year plan. The first-ever framework for universal health coverage was developed by a High-Level Expert Group, which planned to develop a system that was in accordance with the nation’s financial capabilities. The primary objective of these reforms was to reduce the out-of-pocket expenditures incurred by lower-income groups on healthcare services and increase the number of people covered under the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana. Around this time the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana was scrutinized by many due to its low enrolment rates, high transaction costs due to insurance intermediaries, and allegations that the government was using it as a pathway to hand over public funds to the private sector. The objective of reducing out-of-pocket expenditure even though expressly mentioned did not come to fruition because of the lack of extensively funded facilities, especially in rural areas which were covered by RSBY. These facilities were lacking not only in medical infrastructure but also the medicines required for treatment, which compelled the patient to bear the expenses of medicines on their own. The 12th Five-year Plan also proposed an increase in Budget allocation for health from 1.58% to 2.1% of the GDP, which was again criticized because it was very low in relation to the global median of 5%, despite the population size of the country. The healthcare reforms also failed to take note of the important role played by nutrition and the Public Distribution System in aiding the advancement of healthcare. The 12th five-year plan is not considered successful due to the poor implementation of the reforms introduced and provides valuable lessons for the implementation of universal healthcare coverage in the future.

    The need for implementation of universal healthcare coverage can be made evident through a case study of the town of Sonipat, which is near Delhi and is a rural area. The case study is done through the observation of a survey conducted by the Institute of Economic Growth in 2017. The table below shows the data that became available as a result of the last survey conducted.

    CDMO Office, Sonipat District (2017)

    CDMO Office, Sonipat District (2017)

    An analysis of the data portrays that even though the resources and infrastructure are adequate to the population of Sonipat, the facilities are lacking in human resources. The data shows that 6 posts for the Medical Officers (MO) were sanctioned, but only 3 were filled. Despite the high number of deliveries, there was no sanctioned post of a gynaecologist, which can probably be a reason behind the high number of maternal deaths in the area. It was also found that the Non-Communicable Disease (NCD) program was not functioning in the district for the past 2 years. O.P. Jindal University, which is in the heart of Sonipat, houses a total of 7482 individuals, and has an adequate number of facilities, with 5 in-house doctors and 10 nurses. It has an isolation facility ward for cases of communicable diseases. It has an ambulance and referral service to hospitals in the NCR. These facts show that there is an acute shortage of human resources for healthcare in the area. Even though an adequate number of posts were sanctioned, there was no qualified personnel to fill them, and there were no sanctions for important positions. The case of O.P. Jindal university shows that good healthcare requires good investment and incentive for the staff, which the Sonipat administration has failed to provide to the staff of healthcare centres owned by the state.

    The arguments mentioned above portray the acute necessity of universal healthcare in India. The ideals of our constitution implore for the right to health to be established, which gives universal healthcare constitutional support. The failure of the 12th Five-year Plan showcases the failures that can happen if the framework for such a plan is not well-thought-out or well-invested. The example of Sonipat further portrays the need for increased investment in healthcare, which can be achieved by the utilization of universal healthcare. Although there is no concrete data available for the crisis which the nation recently endured, it can be concluded that the approach of universal healthcare could have allowed us to endure this crisis better, as there would have been lesser chances of shortage of supplies like oxygen because of the increased investment. The first step towards the policy of universal healthcare should be to strengthen existing institutions of insurance and learn from the mistakes in the implementation of the RSBY.

     

    References

    1.http://iegindia.org/upload/uploadfiles/Sonipat%20Haryana%202017.pdf

    2.http://ijariie.com/AdminUploadPdf/RIGHT_TO_HEALTH__A_CONSTITUTIONAL_MANDATE_IN_INDIA_ijariie5596.pdf

    3.http://jsslawcollege.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/RIGHT-TO-HEALTH-AS-A-CONSTITUTIONAL-MANDATE-IN-INDIA.pdf

    4.http://nhsrcindia.org/sites/default/files/Twelfth%20Five%20Year%20Plan%20Health%202012-17.pdf

    5.https://www.hindustantimes.com/health/why-india-s-national-health-insurance-scheme-has-failed-its-poor/story-6TIXYO0A8CyxTfGYPRdkYK.html

     

    Image Credit: www.financialexpress.com

  • How Representative is the Representative Democracy in India?

    How Representative is the Representative Democracy in India?

    India’s transition from an erstwhile British colony to an independent, sovereign state meant, for her people, a change in their status from being mere subjects to citizens bestowed with adult suffrage. The ultimate authority, therefore, now rests with the citizens. India’s large and complex population made it impossible for this authority to be discharged directly and therefore, the citizens elect their ‘representatives.’ This act of electing their representatives is called ‘elections’ and the set of rules that determine how the elections are conducted and the results ascertained is called the ‘electoral system.’ The electoral system adopted by the Constituent Assembly, through the debates on the constitution for the adoption of the parliamentary democracy, is a variant of the majoritarian system known as the ‘First Past The Post System.’ The fundamental principle underlying the system is that for the candidate, to cement his/her electoral victory, does not need a majority of the votes polled, but only a plurality of votes would suffice. The basis for the decision of the Constituent Assembly members to opt for the FPTP system lies in its simplicity and its promise of producing a stable government. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar when speaking in the assembly said, “Now, I have not the least doubt in my mind that whatever else the future government provides for, whether it relieves the people from the wants from which they are suffering now or not, our future government must do one thing, namely, it must maintain a stable government and maintain law and order. I am therefore very hesitant in accepting any system of election which would damage the stability of the government.”

    Legislative bodies aren’t merely law-making authorities, they are mini societies in themselves that reflect and react to the issues plaguing the citizenry at large. Labelling legislative bodies as mini societies emphasizes the fact that the composition of the representatives reflects the diversity of social groups and shades of opinion present within the country. The divisions and prejudices that exist in the Indian subcontinent based on caste, class, and religion were a primary point of reference for the members of the constituent assembly when debating over whether the various provisions of the constitution would be functional in the country. In this sense, the decision to choose the FPTP system over other electoral formulas signifies an attempt to alleviate the fears of the members of a further divided subcontinent. Yet, as we enter the 75th year of our freedom with entrenched unresolved issues, it brings us back to the question that the constituent members struggled with: how efficient and representative is the present electoral formula?

    Loksabha Elections – 2019

    Regional representation

     A post-election analysis by IndiaVotes showed that the two major alliances – National Democratic Alliance and United Progressive Alliance won 45.2% and 27.5% of votes respectively and the rest was shared among parties including All India Trinamool Congress, Yuvajana Sramika Rythu Congress Party, Biju Janata Dal, Bahujan Samaj Party, Telangana Rashtra Samithi and so on. With 45.2% votes, the NDA led by the BJP satisfied the requirements laid down by the FPTP allowing it to take charge of the government formation. However, what the vote percentage implies is that the current regime isn’t exactly a popular choice given more than fifty percent of the voters chose to vote against them. In their paper ‘Minoritarian Rule: How India’s Electoral System Created The Illusion of a BJP Landslide’, Macdonald and Moussavi call India a “minoritarian” democracy wherein ‘ a plurality of voters selects the majority of representatives in Parliament.’

    Furthermore, the success was concentrated within the states of central and western India which includes- Gujarat, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, and Jharkhand. These are also few of the states with the highest number of Lok Sabha seats- Gujarat (26), Uttar Pradesh (80), Rajasthan (25), Madhya Pradesh (29), Bihar (40), Chhattisgarh (11), Maharashtra (48) and Jharkhand (14). Given how diverse the country is culturally and linguistically, how do we compensate for the lack of the same in the union government?

    Minority representation

     The total minority representation in the 2019 Lok Sabha stands at 9.2%, including Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, and other religious minorities. This means over 90% of the MP’s are Hindus in a country where the minorities make up 19.3% of the total population (Census 2011).

    Kazi Syed Karimuddin when speaking against the efficacy of the FPTP system in the constituent assembly had feared the dilution of minority representation and had said, “Therefore my submission is that the present system as it stands does not guarantee a majority rule as people commonly suppose and does not guarantee a representation to minorities, not necessarily religious, even the political minorities.”  To this Dr. B.R.Ambedkar felt that while the country may not be ready for a complex electoral formula but to ensure minority representation he suggested reserved constituencies for the minorities as an alternative and in this regard, he said, “If any particular minority represented in this House said that it did not want any reservation, then it would be open to the House to remove the name of that particular minority from the provisions of article 292. If any particular minority preferred that although it did not get a cent percent deal, namely, did not get a separate electorate, but that what it has got in the form of reservation of seats is better than having nothing, then I think it would be just and proper that the minority should be permitted to retain what the Constituent Assembly has already given to it.”

    The Constituent Assembly finally decided on reserved constituencies for the communities of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes only.

    Reserved constituency

     The constitution has reserved 131 out of 543 seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (84 for SC’s and 47 for ST’s). In the present Lok Sabha out of the 543 MP’s, 138 come from SC/ST communities implying that only 7 MP’s from SC/ST communities have been elected in unreserved constituencies. The situation would have been grimmer had their representation not been secured through reserved constituencies.

    The major loophole in the practice of securing representation through reserved constituencies with the use of FPTP is that it is the Non-SC/ST communities that majorly get to decide who the representative for the SC/ST communities would be. Given SC/ST populations are spread across regions rather than being concentrated in a few, it is then the dominant communities with their muscle and money power that decide on where the votes go. This keeps outspoken and assertive leaders from marginalized communities outside legislative bodies and in a way excludes these communities and their issues from mainstream political discourse. Hence, Macdonald and Moussavi observe, “District boundaries are therefore fundamentally important. Their shape determines the population size and ideological composition of the electorate facing each party.”

    Mainstream political discourse

     With FPTP’s ‘winners take all’ formula, it so happens that political parties restrict their discourse and activities to the interests of the dominant communities as they become the deciding factor in the contestants getting the plurality of votes. Douglas Amy in her paper ‘Proportional Representation: Empowering Minorities or Promoting Balkanization’ says, “The claim that winner-take-all elections are inherently more capable of bridging political divides does not bear up under scrutiny. For example, the requirement that winning candidates appeal to the majority of voters has done little to discourage factionalism. Indeed, it has merely encouraged candidates to attack minority groups to win over the majority.”

    This has not only further marginalized the already marginalized but also hinders the Socio-Economic and Political progress of the country as spaces for discussing “actual” issues shrink and real development can’t be equated to the progress and well-being of a minute population.

    Effect on voters

    Wastage of votes, a definite consequence of the FPTP system as it often discourages voters from turning up to vote. Furthermore, voters indulge in ‘tactical voting’ wherein instead of voting for a candidate/party who aligns with their values and ideals, they end up voting for one of the major parties or the lesser of the two evils whom they think have more chances of winning. In a way, the voter is making no real impact in the making of the government (Singh & Sharma, 2019).

    Conclusion

    The Law Commission, in their reports in the year 1999 and then again in the year 2015, had recommended that the government look into alternative electoral methods and examine how well they’d work out for the country. However, this has remained a recommendation only on paper with governments taking no active interest in the same. Carles Boix in his paper ‘Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies’ (1999) states that “as long as the electoral arena remains the same, and favours the ruling parties, the electoral system is not changed. If there is a change in electoral dynamics due to the coming of new voters or alterations in voter’s preference, then the ruling party reshapes the electoral setup to suit their choices.” Hence, we still do not see electoral reforms being a part of the mainstream political discourse. However, to make our political system more inclusive, diverse, and efficient, it is about time we give electoral reforms a serious thought.

     

    References

    Amy, D. J. (1995). Proportional Representation: Empowering Minorities or Promoting Balkanization? The Good Society, 5(2).

    Boix, C. (2000). Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. SSRN Electronic Journal. Published. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.159213

    Macdonald, G., & Moussavi, B. (2015). Minoritarian Rule: How India’s Electoral System Created The Illusion of a BJP Landslide. Economic and Political Weekly. Published.

    https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_assembly_debates/volume/7/1949-01-04?paragraph_number=186%2C185%2C12%2C176%2C33%2C189%2C170%2C11%2C7%2C5%2C215%2C196%2C195%2C180%2C179%2C177%2C172%2C122%2C102%2C99%2C98%2C97%2C58%2C57%2C54%2C34%2C6%2C4

    https://www.indiavotes.com/alliance/partyWise/17

    https://scroll.in/latest/924583/elections-2019-bjp-alone-got-more-than-half-the-votes-in-13-states-and-union-territories

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_constituencies_of_the_Lok_Sabha

    https://www.hindustantimes.com/lok-sabha-elections/from-faith-to-gender-and-profession-to-caste-a-profile-of-the-17th-lok-sabha/story-Mnp5M4pRX3aUji1UFFVy2N.html

    https://www.minorityaffairs.gov.in/sites/default/files/MsDP%20%28FAQs%29.pdf

    https://www.indiaspend.com/governance/reservation-scheduled-castes-tribes-representation-social-justice-755256

    https://theprint.in/opinion/17th-lok-sabha-looks-set-to-confirm-ambedkars-fears-no-vocal-dalits-in-parliament/232383/

     

    Image Credit: www.aa.com.tr 

     

  • Marginalised among the invisible: The case of female migrant domestic workers

    Marginalised among the invisible: The case of female migrant domestic workers

    The Pandemic, lockdown, and the chain of events that followed made the country wake up to the state of the most unfortunate group of the labour force; the migrant workers. They have always remained invisible to the development agenda of the government and only the catastrophe of a pandemic could shed light on their woes. Among this invisible workforce, there remains yet another marginalised group of female migrants.

    In India, female migration was initially considered insignificant by equating their movement merely as associational or followers of men.  However, this has certainly changed in the last decade. Marriage was seen as the central motive behind female migration, though lately more women are seen to enter the labour market post-migration as their labour demand rose in sectors of so-called “female occupations” of domestic work, care-work and certain informal labour requirements in sectors such as in construction, garment work, food services and as coolies and vendors.  As family migration from rural to urban abodes saw a rise in the country, both male and female migrants were required to join the labour force to meet their mere subsistence needs. Lack of employment, low income and other economic reasons pushed females, especially from rural areas, to migrate to urban zones of the country (Singh et al., 2015). While in urban areas, the migrants especially females and children are exposed to extreme vulnerabilities with regard to their dismal conditions of work in the informal sector, urban policies are deeply flawed in omitting migrant welfare and the sheer denial of their civil rights and entitlements.

    Precarious domestic work and female migrants

    Domestic work is often regarded as an invisible and insignificant addition to the social and economic values of a country. The work is increasingly feminised with over 80% of the world’s domestic work occupied by women (International Labour Organisation [ILO], 2013a). And this mirrors the traditional notions of domestic work being a woman’s task. These tasks include traditional housework such as cleaning, cooking, washing clothes or utensils etc. or care-work such as a child or elderly care. Female migrants with low skills, low levels of education and migrating from rural abodes in search of employment form a predominant part of the labour pool. With no recognition and regulation of work, the female domestic workers are subject to unequal power dynamics at the workplace, making their lives precarious in terms of wages, security and wellbeing.

    In India, domestic work employment among females saw an upsurge, especially in urban areas. This surge is mainly accounted for by the increasing need for care work given the changing demography, lack of work opportunities in other sectors and the gender constructions moulded by the society (Chandrashekar & Ghosh, 2012). According to the National Sample Survey (NSSO-2011-2012, 68th round), 39 lakh (3.9 million) people are occupied in domestic work, among which 26 lakh (2.6 million) are females. Micro-level surveys suggest a predominant concentration of female migrants in domestic work, especially in urban areas (Mazumdar et al., 2013).  There are two forms of workers: live-in workers, who are accommodated in the household and live-out workers, who return to their respective houses after work and may be involved in work with multiple households. As there is no relevant national data on migrant workers involved in the sector, micro-level surveys or sector-based studies are the only sources in understanding the conditions of these migrants in domestic work. Studies have stated that migrants with low vocational qualifications and often seen as unregulated and undocumented cheap labour, work under low wages for long hours and in dismal working conditions affecting their health and safety. Live-in domestic workers are more prone to the dangers of sexual and physical abuse. Live-out domestic workers migrating to a new city, struggle with the inaccessibility of social security schemes and entitlements. Exploitation by private placement agencies in terms of wages and work conditions is another area among their hassles.

    The domestic work arena, already an unregulated and unorganised sector, puts female migrants with low bargaining power on a higher vulnerability scale. The task of identifying domestic work hinders the formulation of a sound regulatory mechanism to confront such vulnerabilities.

    Barriers to effective Regulation

    Regulating domestic work is impeded by cultural and structural barriers. The traditional notion and disregard of domestic work by women in households is extended to the understanding of paid domestic work as unproductive and hence, making it undervalued. The structural barriers relate to the unusual workplace in private spheres, which makes it difficult in enforcing labour laws and any form of scrutiny against the privacy norms of a household. The informality of work and its complexities aggravates the barriers in regulation. The employment relationship is uncertain as it is without any legal titles of employee and employer, making the relation very personalised and often not under any form of contract or agreement. Even if labour laws are made inclusive of domestic work, implementation and assurance of compliance of these laws in households are challenged until the household is recognised as a ‘workplace’ and the person hiring as an ‘employer’ in the legal framework (Chen, 2011).

    Even though these barriers existed, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) convention 2011 attempted in ensuring decent work to domestic workers and this is recognised as the most important landmark in identifying domestic work under a legal framework. ILO defines domestic work as “work performed in or for a household or households” and domestic worker as “any person engaged in a domestic work within an employment relationship”. The convention specified a comprehensive labour standard for domestic workers in areas of their wages, hours of work, occupational safety and health and social security. The convention addressed and standardized the various concerns in the sector regarding child labour, migrant workers, trafficking, live-in domestic labourers and private recruitment agencies (C189 – Domestic Workers Convention, 2011). Even after the completion of 10 years of the convention and 32 ILO member countries enforcing the landmark treaty, India is yet to ratify the convention.

    As domestic work remains undefined in the country, no significant statistical standard in estimating domestic workers exist. In the ILO policy brief on “Global and regional estimates of domestic workers” (ILO, 2013b), ambiguous nature of data on domestic workers were noticeable from the widely distributed figures, ranging from 2.5 million estimates from a household survey, 4.5 million workers estimated from official statistics (NSSO 2004-05) to an exaggerated figure of 90 million in news media. This difference in estimation is related to the difference in the identification of domestic work among different establishments (Mahanta & Gupta, 2015). With no clarity in identifying domestic workers inclusive of its peculiarities, these figures could be heavily underestimated too. Being a female migrant in the sector aggravates the problem of estimation as National statistics narrows down female migration patterns merely as associational. And thus failing to understand the true motives behind female migration and the subsequent scale of occupations they reside in (Indu et al, 2012).  Macro data narrows down domestic female labour into regular workers based on their duration in employment and disregarding the conditions of low wages and other insecurities, while the temporary and casual nature of work goes unrecognised (Neetha & Indrani, 2020). The informality of work is another area that India has failed to regulate. Labour laws for industrial labour often disregard informal workers. This is evident in the isolation of migrant workers, especially female migrants in domestic work (Poddar & Koshy, 2019).

     Lacunae in the legal framework

    Domestic work and most feminised occupations, in general, in unorganised sectors, are isolated from the legal framework given their unique characterisation of workplace and employment relationships and not to mention the challenges in recognising their work given the cultural and structural barriers. For female migrants in domestic work or any other informal activity, the situation is similar.

    There were certain positive steps in attempting to recognise the domestic workforce in the country. First of such attempts were their inclusion in the Unorganised Workers Social Security Act 2008 which gave hope, but failed to be implemented across different states (Agrawal & Agarwal,2018). Subsequently, the government also set up a task force to recommend a framework for policymaking and after 10 years, in 2019, we see a draft on National policy on domestic work formulated by the government covering their recognition, access to civil rights and social security schemes, skill development, regulating private placement agencies and a grievance redressal system (“National Policy for Domestic Workers”, 2019). Upon the recommendations of the task force, the domestic workers were to be included under the National Health insurance scheme – Rashtriya Bhima Yojana (RSBY). But the limited awareness of the scheme, its functioning and benefits, coupled with corruption reduced the domestic worker’s accessibility of the same (Mahanta & Gupta, 2015). The suggestion of the task force to include domestic worker rights in existing legislations, pertaining to industrial or organised labourers, was widely criticised because it does not adapt to the peculiarities of the feminised domestic work (Poddar & Koshy, 2019). Ensuring minimum wages to the domestic worker through the Minimum Wages Act 1948 with a task-based approach, while ignoring the aspect of personalised nature of employment completely, puts the live-in workers whose tasks are not quantifiable, out of the ambit of the act’s provisions. Similarly, the inclusion of domestic workers in the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act (2013), Employees’ State Insurance Act (1948) and Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act 2008 is considered inadequate. Even though such inclusion is appreciated, these legislations fail to cater to the rights of a domestic worker if they are based on organised sector labour standards and without understanding the complexities of the domestic work (Poddar & Koshy, 2019).

    Private placement agencies, one of the main recruitment channels of domestic work, remain unregulated. This has led to the rise in exploitation in terms of payment and working conditions. The Delhi government drafted a Delhi Private Placement Agencies (Regulation) Bill in 2012 which was widely rejected by the domestic workers’ unions and groups. The proposed bill was criticised to be ineffective as it does not include the registration of the employers and lacks clarity in the process of inspection of these agencies (Chigateri et al., 2016). A study on one of the frequently travelled migrant routes, which is from Jharkhand to Delhi, reveals that migrants were subjected to conditions of exploitation and forced labour under such placement agencies. Conditions of forced labour are witnessed mainly among live-in domestic workers, who have to work under the agent for the stipulated period. The Inter-State Migrant Workmen’s (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1978 fails to address this issue as placement agencies relating to domestic work do not come under the ambit of the act. The act considers only those labour contractors who are registered at the origin state. Placement agencies involved in domestic work function through several sub-agents and mostly are unregistered (ILO, 2015)

    There were some positive responses from state governments. The state of Tamil Nadu set up the Tamil Nadu domestic workers welfare board.  Similarly, Maharashtra set up a domestic worker welfare board under Maharashtra Act (Agrawal & Agarwal, 2018) in 2008 while Kerala adopted a domestic worker bill in 2009. States like Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Rajasthan have set the minimum wage rate (Madhav, 2010). Neetha and Palriwala (2011) analysed the state legal framework on domestic workers and pointed out the same inadequacies noted over and over again, that is of not recognising the intricacies of domestic work, workplace, its several sub-categories, unregulated placement agencies and its unique employment relation. With no data on domestic workers and at the same time their numbers continuing to increase, these loose legislations and provisions go unnoticed by the workers.

    In 2019, with the view to improving compliance and bringing about uniformity of laws, 29 labour laws were consolidated into 4 labour codes: a) code on wages, b) code on industrial relation c) code on social security and d) code on occupational health and working conditions (“Overview of Labour Law Reforms”, n.d.). While the notion was to make the labour laws more transparent and such consolidation was expected to increase the coverage of different workers under the law, these codes remain ambiguous when it comes to certain sectors of informal work. Neetha and Indrani (2020) analyse these codes through a gender lens focusing on domestic and migrant workers. Code on wages does not incorporate private households as an entity hiring employees and thus domestic workers who struggled to attain minimum wages under the previous Minimum wages act (1948) have no mention, leaving them ambiguous. Code on industrial relations dealing with collective bargaining and industrial disputes, do not mention freedom of association in unorganised sectors and curbs the right to strike which has serious implications of registration of domestic workers under trade unions and their right to collective bargaining. Code on social security (CSS) has consolidated the unorganised workers’ social security act 2008, which was the first attempt towards the recognition of domestic workers and the new code puts the functioning of such acts and provisions for the unorganised sector under the discretion of the government, leaving out legislative scrutiny. Hence, there is uncertainty of the efficient functioning of these acts under CSS. Under the code, maternity benefits were applied only to the registered establishment of work. And domestic workers with no recognition of the workplace become ineligible for the same. Code on occupational health and working conditions is also seen to have not recognised the need for laws based on different sectors of work. It has again failed to include private households as a workplace, leaving the conditions of domestic work unregulated. Another failure relates to ignoring the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace Act (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) 2013, which further leaves out the scrutiny of abuse or exploitation of domestic workers. The fact of being migrants among domestic workers isolates them even further from these labour codes.

    The lacunae in existing legislation in recognising domestic work and migrant labour continues to be beset in ambiguities with the new labour reforms.

    Present scenario: Covid-19 adding to the vulnerabilities

    The onset of the Covid-19 and the resultant lockdowns have led to massive disruptions of normal life resulting in the shocks of sudden unemployment, financial strain and increased burden for workers in the unorganised sector. The migrant workers bore the highest brunt. In such a scenario, female migrants in an unregulated and isolated sphere of work such as domestic workers have been subject to severe distress. The lockdown and reduced mobility left the workers unemployed and without income. Live-in migrants faced increased workload but no change in wages. Even with the slow revival of the economy, they are under threat of being infected or being carriers, given their precarious work and living conditions. Sudden dismissals and financial strain have forced many to the situation of borrowing money for subsistence and eventually ending up in debt. Workers struggle to meet the basic needs of health, food, education of the family with lower income and savings (Sumalatha et al., 2021). With dismal employment relations and working conditions, coupled with the exclusion from the legal framework and social protection, Covid-19 has expanded the existing inequalities.

    Government intervention:  The need of the hour

    Government intervention both in ensuring basic rights and providing for the welfare of the domestic workers have been negligible. The cultural and structural barriers are not the only challenges in regulating domestic work. There is a lack of political will in acknowledging domestic workers and their woes. As they remain scattered and invisible, the domestic workers are not seen as potential vote banks and hence remain without any political influence. The sector which is comprised largely of female migrants is devoid of any political voice and agency in their origin or host states since there are barriers in pursuing their voting rights given the nature of their migration. Their interactions with civic authorities and politicians in the host state are marginal and hence, their issues do not come to the fore (Bureau, 2018). There is a lack of awareness among the migrant workers on their voting rights. They are largely unaware as to who should be approached in the host state to resolve their problems. Even a migrant worker, well aware of his/her political rights and agencies, refrain from pursuing any form of interaction as they have either lost faith in the system or are disillusioned by the long time and effort spent pursuing the cases with no results to show. This highlights the need for effective political inclusion of migrant workers and the generation of political and electoral awareness among them (Bureau, 2018).

    Further, identification and protection are the two essentials in creating an inclusive environment for female migrants in domestic work. The feminized nature of domestic work in the country, concentrated predominantly among poor and marginalised migrant workers, need to be recognised as dignified “work” and households they work in as “workplace”. Only separate comprehensive legislation on domestic work can incorporate the varied complexities of the sector, rather than a mere extension of organised sector legislations. Such separate legislation would provide the domestic worker with an identity that can ensure them their rights and entitlements (Sharma & Kunduri, 2015). The legislation should address the working conditions, violations and exploitations, provisions for mobilisation, illegal channels of private placement agencies and establishing basic civil rights from a gender perspective to incorporate the differential experience of females in the sector. Efficient implementation and scrutiny of the same require statistically significant data, the absence of which is another flaw in the system.

    Domestic worker’s inaccessibility of social protection is the result of the lack of recognition. Migrant workers in the sector without any identity proof or formal registration are excluded from social protection schemes. Agrawal and Agarwal (2018) suggest setting up an independent welfare board in every district responsible for registering, ensuring availability of social security benefits, conducting dispute resolution, dissemination of information and providing skill development and training for domestic workers. The provision of financial incentives can help in coping with sudden unemployment situations during any form of crisis such as the pandemic. Allowing for the organisation of domestic workers into unions and cooperatives can also be beneficial in attaining social and legal protection. Domestic worker groups such as SEWA and National Domestic Workers Movement (NDWM) in the country have been attending to the woes of the domestic workers by providing a platform for collective bargaining and assertion of rights.

    The introduction of the draft on National Policy on Domestic workers can be seen as a positive development, however, the policy still remains in consideration. Vulnerabilities of the domestic workers, exacerbated by the pandemic, highlight the urgent necessity for the ratification of the ILO convention on domestic workers. There is an urgent requirement in increasing the government’s sensitivity towards domestic workers and their precarious existence.

    References

    1. Agrawal, U., & Agarwal, S. (2018). Social Security for Domestic Workers in India. Socio-Legal Rev.14, 30
    2. Bureau, A. (2018). Political Inclusion of Seasonal Migrant Workers in India: Perceptions, Realities and Challenges.
    3. C189 – Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189). (n.d.). Retrieved July 15, 2021, from https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C189
    4. Chandrasekhar, C. P., & Ghosh, J. (2012, November 12). Changing patterns of domestic work. @businessline. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/c-p chandrasekhar/changing-patterns-of-domestic-work/article22985402.ece
    5. Chen, M. A. (2011). Recognizing domestic workers, regulating domestic work: Conceptual, measurement, and regulatory challenges. Canadian Journal of Women and the Law23(1), 167-184.
    6. Chigateri, S., Zaidi, M., & Ghosh, A. (2016). Work Like Any Other, Work Like No Other103. Retrieved July 18, 2021, from http://www.unrisd.org/indiareport-chapter4
    7. Chigateri, S. (2021). Labour Law Reforms and Women’s Work in India: Assessing the New Labour Codes From a Gender Lens. Institute of Social Studies Trust.
    8. Indu, A., Indrani, M., & Neetha, N. (2012). Gender and migration: Negotiating rights, a women’s movement perspective. Delhi: Centre for Women’s Development Studies.
    9. International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2013a). Who are domestic workers? Ilo.Org. https://www.ilo.org/global/docs/WCMS_209773/lang–en/index.htm
    10. International Labour Organisation (ILO). (2013b). Global and Regional Estimates on Domestic Workers.
    11. International Labour Organisation (ILO), (2015). Indispensable yet unprotected: Working conditions of Indian domestic workers at home and abroad. Retrieved July 19, 2021, from https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—declaration/documents/publication/wcms_378058.pdf
    12. Klemm, B., Däubler, W., Beimin, W., Lai, A., Min, H., & Sinha, S. (2011). Protection for Domestic Workers: Challenges and Prospects. Briefing Paper Special Issue, May, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
    13. Madhav, R. (2010). Legal Recognition of Domestic Work. Labour File, 8, 41.
    14. Mahanta, U., & Gupta, I. (2015). Road ahead for domestic workers in India: legal and policy challenges.
    15. Mazumdar, I., Neetha, N., & Agnihotri, I. (2013). Migration and gender in India. Economic and Political Weekly, 54-64.
    16. National policy for domestic workers. (2019, February 13). Retrieved July 18, 2021, from https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1564261
    17. Neetha, N. (2004). Making of female breadwinners: Migration and social networking of women domestics in Delhi. Economic and Political Weekly, 1681-1688.
    18. Neetha, N., & Palriwala, R. (2011). The absence of state law: Domestic workers in India. Canadian Journal of Women and the Law23(1), 97-120.
    19. Neetha N., & Indrani, M. (2020, June 01). Crossroads and Boundaries : Labour Migration, Trafficking and Gender. Retrieved July 19, 2021, from https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/20/review-womens-studies/crossroads-and-boundaries.html
    20. Overview of Labour Law Reforms (n.d.) Retrieved from https://prsindia.org/billtrack/overview-of-labour-law-reforms#_edn2
    21. Poddar, M., & Koshy, A. (2019). Legislating for Domestic’Care’Workers in India-An Alternative Understanding. NUJS L. Rev.12, 67
    22. Shanthi, K. (2006). Female labour migration in India: Insights from NSSO data(Vol. 4, p. 2006). Chennai: Madras School of Economics.
    23. Sharma, S., & Kunduri, E. (2015). Of Law, Language, and Labour: Situating the Need for Legislation in Domestic Work. Economic and Political Weekly50(28).
    24. Singh, N., Keshri, K., & Bhagat, R. B. (2015). Gender dimensions of migration in urban India. In India Migration Report 2015(pp. 200-214). Routledge India.
    25. Srivastava, P., & Shukla, P. (2021). Crisis behind closed doors domestic workers’ struggles during the pandemic and beyond. Economic and Political Weekly, 17-21.
    26. Sumalatha, B. S., Bhat, L. D., & Chitra, K. P. (2021). Impact of Covid-19 on Informal Sector: A Study of Women Domestic Workers in India. The Indian Economic Journal, 00194662211023845.

     

    Image Credit: ucanews.com 

  • Wage theft plagues India’s  migrant workers

    Wage theft plagues India’s migrant workers

    Though the South Asian country has relied heavily on remittances from its international migrant workers, the government has been remiss in ensuring their protection and welfare. As labor violations spike amid the COVID-19 pandemic, these workers are left to fend for themselves.

    In August 2020, a group of around forty Indian construction workers staged a hunger strike in Kraljevo, Serbia, demanding to be paid. In addition to not receiving months’ worth of wages from their employer, they had been working 10-12 hours a day without proper food or access to healthcare and were living in cramped, unhygienic quarters during the COVID-19 pandemic.

    The migrant workers from across India first arrived in Serbia in mid-2019. According to the Building and Wood Workers’ International (BWI), a global union federation, around 150 Indians were employed across the Balkan country for the construction of the Corridor 11 project. In a Zoom interview, two of the workers recounted how their troubles with getting paid had begun soon after arrival. When their situation didn’t improve, the first group was repatriated to India in January and February 2020. The rest, including those protesting in Kraljevo, were repatriated by September 2020.

    Much of the Indian government’s efforts have been focused on Gulf countries, where, based on data from the International Labour Organization (ILO), around 9 million Indians live and work. However, the BWI warns that Europe is fast becoming a hub for the exploitation and trafficking of third-country nationals. In Serbia, other reports of exploitation of migrant groups from China and Turkey have recently come to light.

    When he heard about the stranded Indian workers, Ramachandra Khuntia, chair of the BWI Indian Affiliates Council and a former Member of Parliament (MP) contacted the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Indian embassy in Belgrade multiple times.

    the BWI warns that Europe is fast becoming a hub for the exploitation and trafficking of third-country nationals.

    What followed was a cross-border initiative involving labor unions, the Indian government, and Serbian anti-trafficking organization ASTRA. “We were finally able to bring the workers back home. But ‘til today, they have yet to receive their wages from the employer,” says Khuntia.

    “The payment of arrear wages is usually dealt with by the labor department in the host country, but the matter can be pursued through the Indian embassy,” explains Khuntia, adding that despite assurances from the Indian government and the Indian embassy in Serbia, the payments seem nowhere in sight.

    Indian construction workers stage a hunger strike in Kraljevo, Serbia, in August 2020. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, wage theft has soared across the world, and often, the victims are migrant workers from India, who receive patchy support from their own government and have to rely on unions or non-profits for help. (Photo credit: BWI/Boobalan D) 

    Job loss and other ordeals

    Wage theft — the illegal practice of denying workers the money that they are rightfully owed — has dramatically increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to the non- or incomplete payment of wages, employees have to deal with job loss, non-payment of termination benefits, poor working conditions, and hurried repatriation without the chance to register their grievances.

    Migrant workers’ troubles begin in their country of origin, not abroad. “It is a new form of slavery that begins before they even leave the country in the form of recruiting fees. Recruiting agents and others involved are selling dreams to migrant workers.”

    Ponkumar Ponnuswamy, president of TKTMS, a construction workers’ union in Tamil Nadu that was directly involved in the process of repatriating the stranded workers, says that each of the workers is owed anywhere between the equivalent of US$1,300 and US$2,600 by the aforementioned company, depending on how long they were in Serbia. For the workers who were put through this trying ordeal, their unpaid wages represent a substantial amount of money that would have otherwise gone towards debt repayments, medical treatments, and basic subsistence.

    “I think it is a huge loss not only at the individual level but also at the country level,” says S. Irudaya Rajan, an expert on Indian migration and member of the Kerala government’s COVID-19 expert committee. Migrant workers constitute an integral part of the global economy, with their remittances adding up to over three times the amount of international aid and foreign direct investment combined. India, the world’s largest source of international migrants, received US$82 billion in remittances in 2019 according to World Bank data, a sum that has helped keep millions out of poverty.

    “COVID-19 has become a great opportunity for exploitation,” says Rajan, who is currently heading a study on counter-migration from the Gulf to assess wage theft.

    But according to him, migrant workers’ troubles begin in their country of origin, not abroad. “It is a new form of slavery that begins before they even leave the country in the form of recruiting fees,” he says. “Recruiting agents and others involved are selling dreams to migrant workers.”

    The Indian government requires recruiting agents to register themselves with the Protector General of Emigrants. Despite this, many illegal agents continue operating across the country. (Photo credit: Yamuna Matheswaran)

    Is the Indian government doing enough?

    In theory, the Indian government offers various resources for those who emigrate for work: registration portals, insurance schemes, awareness programs, and helplines. They also provide a list of registered recruiting agents (RAs) across the country.

    But the reality of emigration is far more complex, even confusing. For instance, it would be safe to assume that only a fraction of the RAs operating in India is registered with the MEA. A 2018 investigation by the Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), with the support of ILO, found that in the state of Punjab alone the number of unregistered agents ran into several thousands, despite the 2014 Punjab Travel Professionals Regulation Act requiring mandatory registration of all consultants, agents, and advisors involved in sending people abroad.

    These unscrupulous agents make emigrants more vulnerable to exploitation by charging illegal fees and pushing unfair contracts. Some workers arrive in a foreign country only to learn that the job they were recruited for doesn’t exist, says Rajan. Others end up without appropriate visas or permits and are never registered in the system.

    The MEA limits the service fees RAs can charge their clients, which caps at INR 20,000 (around US$270). But Rajeev Sharma, Regional Policy Officer at BWI’s South Asia office, says that many of the workers have paid far more depending on the state they hailed from.

    “Workers from Punjab, for instance, paid up to INR 100,000 (US$1,365) to 150,000 (US$2,048) to the agent,” he says. “We don’t know how they managed to fund their journey, they may have run into debt – so it’s not just the salary, so many other issues are involved.” When asked about this practice, one of the agencies involved – an unregistered ‘Shakti Tread Test Centre’ run by Muktinath Yadav in Deoria, Uttar Pradesh – gave no response.

    “Covid-19 has become a great opportunity for exploitation” – Dr. S Irudaya Rajan, an expert on Indian Migration

    Indian missions abroad are tasked with ensuring the welfare of overseas Indian nationals. The migrant workers and union members state, however, that the Indian embassy in Serbia failed to even register their grievances properly. The Embassy of India in Belgrade did not respond to requests for comment. In response to an inquiry about grievance redressal mechanisms for repatriated migrant workers, the MEA’s Protector General of Emigrants instead pointed to the Pravasi Bharatiya Sahayata Kendra, a general helpline.

    Amnesty International raised concerns about the state of migrant workers under Covid-19 in the Gulf.
    Image Credit: amnesty.org

    “Grievance portals address a lot of topics, including pre-departure issues. However, there needs to be a specific focus on wage theft, particularly during COVID-19,” says Rajan. He stresses the importance of collective bargaining by various governments at the South Asia level, as well as proper grievance registration by Indian embassies in order to pursue the necessary legal steps.

    Recognizing the lack of global mechanisms to address wage theft, Congress MP Shashi Tharoor stated during a panel discussion last year that an escrow fund could be set up, with employers depositing six months’ worth of wages in order to protect workers against non-payment.

    Need for awareness building

    In the case of the Indian migrant workers in Serbia, it was labor unions that initially came to their rescue, following through until they had arrived safely back to their respective homes. When asked if there is enough awareness among migrants themselves about their rights and the resources available to them, Rajan says: “Absolutely not, and I think that is where we are failing.”

    “Migration has three cycles,” he explains. “The first — pre-migration cycle — happens in our country,” and steps to protect migrant workers need to start here. Rajan believes that the government should make pre-departure orientation programs, including skills training, mandatory. “Most workers don’t even know the currency of the host country. They know, in rupees, how much they expect to make and in how much time.”

    Khuntia, of the BWI Indian Affiliates Council, highlights the utter importance of signing bilateral agreements with host countries regarding wages, healthcare, and social security so that those emigrating can feel secure. “And if anything were to happen, by virtue of this bilateral agreement, the Indian government can negotiate with the host country and provide relief to the workers,” he concludes.

    “If everybody were cheated, there would be no migration,” says Rajan. But it’s important to share not only success stories but also those of struggles, he continues, to raise awareness among prospective migrants. It’s not about “how many people we send” but about how well-informed our migrant workers are when they are deployed abroad, he says.

    This article was first published on Asia Democracy Chronicles.

    Feature Image: dw.com

  • Civil-Military Relations: Differing Perspectives

    Civil-Military Relations: Differing Perspectives

    There are a number of theoretical constructs that have been propounded to explain Civil-Military Relations. However, these concepts, be it Huntington’s “Objective Civilian Control”, or Morris Janowitz views on “Subjective Control”, and there are others as well, basically interpret and differentiate the interplay between the degree of civilian dominance and military autonomy.

    Introduction

    At the present time, there is an ongoing controversy in the public domain with regard to our Higher Defence Management as the Services are unable to agree on how to proceed forward with the Government’s stated aim of establishing Theatre Commands. We are told that Raksha Mantri has asked the CDS to convene a meeting of the three services to thrash out the matter so that a consensus can be reached on how to proceed forward. This direction by the RM is a clear pointer to the distressing state of civil-military relations prevailing within our country.

    In any democracy civilian control over the military, which implies the control exercised by our elected representatives through the government, is the very foundation on which civil-military relations are based. Therefore, one would expect when the Services have divergent views, the politicians would step in and give concise directions on how the Services are to proceed. In roughly similar circumstances in the United States, for example, the US Congress broke the logjam through the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. This brought about sweeping changes to the  Department of Defense by reworking the command structure of the United States Military. More recently, in China, on President Xi Jinping’s directions, transformational changes to the PLA’s organizational structure were undertaken. So, to clearly understand why our Ministry of Defence (MOD) is unable to push through such reforms, we perforce must examine its functioning and set up.

    In essence, however, Civil-Military Relations are a messy affair, not just here, but worldwide. The Goldwater Nichols Act, for example, took a year to be passed and nearly another four to five years to be implemented. There are a number of theoretical constructs that have been propounded to explain Civil-Military Relations. However, these concepts, be it Huntington’s “Objective Civilian Control”, or Morris Janowitz views on “Subjective Control”, and there are others as well, basically interpret and differentiate the interplay between the degree of civilian dominance and military autonomy.

    Leaving aside the theoretical aspects, the one thing on which there can be no disagreement is the fact that success or otherwise at tackling vital national security issues depends on, what Raj Shukla in his paper “Civil-Military Relations in India” (CLAWS, 2012), calls “the pattern of institutional interaction between the civil and military components of a nation’s polity.” Most importantly, in our context, this is essential not just because the military is responsible for protecting our national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and must, therefore, deliver the maximum bang for the buck, but more so, because defence spending, while at its’ lowest in the past seven years,  is still  13.73% of all government expenditure at Rs 4.78 Lakh Crores. Not an insubstantial amount in any way.

    In the opinion of Steven Wilkinson, author of  Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence, our military has been defanged and “coup proofed” by a series of measures put in place by the bureaucracy and its political masters.

    Historical Precedent

    It is important to remember the Spanish philosopher, George Santayana’s, words of wisdom that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”, we would also do well to recall the maxim that “there’s a reason why your windshield is bigger than your rear-view mirror. Where you’re headed is much more important than what you left behind”. Therefore, seventy plus years on, historical precedent means little, because we have had enough time to have absorbed lessons from the wars we have fought since and adapted our HDO accordingly. Suffice it to say that Prime Minister Nehru had an inherent dislike for the military and was apprehensive of what it could do, especially after seeing what was happening in our neighbourhood.

    In the opinion of Steven Wilkinson, author of  Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence, our military has been defanged and “coup proofed” by a series of measures put in place by the bureaucracy and its political masters. These include a steep decline in its precedence and perks, diversifying its ethnic composition and giving overriding powers to the civilian bureaucracy within the Ministry of Defence in every aspect of military functioning, including the selection of senior ranks.

    In addition, large paramilitary forces under the Union Home Ministry have also been formed to “ring-fence” the military and for use as countervailing forces against it, if required. Finally, the lure of post-retirement crumbs, such as an ambassadorship, governorship or membership of the Armed Forces Tribunal has ensured that the senior hierarchy remains quiet and continues to toe the Government line. All of this has weakened the military to a large extent making it a less attractive career, which is why it has been attempting to cope with large deficiencies over an extended period of time.

    The Kargil Conflict of 1999 caught us by surprise, and in its aftermath, there were calls for drastic changes to the existing system. It was obvious that the existing defence paradigm of the Indian state was obsolete while we were in the 21st century, our command and control structures were still in the 20th century. The Government established the Kargil Review Committee headed by K Subrahmanyam to go into the issue of reforms and its subsequent recommendations were handed over to a group of ministers for examination and implementation.

    Amongst the recommendations made, the three that were of most importance pertained to the necessity for integration of the services both with each other and with the MOD; the creation of a chief of defence staff (CDS); and joint operational commands. Like nothing else, the Kargil Conflict showed up the serious lack of synergy amongst the three Services of Armed Forces as well as a lack of coordination between the Armed Forces and Civil authorities. It must be pointed out that while some of the lesser recommendations were implemented, including facetiously attempting to fool the political establishment by renaming the Service Headquarters, it has only been after nearly two decades that any serious movement towards reforms has been undertaken with the appointment of the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA). It is still too early to comment on their efficacy.

    Characteristics of Civil-Military Relations in India

    It may come as a surprise to some that the Raksha Mantri and the civilian bureaucrats in the MOD, apart from handling the three Services and the Coast Guard, also deal with a number of civilian manned and run agencies such as DRDO, OFB and Veterans Welfare etc. The total number of civilians paid from defence estimates exceeds 500,000. To put it in perspective it is larger than the active strength of the Pakistan Armed Forces.

    Anit Mukherjee in a paper titled The Absent Dialogue (Seminar 599-2009)  suggests that there are three main characteristics that our Civil-Military Relations present, which explains to a large extent the ongoing interaction between the two. These are:

    • Strong administrative, procedural and bureaucratic controls over the armed forces. Where this differs from other democracies in this respect is the complete lack of expertise on defence matters among the civilian bureaucrats. As a result dialogue between both sides is constrained and, as is to be expected, they are more focused on the process than the outcome. This lack of knowledge also ensures that they are unable to “arbitrate between competing parochial interests”, and are also unwilling to take responsibility or be held accountable for controversial decisions.
    • While consulted, the military is excluded from the crucial decision-making forums, thereby denying them a role in the policy-making process. The CDS has only been granted the position of a member of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) as well as in the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), both headed by the NSA, which is the “principal mechanism for inter-ministerial coordination and integration of relevant inputs in the formulation of national security policies.” Thus, the NSA de facto performs the duties of the CDS—a peculiar situation since the former completely lacks the requisite experience.
    • The military has been granted a great deal of autonomy concerning its own affairs. is allowed to do much of what it wants in what it considers its own sphere of activity: training and education, threat assessments, force structure, doctrine, innovations, appointments (up to a certain rank) and miscellaneous welfare activities. This makes for personality-driven interactions.
    • In addition to the above three characteristics as propounded by Anit Mukherjee, there is also the issue of disjointed and uncoordinated interaction between the MOD with the Ministry of Finance (MoF). For example, Amit Cowshish in his paper, Distortions in the Discourse on Modernization of Armed Forces, in the Journal of Defence Studies (Vol 8, No3, Jul-Sept 2014) writes that “in the run-up to the formulation of the 12th Defence Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2012–17), all the Services Headquarters confirmed to the MoD that the Op Directives were a good enough basis for formulating the plan. However, “the difference of opinion between the MoD and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) over the size of the 11th Defence FYP (2007–12) was one of the reasons why it could not be brought before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)”.

    Impact on Functioning

    The impact on the functioning of our Higher Defence Management of all of this is that we live in a divided house in which the atmosphere reeks of distrust and hostility, the currency for interaction is power, and the aim of all stakeholders is to protect one’s own turf at all costs, at the very least. It is indeed unfortunate that the most important lesson we seemed to have picked up from the British and perfected, is the fine art of divide and rule.

    The second issue of import is the fact that over all these years we have not been able to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy document. This goes far beyond just the functioning of the MOD or Civil-Military interactions and can be blamed on our inability to adopt a ‘whole of government approach. Nonetheless, its absence has not only caused ambiguity in our strategic aims but also has had a debilitating effect on our military. As I have written elsewhere in my paper Rebooting the India Army: A Doctrinal Approach to Force Restructuring (ORF Issue Brief No439, Feb 2021) that “The NSS is also the foundation for a comprehensive military doctrine by the Armed Forces. This military doctrine acts as a formalised guideline that broadly visualises the nature of potential conflicts, the preparations required for them, and the methods to be adopted. In its formulation, it flows from the military-strategic goals enumerated, which dictate how the military must be organised, trained and equipped to carry out its assigned missions”.

    It implies, that instead of transforming our organizational architecture or processes to deal with future conflict scenarios we adopt the lowest common denominator that allows for compromise. 

    If perceptions, within the Services and at the MOD, vary about what our strategic aims are and how we plan to accomplish them, then substantive dialogue on the issue of integration and joint manship are extremely difficult. It implies, that instead of transforming our organizational architecture or processes to deal with future conflict scenarios we adopt the lowest common denominator that allows for compromise.  Basically, that allows us to adopt a bureaucratic bean-counting mode, to ensure harmony among all stakeholders, which translates to proportional representation in all aspects of functioning, entailing only superficial changes in the status quo. The Armed Forces Special Operations Division (AFSOD) is the perfect example of such an approach. Instead of consolidating all of our Special Operations Forces (SOF) resources, we have adopted a flawed approach, not unlike what the United States adopted.  after the disaster of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, the abortive bid to free US diplomats held hostage by the Iranians. They formed the Joint Special Operations Agency which was flawed as it had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF. By providing minimal resources that have little operational impact, we have managed to pay lip service to jointness while each Service continues to control and employ its SOF assets as it chooses.

    Conclusion

    The only way forward for us is a change in mindsets and attitudes. We can no longer afford a system wherein, according to K. Subrahmanyam, “politicians enjoy power without any responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability, and the military assumes responsibility without any direction”. We need a more informed and enlightened polity that is aware of our security environment and is willing to demand answers from our political and security establishment as to how our tax Rupees are being spent on defence. There is no doubt that accountability is the key to a more secure future.

    It is time our political establishment got real, set aside bureaucratic infighting and apathy and took control as the Constitution requires them to do. This requires a better understanding of security issues along with political will, determination and a more assertive leadership that is focused on strengthening our institutions. Otherwise, as Anit Mukherjee so aptly asserts, “It might not make a pretty picture to say that we are weak because we choose to be weak, but sometimes it is necessary to look in the mirror”.

    Feature Image Credit: www.ipdutexas.org

    Article Image Credit: patimes.org

     

  • India’s Duality on Growth and EIA Regulations

    India’s Duality on Growth and EIA Regulations

    Amidst the first nationwide Covid-19 emergency lockdown, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change [MoEF&CC] published the draft Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) notification 2020 to replace the earlier 2006 notification under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. EIA is a process to estimate the overall environmental impacts of projects by taking into consideration the views of the people to decide whether the proposed project is approved for operation. Implementation of EIA is a form of control over the exploitative malpractices of private players while at the same time, it could also form a prerequisite for grants and loans by various international financing institutions.

    The major flaw with the previous EIA which even the current draft failed to fix was its low integration with other frameworks of ecological governance and public policy.

    Commonly the EIA has an entire process of reporting depending on the country and the industry. India follows four major steps in this process: scoping (issuing terms of reference), preparation of the report, public consultation, final expert appraisal. The major flaw with the previous EIA which even the current draft failed to fix was its low integration with other frameworks of ecological governance and public policy. The argument of rent-seeking, red-tape bureaucracy, delay in clearance were legitimate criticism by the current government and developers when we look into the number of scattered amendments made to EIA 2006.

    However, the aim of making the new draft more transparent and pragmatic was proposed through the removal of several activities from consultation and granting post-facto approval. It dismantles the notion of prior clearance from expert committees based on the categorization (A, B1 and B2), construction project size (built-up area up to 150,000 sq. m), reduction in monitoring period (from every 6 months to once a year), exemptions to ‘strategic’ programs and ‘border regions’ all of which were set arbitrarily (Gupta 2020). Reducing the notice period for a public hearing from 30 days to 20 days further dilutes the effectiveness.

    While massive online protests, public feedbacks and petitions ensued, there were cases of websites blocked by filing Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) to few environmental groups such as ‘Fridays For Future’ and others

    Additionally, the possibility of granting resumption through remediation of ecological damage based on assessment goes against the precautionary principle of avoiding environmental harm. The notification also excludes reporting public violations, instead only reports by government and regulatory authority, appraisal community and violator-promoter are reckoned. According to many activists, the reluctance of the MoEF&CC in translating the draft document in vernacular languages for people without any literacy in Hindi and English further favour the majority. While massive online protests, public feedbacks and petitions ensued, there were cases of websites blocked by filing Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) to few environmental groups such as ‘Fridays For Future’ and others (Kunal 2020).

    Nonetheless, the Ministry has appointed the National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to compile the comments received from the public. Post which the final draft will be scrutinised by the committee headed under SR Wate, former director of NEERI who was already given the mandate to re-engineering EIA 2006 and had chaired panels such as appraisal on post-factor clearance (Jackson and Gunasekar 2020). This poses a predicament, as the appointment of the above-mentioned individual might already have a biased viewpoint over the draft.

    The global economy, particularly the developed countries are working towards building an entire ecosystem of environmental, social and governance (ESG) investing. They were developed while keeping societal impact and the conservation and preservation of nature in mind. Various civil groups and governments are becoming more and more acceptable in forfeiting their wealth which increases their domestic input costs in an order to choose merchandise producing lower greenhouse gas emissions. Many mutual funds and portfolios are available for ESG investing though there has not been a uniform standard set to determine these stocks make the cut (Borate 2020).

    The adverse effect of polluting industries can be noted from the Environment Performance Index (EPI) 2020 by researchers in Yale and Columbia University which ranked India at 168th position out of 180 countries (“India EPI – Country Scorecard.” 2020).

    EIA draft presents a contradiction on the government’s aim of emphasising ESG metric (Figure Below). We notice a diversion in the policymaking when the recent National Guidelines on Responsible Business Conduct (NGRBC) was laid down by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) in 2019. Based on which the subsequent consultation paper of the Business Responsibility and Sustainability Report (BRSR) from the top 100 to top 1000 listed market companies were released by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) (Consultation paper 2020).

     

    EIA based on its principle was supposed to be a tool for the protection of natural resources and marginalised community who receive negative externalities from the polluting industries. The adverse effect of which can be noted from the Environment Performance Index (EPI) 2020 by researchers in Yale and Columbia University which ranked India at 168th position out of 180 countries (“India EPI – Country Scorecard.” 2020).

    The author’s opinion over the larger framework is that environmental costs are being balanced with post-facto redressal. The emphasis put upon the private sector for green investing and other mandatory disclosures cannot be followed by diminishing the baseline surveys and the benchmark of EIA regulations. This can lead to more frequent outcomes of incidents such as Assam’s Baghjan oil spill and fire and the Vizag gas leak incident. Instead, the government should develop policies that restrain further ecological damages in the first place.

     

    References:

    Borate, Neil. “ESG Investments Are Fast Gaining Traction in India.” Mint, 11 Nov. 2020, www.livemint.com/money/personal-finance/esg-investments-are-fast-gaining-traction-in-india-11605111323843.html.

    Consultation Paper on the Format for Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting. SEBI, 2020, www.sebi.gov.in/reports-and-statistics/reports/aug-2020/consultation-paper-on-the-format-for-business-responsibility-and-sustainability-reporting_47345.html.

    Gupta, Debayan, et al. The Draft EIA Notification, 2020: Reduced Regulations and Increased Exemptions Part I & II, 31 July 2020, www.cprindia.org/research/reports/draft-eia-notification-2020-reduced-regulations-and-increased-exemptions-part-i-ii.

    “India EPI – Country Scorecard.” Environment Performance Index (EPI), 2020, epi.yale.edu/epi-results/2020/country/ind.

    Jackson, Jacqueline, and Karthik Gunasekar. “Decoding the Current Status of Draft EIA 2020.” The News Minute, 23 Sept. 2020, www.thenewsminute.com/article/decoding-current-status-draft-eia-2020-133728.

    Kunal, Kumar. UAPA Charge in Notice to Environmental Group Fridays for Future Due to ‘Clerical Error’: Delhi Police. India Today, 23 July 2020, www.indiatoday.in/india/story/uapa-charge-in-notice-to-environmental-group-fridays-for-future-due-to-clerical-error-delhi-police-1703716-2020-07-23.

    Vencatesan, Anjana. “[Commentary] The Two Faces of Environmental Regulation.” Mongabay, 21 Dec. 2020, india.mongabay.com/2020/12/commentary-the-two-faces-of-environmental-regulation/.

  • The Democratic Warrior – Countering Unrestricted Violence with Clausewitz

    The Democratic Warrior – Countering Unrestricted Violence with Clausewitz

    This research paper was originally published in the “African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research (AJoTIR)”, Volume 2, Number 1, April 2021. Pp. 89-106.

     

    Abstract

    We often find the application of indistinctive, brutal and extraordinary violence by all fighters and soldiers in terrorist, insurgency, and counter-insurgency acts in Africa. This article argues that we need a code of honour for those bearing arms to limit these unrestricted acts of violence, a code of honour that combines military duties with the demands of civil society in the model democratic warrior. The changes to the global system that followed the end of the Cold War are widely regarded as requiring a different kind of soldier for democratic societies. A number of writers have proposed that the new model should be that of the “warrior,” a concept that highlights the psychological and social distinctiveness of those who bear arms. Such men and (rarely) women are often conceived as operating according to a distinctive code of honour that sets them apart from civil society, usually in a positive way. But we know that the concept of honour may also lead to a terrible escalation. So, the task is to reconnect the concepts—warrior and honour—to civil society to de-escalate the ongoing brutal violence in civil wars. There is no honour in killing innocent people. On the contrary, it is perhaps the most egregious act against one’s honour and dignity to torture, violate, or kill the innocent. The concept of the democratic warrior seeks to reinstate honour and dignity to those bearing arms.Keywords: democracy, warrior, civil society, civil war, honour, dignity, terrorism, Clausewitz, wondrous trinity, containing violence.

    Introduction

    At first glance, the concept of the democratic warrior appears contradictory. Indeed, it combines seemingly conflicting value systems in a single concept. Like a magnet or Clausewitz’s favoured model of the unity of polar opposition between attack and defence, a methodology can be formulated to explain how this type of conflicted unity is not necessarily a logical opposition and can be a dynamic interrelationship on a continuum. At one end of the continuum is democratic equality and non-violent conflict resolution, while at the other end is the threat of (and sometimes) violently enforced limitation of war and violence; at one end is a civilized society, while at the other is a subsystem of society whose identity is defined by martial honour.

    The decisive bond that can link the two poles of this dynamic relationship, without eliminating their opposition, is the classical republican virtues, which can lay claim to relative validity in both spheres. Since Plato, the classical virtues have been prudence (wisdom), justice, fortitude, and temperance. Without a specific ethos aimed at the political functioning of the polity, a state can sustain itself only under the conditions of a dictatorship. If republican virtue, which is oriented toward the polity, cannot be directly reconciled with liberal democracy and its focus on the individual, it can take on a completely new significance as a bond linking a democratic society to democratic warriors. For Machiavelli, republican virtue already guarantees both external and internal freedom. In this respect, the necessary though not yet adequate condition of the democratic warrior is to also be a republican soldier. Add to this the limitation of war and violence in a global society to make democratic societies possible. A renewal of the republican virtue is the link between a liberal-democratic society and a warrior ethos.

    The “warrior” is by definition someone who chooses to bear arms and is proficient in their use. In this sense, whatever the distinctive characteristics of the warrior ethos, its institutionalization reflects the same preferences for professionalism, expertise, and individualism that are characteristic of modern society as a whole. Contemporary conditions, it is argued, no longer call for armed masses, but for experts whose willingness to serve in uniform will allow others the freedom not to serve.

    It must be admitted, however, that the concept of the warrior does not call forth associations with modernity, but rather of the “archaic combatant” (Röhl 2005), whose ethos, skills, and experiences set him apart from normal society and in opposition to its basic values, of which the most cherished is, of course, peace. The fact the warrior freely chooses his profession may be consistent with democratic values, but the existence of a “warrior class” uniquely skilled in the use of force, whose values are not those of society as a whole, is scarcely consistent with democratic interests. It is also true that those who serve in today’s democratic armies are called upon to do a great deal more than fight. Although phrases like “armed social worker” undervalue and denigrate the martial qualities that remain foundational to military life, it is true that only a small percentage of men and women in uniform actually fight, and that their duties entail a wide range of activities in which violence plays no part. To those who wish to uphold the warrior spirit, the diverse requirements of modern military missions are liable to hold scant appeal, which may undermine the sense of purpose and identity that drew them to the profession in the first place.

    The discussion that follows seeks to build a bridge between the distinctive ethos of the warrior and the moral and political requirements of democratic societies, using the concept of the “democratic warrior.” It seeks to do justice to the self-image of those who bear arms (a morally distinctive task) while connecting it to the various goals and practices of democratic societies, and the diverse uses to which they put their armed forces. We may begin by noting that a warrior, even in the most traditional terms, is not merely a combatant—a fighter—but has always performed and embodied a range of social, military, and political roles. Our starting point for considering what those roles must be is Clausewitz’s concept of the trinity, a metaphor intended to encompass all types of war, which, by extension, can provide a lens through which the ideal range of characteristics required of the democratic warrior can be envisioned. War itself, as Clausewitz avers, is compounded of primordial passions, an irreducible element of chance, and what he called an element of “subordination” to reason, by which its instrumental character is revealed. When Clausewitz set forth his trinity, he posited that the chief concern of the warrior must be the mastery of chance through intelligence and creativity; and so it remains. Yet there is no reason to suppose that such mastery means that war’s social and political requirements should be ignored. On the contrary, unless they too are mastered, the warriors sent forth by democratic societies cannot represent the values and interests of the communities that depend on them, and of which they remain apart (Herberg-Rothe 2007).

    Soldiers and Warriors

    In both German and English, the word “soldier” (soldat) originally referred to a paid man-at-arms. The term became common in early modern Europe and distinguished those who were paid to fight— primarily in the service of the increasingly powerful territorial states that were then coming to dominate the continent—from members of militias, criminal gangs, volunteer constabulary and local self-defence forces, and other forms of vernacular military organizations. The rise of the soldier was linked to the rise of the state. This connection distinguished him from the “mercenary,” who also fought for pay, but as a private entrepreneur, what we would today call a “contractor.” Standing armies comprised of soldiers were different from and militarily superior to, the feudal hosts of the past, whose fighters served out of customary social obligation and generally possessed neither the discipline nor the martial proficiency that the soldier embodied. Clausewitz highlights these developments briefly in the last book of On War, and portrays them as an advance in political organization and military efficiency (Clausewitz 1984, 587-91).

    The absolute monarchies that made the paid soldier the standard of military excellence in early modern Europe were generally indifferent to the social and political identities of those they paid to fight, though not always. Frederick the Great, for instance, lamented his reliance on foreign troops and believed that his own subjects made better soldiers. “With such troops,” he wrote, “one might defeat the entire world, were not victories as fatal to them as to their enemies” (quoted in Moran 2003, 49). It was, however, only with the French Revolution that a firm expectation was established that a soldier bore arms not merely for pay, but out of personal loyalty to the state, an identity that was in turn supposed to improve his performance on the battlefield. This connection, needless to say, was largely mythical. Most of the men who fought in the armies of the Revolution, and all major European wars since then, are conscripts who would not have chosen to bear arms on behalf of the state if the law had not compelled them to do so. Nevertheless, submission to conscription was itself regarded as an expression of the ideal of citizenship, a concept that, like honour, depends upon the internalization and subjective acceptance by individuals of norms arising within the larger society.

    The French Republic never referred to its soldiers as conscripts, always as volunteers. The success of its armies and those of Napoleon, although transient, insured that “defence of the Fatherland [became] the foundation myth of modern armies”(Sikora 2002). The myth of voluntary sacrifice by the “citizen-soldier” to defend the community proved central to the legitimization of conscript armies, even in societies where democratic values were slow to emerge. In the middle of the nineteenth century, as Frederick Engels observed, conscription was Prussia’s only democratic institution (Frevert 1997, 21).

    It had been introduced in reaction to Prussia’s defeat by Napoleon, whose triumph was owed to the fact that the resources of the entire French nation were at his disposal. The aim of the Prussian military reforms was to accomplish a similar mobilization of social energy for war, but without inciting the revolutionary transformation of society that had made such mobilization possible in France. Prussia was no sovereign nation of citizens, and while the reform of its armed forces helped it to regain its position among the leading states of Europe, their political effect was limited.

    Many of those who promoted reform, including Clausewitz, hoped conscription would contribute to the democratization of Prussia’s armed forces, and, indirectly, of society as a whole. But the moral influence could as easily run the other way, and, as Friedrich Meinecke observed, measures designed to bind army and society together had the effect, in Prussia, of militarizing society instead. Even the Great War did not fully succeed in stripping war of its moral glamour. The supposedly heroic massacre of German troops attacking the British at Langemarck (1914), for instance, remained a staple of right-wing mythology until the end of the Third Reich, by which “our grief for the bold dead is so splendidly surpassed by the pride in how well they knew how to fight and die (Hüppauf, 1993, 56). Alongside this kind of blood-drenched nostalgia, the industrialized warfare exemplified by battles like Verdun (1916) also asserted themselves. Under these circumstances, fighting and dying well acquired some of the aspects of industrialized labour, in which a soldier’s duty expresses itself, not through the mastery of chance as Clausewitz proposed, but through submission to what Ernst Jüngercalled “the storm of steel.”

    It was only after World War II that German soldiers became authentically democratic citizens in uniform. According to Wilfried von Bredow, the creation of the Bundeswehr in 1956 was “one of the Federal Republic of Germany’s most innovative and creative political reforms, fully comparable in its significance to the conception of the social market economy” (Bredow 2000). Its evolution as an integral part of German society has embodied a calculated break with the German past, one that has become even more apparent since the demise of the Soviet Union has shifted the mission of the German army away from national defence and toward expeditionary operations calculated to help maintain regional and global order. As the conscript armies of the past have given way to the professional and volunteer armies of the present, in Germany and elsewhere, the model of the democratic “citizen in uniform” has once again been required to adapt to new conditions.

    It is perhaps slightly paradoxical that as wars have become smaller and more marginal in relation to society as a whole, the ideal of the warrior as an apolitical professional fighter has regained some of its old prominences. Such individuals are thought to embody values different than those of society as a whole, to the point where their loyalties, like their special capabilities in battle, are thought to spring solely from their organization and mutual affiliation. John Keegan, a proponent of the new warrior, explains the rejection of the values of civil society in terms of the psychological impact of violence on those who experience and employ it. War, Keegan argues, reaches into the most secret depths of the human heart, where the ego eliminates rational goals, where pride reigns, where emotions have the upper hand, and instinct rules. One of Keegan’s models of the warrior is the Roman centurion. These officers were soldiers through and through. They entertained no expectation of rising to the governing class, their ambitions were entirely limited to those of success within what could be perceived, for the first time in history, as an esteemed and self-sufficient profession. The values of the Romans professional soldier have not diminished with the passage of time: pride in a distinctly masculine way of life, the good opinion of comrades, satisfaction in the tokens of professional success, and the expectation of an honourable discharge and retirement remain the benchmarks of the warrior’s life (Keegan 1995, 389-391).

    The enthusiasm of Keegan and others for the revival of the warrior ethos is the belief that “honour” can play an important role in limiting violence, far more effective than the proliferation of legal norms that lack the binding psychological validity required to stay the hand of those who actually take life and risk their own. Warriors use force within a customary framework of mutual respect for one another. This is part of what has always been meant by “conventional warfare”, a form of fighting that necessarily includes a dissociation from combatants considered to be illegitimate. How and whether these kinds of customary restraints can be successfully reasserted under contemporary conditions is one of the central problems with which the concept of the democratic warrior must contend. In opposition to Keegan, I think, that the warriors’ code of honour must be related back to civil society, although this is a task which requires bridging a gap and remains a kind of hybrid.

    Old and New Wars

    To judge what kind of “weapon carrier” will be needed in the twenty-first century, we must begin by looking at developments since the end of the East-West conflict. It has proven, broadly speaking, to be a period of rapid social, political, and economic development whose outstanding characteristics are marked by the decline or disappearance of familiar frameworks and inherited values. Thus, one speaks of denationalization, de-politicization, de-militarization, de-civilization, de-territorialization, and delimitation.

    Unsurprisingly, these changes are also supposed to be marked by “new” wars, characterized by the decline of statehood, the rise of privatized violence, the development of civil war economies, and the reappearance of types of combatants thought to be long gone— mercenaries, child soldiers, warlords, and so on. The new types of combatants are in turn associated with rising incidences of suicide bombing, massacre, and other forms of atavistic and irrational violence(Kaldor 1999, Münkler 2004).

    Political and academic discourses have produced a range of new concepts designed to capture these conditions, including privatized war, asymmetrical warfare, small wars, wild wars, low-intensity conflict, post-national wars; wars of globalization on the one hand, and of “global fragmentation” on the other. It is apparent, however, that each of these terms describes only one segment of a complex reality. To some extent, a new type of war is being discovered with each new war. At the same time, these different terms share a common assumption that war now consists mainly of conflicts involving non-state actors on at least one side, and, by extension, that the motivation and goals of such belligerents are likely to prove unfathomable in political terms. The result for some is an approaching anarchy (Kaplan 1994), whose remedy is a revived liberal interventionism, the only principle that seems able to guarantee a modicum of global order (Münkler 2007).

    It is possible, however, that the contemporary diffusion of conflict beyond the confines of the state system is no more than a transitional phase, with particular strong links to those parts of the world—Africa and Central Asia above all—where the challenges of post-imperial social and political adaptation are still especially pronounced. Neither does the fact that the parties to war are non-state actors necessarily mean that such wars lack a political or ideological basis. Such wars may not represent a clash between order and anarchy but between competing conceptions of order (Münkler 2004). While a revived interventionism may indeed be a suitable antidote to anarchy, it is unlikely to do more than aggravate indigenous conflicts over the politics of order – and as it seems at present, it is contributing to the escalation of violence throughout the world. Now, as in the past, violence is not simply a source of disorder. It is also a means of shaping order and providing the basis for community formation.

    It is possible to wonder, in other words, how new the “new wars” actually are. Widespread atavistic and vernacular violence were already prominent features of the Chinese civil war, the Russian civil war, the Armenian genocide, and many other episodes of “old wars”. Those who favour the concept note a number of formal changes that resulted from the disappearance of Soviet-American rivalry, above all a decline in external assistance. The proxy wars of the past have become the civil wars of the present, conducted by parties that must rely on their own efforts to obtain the necessary resources, including illegal trafficking in diamonds, drugs, and women; brutal exploitation of the population; extreme violence as a way of attracting humanitarian assistance that can then be plundered; and the violent acquisition of particularly valuable resources (robber capitalism). These changes may well amplify the social consequences of violence, but do not necessarily deprive it of its instrumental and political character (Schlichte 2006).

    The point of departure for the study by Isabelle Duyvesteyn, for example, is a very broad definition of politics based on Robert Dahl: “any persistent pattern of human relationship that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule or authority” (Duyvesteyn 2005, 9). Duyvesteyn refers especially to the fact that in the fast-developing states she has studied, the differences between economics and politics are not as clear cut as Westerners expect. Struggles that seem to be about the acquisition of resources can be motivated by power politics to obtain a separate constituency. Because the position of power in these conflicts is often determined by the reputation of the leader, what may appear to be personal issues can also be incorporated into a power-political context. Her hypothesis is not that economically, religiously, ethnically, or tribally defined conflicts are masks for politics, but rather that these conflicts remain embedded in a political framework that is understandable to the participants.

    It is also apparent today’s civil wars do not always trend irrevocably toward social and political fragmentation, becoming increasingly privatized until they reach the smallest possible communities, which are held together by only violence itself. The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, for instance, gave rise to a civil war between warlords and individual tribes that appeared to be tending in this direction for a time, only to acquire a new and recognizably ideological shape once the Taliban seized power. This new tendency was confirmed by the Talibans’ willingness to give shelter to al-Qaeda, a global and trans-national organization of almost unlimited ambition, whose attacks upon the United States have in turn embroiled Afghanistan in a conflict about the world order pitting the West against militant Islam. At present, we witness in “Sahelistan” a similar development, but this is not confined to a single state, but to the whole region.

    At a minimum, it seems clear that the new wars, to the extent that they are new, are not all new in the same way. In some, violence does indeed appear to gravitate downwards towards privatized war; in others, however, the movement is upwards, towards supra-state wars of world order. Although these trends are linked in practice, analytically they are distinct. States do still wage wars, but for the most part, they are now doing so not in pursuit of their own particular interests but for reasons related to world order. This is what accounts for the new interest in an American empire and hegemony (Walzer 2003). Nor is America the only state capable of seeking and exercising global influence.

    Russia, China, India and Europe (whose superficial fragmentation masks its concerted economic, regulatory and power-political influence) are all capable of challenging American influence in particular spheres of activity; and one day they may do so in all spheres (Zakaria 2009). In any event, the use of force by strong states in pursuit of world order, whether cooperatively or competitively, is likely to remain the dominant strategic reality for some time to come; a fact that should not be obscured by the simultaneous proliferation of privatized violence on the periphery of the world system.

    Clausewitz’s Trinity as a Coordinate System

    The argument about the newness of new wars is also an argument about the continuing salience of Clausewitz’s understanding of war as, in his words, a “wondrous trinity,” by which primordial violence and the exigencies of combat may finally be subjugated to reason and politics. It is apparent, however, that while the proportions of these three elements may vary, a good deal nowadays, perhaps more so than in some periods in the past, they do not escape the theoretical framework that Clausewitz established. At the same time, his trinity points us towards the essential characteristics of the “democratic warrior,” whose success requires that he masters the multiple sources of tensions that Clausewitz detected in the nature of war itself.

    Clausewitz’s trinity present war as embodying three elements in constant tension with each other: primordial violence, the fuel on which war feeds; the fight between two or more opponents, by which violence is given military effective form; and the community, whose interests, as represented by policy, give war its purpose, and whose existence provides the soldier with his essential identity: as one who fights for something larger than himself. The shifting proportions among these elements that modern war continues to display would not have surprised Clausewitz. On the contrary, he knew that all three would always be present in every war and that a “theory that ignores any one of them . . . would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless” (Clausewitz, On War, 1984, 89; see Herberg-Rothe 2007). Each requires exploration if the characteristics of the democratic warrior are to be understood.

    Violence and force

    The most crucial polarity in Clausewitz’s trinity is between the instrumentality of war and the autonomy of violence. Clausewitz noted the tendency of violence to become absolute, and therefore an end in itself, a tendency that was restrained both by the instrumental rationality of policy and, less obviously perhaps, by the skill of the combatants. Clausewitz also notes the paradoxical influences that can attend the use of force at a distance. If combatants are separated from each other in space and time, it may promote relative rationality in the use of force; or it may not, since it introduces the disinhibiting influence of impersonal killing, in which the humanity of the opponent is no longer perceived. Fighting “face-to-face” demands personal aggressiveness and even hatred, which can lead to increasing ferocity in the use of force. At the same time, however, it may make it easier to perceive the opponent as human. A similarly paradoxical logic may arise from the use of expensive weapons versus simple ones. Expensive weapons systems and the highly trained combatants required to use them can lead to a certain limitation of war because these cannot be so easily risked (as was the case, he argued, in the wars of the 18th century). In contrast, wars waged by relatively unskilled combatants employing cheap and simple weapons may be more likely to escalate – as is evident from many of the civil wars in Africa, particularly with child soldiers.

    The Fight

    The most basic reason that the violence of war is prone to escalate is that combatants share a common interest in not being destroyed. In most other respects, however, their interaction is asymmetrical, most profoundly so, as Clausewitz says, in the contrasting aims and methods of attack and defence, which he avers are two very different things. The shape of combat is also influenced by whether war is directed against the opposing will (in effect, a war to change the adversary’s mind)or if it aims at his “destruction.” Clausewitz specifies that by the destruction of the opposing armed forces, he simply means reducing them to such a condition that they can no longer continue the fight. Nevertheless, Clausewitz long favoredNapoleon’s approach to warfare, which emphasized direct attack against the main forces of the enemy. Other forms of fighting are also possible, however, whose aim is to exhaust the enemy’s patience or resources indirectly, rather than confront and defeat his armed forces in the field. The real war, in Clausewitz’s days and in ours, is generally a combination of direct and indirect methods, whose proportions will vary with the interests at stake and the resources available.

    Warring Communities

    When referring to warring communities, we must first differentiate between relatively new communities and those of long-standing. This is because in newly constructed communities, recourse to fighting is liable to play a greater relative role in its relations with adversaries; whereas, in the case of long-standing communities, additional factors come into play. Clausewitz argues that the length of time a group of communities has existed significantly reduces the tendency for escalation because their long-standing interactions will include elements other than war, and each party envision the other’s continued existence once peace is made, a consideration that may moderate the use of force.

    War’s character will also vary depending on whether it aims to preserve the existence of a community or, as in revolutionary crises, to form a new one; whether war is waged in the pursuit of interests, or to maintain and spread the values, norms, and ideals of the particular community (see Herberg-Rothe 2007). Closely related to this contrast, although not exactly congruent with it, is the question of whether the purpose of war lies outside itself or, especially in warring cultures, whether the violence of the fight has independent cultural significance. The social composition of each society and the formal composition of its armed forces (regular armies, conscripts, mercenaries, militias, etc), play an important role here. Summarizing these fundamental differences yields the coordinate system of war and violence shown in the diagram.

     

    Every war is accordingly defined in terms of its three essential dimensions: violence, combat, and the affiliation of the combatants with a community on whose behalf the combatants act. Historically, these three tendencies within the “wondrous trinity” display almost infinite combinations and multiple, cross-cutting tensions since every war is waged differently. Thus, every war has symmetrical and asymmetrical tendencies, for instance, even when it may appear that only one of these tendencies comes to the fore (Herberg-Rothe 2007).

    The tension between the coordinates of Clausewitz’s trinity may also be heightened by different forms of military organization. Those that feature strict hierarchies of command are perhaps most conducive to the transmission of political guidance to operating forces; whereas what is today called network-centric warfare is characterized by loose and diffuse organizational structures, in which the community’s political will and mandate can no longer be so readily imposed on combatants directly engaged with the enemy. As in the warfare of partisans, networked military organizations place a high value on the political understanding of the individual soldier. It is because of the relative independence of soldiers in network-centric warfare that this type of warfare does not require an “archaic combatant,” but a democratic warrior who has fully internalized the norms of the community for which he fights.

    The Democratic Warrior in the Twenty-first Century

    Even in Clausewitz’s day, war was not the only instrument of policy that state’s possessed, though it was undoubtedly the most central. Today, its centrality is less obvious, even as the complexity of its connections to other forms of state power has increased (Thiele 2009). Combining the different perspectives afforded by foreign, economic, developmental, judicial, domestic, and defence policy permits a global approach to conflict resolution while making the considerations surrounding the use of force more complicated than ever. States now pursue their security through many avenues at once, and all the agencies involved must consciously coordinate, connect, and systematically integrate their goals, processes, structures, and capabilities.

    Given the continuing expansion of the concept of security in recent years, a democratic army needs a specific task and function since its essential purpose—the use of force—can not be dispensed with. There have been those who thought it might be. When the East-West conflict ended, Francis Fukuyama announced the “end of history,” meaning an end to the practice of war and violence (Fukuyama 1992). The triumphant advance of democracy and free markets seemed unstoppable, to the point where it appeared as if the twenty-first century would be an age defined by economics and thus, to a large extent, by peace. These expectations have now been decisively overturned by ongoing massacres and genocide in Africa; by the return of war in Europe (as happened in the former Yugoslavia); by the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; the war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia in 2008, the civil war in Syria and Iraq and finally the prospect of war to suppress Iran’s nuclear program (itself a profoundly dangerous and destabilizing step, should it become reality).

    In a complete reversal of Fukuyama’s thesis, a struggle against a new brand of Islamic totalitarianism appears to have begun, in which violence has become “unbounded”—because terrorist attacks are potentially ever-present because no end to them is in sight and there is no reason to assume there is any limit to the scale of violence terrorists might employ, including the use of nuclear weapons should they come to possess them. These processes of growing disinhibition must be countered by a new containment policy that limits the expansion of war and violence in the world.

    Two basic assumptions underlie this conception. The first is that the escalation of violence in world society is so multifaceted and differentiated that a single counter-strategy will not suffice. Rather, an overarching perspective is required to decide which measures are suitable in individual cases—without being able to exclude the possibility of terrible errors and miscalculations. The second assumption is that in today’s global society—as has been the case throughout history—many contrary processes are at work. Thus, regard for only one counter-strategy can have paradoxical, unanticipated consequences.

    This can be clarified using the example of democratization. If a general effort at worldwide democratization was the only counter-strategy against the disinhibition of violence and war, the results would almost certainly be counterproductive, not least because the spreading of democracy might itself be a violent process. A one-sided demand for democratic reform without regard for local conditions might, in individual cases, contribute to the creation of anti-democratic movements. The historical experience bears this out. After the First World War, nearly all of the defeated states underwent an initial process of democratization under the tutelage and supervision of the victors. Yet, almost all ended in authoritarian or even totalitarian regimes.

    Thus, the concept of the democratic warrior is not based on imposing democracy by force, but on limiting war and violence to enable the organic development of democratic self-determination. A differentiated counter-strategy of curbing war and violence in the world, with a view to fostering good governance (as a first step toward democratic governance), is the common element shared by humanitarian intervention and the development of a culture of civil conflict management. To this must be added measures to limit the causes of war and violence, such as poverty, oppression, and ignorance. Last but not least, this new form of containment requires effective restraint not just in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also of small arms, which continue to kill far more people than any other kind of arms.

    The containment of violence does not mean there will be entirely non-violent societies, much less a non-violent world society, in the foreseeable future. All else aside, the goal of completely eliminating violent conflict would ignore the fact that historically speaking, conflicts and their resolution have often furthered human development toward free and democratic ideals—as per the American struggle for independence and the French Revolution. The primary task of politics in the twenty-first century is therefore to radically limit violence and war so that non-violent structures and the mechanisms of the “social world” can have an impact. In this context, democratic warriors have a unique role to play; not as those who impose democracy by force, but as those who make diverse forms of culturally authentic self-determination possible, by curbing and containing war and violence.

    Conclusion

    It must be repeated, the concept of the democratic warrior appears to be contradictory. Indeed, it combines contradictory value systems in a single concept. Nevertheless, to adopt the metaphor favoured by Clausewitz (Herberg-Rothe 2007), the elements of tension in the democratic warrior’s identity can be conceived as the poles of a magnet, whose mutual opposition is not an illusion but is nevertheless a means to a larger, unitary end. It is what creates the magnet: the north pole of a magnet cannot exist alone. At one end of the continuum of the democratic warrior’s identity lies the values of democratic equality and non-violent conflict resolution; at the other, the realization that force itself may sometimes be necessary to limit war. At one end, is a civilized society, and at the other a subsystem of that same society, whose identity is defined by traditional concepts of honour and martial valour.

    As observed at the beginning of this essay, the bonds that link the two poles of this relationship, without eliminating their opposition, are the classical republican virtues, which lay claim to validity in both spheres. It was Plato who defined the classical virtues as intelligence, justice, fortitude, and temperance, which is also are characteristics in the Confucian tradition (Piper 1998 concerning Plato). Without them, a state can sustain itself only under dictatorship. With them, both external and internal freedoms are possible (Llanque 2008). They are the keys to the democratic warrior’s identity, providing the crucial link between the values of liberal-democratic society and those other values—courage, loyalty, self-sacrifice—that have always set the warrior apart.

     

     

    References

    Bredow, Wilfried von (2000), Demokratie und Streitkräfte (Wiesbaden: VS publishers, 2000).

    Clausewitz, Carl von (1984), On War. Ed. by Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Oxford: OUP).

    Duyvesteyn, Isabelle (2005), Clausewitz and African War (London: Routledge).

    Frevert, Ute (1997), Die kasernierte Nation (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2001).

    Frevert, Ute(ed.), (1997), Militär und Gesellschaft im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert

    (Stuttgart: Klett–Cotta).

    Fukuyama Francis (1992), The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press).

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (2007), Clausewitz’s puzzle (Oxford: OUP). Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (2017), Der Krieg. 2.Edition. (Frankfurt:

    Campus).

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas and Son, Key-young (2019), Order wars and floating balance. How the rising powers are reshaping our world view in the twenty-first century (New York: Routledge).

    Hüppauf, Bernd (1993), “Schlachtenmythen und die Konstruktion des ‘Neuen Menschen’,” in Keiner fühlt sich hier mehr als Mensch . . . : Erlebnis und Wirkung des ersten Weltkrieges, ed. Gerhard Hirschfeld, et al. (Essen: Klartext, 1993).

    Llanque, Marcus (2008) Politische Ideengeschichte. Ein Gewebe politischer Diskurse (Munich: Oldenbourg.

    Kaldor, Mary (1999), New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era

    (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

    Kaplan, Robert (1994), “The Coming Anarchy.”In: Atlantic Monthly no.

    273, 44–76.

    Keegan, John (1995), Kultur des Krieges (Berlin: Rowohlt).

    Kuemmel, Gerhard (2005), Streitkräfte im Einsatz: Zur Soziologie militärischer Interventionen (Baden-Baden: Nomos).

    Moran, Daniel (2003), “Arms and the Concert: The Nation in Arms and the Dilemmas of German Liberalism,” in The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution, ed. Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Münkler, Herfried (2004), The New Wars (New York: Policy). Münkler, Herfried (2007), Empires (Cambridge:Polity Press).

    Pieper, Josef (1998), Das Viergespann—Klugheit, Gerechtigkeit, Tapferkeit, Maß (Munich: Kösel).

    Röhl, Wolfgang (2005), “Soldat sein mit Leib und Seele. Der Kämpfer als existenzielles Leitbild einer Berufsarmee in EinJob wie jeder andere. Zum Selbst- und Berufsverständnis von Soldaten, ed. Sabine Collmer and Gerhard Kümmel (Baden-Baden:Nomos, 2005) 9–21.

    Schlichte, Klaus (2006), “Staatsbildung oder Staatszerfall. Zum Formwandel kriegerischer Gewalt in der Weltgesellschaft,In: ”Politische Vierteljahresschrift 47, no. 4.

    Sikora, Michael (2003), “Der Söldner,” in Grenzverletzer. Figuren politischer Subversion, ed. Eva Horn, Stefan Kaufmann, and Ulrich Bröckling (Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2002).

    Thiele, Ralph (2009), “Trendforschung in der Bundeswehr”. In: Zeitschrift für Sicherheits- und Außenpolitik 2, 1–11.

    Walzer, Michael (2003), “Is there an American Empire?” In: Dissent Magazine 1 (2003), URL; http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/fa03/walzer.htm  last accessed 16. 4. 2020.

    Zakaria, Faared (2009), The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton).

     

  • Online Justice and the Pandemic: Impact on Procedure

    Online Justice and the Pandemic: Impact on Procedure

     

    Abstract

    The move towards digitization of the judiciary and the adoption of video-conferencing preceded the pandemic. However, the pandemic has necessitated their mainstream adoption. While Indian courts have been prompt in issuing their SOPs, these have been inadequate due to their non-implementation and the inability of traditional legal tools to address unprecedented procedural issues, emerging from the mainstreaming of video conferencing.

    Firstly, there are due process concerns, centred around inadequate hosting platforms, sub-standard organizational practices, inefficient ancillary processes, and non-inclusive technical requirements. Secondly, there is a lack of accountability and transparency because of derogation from the rule of open court, without any effective alternative measures. Thirdly, there are privacy concerns as regards unauthorized participation, the secrecy of data exchanged, and commercial exploitation of data.

    Adopting a design-based approach not only addresses areas conventional legal tools can’t, but also improves efficiency and automates compliance. To this end, several technological and organizational design changes are suggested that can be made to effectively address emerging procedural issues.

    Keywords: online justice, virtual courts, pandemic, design-based approach, digitization, standard operating procedure.

     

    Introduction

    The unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic has necessitated social distancing to be the norm. To this end, courts, across the world, have started resolving disputes through virtual conferencing. While limited physical hearings with rigorous rules have commenced,[i] our courts have limited infrastructural capacity to house adequate daily hearings. Additionally, the surge in COVID-19 cases and the wait for a vaccine mean that virtual conferencing is nevertheless here to stay. The pandemic has decreased the average disposal rates of high courts by 50% and subordinate courts by 70%,[ii] with pendency in the Supreme Court increasing by 3,287 cases.[iii]

    Therefore, at this point, it is opportune to realize that the revolutionary potential of virtual courts can help improve judicial efficiency. Apart from facilitating remote access to justice, virtual courts are cost-effective and time-effective, reduce carbon footprint and the employment of dilatory tactics by parties.[iv] These benefits are particularly important given that annually one billion people require basic access to justice, but close to 30 per cent of them do not even take action.[v] Moving forward, this access to justice problem has to be solved through Information & Communications Technology (“ICT”), which will render courts to function as a ‘service’ and not a ‘place’.[vi] In cognizance of this, India launched the e-Court Mission Mode Project (“MMP”), to implement ICT in the Indian judiciary in 3 phases over 5 years.[vii]

    However, this increasing change in the medium of our court processes will inevitably impact civil procedure in unprecedented ways. A survey found that 44.7% of participants experienced technical difficulty during the hearing, with a majority feeling that remote hearings were overall worse than physical hearings and less effective in terms of facilitating participation.[viii] The skill and digital divide will further compound power imbalances among parties, and thus their access to justice.[ix]

    In light of this, it is important to understand the adequacy of the current response plans from the Court and governments. Therefore, in this paper, I will enumerate the legal and policy developments in India on virtual courts, both pre and post COVID-19. Subsequently, I will critically analyse these developments to elucidate implementational failures, and three procedural concerns: impact on due process, accountability and transparency, and privacy. Recognizing the inadequacy of legal tools in addressing these concerns, ultimately, I will utilize a technological and organizational design-based approach to propose solutions.

    Tracing Legal and Policy Developments on Virtual Courts

    India’s attempts to digitize the judiciary and associated processes predate the pandemic. However, the scale of impact has certainly increased since virtual conferencing has now become the dominant norm. Therefore, in this section, I will analyse how law and policy on virtual courts have evolved. However, before we proceed, it must be noted that virtual courts are broader than just virtual conferencing. Other than virtual conferencing, related processes of digitisation and automation, like e-filing and e-listing, need to be implemented alongside.

    Pre-Pandemic:                      In February 2007, the government approved the Supreme Court E-Committee’s (“E-Committee”) strategic action plan to implement ICT in the Indian judiciary in 3 phases over 5 years.[x] It was co-opted as a ‘Mission Mode Project’ of the National e-Governance Plan,[xi] with the objective of re-engineering processes to enhance judicial productivity, and make the system more affordable, accessible, cost-effective, transparent and accountable. To this end, it launched 4 services: automation of case management, online provision of judicial/administrative services, information gateways between courts and government, and creation of judicial data grids.[xii]

    Virtual courts, and associated processes, have found recognition and regulation in jurisprudence too. In State of Maharashtra v Dr Praful Desai, the Supreme Court allowed video conferencing for the recording of evidence.[xiii] It even observed that technological developments have enabled the possibility of virtual courts. This position has found, subsequently, substantial affirmation.[xiv] Courts have allowed video conferencing on conditions of health[xv] and geographical proximity.[xvi] However, under the revised position, parties cannot resolve matrimonial conflict through video conferencing.[xvii]

    To safeguard these proceedings, courts have issued numerous guidelines. These include authenticating the identity of the witness and examiner, administration of the oath, acquainting non-party witnesses with the case, recording demeanour of witnesses on-screen, notarization of witness testimony/statement, and bearing of costs.[xviii] When video-conferencing is global, the foreign party must record evidence in the presence of an Indian embassy officer member.[xix]

    Post-Pandemic:         To comply with social distancing guidelines, the Supreme Court passed an order, under Article 142 of the Constitution, to suspend the physical hearing.[xx] However, recognizing the importance of access to justice, it identified the duty of courts to use ICT like video-conferencing for dispensation of justice, in urgent matters. Accordingly, it issued directions: empowering itself and all high courts to adopt measures for the functioning of video-conferencing, instructing district courts to follow their respective high courts, for providing videoconference facilities and an amicus curia to the deprived, prohibiting recording of hearing without the mutual consent of parties, and requiring prompt reporting of technical glitches during the video call.

    Pursuant to this, the apex court issued its standard operating procedure (“SOP”) mentioning the instructions for joining/conduct during virtual hearings and the technical requirements as well as the procedure for listing, mentioning, and e-filing.[xxi] Parties can choose between getting virtual links or availing the facility in the Court’s premises. However, only two appearance links and one viewing link is provided to parties. While the hearings are hosted on the “Vidyo” platform available either as a desktop application or on Android or iOS app store, parties are advised against using mobile phones for connectivity reasons. Communication between the registry and participants happens through private WhatsApp groups, with links being shared 30 minutes prior. Parties are forbidden from sharing these links, engaging in indecorous conduct, and recording the hearings. Furthermore, they are expected to ‘mute’ themselves, except when making submissions or responding to questions from the bench, and must ‘raise hand’ to indicate an intention to speak. The Court has also mandated the use of e-filing even if parties file physically at the registry and reduced the cost of filing by half, thus promoting digitization.[xxii]

    Currently, virtual hearings are inaccessible to the public, but limited journalists can attend the Court’s physical video-conferencing room, to report on cases. The Court has now started hearing non-urgent matters too.[xxiii] The E-Committee has also resolved to institutionalize technology even after the pandemic ends.[xxiv]

    While high courts can employ their own rules, 11 of them have adopted the model rules developed by the E-Committee.[xxv] Even those with unique rules broadly convey the same instructions,[xxvi] with the only difference being the hosting platform. The most popular is Vidyo, followed by Zoom, Jitsi, and Cisco Webex.[xxvii] However, pursuant to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs’ advisory declaring Zoom as unsafe, most high courts discontinued using it.[xxviii] Remarkably, the Delhi High Court issued comprehensive legislative rules covering not just the aforementioned matters, but also the procedure for service of summons, examination of persons, sharing of documents, and access to legal aid. It statutorily establishes a “remote point coordinator”, entrusted with ensuring seamless functioning and ingenuity of the hearing.[xxix]

    However, other than Chandigarh District Court and a few others, district courts have failed to organize virtual hearings, given their infrastructure limitations.[xxx] Most tribunals are following the procedure established by the apex court.[xxxi]

    Critically Analyzing Indian Developments on Virtual Courts

    The Mission Mode Project

    The implementation of Phase-II of the MMP has been sluggish, with only 3477 courtrooms having video-conferencing, and 14443 more courtrooms requiring this facility.[xxxii] 2992 sites are yet to still get WAN connectivity.[xxxiii] Only states like Delhi, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh have started the digitisation of both disposed and pending case records in the high courts and district courts.[xxxiv] E-filing is currently available only in four high courts,[xxxv] and in the NGT, NCLAT, and ITAT.[xxxvi] Even in these courts, only 50-600 cases were instituted through e-filings, as against the 1.9 lakh cases instituted through regular filings.[xxxvii] Despite listing being digital, the process involves significant human input, rather than the use of algorithms.[xxxviii] The implementation of this project will further stagnate because courts have been instructed to utilize their unused funds from Phase-II for meeting immediate needs.[xxxix]

    The failure in technology up-gradation is also at the litigant and advocate’s end. The internet penetration in India is only 40%.[xl] 30% of the population lacks basic literacy, and nearly 90% lack digital literacy.[xli] At least 50% of advocates, mostly at the district and lower levels, do not own relevant devices and lack the requisite skills for virtual proceedings.[xlii] Thus, there is a clear digital, connectivity, and skill divide.

    Evaluating SOPs- Emerging Legal Issue

    • Due Process

    The paradigm shift consequent to virtual hearings has raised numerous unprecedented due process concerns. The smoothness of accessing and using virtual court facilities, along with available facilities, has an inextricable impact on one’s right to properly present their case.

    Technical Issues with the Platform:                       The most popular platform, Vidyo has received an extremely negative response. Reportedly, the platform frequently crashes,[xliii] and participants struggle to log in or are automatically logged out during court proceedings due to bandwidth issues with the platform. There were also difficulties in re-joining the hearing, once logged out.[xliv]

    The screen sharing feature on Vidyo is ineffective, and thus advocates are precluded from even presenting documents before the bench.[xlv] There is also no means for the attorney and client to engage in private discussion during the hearings.[xlvi] The Control Room is tasked with managing the entire process flow. In several cases, advocates have complained of not being unmuted, despite raising their hands, or their chat messages going unread, thus affecting their opportunity to present arguments. This is especially the case in matters involving a large number of parties.[xlvii]

    This adverse impact is compounded since there is no clarity on who to contact for technical issues.[xlviii] The authorities provided in the SOP are extremely unresponsive. Moreover, links for hearings are shared last minute, with communications on WhatsApp being inefficiently followed.[xlix]

    The Court has been ignorant of these technical inefficiencies, passing adverse orders against at least 19 advocates who were unable to attend/connect due to technical issues.[l]

    Issues with Associated Digital Process:      The processes of e-listing and e-filing are not user-friendly and unnecessarily verbose.[li] Under the current e-listing mechanism, there is uncertainty over acknowledgement of their filings, because the diary numbers are not immediately generated. Even the procedure for curing defects is inefficient, voluminous, and confusing. There is also a delay in the listing of matters, despite pleas of urgency in petitions.[lii] Support from the Registry in this regard is inadequate. There is also a need for improving coordination between sections of the Registry, with procedures being more consistent and transparent.[liii]

    Furthermore, court records are not fully digitized, and when so, they cannot be remotely accessed in a centralized server.[liv]

    Technical Requirements as Impediments:             The minimum technical requirements determine who can even access the platform, and therefore, determine who even has the opportunity to present their case, to begin with. Presently, the SOP of all Indian courts require a minimum of 2 MBPS broadband connection or 4G connections, and the onus is on the participant to ensure seamless connectivity. Given that 20% of the internet users in India are still dependent on 2G and 3G,[lv] this directly leads to their exclusion. Even digitally advanced nations like Singapore have stipulated 3G as the minimum requirement.[lvi] Moreover, even the 4G connections in India are relatively slow, with no service provider crossing the 70% LTE threshold.[lvii]

    Even in data-intensive platforms like Skype, the minimum download speed requirement for a high-quality video call is only 400 KBPS, with group calls of up to 3 people supported at 512 KBPs, and 5 people at 2 MBPS.[lviii]

    Additionally, all video-conferencing platforms have only been made available as desktop apps, or on Android or iOS app stores. The over 55 million users with KaiOS, operating mostly on Jio Phones,[lix] are denied access to videoconferencing, despite their phones supporting video calls.

    (Dis)Comfort with Virtual Testimony and Demeanour Assessment:      The process of testimony, along with cross-examination, are in themselves strenuous for witnesses. The unfamiliar nature of virtual conferences can cause severe anxiety among witnesses while appearing, especially if they’re children, foreigners, or persons with disabilities.[lx]

    During video conferencing, courts are allowed to assess the credibility of parties through their demeanour.[lxi] This is problematic because in a virtual setting it is extremely difficult for the judge to accurately understand the body language and emotions of the witness.[lxii] Studies find that one’s social and economic background has a heavy correlation with one’s perception, which plays out in the form of subtle choices like lighting and camera angles.[lxiii] Given these inaccurate and disproportionate adverse impacts, demeanour assessment during virtual hearings must be disallowed.

    • Transparency and Accountability

    The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of the rule of ‘open court’ in preserving and promoting accountability and transparency, and thus guaranteeing a fair trial.[lxiv] Presently, virtual hearings are not recorded, except for witness testimony in some cases,[lxv] even by the court. While theoretically limited journalists are allowed to attend these hearing, this is severely inadequate because this facility is accessible only to reporters who can make it to the Supreme Court’s video-conferencing chamber. Moreover, no such facility has been provided in most high courts. Therefore, there is no effective means of ensuring even a shadow of public pressure, which would bind the judge’s actions. This is contrary to jurisdictions like the UK, Australia, and Singapore where public participation has been allowed through live links or even live streaming.[lxvi]

    Virtual conferencing presents an opportunity to eliminate the practical physical, informational, and temporal barriers to open courts. If hearings are online and broadcasted, then a large number of people can access them. For instance, over 3,500 people viewed a YouTube live stream of oral arguments taking place in the Kansas Supreme Court over Zoom. The digital landscape can even house much more people than the court logistically can.[lxvii]

    However, we must be mindful that live streaming for virtual hearings is distinct from the cameras in the courtroom context.[lxviii] In the latter, even if live streaming is not allowed, the public and media can anyway access the trial. However, if there is no public access to virtual hearings, which entirely supplant in-person proceedings, only then participants to the proceedings have knowledge of events.

    Livestreaming virtual proceedings do raise some legitimate privacy concerns because there is a loss of ‘practical obscurity’. This concept recognizes that there is a privacy interest in the information that is not secret but is otherwise difficult to obtain.[lxix] Public online hearings could make access to personal data easier because the process of transferring information from physical documents to a digital format will not have to be done.

    • Privacy;

    There are serious concerns regarding video-conferencing platforms, which are apps owned by foreign companies. The terms of use of these apps mandate cross-border transfer, and the business model of most of these companies involves selling their consumer’s data.[lxx] Therefore, there is the risk of commercial exploitation of data, either for general profiling of the individual or blackmailing them.[lxxi] This is indicated by the Globe24h.com incident, wherein a Romanian man downloaded judgements in bulk and indexed them so they would be optimized on Google results. Then, he charged people for removing embarrassing personal information from this website.

    The biggest privacy challenges stem from authentication of the participants to the video conference and security of the data exchanged over the platform.[lxxii] Furthermore, the weak data security features of Vidyo and Zoom render them susceptible to unauthorized third-party access.[lxxiii] Inadequate training among Control Room members has also resulted in them engaging in risky practices, like using non-updated versions of the software, thus compromising privacy.[lxxiv]Such weaknesses may allow parties to illicitly obtain information to the detriment of their opponents, which they wouldn’t have gotten under civil discovery.

    There is a petition before the Supreme Court that argues that transfer of such judicial and government data prima facie impacts national security, and violates laws such as the Public Records Act, 1993, and the Official Secrets Act, 1923.[lxxv]

    Utilizing a Design-based Approach

    The courts have so far used conventional legal tools to address the concerns of due process, accountability, and data security. There are inherent limitations to these tools, in that the scope of control is merely through prescriptions, which may not necessarily be followed.[lxxvi] The shift to video-conferencing leads to the emergence of unprecedented issues, which the law itself cannot redress.[lxxvii] On the other hand, using design as a policy tool not only expands the scope of control over the participants but ensures mandatory compliance due to technological automation.[lxxviii] Moreover, as an interdisciplinary and innovative approach, design-based approaches allow anticipation of risks and baking of countermeasures into the systems and operations, throughout the entire lifecycle of the product/service.[lxxix] Notably, this approach extends to only technological operation, but to organizational practices too.[lxxx]

    Therefore, in this section, I will propose design-based changes that need to be implemented to address the aforementioned challenges to civil justice.

    ·      Due Process

    The Platform:                        To address the aforementioned technical issues, there is a need for designing certain features onto the video-conferencing platform. Alike UK, USA, Australia, and Singapore, there must be designated and accessible icons for a private waiting room and a private pop-up chatbox.[lxxxi] During such private communication, the court proceedings must be paused, and no ex-parte discussion must occur. A more nuanced and effective screen sharing option must be introduced, wherein on clicking a designated button, the documents are first shared with the judge(s). Once approved, then this must be shared with other parties. Once any button has been clicked,[lxxxii] there should be a real-time notification that pops up in the centre of the court staff and/or judge’s screens. When participants are kept in the waiting room before the commencement of the hearing, real-time updates should be provided via the chat option. This is similar to the practice in Singapore, where constant updates are provided during the pre-hearing stage.[lxxxiii]

    Given the extent of concerns from Vidyo, courts must move towards adopting a different platform altogether. In the medium-term, they can use Cisco Webex,[lxxxiv] or Microsoft teams given that most of these features exist herein. However, if the court intends to mainstream video-conferencing, it must indigenously develop its platform that consolidates best practices. Thankfully, the Supreme Court has started moving in this direction by inviting tenders for “a comprehensive plan for video conference hearings including hardware and support”.[lxxxv]

    Organisational Practice;                      The video-conferencing screen must contain a help button, which opens a pop-up window that shows a user guide with relevant features available to a participant at their access level. If a participant finds this inadequate, there must be a support button, which allows them to connect to a helpline number. Most importantly, there should be designated officers assigned to each court who uninterruptedly serve as single points of contact.[lxxxvi]Before the platform is re-designed, the coordinators/members of the Control Room must be trained to be more proactive and responsive to the process flow. Anyhow, given peculiar circumstances, courts must largely refrain from passing adverse orders against litigants/advocates claiming to miss hearing due to technical issues.

    Associated Digital Processes:                       Unlike the current system which relies on the physical generation and sharing of links, courts can publish the links for different virtual courts along with the cause list or send automated e-mails to advocates in advance. This will improve efficiency, and reduce anxiety for advocates.[lxxxvii]

    As for e-filing, the Delhi High Court’s model should be adopted nationally.[lxxxviii] The only substantial information that required manual entry is the details of the parties. Thereafter, the entire case file can be uploaded as a single PDF. Even the diary numbers are immediately generated. For curing of defects, advocates are only be required to submit the entire final PDF file, as against separately uploading each page on which defect is secured.

    Technical Requirements;     The video-conferencing platforms must also be available for KaiOS users. Additionally, the bandwidth requirement can be lowered to 512 KBPS or 1 MBPS. To provide access to litigants with lower speeds, the court can always reduce the number of participants on an ad-hoc basis, when required. Even in the worst case, to ensure wider inclusivity, courts can adopt the practice that one bench of the Delhi High Court did. Parties can be asked to submit a 15-minute-long video clip of their arguments within a week of the order. Thereafter, within a week, they must be asked to submit an additional brief note along with a 10-minute-long video clip in rebuttal.[lxxxix]

    ·      Transparency and Accountability

    All virtual hearings should be recorded and stored using cryptography by the courts for a limited period. Additionally, voice-to-text transmission tools can be used for text records of hearings. To preserve privacy, automated redaction software can be used, which automatically redacts sensitive data fields. This is similar to the approach of certain courts like Florida, Pennsylvania, and Michigan.[xc]

    While live streaming promotes greater accountability, there are privacy concerns, as outlined earlier. These concerns can be balanced using the following three-fold approach: (1) Where the case does not involve sensitive information or witnesses, then these can be live-streamed;[xci] (2) When this cannot be done, limited broadcasting can be followed in two ways. While live-streaming is permitted, subsequent dissemination of the hearing, especially by media, is prohibited.[xcii] While public broadcasting may be forbidden, a screen at the courthouse can be provided where these proceedings are broadcasted for people at the court to view;[xciii] and (3) Providing a separate viewing room were advocates, journalists, and CSOs can observe and report on court proceedings, without participating in them.

    Lastly, to promote public awareness the digital portals of court websites must be regularly updated with weekly operational summaries of the working of the court and relevant policy updates, like in the UK.[xciv]

    ·      Privacy

    Technological Design;          The platform must generate unique meeting IDs, which expire after a limited time. The entry to the hearing must be verified using two-factor authentication. This entails OTP verification in addition to entering the unique ID and password of the meeting. The host must have the option of “locking” the meeting once all participants have joined, to ensure unauthorized entry does not subsequently take place.[xcv] All communication on the platform must be end-to-end encrypted using SSL/TLS, which will obfuscate the message and prevent third parties from accessing personal data. Even the entire video session must be encrypted. The servers storing the data must be secure to prevent any end-point vulnerabilities. To this end, advanced threat protection features can be used to protect against sophisticated malware or hacking attempts.[xcvi] Developing an indigenous government-backed platform will also mitigate concerns of data commercialization.

    Organisational Design:        Human errors still contribute to data leaks, despite advanced security designs.[xcvii] Thus, a safe user policy needs to be developed. Participants must be instructed to not connect through unsecured WiFi, or use weak password codes. The video-conferencing software must be routinely updated to ensure only the latest version is used. The coordinators/members of the Control Room must be trained on the necessary steps and contingency plans they must adopt to secure privacy.

    Conclusion

    The move towards digitization of the judiciary and the adoption of video-conferencing preceded the pandemic. However, the pandemic has necessitated their mainstream adoption. Indian courts have been prompt in issuing their SOPs, but these have been inadequate due to non-implementation and the inability of traditional legal tools to address unprecedented procedural issues, emerging from the mainstreaming of video conferencing.

    Firstly, there are due process concerns, centred around inadequate hosting platforms, sub-standard organizational practices, inefficient ancillary processes, and non-inclusive technical requirements. Secondly, there is a lack of accountability and transparency because of derogation from the rule of open court, without any effective alternative measures. Thirdly, there are privacy concerns as regards unauthorized participation, the secrecy of data exchanged, and commercial exploitation of data.

    Adopting a design-based approach not only addresses areas conventional legal tools can’t, but also improves efficiency and automates compliance. To this end, several technological and organizational design changes, as suggested, can be made to effectively address emerging procedural issues.

     

    End Notes:

    [i] PTI, ‘Supreme Court to begin physical hearing of cases in limited manner, releases SOP’ (The Print, 31 August 2020` <https://theprint.in/judiciary/supreme-court-to-begin-physical-hearing-of-cases-in-limited-manner-releases-sop/492699/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [ii] Sruthisagar Yamunan, ‘Covid impact: Cases disposed of by High Courts drop by half, district courts by 70%’ (Scroll, 4 September 2020) <https://scroll.in/article/971860/covid-impact-cases-disposed-by-high-courts-drop-by-half-district-courts-by-70> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [iii] ‘Court Data: Quantifying the Effect of COVID-19’ (Supreme Court Observer, 29 April 2020) <https://www.scobserver.in/court-by-numbers?court_by_number_id=quantifying-the-effect-of-covid-19> accessed 14 January 2021; Given that the National Judicial Data Grid does not provide statistics on pendency for the Supreme Court, calculating impact on pendency due to COVID-19 is tricky. One metric that can be used is number of judgements delivered, which was 88 in March 2020, the same as March 2018, i.e., when the swine flu outbreak paralyzed the court. While this doesn’t accurately account for situational peculiarities, it provides an indication that the court has managed to fair well, by its own past metric. This discussion is notwithstanding the general impact the pandemic will have on case institution and disposal in the apex court.

    [iv] Nikitha, ‘Impact of Video Conferencing on Court Proceedings with Respect to Litigants and Lawyers’ (BnB Legal, 14 August 2020) <https://bnblegal.com/article/impact-of-video-conferencing-on-court-proceedings-with-respect-to-litigants-and-lawyers/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [v] Richard Susskind, Online Courts and the Future of Justice (OUP 2019) 27.

    [vi] Anuradha Mukherjee, Amita Katragadda, Ayushi Singhal, & Shubhankar Jain, ‘From the Gavel to the Click: COVID 19 poised to be the inflection point for Online Courts in India’ <https://corporate.cyrilamarchandblogs.com/2020/04/gavel-to-click-covid-19-online-courts-in-india/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [vii] Ibid; ‘Indian Courts and e-Governance initiative’ (Vikaspedia) <https://vikaspedia.in/e-governance/online-legal-services/how-do-i-do> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [viii] Dr Natalie Byrom, Sarah Beardon, & Dr Abby Kendrick, ‘The impact of COVID-19 measures on the civil justice system’ (2020) Civil Justice Council, 9 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/CJC-Rapid-Review-Final-Report-f.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [ix] ‘Standing Committee Report Summary’ (PRS Legislative Research, September 2020) <https://www.prsindia.org/report-summaries/functioning-virtual-courts> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [x] Shalini Seetharam & Sumathi Chandrashekaran, ‘E-Courts in India: From Policy Formulation to Implementation’ (2016) Vidhi Center for Legal Policy, 6-8 <https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/eCourtsinIndia_Vidhi.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021; Vikaspedia (n 7).

    [xi] Seetharam (n 10) 8-9.

    [xii] Phase-II of the project already contemplates video-conferencing and recording facility for courts and jails. So far, as many as 3,388 court complexes and 16,755 court rooms across India have been computerised, with video-conferencing equipment available in 3,240 court complexes and 1,272 jails, see: Mukherjee (n 6).

    [xiii] (2003) 4 SCC 601.

    [xiv] Twentieth Century Fox Film v NRI Film Production Associates AIR (2003) Kar 148; Amitabh Bagchi v Ena Bhagchi AIR (2005) Cal 11; Sujay Mitra v State of West Bengal (2015) SCC Online Cal 1191.

    [xv] Alcatel India Limited v Koshika Telecom Ltd (2004) SCC Online Del 705.

    [xvi] Bodala Murali Krishna v Smt Badola Prathim AIR (2007) AP 43; Dr. Kunal Saha v Dr. Sukumar Mukhurjee (2006) SCC Online NCDRC 35.

    [xvii] Santini v Vijaya Venketesh (2018) 1 SCC 62.

    [xviii] Bagchi (n 14).

    [xix] Desai (n 13).

    [xx] Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5/2020; Jai Brunner & Balu Nair, ‘Switching to Video’ (Supreme Court Observer, 6 April 2020) <https://www.scobserver.in/the-desk/switching-to-video> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxi] ‘Standard Operating Procedure for Ld. Advocate/Party-in-person for e-Filing, Mentioning, Listing and Video Conferencing Hearing’ (Supreme Court of India, 4 July 2020) <http://scobserver-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/ckeditor/attachments/477/SOP_04072020.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxii] SCO Editorial Team, ‘COVID Coverage: Court’s Functioning’ (Supreme Court Observer, 28 July 2020) <https://www.scobserver.in/the-desk/covid-coverage-court-s-functioning> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxiii] Ibid.

    [xxiv] ‘Use of technology must be institutionalised even after Lockdown: Justice Chandrachud in video conference with HC judges manning E-committees’ (Bar and Bench, 4 April 2020) <https://www.barandbench.com/news/use-of-technology-must-be-institutionalised-even-after-lockdown-justice-chandrachud-in-video-conference-with-hc-judges-manning-e-committees> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxv] Debayan Roy, ‘Supreme Court allows High Courts to frame own rules for virtual hearings, says media access “should only be for output and not input”’ (Bar and Bench, 26 October 2020) <https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/supreme-court-allows-high-courts-to-frame-own-rules-for-virtual-hearings> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxvi] The main changes involve differing instructions for differing e-filing and e-listing. Others are minor additions in instructions relating to conduct during the hearing, and differing steps, for differing platforms, for joining a video-conference using the virtual link.

    [xxvii] Amulya Ashwathappa, Arunav Kaul, Chockalingam Muthian, et al, ‘Video Conferencing in Indian Courts: A Pathway to the Justice Platform’ (2020) Daksh Whitepaper Series on Next Generation Justice Platform Paper 4, 62-67 <https://dakshindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Paper-4-_Video-Conferencing-in-Indian-Courts.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxviii] ‘Impact of COVID19 on functioning of the Indian Judiciary – Weekly Update on Virtual Courts’ (Khaitan & Co, 4 May 2020) <https://www.khaitanco.com/thought-leaderships/Impact-of-COVID19-on-functioning-of-the-Indian-Judiciary-Weekly-Update-on-Virtual-Courts-1242020_2042020> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxix] Notification No. 325/Rules/DHC dated 1 June 2020.

    [xxx] Gautam Kagalwala, ‘Just Virtually’ (India Business Law Journal, 19 August 2020) <https://law.asia/video-conferencing-lockdown/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxxi] PTI, ‘NCLAT issues standard operating procedure for virtual hearings from June 1’ (Financial Express, 30 May 2020) <https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/nclat-issues-standard-operating-procedure-for-virtual-hearings-from-june-1/1976249/> accessed 14 January 2021; For ITAT and NGT, see: Nikitha (n 4).

    [xxxii] Department Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice, Functioning of Virtual Courts(Rajya Sabha 2020, 103) 15.

    [xxxiii] Ibid.

    [xxxiv] Amulya Ashwathappa, ‘The Parliamentary Standing Committee On Virtual Courts In India’ (Daksh, 16 September 2020) <https://dakshindia.org/the-parliamentary-standing-committee-on-virtual-courts-in-india/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxxv] These are the High Courts in Delhi, Bombay, Punjab and Haryana, and Madhya Pradesh.

    [xxxvi] Ashwathappa (n 27) 17.

    [xxxvii] Deepika Kinhal, Ameen Jauhar, Tarika Jain, et al, ‘Virtual Courts in India’ (2020) Vidhi Center for Legal Policy Strategy Paper, 20 <https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/20200501__Strategy-Paper-for-Virtual-Courts-in-India_Vidhi-1.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xxxviii] Ashwathappa (n 27) 18.

    [xxxix] Bar and Bench (n 24).

    [xl] Digbijay Mishra & Madhav Chanchani, ‘For the first time, India has more rural net users than urban’ (The Times of India, 6 May 2020) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/for-the-first-time-india-has-more-rural-net-users-than-urban/articleshow/75566025.cms> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xli] Ashwathappa (n 27) 20.

    [xlii] Murali Krishnan & Smriti Kak Ramachandran, ‘House panel backs e-courts’ (Hindustan Times, 12 September 2020) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/house-panel-backs-e-courts/story-F5GNGVNcYT3dTHHdx4uMHJ.html> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xliii] Dipak Mondal, ‘Coronavirus lockdown: Fear of data security over video-conference apps Indian courts use’ (Business Today, 7 May 2020) <https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/coronavirus-lockdown-fear-of-data-security-over-video-conference-apps-indian-courts-use/story/403154.html> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xliv] Murali Krishnan, ‘Supreme Court should migrate from Vidyo app: Survey’ (Hindustan Times, 23 September 2020) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/supreme-court-should-migrate-from-vidyo-app-survey/story-S5mMZD3K29bYTfoUvZUi2J.html> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xlv] Bhabna Das, D. Abhinav Rao, Harsh Parashar, et al, ‘Survey Report on the Virtual Systems Adopted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’ (29 August 2020) <https://images.assettype.com/barandbench/2020-09/05eb71ca-d07f-4ef1-9e6c-9d49ae0f64eb/Survey_Report_on_Virtual_Courts_System_adopted_by_SC.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xlvi] Krishnan (n 44).

    [xlvii] Das (n 45).

    [xlviii] Krishnan (n 44).

    [xlix] Das (n 45).

    [l] Ibid

    [li] Ibid

    [lii] Krishnan (n 44).

    [liii] Das (n 45).

    [liv] Kagalwala (n 30).

    [lv] Sandhya Keelrey, ‘Internet access across India in 2019, by type of mobile network’ (Statista, 16 October 2020) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1115260/india-internet-connection-by-type-of-network-mobile/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lvi] Neeraj Arora, ‘Serving Justice in COVID-19 Pandemic, only option is Virtual Court: an Indian Prospective’ (2020) Cyber Research and Innovation Society, 34 <https://cyberpandit.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Virtual-Court-Room_HandBook.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lvii] ‘State of Mobile Networks: India’ (Open Signal, April 2018) <https://www.opensignal.com/reports/2018/04/india/state-of-the-mobile-network> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lviii] ‘How much bandwidth does Skype need?’ (Skype) <https://support.skype.com/en/faq/FA1417/how-much-bandwidth-does-skype-need> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lix] Simon Sharwood, ‘India’s contact-tracing app unleashes KaiOS on feature phones’ (The Register, 17 May 2020) <https://www.theregister.com/2020/05/17/contact_tracing_on_feature_phones/#:~:text=Aarogya%20Setu%20App%20is%20now,join%20the%20fight%20against%20COVID19.&text=Jio%20currently%20offers%20two%20phones,Blackberry-like%20%2440%20model%202> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lx] Arunav Kaul, ‘Examining The Use Of Video Conferencing In Indian Courts’ (Daksh, 30 April 2020) <https://dakshindia.org/examining-the-use-of-video-conferencing-in-indian-courts/> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lxi] Paragraph 8.6, Notification No. 325/Rules/DHC dated 1 June 2020.

    [lxii] Nikitha (n 4).

    [lxiii] Meredith Rossner & David Tait, ‘Courts are moving to video during coronavirus, but research shows it’s hard to get a fair trial remotely’ (The Conversation, 8 April 2020) <https://theconversation.com/courts-are-moving-to-video-during-coronavirus-but-research-shows-its-hard-to-get-a-fair-trial-remotely-134386> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lxiv] Naresh Shridhar v State of Maharashtra (1966) 3 SCR 744 [The primary dispute arose out of a civil defamation case filed against the petitioner, who was a journalist, by the Thackerys. The petitioner challenged the lower courts decision on the ground of its in-camera nature. The Court affirmed the importance of open courts in ensuring objective and fair administration of justice as well as preservation and growth of our democracy. Subsequently, it examined the cases where exceptions can be made, such as in rape trials or matrimonial disputes.]; Swapnil Tripathi v Supreme Court of India (2018) 10 SCC 639 [The petitioners, as public-spirited persons, petitioned the Court to direct that cases of national and constitutional importance must be live streamed in a manner accessible to the public. The Court recognized the importance of open justice in ensuring accountability, transparency, and freedom of speech. As an extension of this principle, it noted that live streaming should be allowed. It then amended its own rules, and provided detailed guidelines on live streaming.]

    [lxv] Paragraph 8.9, Notification No. 325/Rules/DHC dated 1 June 2020.

    [lxvi] Mukherjee (n 6).

    [lxvii] Amy Salyzyn, ‘“Trial by Zoom”: What Virtual Hearings Might Mean for Open Courts, Participant Privacy and the Integrity of Court Proceedings’ (Slaw, 17 April 2020) <http://www.slaw.ca/2020/04/17/trial-by-zoom-what-virtual-hearings-might-mean-for-open-courts-participant-privacy-and-the-integrity-of-court-proceedings/> accessed 14 January 2021; While the Supreme Court has expressed support for limited livestreaming matters of constitutional/national importance in Swapnil Tripathi v Supreme Court of India (n 63), nothing has ever come of this, see: Parliamentary Standing Committee Report (n 32) 7-10.

    [lxviii] Salyzyn (n 67).

    [lxix] Jane Bailey & Jacquelyn Burkell, ‘Revisiting the Open Court Principle in an Era of Online Publication: Questioning Presumptive Public Access to Parties’ and Witnesses’ Personal Information’ (2017) 48(1) Ottawa LR 147, 167-178.

    [lxx] Arora (n 56) 44.

    [lxxi] Graeme Hamilton, ‘How a now-defunct Romanian website exposed tension between privacy and openness in Canadian courts’ (National Post, 6 April 2017) <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/how-a-now-defunct-romanian-website-exposed-tension-between-privacy-and-openness-in-canadian-courts> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lxxii] Arora (n 56) 23.

    [lxxiii] Arora (n 56) 23-24.

    [lxxiv] Ibid.

    [lxxv] Mondal (n 43).

    [lxxvi] Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Blueprint: The Battle to Control Design of New Technologies (HUP 2018) 7-11.

    [lxxvii] Ibid.

    [lxxviii] Ibid.

    [lxxix] Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles, Implementation and Mapping of Fair Information Practices’ (Information and Privacy Commissioner, 2011) <https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/pbd_implement_7found_principles.pdf> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [lxxx] Ibid.

    [lxxxi] Ashwathappa (n 27) 28.

    [lxxxii] This could include the ‘raise hand’ or ‘screen share’ or ‘text in chat box or ‘request to move to private breakout room’.

    [lxxxiii] Arora (n 56) 34-36.

    [lxxxiv] In a survey, this emerged as the most popular choice among advocates of the Supreme Court.

    [lxxxv] Krishnan (n 44).

    [lxxxvi] Das (n 45).

    [lxxxvii] Ibid.

    [lxxxviii] Practice Direction for Electronic Filing in the High Court of Delhi, accessible at http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/writereaddata/upload/Notification/NotificationFile_LC0S0PP0.PDF.

    [lxxxix] Ashish Prasad & Rohit Sharma, ‘Delhi HC’s VC Hearing Rules – Taking the Virtual Courts System Forward’ (Law Street India, 5 June 2020) <http://www.lawstreetindia.com/experts/column?sid=398> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xc] Ashwathappa (n 27) 46.

    [xci] Colette Allen, ‘Open justice and remote court hearings under the UK’s Coronavirus Act’ (International Bar Association 2020).

    [xcii] This is similar to the position taken up by the Canadian Supreme Court in Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v Attorney General of Canada[2011] 1 SCR 19 [In this case, Stephen Dufour was charged with aiding suicide, and at his trial a video, containing a statement by him, was admitted as evidence. Journalists were permitted to view the film. But the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation petitioned the Court requesting that it should be allowed to broadcast this video. It denied this request but held that this is not a blanket rule. In granting this request, factors such as “the serenity of the hearing, trial fairness, and the fair administration of justice” should be considered. Most importantly, it noted that there is a difference in having to testify in open court and having said testimony telecasted into the houses of Canadians.].

    [xciii] This is similar to what the New York City Court has done, see: Jamiles Lartey, ‘The Judge Will See You On Zoom, But The Public Is Mostly Left Out’ (The Marshall Project, 13 April 2020) <https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/13/the-judge-will-see-you-on-zoom-but-the-public-is-mostly-left-out> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xciv] Jeff Galway & Dr. Urs Hoffmann-Nowotny, ‘Impact of COVID-19 on Court Operations & Litigation Practice’ (International Bar Association Litigation Committee 2020) 33.

    [xcv] Arora (n 56) 23-24.

    [xcvi] Nate Lord, ‘What is Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)?’ (Digital Guardian, 17 July 2020) <https://digitalguardian.com/blog/what-advanced-threat-protection-atp> accessed 14 January 2021.

    [xcvii] Arora (n 56) 31-33.

  • Bengal’s thinking is clear: will rest of India follow?

    Bengal’s thinking is clear: will rest of India follow?

    The second wave of Covid-19 began on February 10 when India reported 11,000 new cases. In the next 50 days, the daily average was 22,000 cases. In the following 10 days the daily average touched 89,800. We are now adding over 400,000 a day. India has never been engulfed by a crisis of this order.

    We are woefully short of hospital beds, oxygen, Remdesivir and Tocli-zumab, vaccines, ambulances and sadly even space in our crematoria. The growth and spread are expected to scale to almost a million a day. In two months, India has become the world’s basket case. Yet, on January 28 this year, speaking to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister Narendra Modi showed a blissful and disturbing ignorance of the perfect storm looming. The committee of scientists monitoring the virus warned the PMO of the gathering storm. He was not interested. He was crowing about his perceived “achievement” of beating back the much-mutated “Chinese virus”. He was so wrong, and the country is paying a huge price. There is no Modi image of competence left.

     Prime Minister Modi’s inability to defend India against the second Covid-19 wave, and his inability to cajole the Chinese from withdrawing from areas they occupied in Ladakh now make him an easy target.

    The elections to the four states and Puducherry, which he was so focused on, have been his undoing. He began campaigning on February 5 and 7 in Assam and West Bengal. After that he addressed 20 more rallies in West Bengal and six more in Assam. He also addressed 10 rallies in Tamil Nadu, three in Kerala and one in Puducherry, in all around 40 giant rallies criss-crossing across in IAF Boeings. I wouldn’t even hazard the true cost to the exchequer, but I have heard it said the PM himself is liable to a charge of Rs 6 per air km. Other costs are borne by the PMO.  But the cost is not important. The time spent on huckstering is important. He lost almost a month campaigning, instead of managing the engulfing crisis. I always had a low opinion of his intellect, but even he could have surmised the risks posed to the nation by the renewed pandemic. Clearly, he factored winning West Bengal was more important and worth the cost. Mr Modi himself cheerfully paraphrased what Gopal Krishna Gokhale said almost 100 years ago: “What Bengal thinks today, India thinks tomorrow”!

    West Bengal has unambiguously expressed what it is thinking. It has rejected Mr Modi and his message and campaign-style, lock, stock and barrel. A subservient Election Commission helpfully broke up West Bengal’s polls into eight phases starting March 27 and closing April 29. During this period the daily Covid-19 cases rose in West Bengal from 812 to 17,403. Breaking it into eight phases didn’t help the BJP either. It lost in every phase and got double digits only in four. West Bengal has a sizable Muslim electorate and Mr Modi didn’t mince words in targeting them by making it appear they were Mamata Banerjee’s personal votebank. He didn’t bother to even conceal what he thought of them. His electoral style touched a new low, even by his standards and most certainly by the standards expected of a PM, when he jibed her by catcalling “Didi-O-Didi”. Urban Bengal responded to this by defeating the BJP soundly in all urban constituencies. There is a message here. All over the country the BJP and RSS have strong urban bases, but urban and urbane Bengal administered a resounding slap to gutter politics. With no record to show, Mr Modi’s politics are nothing but that now.

    There was no surprise in Assam. The BJP was returned by almost the same margin as in 2016, getting a majority with the AGP’s nine seats. The Congress lacked a visible local leadership who could match wits with the BJP’s Hemanta Biswa Sarma. Tamil Nadu was as expected. The two so-called national parties were clinging to crumbs thrown by the two so-called Dravidian parties. In Kerala, Pinrayi Vijayan showed why he’s India’s topmost and only surviving commissar. The DMK’s Stalin made no bones about what he thinks of Mr Modi’s Hindu and Hindi-centric politics. The Modi government used every means, including ED raids, to slow down Stalin. The ED even raided Stalin’s daughter.

    So where does our politics go from here? One clear conclusion is that both the BJP and Congress were dealt severe blows. It’s interesting the BJP’s campaigns were entirely shouldered by Narendra Modi and Amit Shah. None of the other top BJP leaders even bothered to show up anywhere. What shouldn’t be missed is that the Raksha Mantri, a former BJP president, was the first from the party to congratulate Mamata Banerjee. In Assam, Mr Sarma’s supporters have gone public crediting the victory to their leader. Mr Sarma has already fired a shot across Sarbananda Sonowal’s bow, saying he was no longer interested in being just a minister in someone’s Cabinet. The numbers might work for him, as he needs just a dozen MLAs to cross over and give Assam a new government. Mr Sarma was a Congress satrap till Rahul Gandhi insulted him by playing with his dog rather than listening to him. Rahul will be all ears now.

    Mamata Banerjee’s stunning victory puts her squarely on the centre stage of Opposition politics. Joining her there will be Lalu Prasad Yadav, released on bail by the Supreme Court despite the government’s strenuous objections. Tejashwi Yadav has shown he’s capable of leading a party when the RJD came so close to upstaging the BJP-JDU alliance in Bihar. Rajasthan’s Ashok Gehlot and Punjab’s Amarinder Singh have emerged as fairly independent Congress satraps. Uddhav Thackeray has shrugged off the Shiv Sena’s pariah status by providing Maharashtra with good leadership and a penchant for making politics the art of the possible. In Telangana, KCR has put the BJP in its place by a resounding win in Nagarjunasagar after its surprise showing in the Dubbaka and GHMC polls. YSRC scored a resounding win in Tirupati with the BJP candidate, a retired chief secretary, losing her deposit. The anti-BJP lineup now has seven chief ministers, excluding Naveen Patnaik. Seven CMs will mean the election and propaganda machines can be kept well-greased and the powder kegs dry and replenished. Prime Minister Modi’s inability to defend India against the second Covid-19 wave, and his inability to cajole the Chinese from withdrawing from areas they occupied in Ladakh now make him an easy target. The Gujarat model has been long exposed as bogus. There is light seen at the end of the tunnel.

    Image Credit: Patrika.com