The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Iran

  • The Costs of Strategic Silence: An Analysis of India’s Stance during the 2026 Iran War

    The Costs of Strategic Silence: An Analysis of India’s Stance during the 2026 Iran War

    As West Asia’s geopolitical flashpoints grew more volatile, most notably with direct confrontation between the U.S., Iran and Israel, and the broader regional escalation, New Delhi’s diplomatic posture has come under intense scrutiny. India’s response is not a sign of diplomatic paralysis, nor a passive withdrawal from the global stage, but a calculated, measured quietude – an active realisation of its “calibrated multi-alignment” strategy.
    This analysis decodes the rationale behind India’s silence through the lens of deep economic vulnerabilities, critical infrastructure dilemmas and multilateral frictions that New Delhi must navigate in order to preserve its foundational doctrine of strategic autonomy.

    Juggling Act of Multi-Alignment

    India’s diplomatic manoeuvring is taking place in a highly fractured West Asian landscape. Crucial regional partners are pulling New Delhi in opposite directions, and the government has to use precise verbiage and a highly restrained tone.

    Two conflicting diplomatic realities illuminate the complexity of this tightrope. One is New Delhi’s Gulf alignment. India signed landmark defence and energy pacts during a high-profile state visit by the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the UAE, standing “shoulder-to-shoulder” with Abu Dhabi after drone and missile strikes by Iran hit Emirati soil.

    Second is Tehran’s direct engagement with New Delhi, assuring the security of Indian commercial ships in the key Strait of Hormuz, and proposing a long-term constructive role for India in the region.

    At the same time India was hard at work, striving to ensure some degree of balancing vis-à-vis the warring parties that include negotiating for U.S.  strategic partnership and Israeli technology and weapons (The West and Israel Axis); UAE energy and defence cooperation and Saudi capital flows (The Gulf Cooperation Council – GCC); and striving to retain its stakes in the Iran and Eurasian corridor via the Chabahar port and INSTC (International North–South Transport Corridor) trade route.

    Now that these bedrock bilateral partnerships are in direct conflict, it is extraordinarily difficult to maintain tight strategic autonomy.

    Costs of Silence

    Diplomatically, India’s external attitude is restrained, but the internal home reality is one of high-stakes management of acute energy and trade vulnerabilities. The ongoing conflict between the U.S., Israel and Iran has created immediate economic headwinds to New Delhi’s neutrality, threatening its viability.

    Economic Vulnerability

    For New Delhi, the most immediate casualty is energy supply security with long-term impacts.  Retaliatory disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have forced India to draw down its national petroleum inventories by 15%. Rising domestic fuel prices and supply chain shocks present a risk to broader inflationary pressures. These are evident in high-level political appeals to citizens to conserve fuel and undertake temporary demand reduction, and in suggestions of structural changes, including working from home and limiting gold imports, to stabilise the current account deficit.

    Unfortunately, the public at large interpreted these as signs of impending doom rather than the precautionary measures, which were the intent. Thus, people rushed in to stock up on cooking gas, vehicle fuels, and even groceries, with many hoteliers reducing their menu offerings and food aggregators that service home delivery charging additional amounts in the guise of “packing charges,” etc., pushing up retail prices for unfounded reasons.

    The most chaotic but strategic impact is expatriate safety. The transport disruptions, especially air transport to and from the Middle East, heightened fears of the potential displacement of the large Indian workforce in the region (approximately 8.5 to 10 million Indians reside and work across West Asia, primarily in the GCC countries). This prompted transactional diplomacy over “prestige politics,” focusing on localised maritime safe-passages and repatriation readiness.

    Chabahar Port Puzzle & Infrastructure Stakes

    India’s Eurasian connectivity plan is based on two big projects, the Chabahar Port in Iran and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). New Delhi’s investments are designed to bypass overland blockades and build a direct trade route to Central Asia and Russia. However, the recent surge of regional hostilities has put these strategic transit corridors in temporary jeopardy.
    India can cede operational stakes to an indigenous Iranian operator to avoid secondary sanctions, or retain direct control and risk an instant diplomatic confrontation with Washington.
    The impasse starkly illustrates the tension between India’s desire for sovereign regional connectivity and the hard realities of international secondary sanctions regimes.

    Strategic Silence: Neutrality and Autonomy
    India’s quiet reactions and generic pleas for “dialogue and restraint” are often seen by detractors as diplomatically problematic – the reluctance of a rising power to take a stand. But this could also be interpreted as a deliberate tactic for survival.

    For decades, India has been decoupling its bilateral ties under its multi-alignment framework: procuring oil from Iran and the Gulf; sourcing weapons and defence technology from Israel; securing advanced technology and strategic backing from the U.S.; and taking sovereign wealth and capital out of the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

    Both the Russian and Iranian leaderships have publicly called upon India to use its unique position to be a long-term mediator, but New Delhi has deliberately refrained from doing so.

    India has thus been consciously avoiding “prestige politics” by not taking on high-risk mediation initiatives beyond its immediate regional mandate. This stance replaces grandstanding with pragmatic, transactional arrangements, such as securing localised maritime safe passages for its commercial ships, rather than seeking to resolve deep-seated ideological wars.

    Process Diplomacy: Handling Multilateral Frictions

    The West Asia skirmishes have also tested India’s aspirations to lead the Global South, particularly in larger international platforms such as BRICS. The June 2026 BRICS foreign ministers meeting held in India exposed the limitations of consensus-based diplomacy.


    Iran and the UAE, the new members, joined the forum in the midst of a heated deadlock; Tehran insisted on a direct and explicit condemnation of the U.S. and Israel, while Abu Dhabi countered with a call for a formal condemnation of Iranian actions in the region.

    India used procedural diplomacy to recognise internal rifts without sweeping them away, avoiding the fracturing of the broader multilateral partnership over regional disputes, and thereby preserving its bilateral capital with both capitals- Abu Dhabi and Tehran.

    Conclusion: Is Calibrated Silence Sustainable?

    India’s strategic quiet is not an abnegation of responsibility. It is a conscious effort to protect its national interests from a volatile external crisis. In a remarkable blend of procedural diplomacy at forums like BRICS, refusal to be sucked into risky regional mediation, and pragmatic bilateral hedging, New Delhi has managed to avoid burning its bridges with either Tehran or the US-Israel-Gulf axis.

    At the same time, this crisis is a crucial test of New Delhi’s professed policy of strategic autonomy. As the country’s domestic oil reserves dwindle and external sanctions squeeze key assets such as the Chabahar Port, the economic repercussions may ultimately outweigh the benefits of diplomatic quietude. India’s challenge going forward will be to ensure that its calculated neutrality is flexible enough to change if the regional balance tips into an outright breakdown of the regional order from a managed crisis.

    Feature Image Credit: https://thewire.in

  • Flattery’s Limits: How Pandering to Trump Undermines Pakistan’s Mediation

    Flattery’s Limits: How Pandering to Trump Undermines Pakistan’s Mediation

    Flattery may open doors, but it cannot sustain trust in high-stakes diplomacy. Pakistan’s Trump-centric approach reveals the limits of personality-driven foreign policy.

    Pakistan’s recent foreign policy under a hybrid regime led by its Field Marshal Asif Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is heavily influenced by a personality-driven dynamic, particularly in its engagement with Donald Trump. As pointed out by Mehdi Hasan, a British-American journalist and political commentator, in an interview with NDTV, Pakistanis have “done a good job of sucking up to Trump,” underscoring a growing reliance on flattery and ego-boosting tactics to remain in Trump’s good books.

    When Flattery Becomes a Diplomatic Constraint

    From the early phase of Donald Trump’s second term, especially after developments like Operation Sindoor, Pakistan openly credited Trump for ceasefire efforts—something India refrained from doing. Islamabad went further by nominating Trump multiple times for the Nobel Peace Prize. At many international platforms, particularly during the Gaza Board of Peace meeting in Washington and earlier at the Gaza peace summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Pakistan’s leadership left no stone unturned in praising Trump, with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif describing him as a “man of peace” and even a “saviour of South Asia.” Even during recent ceasefire extensions by Trump, Pakistan continued this pattern of excessive praise.

    This reflected a calculated strategy: to appeal to Trump’s personality, which is widely perceived as ego-driven and narcissistic. By consistently affirming his self-image and constantly putting messages into his psychological zone of acceptance. Pakistan managed to secure his attention and, to some extent, his favour. Of course, the United States has its own strategic calculations—particularly regarding Iran—but the personal dimension of Trump’s leadership style makes such flattery tactically useful in the short term.

    However, this approach is now showing clear limitations, especially in the context of reaching any peace deal with Iran. The very strategy that helped Pakistan gain proximity is now constraining its ability to act as a credible intermediary. Because Islamabad has focused primarily on sending positive, non-confrontational messages to Trump, it appears reluctant—or unable—to convey messages that might irritate or challenge him.

    This concern has been explicitly raised by Iranian voices. Iranian analysts and officials have questioned whether Pakistan is genuinely transmitting Tehran’s positions to Washington. One such voice, Iranian lawmaker Ebrahim Rezaei, pointed out that Pakistan is no longer seen as a neutral mediator. According to him, Islamabad selectively communicates, prioritising Trump’s preferences over balanced diplomacy. He stated that Pakistan “lacks the necessary credibility” and “always takes Trump’s ego into account and does not say a word against his wishes,” underscoring a growing perception that its role as an intermediary is increasingly compromised.

    Importantly, the United States now appears to be echoing similar concerns. A CNN report published on May 12, 2026, titled “Trump increasingly considers resuming large-scale military action against Iran,” stated that many Trump administration officials believed Pakistan had been sharing “a more positive version of the Iranian position with the US than what reflects reality,” while also questioning whether Islamabad was “aggressively conveying Trump’s displeasure” to Tehran. Significantly, an earlier CNN report published on May 6, 2026, titled “US and Iran closing in on memorandum aimed at ending war, source says,” had already hinted at scepticism inside the White House, noting that Pakistani mediators were presenting an optimistic assessment of Iranian flexibility that some US officials did not fully share.

    This is the core psychological flaw in a personality-centric foreign policy. When diplomacy is personalised to accommodate one man’s ego, it is bound to hinder strategic flexibility. Mediators must be in a position to deliver awkward truths and dissenting opinions. But when a state is afraid to upset a leader like Trump, it starts filtering messages, putting them into what can be called the ‘zone of psychological acceptance.’ Anything outside that zone is open to suppression.

    Erosion of Trust and Mediation Credibility

    As a result, trust erodes. Iran’s scepticism about Pakistan’s neutrality is not incidental—it is a direct consequence of this ego-management strategy. Even technical issues, such as disagreements over the scope of ceasefire agreements—for example, whether regions like Lebanon were included when the initial ceasefire between the United States and Iran was reached—became points of contention because communication was filtered, biased, and incomplete. This then became a major point of contention, with Iran maintaining that Lebanon formed part of the ceasefire framework, while the United States rejected this interpretation, deepening mistrust and reinforcing perceptions of inconsistency in how the agreement was conveyed. As Ebrahim Rezaei further said, “They are unwilling to tell the world that America first accepted Pakistan’s proposal but then went back on its word. They do not say that the Americans had commitments regarding Lebanon or the blocked assets, but that they failed to fulfil them. A mediator must be impartial, not always leaning to one side.”

    In the long run, such a policy is unsustainable. Personality-driven diplomacy may yield short-term visibility and tactical gains, but it weakens institutional credibility. Relationships built around individuals rather than enduring interests and institutions tend to fade with political transitions. When leadership changes in Washington, Pakistan may once again find itself marginalised, having invested too heavily in a single personality rather than in a broader strategic framework.

    As Pakistani security analyst and president of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, Muhammad Amir Rana, warned in his February 1, 2026, article “Pakistan’s Trump Test” published in Dawn, “The post-Trump phase will test Pakistan’s diplomacy and political leadership,” while also questioning “how far the country can maintain its relevance” once Trump exits the political stage. Rana further argued that Pakistan’s current diplomatic positioning is too closely tied to a “Trump-endorsed defence equation” and cautioned that, without developing “alternative strategic options,” Islamabad could face increasing diplomatic marginalisation in the future. These concerns reinforce the broader perception that Pakistan’s recent diplomatic gains are heavily dependent on Trump-era political dynamics rather than on durable institutional and bipartisan foundations in Washington.

    Playing to a leader’s ego can open doors, but it also shrinks the space for honest diplomacy. Pakistan’s experience suggests that an over-reliance on psychological appeasement in foreign policy can compromise both credibility and effectiveness in complex negotiations. As also noted by American psychologist Michael Maccoby in his book, “The Productive Narcissist: The Promise and Peril of Visionary Leadership,” leaders with strong narcissistic traits may initially respond positively to admiration and validation. However, their effectiveness tends to decline over time as underlying behavioural patterns become more visible. In such contexts, strategies based on flattery and ego management may generate short-term gains but ultimately constrain credibility and weaken long-term influence.

  • Actions Speak Louder than Words

    Actions Speak Louder than Words

    The recent kidnapping of President Maduro and his wife, with Venezuela being held to ransom at gunpoint, has made clear that it is not high-minded principles, but an imperialistic mindset and the grubbiness of colonial greed, the hankering for resources belonging to others, that has always been their sole motive.

     

    For years, American academics and mainstream media successfully portrayed American foreign policy as benign and dedicated to promoting freedom, democracy and human rights worldwide. Unfortunately, those involved in dealing with them intimately in the rest of the world, especially the Global South, knew better.

    Their benevolence was nothing more than a mirage. In practice, their malevolent and vindictive security and intelligence establishment used bribery and strong-arm tactics like coups, assassinations and kidnapping as their primary modus operandi to get their way. If none of those worked, then there was always the option of military intervention.

    If anything, we should be grateful to President Trump for two things. Firstly, for having swept aside the sludge of hypocrisy that the United States practised to justify its assertive foreign policy actions. For example, Operation Ajax, the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mossadegh’s democratically elected government in August 1953, was justified as a containment of communism, though he was not a communist. Similarly, Operation Iraqi Freedom, which resulted in the overthrow and execution of Saddam Hussein, was justified on the grounds that Iraq had WMDs and was supportive of Al-Qaeda. That simply turned out to be lies, known only after previous damage had been done.

    The recent kidnapping of President Maduro and his wife, with Venezuela being held to ransom at gunpoint, has made clear that it is not high-minded principles, but an imperialistic mindset and the grubbiness of colonial greed, the hankering for resources belonging to others, that has always been their sole motive. American exceptionalism, it turns out, was no different from how the strong have always behaved toward the weak, throughout history. As the Greek historian, Thucydides, put it, “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must”.

    Even Trump’s desire to occupy Greenland can be seen in this context. We seem to have forgotten that over 86% of Greenland’s 56000 population are Innuits, who were colonised by Denmark only in the 1700s. There has always been a strong movement for independence there, and polls as recently as 2023 have suggested over 85% of the population supports independence from Denmark. At the end of the day, this confrontation between the United States and Denmark is just about two imperialistic powers contesting territory that neither owns, to extract resources. Some may recall that we, too, have been victims of similar contestations between the English and other imperial powers as well.

    The second has been the treatment that he has meted out to his fellow Americans. They are at the receiving end of how America normally treats the world- with arrogance, a sense of entitlement, and the belief that it is above the law and can do as it pleases. Whether we openly admit it or not, there are many who believe that America has finally got its just desserts- “they who sow the wind, will reap the whirlwind” as Bible-thumping Americans would say. Whether they ever be able to get over Trumpism, even after he is gone, is debatable.

    Notwithstanding this singular truth, we continue to be confused by Trump’s actions. While many see them as incoherent and a symptom of American decline, others, including some here, believe his actions in America will degrade Chinese and Russian capabilities, dampening their geopolitical ambitions. Nothing could be further from the truth.

    America, for all its wealth and overwhelming military might, suffers from a human problem. An overwhelming unwillingness on the part of the average American to be treated as sacrificial lambs in support of imperialistic ambitions. After Iraq and Afghanistan, they do not see such actions as being in the national interest, but as just another initiative to fill the coffers of corporations and those who run them. If Trump, or any other American President for that matter, were to again actually put boots on the ground to implement ongoing plans, be it in Venezuela, Iran or Cuba, it would result in massive protests against the Government, especially once the body bags start rolling in, as they are bound to.

    Bullies only get their way as long as they are not challenged. The very reason for America’s hesitation, even unwillingness, to act as the World’s policeman, especially as hybrid warfare gains currency and conventional forces lose their ability to achieve total domination or success. Trump and his cronies have probably concluded that the security and prosperity of the continental United States lie in ensuring its effectiveness as a regional satrap rather than spreading itself too thin. Threats against Iran are just mere cosplay.

    This applies equally to the Chinese and the Russians, especially the latter, having been seriously debilitated by the million-plus losses that they have suffered in their seemingly unending conflict with Ukraine. The last thing President Xi would want is to find himself in Putin’s shoes, if a military assault on Taiwan were to go awry, as it very well might, given the complexities of amphibious assaults.

    For him to be able to carve out his place in history, action against India is a far more promising prospect. It would be at a much lesser cost and manageable risk, as the political establishment here, whatever be their ideologies, has little, if any, inclination or spine to confront the Chinese. This is borne out by the fact that the BJP and RSS hosted a Chinese Communist Party delegation at the very time that the Chinese Government has renewed its thrust on infrastructure development in the illegally occupied Shaksgam Valley.

    Actions always speak louder than words, and our diplomatic protests mean little when we act in the manner that we have. Incidentally, Chinese actions seriously undermine our positions in the Siachen Glacier and further complicate our already complex security environment. It is indeed time our political establishment and their oligarch friends faced reality, developed resilience and learnt to withstand some pain. Everything cannot be about profit or the chair; sometimes, national interest must take precedence.

    Feature Image Credit: bhaskarenglish.in ‘I’m Venezuela’s President, a prisoner of war’:Maduro denies all charges in US court as heavy gunfire erupts in Caracas
  • West Asian moves and countermoves: Challenges of them spinning out of control

    West Asian moves and countermoves: Challenges of them spinning out of control

    What will the complex calculus of the new Middle East crisis resolve into, and what will be the impact on India?

    ISRAEL has succeeded in diverting world attention from Gaza and Hamas to Iran. This is similar to how Hamas, in October 2023, successfully short-circuited US efforts at normalising relations between the Arab states and Israel under the Abrahams Accord.

    These moves and countermoves are ratcheting up the intensity of conflict in West Asia with serious global implications, including for India. The Indian approach seems to be similar to that in the case of the conflict in Ukraine— to play both sides.

    Countermoves

    Iran’s attack on Israeli soil is unprecedented. It is a response to the Israeli attack on its consulate in Syria on April 1, killing some of its top army commanders. It had warned of a retaliation and that gave Israel and its partners, the US, the UK, etc., time to prepare.

    The US had already moved its forces and prepared its allies in the region to shoot down the projectiles from Iran. Even Jordan apparently participated in this. Israel could take care of the projectiles that managed to reach its territory. So, 99 percent of the projectiles were shot down in the air and there was little damage in Israel.

    The Indian approach seems to be similar to that in the case of the conflict in Ukraine— to play both sides.

    It provided a sense of victory to Israel, the US and their allies. This was US President Joe Biden’s message to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and to forestall any immediate Israeli retaliation.

    Did Iran need 15 days to prepare to attack Israel? Could it not have used many more than 300 projectiles to attack to overwhelm Israeli defences? Could the Iranian allies like the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen not have fired a much larger number of projectiles?

    Clearly, Iran was making a show of avenging an attack on them but did not want to hit Israel. It did not want to provoke an attack on its territory from the much superior US and Israeli forces.

    The Iranian foreign minister stated in a press conference after the attack that the US, Turkey and some Arab neighbours were given advance information about the limited attack. The US has denied that it had advance information.

    Not only were 15 days given to Israel to prepare its defence, the timing of the attack was also conveyed in advance. The drones, which would take six–seven hours to reach Israel, and cruise missiles, which would take two–three hours, were bound to be neutralised given the advance preparations.

    Only ballistic missiles, which take only a few minutes to traverse the distance that exists between Israel and Iran, were a serious challenge, but due to the advanced notice and preparation, even they got neutralised.

    The Iranian army briefing after the attack also mentioned that the attack was a limited one and had achieved its objective and no more attacks would occur unless Israel attacked its territory. Thus, the Iranian attack was for show and not effect.

    The US and the G7 that met in the aftermath of the Iranian attack while condemning the Iranian attack suggested that Israel had won and that it should not retaliate against Iran.

    Some even argue that this presents an opportunity to take out Iran’s nuclear establishments and cripple its nuclear bomb capability.

    Indeed, Israel’s attack on the embassy in Syria was meant to draw the US and other allies into unequivocally supporting Israel. That support had been dwindling due to the ongoing genocide in Gaza which was inflaming world opinion. Israel has succeeded in this aim. Today, the attention has shifted from genocide in Gaza to the global implications of a wider war in West Asia.

    Pressures escalating

    The US, while saying it does not want an escalation and that it would not support an Israeli strike, has also said its support to Israel is “ironclad”. Just as Israel has defied US advice to avoid civilian casualties in Gaza and allow more humanitarian aid to enter, it can defy the current US advice to not escalate the conflict.

    Israel could attack, secure in the fact that the US and the allies would defend it if Iran retaliates substantially in response to the Israeli retaliation.

    Will Israel oblige by not attacking Iran? The ultra-right in Israel is pressurising the government to retaliate. They have been a part of the growing problem created by the displacement of Palestinians from the West Bank, coming up of new settlements and aggressive assertions in Jerusalem. All this has led to rising Palestinian resentment.

    Many Israelis and conservative Republicans in the US are arguing for Israeli retaliation. The Israeli war cabinet said the conflict is “not over yet” and we will “extract a price”.

    Even the moderate leader Benny Gantz wants retaliation, though at a time of Israel’s choosing. The ultras argue that Iran has crossed a red line by attacking Israeli soil and it must pay for that.

    Some even argue that this presents an opportunity to take out Iran’s nuclear establishments and cripple its nuclear bomb capability.

    Hamas’s action was a result of perceived subjugation and atrocities by Israel over a long period, which could not have been anticipated by Israel and the US.

    But, there are limits to such actions since there are other players who may be forced to intervene. Also, it could lead to a wider conflict in West Asia. The Sunni nations, though not allies of Iran, may also be forced to act. Already, some of these US allies have prohibited the use of their air space by the US.

    Limits of shadow fights

    Israel has a huge network of intelligence in not only Gaza but all over West Asia. It has been able to kill its opponents’ leaders in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Recently, it could kill the sons and grandsons of Hamas leader.

    But, the October 7 attack by Hamas in Israel and Hamas still being able to fight in Gaza six months later lays bare the limits of their intelligence. The extensive network of tunnels in Gaza, the troop strength of Hamas and Israel’s inability to get hostages released for six months also point to the same limitation.

    All this points to the limits of shadow fighting in international relations. Hamas’s attack on October 7 destroyed an equilibrium because it was willing to accept the massive death and destruction in Gaza.

    Israel’s attack on the embassy in Syria knowing that Iranians would retaliate has further shifted the out-of-equilibrium position. These instabilities are feeding into each other since one cannot anticipate what nations may do under uncertainty no matter how well a powerful nation may plan.

    Hamas’s action was a result of perceived subjugation and atrocities by Israel over a long period, which could not have been anticipated by Israel and the US.

    The attack on the embassy in Syria was also unanticipated and a result of Israel’s perception that Iran is behind the Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthis. Iran’s attack on Israel is also a result of its perception of having been attacked on its soil which required an attack on Israeli soil.

    Conclusion: Rising global challenges

    Now that the world is divided into two blocs, the situation has become more worrisome. Iran is a part of the bloc consisting of Russia and China. It has been supplying drones to Russia for its war in Ukraine. Even though this bloc may not want a second front, it cannot but stand with Iran in case of a Western bloc attack on Iran.

    Its stand on the issue will be a crucial determinant of what happens next. The stance of G7 and NATO will be vital since they have been unsuccessfully trying to restrain Israel. Military mobilisation will rise in key nations. The beneficiary will be the military-industrial complex.

    War in West Asia will impact the petroleum products market. If Iran is attacked and it blocks the Hormuz Strait or attacks oil tankers, petro-goods prices will rise. Shipping through the Suez has already been impacted and may face further disruption.

    India imports 85 percent of its petroleum requirements so the outgo of foreign exchange may increase leading to a deterioration in the balance of payments (BOP), weakening of the Indian rupee and higher inflation.

    Thus, the post-pandemic easing of supply bottlenecks may reappear and create inflation globally, disrupting many economies.

    India imports 85 percent of its petroleum requirements so the outgo of foreign exchange may increase leading to a deterioration in the balance of payments (BOP), weakening of the Indian rupee and higher inflation.

    Foreign investments may slow down. A substantial number of Indians working in West Asia may be forced to return and that will reduce repatriation by non-resident Indians.

    Thus, capital flows may be impacted and further aggravate the BOP. India would need to prepare for these challenges in the midst of the fraught election season where the leadership’s attention is not where it should be.

     

    This article was published earlier in The Leaflet.

    Feature Image Credit: Wall Street Journal.

  • Houthi’s attacks in the Red Sea: What does this mean for the world?

    Houthi’s attacks in the Red Sea: What does this mean for the world?

    The Houthis started in the 1990s as an armed group in Yemen, fighting against corruption. They belong to a community called Zaidis, who are a part of the Shia-Muslim minority. Along with Hamas and Hezbollah, the Houthis have declared themselves to be a part of the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” against Israel, the US, and the larger West.1 The Houthis have been attacking commercial ships passing through the lower Red Sea, and this has dramatically increased since mid-November in retaliation to Israel’s bombardment of Gaza. Due to these events, the Red Sea trade route is significantly affected, impacting the flow of global trade and having the potential to cause further damage. With ships attacked and stranded in one of the leading shipping routes of the world, countries seem to find themselves in yet another geopolitical fix. As the war continues between Israel and Gaza, the Red Sea has become a renewed hotspot for geopolitical and military tensions.

    Situated between Africa and West Asia, the Red Sea is a seawater entrance to the Indian Ocean in the south and goes through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab El Mandeb Strait, meeting the Gulf of Suez in the north. Countries like the US, France, Japan, and China have military bases in the region, including in Djibouti and many along the Horn of Africa, with considerable deployment of ships, weapons, and personnel. Establishing such bases conveys how critical it is to have control of the area as a measure of regional power and as a way of asserting their dominance internationally. Big players, including the Cold War rivals, have long struggled to gain presence and influence in West Asia. Having a military and economic presence in Africa with proximity to the Red Sea was necessary, for it provides access to almost 12% of the world’s trade, including nearly 40% of the trade between Europe and Asia.2 

    Until recently, the Houthis had been targeting ships heading towards Israel or ones that Israelis owned. However, recent developments showing attacks on ships bound for Israel with flags of various countries have raised grave concerns for global trade and security in the immediate future. The US, along with countries like the UK, France, and Bahrain, have tried to stop Houthi attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea under what Washington calls the “Operation Prosperity Guardian”. On the first day of the new year, The US military released a statement conveying that they killed at least 10 Houthi rebels and sabotaged three Houthi ships. Although the US was successful in deterring the Houthis from their attempt to attack, it did not do much to stop the group from being involved in disrupting peaceful navigation through the Red Sea.

    Private shipping companies such as Maersk, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and MSC have begun to avoid using the Red Sea route due to the imminent threat from Houthis.3  The ongoing supply chain disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could further escalate due to the Red Sea crisis and cause severe concerns for world trade and consumer goods supply. With the suspension of trade via the Suez Canal, traffic through the Red Sea has dropped by 35%.4  The Houthis have raised the shipping cost internationally, imposing additional costs on commerce when trouble at the Panama Canal due to low water levels has already made shipping more complicated and central banks worry about a new inflationary spike. While trade hasn’t wholly stopped, most ships can choose the longer but safer route around Africa through the Cape of Good Hope to reach Europe and Asia from either side. This option imposes significant costs on shipping and, therefore, to consumers and affects local states in the region if the Houthi “blockade” persists. In the worst-case scenario, crude oil prices would rise in 2024 if oil shipments through the canal were stopped entirely, and this could cause a significant disturbance.

    Image Credit: washingtoninstitute.org

    Surprisingly, though, Russian ships have enjoyed free navigation through the Red Sea. Russian ships travel to Asia through the Black Sea, connecting to the Mediterranean Sea, passing through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and joining the Indian Ocean. With sanctions from Europe and the US amid the war in Ukraine, Russia cannot afford to lose its markets in Asia, particularly India and China, since these two countries buy almost 90% of Russia’s oil exports.5  The free navigation of Russian ships could possibly be due to its close relationship with Iran or due to the adoption of a similar stance with the Houthis on the war between Israel and Gaza. In the unlikely scenario that Russia does not have access to the Red Sea, it leaves them with the only other option of travelling through the Cape of Good Hope, adding 8,900 kilometres with an additional two weeks of travel. Such delays in oil shipments and a highly possible hike in price may prompt countries like India and China to start looking for other alternatives to their oil requirement, given the pre-existing energy crisis. Most probable alternatives include Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries that do not need to pass the Red Sea to reach the Indian Ocean and thus Asian markets since they have ports in the Persian Gulf with access to the Arabian Sea.

    The disruption in trade has caused an impact on Indian imports and exports as well. Indian exports traverse the Indian Ocean and reach the Suez Canal through the Arabian Sea to reach European markets. Trade between India and Europe has been rising, at an all-time high in 2022, with goods traded worth $130 Billion.6   As of 2021, India engaged in trade worth $200 Billion through the Suez Canal, making the EU one of India’s main export destinations, with a Free trade agreement in the talks.7  India also procures its oil from Russia using the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. A slowdown or possible pause of oil imports may cause severe concerns amid the ongoing energy crisis. At such a juncture for the Indian economy, if the situation persists, trade will likely take a hit along with India’s domestic economy. If the condition fails to change decisively, the higher fees and the expense of prolonged travel duration will also put inflationary pressure on the global economy and India.

    The Houthis will most likely continue to put pressure on Israel to stop its onslaught in Gaza, and they are likely to keep attacking until they reach their goal. By taking control of the Red Sea and indirectly and directly hurting countries irrespective of their size and power, Houthis pressurize the international community to, in turn, put pressure on Israel. This also means that the group is unlikely to agree on any other way of settlement. Not only does this fall on Israel to stop their attacks but also on the US since the latter has always portrayed itself as a peace negotiator in the Middle East and, therefore, has the responsibility to restore order in the region. The Houthis possess a plethora of Iranian-supplied weaponry, ranging from precision drones to anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can strike a moving vessel hundreds of kilometres away. What makes the Houthis more dangerous is the enormous stockpile that can help them continue their campaign indefinitely.

    The attacks have also prompted an unanticipated return of Somali piracy in international seas. As a result, increased expenses are now a worry for merchant shipping lines and seafarer safety for governments worldwide. The ship Lila Norfolk, under the Liberian flag and carrying six Filipinos and fifteen Indians, was taken over by Somali pirates on January 4th, 2024. The Indian navy had already deployed four warships patrolling the Indian Ocean, including INS Chennai, which was involved in the rescue operation during the recent highjack of ship Lila Norfolk. Even though the Indian Navy’s intervention allowed for the sailors’ rescue, it caused further concerns for India’s security and economy. The spill over of these attacks onto the Indian Ocean may threaten India’s security.

    Countries must monitor developments in the Red Sea and, for India, the Indian Ocean. Although India has not joined any Western-led operations on this matter, the country must push the international community to ensure freedom of navigation and the territorial integrity of countries over their sea is upheld under the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas.

     

    References

    [1] Who are the Houthi rebels and why are they attacking Red Sea ships? (2023, December 23). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911

    [2] Yerushalmy, J. (2023, December 19). Red Sea crisis explained: what is happening and what does it mean for global trade? The Guardian.

    [3] A new Suez crisis threatens the world economy. (2023, December 16). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/international/2023/12/16/a-new-suez-crisis-threatens-the-world-economy

    [4] Graham, R., Murray, B., & Longley, A. (2023, December 19). Houthi Red Sea Attacks Start Shutting Down Merchant Shipping. Bloomberg.com. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-18/houthi-attacks-start-shutting-down-red-sea-merchant-shipping

    [5] Russia: crude oil shipments by destination 2023 | Statista. (2023, September 14). Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1350506/russia-crude-oil-shipments-by-destination/

    [6] I. (n.d.). First India-EU Trade and Technology Council: Significant Milestone in India-EU Relations – Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India). https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9416&lid=6112#:~:text=The%20EU%20is%20India’s%202nd,EU%20total%20trade%20in%20goods.

    [7] Ibid.

     

    Feature Image Credit: dailynewsegypt.com

  • The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The port of Chabahar is a seaport in south-eastern Iran, located on the Gulf of Oman, at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is situated in Sistan-va-Baluchestan, one of Iran’s least developed provinces. Contrary to Bandar Abbas, the busiest port in Iran, Chabahar is a deep-water port with direct access to the Indian Ocean that is outside the Hormuz Strait. It is Iran’s only seaport and consists of two separate ports called Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari. The last Shah of Iran proposed the port’s development in 1973. Work in Chabahar began when the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, was in power. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 hindered the development of this port. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, US firms involved in various infrastructure investments fled the country. The new government took on these projects. The port of Chabahar grew in importance during the Iran-Iraq war of 1983 when ships were hesitant to enter the Strait of Hormuz. The port’s first phase opened during the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran began shifting maritime trade up the east coast toward the Pakistani border to reduce the reliance on Persian Gulf ports which were susceptible to attack by the Iraq Air Force. Chabahar is substantial for its fishing industry and will serve as a major trade hub designed to connect South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Chabahar can emerge as a potential global trading hub – and an arena for geopolitical competition. Chabahar is vital for both India and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Suez Canal for transporting cargo to Europe. Chabahar is a strategic port from an Indian perspective. Apart from being easily accessible from India’s western coasts, it serves several important functions. For starters, by having access to the port, India can reduce its commute time to Central Asia by one-third. Second, a link between Afghanistan and India could be built without going through Pakistan and this could help the already established diplomatic, security and economic relationship between New Delhi and Kabul. Third, India gains road access to four cities in Afghanistan via Chabahar: Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif. This will help India strengthen its trade with Afghanistan (“Chabahar and Beyond” 2016). However, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 gives rise to a certain level of uncertainty. The current geopolitical environment, both regional and global, creates opportunities for India to overcome possible uncertainties.

    New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets.

    Being one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, expansion of trade relations and access to new markets is a necessity for India. As an investor, New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets. Pakistan’s Gwadar port is one possible route for India to access Central Asian markets, India has long aimed for alternative routes due to its adversarial relationship with Pakistan (“Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan,” n.d.). Additionally, the port will strengthen relations between India and Iran, which may help counterbalance strong Sino-Pakistani cooperation. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MEA), India and Iran share close historical and civilizational ties, “Our bilateral relations are marked by strong linkages across institutions, cultures and people-to-people ties,” the MEA said in a statement. Afghanistan also seeks to explore new trade routes to reach international markets. It aims to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, which handles most of the Afghan trade due to the country’s landlocked status. 

    Afghanistan is crucial for India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ strategy. India assisted Afghanistan in becoming a full member state of SAARC in 2007. It signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with Kabul in 2003 following the establishment of the interim government post the US’s intervention in 2001. Under the North-South Transport Corridor framework, India, Afghanistan, and Iran signed the Chabahar port agreement in 2003, allowing all three countries to use the Chabahar port as a trade hub. India is working on constructing the Chabahar port primarily to compete with the Gwadar port project and to connect it to Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). India has already built a 218-km-long road from Delaram to Zaranj (“India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan” 2008) and now plans to connect this road to Chabahar port and deliver goods through this route. India is also keen on using the Chabahar port to connect the oil-rich Central Asian countries by road connectivity via the Milak (Iran) and Zaranj-Dilaram (Afghanistan) roads. For India, the port, which is only 940 kilometers from Mundra in Gujarat, is about more than just facilitating the flow of trade with Afghanistan. Rather, the development of Chabahar is a crucial component of the country’s grand strategy to connect with Central Asia. India’s justification for wanting to develop the Chabahar Port goes beyond its interest in Afghanistan. Enhancing regional trade and connectivity as well as thwarting China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean are other top priorities for Indian foreign policy (“What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses,” n.d.).

    Geopolitical Challenges

    The port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    The competition for regional dominance between India and China can be seen in the development of ports in the regions. Indian involvement in the Chabahar port is important in securing India’s interest in the region. A calculative China will seize any opportunity that India might present in the port facility. If China moves in, Indian investments in the Chabahar port may be unfavorably affected (Pant and Mehta, 2018). A significant barrier is the complex nature of India-Iran relations, in which the former does not hold a privileged position. Given India’s priorities in the Middle East, it is unlikely that the relationship with Iran could compete with the comprehensive partnership that China and Pakistan share, which includes a strong defence and security arrangement. Iran may find it challenging to ignore or exclude China, its largest foreign investor, from the Chabahar project. Additionally, China has successfully completed several infrastructure projects in Iran, including the Tehran Metro, and has allocated US$ 1.5 billion through its EXIM Bank for the electrification of the Tehran-Mashhad railway line (“$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project” 2017).

    Peace and stability in Afghanistan will also impact the performance of the Chabahar Port. The tumultuous security situation in Afghanistan could jeopardise trilateral efforts between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to operate the Chabahar Port facility. And finally, the port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    References

    “$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project.” 2017. Financial Tribune. July 25, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/68986/update-15b-china-loan-for-iranian-rail-project.

    Amirthan, Shawn. 2016. “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement?” Strategic Analysis 41 (1): 87–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1249184.

    “Chabahar and Beyond.” 2016. Www.thehindubusinessline.com. May 25, 2016. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/chabahar-and-beyond/article8646239.ece.

    “Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan.” n.d. Thediplomat.com. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/chabahar-port-a-step-toward-connectivity-for-india-and-afghanistan/.

    “India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan.” 2008. Development News from Afghanistan, August 24, 2008. https://afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2008/08/24/india-completes-zaranj-delaram-highway-in-afghanistan/.

    Pant, Harsh V., and Ketan Mehta. 2018. “India in Chabahar.” Asian Survey 58 (4): 660–78. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.4.660.

    “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.” n.d. Idsa.in. https://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/40_1/india-iran-and-afghanistans-benefits-from-the-chabahar-port-agreement.

    Featured Image Credit: Lowy Institute

  • Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi: Yemen civil war and Regional Complexities

    Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi: Yemen civil war and Regional Complexities

    On 17th January, the Houthis conducted their first attack on Emirati soil in years. Carried out in the heart of the country– Abu Dhabi –with the help of a UAV, the attack killed three foreign nationals working in the city– two Indians and one Pakistani. In the aftermath of the attack, the Arab Coalition intensified the air bombings of key strongholds of the Houthis, leading to an increase in civilian casualties in a proxy war that has already caused several thousand civilians their lives. The attack has also underlined the capabilities of the Islamist political outfit in striking a distant country, and not just its northern neighbour. The attack has also rendered the UAE as a country susceptible to attacks from hostile groups in the region.

    Costs of UAE’s intervention strategy

    Importantly, the attack has led to a scrutiny of UAE’s policy vis-à-vis the hapless South Arabian country. Not long ago, in February 2020, the Emirati leadership, in an official ceremony addressing the recent returnee personnel deployed in Yemen, added an achievement to its touted ‘Peace First’ strategy in the country[1]. The gulf country had begun its troop withdrawal from the war-torn country in July of 2019[2]. This move, though remarkable, was hardly surprising by a country that was stopped in its tracks after finding itself as a part of the Arab Coalition[3] back in 2015. But the withdrawal of troops from Yemeni soil didn’t mean a dilution of its involvement in the Civil War. The move by the Emirates was seen as merely a shift from direct involvement to an indirect one.[4] The leadership of the country had utilized its presence in Yemen to cultivate and build a network of belligerents of the Civil War, such as the Sothern Transitional Council (STC), Security Belt Forces and the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite forces to name a few.[5] A withdrawn and non-aggressive UAE depends heavily both upon and sponsors such groups to keep its influence in the country afloat. It had reportedly trained some 90,000 South Yemenis during its stint in the country.[6] These militias have fought, in the past, against the Houthis, Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Islah and the ISIS. In December last year, one such group, the Giants Brigades, attacked Houthis, eventually defeating them in the Shabwah province. The Houthi attack in January is seen as a retaliation for this precise attack.

    In December last year, one such group, the Giants Brigades, attacked Houthis, eventually defeating them in the Shabwah province. The Houthi attack in January is seen as a retaliation for this precise attack.

    Another key takeaway from the attack on 17th January is associated with the Saudi Arabia-UAE partnership. The Emirates, which contributed the second-largest troops to the Arab Coalition, had virtually abandoned Saudi Arabia in its effort to bring the Hadi government back to Sana’a. Since 2016 up to the troops’ pull-out, the country had focused mainly on counter-terrorism operations, primarily targeting Islah.[7] The two partners were pitted against each other when, in 2019, the Emirati-backed STC pushed itself into the provinces of Shabwa and Abyan held by the Saudi-backed government. Now, with the Houthis becoming a potent threat to the security of the UAE, the stress between the two governments is set to cool down. The attack has made UAE substantially, if not equally vulnerable, when compared with Saudis, to Houthis’ aggression. But it is not likely that the country will put an end to its troop withdrawal strategy. Its focus is likely to be on strengthening its security apparatus, something already visible in French, American and Israeli assistance.

    Attacks boost UAE-Israel Strategic Partnership

    The Houthis conducted another failed attack on Abu Dhabi in late January during Israeli President Herzog’s visit. The day was chosen to deliver a message to both Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem. This, and other numerous attempts by the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia militia to attack the Emirates, is set to further firm up the already burgeoning ties between the two. Immediately after the January 17th attack, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett offered Israeli ‘security and intelligence support’ to the victim state[8]. He committed to partner with the UAE to defeat ‘common enemies’. Right after the signing of the Abraham Accords, both the countries embarked upon strengthening security-related ties[9], leading to the signing of a strategic agreement to develop unmanned military and commercial vessels in November last year. Both the countries have been susceptible to attacks by Iran’s proxies. It is Israel’s North-eastern neighbour Syria that has posed a threat to its security. Now, Houthis’ reach to the Emirati soil renders Israel vulnerable to similar attacks, with speculations already in works in Israel.[10] Additionally, Houthis’ ties with Lebanese Hezbollah could aggravate the situation further. Israeli-Emirati partnership seems to be the greatest benefactor of the attack.

    the UAE has been applauded for pursuing a balanced approach between Saudi Arabia and the US on one hand and Iran and its allies on the other[13]. But with the continuous attack on Abu Dhabi by Iranian proxies, the relations between the UAE and Iran are set to face road blocks

    Just as Emirates was coping with the deadly attack from Yemen, another Iraq-based armed group conducted a drone strike on Abu Dhabi. Known by the name Awliyat al-Waad al-Haq, or the True Promise Brigades, the Shia Islamist group is widely believed to have close ties with both Tehran and Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah. Though the Iranians have not publicly supported the attacks, they haven’t condemned them either. Moreover, the attacks on Abu Dhabi came just months after Emirati National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Tehran where he touted his visit as a ‘turning point’ for the two countries[11] and visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani to Abu Dhabi, declaring that the two countries had agreed to open ‘a new chapter’ in their bilateral relations[12]. Also, the UAE has been applauded for pursuing a balanced approach between Saudi Arabia and the US on one hand and Iran and its allies on the other[13]. But with the continuous attack on Abu Dhabi by Iranian proxies, the relations between the UAE and Iran are set to face road blocks.

    Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis

    Last year, in one of his first decisions regarding West Asia, President Biden revoked the Trump administration decision to recognize Houthis as a foreign terrorist group. After the recent attacks on Abu Dhabi and the al-Dhafra airbase, the Biden administration has been forced to reconsider its previous decision[14]. The US has, in response to the attacks, stepped up its naval deployment in the Gulf region, along with enhancing cooperation in intelligence and air defence with the Emirates. It also helped stave off other Houthi missile attacks on Abu Dhabi through US Patriot interceptors. The attacks also come at a crucial time when the talks between P5+1 and Iran regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal underway in Vienna. With eight rounds that have passed without any breakthrough, it remains to be seen how Houthi aggression impacts the JCPOA.

    The Civil War in Yemen is in its eighth year, with no signs of the end in near future. The casualties have reached as high as 377,000. It has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, pushing millions to the brink. According to a UNDP report, the war may cause more than 1.3 million casualties by 2030. Hence, we need to ask, has the international community failed to protect the Yemeni people?

    Notes

    [1] Jalal, I (2020, February 25), ‘The UAE may have withdrawn from Yemen, but it’s influence remains strong’ Middle East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong

    [2] Ibid

    [3] Salisbury, P. (2020, July 1), ‘Risk perception and appetite in UAE Foreign and national security policy’ Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/8-case-study-uae

    [4] Jalal, I (2020, February 25), ‘The UAE may have withdrawn from even, but it’s influence remains strong’ Middle East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Ibid

    [7] Salisbury, P. (2020, July 1), ‘Risk perception and appetite in UAE Foreign and national security policy’ Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/8-case-study-uae

    [8] TOI staff, (2022, January 18),’Bennett offers UAE security and intelligence support after attack by Houthis’ Times of Israelhttps://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-offers-uae-security-and-intelligence-support-after-attack-by-houthis/

    [9] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2021, August 6), ‘Restoring balance to UAE-Iran relations’ Doha Institute https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Restoring-Balance-to-UAE-Iran-Relations.aspx

    [10] Melman, Y. (2022, January 21),’After Abu Dhabi, is Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat next target for Houthi drone strike’ Haaretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-red-sea-eilat-target-houthi-iran-drone-strike-abu-dhabi-1.10553018

    [11] Hafezi, H. (2021, December 6), ‘UAE security official pays rare visit to Iran to discuss ties, regional issues’ Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-emirates-idAFKBN2IL0ME

    [12] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2021, August 6), ‘Restoring balance to UAE-Iran relations’ Doha Institutehttps://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Restoring-Balance-to-UAE-Iran-Relations.aspx

    [13] Ibid

    [14]  Landay, J (2022, January 20). ‘Biden says administration mulling re-designating Yemen’s Houthis a terrorist group’, Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-yemen-envoy-lenderking-visit-gulf-london-state-department-2022-01-19/

    Feature Image Credit: www.mirror.co.uk

    Image Credit: itv Times News

  • UAE-Israel Deal: An Analysis of its Regional Impact

    UAE-Israel Deal: An Analysis of its Regional Impact

    Introduction

    The recently brokered Abraham Accords Peace Agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Israel marks the beginning of the potential shift in West Asia’s existing power relations. Driven by their security interests, and in an attempt to amplify their power projections in the region, the two countries have come together, in what is being seen, as an opposition to the Iranian axis of influence. Although the normalization of relations with Israel marks a huge setback for the possibility of a Palestinian Statehood, several Arab countries are expected to jump on the bandwagon, with Bahrain having already concluded a treaty after UAE. This article highlights the eclectic mix of reactions from various players in West Asia and the potential opportunities and setbacks it brings with itself.

    Palestine

     Several countries held strongly pro-Palestine policies during the Cold War and decolonization period. However, in the last few decades, many have established ties with Israel; Egypt in 1979, and Jordan in1994 and now UAE and Bahrain in 2020. That being said, majority of the Arab and Gulf countries still officially do not recognize Israel. The United Arab Emirates announced its decision to normalize relations with Israel on 12th August 2020. There are many reasons why UAE and Bahrain decided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel; according to some analysts it is to counter Iran’s influence in the region, but for some it is also to establish trade and business contacts.

    However, do these developments indicate that countries in the Arab world are moving gradually into accepting Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands as ‘fait accompli’? A significant development that needs to be recognised is the fact that many West Asian countries no longer demand the return of Palestinian lands as a precondition to normalizing ties with Israel.

    The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have strongly criticised the deal and see it as betrayal of their rights and cause by the international community.

    It is long-known that Israel will not return to pre-1967 boundaries; in May 2020 Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly stated his plan to annex the West Bank. He has, however, postponed the implementation of his decision, probably indefinitely, in the interests of the deal that is likely to benefit Israel greatly.

    The Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have strongly criticised the deal and see it as betrayal of their rights and cause by the international community.  Banners  displaying “Treason” and “No to normalization with the occupier’ have come up across the region.  The Palestinian Authority, in very obvious response, have rejected the deals. These accords, as they rightly fear, affect the future of Palestinian sovereignty and legitimize Israel’s occupation.

    Turkey  

     President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sees himself as the champion of Muslims ever since he came to power in 2002. Under Erdogan, Turkey has pursued a clear pro-Palestinian stance. Turkey has indeed provided aid to Palestine at various times, including during COVID-19. It has criticized Trump’s peace plan for the Israel-Palestine conflict, for ignoring Palestinians’ legitimate rights. Not surprisingly, Turkey is clearly unhappy with UAE’s and Bahrain’s steps to normalize ties with Israel. Turkey has threatened with the option of halting diplomatic relations with UAE over the deal.

    However, for Palestinians Turkey’s statements ring hypocritical and hallow. Turkey was one of the earliest and the first Muslim majority state to recognize Israel in 1949. Turkey and Israel have a long history of intelligence cooperation. Even in the current situation, Turkey is focused more on dealing with the UAE on this issue, rather than Israel. Nevertheless, speaking for Palestinian rights in the international forum is equally important. In that respect, Turkey’s voice in support of the Palestinian cause is an important one.

    Saudi Arabia

     Saudi Arabia, long seen as the champion of Islamic nations, particularly in view of the fact that it is home to the two holiest shrines of Islam. Therefore, this peace agreement is a shock to the conservatives who form the majority in the Kingdom. This move by the UAE is seen as going along with the Jewish regime that denies the rights of the Palestinian Muslims. However, the Foreign Minister, Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said the deal could be seen as positive, but his country will not normalize relations until peace is signed with the Palestinians,  within the framework of the Arab Peace Initiative.  Saudi Arabia’s track record of its unwavering support to the Palestinian cause from the days of the Yom Kippur war, also known as Ramadan War, makes the nation’s stance on the ‘Abraham Accords’ more influential than any other Gulf country. The advocacy for Palestinian state runs deep in the Saudi people. As a result, Saudi leadership’s slightest inclination towards the agreement could spark unrest among its citizens.

    The current regime under the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), who is a very capable leader compared to his predecessors because of his broader outlook to mend diplomatic ties with the regional enemies, yields an element of uncertainty as he may be inclined towards the accord. The political and ideological differences between the people of Saudi and their leader might spark cynicism towards the government; hence, support for the accord is implausible in the short term.

    Israel, which shares the Red Sea coastline with the country and is a major player in technology innovations in the region, makes it an ideal ally for the Kingdom.

    The idea, however, is not wholly inconceivable because of MBS’s Vision 2030. Upon ascending the throne, the Crown Prince has constructed an elaborate plan to detach the Kingdom’s dependence on its natural resources and focus on bringing in diverse investments into the country. One of the main plans is to develop the Red Sea Coastline by exploiting its tourism prospects by building a smart city. Israel, which shares the Red Sea coastline with the country and is a major player in technology innovations in the region, makes it an ideal ally for the Kingdom. One of the other factors that could generate a coalition between Saudi Arabia and Israel is their common enemy, Iran.

    If MBS does accept the accord, it may not come as a surprise, but that does not warrant the fact that there is a high possibility of the decision shocking many conservative and religious establishments.  In retrospect, that could give birth to the “new” Saudi Arabia that the crown prince has promised to build.

    Qatar

    Qatar, which is considered the most developed state in the Gulf region, is in the middle of a diplomatic standoff with the regional players. Its dispute with the two major states, Saudi Arabia and UAE, has made the state go out of its way to establish diplomatic ties with parties that are not particularly approved by the GCC. The state has not given any official statement on the accord, but it’s closeness with Iran may be taken as an unofficial veto to the accord in itself. Qatar’s close relationship with the US and Iran has been a subject of debate ever since the Gulf crisis, but the state has somehow managed not to let the relationship cut across each other. This particular agreement with Israel orchestrated by the Trump government could pressure Qatar to push and resolve its issues with the UAE.

    Like any other Arab country, Qatar has advocated for the Palestinian state. It took it a little further by investing in the Gaza Strip, funding welfare payments to the coastal territory. One can suspect that the Emirati’s decision to form a coalition with the Israeli state will only deepen the ties between Qatar and Palestine.

    Though the Qatar government has been silent about the accord, Doha based news media, Al Jazeera has not shied away from raising concerns regarding the agreement. It even went to the extent of calling the accord ‘PR stunt’ initiated by the UAE. It’s support to Palestine and capitalisation of the hashtag ‘normalization as betrayal’ have received a lot of criticism from those countries that support the agreement. Qatar has always been hostile to Israel’s treatment towards the Palestinian state but has managed to have practical relations with Israel.

    Iran  

    As the world witnesses the coming together of the United Arab Emirates and Israel, two of the former adversaries, it comes as no surprise that Iran has been aggressively lashing out against the deal. With Iran still reeling under the economic pressure of the US sanctions, President Rouhani has called the deal a ‘betrayal’, aimed at satisfying the United States at a time when President Trump prepares himself to run in the national election in November. The leader of Iran-backed Hezbollah has also condemned the deal on similar grounds. Iran’s disapproval stems from two main factors – first, from its support for the Palestinian statehood; and second, more realistically, due to the increasing influence of Israel-United States nexus in the region and consequently its declining axis of influence. Iran’s insecurity is speculated to have stemmed from the confluence of actors that oppose the Islamic Republic’s attempts to establish its hegemony in the region. The confluence opens up the possibility of shifting the regional balance of power in favour of Israel, and Saudi Arabia, under the shadow of the United States. While Saudi Arabia and Israel do not yet have an official diplomatic relationship, various reports suggesting backdoor diplomacy between the two countries have surfaced over the years. The common factor bringing the two countries together has most often been assumed as the perceived threat from Iran.

    Iran and UAE, on the other hand, while maintaining a meaningful trade relationship, continue to have persistent sources of bilateral tension.

    On the other hand, while Iran and Israel have often been engaged in rhetoric of bellicose jingoism towards one another, it is essential to note that both the countries maintained a friendly relationship before the Iranian revolution of 1979, with Iran being the second Muslim country recognizing the state of Israel.

    Iran and UAE, on the other hand, while maintaining a meaningful trade relationship, continue to have persistent sources of bilateral tension, one of which is the unresolved territorial dispute over the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, which lie near the critical Strait of Hormuz, providing access to key shipping lanes. Despite UAE’s historical claims over their sovereignty, the islands that were forcefully occupied by Iran continue to be a strain in the relationship between the two countries. A second irritant is a growing relationship between UAE and the United States, with the former becoming one of the largest importers of US weapons and providing the US with military bases and intelligence on Iran. Worried about the growing Iranian aggression, the country has maintained a strong security relationship with the United States and has often supported the UNSC resolutions to bar sensitive materials and technology to Iran.

    Yemen

    The conflict in Yemen that began to unravel with the spread of Arab Spring in 2011 has resulted in an unprecedented loss of civilian lives across the country, making Yemen one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The Israel-UAE deal, which reflects the beginning of normalization of ties between Arab countries and Israel, cannot be seen in isolation from the region’s larger volatile landscape. The Peace Treaty, as it is being termed, brings with itself a plethora of threats that seek to shift the existing power relations, without aiming at the cessation of violence. UAE’s increasing outreach must be looked at in the context of its increasingly interventionist policies, especially in Yemen. The deal may ultimately lead to more interference and militarization in Yemen, prolonging the prospects for conflict resolution, and sustaining hostile conditions.

    Varied responses to the deal can be seen with the Yemeni government, and the Houthis, an armed group championing Yemen’s Zaidi Shia Muslim minority, coming out in opposition to the deal in a bid to continue their support for Palestine. On the other hand, it comes as no surprise that members of the Southern Transitional Council (southern separatists), which gets its support from the UAE, have applauded the treaty to build cooperation between UAE and Israel.

    Interest and interference in Yemen are of tremendous strategic significance to both Israel and UAE.

    Interest and interference in Yemen are of tremendous strategic significance to both Israel and UAE. In a show of its strengthening military projection, UAE seized control of the Yemeni island of Socotra, located in the Indian Ocean,allegedly allowing Israel to establish its presence in the region. The archipelago sits at a crucial strategic position en-route to Bab el-Mandeb, providing access to key shipping lanes.

    On the other hand, while there exists no diplomatic relationship between Yemen and Israel, the latter has often been seen intervening in the ongoing conflict in Yemen, “under the pretext of defending its interests in the Red Sea and the Strait of Bab-El-Mandeb”. With a military base already constructed at Emba Soira in Eritrea, Israel continues to increase its strategic presence across the Strait. Further, as speculations about the possible Houthi-Iran cooperation spread across the region, Israel’s surveillance centres continue to monitor the armed group’s actions and other actors in Yemen.

    Conclusion

    Palestine is a very sensitive and rousing issue for most of the citizens in West Asia. It is a shared memory of betrayal and expulsion; indeed, many politicians in West Asia use Palestine as an element in their speech and citizens also use it during slogans referring to Palestine protests.

    That being said, these deals are coming at a time when Israel is increasing its hawkish behaviour towards the Palestinians. Once the annexation happens, one cannot help but wonder how it could change the landscape of West Asia. Thus far, the progress made is the mild indication of some major players in the region favouring the accord.  Analysts suspect that the support for the accord will gain momentum in the long-term side-tracking religious, cultural and social identities to maintain diplomatic relations for economic growth.  If all countries, therefore, become friendly with Israel, will the annexation only receive loud threats with no actions?

    This study is put together by Dharika Athray, Rupal Anand, and Vrinda Aiyaswamy. All of them are Research Interns at TPF.

  • The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction

    The Geopolitics of Syria’s Reconstruction

    Introduction

    Syria’s territories are controlled by a variety of actors – Al Assad’s regime (with Russia and Iran as its supporters); Kurdish dominated self-administration (with a small number of US troops supporting them); Turkey and its affiliated militias; and the Syrian Salvation Government affiliated to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaida offshoot.

    Fragmentation of the state’s territories, as the state lost control of its territories, resulted in the emergence of a network of localised war economies with numerous local and foreign actors being involved. War economies emerged in territories held by Assad’s regime as well as those under the control of various other opposition parties, characterised by an increase in smuggling of goods (among which essential goods, crude oil and arms were popular), extortion, rent seeking for essential services, and taxation of goods at checkpoints established by the warring parties, including local warlords, opposition armed groups or regime’s militias. The Syrian Arab army is also reported to have engaged in rent seeking behaviour through the establishment in recaptured territories (Hinnebusch, 2020).

    Another area of priority for armed opposition groups is the border crossings with Turkey whose access they have sought to control. The Ahrar-Al Sham group, established control over the Bab al-Hawa crossing between 2015-16, and earned around $5 million per month. Armed opposition groups have been involved in conflict with each other over control for border crossings, particularly conflict between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahrar al-Sham in 2017 (al-Kattan, 2017).

    The Syrian army (that was cross-sectarian) is in crisis of its reducing force size as it is hampered by resistance to conscriptions and many desertions. The Alawite sect was co-opted into the state’s army, political and security apparatus, resulting in tensions along sectarian lines. Another significant development was that those among the pre-war elite who advocated for a political solution based on power sharing were expelled from it, resulting in the contraction of the core to comprise of individuals along sectarian lines. Further, pro-regime militias emerged as pro-government communities were forced to rely on themselves for their defence, leading to a widespread localisation of power to fiefdoms (al-Kattan, 2017).

    The political, economic and security dimensions of the conflict which led to the emergence of war economies has been accompanied by shift of composition of the economy marked by the emergence of ‘war commanders’ and a decentralised elite, who capitalised on evading sanctions, served as middlemen between the armed groups of the state and opposition and established monopoly upon the supply of goods and services.

     These developments further led to the emergence of new centres of power which existed alongside the existing regime that consolidated its power by strengthening its relations with the new elite, army and security sector.

    The domestic dynamics of the Syrian conflict are closely related to a wider geopolitical struggle among regional and external actors who act as patrons for the domestic actors.

    In addition, by portraying itself as a bulwark against radical Islamism and strengthening its relations with influential individuals in minority communities and providing them with disproportionate authority within their societies, the regime’s efforts have redefined existing social hierarchies and co-opted pro-regime minority leaders to power. The regime’s policies, throughout the war, have not only strengthened the neo-patrimonial nature of the State and its relations with its multiple networks but lead to the decentralisation of a system of neo-patrimonialism (Middle East Institute & Etana Syria, 2020).

    The domestic dynamics of the Syrian conflict are closely related to a wider geopolitical struggle among regional and external actors who act as patrons for the domestic actors. The Syrian conflict that began as an internal conflict emerged into a proxy conflict where regional struggle for influence played out between the ‘resistance axis’ comprising of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran, and Sunni dominated ’moderate’ states comprising of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. The latter wished replace the Assad regime that was aligned towards the ‘resistance axis.’ Iran considers the Syrian conflict as threat to its survival and its ability to support Hizbollah against Israel.  The rival axes instrumentalised sectarianism as a part of their discourse and in their support for proxies. However, the interests of those within the Sunni camp clashed (with Turkey and Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Arabia and UAE against the Muslim Brotherhood and its version of political Islam) resulting in division of the Sunni camp further leading to the division of their proxies (Aita, 2020).

    The global struggle for power between the US and Russia, with the former promoting a liberal world order and advance its hegemonic interests, and the latter interested in increasing its sphere of influence, limiting US intervention while emphasising on state sovereignty. Russian intervention in Syria in support of the Assad regime tilted the power balance in its favour allowing the regime to gain control of its lost territories.

    Image Credit: Al Araby

    US sought to limit direct intervention in Syria while relying on proxies and financial sanctions (that it pursued along with the EU) to pressurise Assad’s regime to compromise to a solution that would promote its interests. Assad’s regime, due to its connection Iran, Shia militas in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon, was able to manage despite the external pressure it faced. US attention and efforts were diverted to controlling ISIS. In 2019, while US withdrew from Northern Syria due Turkish intervention against the Kurdish forces, it announced it would redeploy its forces to the energy reserves in Deir ez-Zor to prevent Assad’s forces or ISIS from gaining control over them (Hinnebusch, 2020).

    The geo-political struggle for influence in the Syrian conflict among regional and global actors, has also transcended into efforts to capitalise on Syria’s post-war reconstruction efforts and business.

    With diversion of US efforts towards constraining ISIS, Russian intervention, growing differences between Saudi and Qatar, Saudi and UAE intervention in Yemen, have all resulted in a gradual withdrawal of the GCC, leading to a rise in the role played by Turkey, Iran and Russia. Turkey’s role and interests evolved from installing a Brotherhood government and targeting the regime to controlling the Syrian Kurdish PYD, which it views as a terrorist organisation. The threat of a confrontation with Moscow in Syria allowed it to participate in the Astana Process and a gradual realignment of its policy with that of Russia’s policy. More recently, Turkey and Russia have brokered a ceasefire deal in Idlib.

    The geo-political struggle for influence in the Syrian conflict among regional and global actors, has also transcended into efforts to capitalise on Syria’s post-war reconstruction efforts and business.

    This paper explores the local, regional and international dimensions of reconstruction and development Syria while analysing the impact the war has had on the political economy of Syria.

    Internal dynamics of Syria’s reconstruction

    The internal dynamics of Syria’s reconstruction are characterised by conflict among Syrian actors (supported by external actors) for resources and instruments that would lead them to strengthen their control. The regime views reconstruction efforts as a means to consolidate its authority and power over the country.

    Image Credit: NYT

    While the efforts made by the regime to consolidate its power and authority served its objectives and reduce the costs of governance, they have led to the decentralisation of political and security apparatus at the local levels. In addition, Iran and Russia continue to establish relations based on patronage with several Syrian clients. The integration of Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi’i militias and Iran’s revolutionary guards, have further loosened the control the regime holds over the security apparatus and strengthened sectarianism.

    The efforts of Assad’s regime have been directed at satisfying its loyalist elite on whom it is vitally dependent to legitimise its authority and power, and to a lesser extent the public.

    The regime sought to prevent local security apparatus from capitalising on their autonomy by incorporating them into the newly established units under centralised defence forces as in the case of the 5th Army Corps, although this was only partially successful. Russian intervention and participation in the conflict allowed it to establish order in the army.  The paucity of manpower further prevents the regime from extending its authority over the entire country, forcing it to continue to depend on its relations with tribal leaders and local warlords (Hinnebusch, 2020).

    The efforts of Assad’s regime have been directed at satisfying its loyalist elite on whom it is vitally dependent to legitimise its authority and power, and to a lesser extent the public. It encouraged its loyalists to participate and reap benefits off the war economies during the war as its authority over its local proxies declined, while the threat of being targeted by the opposition has ensured that the elites remain loyal. With the localisation of war, the regime has strengthened its relations with the elite while consolidating its power by encouraging investment of income and revenues earned through illicit means into the formal economy. The elite, the warlords, who are partners in the conflict are increasingly participating in the formal economy by setting up formal companies and businesses. However, there remains much to be done to fully integrate them into the productive economy, discourage involvement in rent seeking, and to promote the revival of a productive economy (Sinjab, 2017).

    One of the major effects of the conflict and its resulting socio-economic and political patterns has been the lawlessness, that serves as a deterrent to socio, economic and political cohesion, further preventing the investments required for reconstruction.

    Legislation aimed at Reconstruction

    The regime’s economic strategy for reconstruction namely the ‘National Partnership’, enforced in 2016, allows public bodies to form private investment companies while supporting the establishment of private firms.

    Image Credit: BBC

    Private investors are encouraged to investing in the remaining public property allowing the government to retain its influence on the economic movements. This serves the purpose of attracting new investors to invest in lucrative opportunities while the investments serve to support regime’s prime customers and clients. The legislation also enables them to obtain and secure public sector properties at the cost of the state treasury’s finances, thereby raising a doubt regarding the ability of the ‘new elite’ to alter the nature of the enterprise. Another significant measure taken by the regime as part of its reconstruction repertoire are property and urban reconstruction laws, including the Law 66 of 2012 and Law No 10 of 2018, that expropriate land and property from displaced opposition supporters in substandard living conditions and reallocate them to new upscale housing. This is meant to gather the support of the regime’s loyalists. The regime by creating uncertainty about the security of the property could discourage all investors with the exception of a few capitalists (Daher, 2018).

    Despite the fact that restrictions on capital movement makes it very difficult to attract investments into Syria, the Syrian government is implementing policies and schemes to attract financial aid from outside. It intends to tax finance inflows ranging from money sent by expatriates into Syria for humanitarian aid, which must be channelled through NGO’s funded by the regime. It also intends to attract $100 billion worth Syrian currency held outside Syria through tax concessions and by launching the Syrian International Business Association (SIBA) under the auspices of World Bank. Analysts warn about the difficulties associated with investments from other nations. They suspect that given the dispersion of investments, diaspora would find it difficult to compete with loyalists for reconstruction contracts and there may be issues with fraudulent officials and widespread corruption. The assets of those businessmen who left the state have been frozen. Lastly, the US and EU-imposed multilateral sanctions led to Syria being cut off from the international banking system(Aita, 2020).

    The Syrian Government has declared that reconstruction contracts will be granted to its supporters and not countries who supported its opposition. It has also offered concessions in order to attract investments from Russia and Iran, but this may jeopardize Syria’s financial independence in the coming years.

    Reconstruction of Syria would lead to stronger relations with Iran and Russia followed by simultaneous decline in relations with the West (to whoom it exported a major portion of its oil ) and the Arab Gulf. Previous economic partners may engage in reconstruction in areas where there is negligible regime-control. The reconstruction parameters are bound to affect Syria’s social fabric. The gap between the rich and the poor has widened due to the war economy. The rigged economy will put the interests and benefits of the common people in peril.

    Geopolitical Dynamics of Reconstruction

    The geopolitical struggle over reconstruction among competing players at the regional level is centred around increasing one’s own influence, either through direct intervention or proxies. Considering that different parts of Syria is under the control of different parties there is every chance that Syrian reconstruction effort may not be an integrated effort across the nation but rather take the form of parallel reconstruction initiatives across the many different areas of Syria.

    The global geo-economic factors influence whether resources become available for reconstruction and on what terms. Because the powers that are geopolitically strongest on the ground in Syria (Russia, Iran) are geo-economically weaker than those who lost the geopolitical conflict (US, EU, Gulf), the latter are using the capital that they can withhold and obstruct or seek to leverage their contribution to effect the looming winding down of the military conflict on their terms. They, together with the World Bank, are making their participation conditional on a political settlement. Specifically, this will affect whether the regime will be able to reconstitute authority over the country’s territory and its reconstruction, or will be forced into some sort of power-sharing/territorial confederation or, these failing, reconstruction deepens fragmentation. If the parties do not reach a compromise the outcome could be a frozen conflict consolidated by separate and minimalist reconstruction tracks.

    Further, regional and global actors that have not participated in the conflict happen to be economically stronger and have the means to mobilise resources. Their support and resources to fund the reconstruction and development of Syria remain contingent on the ability of Assad’s regime to fulfil their conditions of a political settlement.

    Russia’s Reconstruction Support

    Russia’s role in Syria’s reconstruction have been driven by the benefits a stable Syria could provide it. It has provided Assad’s regime with support in economic and military terms and settled Syria’s debt. Russia also seeks to renew and recoup its pre-war investments in infrastructure and energy sector, and establish new contracts in geo-strategic areas. Assad’s regime has been granted a preferential role in redevelopment of its energy and infrastructure sectors. The state of the Russian economy has made lesser resources available for investment. The risk of investing in Syria due to the political and security climate and the threat of being targeted by US sanctions have led to minimal investment into Syria. The entities that have invested are operated/owned by oligarchs close to Putin, and those under sanctions, for instance, Gennady Tim-Chenko’s construction company (Van Veen, 2020).

    Russia has realised that it lacks the resources to actively finance Syria’s reconstruction effort and instead focussed its efforts on building the state institutions necessary to provide adequate security infrastructure, which is an important pre-condition for any reconstruction effort.

    Russia has realised that it lacks the resources to actively finance Syria’s reconstruction effort and instead focussed its efforts on building the state institutions necessary to provide adequate security infrastructure, which is an important pre-condition for any reconstruction effort. Simultaneously it tried to seek support from the European Union and international organisations to create the necessary infrastructure required to facilitate the return of refugees based out of Europe while ensuring the attainment of a political settlement that helps Bashar Al Assad to stay in power (Daher, 2018).

    Image Credit: NYT

    Russia has also worked with the Assad regime to implement policies aimed at the return of refugees thereby addressing some of the requirements and requests of the European Union. However, Bashar Al Assad has so far only paid lip service to such requests.  For instance a law intended to promote reconstruction projects has been amended under Russian pressure but without any major changes to its provisions and was used to expropriate the property of Syrians who fled abroad.

    Iran’s Role

    Iran has provided Assad’s regime around $16billion worth of financial aid since 2012.It has provided an additional $3.5 million in 2013 which was further extended by $1 billion in 2015 and $6.4 billion and $700million to pro-Iran militias in Syria.   It has expressed its interests in participating in the reconstruction of Syria. Iranian entities were awarded numerous contracts worth millions of dollars to initiate redevelopment of the electricity infrastructure by the central government as well as local governments but are yet to be implemented. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, who have considerable experience in participating in the reconstruction of Iran after the Iran-Iraq war and own vast construction companies in Iran, have entered into agreements in the sectors of mining and communications. While Iran has stated it would offer $1 billion for reconstruction, the amount it pledged is a minuscule amount of the total funds required. Iran’s participation in Syria’s reconstruction is also likely to be limited due to the impact of US sanctions on its own economy(Van Veen, 2020).

    Diminished role of US, EU and Arab States

    As for regime controlled parts of Syria, Washington moved to block reconstruction funding in these areas. US pundits argued that the regime would inevitably be empowered by reconstruction and should not be rewarded for its brutal repression of the uprising; anti-regime interest groups moved not only to preclude US funding but also to erect obstacles to others participating in reconstruction. In April 2018 the US Congress passed the No Assistance for Assad Act (NAAA) which was designed to prevent any drift from humanitarian assistance to reconstruction stabilization, and according to Faysal Itani, had the effect of ‘killing any World Bank dreams to get funding to operate in Syria’. Indeed, the US has a long history of directing the flow of world financial capital via sanctions, conditionality, etc. for its geopolitical purposes; in Syria, it seeks to manipulate money (geo-economics) to obtain what it could not achieve via geopolitics: specifically, keeping Syria a failed state that would make it a resource-draining burden for Russia and its allies.

    The US has used its influence in North-Eastern Syria, to counter efforts by the Assad regime to consolidate its power over Syria which is a precursor to a “nationally integrated” reconstruction. Establishing control over energy reserves is essential for Assad’s regime to pursue its reconstruction efforts successfully. The US, by controlling reserves in the North-East Syria, has been able to deprive Syria’s access to essential resources.

    US efforts in reconstruction have been motivated by its interests to deter any reconstruction efforts sponsored by the regime through geo-economics measures such as sanctions, when its geo-political efforts have had limited success in motivating Syria and its allies in pursuing a political solution in line with US policy interests.

    The US campaign against ISIS devastated Raqqa but reconstruction there has remained limited to stabilization measures. The Trump administration tried to get the Saudis to assume the burden of reconstruction (asking for $4 billion). The US goal was to start enough reconstruction to deter any move in the area to join regime sponsored reconstruction efforts (Alaaldin et.al., 2018; Burcher, 2018; Harris, 2018; US Congress, 2018;). US efforts at convincing Saudi Arabia to undertake reconstruction efforts have not been successful as the latter offered relatively smaller amount (al-Khateb, 2020).

    US efforts in reconstruction have been motivated by its interests to deter any reconstruction efforts sponsored by the regime through geo-economics measures such as sanctions, when its geo-political efforts have had limited success in motivating Syria and its allies in pursuing a political solution in line with US policy interests.  It simultaneously blocked reconstruction funding directed towards territories under the control of the regime. The Caesar Act, now incorporated into the National Defence Act of 2020, targets investment into Syria, through individuals and businesses coming into the ambit of the UN sanctions (Hinnebusch, 2020).

    While the EU has provided substantial aid to Syrian refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries, it has made its aid and participation in reconstruction contingent on efforts to reach a political solution that is in accordance with ‘UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communique’

    The EU has been affected by the Syrian Conflict due to the influx of refugees and large-scale migration of its citizens to partake in terrorist activities. While the EU has provided substantial aid to Syrian refugees in Syria’s neighbouring countries, it has made its aid and participation in reconstruction contingent on efforts to reach a political solution that is in accordance with ‘UNSCR 2254 and the Geneva Communique’ (Van Veen, 2020).

    Russia is making efforts to broker a political settlement of sorts, with Turkey’s support, to convince EU to invest in reconstruction to enable refugees to return. While the EU seems to be relying on the inability of Syria’s allies to support its funding and thus force Assad to agree to the EU’s conditions, the regime does not seem to be interested in accepting EU conditions and give up its power in return for support of its reconstruction. However, individuals EU states have participated in reconstruction efforts in a limited manner in both the regime-held as well as opposition-held areas.

    Turkey continues to be one of Syria’s top trading partners. Numerous Syrian businessmen who have been exiled have invested in Turkey, around 26% of foreign investment in Turkey in 2014 originated from Syrian businessmen, particularly in its border regions with Syria. While a number of exiled Syrian businessmen supported the opposition, their investment would be instrumental, if mobilised, in territories held by Turkey and its militias at a time when refugees are returning to the region. While the Syrian government is against the participation of Turkey in the reconstruction of Aleppo, Russia’s efforts in mediation would lead Turkey to participate in the reconstruction process. Turkey has invested significantly in establishing institutions facilitating the governance of areas under its control and also in building economic infrastructure in these areas (Daher, 2018).

    While Jordan and Lebanon have expressed interest in participating in the reconstruction of Syria, the resources they can mobilise are limited.  The Gulf countries have, no doubt the resources required for reconstruction, but have made their role in Syria’s reconstruction contingent on withdrawal of Iran and its proxies and in case of some countries, a regime change. The UAE as expressed its interest in participating in Syria’s reconstruction so as to limit Iran’s influence. However, Yazigi (2017) states that reconstruction efforts, in the case of  Lebanon, were contingent on a solution that emphasised upon power-sharing, backed by regional and international actors and substantial financial aid from Saudi Arabia. It is unlikely that either of the two scenarios would play out in the case of Syria.

    China: A Possible Contender?

    the Chinese state considers Al Assad’s regime as a bulwark against terrorism and its relations with the regime an asset in combating Uighurs who are participating on the behalf of terrorists.

    China has expressed its interest in participating in the reconstruction of Syria to advance its interests through investments in economy and geo-strategic areas such as the maritime sector, and to develop and connect its Belt and Road Initiative in the region. Given China’s interests, size and nature of China’s capital, China becomes a viable partner in the reconstruction of Syria.  China conducted a trade fair in 2018, which was attended by 1,000 Chinese companies and witnessed an investment of $2 billion for the reconstruction and development of Syria’s industrial sector. Private investors have been concerned about the widespread corruption in Syria and the threats of being targeted by US sanctions. Moreover, the Chinese state considers Al Assad’s regime as a bulwark against terrorism and its relations with the regime an asset in combating Uighurs who are participating on the behalf of terrorists.

    Conflict Resolution vs Conflict Management

    Given that the warring parties consider the conflict to be more-or-less of a zero-sum game, territorial and social fragmentation of Syria, it would be extremely difficult for them to pursue means to resolve the conflict through creating the need for the conflict to be managed and downsized (Dacrema, 2020). The non-recognition of certain non-state actors by the rival sides and questions regarding the participation of non-state actors in negotiations, which would only serve to legitimise them further, complicates the process of negotiating a solution.

    Temporary Arrangements

    A strategy that would allow for the management of the conflict would be to negotiate temporary agreements and deals. Turkey and Russia have been able to broker temporary ceasefires at multiple instances, throughout the conflict, in the Idlib region. Temporary arrangements would help build confidence among the warring parties in the long run, and reduce the possibility of escalation of war (Dacrema, 2020).

    Conclusion

    Given that the warring parties prefer a status quo in comparison to the resolution of a conflict and value their geo-political and economic interests, it is highly unlikely that parties would push for resolution of the conflict. In consideration of a political stalemate, reconstruction efforts among the warring parties are likely to take place parallelly, as they have played out with the localisation of the conflict. While resources in the territories held by the regime are being diverted to areas that have remained loyal during the conflict and/or areas of strategic importance with areas formerly occupied by opposition forces receiving relatively lesser attention; territories under Turkish control and those held by the Kurdish forces have witnessed efforts aimed at stabilising the territories.

    Russia and EU have the potential and the leverage required to emerge as power brokers in the reconstruction and initiate the process in a manner that promotes social, economic and political cohesion in the long run.

    Russia and EU have the potential and the leverage required to emerge as power brokers in the reconstruction and initiate the process in a manner that promotes social, economic and political cohesion in the long run. The likelihood of being able to convince themselves that the possibility of achieving one’s interests alongside the other is a far better option in comparison to its alternative of a failed state, which threats both their interests. However, their ability to convince their allies and their clients (in this instance, Assad regime is Russia’s client) and the mistrust between both the parties as well as between their allies poses a challenge.

    Russia’s efforts in brokering a constitutional committee for Syria under the aegis of the UN is an indicator of a compromise. Hinnebusch (2020) suggests that “it is not impossible to move incrementally toward a minimalist sort of political settlement that might acquire enough international legitimacy to open the door to some reconstruction funding.” While the likelihood of this occurrence is difficult amid conflicting interests, it cannot be overruled.

    The humanitarian aspects of the conflict and urgent need for reconstruction to alleviate tangible and intangible costs of the conflict have largely been ignored. The warring parties have been preoccupied with advancing and fulfilling their interests at the cost of ordinary Syrians. There is a need for parties to acknowledge and make efforts towards the realisation of the urgency of reconstruction that is vital for securing the social and economic interests of ordinary Syrians. The likelihood of the same, however, is questionable.

     

    References

    Aita, S. (2020). Reconstruction as a political-economy issue: The case of Syria. Retrieved 28 June 2020, from https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/reconstruction-as-a-political-economy-issue-the-case-of-syria/

    al-Kattan, R. (2017). Retrieved 25 June 2020, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/the-economic-case-for-syria-s-stabilisation/

    al-Khateb, K. (2020). US outsources Syria aid to Gulf. Retrieved 4 July 2020, from https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2018/08/us-outsources-syria-aid-gulf.html

    Dacrema, E. (2020). Three Concepts to Understand the Future of Syria. Retrieved 25 June 2020, from https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/what-future-for-postwar-syria

    Daher, J. (2018). The political economic context of Syria’s reconstruction : a prospective in light of a legacy of unequal development. Retrieved 3 July 2020, from https://core.ac.uk/display/162303203

    Hinnebusch, R. (2020). The Battle over Syria’s Reconstruction. Retrieved 1 July 2020, from https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/articles/development-inequality-and-poverty/battle-over-syrias-reconstruction

    Human Rights Watch. (2019). Rigging the System. Retrieved 25 June 2020, from https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/06/28/rigging-system/government-policies-co-opt-aid-and-reconstruction-funding-syria#_ftn114

    Middle East Institute, & Etana Syria. (2020). Manufacturing Division: The Assad Regime and Minorities in South-west Syria. Retrieved 2 July 2020, from https://www.mei.edu/publications/manufacturing-division-assad-regime-and-minorities-south-west-syria

    Sinjab, L. (2017). How Syria’s War Economy Propels the Conflict. Retrieved 25 June 2020, from https://syria.chathamhouse.org/research/how-syrias-war-economy-propels-the-conflict

    Veen, E. (2020). The geopolitics of Syria’s reconstruction: a case of matryoshka. Retrieved 27 June 2020, from https://www.clingendael.org/publication/geopolitics-syrias-reconstruction-case-matryoshka

    Yazigi, J. (2017). Analysis: No Funds to Foot Syria’s Reconstruction Bill. Retrieved 1 July 2020, from https://www.newsdeeply.com/syria/community/2017/12/04/analysis-no-funds-to-foot-syrias-reconstruction-bill

     

    Main Image Credit: Palmyra before its destruction by ISIS – www.citymetric.com 

     

  • China’s support to Syria: In Conflict and Redevelopment

    China’s support to Syria: In Conflict and Redevelopment

    China is looking to ramp up relations with Syria both as part of its strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but also to take advantage of the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort that is expected to materialise following the gradual winding down of the war.

     

    Syria is an ancient civilisation and also an important part of the ancient silk route, with cities such as Palmyra, Aleppo and Damascus playing an important role in trade and travel between the East and the West. While the discovery of a maritime route between Europe and Asia has to some extent diminished its importance in this regard, Syria is still strategically important. China is looking to ramp up relations with Syria both as part of its strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but also to take advantage of the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort that is expected to materialise following the gradual winding down of the war.

    China’s non-interference policy is an integral aspect of its involvement and role in the Middle East. During the course of the Syrian war, China has consistently supported the Bashar Al Assad government on the diplomatic front – through the exercise of the veto power against the resolutions introduced in the United Nations Security Council either condemning the Syrian government, calling for ceasefire or for imposing sanctions on suspected war criminals. While negotiating the renewal of border crossings for aid, China agreed on the need for humanitarian assistance but emphasised on state sovereignty. China’s policy of non-interference has served it well in strengthening bilateral relations and advancing its interests.

    One of the reasons for the diplomatic support extended by China to the Syrian government is also the involvement of the Uighur fighters in the Syrian conflict which has greatly bothered China. While it has never got directly involved militarily in the Syrian conflict there are unconfirmed media reports which suggested that China was sharing military intelligence with the Syrian government and also sent its military advisors to Syria to help it in its fight against the rebels. In this sense, it saw Syria as a key player in its fight against religious extremism thereby preventing its export to its own volatile Xinjiang province.

    With the Syrian conflict slowly winding down and Bashar Al Assad’s hold on Syria greatly strengthened more than at any other time since the beginning of the civil war, China is ramping up its diplomatic efforts in Syria  using trade as an important policy tool to ramp up the relations between the two great civilisations.

    Based on Chinese government’s invitation Syria has participated in the second BRI summit held in Beijing in April 2019. Previously in 2018, China held a Trade Fair on Syrian reconstruction projects which was attended by nearly one thousand Chinese companies and which saw investment proposals of nearly USD two billion. The collapse of most of the industry in Syria due to the war has also resulted in a significant increase of cost-effective Chinese imports into Syria ranging from toys to car parts and industrial machinery and equipment.

    China is also leveraging its economic strength fully by using aid as a foreign policy tool. In 2019,  Xinhua reported on the  that an economic cooperation agreement was signed between Syria’s Planning and International Cooperation Commission (PICC) and the Chinese embassy in Damascus. As part of this agreement, a donation will be set aside to fund a series of humanitarian projects as agreed upon by both sides.

    The collapse of most of the industry in Syria due to the war has also resulted in a significant increase of cost-effective Chinese imports into Syria ranging from toys to car parts and industrial machinery and equipment.

    China is expected to be a key player in the international reconstruction and development effort that is expected to take place in Syria due to its strong bilateral ties with not only Syria but also its alignment with Russian and Iranian position on Syria , these two players being the major supporters of Bashar Al Assad’s government in the civil war. While Russia and Iran are surely expected to carve out a large part of the reconstruction contracts between themselves, their capacity to make the huge investments in these projects, estimated to be worth anywhere between USD 200 million to USD 1  trillion is doubtful. This creates the ripe opportunity for China to enter the reconstruction business effort either by themselves or, as is more likely, in partnership with Russian and Iranian governments or businesses.

    Beyond the business opportunities provided by the potential reconstruction of Syria, China is also strategically interested in Syria. China was always interested in securing access to the Ports of Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Such an access is expected to complement Beijing’s interests in the Greek port Piraeus (COSCO shipping, the Chinese state-owned shipping and logistics services supplier company in the Port authority) and the Israeli port of Haifa, in securing a trade route to Europe. In alignment with these strategic interests, Chinese companies’ area also exploring the possibility of upgrading the deep seaport of Tripoli, Lebanon to allow it to accommodate larger vessels and also the possibility of building a railroad that would connect Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon to Homs and Aleppo in Syria.

    Beyond the business opportunities provided by the potential reconstruction of Syria, China is also strategically interested in Syria. China was always interested in securing access to the Ports of Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.

    Chinese investments into and trade ties with Syria however, risk the attraction of US sanctions on Syria. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Chief Financial Officer of Huawei, , in Canada, based on a request by the United States highlights the extent of these risks. “The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act”, also known as “The Caesar Act”, a United States legislation that sanctions the Syrian government, including Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, for war crimes against the Syrian population, parts of which  are now incorporated  in the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020” greatly tightened the sanctions environment against the Syrian government and a number of its industries potentially impacting the Chinese investments and trade ties. While China has called for an end to sanctions stating they were “inhuman,” they have been wary of being targeted by sanctions and further straining their relations with the US. However, it is unlikely that the sanctions would have a significant effect on China given the size of China’s economy and its ability to circumvent sanctions while dealing with Iran and North Korea. China, as part of its ‘mask diplomacy,’ is increasingly providing aid to the Syrian government in their efforts against Covid-19. This serves the dual purpose of strengthening China-Syria relations and strengthening China’s narrative of Covid-19.

    To conclude, China has been a staunch supporter of the incumbent Syrian government of Bashar Al Assad during the almost decade long Syrian civil war and is set to reap the benefits from the post-war Syrian reconstruction effort in conjunction with the Russians and the Iranians to advance its interests.

    Image: Middle East Institute