The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: USA

  • Deal or No Deal: The Future of Iran’s Nuclear Agreement

    Deal or No Deal: The Future of Iran’s Nuclear Agreement

    Iran’s nuclear program has been at the epicentre of most non-proliferation narratives since the beginning of 21st century. From the initial stages of receiving nuclear assistance from US to being sanctioned for their nuclear activities, Iran has managed to remain at the centre of this discourse. In 2015, Iran signed the nuclear agreement with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – the US, Russia, France, China and U.K as well as Germany and the European Union. However, with the arrival of Trump presidency, this deal was reopened by the US and has remained controversial despite a wide consensus that Iran has largely abided by the clauses of the agreement.

    The Iran Nuclear Deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is unique for a number of reasons. It is an amalgamation of years of negotiation process between countries of widely differing perceptions and interests. It is the coming together of the western powers with Iran in order to sign a deal to curb Iran’s nuclear programme and ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Over the course of fifty odd years, the series of discourses on Iran’s nuclear programme, since its genesis till the time the deal was signed has evolved significantly. These discourses have impacted and resulted in significant policy changes. Most importantly, it has also led to a process of rapprochement between Iran and the western states making it one of the landmark agreements in recent times. However, the deal also received criticism because the narratives portrayed that Iran got a better deal through lifting of sanctions while its part of the commitment to the non-proliferation requirements was much less.

    Unlike the Obama administration that pushed for the deal, President Donald Trump has been clear about his dislike for the agreement and has been an advocate of how this could possibly be “the worst deal”. Owing to this, Trump unilaterally pulled out of the agreement on May 08, 2018 and stated that he would reimpose sanctions until a better deal could be worked out. While Trump’s decision to undo years of negotiation comes from various factors such as Israeli influence, Iran’s support for Hamas and its role in Syria to name a few, it is also due to the perception of the Republican hardliners that there was not enough pressure put on Iran and that the US managed to get a bad deal out of it, and this remains a large part of Trump’s narrative. The US strategy now is to push for a more hard-line agreement and ensure complete isolation of Iran if it refuse to fall in line. This however, has failed because more than two years later there are still no signs of Iran buckling under US pressure, although the economic impact of sanctions has started to bite.

    Given the situation, there are four possible outcomes that can be observed – First, Iran is likely to play a victim card and protest to the Europeans for compensations against the unilateral sanctions that affect its economy despite Iran abiding to all the terms and conditions of the JCPOA. In another context, this could also push Iran to retaliate by threatening to pursue uranium enrichment and continue operations in its nuclear facilities while preventing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspections. Recent announcements by the Iranian government regarding its nuclear enrichment is a clear indication that they are choosing the latter option. Secondly, while the European countries are disappointed with USA’s withdrawal, there are high chances of the deal falling apart purely based on the fact that the European members of P5+1 are strategically and intimately tied to the US through much larger scope of mutual interests. However, the European countries will aim to renegotiate the deal because of the serious security concerns that might come into play if Iran is pushed towards becoming a nuclear power. Thirdly, lack of commitment from the P5+1 countries might force Iran to second guess about its decision to renegotiate a new deal. If Iran decides to abandon the agreement, there exists a high risk of nuclear proliferation in the region. However, this would only lead to further sanctions from the other European countries as well. Therefore, any decision taken by Iran will have to be done taking all these factors into consideration. Finally, Iran’s strategy going forward will largely depend on USA’s strategy and the increasing economic pressure as a result. While Trump has chosen to withdraw from the deal, he has also stated that he is open to further negotiations to ensure a better deal. It is unclear as to what a better deal entails and therefore, Iran will have to play its cards right yet again to not only stop itself from being isolated and ridden with sanctions but to also prevent its own population from revolting against its decisions.

    Another aspect that comes into play with respect to the deal is the role of China and Russia as counter-weights to dealing with US pressure. Along with the European allies, both the countries are against Trump’s decision to leave the nuclear agreement, reintroduce sanctions and renegotiate the deal. Earlier, China and Russia’s involvement remained minimal in the JCPOA. This time around, both the countries won’t allow Iran to be isolated. China and Russia have had historical ties with Iran and therefore, have been reluctant participants in the sanctions regime. However, both the countries will now actively look to counter USA’s unilateral decisions regarding the deal and will support Iran weighing out the consequences.

    Iran is currently amidst domestic protests due to hike in fuel prices and bad economic conditions. Despite being an oil rich country, it is unable to reap the benefits of it through exports, due to sanctions. The Iranian government is exactly in the same situation it was in 2015 (politically and economically) when it signed the JCPOA. Therefore, strategically, this could be the right time for the US to give a window of opportunity to Iran to renegotiate. However, given the circumstances, renegotiating this deal is not at the top of the priority list for any of the countries and therefore, the future of the deal still remains uncertain.

    Looking ahead at the future possibilities

    If the countries come together again at the negotiating table, there are a few things that has to be done differently this time around to ensure that a deal is signed and is followed through. Firstly, a fool-proof clause has to be added in order to ensure that there are no easy exit strategies for any country from the deal. Once the deal is signed, every signatory has to abide by the deal unless there are any violations made by a member country. Secondly, with respect to Iran, the deal should be such that, the benefits of staying in the deal should be far more important than threatening to quit. Thirdly, the P5+1 countries have to ensure that they all have the same goal and approach to the deal rather if they want this deal to succeed. Fourthly, opportunity to improve the nuclear facilities in Iran must be provided but the agreement should be designed to detect and prevent clandestine programs. Finally, any further delay in signing a new deal will only increase Iran’s breakout capabilities which is counter-productive given that it was the need for the deal in the first place. Therefore, the imperative of saving or renegotiating the JCPOA as acceptable to all is never more urgent, particularly in the context of the emerging humanitarian crisis in Iran as a result of back-breaking sanctions.

    Swathi Kallur is a Research Intern with TPF. She holds a master’s in international relations from Symbiosis University, Pune. Views expressed are author’s own.

    Image Credit: Commons.wikimedia.org

  • American Sanctions on Iran and the Underlying Oil War

    American Sanctions on Iran and the Underlying Oil War

    Adithya Subramoni                                                                                      June 24, 2019/Analysis

    In a shocking turn of events, America in 2018 announced its withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015. This came as a surprise to the international community for good reason, because subjecting Iran under harsh sanctions when they kept up their end of the bargain seemed like a punishment from the US for keeping up this good behaviour. President Donald Trump, calling towards the international community and specifically ‘like-minded countries’ for a team effort, said it was time to curb Iran’s state-sponsored terrorism. But his idea to get Iran to re-engage on this field was through the ‘maximum pressure campaign’. This strategy is unlikely to find takers owing to the fact that the nuclear issue and state sponsored terrorism are two completely different issues, and hence need to be dealt with separately. To charge Iran with state sponsored terrorism is completely misplaced. Iran has not caused any damage to US or its citizens in the last twenty five years. On the other hand terrorist acts affecting the US and its allies have almost always had a link to Sunni Islamic fundamentalism with its links to Saudi Arabian Wahabi organisations. The real motive is USA’s geopolitical targeting of Iran. Trump’s recent designation of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary guard corps (IIRGC), a unit of the Iranian army, as a terrorist outfit defies all logic and may become counterproductive to the US interests, the very issue that Trump wants to safeguard.

    Iran’s support to Hamas is fundamentally a regional and geopolitical struggle with Israel, while the Sunni vs Shia conflict is a manifestation of the regional power struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran. If the USA wanted to pressurise Iran on its support to militant outfits like Hamas, it should have ensured it has support of its allies and multilateral institutions. USA’s unilateral action on Iran does not have the support of other members of the P5 +1(Germany) as well as other oil-dependent countries. With the latest round of sanctions, countries with economies having exposure to Iranian trade industry are gearing up to take a major hit. This brings us back to the subject of concern, why take such hasty decisions impacting the global economy without consultations from other members of the P5 + 1?

    The exit strategy

    In 2018 shale oil catapulted America to the leading position amongst the oil producers. As companies in Texas adopted fracking technology to good use in optimising their oil production, America climbed up to the first position in the oil producers list, surpassing major oil producers such as Saudi Arabia,Russia, Iran and the UAE. Climbing up the oil ladder came at a cheaper price for America considering the OPEC countries, excluding Iran, and Russia had agreed to reduce their oil production to protect the free-falling price of oil. This gave America a free hand at capturing the oil market especially where the demand from emerging economies was increasing rapidly. The only barrier to becoming the largest oil exporter was qualms from the emerging economies and other countries who found the American alternative to be an extremely expensive replacement for their oil needs. With emerging economies deeply dependent on Middle Eastern oil sources, one of the options for America to increase the demand for its oil was by blocking Iran’s oil exports through sanctions. This could give multiple advantages to the US: one is to create economic pressure on Iran; second is to boost American oil exports by eliminating Iran’s oil supply from the market; and third is to strengthen its ally Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of regional domination by squeezing Iranian oil-based economy.

    America’s play on executing its exit and sanctions in such a speedy manner may be rooted in the fact that the major countries dependent on the Iranian oil are in the Asian continent. European countries such as France, Greece, Italy and Spain all combined import close to 500,000 barrels a day as opposed to China and India who import close to 600,000 barrels per day and 500,000 barrels per day respectively. With America limiting its oil imports primarily from Canada and Saudi Arabia, and the European Union sourcing two-thirds of its oil requirements from Russia and Saudi Arabia, American sanctions on Iran do not impact the energy requirements of the western power bloc significantly. Hence, it may have been an American expectation that other members in the JCPOA (P5+1) would support Trump administration’s move to scrap the JCPOA and resume the earlier hard line approach of sanctions on Iran. This, however, has not happened.

    Unfortunately for America, other members of the JCPOA did not see any justification in the logic and accusation given by the Trump administration and hence, there was no support forthcoming from them. Trump’s disdain for allies and his unilateral approach, virtually demanding complete acceptance from European allies bordered on disrespect and insult to the member countries’ sovereignty and pride. Reaction to Trumps position was one of disbelief and contempt, as his actions displayed, in their opinion, disregard and contempt for international norms and credibility. Quite clearly USA has sought to bulldoze its way through with utter disregard for international institutions and multilateralism, exploiting its domination of the global financial institutions, banking system, and the fact that the US dollar is still the world’s reserve currency.

    UK, France and Germany together set up Instex – Instrument in Support for Trade Exchanges, to facilitate the trade of medicines, medical devices and food supplies, which trades in Euro through a financial channel having zero exposure to the American financial intermediaries. This marked a milestone in the chapter of American supremacy, where its European allies took a stance against its imposing regime. Though the volume of trade is negligible, the all important European message is that it will not support the American unilateralism. In the absence of any European support, Trump administration should have recognised its folly of trying to impose its decision on its allies, but on the other hand it made it even worse by virtually threatening diplomatic ties with those countries. Others in the P5, such as China and Russia have agreed with the European counterparts to re-examine and review if necessary the terms of the 2015 JCPOA deal and look for ways to deflect and overcome the US sanctions. Iran too, has welcomed the idea and agreed to keep its end of the 2015 deal. Time however, is running out as Iran has demonstrated its loss of patience over the lack of progress on the issue, and has stated on more than one occasion, in the last six months, that it will recommence its nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment activities.

    Asian approach to the Iranian issue

    Asia is the largest customer of crude oil, importing 53% of the global total oil imports, translating to an approximate amount worth $628.2 billion. One major reason for this huge oil influx is the fact that Asia is home to the fastest developing economies such as China and India. Though China and India have maintained that they will continue to import oil from Iran, one issue that concerns all the countries importing Iranian oil is the availability of insurers willing to take up the risk for oil supply from Iran. Most insurers will be cautious to take up projects for fear of losing business and financial access in the West.

    With the ongoing trade war with America, China is fighting a dual war. For America, the opponent has been weighed down with two hurdles co-incidentally and conveniently. With the trade war impacting the export industry and sanctions on its oil supplier indirectly hitting the Chinese economy, China may chose well to hit back on America by disregarding the sanctions on Iran. Iran might just have earned itself a powerful ally because of American hegemony. Chinese imports of crude oil from Iran have surged to record levels in April and May. Iran is set to become China’s 2ndlargest supplier of crude oil.

    Steering the wheel of attention towards India, Iran is its third largest oil source. Particularly being an oil dependent emerging economy, the sanctions on Iran will force India to look at more expensive oil options. The six month credit line and insurance included price for Iranian oil made it the most lucrative oil supplier in the business. Another issue that has come to India’s doorstep is the longevity of the rupee account based trading system with Iran using the UCO Bank. UCO Bank being the only bank with no exposure to American financial channels is the only means for continued Iran-India trade relations. In light of the US sanctions, India reduced its oil imports to turn eligible for a sanction waiver. This sanction waiver came to an end on 02May 2019, and oil imports stopped owing to the election period as well. Now the primary concern for the new Indian government is to prioritise the Iran issue. Iran is accountable for thirty percent of India’s exports, and given that the rupee account is fuelled by the INR deposited in favour of oil imports from Iran, the systematic reduction of oil import also creates a proportional fall in demand for Indian exports, owing to the curb of Iran’s purchasing power. Since the end of the sanctions waiver, India has stopped import of Iranian oil, hopefully only as a temporary measure.

    At the same time, a diplomatic concern that arises for India is its interest over the Chabahar port. Chabahar Port is a major investment arena for India to create a transportation corridor connecting Asia as well as the land-locked Afghanistan with the rest of the world. Though India plans on disregarding the US Sanctions and continuing business through the UCO Bank and Iran’s Pasargad Bank, attention needs to be paid to resolve the reducing Iranian imports, not only to secure India’s exports but also to show Iran the commitment India has towards its diplomatic ties with them and its vested interest in operating the Chabahar Port. Going ahead with the possibility that China would disregard the sanctions on Iran, a reduction in Iranian imports could weaken Iran’s ties to India and pave the path to strengthen Iran-China ties. This would particularly be drastic for India, if Iran were to give China operational rights to the Chabahar port. Needless to say, this would bring in interference from Russia, who wouldn’t be thrilled with the loss of regional trade autonomy to China.

    Approaching the dénouement

    From a bird’s eye view, the rising conflicts in the West Asian region, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE being the main champions who support the efforts for a change in Iran’s regime, Iran finds itself in a cornered situation amongst its neighbours. If cornered, both strategically and economically, Iran could resort to using its strategic location to choke the Strait of Hormuz by planting sea mines or through any other obstruction mechanism. Though unlikely, as it would put Iran in a very hostile situation with rest of the world, it cannot be ruled out as an extreme last resort measure. This could create major international crisis. It would, as a start contribute to the run up in oil prices and owing to supply security – it is possible that USA stands to benefit immensely in such a crisis.

    On the other hand, by imposing sanctions on Iran, America has pushed India to an uneasy corner. Owing to regional ties, it plays to India’s strength to take care of her interests by dealing with Iran and securing operation of Chabahar port. On the other hand it is essential to keep India’s ties with America on an even keel. If it refuses to acknowledge India’s ground interests and resorts to the muscle power of sanctions, China may end up as the beneficiary with a fortuitous win with Chabahar port, leading to an ultimate strategic loss to India and the US.

    The situation calls for global introspection into imposing sanctions by a country due to its phenomenal control over the world’s financial channels and the domination of the USD international trade. But this round of sanctions just might be the one where countries figure out alternate solutions together; considering the European initiative of Instex, Asian methods such as the trade using rupee account, Russian and Chinese support towards Iran; to finding a more cooperative and equitable solution that enables the world to trade outside the control of America. The sanctions may have just provided the edge to catalyze the changing world order, but the question is who’ll sit on the throne of the high table when the rubble settles? Or will it be, as it seems more likely, a more cooperative and less competitive, multi-polar world order?

    Adithya Subramoni is interning at ‘The Peninsula Foundation’. She has a Bachelors degree in Commmerce  from Christ College, Bangalore.

    Photo Credit under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.: english.khamenei.ir

  • Strategic Autonomy and the Looming Oil Crisis

    Strategic Autonomy and the Looming Oil Crisis

    Kamal Davar                                                                                             May 31, 2019/Commentary

    The new Modi government will have to speedily contend with a serious foreign policy challenge on its hands.

    That this ordeal comes in the wake of some underplayed serious economy problems currently facing the nation will compound the problems for India which imports over 80 per cent of its burgeoning oil needs.

    Thus, if the looming crisis in the Persian Gulf between an arrogant US and an equally defiant Iran does not get resolved peacefully, ominous ramifications await the region, the world and all those nations which import crude oil from Iran.

    The genesis of the current crisis between the US and Iran has its roots in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA) which was agreed upon by Iran and six western nations in 2015, led by the US, to curb Iran’s nuclear programme, which boils down to deterring Iran from developing nuclear weapons. But in May 2018, the US, under its mercurial President Donald Trump, chose to renege on this treaty as Trump felt that this was the “worst deal ever negotiated.”

    It is also a fact that Iran did not violate any norms of the law as regards this agreement.

    Meanwhile, the US allowed some nations, including India, which import oil from Iran a six-month waiver, which ended on May 2, 2019. As a consequence of the US action, oil prices the world over have jacked and soon its adverse effects will be felt in India as inflation will hit the already strained Indian economy. Over a 10 per cent hike in global oil prices has already taken place in the last one month and a crippling escalation in oil prices ahead is well on the cards.

    Notwithstanding any US pressure on India, the unalterable fact of Iran’s strategic significance to India in the region remains beyond question. India imported 24 million metric tonnes of crude from Iran in the 2018-19. India was Iran’s second largest buyer of crude last year, while Tehran was the third largest supplier to India after Iraq and Saudi Arabia (11 per cent of a total of India’s oil imports).

    Additionally, Iranian crude comes with a longer credit period and cheaper freight owing to Iran’s geographical proximity to India and, thus, Iranian oil remains the best option for India in more ways than one.

    Higher oil prices also make the Indian rupee weaker, making imports to India costlier. Importantly, that Iran-India collaboration in the development in the vital Chabahar Port in Iran will give India vital ingress to Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics cannot be understated.

    Meanwhile, the US has rushed the formidable USS Abraham Lincoln carrier-borne Task Force to the Persian Gulf region and undertaken certain prophylactic steps in case war breaks out.

    The Iranians, too, have mounted some small-range anti-ship missiles on their warships. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani recently said that his nation is facing acute pressure from international sanctions, dubbing it a “war unprecedented in the history of the Islamic revolution.”

    The US has also branded Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards as a foreign terrorist organisation. A war of words has broken out, with President Trump declaring that if “Iran wants to fight, that will be the official end of Iran. Never threaten the United States again.”

    Replying back sternly, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif retorted that Iranians have stood tall for millennia against aggression and that “economic terrorism and genocidal taunts won’t end Iran.” He added that “never threaten an Iranian. Try respect it works.”

    Importantly, even US allies have steered away from of taking any partisan positions with either the US or Iran. Meanwhile, oil-producing nations like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Mexico and the US itself have been requested to step up their oil production to cater for Iranian oil shortfalls.

    How this oil crisis will shape up to meet global demands is anyone’s guess.

    It is a strategist’s nightmare in conjuring up a scenario concerning the ramifications of a war between Iran and the US. The Persian Gulf is easily one of the world’s critically significant strategic waterways through which one-third of the world’s oil is transported.

    In the event of a war, Iran will definitely close the vital Straits of Hormuz for commercial shipping purposes, throwing the region’s economy out of shape — an eventuality which, hopefully, should not ever take place.

    Preoccupied with its General Election, India, as a major regional player, has so far not reached out to its strategic partner, the US, to impress upon it to defuse the crisis.

    Recently, the Iranian Foreign Minister made a trip to India to explain their position to India on the current standoff.

    India, however, need not succumb to any US pressures or take sides. India has an adequate financial standing and moral stature to play a peacemaker’s role. India must conscientiously follow the time-honoured policy of zealously guarding its strategic autonomy. Respect for India from nations even adversarial to each other — as in earlier decades — will follow automatically and some of India’s economic tribulations will also get simultaneously addressed.

    Let the new government in New Delhi bear in mind Iran’s more than significant strategic value for India in the region.

    The author, Lt Gen Kamal davar is a former DGDIA and is visiting Distinguished fellow at TPF. 

    This article was earlier published in The Tribune.

  • After Balakot: India-Pak ties and nuclear bombast

    After Balakot: India-Pak ties and nuclear bombast

    Mohan Guruswamy                                                                      Apr 19, 2019/Commentary

    We know that in the aftermath of the Balakot airstrikes, India and Pakistan went into some form of nuclear readiness. The Indian Navy quietly announced last week that all its crucial assets, including the nuclear missile-launching INS Arihant, were deployed in the Arabian Sea. Unlike the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union (now Russia), which had several stages of nuclear readiness to signal intent and gravity, India and Pakistan have no such signalling language. So, when it comes, it comes.

    Politicians on both sides of the border are prone to loose talk and nuclear sabre-rattling is part of their lexicon. But this is not without some reason and purpose. Even though there is little risk of a nuclear world war any longer, because of their awesome power and potential to inflict sudden and massive violence on large populations, nuclear weapons inspire tremendous and often irrational fear, however infinitesimal the probabilities of their use. When both adversaries have nuclear weapons, you have a balance of terror.

    As a matter of fact, in the prevailing international situation, any war involving even conventional forces cannot remain a local affair for long, to be sorted out by just the two adversaries. Where there is even the smallest risk of an escalation to nuclear conflict, that intervention could be quite quick. This is what the Pakistanis are counting on.

    But since nuclear weapons cannot be used, their only utility lies in the mere threat of their use. In nuclear theology, this has come to be known as “the utility in non-use”. From time to time declared and undeclared nuclear powers have tried to use nuclear weapons in this manner. The Pakistanis are only travelling down a well-trod path. Each time the Pakistanis threaten us with nuclear war, what they are in fact doing is semaphoring to the rest of the world, particularly those of the West, that have taken it upon themselves to supervise the international regime, to intervene.

    In the early days of the Yom Kippur war of 1973, an incident occurred which tells a great deal about how the game of nuclear diplomacy is played. The sudden and successful attack by Egyptian troops under the command of Gen. Saaduddin Shazli not only put the Egyptians back on the Sinai Peninsula but also unveiled a new generation of Soviet weapons and tactics to match. At the northern end of Israel, a Syrian armored attack under Gen. Mustafa Tlas was threatening to push the surprised Israelis down the slopes of the Golan Heights. In just the first three days of the conflict, the highly regarded Israeli Air Force lost over 40 fighter aircraft and a huge number of tanks to the new generation of Soviet anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. The panicked Israelis turned to the United States for assistance but found Washington quite reluctant. Both President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger till then were of the opinion that a degree of battlefield reverses was needed to get an increasingly intransigent Israel to the conference table. Caught, in a manner of speaking, between the devil and the deep sea, the Israelis then played their nuclear card.

    American surveillance satellites and high-flying reconnaissance aircraft suddenly began to pick up unusually heightened activity around the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona near the Negev desert. Israeli defence minister Moshe Dayan, while imploring Dr Kissinger to start the airlift of urgently-needed weapons and military technical assistance, told him about how desperate their situation actually was and had already hinted that Israel might have to resort to nuclear weapons to halt the Arab armies. The alarmed Americans sent a SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft fitted with special sensors to detect nuclear material over Dimona. The SR-71’s sensors picked up the signature of nuclear material on a bomb conveyor apparently loading an Israeli fighter-bomber. Whether the nuclear flare registered was from an actual nuclear weapon or radioactive material in a container to simulate a weapon will never be known.

    To the advantage of Israel, the Americans read this as preparations for an imminent nuclear attack. Would the Soviets sit quietly when their allies were subjected to a nuclear attack — would have been their immediate thought? Was this going to be the beginning of World War III? Within minutes, President Nixon was on the line to Prime Minister Golda Meir, telling her that a massive US airlift bearing much-needed weapons and military advisers was ordered and that the supply would begin within hours.

    In early 1952, as the Chinese poured in troops into Korea to grind to a halt the advance of the American-led UN forces, a highly placed US diplomat in Geneva conveyed through Indian diplomat K.M. Pannikar a warning to China that the United States will use nuclear weapons on it unless it agreed to talks immediately. China soon afterwards agreed to hold talks, which soon resulted in the armistice that holds till today.

    Others have done this somewhat differently. During the 1982 Falklands War, the British quietly deployed the nuclear submarine HMS Conqueror, armed with nuclear missiles, off the Argentine coast. As the fighting raged and the Argentines scored some naval victories by sinking the destroyer HMS Sheffield and the converted Harrier jet carrier Atlantic Conveyor, the Royal Navy revealed the presence of its nuclear submarine. The presence of the Conqueror with nuclear weapons was to tell its somewhat lukewarm ally, the United States, that if the war went badly for it Britain would be forced to use even nuclear weapons. It was therefore in America’s interest to not only using its enormous clout with the Argentines to end its occupation of the Falkland Islands but to also assist Britain. Soon after this the US tilted fully in favour of the British by giving it critical intelligence and political support.

    In 1992, then US President George H.W. Bush conveyed to Saddam Hussein that a poison gas attack on Israel using its Scud missiles would invite a nuclear strike upon it. The Iraqis fired several Scuds on Israel, but none with poison gas. After the war, UN inspectors scouring Iraq for weapons capable of mass destruction detected huge quantities of poison gas in ready to use explosive triggered canisters. Obviously, the threat had worked.

    Clearly, the threat of the first use of nuclear weapons, if provoked beyond a point, could be often as effective as nuclear deterrence. In recent times, to give credence to its irrationality, Pakistan has deployed or claims to have deployed tactical nuclear weapons to some of its formations. Since a tactical nuclear weapon has a much smaller destructive power, its use is considered somewhat more likely and hence more credible than a strategic nuclear weapon. A strategic weapon is a city or area-buster, whereas a tactical weapon is said to have only a battlefield application. But India’s response to this is that whatever the weapon, and wherever it is used, if it is used it will invite a full-scale retaliation. Many analysts think this is not credible, and India needs a flexible policy that will allow it to also match escalation up the ladder.

    But the frequent Pakistani outbursts that nuclear war can happen here if the Kashmir situation boils over is an addition to the known nuclear semaphoring practices. Here the Pakistanis are using the Western abhorrence of nuclear war to influence Indian policy. They are not threatening India, because that is not credible, more so since India has a far bigger nuclear arsenal. They are in fact threatening the world that the balance of terror might be breached, and inviting it to intervene. Whatever the nature of this intervention, it is deemed to be in its favour. We saw this happen in 2008 when within minutes of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks Presidents and Prime Ministers from all over began calling our Prime Minister calling for restraint. We have a somewhat ironical situation here. A cruel and ruthless military presiding over a notoriously lawless and corrupt nation is pleading for Kashmir’s supposed right to self-determination and is blackmailing the world to come to its assistance.

    The author is a Trustee and Distinguished Fellow of ‘The Peninsula Foundation’. He is a prolific commentator on economic, political, and security issues. The views expressed are his own.

    This article was published earlier in Deccan Chronicle.

    Photo Credit: PTI

  • Will Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections End the Deadlock?

    Will Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections End the Deadlock?

    Andrei Korobkov                                                                                   March 05, 2019/Analysis

    The crisis in Venezuela grows more complex with each passing day. At first, President Nicolas Maduro declared that he was willing to consider the possibility of early parliamentary elections. But it is clear that this proposal is absolutely unacceptable for the opposition, which already wields a majority in the legislature and has the US firmly behind it. The opposition is urging the President to resign and takes a dim view of an early presidential election, no matter how rapidly it can be organized. The “interim president” appointed by parliament, Juan Guaido, is counting on the West’s financial and political support. He is feeling increasingly confident now that the US has frozen Venezuela’s government bank accounts and announced that the pretender president would be given control of them. This means that the government will immediately lose $7 billion deposited in US banks and another $11 billion in expected revenues from 2019 oil sales. Given that, Guaido, dizzy as he is with what he sees as his success, is unlikely to be willing to agree to serious talks or compromises, although he can suggest holding simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. Maduro, for his part, is not going to surrender and has already issued a warning that the growing confrontation and the mounting Western interference in his country’s internal affairs could lead to a civil war.

    There are a number of reasons why the current crisis in Venezuela is of such great interest and may have far-reaching political consequences. The US has always regarded Latin America as its backyard where it is free to lay down the law and punish disobedient. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in effect, introduced a “limited sovereignty” model that became increasingly pertinent during the Cold War.

     The United States has made huge investments in Latin American economies; Latin elites have been educated in the US for generations; the Americans have trained Latin militaries and supplied them with arms for centuries. The region is highly dependent on the US technologically. Besides, Venezuela is one of America’s main oil suppliers. The Americans are exasperated not only by the demonstrative independence of Venezuelan foreign policy but also by the 20 years of leftist reforms under the Chavez and Maduro governments. The same is true of the increasingly noticeable political, economic and military presence of Russia and China in the country. Of no small importance, too, is Venezuela’s good relationship with Cuba.After the Cold War, the Americans initially decided to at least formally follow the rules and refrain from toppling democratically elected governments in the region. Instead they used other, more flexible methods to influence the situation in individual Latin American countries. The exceptions were the abortive coup attempts in Honduras in 2009 and Venezuela (against Chavez) in 2002. From this point of view, the attempt to displace Maduro is relatively out of step with the new US policy in the region and may signal yet another revision of regional strategy.

    One more specific feature of the current situation in Venezuela is that the US line consists of an eclectic array of approaches that the US has used in a number of Latin American countries over the last 60 years. The contras’ failed landing in the Bay of Pigs in 1961 is one notorious example. A more obscure aspect of the story is how the CIA thought about the operation. After all, no one expected that the team in question would be able to launch a large-scale operation and fight Fidel Castro’s government. The plan was for them to dig in on a limited territory, proclaim an alternative government that would be immediately recognized by Washington, and request US troops be sent in to “support the legitimate government.” The gambit was a scandalous failure, but the “alternative government” idea is still alive and being used in Caracas in the form of a constitutional coup.

    Another precedent was set in Chile in 1973. Older people remember well the TV footage of well-fed and clearly not overworked housewives banging pots and pans at protests in Santiago and shouting that they were starving. The same tactics are being used today. The US has introduced economic sanctions and is intentionally destabilizing the economic situation in a country that has already been weakened by the government’s experiments with “Bolivarian socialism” to accuse Maduro of being an ineffective leader and to arouse popular disaffection. (But even today, Maduro’s opponents are failing to turn the lower strata that form the majority in that developing country against him: these people remember that it was Chavez and Maduro after him who gave them access to education and healthcare and enabled them to enjoy far better living standards).

    A third model still in the works is based on the 1989 Panama operation. If the first two options don’t work, outbursts of violence will be provoked through assassination attempts against opposition leaders or assaults on US nationals. This would lay the groundwork for a US invasion under the pretext of restoring law and order and guaranteeing the safety of US citizens.

    The first two models have been tested in Venezuela, without much success. The question is whether the third option will be attempted. This also raises two more interesting questions. Latin American coups usually become possible if military leaders turn on the government, but in Venezuela they continue to support Maduro. Moreover, it was the military who saved Hugo Chavez in 2002 and thwarted the coup masterminded from outside the country. The question is whether this support endures and whether the US succeeds in offering military leaders enough “carrots” for them to change their outlook.

    The second question concerns the US president. Donald Trump took over two years ago with his coterie of right-wing political reformers determined to fundamentally alter both America’s domestic and foreign policy. In the foreign policy arena, this new approach was based on renouncing interventionism, shifting emphasis towards domestic growth, acknowledging that the center of the world system was migrating from the northern Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, and recognizing China as the major geopolitical threat to the United States. The last point implies that the US must create a new system aimed at containing China, which, in turn, requires better relations with Russia as a counterweight to China, the start of tariff wars against the PRC, and the destabilization of the WTO and the free trade system as a whole, which allegedly are more beneficial for China than for the United States. But, seen by the US elite (and not without reason) as a systemic threat, Trump is under continuous attack and unable to implement many of these ideas (with the greatest obstacles put in the way of his attempts to improve US-Russia relations). Gradually, the majority of the right-wing reformers left his administration (the biggest loss was the departure of Steve Bannon and Sebastian Gorka) to be replaced by traditional neocons and interventionists like John Bolton, the current national security advisor.

    Along with the loss of Republican control of the House of Representatives in November 2018, the approach of the presidential primaries, growing stock market volatility, relatively low presidential approval ratings, and unending attacks on Trump from the political establishment and the “elite” press, this is strengthening the hand of those who are urging the president to stage a “small victorious war” of his own. After all, Trump is still the only US president in two generations who has not yet launched a single new military intervention. Meanwhile, Trump himself is between a rock and a hard place, as he is being pressured by both the traditional US right, who dream of the US flexing its military might and toppling the disobedient regime, and the Democrats, who hope to force the president to break his election promises, mire him in a protracted military conflict and thus discredit and politically weaken him ahead of his re-election campaign.

    The current situation has yet another, broader international dimension. The international community is divided over Venezuela. The United States is supported by Canada, Brazil, and many European and Latin American countries. But that is a far cry from unity. Many right-wing governments in Europe, including Italy, whose government is very close to Trump ideologically, have been skeptical of attempts to give Venezuela away to a different suitor.

    An even more important factor is that the new leftist president of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, is well aware of the possibility that Mexico will be the next target, if a constitutional coup is allowed to happen in Venezuela. Moreover, opposing Trump is a win-win for any Mexican politician amid the growing US-Mexican friction over immigration, tariffs, and much else. President Erdogan in Turkey is thinking along the same lines.

    Most important, of course, is the stance taken by Russia and China. Both have actively cooperated with Venezuela in recent years, with Chinese investment in the Venezuelan economy exceeding Russia’s by almost 400 percent. Nevertheless, China is very cautious about its moves, as it is currently under pressure from the US and unwilling to furnish Trump with another pretext to accuse it of growing expansionism.

    This is why the initiative in supporting President Maduro will most likely remain in Russian hands. Though inferior to China in terms of investment, Russia is the main arms supplier to Venezuela (with sales totaling $12 billion). Russia has also invested heavily in Venezuela’s oil industry and a number of other sectors.Thus, the current situation includes many unknowns linked to actors’ moves both in Venezuela and the United States, as well as Russia, China and a number of other countries. As such, both the course of the conflict and its outcome can be of global importance, influencing, among other things, the prospect of whether the US reverts to its traditional imperial interventionism or opts for a somewhat different policy.

    The course of this crisis and its outcome may also have serious impact on the domestic political situation in the United States. The potential for a “controlled crisis” looms large in this situation, because the chances of a political provocation aimed at drawing the Trump administration into a military conflict are sufficiently high. Therefore, the dynamics of the Venezuelan drama may decide the fate of both Maduro and Trump himself in the long run.

    Dr Andrei Korobkov is Professor of Political Science at the Middle Tennessee State University, and is Non-Resident Visiting Distinguished Fellow at TPF. This article is the English translation of the original published earlier in Valdai Discussion Club.

    The views expressed are the author’s own.

  • US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    Vijay Sakhuja September 02, 2018

    There is a sense of urgency among the militaries of United States and China to gain ascendency in the field of artificial intelligence and machine learning. The United States Department of Defence has set upJoint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) that will help the US military to “preserve and expand military advantage” as also pursue “AI applications with boldness and alacrity while ensuring strong commitment to military ethics and AI safety.” The JAIC will costan estimated $1.7 billion over the next six years. It will work on nearly 600 AI projects in partnershipwith the industry, academia and allies, and will have oversight over almost all service and defense agency AI efforts.

    Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has urgedPresident Donald Trumpto consider formulating a national strategy for artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, the US Army has establishedan AI Task Force and given itself three months to identify “specific skill sets that we’re going to need to be relevant and to thrive in this environment that will include AI and machine learning.”

    Likewise, the Chinese government is pursuing an aggressive policy for the development of artificial intelligence at the national level. In December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology through Circular No. 315called on all agencies under the Central Government to implement ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ and ‘ accelerate the development of artificial intelligence industry, promote the deep integration of artificial intelligence and real economy” It also laid out a ‘Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry ( 2018 – 2020).

    According to a reporttitled “China’s AI Development Report 2018” released by Tsinghua University, the China’s artificial intelligence (AI) market touched 23.7 billion yuan ($3.5 billion) in 2017, with the growth rate expected to reach 75 percent in 2018. Further, China emerged as the ‘most attractive country for AI investment and financing’ and in the last five years since 2013 the Chinese AI industry accounted for 60 percent of the world’s total including 18,232 AI technology research experts  accounting ‘for 8.9 percent of the world’s total and was second only to the United States, which accounted for 13.9 percent’.

    In China, AI is used in a number of sectors like robotics, drones, autonomous vehicles such as cars and trucks, in manufacturing white goods including marketing services. Perhaps what merits attention is that China is investingin AI-related devices and systems that range from the anodyne to the dystopian wherein the military is looking to the technology to work in concert with its military strategy? Further, experts believethat the Chinese are “making their machines more creative” and “A little bit of automation gives the machines a tremendous boost” which can be characterized as “remote warfare”.

    The US is visibly concerned about losing military edge to China in the field of artificial intelligence. The PLA Navy presents different challenges with significant investments made in weapons such as the Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG), Solid State Lasers (SSLs) and other systems and sensors.As noted earlier, AI technologies are also being incorporated into a new generation of anti-ship missiles through autonomous targeting capabilities. Similarly, autonomous air and underwater drones and miniaturized assault boats would soon be part of its force structure It is quite plausible that the PLA Navy may have begun to conduct exercises based on AI and ML and assimilated commonly used and commercially available communication devices such as smart phones, tablets and hybrid devices into its naval strategy.

    AI is surely adding to the war fighting tool kit of both the US Navy and the PLA Navy through stealthy ‘robotic trimaran’(Sea hunter and D3000 respectively)thatcould result in a dangerous escalations of a new kind of competition between the two navies. Similarly, China is developing autonomous robotic submarines which are likely to be ready for operations by the early 2020s and supplement regular human-operated submarines. This is sure to pose another set of challenge to the US Navy.

    Dr Vijay Sakhuja is a Trustee of TPF.

  • The Military Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership – Panel Discussion at Stimson Centre

    The Military Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership – Panel Discussion at Stimson Centre

    Past Events July 24, 2018 The Military-Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership
    JULY 24, 2018 | 12:15 PM
    Please join the Stimson South Asia program for a conversation with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, the former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff in the Indian Ministry of Defence, who will talk about the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership. Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School, and Benjamin Schwartz, Head of the Aerospace and Defense Program at the U.S.-India Business Council, will serve as discussants. Sameer Lalwani of the Stimson Center will moderate.
    WHAT: An on-the-record discussion with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran on the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership.
    WHERE: The Stimson Center, 1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 8th Floor, Washington DC, 20036
    WHEN: Tuesday, July 24 from 12.15 to 2 pm. Lunch will be served at 12.15 and the discussion will begin at 12.30.
    RSVP: Click here to RSVP for the event.
    FOLLOW: @StimsonCenter on Twitter for event news and use #StimsonNow to join the conversation
    Featuring:
    Sameer Lalwani, Senior Associate and Co-Director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center (moderator)
    Sameer Lalwani is a Senior Associate and Co-Director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center where he researches nuclear deterrence, inter-state rivalry, and counter/insurgency. He is also an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School and a Contributing Editor to War on the Rocks.
    Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff, Indian Ministry of Defence
    Air Marshal M. Matheswaran retired from the Indian Air Force in 2014 after nearly 39 years of military service. In his last appointment, he was the Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff for 23 months at the tri-service headquarters in the Ministry of Defence, India. Since then, he has held defense and aerospace consulting positions at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Reliance Defence. He is the Founder, Chairman, and President of the Peninsula Foundation, a think-tank for security policy research.
    Benjamin Schwartz, Head, Aerospace & Defense, U.S.-India Business Council
    Benjamin Schwartz leads the U.S.-India Business Council’s Defense and Aerospace program where he advocates for pro-trade policies before officials in the Indian and American governments. He previously served in a range of positions within the U.S. national security community, including at the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense, where he was Director for India in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University.
    Joanna Spear is Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the FAO Regional Sustainment Initiative at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Her areas of focus include U.S. and UK arms sales policies, U.S. counter-proliferation policies, and transatlantic relations. In 2012, she was a Senior Visiting Fellow at Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses New Delhi, working on India’s arms import policies and offset strategies.
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