The Peninsula Foundation

Blog

  • The Russia-Ukraine War: Putin’s Reasons, Objectives and the Way Out

    The Russia-Ukraine War: Putin’s Reasons, Objectives and the Way Out

    In 3 weeks since Russia’s president, Putin ordered on February 24 this year, a “special military operation” against Ukraine, many questions were asked on his reasons and goals.

    Putin answered those questions in the early morning address to the nation on February 24. He referred to Russia’s particular concern and anxiety over the NATO expansion to the east and the US policy of containment of Russia through the military “settlement” of the Ukrainian territory. Transformation of Ukraine, historically a part of the Russian state, into an “anti-Russia” controlled and guided by the U.S. was nothing less, in Putin’s view than a real threat to Russia’s very existence.

    Putin went on to mention Ukraine’s use of armed forces against the pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, the potential threat that the Ukrainian nationalists could present for Russia-annexed Crimea, and Kyiv’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons. “Russia’s clash with these forces is inevitable.”

    This was the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Few of us believed it would actually happen, but it did, nonetheless. Let’s start by trying to understand, why.

    Russia’s red lines

    According to John Mearsheimer, the West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the current crisis, which actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, with the US pushing the alliance to announce a plan for Ukraine and Georgia’s prospective membership. Russian leaders characterized the move as an existential threat to Russia and promises to thwart it. Putin warned the West then and there: “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.”

    Nobody listened, or paid attention, thus underscoring the second point from Putin’s pre-invasion speech: the West no longer treats Russia as a great power and will do whatever it deems necessary without taking heed of Russia’s legitimate interests. Instead, Ukraine was actively encouraged to expand its collaboration with NATO and crush the pro-Russian rebellion in Donbas by force. The U.S. and NATO supplied lethal weapons for Ukraine’s civil war, trained its armed forces and turned a blind eye to reports of atrocities that Kyiv and Kyiv-affiliated militias had committed in the region.

    Ukraine started hosting joint land-based and naval exercises with NATO countries, effectively blocking Russia’s Black Sea fleet in its base in Sevastopol. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. In November 2021, the U.S. conducted its annual Global Thunder 22 exercises, which included strategic aviation practising nuclear strikes against Russia over the Black Sea and only 20 km from Russia’s borders. In parallel to that, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defense announced his country’s aspirations to put as many US/NATO training centers in Ukraine as possible, which effectively amounted to a request for additional U.S. military personnel in the country.

    As John Mearsheimer observed, Ukraine was fast becoming a de facto member of NATO. It wanted to use NATO’s rearmaments and the US political and strategic back-up to crush the separatist rebellion in Donbas and ensure “de-occupation and reintegration” of Crimea, now an integral part of the Russian Federation, by all necessary means, not excluding “military measures.” Russia’s fears of NATO’s ballistic missiles appearing on the Ukraine-Russia border, within 7-8 minutes of flying time to Moscow no longer seemed overly exaggerated. Putin described such a potentiality as NATO’s holding a knife to Russia’s throat and made an explicit connection between Ukraine’s aspirations of NATO membership and Kyiv’s plan to return Donbas and Crimea by force. Both were equally unacceptable.

    Russia’s goals

    According to the Russian leader, if Ukraine joined NATO, it would be tempted to implement its “de-occupation strategy” for Crimea through the use of force. NATO would then be obliged to help Ukraine under its Article V mutual defence clause. “This means that there will be a military confrontation between Russia and NATO,” Putin said. Such a war would soon turn nuclear. The Kremlin came to a conclusion that a pre-emptive strike on Ukraine was the only way to stave off a future Russia-NATO war over Crimea.

    We haven’t seen it coming. It was hard to anticipate because Ukraine’s turning away from Russia and drawing closer to NATO did not start yesterday. Ukraine’s Yavoriv training ground hosted the first joint manoeuvres with NATO back in 1995. In 1997, Ukraine and NATO signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. In 2000, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the Status of Forces Agreement, which enabled the stationing of NATO troops on Ukrainian soil. In 2002, Ukraine’s goal of eventual NATO membership was first voiced by its President; that goal has since become a part of the country’s official foreign policy doctrine. Ukraine’s forces took part in numerous NATO-led operations and missions over the years, from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq. And Russia observed all of these developments over the period of near 20 years with calm and reserve, leaving an impression that Ukraine is free to proceed as it wants.

    Moscow’s calm evaporated after Ukraine’s Maidan revolution of 2014 deposed Russia-leaning president Yanukovych and, through the revolutionary powers’ first acts, indicated a clear break with the last memories of the Russian influence. Symbolically, the very first move was to strip the Russian language of its semi-official status in the areas where significant numbers of Russian-speaking minorities lived. A clear indication was given as to the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet naval base in Sevastopol – the new powers would prefer the Russian navy relocate to Russia proper at its earliest convenience. Plans were underway to offer these naval facilities to NATO.

    Putin moved on to annex Crimea, which, in his view, was an act of strategic necessity. He apparently anticipated Ukraine’s eventually acquiescing to the fact.

    It did not happen. Instead, Ukraine grew more nationalistic, and a significant number of its nationalists embraced anti-Russianism together with far-right politics and symbology. Hence, the Russian goals in the present war include “de-Nazification,” which must be read as Ukraine’s abandonment of anti-Russian nationalism and return to the quasi-Soviet ideology of “one people” with Russians and Belarusians. In other words, Russia would seek to reaffirm, if not impose, a version of the Ukrainian identity that was supported through both the imperial and the Soviet times — Ukrainians as a junior kinfolk to the Russian “older brother.”

    The way out

    With Ukraine’s capital Kyiv under assault and the southern port of Mariupol nearing utter destruction, calls for peace have intensified on all sides, including from Russia’s most important backers in China. Unfortunately, the search for a working compromise has not yet started in earnest. Ukraine’s original position at peace talks focused on the immediate withdrawal of all Russian troops from all of Ukraine, Crimea and Donbas included. From the Russian perspective, that would be equal to capitulation and surrender of a part of its own territory (Crimea), plus legal denunciation of a friendship and support treaty just concluded with Donbas.

    Russia’s present terms for ending the war are equally unrealistic. They include Ukraine’s adoption of a neutral status and the abandonment of its hopes for NATO membership; acknowledgement of the Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the independence of separatist regions in the country’s east; and demilitarization. The objective of the regime change, disguised by the “de-Nazification” rhetoric, has not been voiced much as of recent.

    Given the very fact of the ongoing war with Russia, the demand for demilitarization is clearly a non-starter. Russia’s insistence on Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality could, perhaps, be taken back to Ukraine’s parliament for a serious discussion; however, a ceasefire must be reached first for such a discussion to happen. As for Ukraine’s acknowledgement of Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea or independence of Donbas, these Russia-pushed items look more like the terms of surrender and cannot form the basis of a peace agreement.

    A more plausible ground for a compromise could be the two states’ mutual pledge to refrain from all attempts to solve any outstanding issues by force in the future. That would stop short from Ukraine’s recognition of either Crimea or Donbas but would assure Russia that Ukraine has no plans to regain the lost territories by force. Russia would need to withdraw its army from all areas of Ukraine proper. Ukraine would have to accept that its fight for the return of Crimea and Donbas would now be restricted in its choice of means to mostly diplomatic and legal instruments. The assurances of a non-aligned, non-bloc status that Ukraine could give to Russia should be matched with Russia’s assurances of full compensation for the losses that this war inflicted on Ukraine’s economy and society. While such a compromise will most probably draw the rage of hawkish nationalists on both sides, it might actually form the foundation of a peace agreement that everyone needs.

    Image Credits:

    Feature Image: www.militarytimes.com

    Putin Image: Al Jazeera

    Map: Al Jazeera

  • Book Review: The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths

    Book Review: The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths

     

     

     

    Book Name: The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths
    Author: Mariana Mazzucato
    Publisher: Anthem Press (10 June 2013)
    Page Count: 266
    Price: INR 2,020.00

     

     

     

    Written against the backdrop of the recovery period of the financial crisis of 2008, Mariano Mazzucato’s ‘The Entrepreneurial State’, came at a critical point, arguing against the widely accepted belief of the self-correcting nature of the markets, and the austere state measures of limited intervention, which in the case of the financial crisis, referred to injecting large sums of capital in banks to rescue them from collapsing. The book is an expanded version of a 2011 report which laid down policy proposals for the UK government post the crisis.

    Divided into ten chapters, the book focuses on the need for the institutionalization of innovation and lays down two main arguments. First, state investment is a necessary pre-condition for any long-term innovation, and growth, and requires a steady flow of funds. Arguing that governments must move beyond spending solely on infrastructural development, Professor Mazzucato extensively explains how the state and the industry are interwoven together, and cannot be looked at, in isolation. She draws her examples from a wide spectrum of industries in the United States, covering the pharmaceutical companies, to big tech companies, while also linking the state and industry to public schools, and foreign and defence policies of the United States.

    Second, the book argues that the companies funded by the state should return a part of their profit to the state for investment in other innovative technologies. Here, it is important to note that while the book has been targeted by neo-liberals for suggesting socialization through increased state intervention in the market, the author, however, does not question the right of private companies to accumulate profits, and asks only a proportion of it to be redistributed to the state for further investment.

    A major part of the book is devoted to addressing the illusion that entrepreneurship and innovation come from the private sector alone. Debunking this myth, Professor Mazzucato cites extensive evidence of impatient venture capitalists who have historically depended upon the government support for expensive and ambiguous investment risk, and of companies that have historically preferred to repurchase their shares to increase their stock prices instead of investing in research. She highlights the role of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) in the US which was set up to provide the country with technological superiority. Arguing that the agency played a critical role in funding computer and internet technology, she illustrates how its contribution to the success of companies in the Silicon Valley, is often overlooked by institutions seeking to get away from the long arm of the state’.

    The author draws inspiration from Keynes’ advocacy of increased government expenditures, and Karl Polanyi’s research on central organization and state’s policies of controlled interventionism, where he argued that it was the state-imposed conditions that made a conducive environment for markets to come into existence. She also draws some of her important arguments from Schumpeter’s idea of entrepreneurial innovation and experimentation which paves the way for innovation by constantly destroying the old ones. Throughout her book, Mazzucato argues for a symbiosis of Keynesian fiscal spending, and Schumpeter’s investments in innovation.

    The book challenges the widely promoted concept of a free market based on limited state intervention, by the United States. Claiming that the US has itself invested heavily into its research and industrial sector, the author looks into the role played by programs and agencies like DARPA, Small Business Innovation Research (required large companies to designate a proportion of their funding to small for-profit firms), the Orphan Drug Act (provides tax incentives, subsidies, and intellectual and marketing rights to small firms dedicated to developing products for the treatment of rare diseases) and the National Nanotechnology Initiative. Further, after comparing the data of several countries, the author argues that states like Portugal and Italy are lagging not because of high state presence, but rather due to lack of state investment in research and development.

    The author builds up her argument upon the foundation that the state lacks confidence in its abilities to fund innovation. She argues that an increasing number of research and financial institutions have wrongfully come to regard the state as the ‘enemy of the enterprise’, which should be kept away from meddling in the market to ensure efficiency. Although she does briefly mention that the citizens are often unaware of how their taxes foster innovation, her analysis does not delve into the reason behind the state’s lack of confidence in itself, making it difficult for the reader to grasp the reason behind the state’s as well as the society’s lack of trust in a public-funded healthcare system, despite most new radical drugs have been coming out of public labs.

    Writing on the importance of green technology, Mazzucato holds that any ‘green revolution’ would depend upon an active risk-taking state. While comparing the green economic policies of China, Brazil, the US, and Europe, she elucidates how the state investment banks in China and Brazil act as a major source of funding for clean and solar technology. On the other hand, Europe’s approach to clean technology funding has been weakened by its attempt to present ‘green’ investments as a trade-off for growth, consequently resulting in a lack of support.

    Towards the latter part of her book, Professor Mazzucato presents her hypothesis of the risk-taking state, where both the state, and the market are interwoven to generate growth, and innovation. Her proposal is supported by numerous examples of state-sponsored innovative technology which emerged in the last century, implying that the state may have always been entrepreneurial. However, she argues that countries like India have performed worse than others because of their over-expenditure on several small firms, which have low productivity and output. The focus of state investment, thus, should be placed not on its quantity, but rather on its distribution amongst different sectors of the economy.

    Mazzucato claims that since the traditional tax system cannot provide the state with funds to invest in the innovation system because of tax avoidance and evasion, she suggests a three-step framework to support state-funded innovation. First, the state should extract royalties from the application of a technology that was funded by the state itself, which should be put into a ‘national innovation fund’ for future investment. Second, the state should put conditions on the loans it offers, a part of which should be returned to the state when the company starts to earn profits. And finally, she argues for the establishment of a State Investment Bank, like those in China and Brazil.

    The relevance of her hypothesis increases significantly as one witness the market value of Apple moving past the mark of $3 trillion, and surpassing the GDP of countries like the UK, Italy, Brazil, and Russia.[i] The author debunks the overestimated role of the big private companies like Apple and Google being at the forefront of generating innovative technologies by themselves alone. In doing so, she argues that Apple has received state funds from various channels, including direct investments in their early stage of development under the government programs like the Small Business Innovation Research; through access to technologies that emerged primarily because of state funding; and through the tax policies which benefit the company. Most of the elements used by the Apple, including high-speed internet, SIRI, touch-screen displays have been a result of risky investments by the state.

    Scholars[ii] have argued that the book does not consider the ‘productivity paradox’, which reflects low productivity in times of emerging innovative technologies, as during the IT revolution of the 1970s in the United States. However, it is important to note, that Mazzucato argues against the endogenous growth theory, where the output is taken as a function of capital, and labour, with technology assumed as an exogenous variable. She targets the theory for assuming certainty in growth after investment in technology, and research and development. Taking inspiration from Schumpeter, she asserts that investment in technology and innovation involves high uncertainty, and the growth, thus, cannot be measured using a linear model like the endogenous theory, which does not take into account the social factors responsible for growth (education, design, training, etc.).

    One of the limitations of the book is its lack of analysis on the underlying structural inequality and the impact of technological change on income disparities. Instead of delving further into controversies of value creation, the author cites an example of the wage-disparity between Apple’s broader employee base and its top executives and observes that the process of innovation can go ahead simultaneously with inequality. In the case of Apple, the products of which are considered as global commodities, a major part of the workforce come from countries providing cheap labour. These offshore jobs mostly take place in the low-wage manufacturing industries, and the resulting profit margins are counted as ‘value added’ generated within the United States[iii]. While Mazzucato argues for redistribution of profit between Apple and the US government, her analysis ignores the role played by the globalized workforce in generating the said profits.

    Lastly, the case for a risk-taking entrepreneurial state has been made solely based on politically stable, high-income countries of the West. The author does not address whether high-scale state investments would be viable in situations where governments’ primary focus is placed on maintaining domestic stability and security, as in the case of Afghanistan, Somalia, or Yemen. Thus, one cannot be fully convinced about whether the prescribed model would fit well into the low-income countries of the South, many of which continue to witness high levels of instability, corruption, and violence.

    Overall, in using over three hundred different sources, Professor Mazzucato’s book provides the reader with an extensive critical insight into the working of the state, and the industry. By addressing the various myths associated with industries in each of her chapters, the author makes the reader question the fundamentals of the free-market system and makes one interrogate the existence of such a system. The book also attempts at breaking the cultural hegemony of the United States, by challenging their mainstream narrative of high-scale privatization and limited government presence. By covering a vast ground of industries, the book pushes the reader to delve into further research to investigate the role of the state in funding other technologies and innovations.

     

    [i] Bursztynsky, J. (2020, August 19). Apple becomesfirst U.S. company to reach a $2 trillion market cap. Retrieved August 20, 2020, from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/19/apple-reaches-2-trillion-market-cap.html  and Smith, Zachary Snowdon. (2022, Jan 03). Apple becomes 1st company worth $ 3 trillion – Greater than the GDP OF UK. Retrieved March 08, 2022, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharysmith/2022/01/03/apple-becomes-1st-company-worth-3-trillion-greater-than-the-gdp-of-the-uk/?sh=6142c7b25603

    [ii] Pradella, L. (2016). The Entrepreneurial State by Mariana Mazzucato: A critical engagement. Competition & Change, 21(1), 61-69. doi:10.1177/1024529416678084

    [iii] Greg Linden, Jason Dedrick, and Kenneth L. Kraemer, Innovation and Job Creation in a Global Economy: The Case of Apple’s iPod, Personal Computing Industry Center, UC Irvine, January 2009, http://pcic.merage.uci.edu, 2.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Mariana Mazzucato Quartz

  • The Ukraine crisis: Its impact on India

    The Ukraine crisis: Its impact on India

    India has to tread a fine line in this imbroglio: Taking care of the welfare and evacuation of Indian students and the possibility of an oil price hike.

    The face-off over Ukraine between Russia and the United States and its Nato allies has been dominating the headlines for a while now with tensions ratcheting up as we receive dire public warnings every day of a Russian invasion any day now. Clearly, the possibility of Russian intervention there, and the consequent escalation of sanctions against them, is very real and concerning.

    While Ukraine may be a developing country and the poorest in Europe, by no means is it a pushover. It is the second-largest country there, behind Russia, by area, and in terms of population the eighth largest with its 42 million inhabitants. It has been independent since 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, though it had been a part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union since the 18th century. If there is one lesson that Putin and the Russian military should have learnt from America’s disastrous interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan is that invasions are relatively easy to accomplish, but keeping restive and hostile populations under control is a wholly different proposition.

    [powerkit_button size=”lg” style=”info” block=”true” url=”https://www.dailypioneer.com/2022/columnists/the-ukraine-crisis–its-impact-on-india.html” target=”_self” nofollow=”false”]
    Read More
    [/powerkit_button]

  • 100 Years after the End of the First World War: Are we slipping again into a World War?

    100 Years after the End of the First World War: Are we slipping again into a World War?

    In view of the developments in Ukraine, the question arises whether there could be a repetition of the First World War in slipping into a new World War that no one intended. This original thesis is accentuated in different ways, whether in the form that European politicians behaved like “somnambulists (Clark) or just failed (Münkler). The blame for the war was also sought in Serbia or Vienna. Hereby the original thesis of the main war guilt of Germany is questioned, as it was fixed in the Treaty of Versailles and by the historian Fritz Fischer as the “grip on the world power” of Germany. However, if the causes of the First World War and, above all, its escalation are no longer seen in the German Empire alone, but are more or less equally distributed among the major European powers, this does not mean that “nothing and nobody” is responsible for the primordial catastrophe of the 20th century: Nationalism, arms race, industrialized warfare, pure power politics – all these are factors that contributed decisively to the First World War. Moreover, it should be emphasized, which even today is far from being overcome in many parts of the world. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine War, a much-discussed book by the highly influential American political scientist Robert Kagan takes on a whole new relevance. Kagan suggests the idea that Europeans could live in a paradise of peace and order after World War II only because the Americans were prepared to confront possible threats to that peace decisively and violently. Thanks to America’s power, Europeans could have indulged in the belief that (military) power was no longer important. But does the principle follow from this that law and order must be upheld in dealings with one another, but in the violent “jungle, we must follow the laws of the jungle”? Or, conversely, is it not the case that state warfare and the exercise of violence that does not adhere to its self-imposed conventions and limitations will stir up more violent resistance than they, in turn, can fight?

    Kagan is partly correct. All modern states are based on the state’s monopoly on the use of force, and almost all of them have emerged through a violent process-remember the English, American, and French Revolutions, the German wars of unification, the wars of decolonization, and the emergence of new nation-states after World Wars I and II. Therefore, however, states do not as such embody an order of violence. Hegel had argued that violence is the appearing beginning of the state, but not its substantial principle. Nor is order powerlessness, as Robert Kagan’s much-discussed book on “Power and Powerlessness” in the New World Order suggests. Does political power come from the barrels of guns, as Mao Tse Tung suggested? If so, the Soviet Union should never have collapsed because gun barrels were more than enough for the Red Army.

    Kagan assigns the opposition of power and order thinking to contemporary American and European thinking but admits this has not always been the case. As he points out, the situation was just the opposite for a long time. The Americans up to Woodrow Wilson at the beginning of the last century, he says, were committed to thinking of order and a world-political idealism of spreading human rights, while the Europeans remained committed to pure thinking of power until World War II. What is astonishing, if we take Kagan’s own analysis seriously, is why he does not ask to what final conclusion this “pure power thinking” among Europeans led – to nothing other than the catastrophes of World War I and World War II. Kagan may be right about one thing: in view of the “state-failure” problems in numerous Third World states on the one hand (emphasized by the Europeans in the anti-terror struggle) and those of the so-called “rogue states” on the other (on which American interest focused under Bush), illusions about the end of history and a largely peaceful, because economically determined, 21st century is fast fading. However, this cannot mean developing a new metaphysics of struggle and self-assertion that only force can enforce.

    Historical Traditions

    In determining the political sphere in categories of power or order, Kagan finds himself in a long ancestral line of the history of political ideas. Dolf Sternberger distinguished three different roots of the concept of politics: cooperation, following Aristotle; demonology, starting from Machiavelli; and eschatology, as he essentially saw it realized in Marxism, starting from the church father, Augustine. Sternberger’s distinction is phenomenological still valid today, even if his evaluations are problematic because he saw himself in the tradition of the Aristotelian concept of politics and – as the term demonology already shows – fiercely fought the opposite position.

    How are these distinctions to be understood? Here are two quotations: Aristotle begins his work on politics with the definition: “Everything that is called state is obviously a kind of community, and every community is formed and exists for the purpose of obtaining some good.” In contrast, Jean Bodin, perhaps the most important constitutionalist of the 16th century, referred directly to Aristotle. However, his position should be read as his deliberate inversion: “Republic is a lawful government over several households and what is common to them, with sovereign power.” Precisely because Bodin modelled his work on Aristotle’s, the contrast between the two determinations jumps out all the more clearly: on the one hand, a community for the sake of a common goal; on the other, rule endowed with sovereign power. Marx’s eleventh Feuerbach thesis best describes the third dimension of Sternberger’s distinction: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; what matters is to change it.” In contrast to Sternberger’s notion of demonology, however, one side of this line of tradition is by no means “Machiavellianism,” a struggle for power for power’s sake. Instead, it claims to constitute an (absolute) power out of insight into the violence of human nature, which prevents the struggle of all against all.

    Sternberger emphasizes the fundamental difference between the first two concepts of politics when he asks in summary: “Is it the conflict of interests, powers, beliefs, and wills that thus characterizes the political in its peculiar essence? Or is it rather the balance, the compromise, the contract, the common rule of life. And conversely asked: should we interpret peace – civil peace as well as peace among nations – as the abolition and overcoming, as the negation of politics, or, on the contrary, as its completion?”

    Struggle for power and domination, on the one hand, negotiation and the establishment of order on the other, are the two opposite definitions of the essence of politics that run through the history of political ideas. As antipodes may be mentioned only: Thucydides and Plato resp. Aristotle, Machiavelli and Erasmus of Rotterdam, Hegel and Kant, Schmitt and Arendt, recently Foucault, resp. Luhmann and Habermas.

    If we take a closer look at this line of ancestors, it should be enough reason to warn us not to reduce politics to pure power politics. Thomas Hobbes, for example, with his conception of the state monopoly on the use of force, justified internal peace and the avoidance of civil war, but at the same time advocated an absolute sovereign. And Carl Schmitt stands paradigmatically for the problem of reducing politics to pure power politics. For it was not personal opportunism or immoderate ambition that justified his closeness to the National Socialists, but the extreme consequence of his reduction of the political to the distinction between friend and foe in a crisis-ridden world-historical situation. Carl Schmitt wrote in this regard: A total state “does not allow any anti-state, state-inhibiting or state-dividing forces to arise within it. It does not think of handing over the new means of power to its own enemies and destroyers. Such a state can distinguish friend from foe.” The reduction of the political to only one of two sides, the exercise of power or reliance on the establishment of order, has always led to problematic consequences in historical development. Against the false alternative between power or order and their immediate connection in order of power, the “middle” between power and order has to be found again. Violence cannot establish peace, but it can limit other violence to such an extent that other than violent structures come into play. Perhaps America and Europe have more to learn from each other than either side realizes.

    Developments after September 11

    Especially after the attacks of September 11, hardly any author in his assessment of the events could do without reference to Carl Schmitt’s world-famous definition of the political as the distinction between friend and foe. Even before the attacks, however, the political theory had already noted the shift from “Kant to Schmitt” as a consequence of the crisis of the political. Finally, George W. Bush elevated Schmitt’s definition of the political to a quasi-official governmental program in the United States. In this perspective, Robert Kagan denies that Europe and the USA still have a common view of the world at all. “Americans are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus.” By this, he means that Europe lives in a Kantian fantasy world of eternal peace, while America is called upon and alone empowered to create order in Hobbesian anarchy on a global scale.

    Schmitt as the “mastermind” of the Western world? The tendency to refer back to Schmitt is not unproblematic, however. The possible linking of politics and political theory to Carl Schmitt’s definition of the political cannot, in principle, disregard Schmitt’s temporary proximity to the National Socialists. For it was not personal opportunism or immoderate ambition that justified this closeness, but the extreme consequence of his reduction of the political to the distinction between friend and foe in a crisis-like world-historical situation. Carl Schmitt wrote about this, as indicated: A total state “does not allow any anti-state, state-inhibiting or state-dividing forces to arise within it. It does not think of handing over the new means of power to its own enemies and destroyers……. Such a state can distinguish friend from foe.” Are we not already living in such a total surveillance state?

    The reduction of the political to a pure struggle for power, to a pure friend-enemy distinction, has problematic consequences, as is revealed especially in Schmitt. Conversely, the reduction of the political to the establishment of the agreement, of acting together, leads either to “apolitical” idealism or violent utopianism, as was shown especially in Marxism/communism. But which is now the solution? The distinction between friend and foe is a precondition of political action, but it is not its goal – the goal of politics regarding war and violence is the “mediation” of friend and foe. Or as Yitzhak Rabin described it: Peace is not made with friends, but with enemies! This is the art of politics, to enable a peaceful conflict resolution with opponents instead of falling into the traps of pure power politics – this is the lesson of the First World War then and today.

    Feature Image Credit: powervertical.org 

     

  • US Foreign Policy Is a Cruel Sport

    US Foreign Policy Is a Cruel Sport

    The Russia- Ukraine conflict escalated into a full-blown as Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered special military operations into Ukraine. In this global geopolitical chessboard, Ukraine is a pawn and a tragic victim. However, the causes of this war lie squarely in the decades-long aggressive strategy employed by the US and its European allies in expanding NATO at the expense of Russia’s security and strategic interests. Henry Kissinger’s, in his 2014 article, sounded prophetic – “if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.” He categorically stated Ukraine must not join NATO. Diana Johnston’s article clearly brings out the reasons for the current mess and how the USA’s aggressive and deeply self-centred foreign policy has created much of the mess in today’s world.

    The Peninsula Foundation is happy to republish this article with the author’s permission. The opinions expressed are the author’s own.

    The article was published earlier in Consortium News.

    – Editorial Team

     

    In the time of the first Queen Elizabeth, British royal circles enjoyed watching fierce dogs torment a captive bear for the fun of it.  The bear had done no harm to anyone, but the dogs were trained to provoke the imprisoned beast and goad it into fighting back.  Blood flowing from the excited animals delighted the spectators.

    This cruel practice has long since been banned as inhumane.

    And yet today, a version of bear baiting is being practised every day against whole nations on a gigantic international scale.  It is called United States foreign policy. It has become the regular practice of the absurd international sports club called NATO.

    United States leaders, secure in their arrogance as “the indispensable nation,” have no more respect for other countries than the Elizabethans had for the animals they tormented. The list is long of targets of U.S. bear-baiting, but Russia stands out as a prime example of constant harassment.  And this is no accident.  The baiting is deliberately and elaborately planned.

    As evidence, I call attention to a 2019 report by the RAND Corporation to the U.S. Army chief of staff entitled “Extending Russia.” Actually, the RAND study itself is fairly cautious in its recommendations and warns that many perfidious tricks might not work.  However, I consider the very existence of this report scandalous, not so much for its content as for the fact that this is what the Pentagon pays its top intellectuals to do: figure out ways to lure other nations into troubles U.S. leaders hope to exploit.

    The official U.S. line is that the Kremlin threatens Europe by its aggressive expansionism, but when the strategists talk among themselves the story is very different.  Their goal is to use sanctions, propaganda and other measures to provoke Russia into taking the very sort of negative measures (“over-extension”) that the U.S. can exploit to Russia’s detriment.

    The RAND study explains its goals:

    “We examine a range of nonviolent measures that could exploit Russia’s actual vulnerabilities and anxieties as a way of stressing Russia’s military and economy and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. The steps we examine would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose, although they might contribute to both. Rather, these steps are conceived of as elements in a campaign designed to unbalance the adversary, leading Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advantage, and causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence.”

    Clearly, in U.S. ruling circles, this is considered “normal” behaviour, just as teasing is normal behaviour for the schoolyard bully, and sting operations are normal for corrupt FBI agents.

    This description perfectly fits U.S. operations in Ukraine, intended to “exploit Russia’s vulnerabilities and anxieties” by advancing a hostile military alliance onto its doorstep, while describing Russia’s totally predictable reactions as gratuitous aggression.  Diplomacy involves understanding the position of the other party.  But verbal bear baiting requires total refusal to understand the other, and constant deliberate misinterpretation of whatever the other party says or does.

    What is truly diabolical is that, while constantly accusing the Russian bear of plotting to expand, the whole policy is directed at goading it into expanding!  Because then we can issue punishing sanctions, raise the Pentagon budget a few notches higher and tighten the NATO Protection Racket noose tighter around our precious European “allies.”

    For a generation, Russian leaders have made extraordinary efforts to build a peaceful partnership with “the West,” institutionalized as the European Union and above all, NATO. They truly believed that the end of the artificial Cold War could produce a peace-loving European neighbourhood. But arrogant United States leaders, despite contrary advice from their best experts, rejected treating Russia as the great nation it is and preferred to treat it as the harassed bear in a circus.

    The expansion of NATO was a form of bear-baiting, the clear way to transform a potential friend into an enemy. That was the way chosen by former U.S. President Bill Clinton and following administrations.  Moscow had accepted the independence of former members of the Soviet Union.  Bear-baiting involved constantly accusing Moscow of plotting to take them back by force.

    Russia’s Borderland

    An unpaved road to Lysychansk, Lugansk, March 2015. (Rosa Luxemburg-Stiftung, Flickr, CC BY 2.0)

    Ukraine is a word meaning borderlands, essentially the borderlands between Russia and the territories to the West that were sometimes part of Poland, or Lithuania, or Habsburg lands.  As a part of the U.S.S.R., Ukraine was expanded to include large swaths of both.  History had created very contrasting identities on the two extremities, with the result that the independent nation of Ukraine, which came into existence only in 1991, was deeply divided from the start.  And from the start, Washington strategies, in cahoots with a large, hyperactive anti-communist anti-Russian diaspora in the U.S. and Canada, contrived to use the bitterness of Ukraine’s divisions to weaken first the U.S.S.R. and then Russia.  Billions of dollars were invested in order to “strengthen democracy” – meaning the pro-Western west of Ukraine against its semi-Russian east.

    The 2014 U.S.-backed coup that overthrew President Viktor Yukanovych, solidly supported by the east of the country, brought to power pro-West forces determined to bring Ukraine into NATO, whose designation of Russia as the prime enemy had become ever more blatant. This caused the prospect of an eventual NATO capture of Russia’s major naval base at Sebastopol, on the Crimean peninsula.

    Since the Crimean population had never wanted to be part of Ukraine, the peril was averted by organizing a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Crimeans voted to return to Russia, from which they had been severed by an autocratic Khrushchev ruling in 1954.  Western propagandists relentlessly denounced this act of self-determination as a “Russian invasion” foreshadowing a program of Russian military conquest of its Western neighbours – a fantasy supported by neither facts nor motivation.

    Appalled by the coup overthrowing the president they had voted for, by nationalists threatening to outlaw the Russian language they spoke, the people of the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk declared their independence.

    March 2015: Civilians pass by as OSCE monitors the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine. (OSCE, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

    Russia did not support this move but instead supported the Minsk agreement, signed in February 2015 and endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. The gist of the accord was to preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine by a federalization process that would return the breakaway republics in return for their local autonomy.

    The Minsk agreement set out a few steps to end the internal Ukrainian crisis. First, Ukraine was supposed to immediately adopt a law granting self-government to eastern regions (in March 2015). Next, Kyiv would negotiate with eastern territories over guidelines for local elections to be held that year under OSCE supervision.  Then Kyiv would implement a constitutional reform guaranteeing eastern rights. After the elections, Kyiv would take full control of Donetsk and Lugansk, including the border with Russia.  A general amnesty would cover soldiers on both sides.

    However, although it signed the agreement, Kyiv has never implemented any of these points and refuses to negotiate with the eastern rebels.  Under the so-called Normandy agreement, France and Germany were expected to put pressure on Kyiv to accept this peaceful settlement, but nothing happened. Instead, the West has accused Russia of failing to implement the agreement, which makes no sense inasmuch as the obligations to implement fall on Kyiv, not on Moscow.  Kyiv officials regularly reiterate their refusal to negotiate with the rebels, while demanding more and more weaponry from NATO powers in order to deal with the problem in their own way.

    Meanwhile, major parties in the Russian Duma and public opinion have long expressed concern for the Russian-speaking population of the eastern provinces, suffering from privations and military attack from the central government for eight years. This concern is naturally interpreted in the West as a remake of Hitler’s drive to conquest neighbouring countries.  However, as usual, the inevitable Hitler analogy is baseless. For one thing, Russia is too large to need to conquer Lebensraum.

    You Want an Enemy?  Now You’ve Got One

    Germany has found the perfect formula for Western relations with Russia: Are you or are you not a “Putinversteher,” a “Putin understander?” By Putin, they mean Russia, since the standard Western propaganda ploy is to personify the targeted country with the name of its president, Vladimir Putin, necessarily a dictatorial autocrat.   If you “understand” Putin or Russia, then you are under deep suspicion of disloyalty to the West.  So, all together now, let us make sure that we DO NOT UNDERSTAND Russia!

    Image Credit: metro.co.uk

    Russian leaders claim to feel threatened by members of a huge hostile alliance, holding regular military manoeuvers on their doorstep?  They feel uneasy about nuclear missiles aimed at their territory from nearby NATO member states?  Why, that’s just paranoia, or a sign of sly, aggressive intentions.  There is nothing to understand.

    So, the West has treated Russia like a baited bear.  And what it’s getting is a nuclear-armed, militarily powerful adversary nation led by people vastly more thoughtful and intelligent than the mediocre politicians in office in Washington, London and a few other places.

    U.S. President Joe Biden and his Deep State never wanted a peaceful solution in Ukraine, because troubled Ukraine acts as a permanent barrier between Russia and Western Europe, ensuring U.S. control over the latter.  They have spent years treating Russia as an adversary, and Russia is now drawing the inevitable conclusion that the West will accept it only as an adversary.  The patience is at an end. And this is a game-changer.

    First reaction: the West will punish the bear with sanctions!  Germany is stopping certification of the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline.  Germany thus refuses to buy the Russian gas it needs in order to make sure Russia won’t be able to cut off the gas it needs some time in the future.  Now that’s a clever trick, isn’t it!  And meanwhile, with a growing gas shortage and rising prices, Russia will have no trouble selling its gas somewhere else in Asia.

    When “our values” include refusal to understand, there is no limit to how much we can fail to understand.

    To be continued.

     

    Feature Image: nato.int

  • Change in IAS (Cadre) Rules – Policy Brief

    Change in IAS (Cadre) Rules – Policy Brief

    [powerkit_button size=”lg” style=”info” block=”true” url=”https://admin.thepeninsula.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Change-in-IAS-Cadre-Rules-1.pdf” target=”_blank” nofollow=”false”]
    Download – Change in IAS (Cadre) Rules
    [/powerkit_button]

    Executive Summary:

    The Centre’s proposal to amend the IAS Cadre Rules has sent shockwaves through the State governments and the bureaucratic community. Although the Centre already has the preponderance of power over the State government, it has always been the convention to depute All India Services (AIS) officers with the concurrence of the State government(s) and the Central government and the consent of the officer concerned. By providing overriding powers to the Central government, the proposal poses a fundamental risk to the federal structure of the Constitution. Not only should the proposal be recalled, but the annual intake of the IAS officers should be increased to address the issue of staff shortage, while recruiting suitable personnel from other Central Civil Services. The empanelment process also needs to be reformed to ensure transparency, objectivity and to uphold the principles of natural justice.

    The Centre’s proposal is a reflection of the long overdue need for the complete overhaul and reform of the Indian civil service system. These piecemeal amendments and a myriad of executive orders are not only unproductive to the civil service system but also counterproductive to the basic structure of the Constitution. A high-level committee should be established to undertake a holistic study to reform the Indian civil service system not only to bring in better performance and accountability but more importantly, to get rid of the colonial legacy once and for all.

    What is it?

    Deputation of IAS officers is governed under Rule 6 of The Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954. Rule 6(1) mandates that the deputation of cadre officers to the Centre must be done with the concurrence of the concerned State government(s) and the Central government.

    The provision to Rule 6(1) states that in case of any disagreement, the Central government’s decision will prevail, and the State governments shall give effect to it.

    The proposal attempts to amend the Central Deputation rules by giving overriding powers to the Centre to transfer and post Cadre officers without the consent of the State government.

    Proposed Amendments (Singh, 2022)

    1. ‘Within a specified time’

    The proposal amends the proviso mandating the State governments to give effect to the final decision of the Central government within a specified time as decided by the Central government.

    2. ‘Officer shall stand relieved’

    In case, a State government delays a cadre officer’s deputation to the Centre and does not give effect to the Central government’s decision within a specified time, the concerned ‘officer shall stand relieved from the cadre from the date as may be specified by the Central government’.

    3. ‘Number of officers’

    Another change proposed is that the actual number of officers to be deputed to the Centre shall be decided by the Central government in consultation with the State government which is required to provide a list of eligible names.

    4. ‘Public interest’

    In a specific situation, if the need arises for the services of a cadre officer to be utilized by the Central government in the public interest, the State governments shall give effect to it within a specified time.

    The abovementioned amendments were sent to the State governments in a letter dated 12th January 2022 by the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) seeking comments until 25th January. The DoPT had earlier sent three similar letters (dated 20th,27th December and 6th January) which were strongly opposed by six States (including BJP ruled States) (Singh, 2022). As of now, more than 7 States have written to the DoPT opposing the proposed changes and other states such as Maharashtra, Kerala and Tamil Nadu have also raised their opposition. The CMs of Chhattisgarh and Rajasthan have also written to the PM opposing the proposed amendments to the cadre rules.

    Why is it a problem?

    The proposed amendments are essentially an attack on the federal structure of our Constitution since it derogates the State government’s power in posting and transferring its cadre officers without its consent. In spite of the rules giving preponderance of power to the Centre, it has always been the convention to depute officers to the Centre in concurrence with the State governments and the consent of the officer concerned (Dhingra, 2021).

    Mamata Banerjee, the CM of West Bengal wrote a strongly worded letter to the PM opposing this move and calling it a ‘unilateral decision’ which was ‘historically unprecedented and wholly unconstitutional’.

    The trigger for this move by the Centre is most likely the result of the tussle between the Centre and West Bengal over former IAS officer Mr. Alapan Bandhopadhyay. Given his experience in handling the Covid-19 crisis as the Chief Secretary of West Bengal, the State government had requested the Centre to extend his tenure and the latter acceded by extending his term for 3 months (24th May 2021). However, the Centre on 28th May 2021 did a complete 180° and issued an order to Mr. Bandhopadhyay informing him that he has been placed with the Government of India ‘with immediate effect’. Following this, the State government opposed the order and did not relieve him and the concerned officer also opted to retire from the services and is now appointed as the advisor to the CM. The Centre then issued a show-cause notice to Mr. Bandhopadhyay for his failure to report to the DoPT. There have been other similar tussles in the past between the Centre and Tamil Nadu government (2001) and West Bengal government (2020) (Agnihotri, 2021), but when the States refused to relieve the concerned IPS officers, the Centre upheld the convention of State government concurrence and did not insist on deputing them anyway.

    Shortage of officers in the Centre

    The DoPT cites the shortage of AIS officers in Union Ministries as the driving factor for these proposed amendments since the ‘States are not sponsoring an adequate number of officers for Central Deputation’. While this is true, it is pertinent to note that State governments also have been suffering from a shortage of officers, especially during the pandemic and have requested the DoPT multiple times to increase the cadre strength of IAS officers (West Bengal, Rajasthan, Bihar).

    Senior IPS officers advise that the problem of shortage of AIS officers has been perennial and does not warrant a knee-jerk reaction at the cost of violating the basic structure of our Constitution. The problem of shortage must be seen as secondary to upholding the federal structure especially since there are other ways to address this problem without seizing the State governments’ authority. While only AIS officers come under the common purview of both the Central and State governments, there are other Central Services with ample human resources over which the Central government has sole authority and the shortage can be filled by deputing these Central services officers.

    The Empanelment Process

    The empanelment process of AIS officers in India has been infested with executive arbitrariness and a lack of transparency. The procedure for empanelment is laid down in the Central Staffing Scheme which does not have any legislative sanction and is instead governed by a slew of Executive Orders (E.O), the primary dated 5th Jan 1996 (NO.36/77/94-EO(SM-I)). The flawed Annual Confidential Report system was replaced by the Annual Performance Appraisal Reports (APAR) system following a Supreme Court ruling to ensure more transparency.

    However, the additional layer of review with the 360° appraisal system or the Multi-Source Feedback system introduced by PM Modi in April 2015 allows the panel to override the recommendations of the APAR system.

    The 92nd Report of the Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice in 2017
    reprimanded the 360° system for its opacity and lack of objectivity, thereby leaving the empanelment process ‘susceptible to manipulation’. Former Upper-level Secretaries have also been critical about the 360° system due to its

    ▪ Lack of transparency
    ▪ Absence of an appeal process
    ▪ Susceptible to bias and discrimination.
    (MS, 2018)

    The absence of legal backing for the empanelment procedure has led to the arbitrary exercise of power by the executive. Usually, officers start their career after training in State cadres and it would take up to 9 years for an officer to occupy Central government positions. But the present government has started a practice of appointing newly recruited officers, fresh from training, as Assistant Secretaries in the Union Ministries. Although this move was said to increase exposure for the new officers, it also may as easily be detrimental to their careers. This new pattern, initiated by the Modi govt, is characterised by a lack of transparency and establishing a core group of loyalist officers at the cost of building experience, knowledge, and performance. The loyalty of the officers of the civil services must be to the Constitution alone and not to any political party or even government of the day if it violates the constitutional provisions.

    Already, the AIS officers are in a bind where the State government and Central government are governed by opposing parties. The lack of fairness in the empanelment process has further discouraged and disheartened officers from Central Deputation. Although salaries and incentives remain the same, the State governments use transfers and postings as de facto punishment for AIS officers who do not follow suit with the State government’s decisions. Similarly, the Central government beguiles AIS officers with the temptation of post-retirement postings. The proposed amendments grant overreaching powers to the Central government which could be used to harass and corrupt an
    unwilling officer.

    Conclusion:

    In conclusion, the proposed amendments derogate the consent of State governments and the officer concerned. This not only gives rise to a lack of transparency and increased bias, but also has the potential to disintegrate the delicate federal structure that has been upheld since Independence. The Supreme Court has on many occasions emphasized that federalism is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution, and even a Constitutional amendment cannot do away with it. The Supreme Court has also affirmed cooperative federalism as a ‘cherished Constitutional goal’. Therefore, the Central government must look at other ways to overcome the issue of staff shortage, without granting itself overarching powers in direct violation of the Constitution.

    Recommendations:

    ▪ Recall the proposal amending the IAS (Cadre) Rules which will fundamentally damage India’s federal structure, thereby undermining national integrity and security.

    ▪ Shortage of officers can be addressed, in the short term, by recruiting suitable personnel from other Central Services such as IRS, Indian Defence Accounts service, Customs, etc. Alternatively, well-known professional experts in various fields can be inducted at senior positions, which will not only address the shortage but also the need for professional competence and experience in specialist departments as against the oft raised complaint of generalist nature of the IAS.

    ▪ Keeping in mind the demands of the Covid-19 pandemic, increase the annual intake of IAS officers to address the shortfall of 22 per cent in IAS posts.

    ▪ Increase Lateral recruitment for Central posts on a contract basis in the short term.

    ▪ The empanelment process, especially the 360° Appraisal system must be completely reformed to ensure equal opportunity and better transparency.

    ▪ The Centre’s proposal is a reflection of the long overdue need for the complete overhaul and reform of the Indian civil service system. These piecemeal amendments and a myriad of executive orders are not only unproductive to the civil service system but also counterproductive to the basic structure of the Constitution. A high-level committee should be established to undertake a holistic study to reform the Indian civil service system not only to bring in better performance and accountability but more importantly, to get rid of the colonial legacy once and for all.

    References:

    1. Agnihotri, S. (2021, June 4). Centre’s tussle with Bengal over chief secretary Reeks of uncooperative federalism. The Wire. Retrieved January 25, 2022, from https://thewire.in/politics/centres-tusslewith-bengal-over-chief-secretary-reeks-of-uncooperative-federalism

    2. Dev Dutt v. Union of India & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 725

    3. Dhingra, S. (2021, June 7). Centre vs states, rules vs convention – who really controls IAS officers. ThePrint. Retrieved January 26, 2022, from https://theprint.in/india/governance/centre-vs-statesrules-vs-convention-who-really-controls-ias-officers/672013/

    4. Mishra, N. (2021, June 7). Explained: Chief secretary appointment controversy. TheLeaflet. Retrieved January 25, 2022, from https://www.theleaflet.in/explained-chief-secretary-appointmentcontroversy/

    5. MS, N. (2018, August 29). Why India’s civil servants are disaffected with the 360-degree empanelment process for top central government posts. The Caravan. Retrieved January 25, 2022, from https://caravanmagazine.in/government-policy/why-indias-civil-servants-disaffected-with-360-degree-empanelment

    6. Rajya Sabha, 92nd Report, Appraisal and Empanelment of Civil Servants under the Central Government, Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice, August 2017, available at http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20Personnel,%20PublicGrievances,%20Law%20and%20Justice/92.pdf

    7. Saxena, N. C. (2022, January 24). Who should control where IAS officers serve? The Wire. Retrieved January 25, 2022, from https://thewire.in/government/who-should-control-where-ias-officers-serve

    8. Singh, V. (2022, January 20). States weigh options on IAS cadre rule changes. The Hindu. Retrieved January 25, 2022, from https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/states-weigh-options-on-iascadre-rule-changes/article38293886.ece

    9. The Quint, Centre proposes new IAS Cadre Rules: What are they? why are they being opposed? (2022, January 21). Retrieved January 25, 2022, from https://www.thequint.com/news/india/ias-cadrerules-mamata-banerjee-narendra-modi-centre-states#read-more

    10. Yadav, S. (2022, January 22). Explained: IAS officers and central posting. The Indian Express. Retrieved January 25, 2022, from https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/ias-cadre-rules-amendmentswest-bengal-explained-7734310/

    Featured Image: Press Information Bureau (PIB)

    [powerkit_button size=”lg” style=”info” block=”true” url=”https://admin.thepeninsula.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Change-in-IAS-Cadre-Rules-1.pdf” target=”_blank” nofollow=”false”]
    Download – Change in IAS (Cadre) Rules
    [/powerkit_button]

  • Liquid Globalization and Intercultural Practical Philosophy

    Liquid Globalization and Intercultural Practical Philosophy

    This essay is based on a lecture given by the author at the German Jordanian University in Amman on the 18th of November 2021.

    Abstract

    We are witnessing the birth pains of a new global order. The previous order based on the hegemony of the Western states is in tatters and the newly industrialized nations are no longer seeking to imitate Western modernity but to rely on their own civilizational achievements. They are trying to combine a kind of modernity with an identity of their own. Nevertheless, opposing the declining West is not enough to initiate a global order, which is surpassing the previous one. The most successful challengers of Western modernity are relying on authoritarian or even totalitarian (IS, Taliban) conceptions of identity. But the alternative to the (neo-)liberal world order should not be an illiberal order. In order to design such an alternative, we need to conduct a discourse of the civilizational foundations of our different approaches by further developing intercultural philosophy. Intercultural philosophy has had already its height after the demise of the USSR but remained mainly a theoretical enterprise; it is of paramount importance in the conflicts about the new world order.   Assuming that we are witnessing a new phase of globalization, which can be characterized by the simultaneous processes of the rise (Zakaria) as well as the demise of the other (Herberg-Rothe), intercultural philosophy is becoming a practical philosophy designated to mitigate conflicts about interests.

    Intercultural Philosophy as a Practical Approach

    The Western model of society is viewed to be in crisis and for many people, nations and civilizations it is no longer an attractive role model.

    Intercultural philosophy has had already its height after the end of the Cold War but was mainly a theoretical enterprise. Assuming that we are witnessing a new phase of globalization, which can be characterized by the simultaneous processes of the rise (Zakaria, 2008) as well as the demise of the other (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020), intercultural philosophy is becoming a practical philosophy designated to mitigate conflicts about interests and culture to cope with this process. The current phase of globalization, which in the footsteps of Zygmunt Bauman could be labelled hybrid globalization (Bauman, 2000), is accompanied by emotions (Moisi, 2010) like insecurity, uncertainty and dissolution of identities. Hybrid globalization is characterized by the ongoing process of globalization and local resistance against it. The Western model of society is viewed to be in crisis and for many people, nations and civilizations it is no longer an attractive role model. But all nations and civilizations need to find a balance between their civilizational traditions and coping with hybrid globalization. Mutual recognition of the civilizational foundations of the Western and Non-Western world may be a possible means to cope with this process. I’m assuming that the alternative to Western modernity and the global order which is based on it should not be illiberalism or even authoritarian rule but a new balance of the normative foundations of all civilizations (Katzenstein, 2009).

    What we need, therefore, is to initiate a virtuous circle as follows:

    1. Research on the subject of how conflicts are articulated in terms of culture and religion.
    2. Relating these concepts to different understandings of civilization.
    3. Mutual recognition of the civilizational foundations of Islam and Western thinking.
    4. Self-recognition is not only as religion or culture but as a civilization.
    5. Self-binding to civilizational norms in order to be recognized as equally valued civilization.

    Based on our interpretation of Clausewitz (Herberg-Rothe, 2007) we think that mutual recognition among the great civilizations of the earth is the prerequisite of settling disputes over diverging interests. 

    What we need, therefore, is the initiative of a discourse of mutual recognition of the great civilizations on earth and even a discourse, where the diverse understandings of central concepts like order, self-determination, emancipation, identity, dignity and so forth differ. At the same time, a closer look at the civilizations’ common grounds is essential, to eventually provide a basis for a meaningful dialogue. We think that we must find a balance between the Western model of the billiard game and the Eastern model of the concentric circles (Qin, 2016 and Yan, 2011).

    Additionally, most countries of the Non-Western world are no longer seeing the Western world as a role model they must follow but are seeking to find their own identity as a balance of their traditions and civilizational achievements – be it the Chinese dream of Xi Jinping, Hindu nationalism in India, and the revival of Confucianism in East Asia.

    We assume that there is a close linkage of struggles for recognition, the question of identity and increasing radicalization (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020). The fundamental problem existed in the assumption that the uprooted, redundant, and excluded members of society would come to terms with their destiny on an individual level. We assume that these excluded are forming violent groups, in which they find a kind of stable identity through recognition by exercising violence. Only by recognizing the contributions of the civilizations of the world to the heritage of mankind, it is possible to enable a stable identity contrary to violent actions (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). Additionally, most countries of the Non-Western world are no longer seeing the Western world as a role model they must follow but are seeking to find their own identity as a balance of their traditions and civilizational achievements – be it the Chinese dream of Xi Jinping, Hindu nationalism in India, and the revival of Confucianism in East Asia. Especially in China, the concept of harmony in Confucianism serves the purpose of balancing the other two C’s, communism and capitalism (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018).

    The denial of recognition versus mutual recognition

    The denial of recognition and the struggle for recognition play an ever-increasing role in intra-state conflicts in a globalized world as well as the international sphere, which is characterized by the “Rise of the Other” (Zakaria, 2008). We live in an increasingly globalized world, in which we assume that difficulties concerning recognition (between individuals, groups, ethnos, religious communities, nations or even civilizations) are a major source for radicalization. If mutual recognition is non-existent or cannot be built, conflicting interests are much more likely to escalate. There is a broad consensus (in the field of socialization research and increasingly also within social sciences in general) that the urge for recognition is the important factor for forming and stabilizing identity (personal, group, national, and civilizational) (Daase, 2015)

    Samuel P. Huntington was widely criticized for his assumption that we are facing a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). What the liberal critics of Huntington were highlighting was that there should not be a clash of civilizations, but even more important that there could not be a clash of civilizations because in their view there was only one civilization, the Western one. The others were in their view religions or cultures, but no civilizations, because they did not undergo the process of secularization, which is in the Western discourse a dogma (Katzenstein, 2009).

    So, my first proposition for the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth is that most are based on religion, not in opposition to or separation from their related religions. For example, the Han dynasty created Confucianism as a civilization three centuries after Confucius, similarly Buddhist culture and civilization was constructed and expanded on a worldwide scale by Emperor Ashoka in India, nearly three centuries after Buddha. 

    Through the achievement of mutual recognition, the rapidly growing radicalization tendencies are supposed to be reduced and in the long run, peaceful coexistence is more likely. However, recognition requires awareness for differences and communalities (ontological perspective) or is otherwise produced within a process (epistemological approach). The outlook is thus the development of a third way in between universalization of only one culture or civilization (in the form of “We against the Rest”; Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018), be it eurocentrism or any other kind of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism to stimulate peaceful cooperation and to limit the dramatic tendencies of radicalization throughout the world (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020).

    Given the absence or non-maturity of Chinese, Russian, African, Islamic, or Indian IRTs, the mainstream IRT originated almost exclusively from the Anglo-Saxon world, for example, realism, neo-realism, neo-conservatism, liberal institutionalism, and theories of democratic peace (although in connection to Kant).

    In the wake of globalization, many pundits articulated whether the theoretical concepts developed from the era of nation-states (Beck, 1992) are still tenable for the portrayal of twenty-first century international relations. Furthermore, many concepts regarded as central in the IRT came to be perceived as a mere form of American political science (Acharya, 2000 and 2014). Given the absence or non-maturity of Chinese, Russian, African, Islamic, or Indian IRTs, the mainstream IRT originated almost exclusively from the Anglo-Saxon world, for example, realism, neo-realism, neo-conservatism, liberal institutionalism, and theories of democratic peace (although in connection to Kant). The reason is that in most Non-Western countries’ societies, cultures and civilizations are more important than the state, whereas in the Western understanding the state is the most important institution.

    My second proposition for the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth is, therefore, to be aware that in the Western world the state has the dominant role – international relations are relations between states – whereas in the Non-Western world the state is a variable of society, culture. In the process of globalization this separation between the Western World and all other civilizations is dissolving (Herberg-Rothe and Son,  2018)

    The problem of identity in a globalized world

    One’s identity is shaped through a difficult and open-ended interplay and mutual interdependency of personal performance and societal consideration. Recognition is thus the result of an exchange, during which the failure of a human being is feasible. No given script through societal framing is existent anymore, whereby risk and insecurity increase significantly. It is not necessarily the need for recognition that is “new” and for this reason just generated through modernity, rather the conditions are new in this context. An unsatisfactory identity-building leads to rage and an imminent loss of identity leads to fear – both hold enormously destructive potentials. The paradox of all rebellious attempts to create an identity is thereby that a conspicuous or provocative behaviour of young persons is often, citing Erik Erikson, just a “request for brotherly recognition” (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). Although I share the critique of identity politics put forward by Francis Fukuyama in general, in which identity is related to a fixed core, my consequence is to conceptualize identity as a balance of conflicting tendencies within individuals, societies and communities (Herberg-Rothe, 2007; Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018 and  Fukuyama, 2018)

    Through the social change in rendering globalization, the individual, as well as collectives, face increasing societal pressure. Zygmunt Bauman speaks of the transition from a “solid” into a “fluid” modernity (Bauman, 2000). Former stable identities (determined through solid social and spatial borders which offer, despite quite critical aspects of these borders, still a secured room for identity shaping) become insecure, if not destructed (Beck, 1992). The outcome of this is a high demand on individuals as well as collectives to cope with the obstacles of identity building in constant active work. The continually transforming social, cultural and political spaces and contexts hinder this process additionally. If the obstacles appear to be insuperable or if no realistic options for action exist, societies with a multiplicity of fragmented identities develop. 

    To sum up, the big identity question has such importance because radicalization drifts are an increasing phenomenon in heterogeneous societies.

    To sum up, the big identity question has such importance because radicalization drifts are an increasing phenomenon in heterogeneous societies. Globalization represents profound structural changes that are accompanied by momentous crises (Moisi, 2010). Anyway, existing social inequalities become more and more intensified and find expression in intra-societal tensions. Adjustment processes appear almost impossible, as the promises based on modernity are broadly seen as unrealistic or not reasonable. According to this, an alternative to cope with the rapidly changing transformation must be discovered (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018)

    The developments and assumptions regarding identity, recognition and radicalization serve as the basis for our research project. To enable unstable individuals or collectives to recover their identity, it is necessary, by focusing on the macro level, to foster mutual recognition between the world’s civilizations. Dialogue and with it an associated discourse of mutual recognition is supposed to contribute as a crucial component of avoidance of radicalization. The aim is to establish dialogues and to find practical approaches for inter-civilizational agreement. Under the overall scheme of mutual recognition versus radicalization, it is, for now, the purpose to elaborate differences and similarities of the world’s civilizations. The focus lies on the understanding of societal and international relations in order to initiate a dialogue in which the denial of recognition does not transform conflicts about interests into struggles for recognition, which are again the main source for radicalization processes (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020).

    One can view this kind of balancing and harmonizing as a form of limited plurality or as articulated by Hannah Arendt, unity of multiplicity and multiplicity within unity.

    According to this, the focus lies on mutual understanding and recognition as powerful tools to prevent vanished and unstable identities in the globalized world, to see the last resort in radical thinking and acting. Yet the question arises, how much plurality and variety in thinking and acting is really desirable, respectively rated as positive in principle. It is therefore also an important element of our research, to find a way in between the fundamental contrast, on the one side of the universalism of values of just one civilization and cultural relativism on the other. Amitav Acharya’s concept of “universal pluralism” is in this respect ground-breaking, but still insufficient in our eyes (Acharya 2000 and 2014). We advocate the development of a process, in which the concepts of Clausewitz’s “floating balance” (Clausewitz, 1976), Confucian’s “harmony”, and Hegel’s “mutual recognition” are examined closely (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). One can view this kind of balancing and harmonizing as a form of limited plurality or as articulated by Hannah Arendt, unity of multiplicity and multiplicity within unity. In this way, we aim to devise ways to effectively cope with or govern differences and contrasts facing the international society of the twenty-first century. All in all, we seek to adopt a harmonious mutual recognition of Western and East Asian thoughts and devise a better set of theories and methodologies to analyse the contemporary world.  It is our deepest conviction that the Western and like-minded states could only hold on to such values as freedom, equality, emancipation, and human rights if these could be harmoniously balanced with the contributions of other civilizations (Zhang, 2012) and cultures.

    Intercultural philosophy as a foundational approach for mutual recognition

    Intercultural philosophy can play an important role in this process of the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth. Since Karl Jaspers, the godfather of intercultural philosophy acknowledged the existence of four different civilizations, immense progress has been made concerning understanding of the different approaches (Katzenstein, 2009). Nevertheless, I strongly believe that all civilizations have posed the same question but did find different answers. So, intercultural philosophy is in my view possible beyond the acknowledgement of a mere multiplicity of philosophies, because we as humans are posing the same questions. For example, concerning being born, living and dying, between immanence and transcendence, between the individual and community, between our limited abilities and the desire for eternity, the relation of us as being to some degree animals and ethics which constitutes us as humans – our ethical convictions may be different, but all civilizations have an ethical foundation. I would even argue that it is ethics, which distinguishes us from animals, not our intellect. We might get aware of the full realization of this proposition when relating it to the development of artificial intelligence.

    Although I’m advocating the development of intercultural philosophy as a part of transnational governance and the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth, I would like to highlight the main problem, at least in my view.

    Aristotle already posed the decisive question, whether the whole is more than the sum of its parts? If I understand with my very limited knowledge of Islamic philosophy rightly it is based on the assumption that the whole is more than the sum of its parts – we might label this position a holistic approach. On the contrary Western thinking is characterized by the approach of exchanging the whole exactly through the sum of its parts. We might label this an atomistic approach – atoms are just differentiated by the number of electrons, neutrons and so on. Concerning holism, I would argue that the task might be how to distinguish the whole from mere hierarchies – concerning the concept of harmony in Confucianism I would argue that true harmony is related to a balance of hierarchical and symmetrical societal and international relations. Instead of the false assumption in Western approaches that we could transform all hierarchical relations into symmetrical ones, I think that we need to construct a balance between both (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020). If I’m not misguided there is also a concept in Islam that might be comparable to that of balance and harmony. Harmony is not sameness but implies a lot of tensions: to be clear: harmony can be characterized by “unity with difference and difference with unity” (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). I compare this perspective sometimes with a water wave in a sea: If there are no waves at all, the sea is dying, if the waves are Tsunamis, they are destructive for society.

    My colleague Peng Lu from Fujian university made the following proposition: In the 19th century, the Europeans conquered the whole world, in the twentieth century the defeated nations and civilizations needed to live with the victorious West, in the twenty-first century the civilizations of the earth finally need to learn to live with one another.  This is the task of the century.

    References: 

    Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

    Acharya, Amitav, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

    Bauman, Zygmunt, Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

    Beck, Ulrich, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. Thousand Oaks: Sage publications, 1992.

    Clausewitz, Carl von, On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1976

    Daase, Christopher et. al. (eds.), Recognition in International Relations. Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context. New York: Palgrave, 2015.

    Fukuyama, Francis (2018), Against Identity Politics. The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy. In: Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. Retrieved from: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2018-08-14/against-identity-politics-tribalism-francis-fukuyama; last access, 3.10.2018, 10.21.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, Clausewitz‘s puzzle. The political theory of war. OUP: Oxford 2007.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas und Son, Key-young, Order wars and floating balance. How the rising powers are reshaping our world view in the twenty-first century. Routledge: New York 2018.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas und Foerstle, Miriam, The dissolution of identities in liquid globalization and the emergence of violent uprisings. In: African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research – Volume 1 Number 1, April 2020 b, pp. 11-32.

    Huntington, Samuel. The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

    Katzenstein, Peter J, Civilizations in world politics. Plural and pluralistic perspectives. Routledge: New York 2009.

    Moisi, Dominique, The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the World, New York: Doubleday, 2010.

    Qin, Yaqing. “A Relational Theory of World Politics.” International Studies Review 18 (2016): 33-47.

    Yan, Xuetong. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

    Zakaria, Fareed, The Post-American World, New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2008.

    Zhang, Wei-Wei, The China Wave: Rise of A Civilizational State. Hackensack: World Century Publishing Corporation, 2012.

    Feature Image Credit: Harvard Business Review

  • Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi: Yemen civil war and Regional Complexities

    Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi: Yemen civil war and Regional Complexities

    On 17th January, the Houthis conducted their first attack on Emirati soil in years. Carried out in the heart of the country– Abu Dhabi –with the help of a UAV, the attack killed three foreign nationals working in the city– two Indians and one Pakistani. In the aftermath of the attack, the Arab Coalition intensified the air bombings of key strongholds of the Houthis, leading to an increase in civilian casualties in a proxy war that has already caused several thousand civilians their lives. The attack has also underlined the capabilities of the Islamist political outfit in striking a distant country, and not just its northern neighbour. The attack has also rendered the UAE as a country susceptible to attacks from hostile groups in the region.

    Costs of UAE’s intervention strategy

    Importantly, the attack has led to a scrutiny of UAE’s policy vis-à-vis the hapless South Arabian country. Not long ago, in February 2020, the Emirati leadership, in an official ceremony addressing the recent returnee personnel deployed in Yemen, added an achievement to its touted ‘Peace First’ strategy in the country[1]. The gulf country had begun its troop withdrawal from the war-torn country in July of 2019[2]. This move, though remarkable, was hardly surprising by a country that was stopped in its tracks after finding itself as a part of the Arab Coalition[3] back in 2015. But the withdrawal of troops from Yemeni soil didn’t mean a dilution of its involvement in the Civil War. The move by the Emirates was seen as merely a shift from direct involvement to an indirect one.[4] The leadership of the country had utilized its presence in Yemen to cultivate and build a network of belligerents of the Civil War, such as the Sothern Transitional Council (STC), Security Belt Forces and the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite forces to name a few.[5] A withdrawn and non-aggressive UAE depends heavily both upon and sponsors such groups to keep its influence in the country afloat. It had reportedly trained some 90,000 South Yemenis during its stint in the country.[6] These militias have fought, in the past, against the Houthis, Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Islah and the ISIS. In December last year, one such group, the Giants Brigades, attacked Houthis, eventually defeating them in the Shabwah province. The Houthi attack in January is seen as a retaliation for this precise attack.

    In December last year, one such group, the Giants Brigades, attacked Houthis, eventually defeating them in the Shabwah province. The Houthi attack in January is seen as a retaliation for this precise attack.

    Another key takeaway from the attack on 17th January is associated with the Saudi Arabia-UAE partnership. The Emirates, which contributed the second-largest troops to the Arab Coalition, had virtually abandoned Saudi Arabia in its effort to bring the Hadi government back to Sana’a. Since 2016 up to the troops’ pull-out, the country had focused mainly on counter-terrorism operations, primarily targeting Islah.[7] The two partners were pitted against each other when, in 2019, the Emirati-backed STC pushed itself into the provinces of Shabwa and Abyan held by the Saudi-backed government. Now, with the Houthis becoming a potent threat to the security of the UAE, the stress between the two governments is set to cool down. The attack has made UAE substantially, if not equally vulnerable, when compared with Saudis, to Houthis’ aggression. But it is not likely that the country will put an end to its troop withdrawal strategy. Its focus is likely to be on strengthening its security apparatus, something already visible in French, American and Israeli assistance.

    Attacks boost UAE-Israel Strategic Partnership

    The Houthis conducted another failed attack on Abu Dhabi in late January during Israeli President Herzog’s visit. The day was chosen to deliver a message to both Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem. This, and other numerous attempts by the Iran-backed Zaidi Shia militia to attack the Emirates, is set to further firm up the already burgeoning ties between the two. Immediately after the January 17th attack, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett offered Israeli ‘security and intelligence support’ to the victim state[8]. He committed to partner with the UAE to defeat ‘common enemies’. Right after the signing of the Abraham Accords, both the countries embarked upon strengthening security-related ties[9], leading to the signing of a strategic agreement to develop unmanned military and commercial vessels in November last year. Both the countries have been susceptible to attacks by Iran’s proxies. It is Israel’s North-eastern neighbour Syria that has posed a threat to its security. Now, Houthis’ reach to the Emirati soil renders Israel vulnerable to similar attacks, with speculations already in works in Israel.[10] Additionally, Houthis’ ties with Lebanese Hezbollah could aggravate the situation further. Israeli-Emirati partnership seems to be the greatest benefactor of the attack.

    the UAE has been applauded for pursuing a balanced approach between Saudi Arabia and the US on one hand and Iran and its allies on the other[13]. But with the continuous attack on Abu Dhabi by Iranian proxies, the relations between the UAE and Iran are set to face road blocks

    Just as Emirates was coping with the deadly attack from Yemen, another Iraq-based armed group conducted a drone strike on Abu Dhabi. Known by the name Awliyat al-Waad al-Haq, or the True Promise Brigades, the Shia Islamist group is widely believed to have close ties with both Tehran and Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah. Though the Iranians have not publicly supported the attacks, they haven’t condemned them either. Moreover, the attacks on Abu Dhabi came just months after Emirati National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Tehran where he touted his visit as a ‘turning point’ for the two countries[11] and visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani to Abu Dhabi, declaring that the two countries had agreed to open ‘a new chapter’ in their bilateral relations[12]. Also, the UAE has been applauded for pursuing a balanced approach between Saudi Arabia and the US on one hand and Iran and its allies on the other[13]. But with the continuous attack on Abu Dhabi by Iranian proxies, the relations between the UAE and Iran are set to face road blocks.

    Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis

    Last year, in one of his first decisions regarding West Asia, President Biden revoked the Trump administration decision to recognize Houthis as a foreign terrorist group. After the recent attacks on Abu Dhabi and the al-Dhafra airbase, the Biden administration has been forced to reconsider its previous decision[14]. The US has, in response to the attacks, stepped up its naval deployment in the Gulf region, along with enhancing cooperation in intelligence and air defence with the Emirates. It also helped stave off other Houthi missile attacks on Abu Dhabi through US Patriot interceptors. The attacks also come at a crucial time when the talks between P5+1 and Iran regarding the Iran Nuclear Deal underway in Vienna. With eight rounds that have passed without any breakthrough, it remains to be seen how Houthi aggression impacts the JCPOA.

    The Civil War in Yemen is in its eighth year, with no signs of the end in near future. The casualties have reached as high as 377,000. It has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, pushing millions to the brink. According to a UNDP report, the war may cause more than 1.3 million casualties by 2030. Hence, we need to ask, has the international community failed to protect the Yemeni people?

    Notes

    [1] Jalal, I (2020, February 25), ‘The UAE may have withdrawn from Yemen, but it’s influence remains strong’ Middle East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong

    [2] Ibid

    [3] Salisbury, P. (2020, July 1), ‘Risk perception and appetite in UAE Foreign and national security policy’ Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/8-case-study-uae

    [4] Jalal, I (2020, February 25), ‘The UAE may have withdrawn from even, but it’s influence remains strong’ Middle East Institute https://www.mei.edu/publications/uae-may-have-withdrawn-yemen-its-influence-remains-strong

    [5] Ibid

    [6] Ibid

    [7] Salisbury, P. (2020, July 1), ‘Risk perception and appetite in UAE Foreign and national security policy’ Chatham House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/8-case-study-uae

    [8] TOI staff, (2022, January 18),’Bennett offers UAE security and intelligence support after attack by Houthis’ Times of Israelhttps://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-offers-uae-security-and-intelligence-support-after-attack-by-houthis/

    [9] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2021, August 6), ‘Restoring balance to UAE-Iran relations’ Doha Institute https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Restoring-Balance-to-UAE-Iran-Relations.aspx

    [10] Melman, Y. (2022, January 21),’After Abu Dhabi, is Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat next target for Houthi drone strike’ Haaretz https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-red-sea-eilat-target-houthi-iran-drone-strike-abu-dhabi-1.10553018

    [11] Hafezi, H. (2021, December 6), ‘UAE security official pays rare visit to Iran to discuss ties, regional issues’ Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-emirates-idAFKBN2IL0ME

    [12] Ulrichsen, K.C. (2021, August 6), ‘Restoring balance to UAE-Iran relations’ Doha Institutehttps://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Restoring-Balance-to-UAE-Iran-Relations.aspx

    [13] Ibid

    [14]  Landay, J (2022, January 20). ‘Biden says administration mulling re-designating Yemen’s Houthis a terrorist group’, Reuters https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-yemen-envoy-lenderking-visit-gulf-london-state-department-2022-01-19/

    Feature Image Credit: www.mirror.co.uk

    Image Credit: itv Times News

  • FCRA, NGOs and the Question of Which Foreign Funding Is in National Interest

    FCRA, NGOs and the Question of Which Foreign Funding Is in National Interest

    Foreign interests and influences come with foreign capital and these are far stronger than what the funds flowing to NGOs bring with them.

    The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) registration or license that enables the licensees to get foreign funds has either not been renewed or cancelled for many non-governmental organisations or NGOs.
    Problems created for of one of the best known of them, Missionaries of Charity, drew international attention and criticism since the organisation has been doing yeoman’s work in giving succour to the poor. Under pressure, permission was restored for the organisation and along with it the FCRA of prestigious institutions like IIT Delhi and JNU were also restored.

    Why did all this happen in the first place?


    Read More

  • Responsible Decision-making in the Face of Corona – A Need for a Metric

    Responsible Decision-making in the Face of Corona – A Need for a Metric

    [powerkit_button size=”lg” style=”info” block=”false” url=”https://admin.thepeninsula.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Issue-Brief-TPF_Corona-Metric-2_compressed-1-12-1.pdf” target=”_blank” nofollow=”false”]
    DOWNLOAD PDF
    [/powerkit_button]

     

    Abstract

    The asymmetry of the human mind in treating the information that is currently available and the information we do not have is remarkable. During the Covid-19 pandemic, many people have been conscious to take precautions to prevent contracting the virus oneself or their family members. However, the consequences of a person infecting another are not consciously considered by everyone while going on about their ‘new normal’ life making daily transactions that involve the labour of a multitude of people. Nobody pauses to wonder whether anyone in the supply chain of the product or service consumed by an individual has contracted the virus or died due to the virus in the process of its production. This is because that information is unavailable to us in a tangible form for our minds to perceive and hence it chooses to ignore it. Although the number of cases increases with every wave, people have started accepting it or rather have become desensitised to the number of lives lost to Covid-19, mainly because these deaths are unseen. This article explores whether such a pondering – number of people infected and consequently lives compromised – would be a consideration in the decision-making in the production and consumption of products and services. If so, is there a need to develop a metric to inform us of this number? Would it be feasible to have such a metric? This article attempts to quantify these unseen deaths, so as to sensitise people to the consequences of a person getting infected.

    Introduction:

    Now, two years after the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, most people reading this would have lost one or more relatives, friends, colleagues or an acquaintance due to the infection. I am no exception. But the trigger for this article is the death of a couple, Razia and Nasir (names changed) that happened in the summer of 2021. Their small fruits and vegetable outlet, by a synergic arrangement, was situated within the spacious premises of another outlet – a cold storage that dispenses meat, poultry and fish for the upwardly mobile residents living in a posh locality of Bangalore. 

    [powerkit_button size=”lg” style=”info” block=”true” url=”https://admin.thepeninsula.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Issue-Brief-TPF_Corona-Metric-2_compressed-1-12-1.pdf” target=”_blank” nofollow=”false”]
    READ MORE
    [/powerkit_button]

    Featured Image Credit: OSORIOartist