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  • Small States, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Subtle Power: A study of Qatar  and the United Arab Emirates

    Small States, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Subtle Power: A study of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates

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    Abstract

    This paper argues that Sovereign Wealth Funds can be an important foreign policy tool for small states. The author analyzes select investments of the Sovereign Wealth Funds of Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai in the theoretical framework of subtle power. Subtle power is a means of exerting influence behind the scenes. This paper categorically analyzes sovereign wealth fund investments to understand how they contribute to the three sources of subtle power; physical and military protection, branding efforts, and diplomacy. The author does not dispute that these Sovereign Wealth Funds have financial motives, but adds nuance to the literature by arguing that they also hold political motivations. The paper finds that the structural difference in the governance model of Qatar and the UAE has resulted in a variation in the foreign policy roles of their Sovereign Wealth Funds. In the UAE’s case, Abu Dhabi’s Sovereign Wealth Fund takes the lead in matters related to physical security and diplomacy, whereas Dubai’s Sovereign Wealth Fund focuses on national branding efforts. Meanwhile, for Qatar, QIA acts as the primary instrument exuding subtle power across all three categories.

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  • Vietnam-China Relations in 2022: Continuity and No Change

    Vietnam-China Relations in 2022: Continuity and No Change

    The year 2022 has begun on a positive note for Vietnam and China, and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee Nguyen Phu Trong and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and President Xi Jinping exchanged Spring Festival congratulatory messages.

     President Xi Jinping impressed on upholding the “spirits of good neighbours, good friends, good comrades and good partners, consolidate traditional friendship ….push for new achievements in China-Vietnam relations, elevate regional cooperation to new heights, and build a community with a shared future for mankind”.….”, and  General Secretary of CPV Nguyen Phu Trong emphasised on “promoting the sustainable, sound and stable development of relations both between the two parties and between the two countries… inject new impetus into the efforts to push Vietnam-China good-neighbourly friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation to a higher level.”

    Both leaders expressed satisfaction with the state of relations between the CPV and CPC, and, looking ahead to 2022, hoped to maintain close communication. Also, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Premier Li Keqiang agreed to “properly manage differences, to push forward the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership”.  While that may be so, the bilateral relationship between the two countries presents a mixed bag of economic opportunities as well as strategic challenges. 

    the China-Vietnam freight train (launched in August 2017) run by the China Railway Nanning Group Co Ltd is a success story. It connects South China’s Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region with the Vietnam border and carries a variety of goods between China and ASEAN countries. In 2021, as many as 346 train trips were made, representing an increase of over 108 per cent from the previous year

     As far as bilateral economic relations are concerned, bilateral trade has grown.  In this regard, the China-Vietnam freight train (launched in August 2017) run by the China Railway Nanning Group Co Ltd is a success story. It connects South China’s Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region with the Vietnam border and carries a variety of goods between China and ASEAN countries. In 2021, as many as 346 train trips were made, representing an increase of over 108 per cent from the previous year. A total of 400 China-Vietnam freight train trips are expected to be made in 2022. China is also willing to provide more “customs clearance convenience for Vietnam’s high-quality agricultural products”, particularly durians, mangosteens, and longans.

     

     

    Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Premier Li Keqiang have agreed to give a boost to their bilateral ties through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that came into force earlier this year. China has assured Vietnam that it is ready to “push for the effective implementation of the agreement, promote the regional economic integration to a higher level and bring more benefits to the people in the region”.

    at the strategic level, Vietnam continues to confront contentious initiatives by China, particularly on the issue of the South China Sea

     However, at the strategic level, Vietnam continues to confront contentious initiatives by China, particularly on the issue of the South China Sea. On March 7, pursuant to Hainan Maritime Safety Administration’s announcement on China’s military drills in the East Sea, Vietnam requested China to “respect and not to violate the nation’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, and not to take actions that complicate the situation, thereby contributing to maintaining peace, security and stability in the East Sea area. Vietnam has exchanged views with China on this issue”.

     Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang observed that part of the area where Chinese military drills are planned is under the jurisdiction of Vietnam (exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Vietnam) and reiterated that Vietnam always adheres to international law, especially the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This has been refuted by China and it’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian defended the military exercises by stating that the drill is lawful…“China’s military exercise on its own doorstep is reasonable and lawful. It is beyond reproach.” It is now learnt that China may have cordoned a part of the sea area close to Vietnam ostensibly to salvage a crashed military aircraft “while its forces searched for it, and also to conduct drills”.

     

     

    Notwithstanding the above challenges, it is fair to argue that the trajectory of Vietnam-China bilateral relations will not change in 2022 and can be expected to follow trends of the last year.  Vietnam is steadfast in its adherence to the one-China principle and supports China to play a greater role in regional and international affairs. This should go as a signal to the US which can be expected to send many political-diplomatic-military delegations to Vietnam in 2022 to influence the leadership, but Hanoi can be expected to pursue an independent foreign policy. 

    Feature Image: The Independent

    Map: www.isanrealestate.com

  • Book Review: Contesting the Global Order – The Radical Political Economy of Perry Anderson and Immanuel Wallerstein

    Book Review: Contesting the Global Order – The Radical Political Economy of Perry Anderson and Immanuel Wallerstein

    Book Name: Contesting the Global Order – The Radical Political Economy of Perry Anderson and Immanuel Wallerstein

    Author: Gregory P Williams

    Publisher: SUNY Press, 2020

    Contesting the Global Order is a comparative intellectual biography of Immanuel Wallerstein and Perry Anderson, two leading and prolific intellectuals of the Left since the end of the Second World War. Williams opens the book by relating their ideas to two main explanations offered in the wake of the global crisis of 2008: the prevailing explanation and the unconventional explanation. The former, devised by mainstream economists and punditry, explains the crisis with reference to a number of recent factors. This implies that this was a crisis within capitalism and, as such, all that the system needed was a course correction, if perhaps a drastic one. The unconventional explanation, which the books’ protagonists subscribe to, holds that what happened in 2008 and after has been a crisis of capitalism. It is only the latest one among many in the history of this ever violently gyrating system, and it is most certainly not the last. Therefore, its explanation must be sought in long-term processes and at the macro-structural level.

    This opening move not only helps readers to relate the book’s subject material with contemporary debates on global capitalism and its crisis, but also associates Wallerstein and Anderson to the radical wing of the field of International Political Economy. Williams tells us that, as influential texts of Radical Political Economy, their works have repeatedly returned to three key issues: “totalities as an object of study; the origins and operations of capitalism; and the role of agency in determining behavior” (p.9). With these guiding themes of comparison at hand, Williams proceeds onto a chronological narrative analysis distributed over seven chapters and two ‘Intermissions,’ essentially one mini-chapter for each thinker that deals with a specific issue in their intellectual biography.

    Chapters 1 and 2 together provide an overview of Anderson’s and Wallerstein’s early years as scholars and the influences behind their ideas. In the first, Williams introduces their early intellectual formations against the backdrop of intellectual battles of interwar and postwar years. He defines these years as cosmopolitan beginnings for both. It appears that, for Williams, Anderson’s early intellectual journey and his involvement with the British New Left is more interesting than Wallerstein’s conventional academic career largely restricted to Columbia University, as the former receives almost twice as many pages dedicated to his story. The second chapter presents a very well-written account on the intellectual lineages of Wallerstein’s and Anderson’s theories. For the former, Williams shows the influence of Frantz Fanon, Fernand Braudel, and Karl Polanyi (and later Ilya Prigogine). In the case of Anderson, the key names listed are Edward Gibbon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Georg Lukács, and Lucio Colletti. An important point that we get from this chapter is that, while already established scholars in their thirties, Wallerstein and Anderson never ceased to learn from others throughout their careers.

    The momentous year of 1968 and the revolutionary energies it generated are at the center of Chapter 3. In Wallerstein’s experience, 1968 offered the development of an indigenous socialist tradition in the US and provoked him to theorize the connections between that and the decolonization movements. For Anderson, the flare for socialism was fired not at home, but across the channel. The scale of revolt in France amazed him and his New Left Review (NLR) colleagues; “the opportunity for socialism now seemed real” (p.62), even in an advanced capitalist society. It is with this energy and optimism that they turned to fashioning institutions that would help keep the revolutionary flame of 1968 going. If Wallerstein wanted universities as key institutions to encourage Third World movements, Anderson sought to turn the NLR into a vanguard organization for socialist politics. To achieve this, Williams notes in Chapter 4, they agreed on the premise that there was an urgent need to promote a “public and scholarly understanding of the historical processes that gave rise to the current historical order” (p.67). A sober sense of history was necessary for the building of a socialist future. To show how they did this, Williams takes the readers on a tour into the theoretical and historiographical building blocks of their magnum opuses published in 1974. If Chapter 3 is more about political agency, Chapter 4 delivers a sophisticated overview of the themes of totality and the origins of capitalism.

    In the following chapters, the question of agency, the future of capitalism and the prospects for socialism come back to the forefront, but this time in the context of vanishing revolutionary energies in the face of two momentous developments. The first is the rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and the onslaught it brought on to organized labor and to Left-wing politics more generally. The second is the collapse of the East European communist regimes. While both acknowledged the scale of ‘the defeat,’ Wallerstein and Anderson held different sentiments towards it. For Wallerstein, being optimistic or pessimistic about the role of human agency undoing capitalism’s ills did not matter. He thought capitalism as a world-system was in crisis, hence what mattered was what human agency could do when it collapsed. Anderson, on the hand, holds a pessimistic view. Capitalism’s victory was comprehensive and the Left failed to match the simple and appealing political message of the Right. Yet, Williams shows that Anderson also believes that workers of the twentieth and twenty-first century have developed class consciousness through their accumulated experience in organization and strategy. In order to recapture the working-class votes from the Right, what the Left needs to do, Anderson and Wallerstein agree, is to develop “a compelling social narrative, an explanation for the present that took stock of the past” (p.175).

    Williams writes with clarity and economy, except perhaps in Chapter 5 where the analysis of Wallerstein’s world-systems theory could have been more concise. In certain points, Williams does not shy away from adding his input. For example, he casts doubt on the claim that Anderson’s third volume, successor to Passages and Lineages, never arrived because Robert Brenner (whose work Anderson has always held in high esteem) had dealt a decisive blow to the historical category of bourgeois revolutions (pp.113-114). There is also the occasional nugget produced by the meticulous archival work. We get to learn that in 1973 Robert Brenner requested a manuscript of the first volume of Wallerstein’s The Modern World-System and an exchange followed (p.170).

    Above all, its comparative investigation is what makes Contesting the Global Order a distinctive contribution to Radical Political Economy. Not only is this a relatively uncommon undertaking in the field, it is also a challenging one. Comparative intellectual biographies require their authors to master the intellectual trajectories and outputs of their subjects, and then make the critical decision of choosing the right axes of comparison. Even more crucially, the actual substance of comparison has to be parsimoniously presented in order to be effective. Williams does a great job on all these scores. He makes the reasonably specialized discussions on the origins of capitalism and the concept of totality accessible to his readers. The comparative analysis expertly documents and discusses the different life trajectories, the changing intellectual sensibilities and the evolving political visions of Anderson and Wallerstein. And he manages this feat while also highlighting the relevance of his subjects for the contemporary political scene.

    This Review is republished under the Creative Commons license.

    This was published earlier in E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

  • Giveaways & Elections: Short-termism to the Fore

    Giveaways & Elections: Short-termism to the Fore

    BJP and AAP are the two winners in the just concluded crucial Assembly elections. The scale of victory of these two parties surprised most analysts. In UP after three decades, a ruling party won, overcoming severe anti-incumbency. There are accusations of the rigging of the EVMs but this can’t be proved when VVPAT slips are not being fully counted. Even if they were to be counted, fraud could have been committed in other ways and this could become an endless exercise. AAP, a new kid on the block, won on the promise of change from the terribly corrupt politics of the moribund established parties.

    Delivery is Important

    So, the ruling BJP won because it said that it had brought about a change in the lives of the common people while AAP won on the promise of bringing about change in their lives. What is this change that was so attractive to the people?

    BJP faced anti-incumbency due to high inflation, youth unemployment, farmers’ discontent, COVID mismanagement, etc. But its cadres went door to door to point to the Rs. 6000 is given to farmers, free grains, etc. to households, money for toilets and houses, etc. The beneficiaries from these schemes are called `Labhartis’ by the pundits. The opposition also promised various things if they came to power but obviously, a bird in hand is better than two in the bush. Also, the credibility of the opposition parties in UP is low since they delivered little when they were in power earlier. Finally, public memory is short. Many of the schemes that are listed as achievements by the present government were initiated by the earlier regimes.

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  • 10 Bangladeshis Evacuated By India From Ukraine: PM Hasina Dials To Thank PM Modi

    10 Bangladeshis Evacuated By India From Ukraine: PM Hasina Dials To Thank PM Modi

    Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has expressed her gratitude to Prime Minister Narendra Modi for rescuing nine stranded Bangladeshi students from Sumy, the north-eastern city of besieged Ukraine and other areas.

    At least two more Bangladeshi nationals are still stuck in Mariupol, shared Ambassador Sultana Laila Hossain, Bangladesh’s envoy to Poland and Ukraine in an exclusive interaction with The New Indian. Ambassador Hossain also thanked India for saving 10 Bangladeshi lives.

    Nine Bangladeshis have been evacuated by India under its pilot evacuation drive Operation Ganga on March 9, and one Bangladeshi was airlifted on March 4. The nine evacuees are on the way to the domicile via transit route in Poland.

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  • Sanctions on Russia: How will they play out?

    Sanctions on Russia: How will they play out?

    The rich nations supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia have imposed sanctions on the latter. They cannot intervene militarily directly since that would lead to a much wider conflagration and a possible catastrophic Third World War, as the Russian Foreign Minister has warned. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization realizes that and has not sent its troops to Ukraine, in spite of pleadings by the Ukrainian government. Instead, it is providing arms and other support to Ukraine to resist the invasion. The situation remains dangerous and tricky.

    Sanctions are supposed to punish the Russians for their aggression. It won’t halt the war but will it hurt the Russians enough that they will regret the invasion and not embark on future adventures? If the war drags on the costs could mount. This could lead to pressures for a regime change in Moscow and that may lead to a ratcheting up of the war. If sanctions are successful, will it be a lesson to China? Severe sanctions against Iran (0.3 per cent of the World’s Gross Domestic Product [GDP]) did not bring it to its knees. Given that the Russian economy is bigger (1.7 per cent of the World’s GDP) and much more advanced technologically, its economy may be much less impacted.

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  • The Russia-Ukraine War: Putin’s Reasons, Objectives and the Way Out

    The Russia-Ukraine War: Putin’s Reasons, Objectives and the Way Out

    In 3 weeks since Russia’s president, Putin ordered on February 24 this year, a “special military operation” against Ukraine, many questions were asked on his reasons and goals.

    Putin answered those questions in the early morning address to the nation on February 24. He referred to Russia’s particular concern and anxiety over the NATO expansion to the east and the US policy of containment of Russia through the military “settlement” of the Ukrainian territory. Transformation of Ukraine, historically a part of the Russian state, into an “anti-Russia” controlled and guided by the U.S. was nothing less, in Putin’s view than a real threat to Russia’s very existence.

    Putin went on to mention Ukraine’s use of armed forces against the pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, the potential threat that the Ukrainian nationalists could present for Russia-annexed Crimea, and Kyiv’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons. “Russia’s clash with these forces is inevitable.”

    This was the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Few of us believed it would actually happen, but it did, nonetheless. Let’s start by trying to understand, why.

    Russia’s red lines

    According to John Mearsheimer, the West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the current crisis, which actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, with the US pushing the alliance to announce a plan for Ukraine and Georgia’s prospective membership. Russian leaders characterized the move as an existential threat to Russia and promises to thwart it. Putin warned the West then and there: “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.”

    Nobody listened, or paid attention, thus underscoring the second point from Putin’s pre-invasion speech: the West no longer treats Russia as a great power and will do whatever it deems necessary without taking heed of Russia’s legitimate interests. Instead, Ukraine was actively encouraged to expand its collaboration with NATO and crush the pro-Russian rebellion in Donbas by force. The U.S. and NATO supplied lethal weapons for Ukraine’s civil war, trained its armed forces and turned a blind eye to reports of atrocities that Kyiv and Kyiv-affiliated militias had committed in the region.

    Ukraine started hosting joint land-based and naval exercises with NATO countries, effectively blocking Russia’s Black Sea fleet in its base in Sevastopol. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. In November 2021, the U.S. conducted its annual Global Thunder 22 exercises, which included strategic aviation practising nuclear strikes against Russia over the Black Sea and only 20 km from Russia’s borders. In parallel to that, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defense announced his country’s aspirations to put as many US/NATO training centers in Ukraine as possible, which effectively amounted to a request for additional U.S. military personnel in the country.

    As John Mearsheimer observed, Ukraine was fast becoming a de facto member of NATO. It wanted to use NATO’s rearmaments and the US political and strategic back-up to crush the separatist rebellion in Donbas and ensure “de-occupation and reintegration” of Crimea, now an integral part of the Russian Federation, by all necessary means, not excluding “military measures.” Russia’s fears of NATO’s ballistic missiles appearing on the Ukraine-Russia border, within 7-8 minutes of flying time to Moscow no longer seemed overly exaggerated. Putin described such a potentiality as NATO’s holding a knife to Russia’s throat and made an explicit connection between Ukraine’s aspirations of NATO membership and Kyiv’s plan to return Donbas and Crimea by force. Both were equally unacceptable.

    Russia’s goals

    According to the Russian leader, if Ukraine joined NATO, it would be tempted to implement its “de-occupation strategy” for Crimea through the use of force. NATO would then be obliged to help Ukraine under its Article V mutual defence clause. “This means that there will be a military confrontation between Russia and NATO,” Putin said. Such a war would soon turn nuclear. The Kremlin came to a conclusion that a pre-emptive strike on Ukraine was the only way to stave off a future Russia-NATO war over Crimea.

    We haven’t seen it coming. It was hard to anticipate because Ukraine’s turning away from Russia and drawing closer to NATO did not start yesterday. Ukraine’s Yavoriv training ground hosted the first joint manoeuvres with NATO back in 1995. In 1997, Ukraine and NATO signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. In 2000, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the Status of Forces Agreement, which enabled the stationing of NATO troops on Ukrainian soil. In 2002, Ukraine’s goal of eventual NATO membership was first voiced by its President; that goal has since become a part of the country’s official foreign policy doctrine. Ukraine’s forces took part in numerous NATO-led operations and missions over the years, from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq. And Russia observed all of these developments over the period of near 20 years with calm and reserve, leaving an impression that Ukraine is free to proceed as it wants.

    Moscow’s calm evaporated after Ukraine’s Maidan revolution of 2014 deposed Russia-leaning president Yanukovych and, through the revolutionary powers’ first acts, indicated a clear break with the last memories of the Russian influence. Symbolically, the very first move was to strip the Russian language of its semi-official status in the areas where significant numbers of Russian-speaking minorities lived. A clear indication was given as to the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet naval base in Sevastopol – the new powers would prefer the Russian navy relocate to Russia proper at its earliest convenience. Plans were underway to offer these naval facilities to NATO.

    Putin moved on to annex Crimea, which, in his view, was an act of strategic necessity. He apparently anticipated Ukraine’s eventually acquiescing to the fact.

    It did not happen. Instead, Ukraine grew more nationalistic, and a significant number of its nationalists embraced anti-Russianism together with far-right politics and symbology. Hence, the Russian goals in the present war include “de-Nazification,” which must be read as Ukraine’s abandonment of anti-Russian nationalism and return to the quasi-Soviet ideology of “one people” with Russians and Belarusians. In other words, Russia would seek to reaffirm, if not impose, a version of the Ukrainian identity that was supported through both the imperial and the Soviet times — Ukrainians as a junior kinfolk to the Russian “older brother.”

    The way out

    With Ukraine’s capital Kyiv under assault and the southern port of Mariupol nearing utter destruction, calls for peace have intensified on all sides, including from Russia’s most important backers in China. Unfortunately, the search for a working compromise has not yet started in earnest. Ukraine’s original position at peace talks focused on the immediate withdrawal of all Russian troops from all of Ukraine, Crimea and Donbas included. From the Russian perspective, that would be equal to capitulation and surrender of a part of its own territory (Crimea), plus legal denunciation of a friendship and support treaty just concluded with Donbas.

    Russia’s present terms for ending the war are equally unrealistic. They include Ukraine’s adoption of a neutral status and the abandonment of its hopes for NATO membership; acknowledgement of the Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the independence of separatist regions in the country’s east; and demilitarization. The objective of the regime change, disguised by the “de-Nazification” rhetoric, has not been voiced much as of recent.

    Given the very fact of the ongoing war with Russia, the demand for demilitarization is clearly a non-starter. Russia’s insistence on Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality could, perhaps, be taken back to Ukraine’s parliament for a serious discussion; however, a ceasefire must be reached first for such a discussion to happen. As for Ukraine’s acknowledgement of Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea or independence of Donbas, these Russia-pushed items look more like the terms of surrender and cannot form the basis of a peace agreement.

    A more plausible ground for a compromise could be the two states’ mutual pledge to refrain from all attempts to solve any outstanding issues by force in the future. That would stop short from Ukraine’s recognition of either Crimea or Donbas but would assure Russia that Ukraine has no plans to regain the lost territories by force. Russia would need to withdraw its army from all areas of Ukraine proper. Ukraine would have to accept that its fight for the return of Crimea and Donbas would now be restricted in its choice of means to mostly diplomatic and legal instruments. The assurances of a non-aligned, non-bloc status that Ukraine could give to Russia should be matched with Russia’s assurances of full compensation for the losses that this war inflicted on Ukraine’s economy and society. While such a compromise will most probably draw the rage of hawkish nationalists on both sides, it might actually form the foundation of a peace agreement that everyone needs.

    Image Credits:

    Feature Image: www.militarytimes.com

    Putin Image: Al Jazeera

    Map: Al Jazeera

  • Book Review: The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths

    Book Review: The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths

     

     

     

    Book Name: The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths
    Author: Mariana Mazzucato
    Publisher: Anthem Press (10 June 2013)
    Page Count: 266
    Price: INR 2,020.00

     

     

     

    Written against the backdrop of the recovery period of the financial crisis of 2008, Mariano Mazzucato’s ‘The Entrepreneurial State’, came at a critical point, arguing against the widely accepted belief of the self-correcting nature of the markets, and the austere state measures of limited intervention, which in the case of the financial crisis, referred to injecting large sums of capital in banks to rescue them from collapsing. The book is an expanded version of a 2011 report which laid down policy proposals for the UK government post the crisis.

    Divided into ten chapters, the book focuses on the need for the institutionalization of innovation and lays down two main arguments. First, state investment is a necessary pre-condition for any long-term innovation, and growth, and requires a steady flow of funds. Arguing that governments must move beyond spending solely on infrastructural development, Professor Mazzucato extensively explains how the state and the industry are interwoven together, and cannot be looked at, in isolation. She draws her examples from a wide spectrum of industries in the United States, covering the pharmaceutical companies, to big tech companies, while also linking the state and industry to public schools, and foreign and defence policies of the United States.

    Second, the book argues that the companies funded by the state should return a part of their profit to the state for investment in other innovative technologies. Here, it is important to note that while the book has been targeted by neo-liberals for suggesting socialization through increased state intervention in the market, the author, however, does not question the right of private companies to accumulate profits, and asks only a proportion of it to be redistributed to the state for further investment.

    A major part of the book is devoted to addressing the illusion that entrepreneurship and innovation come from the private sector alone. Debunking this myth, Professor Mazzucato cites extensive evidence of impatient venture capitalists who have historically depended upon the government support for expensive and ambiguous investment risk, and of companies that have historically preferred to repurchase their shares to increase their stock prices instead of investing in research. She highlights the role of the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) in the US which was set up to provide the country with technological superiority. Arguing that the agency played a critical role in funding computer and internet technology, she illustrates how its contribution to the success of companies in the Silicon Valley, is often overlooked by institutions seeking to get away from the long arm of the state’.

    The author draws inspiration from Keynes’ advocacy of increased government expenditures, and Karl Polanyi’s research on central organization and state’s policies of controlled interventionism, where he argued that it was the state-imposed conditions that made a conducive environment for markets to come into existence. She also draws some of her important arguments from Schumpeter’s idea of entrepreneurial innovation and experimentation which paves the way for innovation by constantly destroying the old ones. Throughout her book, Mazzucato argues for a symbiosis of Keynesian fiscal spending, and Schumpeter’s investments in innovation.

    The book challenges the widely promoted concept of a free market based on limited state intervention, by the United States. Claiming that the US has itself invested heavily into its research and industrial sector, the author looks into the role played by programs and agencies like DARPA, Small Business Innovation Research (required large companies to designate a proportion of their funding to small for-profit firms), the Orphan Drug Act (provides tax incentives, subsidies, and intellectual and marketing rights to small firms dedicated to developing products for the treatment of rare diseases) and the National Nanotechnology Initiative. Further, after comparing the data of several countries, the author argues that states like Portugal and Italy are lagging not because of high state presence, but rather due to lack of state investment in research and development.

    The author builds up her argument upon the foundation that the state lacks confidence in its abilities to fund innovation. She argues that an increasing number of research and financial institutions have wrongfully come to regard the state as the ‘enemy of the enterprise’, which should be kept away from meddling in the market to ensure efficiency. Although she does briefly mention that the citizens are often unaware of how their taxes foster innovation, her analysis does not delve into the reason behind the state’s lack of confidence in itself, making it difficult for the reader to grasp the reason behind the state’s as well as the society’s lack of trust in a public-funded healthcare system, despite most new radical drugs have been coming out of public labs.

    Writing on the importance of green technology, Mazzucato holds that any ‘green revolution’ would depend upon an active risk-taking state. While comparing the green economic policies of China, Brazil, the US, and Europe, she elucidates how the state investment banks in China and Brazil act as a major source of funding for clean and solar technology. On the other hand, Europe’s approach to clean technology funding has been weakened by its attempt to present ‘green’ investments as a trade-off for growth, consequently resulting in a lack of support.

    Towards the latter part of her book, Professor Mazzucato presents her hypothesis of the risk-taking state, where both the state, and the market are interwoven to generate growth, and innovation. Her proposal is supported by numerous examples of state-sponsored innovative technology which emerged in the last century, implying that the state may have always been entrepreneurial. However, she argues that countries like India have performed worse than others because of their over-expenditure on several small firms, which have low productivity and output. The focus of state investment, thus, should be placed not on its quantity, but rather on its distribution amongst different sectors of the economy.

    Mazzucato claims that since the traditional tax system cannot provide the state with funds to invest in the innovation system because of tax avoidance and evasion, she suggests a three-step framework to support state-funded innovation. First, the state should extract royalties from the application of a technology that was funded by the state itself, which should be put into a ‘national innovation fund’ for future investment. Second, the state should put conditions on the loans it offers, a part of which should be returned to the state when the company starts to earn profits. And finally, she argues for the establishment of a State Investment Bank, like those in China and Brazil.

    The relevance of her hypothesis increases significantly as one witness the market value of Apple moving past the mark of $3 trillion, and surpassing the GDP of countries like the UK, Italy, Brazil, and Russia.[i] The author debunks the overestimated role of the big private companies like Apple and Google being at the forefront of generating innovative technologies by themselves alone. In doing so, she argues that Apple has received state funds from various channels, including direct investments in their early stage of development under the government programs like the Small Business Innovation Research; through access to technologies that emerged primarily because of state funding; and through the tax policies which benefit the company. Most of the elements used by the Apple, including high-speed internet, SIRI, touch-screen displays have been a result of risky investments by the state.

    Scholars[ii] have argued that the book does not consider the ‘productivity paradox’, which reflects low productivity in times of emerging innovative technologies, as during the IT revolution of the 1970s in the United States. However, it is important to note, that Mazzucato argues against the endogenous growth theory, where the output is taken as a function of capital, and labour, with technology assumed as an exogenous variable. She targets the theory for assuming certainty in growth after investment in technology, and research and development. Taking inspiration from Schumpeter, she asserts that investment in technology and innovation involves high uncertainty, and the growth, thus, cannot be measured using a linear model like the endogenous theory, which does not take into account the social factors responsible for growth (education, design, training, etc.).

    One of the limitations of the book is its lack of analysis on the underlying structural inequality and the impact of technological change on income disparities. Instead of delving further into controversies of value creation, the author cites an example of the wage-disparity between Apple’s broader employee base and its top executives and observes that the process of innovation can go ahead simultaneously with inequality. In the case of Apple, the products of which are considered as global commodities, a major part of the workforce come from countries providing cheap labour. These offshore jobs mostly take place in the low-wage manufacturing industries, and the resulting profit margins are counted as ‘value added’ generated within the United States[iii]. While Mazzucato argues for redistribution of profit between Apple and the US government, her analysis ignores the role played by the globalized workforce in generating the said profits.

    Lastly, the case for a risk-taking entrepreneurial state has been made solely based on politically stable, high-income countries of the West. The author does not address whether high-scale state investments would be viable in situations where governments’ primary focus is placed on maintaining domestic stability and security, as in the case of Afghanistan, Somalia, or Yemen. Thus, one cannot be fully convinced about whether the prescribed model would fit well into the low-income countries of the South, many of which continue to witness high levels of instability, corruption, and violence.

    Overall, in using over three hundred different sources, Professor Mazzucato’s book provides the reader with an extensive critical insight into the working of the state, and the industry. By addressing the various myths associated with industries in each of her chapters, the author makes the reader question the fundamentals of the free-market system and makes one interrogate the existence of such a system. The book also attempts at breaking the cultural hegemony of the United States, by challenging their mainstream narrative of high-scale privatization and limited government presence. By covering a vast ground of industries, the book pushes the reader to delve into further research to investigate the role of the state in funding other technologies and innovations.

     

    [i] Bursztynsky, J. (2020, August 19). Apple becomesfirst U.S. company to reach a $2 trillion market cap. Retrieved August 20, 2020, from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/19/apple-reaches-2-trillion-market-cap.html  and Smith, Zachary Snowdon. (2022, Jan 03). Apple becomes 1st company worth $ 3 trillion – Greater than the GDP OF UK. Retrieved March 08, 2022, from https://www.forbes.com/sites/zacharysmith/2022/01/03/apple-becomes-1st-company-worth-3-trillion-greater-than-the-gdp-of-the-uk/?sh=6142c7b25603

    [ii] Pradella, L. (2016). The Entrepreneurial State by Mariana Mazzucato: A critical engagement. Competition & Change, 21(1), 61-69. doi:10.1177/1024529416678084

    [iii] Greg Linden, Jason Dedrick, and Kenneth L. Kraemer, Innovation and Job Creation in a Global Economy: The Case of Apple’s iPod, Personal Computing Industry Center, UC Irvine, January 2009, http://pcic.merage.uci.edu, 2.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Mariana Mazzucato Quartz

  • The Ukraine crisis: Its impact on India

    The Ukraine crisis: Its impact on India

    India has to tread a fine line in this imbroglio: Taking care of the welfare and evacuation of Indian students and the possibility of an oil price hike.

    The face-off over Ukraine between Russia and the United States and its Nato allies has been dominating the headlines for a while now with tensions ratcheting up as we receive dire public warnings every day of a Russian invasion any day now. Clearly, the possibility of Russian intervention there, and the consequent escalation of sanctions against them, is very real and concerning.

    While Ukraine may be a developing country and the poorest in Europe, by no means is it a pushover. It is the second-largest country there, behind Russia, by area, and in terms of population the eighth largest with its 42 million inhabitants. It has been independent since 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, though it had been a part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union since the 18th century. If there is one lesson that Putin and the Russian military should have learnt from America’s disastrous interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan is that invasions are relatively easy to accomplish, but keeping restive and hostile populations under control is a wholly different proposition.

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  • 100 Years after the End of the First World War: Are we slipping again into a World War?

    100 Years after the End of the First World War: Are we slipping again into a World War?

    In view of the developments in Ukraine, the question arises whether there could be a repetition of the First World War in slipping into a new World War that no one intended. This original thesis is accentuated in different ways, whether in the form that European politicians behaved like “somnambulists (Clark) or just failed (Münkler). The blame for the war was also sought in Serbia or Vienna. Hereby the original thesis of the main war guilt of Germany is questioned, as it was fixed in the Treaty of Versailles and by the historian Fritz Fischer as the “grip on the world power” of Germany. However, if the causes of the First World War and, above all, its escalation are no longer seen in the German Empire alone, but are more or less equally distributed among the major European powers, this does not mean that “nothing and nobody” is responsible for the primordial catastrophe of the 20th century: Nationalism, arms race, industrialized warfare, pure power politics – all these are factors that contributed decisively to the First World War. Moreover, it should be emphasized, which even today is far from being overcome in many parts of the world. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine War, a much-discussed book by the highly influential American political scientist Robert Kagan takes on a whole new relevance. Kagan suggests the idea that Europeans could live in a paradise of peace and order after World War II only because the Americans were prepared to confront possible threats to that peace decisively and violently. Thanks to America’s power, Europeans could have indulged in the belief that (military) power was no longer important. But does the principle follow from this that law and order must be upheld in dealings with one another, but in the violent “jungle, we must follow the laws of the jungle”? Or, conversely, is it not the case that state warfare and the exercise of violence that does not adhere to its self-imposed conventions and limitations will stir up more violent resistance than they, in turn, can fight?

    Kagan is partly correct. All modern states are based on the state’s monopoly on the use of force, and almost all of them have emerged through a violent process-remember the English, American, and French Revolutions, the German wars of unification, the wars of decolonization, and the emergence of new nation-states after World Wars I and II. Therefore, however, states do not as such embody an order of violence. Hegel had argued that violence is the appearing beginning of the state, but not its substantial principle. Nor is order powerlessness, as Robert Kagan’s much-discussed book on “Power and Powerlessness” in the New World Order suggests. Does political power come from the barrels of guns, as Mao Tse Tung suggested? If so, the Soviet Union should never have collapsed because gun barrels were more than enough for the Red Army.

    Kagan assigns the opposition of power and order thinking to contemporary American and European thinking but admits this has not always been the case. As he points out, the situation was just the opposite for a long time. The Americans up to Woodrow Wilson at the beginning of the last century, he says, were committed to thinking of order and a world-political idealism of spreading human rights, while the Europeans remained committed to pure thinking of power until World War II. What is astonishing, if we take Kagan’s own analysis seriously, is why he does not ask to what final conclusion this “pure power thinking” among Europeans led – to nothing other than the catastrophes of World War I and World War II. Kagan may be right about one thing: in view of the “state-failure” problems in numerous Third World states on the one hand (emphasized by the Europeans in the anti-terror struggle) and those of the so-called “rogue states” on the other (on which American interest focused under Bush), illusions about the end of history and a largely peaceful, because economically determined, 21st century is fast fading. However, this cannot mean developing a new metaphysics of struggle and self-assertion that only force can enforce.

    Historical Traditions

    In determining the political sphere in categories of power or order, Kagan finds himself in a long ancestral line of the history of political ideas. Dolf Sternberger distinguished three different roots of the concept of politics: cooperation, following Aristotle; demonology, starting from Machiavelli; and eschatology, as he essentially saw it realized in Marxism, starting from the church father, Augustine. Sternberger’s distinction is phenomenological still valid today, even if his evaluations are problematic because he saw himself in the tradition of the Aristotelian concept of politics and – as the term demonology already shows – fiercely fought the opposite position.

    How are these distinctions to be understood? Here are two quotations: Aristotle begins his work on politics with the definition: “Everything that is called state is obviously a kind of community, and every community is formed and exists for the purpose of obtaining some good.” In contrast, Jean Bodin, perhaps the most important constitutionalist of the 16th century, referred directly to Aristotle. However, his position should be read as his deliberate inversion: “Republic is a lawful government over several households and what is common to them, with sovereign power.” Precisely because Bodin modelled his work on Aristotle’s, the contrast between the two determinations jumps out all the more clearly: on the one hand, a community for the sake of a common goal; on the other, rule endowed with sovereign power. Marx’s eleventh Feuerbach thesis best describes the third dimension of Sternberger’s distinction: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; what matters is to change it.” In contrast to Sternberger’s notion of demonology, however, one side of this line of tradition is by no means “Machiavellianism,” a struggle for power for power’s sake. Instead, it claims to constitute an (absolute) power out of insight into the violence of human nature, which prevents the struggle of all against all.

    Sternberger emphasizes the fundamental difference between the first two concepts of politics when he asks in summary: “Is it the conflict of interests, powers, beliefs, and wills that thus characterizes the political in its peculiar essence? Or is it rather the balance, the compromise, the contract, the common rule of life. And conversely asked: should we interpret peace – civil peace as well as peace among nations – as the abolition and overcoming, as the negation of politics, or, on the contrary, as its completion?”

    Struggle for power and domination, on the one hand, negotiation and the establishment of order on the other, are the two opposite definitions of the essence of politics that run through the history of political ideas. As antipodes may be mentioned only: Thucydides and Plato resp. Aristotle, Machiavelli and Erasmus of Rotterdam, Hegel and Kant, Schmitt and Arendt, recently Foucault, resp. Luhmann and Habermas.

    If we take a closer look at this line of ancestors, it should be enough reason to warn us not to reduce politics to pure power politics. Thomas Hobbes, for example, with his conception of the state monopoly on the use of force, justified internal peace and the avoidance of civil war, but at the same time advocated an absolute sovereign. And Carl Schmitt stands paradigmatically for the problem of reducing politics to pure power politics. For it was not personal opportunism or immoderate ambition that justified his closeness to the National Socialists, but the extreme consequence of his reduction of the political to the distinction between friend and foe in a crisis-ridden world-historical situation. Carl Schmitt wrote in this regard: A total state “does not allow any anti-state, state-inhibiting or state-dividing forces to arise within it. It does not think of handing over the new means of power to its own enemies and destroyers. Such a state can distinguish friend from foe.” The reduction of the political to only one of two sides, the exercise of power or reliance on the establishment of order, has always led to problematic consequences in historical development. Against the false alternative between power or order and their immediate connection in order of power, the “middle” between power and order has to be found again. Violence cannot establish peace, but it can limit other violence to such an extent that other than violent structures come into play. Perhaps America and Europe have more to learn from each other than either side realizes.

    Developments after September 11

    Especially after the attacks of September 11, hardly any author in his assessment of the events could do without reference to Carl Schmitt’s world-famous definition of the political as the distinction between friend and foe. Even before the attacks, however, the political theory had already noted the shift from “Kant to Schmitt” as a consequence of the crisis of the political. Finally, George W. Bush elevated Schmitt’s definition of the political to a quasi-official governmental program in the United States. In this perspective, Robert Kagan denies that Europe and the USA still have a common view of the world at all. “Americans are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus.” By this, he means that Europe lives in a Kantian fantasy world of eternal peace, while America is called upon and alone empowered to create order in Hobbesian anarchy on a global scale.

    Schmitt as the “mastermind” of the Western world? The tendency to refer back to Schmitt is not unproblematic, however. The possible linking of politics and political theory to Carl Schmitt’s definition of the political cannot, in principle, disregard Schmitt’s temporary proximity to the National Socialists. For it was not personal opportunism or immoderate ambition that justified this closeness, but the extreme consequence of his reduction of the political to the distinction between friend and foe in a crisis-like world-historical situation. Carl Schmitt wrote about this, as indicated: A total state “does not allow any anti-state, state-inhibiting or state-dividing forces to arise within it. It does not think of handing over the new means of power to its own enemies and destroyers……. Such a state can distinguish friend from foe.” Are we not already living in such a total surveillance state?

    The reduction of the political to a pure struggle for power, to a pure friend-enemy distinction, has problematic consequences, as is revealed especially in Schmitt. Conversely, the reduction of the political to the establishment of the agreement, of acting together, leads either to “apolitical” idealism or violent utopianism, as was shown especially in Marxism/communism. But which is now the solution? The distinction between friend and foe is a precondition of political action, but it is not its goal – the goal of politics regarding war and violence is the “mediation” of friend and foe. Or as Yitzhak Rabin described it: Peace is not made with friends, but with enemies! This is the art of politics, to enable a peaceful conflict resolution with opponents instead of falling into the traps of pure power politics – this is the lesson of the First World War then and today.

    Feature Image Credit: powervertical.org