Tag: India

  • Analysing Denmark’s Offshore Wind Energy Sector: Lessons for India

    Analysing Denmark’s Offshore Wind Energy Sector: Lessons for India

    Globally, Europe has the highest capacity of power generated from offshore wind energy. Amongst the European countries, Denmark, the UK and Germany have been pioneers and are currently leading as the largest power producers from offshore wind energy. Danish assistance has been in high demand to help countries shorten their implementation time for offshore wind turbine projects. In 2019, India entered into a bilateral agreement with Denmark to develop an offshore wind market and related technical capabilities. According to a document published by the Danish government, their authorities have specialised technical knowledge that can help Indian authorities establish framework conditions for the rollout of offshore wind power.

    Denmark’s Offshore Wind Energy Sector  

    The Danish Government has set a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 70%, as compared to 1990 levels, by 2030 and having 100% of Danish energy supplied through renewable sources by 2050, apart from achieving net-zero emissions by the same time. The scarcity of proper onshore sites and the abundance of shallow waters with wind resources drove its move to offshore wind, in the early 1990s,. In Denmark, there is a strong symbiosis between energy and industrial policy because of many leading offshore wind energy companies having Danish roots such as DONG, Vestas, Bladt, Siemens Wind, etc. India must achieve such a symbiosis in its offshore wind policies so that the industry can be successful in the long term.

    Denmark’s ambitious targets coupled with their evolving policies in terms of bureaucratic procedures, environmental safety, and finance, among others, have driven the growth of the offshore wind energy sector since the 90s. This analysis looks at each of these segments.

    Consent Procedures:         The Danish Energy Agency (DEA) has been a single point of access to all offshore wind energy companies when it comes to issues related to permits. Meaning, the DEA grants all permits which include permits from other appropriate government authorities such as the Danish Nature Agency, Ministry of Defence, and the Danish Maritime Authority. This is the one-stop-shop and has been adopted not only in Denmark but in many other European countries. Such a method ensures rapid and un-bureaucratic application processing and ease of doing business. This also avoids a lot of confusion.

    Grid Connectivity:             The financing of the grid connection for offshore wind farms depends on how it is established:

    • Enterprises can follow the Government’s action plan for offshore wind development wherein the DEA will invite bids to tender for pre-specified sites or
    • Enterprises can follow the ‘open-door principle’ wherein independent applications can be made for any site and upon complete assessment by the DEA, it will invite bids to tender for the site, given that the results of the assessment are positive.

    In the first case, the grid operator will finance the connection, including step-up transformers. Such socialisation of grid costs is an attractive feature for project developers in Denmark.

    However, in the second case, the responsibility falls on the developer. We may also expect costs of any necessary grid reinforcement to be borne by the developer. The three private offshore wind farms established in Denmark, following the ‘open-door principle’ – Samsø, Rønland, and Middelgrunden – have had no notable problems. These projects are, however, within 3km of the coast, which would imply that the grid connection costs were not exorbitant.

    Environmental Assessment:          In Denmark, an extensive environmental assessment takes place before the construction of an offshore wind farm. The DEA provides companies or enterprises a license to conduct preliminary studies, including environmental (Environmental Impact Assessment) and technical (ground investigation) studies, either directly after a tender (first process) or following the receipt of the first satisfactory planning documentation (second process).

    For instance, in the case of the Anholt farm, one of the largest offshore wind farms with a capacity of 400 MW, the project team performed an extensive environmental assessment that included the impact on marine animals in the area and their habitats, noise calculations, air emissions, and the potential risk to ship traffic. Using data from other wind farm projects like Denmark’s Nysted Wind Farm, and undergoing their analysis, the Anholt project team projected only minor, insignificant affects.

    Financial Incentives:          In Denmark, they support offshore wind farms through a feed-in tariff system, which is set through a competitive auction process. Power off-take in Denmark is largely managed through the DEA. There is no renewable purchase obligation in place in Denmark, but electrical power from renewable energy has priority access to the grid. In some cases, the owner may choose to sell the electrical power to utilities or other power suppliers through a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). If the power price drops to zero or negative, there is an oversupply of electricity – then renewable projects do not receive any support. Hence this motivates generators to curtail output and help supply-side grid management.

    De-risking the development process:          The Danish Government undertakes geotechnical studies, wind resource assessment, and environmental surveys before a site being leased. The lease areas are then auctioned off to the lowest bidder. This hugely benefits developers as the site is effectively de-risked, leading to a lower tender price. If this were not the case, the developers would have to include risk provisions and contingency, owing to uncertainty regarding the ground conditions. Further, de-risking a site would increase willingness to plan and bid for the sites leased.

    Simply put, the Danish offshore wind energy policies developed by the DEA and the Government have evolved over the years to tackle situations as they occur. This has led to sustained growth in the sector and has succeeded in powering close to 50% of the country’s electricity demand. Besides successfully developing its sector, it has been an outstanding example to many countries in Europe such as the UK and Germany. The UK has adopted the one-stop-shop model to ease procedural difficulties. Germany has adopted the open-door procedure of establishing offshore wind farms.

    India’s Offshore Wind Energy Sector

    The offshore wind energy sector in India is in its nascent stage. Its 2015 National Offshore Wind Energy Policy shows that the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) will act as the nodal Ministry for the development of Offshore Wind Energy in India that will monitor offshore wind energy development in the country. It will also work closely with other government entities for the use of maritime space within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

    The Ministry has set a short-term target of 5.0 GW of offshore wind installations by 2022 and a long-term target of 30 GW by 2030 which, according to government documents, is expected to give the confidence to project developers in the Indian market. Over 95% of commercially exploitable wind resources are concentrated in seven states – Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu. But the land resources required for onshore wind projects are gradually becoming a major constraint. This could very well cause an increase in the market-determined tariffs of onshore wind energy in the future. Offshore wind power, however, offers a viable alternative in such a scenario. The Indian government, like Denmark, has to make policies to the best of their effort that will bring confidence to developers and de-risk the development of the sector to further encourage developers.

    Although India has a huge potential in the renewable energy sector, the developers’ issues remain unresolved. For instance, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu have most of the high potential sites off their coasts to develop offshore wind energy. But a major concern for offshore wind developers would be the problem of grid integration. The two states already have a high degree of solar and wind renewables integrated into their power grid. By adding on power generated through offshore wind energy, they will face a significant hurdle with the evacuation and integration of this additional power. Without proper renewable energy storage systems, there is also the added burden to maintain an equilibrium between the supply and demand of power generated through the variable sources as otherwise, there will be a great deal of wastage and an unnecessary surge in the prices.

    Adding on to the problems faced by developers, benefits such as accelerated depreciation were recently withdrawn and as a result, investments have slowed down. Thus, project developers not only want accelerated depreciation to be reintroduced, but they also want assurance from the government that such fiscal benefits will continue for the long-term. If these fiscal benefits are reintroduced, developers will feel more optimistic about their prospects in the sector. Further, it would also encourage small developers to invest more in the sector.

    Another area that is causing considerable angst for the wind project developers in India is the delay in realising the payments due to them from the state electricity boards. These delays affect the cash flows, thereby threatening the viability of many of these projects. Such experiences will make offshore project developers cautious in venturing into making large investments into the sector.

    In terms of policies that Indian policymakers can adopt from Denmark are the one-stop-shop and an open-door procedure of establishing offshore wind farms. Having the MNRE as a single point of access would make the bidding and tendering process more efficient. This is because a developer has to coordinate with various departments such as the MNRE, the ministry of defence, the ministry of external affairs, nature and wildlife, etc before they can start producing in an offshore wind farm. It would also benefit to have an open-door procedure, but only in the long term. Initially, though, the government should identify possible sites and work on de-risking the development process to encourage more participation in the bidding process.

    Conclusion

    In line with its Paris Agreement commitments, India is working to ensure that by 2030, 40% of its power generation capacity will come from non-fossil fuel sources. Currently, renewable energy makes up 36% of India’s power capacity through mainly small and large hydro, onshore wind, and solar energy. Producing power through offshore wind energy will be a welcome addition to the existing sources.

    During the RE-Invest 2020 conference, the MNRE Joint Secretary announced that the Indian government is looking into setting up structures for power purchase agreements and offshore wind auctions. Thus, to successfully implement its plans, it will require further offshore wind resource data and analysis to identify viable project sites and, revive industry demand for this market.

    Feature Image Credit: www.renewablesnow.com

    Image: Anholt Offshore Wind Farm

     

  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    India, China, and Arunachal Pradesh

    The satellite picture below brilliantly depicts the geographical separation of Arunachal Pradesh (called Lower Tibet by the Chinese) and Tibet. The McMahon Line more or less runs along the crest line of the Himalayas.

    The Chinese have never been quite explicit on how much of Arunachal they seek.  I once saw an official map displayed in a travel agents office in Lhasa that showed only the Tawang tract as Chinese territory. In other maps they have their border running along the foothills, which means all of Arunachal.

    The Chinese have based their specific claim on the territory on the premise that Tawang was administered from Lhasa, and the contiguous areas owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. Then the Chinese must also consider this. Sikkim till into the 19th century a vassal of Tibet and Darjeeling was forcibly taken from it by the British! By extending this logic could they realistically stake a claim for Sikkim and Darjeeling? Of course not. It would be preposterous. History has moved on. The times have changed. For the 21st century to be stable 20th century borders must be stable, whatever be our yearnings.

    At the crux of this issue is the larger question of the national identities of the two nations and when and how they evolved. The Imperial India of the Mughals spanned from Afghanistan to Bengal but did not go very much below the Godavari in the South. The Imperial India of the British incorporated all of today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but had no Afghanistan, not for want of trying. It was the British who for the first time brought Assam into India in 1826 when they defeated Burma and formalized the annexation with the treaty of Yandabo.

    It was only in 1886 that the British first forayed out of the Brahmaputra valley when they sent out a punitive expedition into the Lohit valley in pursuit of marauding tribesmen who began raiding the new tea gardens. Apparently the area was neither under Chinese or Tibetan control for there were no protests either from the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Amban in Lhasa. Soon the British stayed put.

    Tibet remained in self imposed isolation and the race to be first into Lhasa became the greatest challenge for explorers and adventurers in the second half of the 19th century. Not the least among these were the spies of the Survey of India, the legendary pundits. The most renowned of these was the Sarat Chandra Das whose books on Tibet are still avidly read today. As the adventurers, often military officers masquerading as explorers began visiting Tibet the British in India began worrying. Reports that the most well-known of Czarist Russia’s military explorers, Col. Grombchevsky was sighted in Tibet had Lord Curzon, the Governor General of India most worried.

    In 1903 Curzon decided to send a military expedition into Tibet led by Grombchevsky’s old antagonist, Col. Francis Younghusband. A brigade strong mixed force of Gurkhas and Tommies went over the Nathu La into the Chumbi valley and advanced unhindered till Shigatse. A Tibetan military force met them there but offered what can only be described as passive resistance. Not a shot was fired back as the British Indian troops rained bullets on them. It was a forerunner to Jallianwalla Bagh. From Shigatse Younghusband made a leisurely march into Lhasa. The British got the Tibetans to agree to end their isolation and having extracted trade concessions withdrew in 1904, the way they came.

    In 1907 Britain and Russia formally agreed that it was in their interests to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart.” It may be of interest to the reader to know that the Great Game nevertheless continued. In 1907 Col. Mannerheim then of the Russian Army, later Field Marshal Mannerheim and first President of Finland, led a horseback expedition from Kyrgyzstan to Harbin on China’s northeast to identify a route for the cavalry.

    The next important year was 1913 when the Tibetans declared independence after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a Republic in China under Sun Yat Sen. They attacked and drove the Chinese garrisons in Tibet into India over the Nathu La. Also in 1913 the British convened the Simla Conference to demarcate the India-Tibet border. The British proposed the 1914 McMahon Line, as we know it. The Tibetans accepted it. The Chinese Amban however initialed the agreement under protest. But his protest seemed mostly about the British negotiating directly with Tibet as a sovereign state and not over the McMahon Line as such.

    Things moved on then. In 1935 at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe ICS, then Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, the McMahon Line was notified. In 1944 JP Mills ICS established British Indian administration in NEFA, but excluding Tawang which continued to be administered by the Lhasa appointed head lama at Tawang despite the fact that it lay well below the McMahon Line. This was largely because Henry Twynam, the Governor of Assam lost his nerve and did not want to provoke the Tibetans. In 1947 the Dalai Lama (the same gentleman who is now in Dharamshala) sent the newly independent India a note laying claim to some districts in NEFA/Arunachal.

    On October 7, 1950 the Chinese attacked the Tibetans at seven places on their frontier and made known their intention of reasserting control over all of Tibet. As if in response on February 16, 1951 Major Relangnao ‘Bob’ Khating IFAS raised the India tricolor in Tawang and took over the administration of the tract. The point of this narration is to bring home the fact that India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh doesn’t rest on any great historical tradition or cultural affinity. We are there because the British went there. But then the Chinese have no basis whatsoever to stake a claim, besides a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China among some of the hangers-on in the Qing emperor’s court. The important thing now is that we have been there for over a hundred years and that settles the issue.

    Arunachal Pradesh has a very interesting population mix. Only less than 10% of its population is Tibetan. Indo-Mongoloid tribes account for 68% of the population. The rest are migrants from Nagaland and Assam. As far as religious affinities go Hindus are the biggest group with 37%, followed by 36% animists, 13% Buddhists. Recent census figures suggest a spurt in Christianity, possibly induced by pocketbook proselytizing. In all there are 21 major tribal groups and over 100 ethnically distinct sub-groupings, speaking over 50 distinct languages and dialects. The population of about a million is spread out over 17 towns and 3649 villages. With the exception of a few villages of Monpas who live north of the McMahon Line, it is an ethnically compact and contiguous area.

    In fact in future boundary negotiations India could make a case for inclusion of the few Monpa villages left behind north of the McMahon Line? Many knowledgeable observers suggest that the area south of the Huangpo/Brahmaputra from the Pemako gorge till it enters the Subansiri division of Arunachal would be a logical boundary as the raging and hence un-fordable and unbridgeable river ensures hardly any Chinese administrative presence in the area.

    It is true that historically India never had a direct border with Tibet till the British took Kumaon and Garhwal from Nepal in 1846 and extended its domain over Arunachal in 1886. On the other hand the formidable Himalayas were always culturally a part of India and formed a natural barrier against ingress from the north, whether Tibetan or Chinese. But times have moved and technology and mankind’s great engineering powers now make it possible for even the most hostile terrain to be subjugated. The Himalayas are no longer the barrier they once were. As China and India emerge as the world’s great economies and powers can India possibly allow China a strategic trans-Himalayan space just a few miles from the plains?

    The view from the Chinese side about what exactly constitutes China is no less confused. Apparently like the British, the Manchu’s who ruled China from the 17th to the early 20th century had a policy of staking claim to the lands that lay ahead of their frontiers in order to provide themselves with military buffers. In a recent article in the China Review magazine, Professor Ge Jianxiong, Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai writes: “to claim that Tibet has always been a part of China since the Tang dynasty; the fact that the Qinghai-Tibetan plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim.” Ge also notes that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China was established the idea of China was not clearly conceptualized. Even during the late Qing period (Manchu) the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Qing Empire. At other times it would be taken to refer to only the eighteen interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang.

    Professor Ge further adds that the notions of “Greater China” were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the courts self-aggrandizement.” Ge criticizes those who feel that the more they exaggerate the territory of historical China the more “patriotic” they are. In this context I would like to recall a recent conversation I had with the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi. Ambassador Sun said that while he was soundly castigated in India for his unintended comment, he gained a major constituency in China. The mandarins in the Beijing would do well to take heed to Ge Jianxiong’s advice: “If China really wishes to rise peacefully and be on solid footing in the future, we must understand the sum of our history and learn from our experiences.” The same holds true for the babus in South Block and ‘the having writ move on’ media pundits. If we don’t then we know who will be laughing!

     

    Image Credit: Tawang Monastery

  • Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    Quad 2.0: Can it be a win-win for the four Democracies

    China’s GDP expanded from USD 6 trillion in 2010 to USD 14.3 trillion in 2019. It has had exponential growth over the last three decades, with an average GDP growth rate of 9.23% from 1989 to 2020. Although the impact of the COVID pandemic pushed its GDP into decline and negative (-6.80%) in the first quarter of 2020, it has rebounded with a growth of 5% in the third quarter. It’s military spending, officially, is more than three times that of India, unofficially maybe five times or more. China has become one of the key players in the Indo-Pacific as a significant part of its economic activities depend on this region.

    The Indo-Pacific has replaced the Trans-Atlantic as the epicentre of global politics. Its importance to the global order is multifarious. In economic terms, one half of the world’s commercial influx goes through the Indo-Pacific sea routes and the Indian Ocean carries two-thirds of global oil shipments. Besides, a few of the biggest military spenders are part of the region. China’s hostile actions and policies have agitated the US, Japan, Australia and India. A shared concern over the expansion of China’s political and military clout was fundamental to the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad 2.0), on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Manila, in 2017.

    Quad is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific

    There is growing speculation over what the re-emergence of the Quad means. On the one hand, it is seen as cooperation between four large democracies that share the idea of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific; on the other, a strategic alliance towards keeping China’s assertive actions in check.

    The Quad: Overcoming Intransigence

    The Quad is a mechanism that enables a dialogue on regional security issues between the four countries. Its revival, this year, reflects an intersection of strategic interests: that of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific and a rules-based international order. The Quad came together in November for the naval exercise – Exercise Malabar – in two phases, in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. The exercise, in its 24th edition, is the biggest so far and has sent significant strategic signalling to China.

    The Quad should be considered less as a formal alliance and more as a mechanism built on existing bilateral and trilateral partnerships between the four countries. It first emerged as a cooperative response to the 2004 tsunami, when the four navies were involved in providing humanitarian and disaster relief. Despite strong support from Japan and the US to formalise the group, it disbanded with Australia and India backing out in 2007, due to concerns about China’s reaction to the grouping. This gave rise to multilateral partnerships among the four countries.

    Between the four democracies, there are three trilateral and six bilateral partnerships. Trilaterally, Japan, India and Australia first came together in 2015 to discuss shared concerns over maritime security in the Indo-Pacific Region and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. More recently, the three countries agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific Region amid growing recognition of their excessive, economic reliance on China.

    Bilaterally, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) on October 27 that gives India access to American geospatial intelligence that will be useful for precision guidance of its missiles. Further, India-Australia ties have strengthened over the last few years with their initial 2+2 dialogue in 2017 and with Australian participation in India’s Milan exercise in 2018, focusing on interoperability between navies in the region.

    China and the Quad

    Over the years, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a region of strategic importance. As China expands into the region, its actions have created tensions with the Quad members.

    Sino-Indian relations:  India-China relations have touched rock-bottom since the clashes on the LAC in Ladakh.  China’s intrusions and violations along the LAC have been backed up by significant massing of PLA forces, for the first time in 40 years. India’s strong actions at the LAC and subsequent sanctions and banning of Chinese IT applications have signalled that India is not shy of escalating its response. China’s actions are seen as part of its coercive strategy to India’s refusal to back China on BRI, and its vehement opposition to CPEC. It sees India’s closeness to the USA and its coordination in the Quad as a threat to China’s strategic interests.

    China’s increasing influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has raised India’s concerns. It has always been wary of ties between Beijing and Islamabad, which intensified with the launch of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2013. The Chinese-operated Gwadar port off the Arabian Sea in Pakistan, which can be used by the Chinese navy to establish a submarine presence in the region, did not rest well with India. Such a port would also help China with its ‘Malacca Dilemma’. Other ports of such concern are Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Kyaukphyu in Myanmar. Though China claims these ports are of economic significance, these are also militarily strategic ports that give it an advantage in the IOR.

    In light of these issues, a revived and active Quad will benefit India’s strategic interests. The partnership could affect China in two ways. First, China would face increased competition in the IOR from India that now works with strong allies. Second, with the recent imposition of the technology ban, China stands to lose a large market for its products.

     Japan-China relations: Over the past few years, the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) has worsened with China’s land reclamation activities and militarisation of islands. Japan sees the South China Sea as key to its security because of its crucial sea lanes vital to its trade and economic health. It is also wary of China’s ability to influence the energy supply chains, which East Asia is dependent on, and the PLA’s movement in the Indo-Pacific region that could affect regional security.

    Despite its renewed trade with China and the recent signing of the RCEP, increased tensions in the SCS has forced Japan to support revival of the Quad. China’s increased naval and air activities in the South China Sea makes the Quad and its possible expansion into Quad Plus even more relevant for Japan.

    China-Australia relations: Australia backed out of the Quad in 2007 primarily because it was concerned about how China would view it, and the possible impact it might have on their bilateral trade. By 2017, China became Australia’s top export destination, and this trend has continued through 2019, pushing Australia into a dangerous economic dependency with China. Further, Australia’s 2016 White Paper called out China for its coercive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific, identifying the South China Sea and the Southern Pacific as vital strategic regions.

    Australia’s economic dependence on China is high and this is unlikely to change despite the strong statements from prime minister Morrison.  Australia’s strong stand against China is also seen as emanating from American pressure. Australia actively supports Quad as it sees an increasingly powerful China working to change the world order. Australia is also a member of the newly signed RCEP, the new economic grouping that will be dominated by China. While Australia has hedged its economic interests by signing the RCEP, its strategic and security priorities are linked to the Quad.

    China-US relations:  China’s rising military power is now seen as a threat to American power and the liberal world order. Since 2011, American strategies and policies have focussed more on the Indo-Pacific. This shift in focus has strengthened its ties with Japan, Australia and India. Tensions between the US and China have increased since then and the 2018 trade war not only aggravated their relations but also kept the rest of the world on an edge.

    With a strong Quad partnership, the US expects to regain and strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific. For China already hit hard by the US trade war, more setbacks will accentuate the problems. Moreover, with a more focused Quad led by the US, China’s efforts to project its power and influence in the Indo-Pacific region will come under pressure.

     Conclusion

     A few aspects about the Quad remain unclear. First, its intent is still uncertain because the respective countries have to evaluate their relations with China if they want to make the bloc official. Second, if it were to be official, to what extent would it serve the interests of the member countries? Third, is the Quad a concert of democracies to contain China? Last, will it coordinate with other members in the Indo-Pacific region, that is will Quad translate into Quad Plus?

    China’s actions have managed to bring the four countries closer.  China, however, has scored a success when the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), the world’s largest plurilateral trade agreement was signed on November 15th. Both Japan and Australia are members of the RCEP. Many see this as a setback for India and America, and an important building block in a new world order, in which China calls the shots all over Asia. It puts in doubt the viability of SCRI (Supply Chain Resilience Initiative), an effort by Quad members to create an alternative to Chinese domination of supply chains.

    The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    While security and military cooperation will help in checking China’s aggressive approach, it must be recognised that this alone will be an incomplete strategy. The nature of China’s challenge to the global order and the Indo-Pacific is geoeconomics in design, as evidenced by its Belt and Road Initiative and its recent success in RCEP. The Quad will need to go beyond security cooperation.

    The conclusion of RCEP maybe China’s gain, but it is important to recognise the fact that ASEAN is the main driver of RCEP. In attempting to balance China, ASEAN and Japan have kept the door open for India to re-join the RCEP. It is possible that the US, under the Biden presidency, may revive the TPP (now proposed by Japan as CATPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Pacific Partnership), which could balance the RCEP. The Quad, in this context, will continue to be very relevant for peace and security in the Indo-Pacific.

     

  • A third aircraft carrier for India: Budget versus necessity

    A third aircraft carrier for India: Budget versus necessity

    Category: Defence Policy, Military Power & Modernisation

    Title: A Third Aircraft Carrier for India: Budget vs necessity

    Author: M Matheswaran  02.06.2020

    The Indian military is undergoing what may be its most significant reorganisation since India’s independence, with considerable implications for its future strategic posture. One important issue that has been brought to the fore is the role of the Indian Navy as a regional power projection force built around three aircraft carriers. The government’s decision on this issue will have significant implications for the region.


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  • InsurTech In India

    InsurTech In India

    It is not an unknown to anyone that the third, or Digital, Revolution, and the Fourth- The Technological Revolution has transformed the world order and the way daily activities are conducted. From a linear to an exponential growth rate of the revolutions, all the sectors- minor and major have seen unprecedented changes. The financial sector, though slow and cautious, is not an exception to these transformations.

    FinTech, or Financial Technology is the integration of technology into the offering of financial service to improve and automate their delivery and usage. Regular activities like online transfer of money to purchase of equity through an online platform come under the umbrella of Fintech. The Global Fintech Market has been valued at $127.66 bn by 2018 and was estimated (before COVID) to grow at 24.7% per annum. India is the 3rd largest fintech centre with FinTech investments of nearly $3.7 bn.

    Financial systems globally have incorporated certain level of digitalization and have experienced growth. One of the major markets that were perceived to have huge potential for Fintech investments is Insurance. Reducing vulnerability to financial loss, mobilization of funds and capital formation, and funding of infrastructural (or long term) projects had made the Insurance sector attractive for both demand-side and supply side parties for centuries, essentially making it a necessary financial instrument. Given this, the insurance penetration in the world is still quite low, and this industry is perceived as ripe for disruption and innovation by the FinTech Start-Ups.

    Insurtech, coined in 2010, is a combination of insurance and Fintech i.e. exploiting the wave of the digital revolution to improve insurance provision, innovation, and cost reduction. Insurtech employs artificial intelligence for customization of insurance products, simplification of pricing and underwriting for the products, cost reduction through disintermediation and automation, easy and quick settlement of claims and provide a platform for innovation. For example, claim settlement in motor insurance could be automized and made digital intensive, by uploading photographs of the accident and relevant documents to verify the claim, and online processing and approval of the claim. Blockchain technology would be of critical here for collaboration and common sharing of data and transactions with other insurance players, to avoid fraud by customer( for example, repetitive claims). Use of technology would also enable extending of services to those previously left out of the system.

    Why InsurTech?

    Say for example, in health insurance, an insurer would obtain only point-in-time data (through medical tests) about the policyholder which is not completely sufficient to make accurate risk assessment and underwriting. Once the customer is on-boarded, there is no effective way an insurer could know or keep track of the risk entailed in activities of the agent. That is the problem of moral hazard[1] which is a most relevant in case of motor insurance (at the individual level) or marine insurance (at the institutional level). InsurTech extract information from repositories like Big Data, BlockChain[2][3] or information records of Technology-driven devices (IoT devices like wearables and trackers) to maintain a regular stream of data that enables them to price the risk better and provide appropriate incentives to customers’ to reduce their risk exposure.

    For example, Pedometers to count steps walked in a day, fitness devices that capture heartbeat, oxygen intake, blood pressure etc, or even information recorded by smartphones (sometimes linked to the wearables) is used as input data that helps insurers to gain better insights(to a limited extent)  into the behavioural pattern of the policyholder. This is additional information available to the tech-driven InsurTechs that gives them an edge over the conventional insurance companies in assessing the risk more accurately. The analysis could be utilized to motivate customers to maintain good health by providing incentives like health-score based reduction in premium or other tangible benefits like discounts on health products, free subscriptions etc.

    There are several types of innovations[4] that fall within the scope of InsurTech—Digital platforms, Internet of Things (IoT), Big Data Comparators, Robo Adviser, Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence, Blockchain, P2P (peer to peer), Usage-based and so on. India, being one of the largest smartphone users could take advantage of the Existing mobile and digital penetration to extend the outreach of insurance products (life, health, pension schemes) into untapped segments in the country- like youth and low-income customers.

    Risk assessment, underwriting and Fraud detection is done by the analysis of the accumulated data using Artificial intelligence and Machine Learning techniques. Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to the simulation of human intelligence in machines that are programmed to think like humans and mimic their actions. Machine Learning (ML), [5]a subset of Artificial Intelligence, is the science and engineering of making machines ‘learn’ by finding patterns in data in an automated manner, using sophisticated methods and algorithms.

    So how does Insurtech aspire to be the face of the insurance market?

    With the digital revolution and rapid increase in the use of mobile phones, insurtech sees an opportunity to reach out to its customers in a fast and convenient way. Data resources like Big data and SaaS, about the customers collected from multiple sources could be employed to draw better inference from raw data and target the pool of potential customers. Unlike traditional insurance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning(ML) could be used to develop chat bots and multiply interaction between agent and customer for assessing and customize the products in line with their needs. New Technologies (like Robotic process automation) could be used to reduce human intervention and automate the mundane activities like underwriting the contracts, claim settlement and also reducing operational costs. Moreover, AI and ML enable fraud detection from the pattern of activities of the customer. Unlike established insurers, insurtech have the flexibility to steer clear of legacy products and provide tailor-made products for the customers according to their needs and demand.

    Incumbents, or the established insurers, are viewing this as an opportunity and catalyst of innovation rather than a threat to their market penetration and customer acquisition. Collaboration of incumbents with the nascent start ups is a win-win situation, with the integration of best of both the worlds- the established infrastructure and market share of incumbents and innovative products, niche targeting and better pricing by employing AI and ML algorithms of the Insurtech.

    Insurtech in the World

                US homes nearly half of the InsurTech start-ups, followed by UK and India, and is an avenue for 63% of the insurtech investments.

     

     

    Source: InsurTech 2020 , Research Insights by Imaginea

     

                Some of the innovative on-demand insurance products launched by Insurtech around the world include-

    • MANGO: a Mexican- retirement and life insurance intermediary, for obtaining life insurance in minutes without excessive paperwork and confusing coverages.
    • Go Girl: women-only drivers insurance. It involves lower premiums for good drivers, free courtesy car repairs and an inbuilt accident and theft insurance. Complete transaction is conducted online.
    • VisitorCoverage: a travel medical insurance for only non-US citizens. It also provides insurance for public emergency health screening including Covid-19 and other tests.
    • Fizzy: an mobile insurance for delays in flights for 2hours or more
    • Dapp: Etherisc, a Munich Based insurance platform , offers a crop insurance, providing an instant payout of insurance in case of flood or drought.
    • AgUnity and Etherisc, a austalian start up to provide insurance covers directly to farmers to reduce the last mile challenges in providing insurance to customers who need it.

    InsurTech in India

    Currently, there are 24 life insurance and 39 non- life insurance companies in India (incumbents). In spite of that, India with a population of 121 billion has less that 4% (3.7% to GDP) of insurance penetration and a lapsation rate (unpaid premium for >6 months) as high as 20% compared to 15-20% in other Asian countries. As of 2017, at least 75% or 988 million Indians do not have life cover and 56% of population do not have any significant health coverage (out of 44%, 26% are covered by Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana and only 8% by insurers).

    Incidentally, Indian insurance industry for a long time has relied on one-size-fits-all insurance products in the market, but now the dynamics of the insurance market are changing. Innovative products like usage-based insurance, micro insurance and on-demand insurance are flooding the Indian market. The large section of uninsured population is a candy store of opportunities for competent start ups that are in search of potential markets.

    • Usage based insurance: insurance products with low premium, paid periodically based on usage like pay-per-mile auto insurance; individual habits-based life insurance.
    • Need – based insurance: based on specific needs of the customer like theft insurance when away from home, theft insurance for valuables in the rented house. IRCTC travel insurance – in collaboration with ICICI Lombard, Royal Sundaram and Shriram general. Paytm launches a e-wallet insurance, refunding money stolen or accessed unauthorized.
    • Sachet-size insurance: provision of products like insurance against dengue (dengue insurance) to accident and life insurance, at a low premium rates is the agenda of this insurance.  Toffee Insurance – gurgoan based insurance start up, offers insurance against cycle theft and mosquito related diseases for a premium starting from Rs 20.

    [innovative ideas like Tinder-Date-Gone-Bad insurance to cover for restaurant bills and gift expenses are all our millennials and Gen X need to mobilize some cash for insurance].

    These are the some of the innovative products tailor-made for its customers according to their needs and economy. The primary incentive behind these innovations is to create an environment where customers are introduced to the benefits of insurance, who would ultimately vouch for the long-term insurances.

    Paytm which has users mostly in Tier II and Tier III cities has partnered with insurers to provide insurance services like premium payment and policy renewal and has  launched PayTm Insurance in early 2020, tying up with leading insurance firms in india. Amazon and Flipkart have collaborated with ACKO and AEGON LIFE respectively to provide Point-of-Sale insurance(for example, insurance on electronics). Ola provides commutation insurance for the rides at Rs 1. IRDA and the incumbents have viewed this disruption as an opportunity to improve penetration and provision of service. Collaboration with incumbents would also reduce barriers to trade for the emerging start ups and would provide financial support for more innovations. IRDA granted licenses to AKCO, DIGIT INSURANCE, COCO by DHFL and reliance health insurance to work as “neo-insurers”; a sandbox was established for the initial testing of new innovations before launching them into the market; guidelines and regulations were laid down for the functioning of insurtech, under the supervision of IRDA.

    Though at nascent stage, Insurtech has already attracted $3 billion investments worldwide. India has attracted nearly $183 million investments, as of 2019.

     
     

    Source: Predictions, BusinessToday.in 

     

    Source: Predictions

    IRDAI on Insurtech

                IRDA is the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India. The demand for linking wearables to product designing by the insurers prompted the setting up of a working group to look into the new innovations and wearables. The main purpose/aim of working committee was to make recommendations for supervisory and regulatory frameworks for InsurTech.

    What should be the Regulator’s role in encouraging innovation”[6]       

    IRDA working committee has recognized that customers’ needs have evolved over time which cannot be fulfilled by traditional insurance alone. IRDA subsequently acknowledged that use of technology will, not only aid in new innovations and better service provision, but also helps insurers assess risk better, develop new business models, processes and products, through the use of data collected through various devices (for example: IoT[7] devices in the automobile to assess policyholders’ driving behaviour, which are recorded as data points). Insurers are embracing innovations with focus on data analytics, and sophisticated data models that help the identify, understand and quantify risk.
    Nevertheless, IRDA also acknowledged that this data capture poses several threats and challenges to the insurer and the customer. IRDA recognized the need for a regulator to understand the fast moving innovations in the sector, and develop proper knowledge and skills that foster Insurtech, simultaneously protecting the customers’ interests. In its report, it has made some recommendations regarding supervisory and regulatory framework with respect to InsurTech – Risk assessment, risk Improvement, product design and product pricing.

    For a better insight into the status quo of InsurTech worldwide, IRDA working committee looked into the variety of measures insurance regulatory bodies in other countries have observed.

    • Financial Conduct Authority (UK): FCA has taken initiative to look out for upcoming start ups and understand their potential problems, alongside with providing direct support (advisory support and clearing regulatory ambiguities); it has established a sandbox for pilot testing of new products on live customers on a small scale.
    • BaFin, Germany: it has adopted a technologically neutral position, i.e no special treatment is accorded to InsurTech owing to their innovative nature. Regulations to the insurers are strictly based on the functions performed by them.
    • Mexico: Regulators felt it is too early for developing separate regulations for Insurtech and they would be supervised under the existing regulations.

    Notable observations

    “From purchasing a policy to raising a claim, the process is time consuming, resource driven, and paper intensive. Technology can address these concerns and make the customer experience very smooth and hassle free.”

    “Digital technology could extend the reach coverage into largely untapped areas such as lower income segments, by reducing costs and allowing businesses to engage with customers in more compelling and relevant ways”

    “The use of technology has an impact on product design and the efficiency of inclusive insurance delivery.”

    “The consent of the customer to share data is a must for participation in such products.”

    “Insurers may be allowed to capture data as per their product requirements, but within the scope of insurance and underwriting need.”

    “The provider shall capture and give the insurance companies only the specified information, and the privacy of data arrangement will be directly between the insured and the provider.”

    “Insurers shall develop robust internal monitoring mechanisms to ensure that data leakages do not take place as this data could be misused for monetary benefits (e.g., sending promotional offers to customer based on his location etc.).”

    “The products can evolve and be tested in a sandbox environment before fully going live and a transition strategy should be proposed for when the proposed product exits the sandbox environment.”

                 Working Committee insisted on maintaining transparency and follow protocol for data collection, data usage and data sharing with third parties. It suggested that there is a need for portability/ sharing of data between the insurers. They could employ block chain technology unto this purpose.

    IRDA permits the insurers to offer discounts or offers to the customer based on the data collected. Premium and other benefits like discounts or subsidized or free health services  could be determined by the performance, progress, and consistency in individual’s (say health) score arrived at by analysing data obtained from single or multiple sources.

    Data Mining and Security

    Data collection could be done through proprietary or third party services. However,

    • Consent and customer access: The insurer should provide the details of the data collected to the customer and he should have access to this data (on a portal etc). There should be complete transparency about the data collected (should be as per/after his consent) and the benefits bestowed.
    • Usage: The usage of data should be as per the notice given to the customers. Regulations have to provide appropriate safeguards against data misuse
    • Disclosure: Insurer should not share the data with any third party, except for analytical services, provided they(analytical firms) satisfy the framework laid down.
    • BlockChain: BlockChain is an effective way to ensure transparency and security (encrypted records-blocks which are resistant to modification of data) which makes them ideal for recording of events and transactions. This is an ideal platform to ensure security and sharing to data among insurers.

    Concerns

    • It is important to maintain a right balance between protection of policyholders’ interest and promoting innovation.
    • There is a chance that some segment of populated may be rendered commercially uninsurable. Risk granulation might worsen the affordability and exclusion of certain sections in the society.
    • Innovations might disrupt the traditional risk pooling mechanism of the incumbents
    • Technology might disrupt the conventional business models of the insurers. There is a possibility of minimized engagement (integration) between insurers and customers.
    • Data insecurity is a prominent challenge.
    • Overreliance on technology could be a threat.
    • Supervisors ought to develop adequate technical resources, knowledge and skills to make sure there are no lapses.

    Recommendations

    • Insurers should perform a cost-benefit analysis, because the cost is ultimately borne by policyholders
    • (As mentioned) Product pricing and premium reviews, incentives to customers can be based on data collected through devices.
    • Such products must be tested in the sandbox before launch in the market.
    • Provision for adding wearbles data pricing for existing products. Details of usage of wearble devices should be a part of product filing.

    Interview

                InsurTech is still newbie. I found it more appropriate to  interview  few analysts who have hands on experience in the insurance market and have worked, supervised or studied about InsurTech and InsurTech start ups.

    I have interviewed 4 analysts

    Dr Sahil: A medical graduate(Cancer Biology) who ventured into Insurance sector. He is a experienced professional with an in-depth knowledge of healthcare and Insurance industry. Had the opportunity to be a part of 4 startups Currently working as a Director in a new and upcoming zen space of Insurtech- Meta InsurTech.

    Aparajit Bhattacharya: Senior-level Insurance professional experienced as Business Head of public and private companies. He is also a seasoned executive with an in-depth understanding of emerging technologies and their commercial applications, also having international business expertise, having conducted business in South Asia, Nigeria. Motivated self-starter who earned multiple sales achievement awards during the early career, as well as sustained recognition for Co-Founded Start-Up- Insure First.

    Rahul Mathur: He has completed his Master’s degree from the University of Warwick. He worked as a  Insurance Product Manager at Laka Insurance focused on product development, strategy and research. Presently, he is based in London working as a consulting analyst for a Start-up lead at the London chapter of Accenture’s FinTech Innovation Lab. He is also an Ambassador for Asia Insurtech Podcast, Asia’s first podcast dedicated to InsurTech and innovation in insurance featuring entrepreneurs, thought leaders and investors.

    Neerav:  Senior-level insurance professional.

    1. Where does insurTech stand today in India?

    Dr.Sahil:  InsurTech is basically employing AI and ML methods, and other technological tools, that reduce human intervention and processing time and increases efficiency in the insurance sector processes. InsurTech can help in early and easy, simplified purchase, processing and settlement of claims. According to me, we haven’t really reached that stage yet. Currently, we are in a behavioural changing phase, through digitalization of insurance Claims processing is still paper intensive (physical documents). The farthest we have gone so far is the approval of sandbox for testing products. But we are still behind in R&D and new products are yet to come out.

    Aparajit: InsurTech is a mix of insurance and technology. Though AI seems like a catchy concept, it hasn’t entered insurance globally. Presently, InsurTech is majorly dominated by Cloud-Based API. In the coming decade, more insurtech start ups and intermediaries will subscribe to using blockchain to automate activities more than AI.

    Neerav: InsuTech is mainly AI driven ecosystem that aids in reducing human intervention, cost and time, and improves accuracy. It cannot be regarded as a separate field. It has touched all areas in insurance so far, from risk analysis to price determination. But we are certainly slower than some countries like Singapore which have been using more advanced technologies.

    Rahul: More incumbents are willing to engage with Start ups to do business for example- partnerships with Riskcovry for distribution via APIs. Situations have changed for the insurance industry. Digit has scaled to $313M GWP for FY20 via commercial lines business. Private players are laying an active role in insurance. InsurTech has penetrated almost all areas in insurance including risk analysis, and price determination.

    1. What has been the Biggest success of InsurTech so far? What more could be done?

     

    Dr.Sahil: Sandbox is a appaudable success. New products are entering markets right now. But country needs to be more adaptable. As a premium- driven economy, we are attracted to cheaper premium products, which defeats the purpose of insurance. Awareness is still a big challenges in India.

    Aparajit:  One of the major successes is digital customer onboarding ( and acquisition) . Social media and search engines are creating awareness. Specially after covid, awareness about insurance (mostly health) has increased. InsurTech also created a excellent API culture for customer acquisition.

    Secondly, Sandbox is a commendable breakthrough, indicating that regulator is working on creating a conducive environment for growth of insurtechs. IRDA is also promoting e-commerce sales in Insurance. In Additional, various business-to-business start ups that work on administration, customer onboarding have also developed. These are some appreciable successes so far.

    Neerav: Insurers in India have become more adaptive to change and are more open to suggestions, new technologies and actively building internal infrastructure. They are looking for ultimate outcome.

    Rahul: Biggest success of InsurTech so far is lowering operational cost resulting in lower premiums (e.g.how). Secondly, B2B2C (business to business to customer) distribution via new affinity channels like e-commerce and payments apps entering into insurance (Patym premium payment). Incumbents have realized the need for change and “innovation”. As more InsurTechs enter the space, incumbents are becoming increasingly comfortable working alongside Technology companies (they are starting to appoint “Heads of Innovation” and create standalone teams for new affinity)

    1. What do you think are the niche areas that InsurTech could cater to?

    Dr.Sahil: There are numerous opputunities for InsurTech. There are numerous pools of customers that need to be insured. So the questionhere shifs to what should be done by the insurtechs to tap into these pools. To achieve these oppurtunities, Increased interaction between insurers, early processing and common data repository are 3 component areas that needs work on initially. For example, in case of health insurance, digital recording of medical report results, prescriptions and OPD slips saves huge amount of processing time (even for third party administrator) for the customer. Moreover, creating a central repository of relevant data, accessible to all insurers, would avoid be beneficial.

    Aparajit: India is one of the fastest growing insurance markets in the world. Yet,it has less than 4% penetration. InsurTech is an necessary means of reaching out to less insured tier II and tier III cities, which entails high capital costs if done in the traditional way. Secondly, unorganized sector workers are more likely uninsured for most part. Insurtech could bridge this gap through digital customer onboarding, virtual distribution of policies, e- kyc etc Digital Customer acquisition, identity verification (through e- Aadhaar), quick accessing of product details as per customer needs etc could be done without the need for physical infrastructure. Thus, API driven InsurTech would be the key to solve the low penetration problem in India.

    Neerav : there are two  types of distributors-  retail and corporate. Corporate have broadly foussed on launching Apps say, a wellness app for pharmacy buying and telecalls. Gradually, it will be expanding to other customers (retails). The main focus would be on customers in tier II cities and rural areas, rather than in metrocities.

    Rahul: InsurTech has prospective future in Drone insurance. The upcoming use for electrical vehicles opens up doors for new product- electrical vehicles insurance. InsurTech also has huge scope in Micro insurance and insurance in sharing economy. 

    1. Personal Data Security is one of the biggest challenges India is facing. How are the new Start ups assuring the customer data safety?

    Dr.Sahil: InsurTech is all about data. And Tech doesn’t happen overnight. It has various layers that need to be designed before a robust technology takes form.

    1. Functionality or purpose of the innovation
    2. Independence in the working
    3. The Load taking capacity
    4. Security measures

    Younger population currently prefers hassle free processing through digital platform, hence data security is not the first thing on mind. This is surely a big challenge, but this is a task for a later stage. Moreover, In India, Most insurtechs are intermediaries and the essential processes like underwriting, policy issue, claim settlement are done at the insurers’ end. So in ideal situations, insurers should be responsible for Data security. Alternatively, Government, a more informed member, should take responsibility to ensure data security and measures in case of a data leak where parties involved are punished.

    Aparajit: InsurTechs abide by the data safety protocols, system audits reports and security protocols mandated by IRDA. Mostly all the Servers are located in india, which reduces risk to considerable extent. However, data threat is very much of a real problem and IRDA will come up with new measures in due course of time to tackle this effectively.

    Neerav : Big companies are mainly following European data security standards and

    Guidelines and hence are legally insulated. But in practical sense, there are still gaps. Risk prevails. Challenges are there but we will figure out more ways. Infact, this isone of the many reasons, incumbents are hesitant to invest in newbies.

    Rahul: Typically, start-ups are built on AWS[8] or MS Azure or GCP(cloud based platforms) which comes with in-built security features  that incumbents who use on-premise services would not have access to. Moreover, Incumbents tend to be more vulnerable since they are the targets of cyber criminals owing to the size of their operations. Typically, leading InsurTech companies with increasing investments (Series A/B) have a full-service cyber security team (but this varies by company).

    1. How can we increase the awareness about Insurance in India?

    Dr.Sahil: Agents, more often than not, focus on appraisal and incentives. Similarly, customers are concerned with cheaper premium with more benefits. Improving customer welfare is hardly talked about. This is a consequence of lack of awareness. Insurer should focus on post sales engagement. Inception of a chat bot or common call centre, agnostic touch point not represented by any one company could be a innovative start.

    Aparajit: Social media and search engines playing a major role in creating awareness- like  insurance specific pages on facebook, Linkedin. API culture of InsuTech also actively creates awareness. For the benefit of customers, simplification and bullet pointing the terms and conditions in policy underwriting is a suggestion.

    Neerav: Most effective way is ‘word of mouth’. Customers will do away with agents, only if they see a better alternative in new technology. Though Advertising is effective promotion, it has a limited impact. Lack of awareness has negatively impacted customers’ welfare for a long time.

    1. In my opinion, one of the implications of digital insurance is lesser personal contact and more digital interaction between the agents and the customers. Do you think this could transform into challenge in any context?

    Dr.Sahil: As mentioned before, Agent is certainly more concerned about his benefits. Post sale of product, subsequent contact with agent will be for claim processing and settlement or maturity. thus, evidently, it is more profitable to be more interactive with the insurer. Most queries by the clients are not complex or tech related (like clauses of a claim) and could be answered by Chatbots. Chatbots infact make his process more efficient- make it phygital- physical person plus digital model. Many Insurers like policy bazaar, HDFC have already employed this technology. Is time agents also adapt to this change.

    Aparajit: Unlike popular belief, digitalization can infact improve the productivity of Agent if taken advantage of. Typically, an Agent could contact 2-3 clients per day, given the distance and time factor. Digital arrangement is cost effective in the sense that it reduces transaction costs and travelling time, increases agent productivity and outreach.  Tier II and III cities are becoming with active on online platforms and are looking for online modes of communication. Voice and video could become the new mode of communication, the new normal.

    Neerav: Not really. This was a problem of past. On the contrary, InsurTech could make huge difference in Tier II and III cities which are highly dependent on agents. InsurTech would promote awareness, and provide more transparent information and advice unlike an agent. Agents could still be a source of contact forsecond opinion, but InsurTech could replace agents at primary level.

    Rahul: It is difficult to say certainly. For more established agents/brokers who own large books, they might just return to business as usual The younger generation of agents & brokers might accept the support that digital platform provides (lower commissions but higher volume) since they are less embedded in the “old ways”. It is also important to consider that customers at different points in their life would want different levels of service ranging from digital to Face-to-Face.

    1. IRDA has been welcoming to the changes in the sector. Do you think there is more to be done?

    Dr.Sahil: IRDA has done a great job so far in welcoming InsurTech into the country and establishing the sandbox. But It has to move beyond the role of a regulator and expand its capabilities in technology and insurtech.

    Aparajit:  Yes, there is a lot of scope for IRDA as a regulator. But the pace has been set, which is a progressive step. Finance ministry and IRDA could promote digitalization and modrenization in LIC.

    Neerav: No. IRDA has been very supportive and cautious. As long as the product quality meets the standards, IRDA would approve and promote the product and the firm. Although, may be Public sector firms in the economy could be given a nudge by the government and IRDA.

    Rahul: Sandbox is a good starting point and  Standardization of clauses, exclusions and claim settlements in Health is a welcome move. However, there is a  Lack of clarity on policy wordings and interpretation which makes it harder for brokers/customers to compare products on features beyond price. In addition, there is a need for Centrally pooled underwriting capacity for innovation. This is a global problem where any start-up or platform which requires “product innovation” in insurance has to chase multiple carriers. Similar to how the IRDA used to operate the Third-Party motor pool, it should consider operating an innovation pool for capacity (application system like Sandbox)

    1. Covid 19 is the biggest pandemic any country has faced so far. Yet, it is believed that Covid could in fact accelerate digitalization. Do you believe that? Do you think this holds true for India? What will be its short term and long term impacts?

     Dr.Sahil: Covid has succeded in driving a behavioural change in the customers. People have become more adaptive to digitalization of processes. This could be a long lasting effect. Yet, this seems to a  very limited group, expansion of which depends on the InsurTechs now. However, In my opinion, InsurTech per se is covid independent.

    Aparajit:

    Traditionally, There are 4 distribition channels for insurance- bancassurance, agency, direct sales and brokers and corporate agents. Prior to Covid, agency and bancassurance owned  major market share and digital platforms have less than 5% contribution. But currently, with  bancassurance and agency which are not technologically prepared, are shut and digital platforms have taken their place. Policy bazaar’s business has increased by 30% due to their digital front which is certainly going to sustain even when bancasssurance and agents revive. Thus, in this way, InsurTech will be efficient, removing manual and menial (repetitive) works. Some jobs would become obsolete, and those employees could be used for other human intensive activities. Though motor and travel insurance companies have expected short term losses, these can be recovered as the industry revives.  Insurtech was initially met with scepticism. Adopting digitalization was considered “optional”. Covid has certain ways exposed the inefficiencies in the industry. It is now a question of how fast industry can adopt technology for the long term benefit.

    Neerav: Covid infact has a multifold effect on the industry. It could change the business is done by the insurers. Gradually, a virtual work culture may develop, where client meetings are held digitally. This is entail large cost benefits.  Smaller cities and towns are moving towards digital payments and service, which has become a necessity now. It also achieving a gradual behavioural change and adaptation to technology. Insurance industry will see a change

    Rahul: Some B2B InsurTechs (like policybazaar.com, Metamophsys) have seen several inquiries come in and sales cycles shorten. Executives understood the limitations of not having digital capabilities to administer policies, renewals and claims remotely, and incumbents are inclining rapidly towards digital operations. This effect is bound to remain for a long period. Moreover, Awareness of the importance of health insurance is likely to remain. Health Insurance was one of the few segments to maintain positive YoY growth in April and May 2020)

                Presently, nearly 60- 65%  of population in India is young. They would form a major share of insurance demand in the forthcoming years and InsurTech and incumbents should be prepared for this. Demand for Renters policies and gadget protection policies will increase rapidly. Health Insurance also holds more oppurtunities for innovation and disruption. A more customer centric approach will pave the way for InsurTech.

    Evidently, Insurtech needs to happen as it is an effective way to create awareness among customers, for them to look beyond return on investment or fear. Insurance is a precaution against an eventuality and should be considered a long term investment.

    Appendix

    List of InsurTechs in India

    India: InsureTech Acitivity (Sorted by Type and then Alphabetical Order)
    Name Type Description Founded in Location
    Konsult Enabler Mobile app offering health consultations with potential insurance leads 2015 Delhi
    SatSure Enabler Crop damage assessment service 2015 Bangalore
    Trak N Tell Enabler A leading telematics solution provider 2009 Delhi
    BharatSaves Enabler Online insurace shopping by Google N/A Bangalore
    Xceedance Enabler Insurance analytics and consulting to P&C carriers 2013 Bangalore
    Senseforth Enabler Conversational AI – has developed SPOK, an email bot HDFC Life Insurance 2012 Bangalore
    Ask Arvi Enabler Health Insurance Assistant / Conversational AI 2017 Mumbai
    Girnar Software Intermediary IT company offering mobile and web solutions. Operators of CarDekho.com car buying portal 2007 Jaipur
    Demyto Intermediary A portal for car services with the ability to request an insurance quote 2015 Pune
    EasyPolicy Intermediary Life and P&C insurance comparison site 2011 Noida
    Wishfin Intermediary Insurance and finance marketplace, formerly known as Deal4Loans 2015 Delhi
    Pickme India Intermediary Gadget insurance 2011 Mumbai
    YuMiGo Intermediary Travel insurance aggregator 2015 Delhi
    Turtlemint Intermediary Insurance aggregator with online quotes and form assist 2015 Mumbai
    RenewBuy Intermediary Car insurance aggreagtor 2015 Noida
    Coverfox Intermediary Insurance aggregator with online quotes and form assist 2013 Mumbai
    ETInsure Intermediary Insurance aggregator with online quotes and form assist 2016 Delhi
    121Policy Intermediary Insurance aggregator with online quotes and form assist 2016 Kolkata
    GIBL Intermediary Insurance aggregator with online quotes 2013 Kolkata
    GramCover Intermediary An insurance marketplace for the rural sector. 2016 Delhi
    PolicyMantra Intermediary Insurance aggregator with online quotes and form assist 2010 Mumbai
    PolicyBazaar Intermediary Insurance aggregator with online quotes and form assist 2008 Gurgaon
    CarDekho Intermediary Car search portal that also provides online car insurance quotes (Subsidiary of Girnar) 2016 Gurgaon
    PolicyBoss Intermediary Online insurance aggregator 2003 Mumbai
    Acko General Insurance Primary India’s first online insurance company 2017 Mumbai

     
    References

    [1] Moral Hazard is the case where the insured assumes more risk, since the burden of the loss is borne by someone else( insurer)

    [2] Blockchain or distributed registry technology is a digital ledger that stores active transaction data without intermediate control by using a consensus system to validate transactions. Blockchain operates on a principle of transparency for fixed record keeping.

    [3] InsurTech -Working Group Findings & Recommendations (IRDA)

    [4] InsurTech -Working Group Findings & Recommendations (IRDA)

    [5] InsurTech -Working Group Findings & Recommendations (IRDA)

    [6] InsurTech -Working Group Findings & Recommendations (IRDA)

    [7] Internet of Things

    [8] Amazon Web Services

     
    This is a working paper. Comments are welcome and can be forwarded to aqf19surya@mse.ac.in
     

  • What Triggered Recent Chinese Naval Exercises in the South China Sea?

    What Triggered Recent Chinese Naval Exercises in the South China Sea?

    During the last few months, the PLA Navy along with the PLA Air Force conducted several exercises in the South China Sea. China used these maneuvers to deter Taiwan against its growing relationships with the US, and as a tool of “strategic communication” to signal to the US of its military capabilities to project power and defend its national interests. There are at least five important reasons that could have triggered such aggressive posturing by China.

    First is COVID-19. After Wuhan was designated as the source-destination of COVID-19 in January this year and over 80,000 of its residents were reported to have been infected by the virus, the Chinese leadership sought to boost its image among its people who had been struggling by lockdowns.[i] In the first half of February, China chose to divert international attention away from the pandemic by deploying fighter jets and bombers to intimidate Taiwan which had been critical of China over its handling of the virus. This prompted Taipei to advise authorities in Beijing to “focus on preventing the spread of the epidemic” and admonished it for “inciting nationalism at home to shift public focus away from challenges at hand” and labelled it as a “game not worth the candle”.[ii]

    the PLA Navy, led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, conducted naval exercises and the taskforce sailed through the Miyako Strait, Bashi Channel and the South China Seaostensibly to display its military readiness during the pandemic. 

    Also, while the global community struggled to combat the pandemic and at least three US Navy carriers afflicted by COVID-19 virus, the PLA Navy, led by the aircraft carrier Liaoning, conducted naval exercises and the taskforce sailed through the Miyako Strait, Bashi Channel and the South China Sea[iii] ostensibly to display its military readiness during the pandemic. The PLA Air Force too showcased it combat readiness and fighter jets intruded into Taiwan’s air space. However, the US responded by three-carrier deployment including dual-carrier operations; B-52 Stratofortress bombers operated from Guam and the nuclear submarines were forward-deployed to conduct “contingency response operations.”[iv]

    Second, China was rattled after the US turned the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act into law to show that “it has the support of both branches of government, which is required for a strong and effective U.S. foreign policy”.[v] Similarly, it also introduced a new Bill ‘Taiwan Defence Act’ in the US Congress[vi] which requires the Department of Defense to provide weapons to Taipei. The Trump administration also announced a military package worth US$ 180 million to improve Taiwan’s capability against “regional threats and to strengthen homeland defense,” [vii]

    Third, is about the Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) which entails fiscal support for military activities and associated infrastructure investment plans[viii] in the Pacific Ocean. The PDI is similar to the 2014 European Deterrence Initiative (targeted against Russia) and is meant to advance US priorities in the Indo-Pacific region. It aims to “focus resources on key capability gaps to ensure U.S. forces have everything they need to compete, fight, and win in the Indo-Pacific” is conspicuously targeted against China.

    India, in response to Chinese posturing in the Himalayas, deployed its naval ship in the South China Sea. This unexpected Indian posturing challenging China in its own backyard and operating in close cooperation with the US Navy, has caused alarm bells in Beijing.

    Fourth, China is concerned about the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), a grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the US, which China believes is meant to contain it. Since 2018, India has been hosting the Malabar series of naval exercises which include Japan and the US; but this is being expanded to include Australia. The geographic focus of the Malabar exercises had so far remained in the Bay of Bengal or the Pacific Ocean (around Guam and Japanese waters), could now shift to the South China Sea. India, in response to Chinese posturing in the Himalayas, deployed its naval ship in the South China Sea. This unexpected Indian posturing challenging China in its own backyard and operating in close cooperation with the US Navy, has caused alarm bells in Beijing.

    Chinese worries about the Quad are further aggravated after Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, amid rising tensions between Taiwan and China around the South China Sea region, has called for a joint alliance of democratic nations to uphold “a strategic order that encourages cooperation, transparency and problem-solving through dialogue, not threats of war”.[ix]

    Fifth, is related to Code of Conduct (CoC) for South China Sea between China and the ASEAN. The Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit has “emphasised the need to maintain and promote an environment conducive to the COC negotiations”[x] and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc has urged China to accelerate talks on an effective and efficient COC in line with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS.[xi] China has in the past disregarded the urgency over the finalization of the CoC and has dragged the issue far too long, but now appears to have realized that there is high degree of unity among the Member States over the South China Sea issue and attempted to reassure ASEAN of its intentions to pursue the issue hopefully in right earnest.

    Among other political, diplomatic and economic toolkits to appease the ASEAN Member States, it also chose to conduct military exercises to intimidate Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam.

    Among other political, diplomatic and economic toolkits to appease the ASEAN Member States, it also chose to conduct military exercises to intimidate Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam. It relented only after Philippines Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr denounced as ‘illegal provocations’ Chinese air patrols over the South China Sea and threatened if “something happens that is beyond incursion but is in fact an attack on say a Filipino naval vessel … [that] means then I call up Washington DC,”

    China’s attempts to dominate the regional security affairs, non-adherence to the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea, coercion of other claimants to the disputed features in South China Sea and its intimidation of Taiwan has not gone well among the ASEAN Member States. ASEAN sees US’ formidable capabilities and above all its commitment to keep the Indo-Pacific ‘free and open’ against any attempts by China, as reassuring.

    In his recent remarks at the 10th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,[xii] Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo assured his counterparts from 17 countries that the US shares and supports the “principles of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, and respect for international law contained in the US’ Indo-Pacific vision, ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo Pacific, and the visions of many other EAS Member States”.

     
    Image Credit: The Globe and Mail and VoA
     
     
    References

    [i] “China Sends Ships, Planes over Disputed Seas to Show Strength after COVID-19 Outbreak”, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/china-sends-ships-planes-over-disputed-seas-show-strength-after-covid-19-outbreak  (accessed 08 September 2020).

    [ii] “The ROC Firmly Defends its Sovereignty: The CCP Should Immediately Stop its Military Provocations and not Misjudge the Situation”, https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=A921DFB2651FF92F&sms=37838322A6DA5E79&s=3AF953C12D84A525  (accessed 08 September 2020).
    [iii] “   Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning conducts exercises in South China Sea: PLA Navy spokesperson”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1185471.shtml  (accessed 08 September 2020).
    [iv] “Pacific Fleet Submarines: Lethal, Agile, Underway”, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=112909 (accessed 06 July 2020).
    [v] “Trump and the TAIPEI Act”, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/trump-and-the-taipei-act/  (accessed 08 September 2020).
    [vi] Under the 1978 Taiwan relations Act the United States “will make available to Taiwan such defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capabilities”;
    [vii] “Trump administration approves arms sale to Taiwan amid China tensions”, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/21/politics/us-taiwan-arms-sale/index.html (accessed 20 June 2020).
    [viii] “Investments in theater missile defense, expeditionary airfield and port infrastructure, fuel and munitions storage, and other areas will be key to America’s future force posture in the Indo-Pacific.” See “The Pacific Deterrence Initiative: Peace through Strength in the Indo-Pacific”, https://warontherocks.com/2020/05/the-pacific-deterrence-initiative-peace-through-strength-in-the-indo-pacific/ (accessed 20 June 2020).
    [ix] “Fed-Up of Chinese Threats, Taiwanese President Urges ‘Coalition of Democracies’ to Confront Beijing”, https://eurasiantimes.com/fed-up-of-chinese-threats-taiwanese-pm-urges-coalition-of-democracies-to-confront-beijing/ (accessed 09 September 2020).
    [x] “Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit 26 June 2020” https://asean.org/storage/2020/06/Chairman-Statement-of-the-36th-ASEAN-Summit-FINAL.pdf (accessed 14 July 2020).
    [xi] “Pompeo: China cannot be allowed to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire”, https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/pompeo-china-cannot-be-allowed-to-treat-the-south-china-sea-as-its-maritime-empire-21832.html (accessed 14 July 2020).
    [xii] “Secretary Pompeo’s Participation in the 10th East Asia Summit Virtual Foreign Ministers’ Meeting”, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/secretary-pompeos-participation-in-the-10th-east-asia-summit-virtual-foreign-ministers-meeting/  (accessed 10 September 2020).

  • Contemporary and Upcoming Issues In the Field of Intellectual Property Rights

    Contemporary and Upcoming Issues In the Field of Intellectual Property Rights

    1.1   Contemporary Issues: IP Awareness and Drug Price Caps

    1.1.1. Introduction

    The realm of intellectual property (IP) rights has been in existence and been a driving force for novelty and innovation for centuries and can be dated back to at least 500 BC when a state in Greece provided protection for 1 year to innovators of ‘a new refinement in luxury’, ensuring innovators can monopolize and reap benefits out of their innovations.[i] That being the case, the first international convention (known as the ‘Paris Convention’) was enforced much later in the year 1883, establishing a union for the protection of ‘industrial property’. Since then, we have seen rapid growth in the field of IP rights. It goes without saying that till the time entrepreneurs are incorporating companies, innovators are inventing technology or artists are creating their works of art and/or literature, the domain of IP will only progress further.

    Although the evolution of international IP regime has been rapid and the laws have become a lot more complicated than they initially were, it appears that we have only scratched the surface of the extent and reach of IP rights. It cannot be stressed enough that IP rights are crucial to every company, creator and inventor since it ensures that their rights and interests are protected and gives them the right to claim relief against any violation.

    Insofar as the Indian IP regime is concerned, we have seen a gradual but crucial development in our laws which has now motivated not only foreign corporations to seek IP protection in India but has also supported start-ups in seeking protection of their IP to the extent that these enterprises have the liberty to seek the protection of their IP at significantly reduced fees (barring copyright and geographical indications). The Indian Intellectual Property Office (IPO) has also taken measures to promote e-filing by reducing costs associated therewith and improving its e-filing system/mechanism. However, the issues arise when start-ups and small enterprises seek to register their IP and are unaware of these common, but cost-effective mechanisms in place.

    Besides, our intellectual property policies (especially patent policies) have been a subject matter of criticism for a long time at a global stage due to the government’s intervention in the enforcement of patent rights. One of the primary concerns for foreign corporations and organizations have been related to working of patented inventions in India and the issue of compulsory licensing.

    1.1.2. Lack of Awareness of Intellectual Property Rights

    Launched by the Government of India in 2014, the ‘Make in India’ project has motivated entrepreneurs to establish their business with the help of government funding and foreign direct investments (FDI) of up to 100%.[ii] This step has led to a boost in people exploiting their entrepreneurial skills to establish a successful business (in most cases). Although the Make in India project also focuses on the importance of IP rights by attempting to educate the entrepreneurial minds of the importance and benefits of their IP, it appears that small businesses are yet to benefit from the IP aspect of the project. These businesses/start-ups do not realize the importance of their IP and tend to often misuse violate another’s. This leads to the institution of a lawsuit seeking infringement (or passing off) against such businesses by big corporations and since defending such Suits is an expensive and time-consuming process, it becomes an uphill task for the entrepreneurs to defend the Suits and run their business effectively. Entrepreneurs are often misinformed and miseducated of the basics of IP by professionals who do not have an expertise in the area of IP law, which leads them to believe that their acts of adopting an identical or deceptively similar trademark would go unnoticed or would not constitute infringement or passing off. Due to their lack of knowledge in the domain of IP and lack of proper guidance by professionals, these entrepreneurs tend to believe that: –

    • Adopting an identical mark (intentionally) in a different class does not constitute infringement or passing off;
    • Adopting a similar mark in the same (or allied and cognate) class does not constitute infringement or passing off;
    • Even if the competing marks are identical or deceptively similar, filing a trademark application with a user claim would give them a defensible stand against the true proprietor’s claim.

    Needless to say, these are some of the common misconceptions which lead to a claim of infringement or passing off being raised by true proprietors of the marks. Also, the possibility of the Court of law imposing damages and/or costs on a defendant cannot be ruled out either. In such a scenario, due to the limited funding of these start-ups, they are often forced to reconsider their entire business strategy in-line with the pending lawsuit. This can, however, be avoided if the entrepreneurs are either well-educated in the field of IP law or take necessary steps to ensure that they receive proper guidance regarding risks involved in registration and use of their mark, from a professional with expertise in the field of IP laws. Instances of start-ups adopting a similar or identical mark of a big corporation/start-up are quite common nowadays with some of the known cases being instituted by ‘Bookmyshow’ against ‘Bookmyoffer’, ‘Shaadi.com’ seeking relief against use of ‘Secondshaadi.com’, ‘Naukri.com’ suing ‘naukrie.com’, etc.[iii]

    In instances involving the pharmaceutical industry, the issue becomes far severe since adopting a similar or identical mark can result not only in infringement of IP but can only be extremely harmful to the patients/consumers. Unlike any other consumable item, patients/consumers are at much greater risk if they consume wrong medication and such instances where corporations adopt a similar or identical mark for its pharmaceutical drug, the consequence can be fatal to the extent that it may even lead to death. In one such famous instance in India where the Defendant was a repeated/hardened infringer, the High Court of Bombay while imposing exemplary costs of INR 1.5 crores stated “Drugs are not sweets. Pharmaceutical companies which provide medicines for the health of the consumers have a special duty of care towards them. These companies have a greater responsibility towards the general public. However, nowadays, the corporate and financial goals of such companies cloud the decision of its executives whose decisions are incentivized by profits, more often than not, at the cost of public health. This case is a perfect example of just that”.

    Another issue these entrepreneurs/start-ups tend to face in the realm of IP law is vis-a-vis use of copyrighted material without knowledge/intention to infringe upon someone else’s IP rights. For instance, when start-ups launch their online portals, they tend to use images/GIFs or music for their videos which are copyrighted and use thereof without permission is illegal. On account of lack of knowledge of IP laws and consequences of such misuse, they often violate rights residing in the copyrighted work and are then subject to either a legal notice from the owner/proprietor of the copyrighted material or a lawsuit before the Court of law.

    The United States of America’s (USA) Chamber of Global Innovation Policy Center (GIPC) which promotes innovation and creativity through intellectual property standards, in its 2019 list of countries performing in the field of IP law, places India at a substantially low rank of 40 out of 53[iv] which indicates that USA considers India as a major threat when it comes to development and investment the field of IP rights in India (especially in the field of patents). Additionally, India also lacks in the number of patent applications filed before the Indian Patent Office, averaging at around 9,500 filings per year, compared to 2,69,000 filings in the USA.[v] One of the primary reason behind this difference might have something to do with India’s lack of support towards the encouragement of IP protection, especially for start-ups.

    1.1.3. Raising Awareness on Intellectual Property Laws for Entrepreneurs

    With almost 50% of litigations within the domain of IP pertaining to trademark infringement and passing off,[vi] entrepreneurs and small businesses must take the following necessary steps to ensure that their rights and interests in their business are protected: –

    • Entrepreneurs/Business owners must entrust lawyers/law firms specializing in the field of IP rights to advise and prosecute their trademark applications;
    • Understand or attempt to understand each and every step involved in prosecuting and registering a trademark application and participate in discussions leading to every step taken in the prosecution of their IP; and,
    • Approach IP lawyers/law firms to get a gist of importance of IP protection along-with freedom to use a mark either before registering it or using the said mark for goods in classes not forming part of the trademark registration.

    It is also the duty of IP lawyers/law firms to promote IP protection for entrepreneurs and small businesses by organizing interactive sessions with new and/or domestic clients and providing competitive charges for prosecuting and enforcing IP rights of these entrepreneurs and businesses.

    Statistics reflect that majority of IP infringement cases in India involve a small enterprise being unaware of the basics of IP rights and therefore, using an IP that is either deceptively similar or virtually identical to a registered and/or well-known IP.[vii] Often businesses expanding their presence in the online portal (either through their website or a social media page) use copyrighted material without realizing that their use of the same would tantamount infringement.   Raising awareness of the importance of IP and consequences of infringement (and passing off) would ensure that start-ups avoid misusing an IP belonging to someone else.

    1.1.4. The imposition of Price Caps on pharmaceutical drugs in India and its work-around

    One of the primary reasons why the USA considers India’s IP regime a major threat has something to do with India’s patent laws, especially vis-à-vis the pharmaceutical industry. Albeit the US Trade Representative (USTR) last year stated that the USA is attempting to restrict patentability for new pharmaceutical drugs which are “essentially mere discoveries of a new form of a known substance which does not result in enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance ….. machine or apparatus” (which is identical to Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970),[viii] it still considers India as a threat to its IP regime, especially due of India’s patent laws.

    To better understand the problems faced in the Indian pharmaceutical industry, it would be prudent to point out that unlike developed nations, the Indian government (through its Patents Act and policies) keeps strict control over the drug pricing with an intention to make healthcare (specifically medication) accessible amongst all States and income groups. This can especially be observed in pharmaceutical drugs for cancer and diabetes medication. The Government of India has imposed strict price restrictions for its pharmaceutical drugs, thereby diluting IP rights and causing a severe impact on IP valuation of those pharmaceutical drugs.[ix]Although the impact might seem insignificant to consumers since they benefit from these price reductions, making cancer medicines 90% cheaper due to price control would not make IP holders happy or promote invention. Simply put, once the government slashes prices of pharmaceutical drugs intending to make them easily accessible to the majority of patients, it severely impacts the profit margin of the pharmaceutical industries, forcing them to invest more into the industry of generic drug manufacturers because of a bigger profit margin and lesser costs, rather than invest into inventing new drugs, which might although tackle a currently incurable disease (or a curable disease more effectively), but would at the same time, lead the corporation into losses. These price cuts would also force the pharmaceutical corporations to compromise on the quality of drugs which might, in a longer run, have a severe impact on healthcare.

    India’s investment in its healthcare sector has been a major concern since the Indian States ideally spend as low as 1.3% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on healthcare which results in a substantial increase in out-of-pocket expenses and placement of poor healthcare mechanisms.[x] India’s heavy reliance on generic drugs supporting the lesser privileged consumers has been expressed as a concern by the USTR[xi] and global pharmaceutical giants to the extent that investors and pharmaceutical corporations have restricted their investment into the Indian pharmaceutical industry since their price margin would result in government either forcing price caps on the drugs or implement compulsory licensing for the expensive and life-saving drugs.

    As stated above, this approach of placing price caps towards the Indian and global (vis-à-vis their sale of drugs in India) pharmaceutical industry has a major impact on India’s patent laws since it affects innovation, and since innovation is an essential part of the invention in the healthcare sector, pharmaceutical industries tend to focus more on generic drug production, profit from out-of-pocket expenses of consumers/patients, hospitalization costs, etc.[xii] The imposition of price caps has shown to have no significant improvement in accessibility of pharmaceutical drugs.

    Although the imposition of price caps is necessary for a developing nation, the same should be practiced to a limited extent. For instance, instead of capping the price of a pharmaceutical drug and dropping its price by 90%, the price caps should be dependent on the situation and need for the drug. For instance, cancer and diabetes medication are in high requirements in India[xiii] (and other nations) and therefore, the government can impose price caps and reduce the cost of the drugs by 50%. Insofar as other (less crucial/critical) pharmaceutical drugs are concerned, the government can either refrain from price caps or impose a price cap of a maximum of 20%. This would not only promote investment in innovating patented drugs but would also increase FDI in the Indian pharmaceutical sector, thereby permitting Indian pharmaceutical corporations to invent new and possibly better pharmaceutical drugs.

    At the same time, a concerned person always reserves their right under Section 84(1)[xiv] of the Indian Patents Act, 1970 to request for issuance of a compulsory license (after the expiry of three years from the date of grant of the patent) against the said pharmaceutical drug in case it does not comply with the guidelines issued under Section 83[xv]  of the afore-mentioned Act like in the case of Bayer Corporation v. Union of India.[xvi] In essence, the Indian government must invest more in its healthcare sector policies to reduce out-of-pocket expenses incurred by patients/consumers and reduce the price caps by a significant amount to promote innovation in the field of patent laws, especially in the pharmaceutical sector.

    1.2. A Global Upcoming Issue: Impact of Use/Commercialization of Artificial Intelligence on Intellectual Property Rights

    1.2.1. Introduction

    “Can machines think?” – Alan Turing, 1950

    A few years after Alan Mathiso Turing, a renowned English mathematician, cryptanalyst and computer scientist played a pivotal role in defeating Hitler’s Nazi Germany, he wrote a paper titled ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (1950) where he asked a simple, yet intriguing question: “Can machines think?”. His paper and subsequent research established the basis of what we refer to as ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (AI) or machine learning/intelligence. Fast forward to today, the concept of AI has become a lot more complex than what had been imagined by researchers around half a century ago. AI or a machine which reflects the ability to think and act in as close of a manner as a human mind is as of date, an exciting new development in the field of technology.

    From ‘The Turin Test’ in the year 1950 to creation of Sophia, a humanoid robot created by Hanson Robotics in the year 2016, technology, especially in the field of AI has progressed at a drastic rate, with some of the major developments being the creation of Google’s Home device (2016), Apple’s virtual assistant ‘Siri’ (2011), Microsoft’s virtual assistant ‘Cortana’ (2014), Amazon’s home assistant ‘Alexa’ (2014), etc. occurring in the past decade (2010 to 2019) itself. It is safe to say that with this progress, it is not far-fetched to assume that we may soon see the age of commercialization of much smarter versions of currently existing machine learning devices. The technology relating to AI has seen explosive growth in recent times with the number of patent applications for technologies relating to AI exceeding 1,00,000.[xvii]

    Today, AI can be dissected into two types of intelligence, namely:

    • Weak AI: This is a more common type of AI which is used amongst major corporations like Google, Apple, Microsoft, etc. and although it is being used widely, its abilities are limited to performing tasks that it has been trained to perform. Such AI can store data and present it to the consumer upon enquiry or on need-basis. However, the algorithms do not permit this AI to think and act in a manner a human mind would and therefore, this AI does not pose a threat within the domain of IP.
    • Strong AI: Unlike weak AI, this form of AI would perform more cognitive functions that imitate a human mind more closely as against weak AI. Even though weak AI is known to perform basic functions more efficiently (when compared to humans), the strong AI will not only perform those basic functions of a weak AI but also will also perform more complex tasks such as inventing or creating a new IP (like a new copyrightable sound or video or a unique design, etc.).

    To a certain extent, researchers worry about the consequences of AI in case its goals end up being misaligned to ours. But at this stage, AI seems to be more promising than dangerous, especially in the field of healthcare and agriculture which is a critical industry for India.

    Needless to say, corporations are investing a lot of resources to develop this field of technology which is said to have revolutionary impacts including prediction of epidemics, advanced disaster warnings and damage prevention methods, increased productivity in all industries, etc. The possibilities and benefits (and in many cases, risks) of AI are innumerable and at the current rate of its development, it will quite possibly be overwhelming. Regardless of its pros and cons, commercialization of AI is inevitable and therefore, this raises a material question: Do we have the appropriate laws in place to tackle issues arising out of commercialization (or use) of AI? The answer, unfortunately, is no.

    1.2.2. The Current Scenario

    Being an upcoming digital frontier, it is apparent that AI will have a huge impact on our current laws and practices. For instance, our current world IP regime only permits a ‘person’ to be a proprietor and/or owner of an IP (see Naruto v. Slater[xviii]) which implies that any form of IP that is generated/invented by an AI cannot be a subject matter of registration. However, a recent decision by the Chinese Court wherein a tech giant ‘Tencent’ claimed copyright infringement against a local financial news company overwork created by its Dreamwriter robot might reflect a contrary view. The Court in the said case held that an article generated by AI is protectable under Chinese copyright law.[xix] Holding a contrary view, the European Patent Office (EPO) in the case pertaining to patent applications filed by ‘DABUS’ an AI technology, gave a finding similar to the Naruto case wherein it held that application has to be filed by a human being.[xx] Professor Ryan Abbott along-with his multi-disciplinary team at the University of Surrey had filed (through their AI called DABUS) the first-ever patent application without a human inventor[xxi] indicating that the move towards AI-based IP filing is underway, however, given that the laws are currently not in place, the application was, unfortunately, refused.

    Although an old principle, the Courts around the world at times rely (either directly or indirectly) on the principle of “sweat of the brow”, which indicates the inventor’s effort and hard work invested in creating an IP. However, the application of the said principle becomes rather complicated when the issue of IP generated by AI comes into the picture. At the same time, the commercialization of AI might also lead to dilution of IP rights, given that the possibility of AI being better and quicker at generating IP than human beings cannot be ruled out. Undoubtedly, AI might eventually be considered as a ‘smarter’ variant of a human inventor since an AI would require a significantly less amount of time and effort to generate a registrable IP. Apart from the ones already mentioned above, several unknown issues are likely to arise upon commercialization of AI (to generate IP) and there is a dire need to highlight and resolve these issues at the earliest.

    The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has recently taken an initiative to invite public feedback on possible impacts of AI on the world IP regime[xxii] by conducting press conferences to tackle the impending issues vis-à-vis IP laws upon commercialization or use of AI. Although the topic of discussion during the previous conference was somewhat restricted to Patent laws and did not tackle IP laws holistically, the next round of sessions might emphasize on all IP laws and be more holistic towards progress. Needless to say, AI will impact our IP regime all the way from the creation of an IP to valuation, commercialization, transfer/assignment, etc. thereof, which would require a complete overhaul of our current laws in order to inculcate and appreciate the investment (in terms of time and costs) and labour involved in the creation of the AI, as well as use/transfer/assignment of an IP generated by that AI.

    1.2.3. India’s Approach towards Artificial Intelligence

    India has seen rapid growth in its information technology (IT) sector which has further contributed to other primary sectors like agricultural sector, healthcare sector, etc. by developing various mechanisms such as a system for online trading or integrated crop management system (amongst other things). It is safe to say that technology has a big role to play in India’s growth. Apart from the agricultural industry, the software industry has played a pivotal role in India’s move towards becoming the fastest-growing trillion-dollar economy.[xxiii]

    Being amongst the most profitable investment jurisdictions, India has recently been a hub for tech-related start-ups. Understanding the importance of technology, Indian entrepreneurs, along-with government support, have started to invest heavily in the technology field and with the help of FDI, there has been a substantial boom in the field of technology. Since other fields such as agriculture, healthcare and education are all somewhat dependent on this field, the scope of AI transforming all the other sectors through the tech sector is clearly perceivable.

    As discussed earlier, India’s healthcare sector is in a dire need for investment and development and on account of lack of funding and need to make medication accessible, reliance on AI would drastically reduce costs incurred in labour, research and development, trials, etc., which would eventually reduce the costs of pharmaceutical drugs themselves, thereby impacting the final sale price of the drug. Reliance on AI (by developing the tech sector) would extinguish the need for State governments to invest heavily in their healthcare programmes. Although the current investment might not cut it, a substantial investment, in that case, would not be required. AI support in the development and marketing of pharmaceutical drugs, thereby reducing the overall costs and increasing production and sale would also invite more FDI in India’s healthcare sector. This will also eventually make healthcare more accessible in less developed regions in India. Statistics indicate that healthcare is majorly accessible/available in limited States/Cities like Bengaluru, Chennai, Gurugram, etc.[xxiv] while cities like Singrauli continue to suffer.[xxv] With the major impediment of drug pricing out of the way, access to healthcare will become more of a focus and would eventually thrive with AI support.

    Insofar as the agricultural sector is concerned, the same plays an essential role in our developing economy. According to a report issued by India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), around 58% of Indian population relies on India’s agricultural sector with a contribution of an estimated $265.51 billion (approximately INR 18.55 lakh crore) of gross value added to its economy (in Financial Year 2019).[xxvi] This implies that majority of the lesser developed States and Cities in India rely solely on production and sale of their agricultural produce.[xxvii] With an FDI inflow of up to 100% and an increasing reliance on technology, the sector keeps looking for methods to increase crop yields in a cost-effective manner. Having said that, the agricultural sector still faces some major issues like weather instability and fluctuations, condition of agricultural labourers, poor farming techniques, inadequate irrigation facilities, etc.[xxviii]  Unlike the healthcare sector, the agricultural sector is already witnessing the impact of AI from companies like Microsoft India and Intello Labs which have introduced mechanisms to maximize crop yield and reduce wastage/infestation. For instance, Microsoft India has introduced an AI-based sowing app which determines and informs the farmers of the best time to sow their crop based on analysis of climate data for the specific area and amount of rainfall and soil moisture the crops have received.[xxix]  Farmers can benefit from these AI-based apps without spending any additional costs on installing sensors.

    Indian (and foreign) tech industries have already played an important role in providing ease of business through reliance on weak AI and therefore, if India invests and conducts thorough research into strong AI, the implications of AI can be countless. However, since research and investment in the field of strong AI are extremely limited in India, commercialization thereof seems far-fetched as of date. Due to lack of expertise in the field of AI, it has been difficult to conduct research and yield any result. Colleges/Universities often refrain from investing in the field of AI research due to lack of participation and heavy research costs. Also, since the education system in the majority of institutions is somewhat traditional, graduates (or post-graduates) lack the required skill set to work in this technical field.[xxx]

    In contrast, however, the Chinese government is already taking steps to become a leader in the AI space by 2030s. It has adopted a three-step method which involves appreciating AI-based applications by the year 2020, making cutting edge breakthroughs in the said field by 2025 and leading in the industry by 2030. To support this process, a Chinese Court has already ruled in favour of AI-generated copyright work in its decision favouring Tencent,[xxxi] a tech company focusing on communication and social platforms. Since India (through its tech industry) has started taking steps to work towards its AI technology (albeit weak AI for now) and has also entrusted its think-tank ‘NITI (National Institution for Transforming India ) Aayog’ for assistance in such development through the National Program on AI,[xxxii] we hope to see India catch-up to tech giants like China, USA and Europe.

    1.2.4. Development of Intellectual Property Laws on Artificial Intelligence: An Indian Perspective

     Since WIPO has only recently started discussing the implications of AI on global IP laws, the member states of WIPO are yet to come out with laws pertaining to AI-based IP. While beginning its public consultation process on AI and IP policy, Director General of WIPO Mr Francis Gurry said: “Artificial intelligence is set to radically alter the way in which we work and live, with great potential to help us solve common global challenges, but it is also prompting policy questions and challenges,”.[xxxiii]  On December 13, 2019 WIPO also published ‘Draft Issues Paper on Intellectual Property Policy and Artificial Intelligence’ with an intent to invite feedback/opinion on the most pressing issues IP policymakers will face in the near future. One of the most crucial questions where jurisdictions conflict is whether AI can be an inventor/owner of an IP. While the EPO held that an AI cannot be the inventor of a patent application, the Chinese Court observed the contrary, holding that an AI can be an inventor of a copyrightable subject matter. Apart from the issues arising vis-à-vis prosecution of such applications (assuming an AI can be an inventor/originator of an IP), another important issue would pertain to enforcement by or against IP owned by an AI. For instance, if an AI generates a copyrightable subject matter which is deceptively similar or identical to a copyrighted matter, against whom will a Suit claiming infringement and damages lie? Further, in case of a finding against the AI wherein damages have been awarded, will the AI be expected to bear the damages or the owner of the AI? To answer these complex questions, WIPO has invited inputs from member States on issues (not exhaustive) published on December 13, 2019.[xxxiv]

    In view afore-mentioned development, India should establish a team of technical and legal (IP) experts to review the current laws and issues drafted by the WIPO Secretariat, draft possible answers to the issues and suggest required amendments to our current laws to inculcate rights of AI in the best way possible and then discuss the same at a larger stage, i.e., at the 25th Session of the WIPO Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP). Until now, India’s role/participation in WIPO’s sessions/meetings has been passive and considering how AI would impact its various sectors, especially the agricultural and healthcare sector (a sector which needs an improvement), India must play an active role in the development of IP laws to support AI. Given the fact that India is one of the fastest-growing economies and one of its cities is also considered as the ‘Silicon Valley’ of India,[xxxv] commercialization/use of AI would greatly benefit its economy to the extent that it would substantially reduce labour costs and at the same time, benefit a lot of entrepreneurs in the tech industry. Additionally, AI would also be crucial for government offices as it would greatly reduce delay in processing time and errors. For instance, the use of AI in Indian Intellectual Property Offices would enable machines to review applications for basic defects such as non-filing of an essential document or improper authentication, etc. In case strong AI is adopted by these departments, it would also enable machines to raise basic objections on applications and upon clearance thereof, advertise or register the same, thereby reducing significant costs and time.

    It goes without saying that AI is the next big thing in the field of technology and once it is commercialized at a large scale, it is going to have a huge impact on our laws (especially IP laws). Given India’s interests and possible benefits in the field of AI, its involvement in the development of our current IP regime is pivotal.

     

    Notes

    [i] Jeff Williams, The Evolution of Intellectual Property, Law Office of Jeff Williams PLLC; link: https://txpatentattorney.com/blog/the-history-of-intellectual-property(published on November 11, 2015).

    [ii] Foreign Direct Investment, published by Make in India; link: http://www.makeinindia.com/policy/foreign-direct-investment.

    [iii] Top 17 Startup Legal Disputes, published by Wazzeer; link: https://wazzeer.com/blog/top-17-startup-legal-disputes (published on May 02, 2017).

    [iv] GIPC IP Index 2020, published by Global Innovation Policy Center; link: https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/ipindex2020-details/?country=in.

    [v] Darrell M. West, India-U.S. relations: Intellectual property rights, Brookings India; link: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/india-u-s-relations-intellectual-property-rights (published on June 04, 2016).

    [vi] Thehasin Nazia & Rajarshi Choudhuri, The Problem of IPR Infringement in India’s Burgeoning Startup Ecosystem, IPWatchdog; link: https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/11/16/problem-ipr-infringement-indias-burgeoning-startup-ecosystem/id=116019 (published on November 16, 2019).

    [vii] Press Trust of India, Absence of legal awareness root cause of rights’ deprivation, Business Standard, Nagpur; link: https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/absence-of-legal-awareness-root-cause-of-rights-deprivation-119081800664_1.html (published on August 18, 2019).

    [viii] Kristina M. L. Acri née Lybecker, India’s Patent Law is No Model for the United States: Say No to No Combination Drug Patents Act, IP Watch Dog; link: https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/26/indias-patent-law-no-model-united-states/id=110727 (published on June 26, 2019).

    [ix] Amir Ullah Khan, India’s drug price fix is hurting healthcare, Live Mint; link: https://www.livemint.com/politics/policy/india-s-drug-price-fix-is-hurting-healthcare-11572334594083.html (published on October 29, 2019).

    [x] Ibid.

    [xi] E Kumar Sharma, Hard bargaining ahead, Business Today; link: https://www.businesstoday.in/magazine/focus/us-to-pressure-india-change-intellectual-property-ipr-regime/story/214440.html (published on February 01, 2015).

    [xii] Amir, supra note 9 at __(page No.)__.

    [xiii] Key diabetes, anti-cancer drugs among 92 in price-ceiling list, published by ET Bureau, The Economic Times; link: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/healthcare/biotech/pharmaceuticals/key-diabetes-anti-cancer-drugs-among-92-in-price-ceiling-list/articleshow/65433283.cms?from=mdr (published on August 17, 2018).

    [xiv] Section 84(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 :-

    Compulsory licenses –

    (1) At any time after the expiration of three years from the date of the 170 [grant] of a patent, any person interested may make an application to the Controller for grant of compulsory license on patent on any of the following grounds, namely:-

    (a) that the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied, or

    (b) that the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price, or

    (c) that the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India.

    [xv] Section 83 of the Patents Act, 1970:-

    General principles applicable to working of patented inventions –

    Without prejudice to the other provisions contained in this Act, in exercising the powers conferred by this Chapter, regard shall be had to the following general considerations, namely;-

    (a) that patents are granted to encourage inventions and to secure that the inventions are worked in India on a commercial scale and to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable without undue delay;

    (b) that they are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article;

    (c) that the protection and enforcement of patent rights contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations;

    (d) that patents granted do not impede protection of public health and nutrition and should act as instrument to promote public interest specially in sectors of vital importance for socio-economic and technological development of India;

    (e) that patents granted do not in any way prohibit Central Government in taking measures to protect public health;

    (f) that the patent right is not abused by the patentee or person deriving title or interest on patent from the patentee, and the patentee or a person deriving title or interest on patent from the patentee does not resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology; and

    (g) that patents are granted to make the benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices to the public.

    [xvi] Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(S). 30145 of 2014.

    [xvii] Ryan N. Phelan, Artificial Intelligence & the Intellectual Property Landscape, Marshall Gerstein & Borun LLP, published by Lexology; link: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8c2b5986-95bb-4e8e-9057-e4481bfaa471 (published on September 14, 2019).

    [xviii] No. 16-15469 (9th Cir. 2018).

    [xix] Stefano Zaccaria, AI-written articles are copyright-protected, rules Chinese court, World Intellectual Property Review (WIPR); published on January 10, 2020 (link:https://www.worldipreview.com/news/ai-written-articles-are-copyright-protected-rules-chinese-court-19102).

    [xx] EPO refuses DABUS patent applications designating a machine inventor, European Patent Office; link: https://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2019/20191220.html(published on December 20, 2019).

    [xxi] Laura Butler, World first patent applications filed for inventions generated solely by artificial intelligence, University of Surrey; published on 01 August, 2019 (link: https://www.surrey.ac.uk/news/world-first-patent-applications-filed-inventions-generated-solely-artificial-intelligence).

    [xxii] WIPO Begins Public Consultation Process on Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property Policy, published by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); PR/2019/843; published on December 13, 2019 (link: https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2019/article_0017.html).

    [xxiii] Caleb Silver, The Top 20 Economies in the World, Investopedia; link: https://www.investopedia.com/insights/worlds-top-economies/#5-india (published on November 19, 2019).

    [xxiv] Akriti Bajaj, Working towards building a healthier India, Invest India; link: https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/healthcare (published on January 18, 2020).

    [xxv] Leroy Leo, Niti Aayog calls healthcare system a ‘sinking ship,’ urges private participation in Ayushman Bharat, Live Mint; link: https://www.livemint.com/news/india/niti-aayog-calls-healthcare-system-a-sinking-ship-urges-private-participation-in-ayushman-bharat-11574948865389.html (published on November 29, 2019).

    [xxvi] Agriculture in India: Information About Indian Agriculture & Its Importance, Indian Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF); link: https://www.ibef.org/industry/agriculture-india.aspx (published on November 2019).

    [xxvii] Ayushman Baruah, Artificial Intelligence in Indian Agriculture – An Industry and Startup Overview, Emerj; link: https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/artificial-intelligence-in-indian-agriculture-an-industry-and-startup-overview (published on November 22, 2019).

    [xxviii] Vidya Sethy, Top 13 Problems Faced by Indian Agriculture, Your Article Library; link: http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/agriculture/top-13-problems-faced-by-indian-agriculture/62852.

    [xxix] Ibid.

    [xxx] Neha Dewan, In the race for AI supremacy, has India missed the bus?, The Economic Times; link: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/features/in-the-race-for-ai-supremacy-has-india-missed-the-bus/articleshow/69836362.cms (published on June 19, 2019).

    [xxxi] Rory O’Neill and Stefano Zaccaria,

    AI-written articles are copyright-protected, rules Chinese court, World Intellectual Property Review (WIPR); link: https://www.worldipreview.com/news/ai-written-articles-are-copyright-protected-rules-chinese-court-19102 (published on January 10, 2020).

    [xxxii] National Strategy On Artificial Intelligence, published by NITI Aayog; link: https://niti.gov.in/national-strategy-artificial-intelligence.

    [xxxiii] WIPO Begins Public Consultation Process on Artificial Intelligence and Intellectual Property Policy, PR/2019/843, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Geneva; link: https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2019/article_0017.html (published on December 13, 2019).

    [xxxiv] WIPO Secretariat, WIPO Conversation on Intellectual Property (IP) and Artificial Intelligence (AI), Second Session, WIPO/IP/AI/2/GE/20/1, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); link: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ip_ai_ge_20/wipo_ip_ai_2_ge_20_1.pdf (published on December 13, 2019).

    [xxxv] Bangalore, published by Wikipedia; link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangalore (last updated on February 07, 0220).

     

    Image Credit: WIPO

  • Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis and the way Forward

    Creation of Statelessness in India: an Analysis of the Crisis and the way Forward

    Introduction

    Over the last few decades, migration has become a global norm. Although a substantial part of the global population migrates for economic and personal reasons, it is undeniable that migration as a phenomenon is exacerbated by factors such as armed conflicts, ethnic or politico-social tensions, climate change and others. The effect that migration has on global economic, social and political transformations is widely recognized.[1] Naturally, in contrast to migration policies, all States have specific laws to regulate the acquisition of nationality by birth, descent and/or naturalization. While most of us realise the significance of the concept of nationality, we tend to overlook the fact that inclusion by nationality often brings the phenomenon of statelessness with it. In this context, the latest developments in the Indian laws regulating nationality raise several social and legal conundrums. However, the lack of any legal framework on statelessness or India’s abstinence from signing the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is a clear indication of India’s unpreparedness to deal with the potential long-term consequences of its new laws.

    Deprivation of Citizenship and Statelessness in the Contemporary Era

    The concepts of nationality and citizenship have attracted great attention for raising several contemporary politico-legal and social issues. Citizenship confers an identity on an individual within a particular state. Consequently, a citizen is able to derive rights and is assigned obligations by virtue of this identity.[2] Political Philosopher, Hannah Arendt, terms this as “the right to have rights”.[3] Citizenship is what entitles a citizen to the full membership of rights, a democratic voice and territorial residence. While we understand the significance of being a citizen of a country, we often fail to ponder upon the consequences of losing it. Immanuel Kant argues that citizenship by naturalisation is a sovereign privilege and the obverse side of such privilege is the loss of citizenship or “denationalisation”.[4] Arendt has also identified the twin phenomena of “political evil” and “statelessness”.[5]

    This condition of statelessness is not only a harmful condition which makes the person vulnerable to violation of human rights, but it also works in delegitimising a person in the socio-legal order of a State.

    An introspect into the right to have the right to a nationality goes on to throw light on the issue of statelessness. Although history has proven the existence of both de facto and de jure statelessness, this chapter is only concerned with de jure statelessness, specifically within the Indian context. The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons defines a “stateless person” as ‘a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law’.[6] This condition of statelessness is not only a harmful condition which makes the person vulnerable to violation of human rights, but it also works in delegitimising a person in the socio-legal order of a State.[7] The number of stateless persons globally in the year 2018 was 3.9 million.[8] This number is still regarded as a conservative under-estimation owing to the fact that most of the affected population reside precariously within the society and most countries do not calculate comprehensive statistics of stateless persons within their territory. UNHCR estimates at least a global figure of 10 million stateless persons globally.[9]

    Statelessness hinders the day-to-day life of a person by depriving them of access to the most rudimentary rights like education, employment or health care to name a few.  It may be attributed to multiple causes inter-alia discrimination, denationalization, lack of documentation, climate change, forced migration, conflict of laws, boundary disputes, state succession and administrative practices.[10] Discrimination based on ethnicity, race, religion or language has been a constant cause of statelessness globally. Currently, at least 20 countries uphold laws which can deny or deprive a person of their nationality in a discriminatory manner.[11] Statelessness tends to exaggerate impact of discrimination and exclusion that minority groups might already be facing. It widens the gap between communities thus deepening their exclusion.[12]  The phenomenon of statelessness has been the more prominent in South and South East Asian countries. The Hill Tamil repatriates in India from Sri Lanka and the Burmese refugees in Cambodia are examples of Asian Stateless populations who are vulnerable to human rights abuses. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness are the two most important conventions addressing this issue. The former has 94 parties and 23 signatories, and the latter has 75 parties and only 5 signatories. Albeit international legal norms on the issue of statelessness have restrained the States’ denationalisation power, it has however not erased the use of discrimination as a tool for denationalization.[13] This has been particularly relevant in the case of naturalization of nationals from Muslim-majority countries.[14]  It can be argued that India’s Citizenship Amendment Act has also joined this bandwagon.

    Interplay of the NRC and Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019

    The Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament on 11th December 2019 has caused a lot of uproar and outbreak of protests all over the country. This Act has attracted wide international condemnation[15] for being discriminatory[16], arbitrary and unconstitutional.[17] Before we go on to scrutinise the role of Citizenship Amendment Act in statelessness creation, an analysis of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) is warranted. The NRC process has been the source of several issues regarding migration, citizenship and polarisation of political support in the state of Assam. It has culled out a distinct space in mobilising the political discourse in Assam specifically during the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections.[18]

    The NRC is a register containing names of Indian Citizens. This register was prepared for the very first time in the year 1951 based on the data collected during census. This process was done subsequent to various groups[19] causing agitation in Assam over the non-regulation of immigrant inflow into the region. This resulted in resorting to laws like the Foreigners Act, 1946 and Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1939. The contrast in India’s approach to disregard the aforementioned laws to accommodate people escaping violence in West Pakistan[20] is to be noted here.  The NRC process in Assam determines illegal migrants based on their inability to prove the nexus between their documented ancestral legacy to the Indian State. The NRC process defined such illegal immigrants irrespective of their religious affinity. The cut-off date used to determine a person’s ability to prove ancestral legacy was set to March 24, 1971 which is in line with Bangladesh’s war of liberation.

    Despite the criticisms and drawbacks, the NRC process is  in fact a much needed exercise in the State of Assam. Owing to its shared border with Bangladesh, Assam has been the gateway for refugees, economic and illegal migrants who come to India.

    As Assam has been a hub for labour migration right from the colonial era, the ethnic Assamese have been insecure about the potential demographic shifts in favour of the ethnic Bengali migrants, for a long time.[21] This concern was exacerbated by the mass influx of Bengali migrants after the birth of Bangladesh. This mass migration which aggravated the already anti-immigrant sentiment culminated in a student-led movement in the 1970s and 1980s.[22] A series of protests broke out in the Assam to pressure the government to identify and expel illegal immigrants. In the year 1985, the Union government and the AASU signed the Assam Accord by which the government assured the establishment of a mechanism to identify “foreigners who came to Assam on or after March 25, 1971” and subsequently take practical steps to expel them.[23] Consequent to a Public Interest Litigation[24] filed in 2009. In the year 2014, the Supreme Court assumed the role of monitoring the process of updating the NRC to identify Indian citizens residing in Assam in accordance with the Citizenship Act of 1955. The very first draft of the process was published in December 2017 and 1.9 million people were left out of the register from a population of 3.29 million people in Assam.[25] In August 31, 2019, the final list was published which left out 4 million residents from the NRC.[26] Neither drafts of the NRC specifically mention the religion or community of the non-included applicants, although certain commentators[27] and media outlets[28] have alleged  that five out of nine Muslim-majority districts of Assam had the maximum number of rejections of applicants.[29] Out of the 4 million applications which were excluded from the final list, 0.24 applicants have been put on ‘hold’. These people belong to categories: D (doubtful) voters, descendants of D-voters, people whose cases are pending at Foreigners Tribunals and descendants of these persons.[30] The NRC process has for long attracted mixed reviews. Scholars have suggested that the process has been an arbitrary one that is aimed more at exclusion[31] than inclusion.[32] It has also been regarded as an expensive process, the brunt of which is borne substantially by the people of India.[33] Despite the criticisms and drawbacks, the NRC process is  in fact a much needed exercise in the State of Assam. Owing to its shared border with Bangladesh, Assam has been the gateway for refugees, economic and illegal migrants who come to India. This not only led to the cultural identity crises of Assamese people but it also significantly influenced the political operations in the State.[34] It is also important to note that, owing to the absence of a concrete refugee law in place and due to the general population’s lack of awareness about refugees in India, the distinction between refugees, illegal migrants and economic migrants often get muddled. This is reflected in the anti-migration narrative that brews in the State. Although we maintain that the NRC process is not necessarily a communal exercise, it does have seem to have such repercussions when read together with the Citizenship Amendment Act which was passed by the Indian Parliament last year.

    The Preamble of the Indian Constitution recognises the India as a secular state. This has also been reiterated in landmark Supreme Court decisions, whereby the principle of secularism has been recognised as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.Therefore, the fact that the Citizenship Amendment Act discriminates migrants based on their religion, makes is fundamentally unconstitutional.

    According to the Indian citizenship Act of 1955, an “illegal migrant” is a foreigner who enters India without a valid passport or such other prescribed travel documentation.[35] The Citizenship Amendment Act, amends this definition. The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 is not just discriminatory, but it also goes against the basic principles of the Constitution of India. This Act provides that ‘any person belonging to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi or Christian community for Afghanistan, Bangladesh or Pakistan’, who entered into India on or before December 31, 2014 who have been exempted by the central government by the Passport Act, 1920 or the Foreigners Act 1946, shall not be treated as an illegal migrant.[36] Further, the Act has reduced the aggregate period of residence to qualify for naturalization from 11 years to 5 years for the aforementioned communities.[37] This Act has attracted worldwide criticism from various human rights groups and international organizations. The alleged raison d’etre for the Act is two fold – the alleged religious persecution of minorities in the three Muslim-majority countries mentioned before and rectifying the misdeeds of partition.[38] However, on a careful scrutiny, both these reasons fail to stand the test of rationale and reasonableness. Firstly, it has to be noted that prima facie the Act violates Art.14 of the Indian Constitution by specifically enacting a law that discriminates based on a person’s religion. Documented evidence of persecution of the Islamic minority sects such as the Shias[39] [40], Baloch[41] and Ahmadis[42] [43] in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan is existent. Therefore, the contention that people belonging to Islamic sects would not have faced persecution in Muslim-majority countries is misconceived and simply wrong. Unlike Israel[44], India does not have a ‘Law of Return’. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution recognises the India as a secular state. This has also been reiterated in landmark Supreme Court decisions, whereby the principle of secularism has been recognised as one of the basic structures of the Constitution.[45] Therefore, the fact that the Citizenship Amendment Act discriminates migrants based on their religion, makes is fundamentally unconstitutional.

    Further, the Act seems to operate vis-à-vis three Muslim-majority countries. However, India hosts a large number of refugees and migrants from other neighbouring countries also, particularly Myanmar, Nepal, China and Sri Lanka.[46]There has been no clarification rendered as to the rationale behind including only Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Finally, unlike the cut-off date mentioned in the Assam Accord, the date of December 31, 2014 lacks rationale and therefore comes across as arbitrary. While the NRC process is already criticised for being exclusionary, the effect of NRC combined with the operation of provisions of the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to benefit the non-Muslim communities mentioned in the Act while disadvantaging the Muslim migrants whose names did not figure in the list. This essentially pushes the latter into a predicament of statelessness. It has to be noted here that this legislation is not merely discriminatory, but also wildly inconsistent with India’s obligations under International law.

    India’s Approach to Statelessness in the Past

    The outcome of NRC-CAA is not the first time India had to deal with the issue of statelessness. India has taken steps to mitigate the risks and consequences of statelessness in the past. The situation of enclave dwellers being a key example. Chittmahal or enclaves are pieces of land that belonged to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), yet remained in India, and vice versa. After the India-Pakistan partition in 1947 and the boundary limitations thenceforth, the enclave dwellers were essentially cut-off from access to their country of nationality as they were surrounded by foreign land, eventually pushing them into a state of de facto statelessness. Therefore, crossing borders for daily engagements became an illegal activity.[47] The hostility that ensued from the Partition reflected in the control of these enclaves. In the year 1952, both countries tightened visa policies, making their borders rigid. This trapped the enclave dwellers in a state of virtual lockdown.[48]Despite the sovereignty shift in 1971, with the creation of the independent nation state of Bangladesh, the plight of enclave dwellers remained unaddressed. On the other hand, the Bangladeshi enclave dwellers in India also lived under the constant fear of being arrested under the Foreigners Act of 1946.[49] The very first headcount in enclaves was conducted by state authorities only in the year 2011.[50] After decades of failed negotiations between India and Bangladesh, a Land-Boundary Agreement  was finally implemented on 31 July 2015 at the Indo-Bangladesh border.[51] Despite this being a significant step towards progress, several scholars[52] have noted the continuity of the plight of erstwhile enclave-dwellers even after the Land-Boundary Agreement.[53] Since census had never been conducted in these area, the issue of identity crisis is quite prominent. Enclave dwellers are reported to own false voter ID cards and educational documents to “avoid becoming an illegal migrant”.[54] At this point, it is important to note the potential effects of an NRC process being implemented in the State of West Bengal (as promised by the ruling government) and its implications for enclave-dwellers. The identity crisis already existing within the enclaves, the errors in their identity cards, the threat of being suspected as a foreigner has been exacerbated by the looming NRC-CAA process.[55]

    Another group of people that was forced to face the plight of statelessness due to the post-colonial repercussions, are the Hill Tamils from Sri Lanka. The Shrimavo-Shastri Pact of 1964 and the subsequent Shrimavo- Gandhi Pact 1974 were significant steps taken towards addressing the problems of the Hill Tamils.[56] However, there are a group of Hill Tamils who are stateless or at a risk of becoming stateless in India. The change in legislation in Sri Lanka, their displacement to India and their lack of birth registration and documentation has continued to add to their plight.[57] Despite qualifying for citizenship by naturalization under Sec.5 of the Citizenship Act, the fact that the Amendment Act has overlooked the plight of Hill Tamils is disappointing.[58]

    In 1964, owing to the construction of the Kaptai hydroelectric project over the river Karnaphuli,  the Chakmas and Hajongs were displaced and forced to migrate to India from the Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).[59] Although the Indian government encouraged them to settle in the Area of North East Frontier Agency (now Arunachal Pradesh), they have not been granted citizenship. With neither States claiming them as nationals, these indigenous people have essentially been pushed into a state of de jure statelessness. In the case of Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP) v The State of Arunachal Pradesh, the apex court upheld the rights of the Chakmas to be protected by the State of Arunachal Pradesh under Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution and also said that they “have a right to be granted citizenship subject to the procedure being followed”.[60]Now, the Citizenship Amendment Act would help in materialising the right to be granted citizenship of the Chakmas as upheld by the Supreme Court.

    Just the fact that the CAA offers comfort and chaos respectively depending on the religious inclinations of the stateless populations in India, is a major red flag.

    India has undeniably taken various steps towards protection of refugee populations and mitigating the risks of statelessness under several circumstances. In the year 1995, India also became a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee and has been playing an important part in reformulating international legal instruments concerning refugees and stateless persons. However, despite assuming such a pivotal position in the Executive Committee, the fact that India lacks a framework regulating the treatment meted out to refugees and stateless persons, thereby resulting in the absolute reliance of socio-politically motivated ad-hoc governmental policies, is worth criticising. Just the fact that the CAA offers comfort and chaos respectively depending on the religious inclinations of the stateless populations in India, is a major red flag.

    International and National Legal Framework on Statelessness in India

    The definition and standard of treatment for a Stateless person is enumerated in the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.[61] This convention is the most comprehensive codification of the rights of stateless persons yet. It seeks to ensure the fundamental human rights of a person and freedom from discrimination against stateless persons. Although the Convention does not entitle a stateless person to acquire the nationality of a specific state, it does require state parties to take steps towards facilitating their naturalization and integration.[62] On the other hand, the 1961 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness provides a directive to States for the prevention and reduction of statelessness.[63] However, as India is a party to neither conventions, as in the case of refugees, we are left to resort to other international human rights instruments that India has signed and ratified.

    The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although a non-binding instrument, has been recognised for contributing to customary international human rights. Art. 15 of the UDHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to a nationality’[64] and that ‘no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality’.[65] Although the principles enshrined under the UDHR are not legally binding, it is pertinent to note that the CAA directly contravenes the right to nationality mentioned above. Further, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 mandates the parties to the convention to ensure that the rights recognized in the Covenant be upheld without any discrimination of any kind in terms of race, colour, sex, language, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.[66] The Convention also guarantees the right of every child to acquire a nationality.[67]The Convention provides that State parties must ensure the protection of the rights of stateless people, without discrimination including under the law.[68] Despite having acceded to the Convention on April 10, 1979, by virtue of enacting the Citizenship Amendment Act and the operational effects of the NRC process combined with the Act is in clear violation of India’s obligations under the ICCPR.

    Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR can be used particularly in favour of India’s obligations to protect stateless persons. Art. 12(4) states that, ‘No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country’. The phrase ‘no one’ under this provision allows scope for inclusion of nationals and aliens within its ambit. Therefore, we ought to analyse the phrase ‘own country’ in order to determine the beneficiaries of this provision. The General Comments of the Human Rights Committee remain the most authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR that is available to State Parties. With regard to Art. 12(4) of the Covenant, the General Comment reiterates that the phrase ‘own country’ does not refer to the concept of nationality alone. It also includes individuals who by virtue of their special ties or claims in relation to a given country, cannot be considered an alien.[69]The General Comment specifically mentions that this interpretation is to be applied in case where nationals of a country are stripped of their nationality in violation of international law.[70] It also states that the interpretation of Art. 12(4) might be read to include with its scope, ‘stateless persons arbitrarily deprived of the right to acquire the nationality of the country of such residence’.[71] In order to understand the concept of special ties and claims as mentioned in the General Comment on Art. 12(4), we may also refer to the concept of ‘genuine and effective link’ as dealt by the International Court of Justice in the Nottebohm Case.[72] The ICJ upheld that although different factors are taken into consideration in every case, the elements of “habitual residence of the individual concerned”, “the centre of his interests” i.e. “his family ties, his participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his children, etc.”[73] are significant in determining a “genuine and effective link” between the individual and the State in question. In India, the people who are facing or at a risk of facing the plight of statelessness are long term residents in India who may be both religiously and ethnically similar to Indian communities and therefore maintain a socio-cultural relationship with India.[74] Under such circumstances, the individuals in question evidently qualify for protection from arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter their own country (India), under Art. Art. 12(4) of the ICCPR.

    Further, by denying citizenship or nationality to people based on religion, India risks effectively excluding stateless persons from the loop of human rights itself. This also goes on to violate India’s commitments under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966. Besides Section 3 of the Indian Citizenship Act[75] which deprives a child Indian citizenship by birth in case of either of his parents being an illegal immigrant, the NRC process has also rendered several children Stateless. This violates India’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child (CRC), to which India has acceded. Article 7 of the Convention mandates state parties to provide nationality to the children immediately after birth.[76]Thus, the Indian citizenship policy runs contrary to a number of international legal obligations of India. Article 51(c) of the Indian Constitution mandates the government to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations.

    Despite the very evident gap in India’s legal framework on statelessness, Indian Courts have not dealt with the issue in detail. Nevertheless, the Courts have taken innovative approaches to avoid the occurrence of statelessness by applying principles of equity and justice.[77] In the case of Namgyal Dolkar vs. Government of India[78], in 2011, the Delhi High Court upheld, as per Sec.3 of the Citizenship Act that people born in India cannot be denied citizenship and the right to nationality based on their description in the identity certificate. In the case of Sheikh Abdul Aziz vs. NCT of Delhi[79], a ‘foreigner’ in India was detained in Kashmir for entering the country illegally. He was later shifted to the Tihar Central Jail to await deportation proceedings. The deportation proceedings were not executed for several years. In the year 2014, on the basis of the Delhi High Court’s direction to identify the nationality of the Individual, the state identified him to be stateless. Consequently, the State declared that the petitioner could approach the passport office to acquire identification papers and thereby apply for a long-term visa later on.[80] While this case indicates the role of Indian judiciary in identifying and providing relief to stateless persons, it also serves as an illustration of the attitude of the State towards stateless persons. This can be alluded to the fact that a concrete legal framework or mechanism to deal with stateless persons and the data and awareness on stateless persons is practically non-existent. The impact of such lacuna is also evident in the NRC-CAA process in Assam.

    Plight of Stateless People in Assam

    Although the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has communicated that the people excluded from the final draft of NRC would not be put in detention centres until their case is decided by the Foreigners Tribunal[81], the future of people whose cases are rejected by the Tribunal has been left mysteriously evaded. The Detention centres in Assam were originally intended for short-term detention of undocumented immigrants. In the case of Harsh Mander vs. Union of India[82], the Supreme Court of India dealt with important legal questions on the condition of detention centres and indefinite detention of ‘foreigners’. The government of Assam presented a plan to secure the monitored release foreigners who had been in detention centres more than five years on paying a hefty deposit and signing a bond. Ironically, this case which was filed to draw the attention of the apex court to the inhumane conditions in detention centres in Assam, turned into exhortation[83] to the government to work proactively on deporting individuals.[84] Although India does not have any legislation to protect stateless people from being deported to regularise their status or grant them citizenship, it does have legislation in place to deport illegal migrants. The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act 1983, which gave the migrants a right to appeal and placed the burden of proof on the government was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of India in 2005 and is no longer valid.[85] In the Harsh Mander case, the Supreme Court directed “the Union of India to enter into necessary discussions with the Government of Bangladesh to streamline the procedure of deportation”[86]. Deportation, however, is not a unilateral exercise. Such processes usually follow negotiations and bilateral agreements for the readmission of nations of relevant country.[87] There has been no documented of India entering into diplomatic talks with Bangladesh regarding the issue of statelessness. Also, as recently as October 2017, it has been reported that the Bangladesh Information Minister, Hasanull Haq Inu denied any unauthorised migration from Bangladesh to Assam in the past 30 years.[88] According to the data produced before the Parliament, over 117,000 people have been declared foreigners by the Foreigners Tribunal in Assam up to March 31, 2019, of whom only four have been deported until now. Across the six detention centres in Goalpara, Kokrajhar, Silchar, Dibrugarh, Jorhat and Tezpur in Assam, 1005 people reportedly remain jailed according to the data produced before the Assam Legislative Assembly on July 29, 2019.[89] As detention camps are located within the jail premises, persons marked as illegal immigrants are locked up along with those jailed for criminal offences or who are undertrial. The country’s largest detention camp in the Goalpara district of western Assam, in addition to 10 proposed camps in the state.[90] In the case of P. Ulaganathan vs. The Government of India[91], the Madras High Court deciding on a case concerning the plight of Sri Lankan Hill Tamils in India who have been held in detention camps for about 35 years, upheld that, “keeping them under surveillance and severely restricted conditions and in a state of statelessness for such a long period certainly offends their rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India”.[92] In the absence of any bilateral agreement dealing with deportation of the stateless persons who are allegedly Bangladeshi nationals, the detention of illegal immigrants seems short-sighted and ill-planned. Additionally, the lack of adequate documentation also makes it unlikely for the individuals to be deported to neighbouring countries in the near future. In addition to the apex court’s ratio in the P. Ulaganathan case on long periods of detention of stateless people, such an indefinite period of detention also violates India’s obligations under the ICCPR to uphold right to life,[93]right to dignity in detention[94] and the right against arbitrary deprivation of the right to enter his own country.[95]In their Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention, the UN High Commissioner on Refugees emphasize the importance of setting a definite period of detention. The Guideline states that, without a cap on the period of detention, it can become prolonged and indefinite, especially for stateless asylum-seekers.[96] In the absence of any legal regulation of detention of the people who are rendered stateless in India, the UNHCR guidelines on detention might serve as a good starting point. Although the guidelines explicitly state that they only apply to asylum seekers and stateless persons who are seeking asylum, it also states that the standards enshrined therein may apply mutatis mutandis to others as well.[97]

    Conclusion: The Way Forward

    Customary international law has placed certain limitations on a state’s power of conferment of citizenship. Article 1 of the Hague Convention 1930, states that “it is for each state to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other states in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, International custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality”.[98] As explained above, this is not the case with regard to the NRC-CAA process in India. Firstly, in order to deal with the problem of statelessness in India, it is absolutely necessary to identify and acknowledge the gravity of it. The data on the number of stateless persons in India is practically non-existent. It is important for the government to undertake efforts to facilitate data collection on stateless persons in India. This would not only help in mapping the extent of the problem, but it would also facilitate legal professionals, researchers, humanitarian works and practitioners to reach out and offer help where necessary.

    Also, the presence of half-information and non-existence on specific data on the number of stateless persons and government policies vis-à-vis their treatment has allowed room for over-reliance on media sources and resulting confusion and frenzy. It might be important for the government to establish information hubs accessible to the common public to demystify data on statelessness and the rights that stateless persons are entitled to in India.  A database of legal professionals, human rights activists and government representatives should be available in all such places. This would go a long way in reducing unlawful and illegal detention. It would also force the government into exercising transparency in their detention policies.

    the combined effect of NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to be exclusionary and discriminatory. The Act is violative of the Indian constitutional principles and India’s international legal obligations.

    The absolute lack of a national and international legal framework on statelessness operating in India is a major drawback. While the rights enshrined under the international bill of human rights and other human rights instruments that India is a party to may be referred, it is not sufficient to fill the lacuna. This absence of a concrete legal framework may leave room for adverse predicaments such as arbitrary detention, human rights abuses, trafficking and forced displacement. Especially considering the number of people who have been disenfranchised by the latest draft of the NRC, the need for a law promising the basic human rights of the people who are rendered stateless is dire. India has also abstained from ratifying the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 1976 and has thereby denied its people the access to the Individual Complaints Mechanism of the UNHRC. The International Court of Justice which is also vested with the power to address ICCPR violations, cannot investigate into the issue of India’s discriminatory and exclusionary Citizenship law as it is a sovereign act of the State.[99] Without the same being disputed by one or more States, the ICJ cannot exercise its power in this case.[100]

    Finally, as explained above, the combined effect of NRC and the Citizenship Amendment Act seems to be exclusionary and discriminatory. The Act is violative of the Indian constitutional principles and India’s international legal obligations. While reviewing the purpose and objective of the Citizenship Amendment Act is important, it is also important for the government to undertake negotiations with the Bangladesh government on the plight of the people who would soon be stateless. The indefinite detention of “foreigners” without a long-term plan in place, would result in grave human rights violations and would also be an expensive affair for India.

    Image Credit: opiniojuris.org 

     

     

    Notes

    [1] See generally IOM, WORLD MIGRATION REPORT 2020 (IOM, Geneva, 2019), available at https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf , [accessed on 15 Feb 2020].

    [2] See generally Emmanuel Kalechi Iwuagwu, The Concept of Citizenship: Its Application and Denial in the Contemporary Nigerian Society, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, Vol. 8 No. 1.

    [3] Seyla Benhabib, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS – ALIENS, RESIDENTS AND CITIZENS, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004) P. 49-52

    [4] Ibid at P. 49

    [5] Ibid at P. 49, 50

    [6] Art. 1, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954.

    [7] David Owen, On the Right to Have Nationality Rights: Statelessness, Citizenship and Human Rights, NETHERLANDS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 2018, (65),  P. 301.

    [8] Supra note 1, P. 47.

    [9] Lily Chen et al, UNHCR Statistical Reporting on Statelessness, UNHCR STATISTICS TECHNICAL SERIES 2019, available at https://www.unhcr.org/5d9e182e7.pdf, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [10] See generally Nafees Ahmad, The Right to Nationality and the Reduction of Statelessness- The Responses of the International Migration Law Framework, GRONINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 5 No. 1.

    [11] UNHCR, “This is our Home”- Stateless Minorities and their search for citizenship, UNHCR STATELESSNESS REPORT 2017, available athttps://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/wp-content/uploads/UNHCR_EN2_2017IBELONG_Report_ePub.pdf, P. 1, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [12] Ibid

    [13] Mathew J. Gibney, Denationalization and Discrimination, JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2019, available at https://doi:10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561065 [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [14] Antje Ellermann, Discrimination in Migration and Citizenship, JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2019, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561053?needAccess=true, P. 7, [accessed on 17 Feb 2020].

    [15] Human Rights Watch, India: Citizenship Bill Discriminates Against Muslims, (11 Dec, 2019),  available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/11/india-citizenship-bill-discriminates-against-muslims, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [16]OHCHR, Press briefing on India, (13 Dec, 2019), available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25425&LangID=E, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [17] USCIRF, USCIRF Raises Serious Concerns and Eyes Sanctions Recommendations for Citizenship Amendment Bill in India, Which Passed Lower House Today, (09 Dec, 2019), available at https://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/press-releases-statements/uscirf-raises-serious-concerns-and-eyes-sanctions, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [18] Manogya Loiwal, India Today, Assam NRC and BJP’s challenge: The votebank politics of NRC,  (31 Aug, 2019), available at https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/assam-nrc-bjp-challenge-votebank-politics-1593711-2019-08-31, [accessed on 18 Feb 2020].

    [19]All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All Assam Gan Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) were the major groups involved in this movement.

    [20] Sanjay Barbora, National Register of Citizens: Politics and Problems in Assam, E-JOURNAL OF THE INDIAN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY 2019, (3)2, available at  http://app.insoso.org/ISS_journal/Repository/Article_NRC.pdf, P. 14, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [21]Harrison Akins, The Religious Freedom Implications of the National Register of Citizens in India, USCIRF ISSUE BRIEF:INDIA 2019, available at https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019%20India%20Issue%20Brief%20- %20Religious%20Freedom%20Implications.pdf, P.1, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [22] Ibid at P.2.

    [23] Assam Accord, Clause 5.8, available at https://assamaccord.assam.gov.in/portlets/assam-accord-and-its-clauses, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [24] Assam Public Works v Union of India and Ors. [Writ Petition (Civil) No. 274 of 2009]

    [25] Alok Prasanna Kumar, National Register of Citizens and the Supreme Court, LAW & SOCIETY 2018, (53)29, available at https://www.academia.edu/37909102/National_Register_of_Citizens_and_the_Supreme_Court, P. 11, [accessed on 19 Feb 2020].

    [26]Tora Agarwala, The Indian Express, Assam Citizenship List: Names missing in NRC final draft, 40 ;akh ask what next,  (30 Jul 2018), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/north-east-india/assam/assam-citizenship-list-names-missing-in-nrc-final-draft-40-lakh-ask-what-next-5283663/, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [27] Amit Ranjan, Assam’s National Register of Citizenship: Background, Process and Impact of the Final Draft, ISAS WORKING PAPER 2018, No. 306, available at https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ISAS-Working-Papers-No.-306-Assams-National-Register-of-Citizenship.pdf, P.2, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [28] Sangeeta Barooah Pisharoty, The Wire, Both the BJP and the Trinamool Congress are Stirring the Communal Pot in Assam, (05 Aug 2018), available at https://thewire.in/politics/bjp-tmc-nrc-assam-communalism

    [29] Supra note 27, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [30]Abhishek Saha, The Indian Express, Assam NRC List: No person will be referred to Foreiners’ Tribunal or sent to detention centre based on final draft, (30 Jul 2018),  https://indianexpress.com/article/north-eastindia/assam/assam-nrc-list-final-draft-foreigners-tribunal-detention-centre-5282652/, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [31] Ditilekha Sharma, Determination of Citizenship through Lineage in the Assam NRC is Inherently Exclusionary, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, Apr 2019, available at https://www.epw.in/node/154137/pdf, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [32] Angshuman Choudhury, National Register of Citizens (NRC): A Synonym for Deep Anxiety, THE CITIZEN , 2019, available at https://www.academia.edu/40257016/National_Register_of_Citizens_NRC_A_Synonym_for_Deep_Anxiety, P. 3, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [33] Anusaleh Shariff, ‘National Register of Indian Citizens’ (NRIC) – Does the Assam Experience help Mainland States?, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, 2019, available at  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337366837_’National_Register_of_Indian_Citizens’_NRIC_-_Does_the_Assam_Experience_help_Mainland_States, P. 18, [accessed on 20 Feb 2020].

    [34] Supra note 27 at P. 8-11.

    [35] The Citizenship Act 1955, No.57 of 1955, Sec. 2(1) (b).

    [36] The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, Sec. 2.

    [37] The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, No. 47 of 2019, Sec. 6.

    [38] Narendar Nagarwal, Global Implications of India’s Citizenship Amendment Act 2019, (Jan 2020), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338673204_Global_Implications_of_India’s_Citizenship_Amendment_Act_2019, P. 3, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [39] Human Rights Watch, “We are the Walking Dead” – Killings of Shia Hazara in Balochistan, Pakistan, Jun 2014, available athttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0614_ForUplaod.pdf, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [40] Anon, The State of Minorities in Afghanistan, SOUTH ASIA STATE OF MINORITIES REPORT 2018, available at http://www.misaal.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/afghanistan.pdf, P. 282, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [41] Human Rights Watch, “We can Torture, Kill, or Keep Your for Years” – Enforced Disappearances by Pakistam Security Forces in Balochistan, Jul 2011, available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0711WebInside.pdf, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [42]UK: Home Office, Country of Origin Information Report, Aug 2019, available at  https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5209feb94&skip=0&query=Ahmediyas%20&coi=PAK, P. 142, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [43] Human Rights Watch, History of the Ahmadiyya Community, n.d., available at https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/bangladesh0605/3.htm, [accessed on 2 Mar 2020].

    [44] The Law of Return, 1950 in Israel established Israel as Jewish State based on the Zionist Philosophy which is also reflected in their citizenship policies.

    [45] Keshavananda Bharati v State of Kerela, AIR 1973 SC 1461

    [46] Supra note 38.

    [47] Deboleena Sengupta, What Makes A Citizen: Everyday Life in India-Bangladesh Enclaves, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (53), 15 Sep 2018, available at https://www.epw.in/engage/article/chhit-spaces-a-look-at-life-and-citizenship-in-india-bangladesh-enclaves [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [48] Prachi Lohia, Forum Asia, Erstwhile enclaves in India: A post-LBA Analysis, 10 Dec 2019, available at https://www.forum-asia.org/uploads/wp/2019/12/Enclave-Report-Final-2.pdf, P. 7, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [49] Ibid

    [50] Ibid

    [51] For the current state of erstwhile enclave-dwellers in India, see supra note 48 and also Prasun Chaudhari, The TelegraphThe same old story in Chittmahal, (12 May 2019), available at https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/the-same-old-story-in-chhitmahal/cid/1690343 [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [52] Supra note 48.

    [53] Sreeparna Banerjee et al., The 2015 India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement: Identifying Constraints and Exploring Possibilities in Cooh Behar, ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER, Jul 2017, P.5, available at https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/ORF_OccasionalPaper_117_LandBoundary.pdf  [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [54] Ibid.

    [55] Supra note 48, P. 45.

    [56] V. Suryanarayanan, Challenge of Statelessness- The Indian Response, IIC Occasional Publication  (88), , (n.d.), available at http://www.iicdelhi.nic.in/writereaddata/Publications/636694277561224320_Occasional%20Publication%2088.pdf, P. 3, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [57] See UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: UPR 27th Sessions, Aug 2016, available at https://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=5a12b5420&skip=0&query=stateless&coi=IND, P. 2, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [58] Supra note 56, P. 16.

    [59] Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, Executive Summary of the Report on ‘The State of Being Stateless: A Case Study of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh, (n.d.), available at http://www.mcrg.ac.in/Statelessness.pdf [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [60] Committee for Citizenship Rights of the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh (CCRCAP) v The State of Arunachal Pradesh, [WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.510 OF 2007]

    [61] Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, Art. 1, 7.

    [62] Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954, Art. 32.

    [63]  See generally Convention on Reduction of Statelessness 1961.

    [64] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945, Art. 15(1).

    [65] The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1945, Art. 15(2).

    [66] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 2.

    [67] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 24

    [68] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 26

    [69] CCPR General Comment No. 27: Article 12(Freedom of Movement), (Nov 2, 1999), ¶ 20 available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/45139c394.pdf

    [70] Ibid

    [71] Supra note 69.

    [72] Liechtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm Case) 1955

    [73] Ibid, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. reports 1955, Rep 4.

    [74] Unnati Ghia, Suddenly Stateless: International law Implications of India’s New Citizenship Law, OPINIO JURIS, Feb 5, 2020, available at http://opiniojuris.org/2020/02/05/suddenly-stateless-international-law-implications-of-indias-new-citizenship-law/ [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

    [75] The Citizenship Act, 1955, Act  No.  57  of  1955,  Sec. 3.

    [76] Convention  on  the  Rights  of  the  Child 1989, Art. 7.

    [77] Sitharamam Kakarala, India and the Challenge of Statelessness – A Review of the Legal Framework relating to Nationality, 2012, available at  http://nludelhi.ac.in/download/publication/2015/India%20and%20the%20Challenges%20of%20Statelessness.pdf, P. 61, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [78] Namgyal Dolkar vs. Government of India, [Writ Petition (Civil) 12179/2009]

    [79] Sheikh Abdul Aziz v. NCT of Delhi, [Writ Petition (Criminal) 1426/2013]

    [80] Aneesha Mathur, The Indian Express, ‘Stateless man’ to get visa, ID to stay in India, (29 May 2014), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/stateless-man-to-get-visa-id-to-stay-in-india/, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [81]Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Statement by MEA on National Register of Citizens in Assam, (02 Sep 2019), available at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31782/Statement+by+MEA+on+National+Register+of+Citizens+in+Assam, [accessed on 5 Mar 2020].

    [82] Harsh Mander v Union of India, [Writ Petition (Civil) No.1045/2018].

    [83] Colin Gonsalves, Human Rights Law Network, Stateless and Marginalised in Assam, (18 Sep 2019), available at https://hrln.org/reporting_publications/nrc-violates-constitutional-morality-principles-of-international-law/, [accessed on 6 Mar 2020].

    [84] Supra note 82.

    [85] Sarbananda Sonawal v. Union of India, [Writ Petition (civil) 131 of 2000]

    [86] Supra note 82.

    [87] See generally, the Shrimavo-Shastri Accord, 1964 (1992).

    [88]Sanjib Baruah, The Indian Express, Stateless in Assam, (19 Jan 2018), available at https://epaper.indianexpress.com/c/25513604, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [89]The Economic Times, 1.17 lakh people declared as foreigners by tribunals in Assam,  (16 Jul 2019), available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/1-17-lakh-people-declared-as-foreigners-by-tribunals-in-assam/articleshow/70244101.cms?from=mdr, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [90] Nazimuddin Siddique, Inside Assam’s Detention Camps: How the Current Citizenship Crisis Disenfranchises Indians, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (55)7, Feb 2020, available at  https://www.epw.in/engage/article/inside-assams-detention-camps-how-current, [accessed on 10 Mar 2020].

    [91] P.Ulaganathan vs The Government Of India, [Writ Petition (MD)No.5253 of 2009]

    [92] Ibid

    [93] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 6.

    [94] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 10.

    [95] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Art. 12(4)

    [96] UNHCR, Detention Guidelines – Guidelines on the Applicable Criteria and Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers and Alternatives to Detention 2012, available at https://www.unhcr.org/publications/legal/505b10ee9/unhcr-detention-guidelines.html, P. 26, [accessed on 17 Mar 2020].

    [97] Ibid, P. 8.

    [98] Nafees Ahmad, The Right to Nationality and the Reduction of Statelessness – The Responses of the International Migration Law Framework, GRONINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (5)1, Sep 2017, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320244117_The_Right_to_Nationality_and_the_Reduction_of_Statelessness_-_The_Responses_of_the_International_Migration_Law_Framework, P. 3, [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

    [99] Supra note 74.

    [100] International Court of Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, available at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/frequently-asked-questions , [accessed on 16 Mar 2020].

  • Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.    

    Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN comes at a time of immense turbulence marked by COVID-19 pandemic, disruption in the global supply chains resulting in economic recession among major economies, and strategic instability in the Indo-Pacific region marked by high tensions between the United States and China in the South China Sea. However, the ASEAN calendar of engagements with its Partner countries has remained busy, and Vietnam has spearheaded the Organisation with adeptness and alacrity and sustained the momentum of the ASEAN’s mandate through meetings and conversations.  During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.

     On 16 June 2020, at the 20th ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting, through a video conference, India and the ASEAN “reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen and deepen their cooperation.” Both sides noted the progress made for the implementation of the ASEAN-India Plan of Action (2016-2020), and “shared their commitment to complete the development of the new Plan of Action for 2021-2025 to further strengthen their strategic partnership over the next five years”.[i]

    A month later Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India, participated in the 22nd annual meeting of the Senior officials of ASEAN countries and India, and commended Viet Nam’s ASEAN chairmanship. Both sides “agreed to continue assisting each other’s citizens affected by the coronavirus outbreak”; provide “ASEAN countries with detailed information about the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative proposed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 16th ASEAN-India Summit in 2019”; welcomed “ASEAN bringing into play its role in fostering cooperation, dialogue and trust building in the region”; and conveyed India’s support for “efforts to seriously and fully implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea and build an efficient and effective Code of Conduct in the waters in line with international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.[ii]

    COVID-19 Pandemic

    India and ASEAN are confronted with COVID-19 pandemic and there is ample evidence that both sides have conveyed their intention to fight the pandemic together. Prime Minister Modi engaged the leaders of Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam through telephonic conversations and assured support to ASEAN Member States. Likewise, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla has had weekly tele-conversations with counterparts from US, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam to share ideas and best practices in the Indo-Pacific region for responding to COVID-19 pandemic.[iii]

    It is an opportune moment for the officials of the health departments in India and ASEAN to set up a dedicated virtual platform/dashboard designated as ‘India-ASEAN Meeting for Health Development (AI-MHD) that can be pluggedinto the ‘ASEAN Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Network, the ASEAN Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Centre, the ASEAN Bio Diaspora Virtual Center (ABVC) and the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) for future public health emergencies’.

     India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jayashankar, in his remarks at the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT), noted that “the impact of the Coronavirus has been beyond our collective imagination. Current estimates put the cumulative loss in the range of USD 5.8-8.8 trillion or approximately 6.5-9.7% of the global GDP.[iv]

    ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP)

    India has acknowledged the importance of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and New Delhi is committed to “explore cooperation in the key areas outlined in the AOIP, covering maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development and economic cooperation, in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace, freedom and prosperity in the region”.[v] Similarly, ASEAN has endorsed synergies in various sectors and promoted regional frameworks under India’s Act East Policy, and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision. Although health and pandemic issues are conspicuously absent in the AIOP and SAGAR, but these are surely part of the broader thematic issues contained therein.

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea.

    On November 04, 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) at the East Asia Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand.[vi] It is an “ an open global initiative” and “ draws on existing regional cooperation architecture and mechanisms to focus on seven central pillars conceived around Maritime Security; Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources; Capacity Building and Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity and Maritime Transport.”

    Cooperation, Dialogue and Trust Building

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea. India’s Foreign Minister has stated that India is working in conjunction with Vietnam and “responses to that (CoC) are being handled by the Vietnamese and that is the way it should be,” [vii]

                Finally, it has been noted that “as we come out of this pandemic, let us be clear on one fact. The world will never be the same again. That means new thinking, fresh ideas, more imagination and greater openness. We need to go beyond orthodoxies, whether of trade, politics or security. These are domains that all of you debate regularly and I am sure today you will have a very productive discussion.”[viii]  It is useful for ASEAN and India to explore commonalities and convergences in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI). In this context, Vietnam has the unique opportunity to further expand, deepen and strengthen the ASEAN India Strategic Partnership.

     

    Notes

    [i] “ASEAN, India strengthen cooperation”, https://asean.org/asean-india-strengthen-cooperation/ (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [ii] “ASEAN, Indian senior officials gather at online 22nd meeting”, https://www.asean2020.vn/xem-chi-tiet1/-/asset_publisher/ynfWm23dDfpd/content/asean-indian-senior-officials-gather-at-online-22nd-meeting (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    [iii] “Cooperation among select countries of the Indo-Pacific in fighting COVID-19 pandemic”, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32691/Cooperation+among+select+countries+of+the+IndoPacific+in+fighting+COVID19+pandemic (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [iv] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT(accessed 20 August 2020).

    [v] “ASEAN Outlook On The Indo-Pacific” https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [vi] “Ministry of External Affairs Indo-Pacific Division Briefs”, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf (accessed 20 August 20200.

    [vii] “Incident between Indian, Chinese militaries was ‘not skirmish but face-off’: Jaishankar”,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/incident-between-indian-chinese-militaries-was-not-skirmish-but-face-off-  (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [viii] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    Image Credit: Asia Times