The Peninsula Foundation

Blog

  • India and Vietnam Need to set up an Industry 4.0 Technology Task Force

    India and Vietnam Need to set up an Industry 4.0 Technology Task Force

    Amid the ongoing difficult times marked by the COVID-19 pandemic and the fear of its highly virulent Omicron variant spreading across the globe, India and Vietnam pledged to further deepen the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  In this context, the recent visit to India by National Assembly Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue to New Delhi this month has strengthened the relationship between the two countries.  Also, next year, India and Vietnam would be celebrating the 50thanniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations and their legislative bodies plan to organise commemorative joint events both in New Delhi and Hanoi.

    Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue held wide-ranging discussions in New Delhi with India’s Vice President of India and Chairman of Rajya Sabha, Shri M Venkaiah Naidu and these focused on international matters of common concern and other global challenges. Both sides aim to contribute to global peace, security, stability and development in the region. At the bilateral level, issues concerning COVID-9, socio-economic development in respective countries, economy, trade & investment, energy, security-defence, science-technology, air connectivity, culture, education and training were also the agenda. As many as 12 MoUs were exchanged between Vietnamese and Indian enterprises in the fields of public health, provision of pharmaceutical materials, drug and vaccine production, oil and gas, information technology and technology transfer, education, and tourism.

    India acknowledged and extended gratitude for the timely supply by Vietnam of oxygen and related equipment and the gifting of 40,000 facemasks to the Indian Red Cross Society. As a reciprocal and goodwill gesture, India has announced a donation of 2,00,000 doses of indigenously developed Bharat Biotech COVAXIN to Vietnam through Duc Minh, Bharat Biotech’s local partner in Vietnam. It is useful to mention that Bharat Biotech has been working with Duc Minh Medical JSC, towards the commercialisation of INDIRAB (Inactivated Rabies Vaccine).

    The bilateral cooperation and mutually beneficial partnership between India and Vietnam in the field of energy are noteworthy. For the last three decades, India’s ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) has been engaged in Vietnam’s offshore energy projects in the South China Sea. New Delhi is now seeking a 15-year extension of the existing arrangement beyond May 2023 when the current MOU between OVL and PetroVietnam (PVN) expires. India hopes that Vietnam and other claimants including China can establish a binding ‘Conduct of Conduct’ and develop concrete mechanisms to institutionalize a regional dialogue among the claimants and other stakeholders to serve for de-escalation of tensions.

    During his interactions, Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue was also assured of India’s support for the ASEAN Outlook for Indo Pacific (AOIP). External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has noted that “From the Indian perspective, Vietnam is a key partner both in the ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific context,” It was also reiterated that there is strong convergence between India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) and the AOIP and India is looking forward to continuing working closely with Vietnam.

    In an interview with a major Indian media house, Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue emphasised investments in the digital sphere to usher in Fourth Industrial Revolution in Vietnam. This fits into Vietnam’s call for greater investment from Indian corporations in fields such as information technology, innovation and renewable energy. Industry 4.0 technologies are high on Vietnam’s agenda and the Party and the State have introduced several policies, guidelines and programs to harness these technologies.  In particular, the country hopes that the digital component of the economy could account for about 20% of the GDP. According to a consulting company, Vietnam’s “GDP may rise by US$28.5-62.1 billion by 2030 depending on the level of technology put into use by businesses, or equivalent to an increase of between 7-16% of the GDP”.

    Earlier this year, Vietnam issued the National Strategy on the Fourth Industrial Revolution by 2030 under which Vietnam hopes to be named among the 40 top performers in the Global Innovation Index (GII), the top 30 in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)’s Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) and the top 50 in the United Nations (UN)’s e-Government Development Index (EGDI) by 2030.

    Vietnam is committed to expanding international cooperation and integration in science and technology, particularly the Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies. India too has similar ambitions and PM Modi highlighted the issue at the WEF’s Davos Digital Agenda, how India is harnessing AI and other technologies of the fourth industrial revolution for achieving its developmental objectives and for promoting social good. Given the political will of both sides, India and Vietnam could explore setting up a task force to ascertain areas of convergences.

     

    Image Credit: vir.com.vn

  • The Scylla and Charybdis of Duty Discharge: Military Dilemma with undemocratic Leaders

    The Scylla and Charybdis of Duty Discharge: Military Dilemma with undemocratic Leaders

    A week after the attack on the U.S. Capitol, the joint chiefs of staff issued a memorandum to the joint force condemning the assault on Congress and the constitutional process. They re-affirmed Joe Biden’s electoral victory and re-iterated their commitment to protecting and defending the constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. This re-iteration came on the heels of another. In the summer of 2020, senior military leaders in the United States were alarmed at the Trump administration’s use of military force to deter civilian protestors gathering in American cities to voice their discontent about racial discrimination and police brutality towards minority communities. Retired officers and seniors in the Defense Department warned against the politicization of the military and cautioned civilian leaders against using the military to achieve partisan goals. The Concerned Members of the Gray Line — a coalition of over 1,000 West Point alumni from six decades of graduating classes who had collectively served across ten presidential administrations — wrote a letter to West Point’s class of 2020 cautioning the graduates that while “the principle of civilian control is central to the military profession … it does not imply blind obedience.”

    These are just two examples of unprecedented steps taken by active and former senior military professionals in the tumultuous civil-military relations that characterized the Trump administration. Another example of an unprecedented action came to light recently in the form of revelations from Bob Woodward and Robert Costa’s forthcoming book, Peril, which suggest that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, took “good faith precaution” to secure America’s nuclear weapons from what he believed to be a worryingly likely scenario of the president “going rogue” and initiating a military strike against China. In the weeks leading up to the inauguration, Milley feared that the outgoing president would either try to use the military to “prevent the peaceful transfer of power” or that he would unleash nuclear war to maintain power. To avert nuclear Armageddon, he inserted himself into the nuclear chain of command — an authority that he does not have by law and doctrine — and reaffirmed with other senior military officials the elaborate procedures that need to be followed in the event of an executive order to launch nuclear weapons. In so doing, Milley positioned himself as a bulwark to thwart a potentially calamitous chain of events set in motion by an increasingly erratic and bellicose leader. His actions have invited an array of responses, ranging from those who support himand defend his conduct to those who demand his resignation and implore that he be court-martialled for treason. In his testimony to the Senate Armed Forces Committee, Milley defended his loyalty to the nation and asserted that he acted well within his statutory role of being in the “chain of communication” as the president’s primary military adviser

    Milley’s conduct, while deserving of public awareness and scrutiny, needs to be understood in the context of the unprecedented dilemma that he faced. What can military leaders do when the norm of military subordination to civilian control clashes with their adherence to the constitution and the rule of law? Milley was a military professional confronting a civilian executive with a penchant for undermining democracy — obeying this leader would risk jeopardizing his oath to defend the constitution and the rule of law, while disobeying would threaten the norm of civilian supremacy and the military’s democratic accountability.

    In recent years, democratic backsliding has affected nascent and mature democracies alike. To preserve and extend their authority, leaders in the United States, Poland, Hungary, the Philippines, Brazil, Nicaragua, Turkey, and India have used and/or threatened to use the military to advance partisan goalslike enforcing controversial immigration policies, detaining journalists, repressing protests, arresting civil society activists, overturning election results or preventing elections from being held at all, and detaining opposition leaders. Understanding military behavior in other countries threatened by democratic erosion can help to contextualize the situation that Milley confronted and the actions that he undertook.

    Democracy and Civil-Military Relations

    The principal dilemma of all civil-military relations, as explained by civil-military relations scholar Peter Feaver, entails the cultivation of a military strong enough to do what civilian leaders ask yet subordinate enough to do so only when asked. Civilian control over a professional subordinate military is a quintessential element of democratic regimes. Non-democracies, on the other hand, are characterized by politically influential militaries that have either overthrown civilian leaders and usurped power through coups or have acted as powerful allies for civilian autocrats like in Syria and North Korea. Comparative politics scholar Dan Slater demonstrates how in many postcolonial regimes, militaries are powerful and effective brokers in ensuring authoritarian durability. As such, curbing the military’s politically aggressive tendencies involves bolstering civilian oversight mechanisms. For example, by punishing disobedient officers, monitoring the appropriate implementation of civilian orders, controlling their purse strings, and ensuring their accountability through public hearings, civilians could keep a check on the military.

    Whereas politically aggressive militaries used to be the dominant cause of democratic decline in the Cold War period, the decades after the Cold War became characterized by executive aggrandizement. This involves a gradual rollback by elected leaders of citizens’ power and rights. Societies with high levels of inequality, when saddled with political institutions that are unable to deliver opportunities for economic advancement, are particularly prone to being captured by demagogues. These “assassins of democracy” like Donald Trump, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Jair Bolsonaro, Narendra Modi, Viktor Orban, Daniel Ortega, and Rodrigo Duterte, among others, use the very institutions of democracy to kill it.

    In this context, the military’s actions are critical to further enhancing or eroding democracy. In dealing with undemocratic leaders, democratic militaries face an unenviable dilemma brought on by their tradition of subordination to civilian control. If they follow orders from an undemocratic leader, they become complicit in democratic erosion. If they disobey, they risk disrupting military cohesion. Populist leaders who are prone to using the military to further their partisan agendas end up affecting the military’s internal cohesion by creating supporters and detractors of their actions within the military. These fissures between supporters and opponents will inevitably paralyze decision-making, threaten the military’s operational effectiveness, and ultimately jeopardize national security.

    This was the dilemma confronted by the Indian military in the 1970s. Like the American military, the Indian armed forces are a professional subordinate institution, beholden to the precept of civilian control and obedience to the constitution and rule of law. And like their American counterparts, the Indian military have played a critical role in protecting India’s fragile postcolonial democracy through the vicissitudes of India’s chaotic politics.

    “India is Indira. Indira is India” 

    On June 25, 1975, the Indian president, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, declared a state of internal emergency upon the advice of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, citing a right-wing conspiracy that aimed at preventing the democratically elected government from functioning. Prior to the announcement of the emergency, India was in the throes of nationwide protests, with agitators clamoring for Gandhi’s resignation after her conviction for electoral malpractice by the Allahabad High Court, which unseated her and nullified her candidature and 1972 electoral victory. The emergency declaration had an immediate effect — 900 arrests were made within 24 hours, 300 of whom were political prisoners including Gandhi’s leading opponent, J. P. Narayan. During the 18-month emergency, Gandhi disempowered state governments, censored the press, banned public meetings, and postponed the national election, tarnishing India’s democratic credentials.

    The opposition implored the Indian army to dethrone Gandhi. Gandhi asked the army to support the implementation of the emergency. They did neither. In a massive rally organized on June 25 in the nation’s capital — New Delhi — Narayan appealed to “the police and armed forces not to obey the illegal and immoral orders of her [Gandhi’s] government” [emphasis added]. This was Gandhi’s last straw, leading to her swift and stealthy imposition of an emergency, as she acutely feared military intransigence and being overthrown in a coup. In a telling incident from 1969, Gandhi candidly asked former field marshal Sam Manekshaw if he planned to oust her. The military, however, refused to heed Narayan’s appeals and did not overthrow her. As explained by Aqil Shah, “the Indian military’s actions were shaped by institutional standards of appropriate behavior which made the notion of a constitutionally prescribed civilian supremacy inviolable and legitimate.” Not only did the military’s organizational beliefs and culture reinforce the norm of civilian supremacy, they also imbibed a learned behavior from their neighbor about the futility of political meddling. In Shah’s interviews with Indian Army officers: “many were typically surprised, and in some cases offended, by any comparison with other ‘political’ armies, including Pakistan. They found it profoundly difficult to countenance actions that constituted subversion of civil supremacy.”

    The army also remained uninvolved in the emergency’s implementation. Gandhi asked the then Indian army chief, Gen. T. N. Raina, for troops to aid civilian authorities in the implementation of her directives. According to retired Maj. Gen. Afsir Karim, who was serving in the army headquarters at the time and was involved in daily official dealings with the army chief’s office, Raina resisted Gandhi’s request and communicated to the military rank and file that “[they] are not a part of the emergency and [should] keep away from politics.” This refusal, however, contravenes their constitutionally prescribed function of obeying civilian authority. How did the army not become complicit in Gandhi’s authoritarian takeover when refusal to obey her meant the subversion of civilian control?

    In this dilemma, the Indian army feared a disruption to their organizational integrity and internal cohesion. Gen. G.G. Bewoor, another former chief of army staff, opined that the army “must protect itself against political influences that could shatter its professional cohesion and erode its capacity to defend the state against external aggression or internal conflict.” [emphasis added] To maintain cohesion and ensure that his troops remained unsullied by politicization, Raina circumvented the issue of obedience versus disobedience by relying on his operational training and professional experience as a trained soldier. When approached by the civilian Ministry of Defence, he instructed the army headquarters to follow the Union War Book, a voluminous classified document that contains detailed instructions for every government department on how to function in the event of war. Invoking the Union War Book implied a deployment for war. This was along the lines of the military’s well-established repertoire of action — the large-scale use of force as dictated by the army’s conventional offensive doctrine that has shaped their crisis behavior and strategy in all security crises since India’s independence. A mobilization on this scale meant the relocation of troops away from India’s restive western and eastern border regions to the national capital and other parts of the country as desired by civilian policymakers. However, the Defence Ministry rejected the army’s proposal, viewing it as “unnecessary for the purposes of an internal Emergency.”

    Raina confronted an elected leader who centralized authority, suspended judicial hearings on constitutional provisions, and undermined democracy. This example is illustrative of how democratic militaries can navigate the dilemma posed by subordination in the context of democratic erosion. The Indian army rejected the opposition’s attempts to co-opt them by reinforcing the norm of civilian supremacy. Simultaneously, they circumvented being used as a pawn in Gandhi’s authoritarian machinations by re-affirming their cardinal function — maintaining national security.

    On Jan. 7, 2021, Milley faced a similarly exceptional conundrum. In his attempt to not let the military be used in a partisan manner by the president and to avert a potential military confrontation with China, he exercised his professional judgment in a manner similar to Raina. Like its Indian counterpart, the U.S. military is organizationally and normatively well-versed in maintaining civilian supremacy, ensuring that coups are never countenanced as a way of expressing disapproval with civilian leaders.

    However, fearing further instability and threats to national security, Milley’s outreach to his Chinese counterpart and his insertion into the nuclear chain of command both leveraged his traditional training and professional experience in averting conventional wars. As argued by Tom Nichols, “Milley, invoking his personal relationship with his Chinese counterpart, told Li that he would hear about any military action from Milley himself. This is what reassurance and transparency looks like in a crisis.” Milley’s knowledge of and personal relationship with Gen. Li Zuocheng can be thought of as a critical wartime resource — both would also have come in handy in the event of an actual military operation. His backchannel reassurances to his Chinese counterpart helped to thwart a nuclear confrontation. In so doing, he stayed true to his higher calling of defending the nation, even when that seemed to undermine civilian supremacy.

    Exceptional circumstances beget exceptional responses. While military officers have a general duty to obey civilian control, they also take an oath to protect the constitution. When compared to other states that have experienced violent civil-military interactions, the United States has benefitted from a relatively stable relationship between its civilian leaders and its military. Obedience to civilian control implies obedience to constitutional and lawful orders. However, the former president delighted in upending norms in politics and civil-military relations, creating situations where obedience to civilian control clashed with protecting the rule of law. In this unprecedented situation, Milley relied on his best understanding of protecting the state — one that was honed through decades of professional experience and service. Shortly before his inauguration, Biden told the general, “we know what you went through. We know what you did.” The president’s confidence in his chief military adviser is a testament to Milley’s professional conduct in upholding American democracy.

     

    This article was published earlier in War on the Rocks.

    Feature Image Credit: theemergingindia.com 

     

  • UAE’s industrialization drive and the potential for Sovereign Wealth Funds to unlock value

    UAE’s industrialization drive and the potential for Sovereign Wealth Funds to unlock value

    The United Arab Emirates has renewed its commitment to the fourth industrial revolution recently with an ambitious target of increasing the industrial sector’s contribution from AED133 billion to AED300 billion (US$ 81.7 billion) by 2031. The main objectives of this ten-year strategy are to leapfrog towards knowledge-intensive industries, apply technology-intensive solutions to retrofit current industries, and push manufacturing in industries like aerospace, pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, etc. However, these objectives are not novel. While the early development plans of the emirates’ primarily focused on diversifying the economy from hydrocarbon revenues, the ultimate objective was to expand towards knowledge-intensive industries. In line with this, economic development plans as early as 1991 record the rulers’ interests in building a manufacturing-oriented economy, but the success is yet to materialize. Even in the case of the most diversified emirate – Dubai, the main drivers of the economy as of 2020 were entrepot activities like trade (26.5%), transportation and storage (12.5%), and financial services (9.7%), while manufacturing contributed to 8.8%. These statistics can be further appreciated by recollecting that from the early 1990s, development plans for Dubai were made under the assumption that the annual real growth rate in its manufacturing sector would meet 7%.[1]  As of 2020, the growth rate in manufacturing is only 0.3%. While manufacturing-oriented industrialization was to play a key role in the economy, there have been considerable challenges in realizing it. This article first briefly recalls the historical development efforts of the emirate, then discusses reasons which could have hindered the country’s trajectory towards knowledge-intensive manufacturing, and highlights a potential development instrument the country can utilize to realize its objectives in the present day.

    Federal Structure and overcoming the Inequalities

    Being a federation every emirate was offered autonomy which retained the control of resources of the respective emirates’ within respective ruling families. This resulted in vast inequalities amidst emirates with Abu Dhabi and Dubai becoming relatively well off compared to others. The remaining emirates were dependent on the budget provisions from oil-rich Abu Dhabi to maintain the social contract over their respective emirates. This internal dynamic resulted in different approaches being taken for economic development in the country. To briefly summarize some of them – Dubai invested in infrastructure to improve its entrepot facilities and industrialize in sectors associated with hydrocarbon resources, Abu Dhabi began focusing on renewable energy and clean technology from the early 2000s,  Ras al-Khaimah benefitted from its low-cost production environment (up to 25-50% lower than in other emirates) to become the country’s manufacturing base, and Fujairah developed a storage and bunkering expertise due to its geographical location beyond the chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz.[2] The developmental push from the emirates created a boom mainly in industries associated with hydro-carbon, real-estate, logistics, and finance. Although official data on sector-wise contribution to GDP remain unpublished, World Bank data confirms that as of 2019 about 16% of the UAE’s GDP is accredited to hydrocarbon sources. It also confirms that as of 2019, manufacturing value-added as a percentage of GDP stood at 8.7%.

    In the context of UAE, the viability of proceeding with labour-intensive industries as a starting point was low as the country has a small Emirati population. Second, while most late developing countries have resorted to wage suppression to make production costs competitive, the UAE is restricted from doing so owing to the social contract it shares with its citizens

    Despite the autonomy every emirate has enjoyed, the overarching approach the country has used for economic development is to invite foreign firms to the country by providing business-friendly infrastructure and environment.[3]For the emirate of Dubai, which was most successful in diversification, Singapore’s development model was an inspiration for implementing policies promoting business-friendly infrastructure and environment.[4] Among potential factors that explain the challenge in the uptake of knowledge-intensive manufacturing in the UAE, this article focuses on two – First, the inherent characteristic of firm relocation, and second, the existence of a twin labour market in the country with high wage levels. Helleiner argued that it is easier to scale to knowledge-intensive industries when labour-intensive production processes exist locally, this way, production activities can upgrade vertically. The logic was that direct relocation of knowledge-intensive functions of industries would imply high costs to the firm. His thesis was based on the development of the Asian tigers whose development process benefitted from the vertical up-gradation of industrial activity. In the context of UAE, the viability of proceeding with labour-intensive industries as a starting point was low as the country has a small Emirati population. Second, while most late developing countries have resorted to wage suppression to make production costs competitive, the UAE is restricted from doing so owing to the social contract it shares with its citizens. UAE nationals are instead offered much better employment packages in the public sector which deters their participation in the private sector.[5] As a result, the private sector across all skill levels is significantly dependent on expatriate labour. In addition to this, foreign talents are paid twice as much as their home countries across all skill levels. Tong and Al Awad demonstrate that this is true not only for low-skilled and semi-skilled jobs but also for high-skilled jobs by comparing the average wages of high-skilled expatriates from the US and the UK. They compare their wage levels at home and in Dubai, control for purchasing power parities, and find that the salaries are twice as that in their home countries. Competition for knowledge-intensive industries has predominantly arisen from the global North and as income levels in the UAE are twice as much as that in developed countries, there is an inherent risk on the price competitiveness of products on a global scale.

    Development model, SWF, and Top-down Approach

    A difference in the UAE’s late development model relative to others in the category is that while the latter was challenged in capital accumulation, it was easily accrued for the UAE. The difficulty for the UAE lies in using accumulated capital to break the dependency. Thus, the way forward for the UAE lies in a radical rethinking of its development model. Where vertical integration by first relocating labour-intensive industries demonstrates a bottom-up approach to development, the UAE is better positioned to approach development in a top-down model of vertical integration having accumulated capital. Although public sector investment and involvement in the economy is high, there exists scope to increase the synergies between industry-leading companies and local producers through the public sector. In this case, a policy instrument with the potential to push economic development is the state’s Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).

    The channelling of SWFs as a development policy instrument provides an opportunity for greater collaboration between international industry leaders and local businesses. Investing in the economic diversification of the country has been an important objective for the state’s SWFs. Some noticeable instances where the SWFs have built linkages between international companies and local businesses have been in the aerospace sector.[6] For instance, Mubadala entered into strategic partnerships with Airbus and Boeing in 2008 and 2009 respectively and launched Strata Manufacturing as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mubadala in 2009. Soon after Strata Manufacturing was launched, the company concluded agreements with both Airbus and Boeing to manufacture aircraft parts at its aerostructures manufacturing facility in Al-Ain. This further continued when Strata Manufacturing received a ten-year contract from Boeing for the manufacture of Boeing 777’s empennage ribs and vertical fin rib for Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner. This development model is novel because it demonstrates how embedded autonomy, a key feature in the East Asian development model, can be replicated while collaborating with established international companies for economic development at home. Sovereign Wealth Funds as an institutional investor demonstrate how the state can be at the forefront of national development efforts from a transnational level.

    This top-down model of economic development through SWFs is a novel use of the investment vehicle as a policy instrument. It allows the state to direct development from a transnational level, which is an important operational condition for developmental states in an era of globalization

    An important lesson from late developers in East Asia and Southeast Asia is that state-directed capitalism is important for economic development. This top-down model of economic development through SWFs is a novel use of the investment vehicle as a policy instrument. It allows the state to direct development from a transnational level, which is an important operational condition for developmental states in an era of globalization. Although the UAE has demonstrated the use of this instrument in some cases, there is great potential to further drive economic development towards the fourth industrial revolution through SWFs. There will likely be more linkages built between local businesses and international companies through SWFs as the UAE moves forward to a knowledge-intensive economy. As the article highlighted above, there will be challenges moving forward in ensuring price competitiveness at a global level when operating in a labour market with price distortions. To this end, the challenge remains in finding innovative financing mechanisms by state investors in the short run and for policymakers to introduce suitable policies for correcting the price distortions in the long run. This ongoing effort in the UAE requires a closer examination from researchers, development practitioners, and policymakers as it is a unique development model and has the potential to deliver promising developmental lessons.

     

    Notes

    [1] Euromoney; London”, Periodical, (1997), World Economic Analysis, United Arab Emirates Document no.:198889294, ProQuest One Business.

    [2] Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics And Policy-Making, p.87-129, Routledge, 2017.

    [3] Davidson, Christopher. The United Arab Emirates: A Study In Survival. 1st ed. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

    [4] Sampler, Jeffrey, and Saeb Eigner. Sand To Silicon. Dubai, UAE: Motivate Publ., 2008.

     

    [5] Davidson, Christopher. The United Arab Emirates: A Study In Survival. 1st ed. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005.

     

    [6] Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics And Policy-Making, p.103-108, Routledge, 2017.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Asharq AL-awsat

  • Vietnam and Russia Commit to Engagements across Domains

    Vietnam and Russia Commit to Engagements across Domains

    Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan Phuc has completed a “very successful and meaningful” visit to Russia with both sides making commitments to reinforce the comprehensive strategic partnership that spans multifaceted engagements across domains. Vietnam figures prominently in the Russian foreign policy and their bonhomie is best demonstrated by the fact that President Vladimir Putin has visited the country five times, a number more than any other country.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Vietnam Nguyen Xuan Phuc made a statement in the wake of their talks in Moscow – “The relations of comprehensive strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam are based upon years-long traditions of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation, laid down by the previous generations. They have been tested by time, they are not affected by conjuncture oscillations, and serve as an example of mutually respectful cooperation that corresponds to the basic interests of the two countries”

    President Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s visit to Russia merits attention from at least five perspectives. First at the politico-diplomatic levels: both sides have a common understanding of international issues; they endorse a multipolar world order; guided by the principles of resolving major conflicts in the world through diplomacy based on respect for international law. Moscow also acknowledges the increasing role of the ASEAN and Vietnam as important Member State. Russia has also agreed to “explore promising areas of cooperation” within the framework of the ASEAN Outlook for Indo-Pacific.

    Second, the Vietnam-Russia bilateral trade has made significant strides. Their bilateral trade reached US$4.05 billion in the first ten months of 2020 and Russia ranked 24 among 129 countries and territories investing in Vietnam. Russia plans to increase its offshore energy business in the country and the joint statement notes that “creation of favourable conditions for the expansion of activities of Russian and Vietnamese oil and gas companies in the territories of the two states and the implementation of joint projects in third countries in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the national legislation of Russia and Vietnam”;  however, it is important to mention that there are frequent standoffs. For instance, there was a major standoff in the Vanguard Bank involving 50 Vietnamese and 40 Chinese vessels over the operations of the drilling rig Hakuryu 5 operated by Russia’s Rosneft in Vietnam’s oil and gas Block 06-01.

    Third, their bilateral defence and security cooperation is well established and in September this year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Vietnamese counterpart Bui Thanh Son announced plans to ramp up military-technical cooperation including setting up a centre for nuclear science and technologies in Vietnam. Vietnamese military has acquired Russian origin naval and air platforms (Kilo Class submarines and SU-30MKK fighter jets) and the bilateral trade in arms increased from US$ 293 million (1993-99) to US$ 6514 million (1999-2018) and constituted nearly 84 per cent of all its military purchases.

    Fourth is about the COVID-19 pandemic that continues to rage in the world and its new variant Omicron bringing new fears. Vietnam has been impacted severely by the pandemic and has recently begun to open up. The US and China have provided it with vaccines. During President of Vietnam Nguyen Xuan Phuc visit to Russia, the  Russian Direct Investment Fund has signed an agreement for the “expansion of cooperation with partners in Vietnam aimed at the production of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine” involving the Russian pharmaceutical company Binnopharm Group and Vietnam’s T&T GROUP. RDIF, leading to creating a full-cycle production of Sputnik V in Vietnam.

    Fifth is the US-led Indo Pacific initiatives that clearly target China.  It merits mention that the joint statement issued at the end of the Summit notes that Russia and Vietnam “do not enter alliances and do not sign agreements with third countries to carry out actions that harm each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and basic interests,” and that “the development of Russian-Vietnamese relations is not aimed against any third side.”

    Vietnam has no plans to align with the US’ Indo Pacific strategy or any US initiatives that target China even though it has disputes with China in the South China Sea. Russia has stayed clear of the South China Sea disputes and has not supported China. It is conscious that it enjoys cordial relations with the majority of the ASEAN Member States.

    Meanwhile, the Russian Navy recently conducted joint exercises with the ASEAN navies including the Vietnamese Navy. The Russian ambassador to the ASEAN has stated that the exercises were about “peace, stability and prosperity in the region,” and the Indonesian first fleet commander said the exercise “enhance the interoperability and understanding between the Russian and ASEAN militaries”. Interestingly, these exercises are also being viewed as signalling ASEAN’s principle of non-alignment, particularly in current times of high regional tensions given that the ASEAN navies held similar exercises with the PLA Navy. The ASEAN Member States routinely conduct bilateral military-naval exercises with the navies of the US, Japan, Australia, India, France and the UK.

    Vietnam has adopted a pragmatic foreign policy and successive leadership have successfully managed tensions in the South China Sea. Likewise, Russia has major stakes in augmenting regional stability which provides for crucial convergences between Hanoi and Moscow.

     

    Feature Image Credit: tass.com

  • The Rich World’s Climate Hypocrisy

    The Rich World’s Climate Hypocrisy

    Many people around the world already consider the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow a disappointment. That is a massive understatement. Global leaders – especially in the developed world – still fail to grasp the gravity of the climate challenge. Although they acknowledge its severity and urgency in their speeches, they mostly pursue short-term national interests and make conveniently distant “” emissions pledges without clear and immediate commitments to act.

    Many of the statements by developed-country leaders at the COP26 summit in Glasgow are at odds with their actual climate policies, and with what they say in other settings. Their short-sighted strategy ultimately benefits no one – including the powerful corporate interests whose immediate financial interests it serves

    For example, could the real US government please stand up and declare itself? In his recent address in Glasgow, President Joe Biden said that “as we see current volatility in energy prices, rather than cast it as a reason to back off our clean energy goals, we must view it as a call to action.” Indeed, “high energy prices only reinforce the urgent need to diversify sources, double down on clean energy deployment, and adapt promising new clean-energy technologies.”

    But just three days later, the Biden administration claimed that OPEC+ is endangering the global economic recovery by not increasing oil production. It even warned that the United States is prepared to use “all tools” necessary to reduce fuel prices.

    This is one of the most blatant recent examples of climate hypocrisy by a developed-country leader, but it is by no means the only one. And the duplicity extends to the proceedings at COP26 itself, where developing-country negotiators are apparently finding that advanced economies’ positions in closed-door meetings are quite different from their public stances.

    Rich countries, which are responsible for the dominant share of global carbon-dioxide emissions to date, are dithering on longstanding commitments to provide climate finance to developing countries. They are also resisting a proposed operational definition that would prevent them from fudging what counts as climate finance. And they are still treating adaptation to climate change as a separate stream and refusing to provide finance to avert, minimize, and address the loss and damage associated with climate change in the worst-affected countries.

    The declared COP26 promises also reveal the developed world’s double standards. A group of 20 countries, including the US, pledged to end public financing for “unabated” fossil-fuel projects, including those powered by coal, by the end of 2022. But the prohibition applies only to international projects, not domestic ones. Significantly, the US and several other signatories refused to join the 23 countries that separately committed to stop new coal-power projects within their borders and phase out existing coal infrastructure.

    But even if the pledges in Glasgow had been more solid, rich-country governments, in particular, face a major credibility problem. They have previously made too many empty climate promises, undermining the interests of developing countries that have contributed little to climate change. Advanced economies have made emissions-reduction commitments that they have not kept, and reneged on their assurances to developing countries regarding not only climate finance but also technology transfer.

    The climate finance commitment is now 12 years old. At COP15 in Copenhagen, advanced economies promised to provide $100 billion per year to the developing world, and the 2015 Paris climate agreement made it clear that all developing countries would be eligible for such financing. This amount is trivial relative to developing countries’ need, which is in the trillions of dollars, and also when compared to the vast sums that rich countries have spent on fiscal and monetary support for their economies during the COVID-19 pandemic.

    But the developed world has not fulfilled even this relatively modest pledge. In 2019, total climate finance channeled to developing countries was less than $80 billion; the average amount each year since 2013 was only $67 billion. And this figure massively overstated the actual flows from developed-country governments, because bilateral public climate finance (which should have been provided to the developing world under the Paris accord) averaged less than $27 billion per year. The remainder came from multilateral institutions – including development banks – and private finance, which rich-country governments sought to take credit for mobilizing. Compared to this paltry sum, global fossil-fuel subsidies amounted to an estimated $555 billion per year from 2017 to 2019.

    Likewise, the rich world’s promises of green technology transfer have become mere lip service. Developed-country governments allowed domestic companies to cling to intellectual-property rights that block the spread of critical knowledge for climate mitigation and adaptation. When countries like China and India have sought to encourage their own renewable-energy industries, the US, in particular, has filed complaints with the World Trade Organization.

    This short-sighted strategy ultimately benefits no one, including the firms whose immediate financial interests it serves, because it accelerates the planet’s destruction and the revenge of nature on what now appears to be terminally stupid humanity. The student and activist marches in Glasgow against this myopic approach are important but are nowhere near enough to force governments to change course.

    The problem is that powerful corporate interests are clearly intertwined with political leadership. People around the world, and especially in the Global North, must become much more vociferous in insisting on meaningful climate action and a real change in economic strategy that resonates beyond national borders. Only that can end the rich world’s green hypocrisy and save us all.

    This article was published earlier in project-syndicate.org

  • Cambodia Assumes Chairmanship of the ASEAN

    Cambodia Assumes Chairmanship of the ASEAN

    While there is euphoria in Phnom Penh over the new responsibility, Prime Minister Hun Sen inherits at least five challenges from the previous ASEAN Chairmanship under Brunei.

    The gavel representing the ASEAN has arrived in Phnom Penh and it is a proud moment for the country to hold the position of Chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the third time after joining the grouping in 1999. In his customary remarks, Prime Minister Hun Sen announced that his country is “committed to leading ASEAN by championing the 2022 theme of “ASEAN Act” – Addressing Challenges Together – to increase harmony, peace and prosperity across the whole region”. He also assured to “uphold the core spirit of ASEAN’s basic principles of “One Vision, One Identity and One Community,”

    While there is euphoria in Phnom Penh over the new responsibility, Prime Minister Hun Sen inherits at least five challenges from the previous ASEAN Chairmanship under Brunei. First is the South China Sea.  Prime Minister HunSen did not hesitate to refer to it as “an unwelcome guest which now turns up on ASEAN’s doorstep annually and without fail”. He even labelled it a “very hot rock” amid fears that his country could be  “tossed” requiring sophisticated diplomacy wherein it is necessary to “catching it to avoid getting burned”

    In this context, it is useful to recall the 26 October 2021 Chairman’s Statement of the 24th ASEAN-China Summit which emphasised the “importance of non-militarisation and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities by claimants and all other states, including those mentioned in the DOC that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the South China Sea”. China continues to engage in exploration activities in the region much to the discomfort of the Philippines. Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia. Also, the Chinese coast guard vessels have engaged in coercion and their operations potentially undermine the ongoing negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

    The second is about ASEAN’s post-pandemic economic recovery. So far ASEAN Member States’ economic indicators are quite promising and marked by positive growth rates. Cambodia has an opportunity to prepare the region and the human resources for the impending disruption that will be marked by Industry 4.0 technologies. It requires regional digitalisation and impetus to fintech through innovation pivoting on resilience across sectors. This issue is also highlighted in the Chairman’s Statement of the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits. The ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on Advancing Digital Transformation in ASEAN has also called for strengthening “regional digital integration and transformation to enhance the region’s competitiveness, and turn the current pandemic crisis into an opportunity through digital transformation.”

    The third issue is about Myanmar. It may be recalled that Myanmar did not participate in the 38th and 39thASEAN Summits after the ASEAN decided to bar Myanmar’s military chief Min Aung Hlaing to join the meeting. This decision, by all accounts, was a “rare bold step by a regional grouping known for its non-interference and engagement”. Prime Minister Hun Sen is concerned about the possibility of a humanitarian crisis in the country and was quite candid to note that the “situation in Myanmar could escalate – and maybe even turn into a full-scale civil war – and so Cambodia must be well-prepared and ready to deal with any potential crisis there.”

    The fourth priority for Cambodia as the Chairmanship of the ASEAN would be to take forward the objectives and principles of the ASEAN Outlook for Indo Pacific (AIOP) initiative. ASEAN’s engagement in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions would be in four key areas i.e.  Maritime cooperation, connectivity, UN SDGs 2030, economic and other possible areas of cooperation. However, the grouping believes that the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms should drive the AIOP for which Cambodia would have to marshal all diplomatic skills at its disposal to convince the major players in the Indo-Pacific of the importance of the AOIP as also about ASEAN’s centrality.

    Although AUKUS did not feature in Prime Minister Hun Sen’s remarks or the Chairman’s statement on the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits, it looms large in the minds of the Member States

    Fifth, Cambodia would have to develop a sophisticated response to the AUKUS which has added a new dimension to the existing security challenges emerging from the QUAD which is allegedly targeted against China. Although AUKUS did not feature in Prime Minister Hun Sen’s remarks or the Chairman’s statement on the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits, it looms large in the minds of the Member States. Indonesian and Malaysian are concerned fearing that the development can result in an arms race and encourage the buildup of power projection capabilities; however, the Philippines has welcomed the AUKUS.  The current situation is akin to the division among the ASEAN Member States over the presence of the Western military in the region. AUKUS has provoked China too and it can potentially intensify US-China military contestation in the western Pacific that further adds to insecurities among the Southeast Asian countries.

    Finally, Cambodia’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN attracts numerous challenges but it remains to be seen how Phnom Penh steers the ASEAN in the coming months particularly when the US too has come down heavily with sanctions on Cambodia after it permitted a Chinese company to build military-naval infrastructure at the Ream Naval Base arguing that it threatens regional security.

    Image Credit: cambodianess.com

  • Democracy and Legislation: Lack of Parliamentary Debates negates the Constitution and accountability to the People

    Democracy and Legislation: Lack of Parliamentary Debates negates the Constitution and accountability to the People

    Democratic principles have long been accepted as the cornerstone of Free India. Reaching beyond a mere organizational setup, democracy has been treated as the ideal through which equality and justice are sought to be ensured for the people.

    Despite the well-recognised principles of equity and transparency in the practice of democracy, it is well established that various Governments, on many occasions in independent India’s history, have resorted to flouting constitutional democratic principles for personal gain; the widely criticized imposition of emergency under Indira Gandhi is one such example. It evident that the Indian people are once more confronted by a situation where the government of the day is guilty of flouting of democratic norms. This article examines various instances of current parliamentary practices in this context.

    60 per cent of proposals were referred to Standing or Select Committees during the United Progressive Alliance’s first term. During the UPA-II administration, this rose to 71 per cent. NDA’s first term from 2014-19 had a 27 per cent reference rate, while it’s second term, so far, has only 12 per cent rate.

    Institutional norms and parliamentary procedures in India, especially for legislation making are designed to ensure space for debate, discussion and dissent. This operates as a system where all decisions are subjected to scrutiny by the people’s representatives. To that end, whether a ruling party adheres to parliamentary procedure speaks volumes about the respect accorded to to the constitution and democracy at large. To analyse whether the current government is adhering to parliamentary procedures and by extension, if it is truly democratic, one must first ascertain what exactly constitutes the ideal parliamentary procedure.

    Parliamentary Procedure on Legislation Making: How Does A Bill Become An Act

    Acts usually start as bills which simply put, is the draft of a legislative proposal. This bill may be introduced by public members or private members and requires passing in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha as well as the president’s assent to become a law.

    There are three stages through which a bill is passed in the parliament: these are known as the first, second and third reading respectively.

    For the First Reading, the speaker puts forth the request for leave of the house, which if granted is used to introduce the bill. Following this stage is the second reading which entails general discussion. It is during this stage that the House may choose to refer the bill to a parliamentary committee for further input or even circulate it to gauge public opinion. During the second reading, parliamentary procedure states that a clause-by-clause reading must proceed and it is during this time amendments are moved. The second reading concludes with the adoption of ‘Enacting Formula’ and ‘Long Title of the Bill’. The next stage is the third and the last reading. At this Juncture, debates for and against the bill take place. For an ordinary bill, only a simple majority of the members present, and voting suffices, however for a constitutional amendment bill, in keeping with article 368 of the constitution, a majority of the house’s total members and at least 2/3rd members present and voting is deemed necessary. Once this process is complete, the bill is sent to the other house of the parliament and goes through the same stages after which it is referred to the president for his assent.

    Modi Government’s track-record of Passing of Bills

    Leaders of opposition and Journalist reports have alleged that the aforementioned procedure has been cast aside by the current regime in favour of bulldozing the bills without debates. This argument is not without merit and one can identify some central ways in which the ruling party has violated parliamentary procedure.

    The first and most grievous is the misuse of Article 123 also known as the Ordinance Route. Article 123 of the constitution permits the president to enact a temporary law in the event of urgent and unavoidable circumstances. It is clear that the Article 123 has been exploited by the current government.

    During the first 30 years of our parliamentary democracy, for every 10 bills in the parliament, one ordinance was issued. In the following 30 years, this number went to 2 ordinances per every 10 bills. During the period 2014-2019 of the BJP government, this number went up to 3.5 ordinances per every ten bills. For perspective, while 61 ordinanceswere issued under the UPA government spanning ten years, the government led by the BJP issued 76 ordinances in a time frame of 7 years spanning from May 2014 to April 2021. It is also useful to note that ten of these ordinances were issued right before the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.

    Astonishingly, as many as 11 ordinances have been passed since March 24th, 2020, which is when the lockdown was imposed. Five of these relate to covid 19, two to the health sector, every other ordinance such as the Banking Regulation Amendment and the Agriculture bills do not have anything to do with the coronavirus pandemic.

    States have also used ordinances to pass legislation. A non-BJP ruled state Kerala, for example, published 81 regulations in 2020, whereas Karnataka issued 24, and Maharashtra issued 21. Kerala has also re-promulgated ordinances: between January 2020 and February 2021, one ordinance to establish a Kerala University of Digital Sciences, Innovation, and Technology was promulgated five times.

    Although previous administrations have utilized ordinances to undermine the constitutional process, the problem is decidedly amplified under the present rule with regards to the number of ordinances produced per given period.

    This sort of rise in Ordinances being issued points to a trend of avoiding in-depth critical evaluation and discussion on proposals by rushing them into becoming acts.

    One of the most controversial ordinances in the recent past pertains to the three farm laws. The reason for not introducing these proposals in the parliament and instead enacting ordinances is unclear for there seems to be no urgent link to the covid 19 pandemic. Additionally, the farm bills not being subjected to any discussions nor being referred to parliamentary committees for any further report making has led to removing any possibility for amendment. These laws provide a useful avenue to assess why the bill was not passed through a proper parliamentary process and instead rushed through the ordinance.

    The ordinance culture has also extended to BJP run states, for instance, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat adopted ordinances weakening labour laws without consulting workers’ unions or civil rights organisations during the lockdown. Moreover, this was followed up on 15th March 2020, when colonial-era legislation was enacted as an Ordinance. This was the Uttar Pradesh Recovery of Damages to Public and Private Property Ordinance which would heavily fine any damage to property, public or private during a protest.

    Moreover, the current administration can be observed violating the parliamentary procedure for there is very little or no involvement of parliamentary committees. Parliamentary committees are key in assessing a proposal with necessary scrutiny and expertise.  These committees provide a place for Members to interact with subject experts and government officials while they are studying a bill.

    60 per cent of proposals were referred to Standing or Select Committees during the United Progressive Alliance’s first term. During the UPA-II administration, this rose to 71 per cent. Prime minister Modi’s first term from 2014-19 had a 27 per cent reference rate, while his second term so far has a 12 per cent rate. Not only is there a blatant and marked disregard for referring bills to parliamentary committees, but the administration has also actively worked to hinder committee work. A meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology on July 28, 2021, had to be cancelled owing to a lack of quorum when 15 BJP members refused to sign the attendance register, it is speculated this was to avoid the discussion on the Pegasus scandal.

    Monsoon Session of Parliament

    The most recent monsoon session of the Parliament is an apt depiction of how the administration has bypassed the norms and rules of parliamentary procedure, endangering the democratic processes that citizens invest faith in.

    A record number of 12 bills were passed by the parliament in the first 10 days of the monsoon session. All these bills were passed by a voice vote which is a tremendously inaccurate mechanism to assess supporters of a particular proposal. None of these 12 bills nor the overall 14 bills were referred to standing committees for in-depth analysis.  According to TMC leader Derek O’Brien, the government rushed through and passed 12 Bills at an average time of under 7 minutes per bill. In the same vein, BSP MP Danish Ali commented that the Essential Defence Services Bill was passed in less than 10 minutes.

    Be it the ordinance route, curtailing zero hour, the excessive use of voice vote or the bypassing of parliamentary committees, all point towards the same and devastating trend, the lack of adherence to parliamentary procedure. This must compel citizens to take stock of whether India needs a reminder on how democratic proceedings should proceed and accountability to the people be restored.

    Feature Image: medium.com

  • Drought or Floods? : Tamil Nadu Needs An Integrated Water Management Policy

    Drought or Floods? : Tamil Nadu Needs An Integrated Water Management Policy

    Tamil Nadu not only requires a more sustainable and scientific approach to water management but an integrated development model that no longer separates the human environment, basic needs, ecological justice and public accountability   

    Every time we are faced with drought or floods, we all complain about the absence of a more sustainable water management policy in the state.  Politicians and the political parties blame each other and present competing narratives of their achievements when people are caught in deep crises of survival either due to bad drought or worse floods.  The bureaucrats, police, public charity and the brave hearts work round the clock while the government monitors the rescue, relief and resettlement of the victims though patterns and intensity of engagements differ between the floods and drought situation.

    We then return to our normal selves when the floods recede and the victims of extreme drought disappear from our sight.  What happened to the excessive water during the floods and the thirsty/hungry people in drought situations who seemed to have gone out of sight? It is important to argue for a more sustainable water management policy and at the same time explore the challenges in developing and executing such a policy. We do not have an open and democratic media/socio-political environment to discuss and debate between the ministers, bureaucrats, experts, non-state actors and creative members of the civil society beyond the blame game. A curious gap is that there are no solutions emerging while causes are either understated or overemphasized by different experts and groups depending on their professional background and personal worldview.

     

    The government appears to be in a catch-22 situation over urbanization, industrialization, population growth, migrations, and the urban slums.  The impact of rural poverty, state of agriculture, unemployment, migrations as well as the level of the rural-urban divide has not been studied adequately even in a developed state like Tamil Nadu.  But there is no escape from the truth that the government is the major violator and path setter for more violations of environmental principles and laws of nature by the greedy builders and corporate interests.

    It may be relevant to recall here the Chennai floods in 2015 and the worse water shortage in less than four years time in 2019.  Besides rapid industrialization and massive urbanization issues, Chennai is also faced with the challenges of climate change which is altering the weather patterns resulting in deadly floods and prolonged droughts.  Given the nature of challenges, there is a need to move beyond developing an appropriate water management policy and strengthening climate change resilience towards addressing core concerns of our democracy such as the absence of public accountability and rights without responsibilities.

     

    Chennai’s water bodies have shrunk at an alarming rate without much public attention. Every lake that has disappeared in Chennai had been part of our ecological system. Pallikaranai marshland has unfortunately been forced to yield land to hospitals, government buildings and educational institutions including (paradoxically) the Indian Institute of Technology – Madras (IIT-M) and National Institute of Ocean Technology.

    Chennai’s water bodies have shrunk at an alarming rate without much public attention. Every lake that has disappeared in Chennai had been part of our ecological system. Pallikaranai marshland has unfortunately been forced to yield land to hospitals, government buildings and educational institutions including (paradoxically) the Indian Institute of Technology – Madras (IIT-M) and National Institute of Ocean Technology. Today, Ennore creek faces a much bigger threat than ever before.  It is time we discuss more openly about our public policy, political culture, and abuse of social power, corruption in public life and the lack of environmental ethics. In intrinsic terms, this reveals about a political society without a conscience for environmental justice which forms the basis of social justice, distributional justice and good governance.

    The percentage culture and corruption prevalent among the politicians cutting across the party and political loyalties and the nexus between the politicians, bureaucrats and the business interests are one of the most unfortunate but successful stories of decentralization of public administration in Tamil Nadu.  If these arguments appear unreasonable, then how do we explain the rise and role of sand mafias, stone quarry contractors, timber lobbies, water industry and corporate bodies engaged in mineral extraction and exploitation?  These are not unspecified and general observations because of the fact that these individuals and the corporates control the lakes, rivers, forests, seashores, land access and ultimately the policy process within the government. Although slum dwellers, settlers along the river banks and seashores as well as forest people appear as main violators of the laws of State, yet the truth is vastly different.  The Palar River in the north, Cauvery River flowing through the west to east and the Tamiraparani River in the south of Tamil Nadu bear testimonies to this brutal reality of sand quarrying and criminal nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, industrialists and the sand mafia in Tamil Nadu.

    We need to question our materialistic approach to progress in the name of growth and development.  It is not adequate to boast about our progress in social justice and the inclusive model of development without environmental justice and responsibility to our future generations.  Tamil Nadu not only requires a more sustainable and scientific approach to water management but an integrated development model that no longer separates the human environment, basic needs, ecological justice and public accountability.

  • Periyar: A social justice champion and beyond

    Periyar: A social justice champion and beyond

    Periyar remains hugely influential and relevant to the politics in Tamil Nadu because of his stance on caste, social justice and rationalist worldview of religion. One need not be an atheist to understand and appreciate Periyar. He continues to be the chief patriarch of Dravidian movement and parties committed to social justice.

    Periyar was one of the most underrated social revolutionaries and political philosophers of twentieth century. Indian political system and its north centric obsession placed him at the periphery more as a dissent than as an untiring crusader for social justice. This prejudice is due to the nature of political discourse revolving around the great divide based on Aryan-Dravidian identity, language, socio-religious and cultural ethos. Periyar challenged the foundations of Indian philosophy with its roots in the Brahmanical Hindu worldview of caste and karma.


    Read More

  • Distress Migration: A case study of KBK districts in Odisha

    Distress Migration: A case study of KBK districts in Odisha

    The former districts of Koraput, Balangir and Kalahandi, also known as KBK districts, were reorganised into 8 districts of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Balangir, Subarnapur, Kalahandi and Nuapada in 1992. These districts form the South-West part of Odisha comprising the great Deccan Plateau and the Eastern Ghats. These highland districts highly rich in mineral resources, flora and fauna remain as one of the most backward regions in Odisha

    Among the different forms of migration, distressed migrants remain the most impoverished and unrecognised. These migrants form the lowest strata of the society; disadvantaged by caste, poverty and structural inequalities. In Odisha, the underdeveloped region of KBK is one among the main sources of distressed migrants. They move to cities in search of employment and better wages, while in cities they are even more disadvantaged due to social, economic and linguistic barriers. Administrative and political apathy over their issues has only enhanced their distress.

    This paper attempts to address three questions:

    1. What are the characteristics of distressed migrants in KBK district, Odisha?
    2. What are the existing policies of the state to curb this form of migration?
    3. What form of government intervention is required to address this distress?

    The analysis is carried out through a review of published articles, government reports, e-books and newspaper reports.

    Defining distress migration

    Migration is a multifaceted concept driven by diverse factors. Migration can be internal or international, voluntary or involuntary, temporary or permanent. Depending on the pattern and choice of migration, each migratory trend could be characterised into different forms. Distress migration is one such form of migration.

    Involuntary migration is often associated with displacement out of conflict, environmental distress, climatic change etc. That is any sudden threat or event forces people to migrate. However, involuntary migration may also arise out of socio-economic factors such as poverty, food insecurity, lack of employment opportunities, unequal distribution of resources etc. This component of involuntary migration is addressed by the concept of distress migration (Avis, 2017).

    To understand distressed rural-urban migration in India, the broad definition used by Mander and Sahgal (2010) in their analysis of rural-urban migration in Delhi can be employed. They have discussed distress migration as:

    “Such movement from one’s usual place of residence which is undertaken in conditions where the individual and/or the family perceive that there are no options open to them to survive with dignity, except to migrate. Such distress is usually associated with extreme paucity of alternate economic options, and natural calamities such as floods and drought. But there may also be acute forms of social distress which also spur migration, such as fear of violence and discrimination which is embedded in patriarchy, caste discrimination, and ethnic and religious communal violence” ( Mander and Sahgal, 2010)

    In brief, the definition states that distress migration is caused by an array of issues. Environmental disasters, economic deprivation, gender or social oppression, lack of alternate employment opportunities and inability to survive with dignity are mentioned as the main drivers of distress migration (Avis, 2017).

    Thus, distress migration is a form of temporary migration driven by environmental and socio-economic factors and not based on an informed or voluntary choice.

    Profile of KBK districts

    The former districts of Koraput, Balangir and Kalahandi, also known as the KBK districts, were reorganised into 8 districts of Koraput, Malkangiri, Nabarangpur, Rayagada, Balangir, Subarnapur, Kalahandi and Nuapada in 1992. These districts form the South-West part of Odisha comprising the great Deccan Plateau and the Eastern Ghats. These highland districts highly rich in mineral resources, flora and fauna remain as one of the most backward regions in Odisha. The region is termed backward on account of rural backwardness, high poverty rates, low literacy rates, underdeveloped agriculture and poor development of infrastructure and transportation (Directorate of Economics and Statistics, 2021).

    The districts are home to primitive tribal communities such as Gonds, Koyas, Kotias etc. dependent on forest produce and subsistence agriculture for a living. KBK region registered a workforce participation rate of 48.06 % in the 2011 census. There was a significant occupation change noticed from the 2011 census.  The region witnessed a fall in cultivators from 33% in 2001 to 26.7% in 2011. However, the fall in cultivators was compensated with an increase in agricultural labourers from 44.24 % in 2001 to 48.87% in 2011. Employment in household industries also witnessed a downfall between the period of 2001 to 2011 (Sethy, 2020).

    The rise in agricultural labourers has a negative impact on the communities. As agriculture is underdeveloped owing to the arid nature of the region, crop failure, extreme calamities, low net irrigated area and falling government expenditure, these workers are pushed into abject poverty. In search of alternate employment options, these workers migrate to other areas of employment in rural or urban pockets. Such a form of seasonal migration during the lean period in agriculture is a predominant phenomenon in these districts. Their dependence on non-timber forest produce is hindered by the rapid deterioration and deforestation of forests for development projects and mining.

    Characteristics of distressed migrants in KBK region

    1. Who Are These Distressed Migrants?

    In the KBK region, distress migration has been a popular coping strategy during lean periods of agriculture. And this strategy is majorly adapted by disadvantaged and marginalised sections of the region. They are disadvantaged by caste, chronic poverty, landlessness, low levels of literacy and skills, increased dependence on forest and agriculture and debt-ridden (Meher, 2017; Mishra D.K., 2011; Tripathy, 2015, 2021).

    1. Why Do They Migrate

    Distressed migration in the region is induced by many interlinked factors. One such factor is that the region is highly under-developed in terms of social and economic infrastructure. Such under-development puts the communities at a disadvantage with low levels of literacy and skills. Their dependence on agriculture and forest produce for livelihood rises. However, agriculture is under-developed and forests are subjected to high levels of deforestation. With low levels of income, crop failure and non-availability of alternate employment opportunities, the communities are subjected to absolute levels of poverty, food and employment insecurities (Kujur, 2019).

    Landlessness is also identified as one significant push factor. As the region is highly dominated by tribal communities, they are more attached to and dependent on the forest cover. Globalisation and industrialisation resulted in deforestation and encroachment of farmlands for industrial and mining purposes. Eventually, a major proportion of land remains with a smaller group of wealthy people (Mishra D.K., 2011).   Relocation and involuntary displacement also result in the loss of their livelihood that is dependent on the local environment (Jaysawal & Saha, 2016).

    With falling income, people approach local moneylenders to meet their basic sustenance needs. With low incomes from agriculture and forest produce, families approach these informal creditors to meet emergency needs like marriage, birth and death rituals or medical treatment as well as to meet basic consumption needs with the expectation of cash flow from labour contractors during the lean season. Moneylenders exploit them by charging higher interest rates. Thus, the non-availability of formal credit facilities pushes them into a debt trap and further to adopt migration (KARMI, 2014; Mishra D.K., 2016).

    The region is also subject to extreme calamities and drought. Small and marginal farmers, poor in income and land, choose to migrate as they are unable to cope with the regular droughts and climate change. A study on historical analysis of the effect of climate on migration in Western Odisha mentions that the migratory trend saw a rise after the mega drought in 1965. Up until then, large-scale migration from the region was not a phenomenon (Panda, 2017).

     

    1. Channel of Migration

    Sardars provide an advance amount and in exchange, the debtor or any family member agrees to work for them for a stipulated period, usually six months. Hence, there exists a form of debt bondage. Large-scale family migration through this system is seen in the KBK region. The major stream of such bonded labour migration is witnessed towards brick kilns in Andhra Pradesh

    In the region, seasonal migration occurs through the channels of agents, locally known as Sardars, on a contractual basis. This form of migration is known as Dadan labour migration. The poor migrant labourers are known as Dadan and they are recruited by Sardars, who are usually local people who are familiar with residents in the region (KARMI, 2014). During the period of Nukhai, they go around the villages and contact prospective labourers. These Sardars are the intermediary between the employer and the migrant labourer. Sardars provide an advance amount and in exchange, the debtor or any family member agrees to work for them for a stipulated period, usually six months. Hence, there exists a form of debt bondage. Large-scale family migration through this system is seen in the KBK region. The major stream of such bonded labour migration is witnessed towards brick kilns in Andhra Pradesh. They are also a major source of labour in the areas of construction, handlooms and other forms of informal sector work across South India (Daniels, 2014). The problems they face in the destination are manifold. They are subjected to poor working conditions, poor housing and sanitation facilities and limited access to education and health facilities. They are recognised as cheap labour with limited bargaining power owing to their social, cultural and linguistic exclusion in the destination state. Upon entering the contract their freedom to move and freedom to express is denied (Acharya, 2020).

    1. Pull Factors to Migrate

    The hope of availability of better job opportunities and wages is the main pull factor. However, upon the analysis of the nature of migration, push factors have a higher weightage in inducing such distress migration. Migration to brick kilns and other informal sectors from the KBK region can be termed as distress migration as in this case, distress is caused mainly by socioeconomic factors. It is not an informed or voluntary choice. Debt migration remains the only coping strategy that they could adopt.

    Government intervention to curb such distress

    1. Policies Addressing Debt-Bondage Migration:

    The first attempt of the state government to address Dadan migration or debt migration is the enactment of the Dadan Labour (Control and Regulation) Act (ORLA) in 1975. The act had provisions for the registration of labourers and agents, ensuring compliance of minimum wages and favourable working conditions and appointing inspection officers and dispute redressal committees (Daniels, 2014).  However, the act remained on paper and no evidence of enactment was published until it was repealed in 1979 upon the enactment of the Interstate Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 (Nanda, 2017).

    The ISMW act has been criticised to be inadequate and failing to regulate and facilitate safe migration. According to the act, only those interstate migrant workmen who are recruited by licensed agents come under the ambit of the act. However, most agents involved in Dadan migration are not licensed and hence, these workers cannot avail of any of the provisions of the act (Singh, 2020). Though registration of labour contractors is mandatory in the origin state, there is no information about the names of these contractors and hence, further monitoring of the migration process is avoided (NCABL, 2016). Lack of adequate enforcement, under-staffing and poor infrastructure are identified as the reasons for poor implementation of the act in the state (Daniels, 2014).

    A positive attempt against distress migration was the Memorandum of Undertaking (MoU) initiated between the labour department of Odisha and Andhra Pradesh to ensure labour welfare measures of migrant workers in Brick Kilns. After the MoU, the state of undivided Andhra Pradesh took up various progressive measures in education, health, housing and PDS for migrant workers in Brick Kilns. ILO necessitated the need for states to enter into inter-state MoUs to effectively address the bonded labour migration. However, no further MoU was signed with other states like Tamil Nadu, Chhattisgarh etc. which are also among the major host states for migrants from the region (NCABL, 2016).

    The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act enacted in 1976 governs the provisions for identification, rescue and rehabilitation of bonded labourers across the country. The act has its loopholes in implementation. There is no information on whether vigilance committees have been set up in every district or whether the surveys have been periodically conducted or to what extent the act has been functioning in the state (Post News Network, 2019). The centrally sponsored scheme for Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour also has its setbacks. There have been reported cases of delay and denial of financial aid by district officials ( Mishra .S., 2016). In 2016, with restructuring and revamping of the Rehabilitation scheme, rescued workers could only avail the full amount of financial aid with the prosecution of the accused employers. With no database on the employer, the rates of prosecution have been low and the rescued bonded labour do not receive their funds (NACBL, 2016)

    1.  Ensuring Accessibility of Health Facilities in Destination

    The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana or RSBY launched by the central government in 2008 provides health insurance to BPL families. The scheme incorporates provisions to split smart cards so those migrant workers could avail health insurance in destination states. After signing of the MoU between Andhra Pradesh and Odisha, the two states took steps to spreading awareness among the migrant workers about how to use the smart cards (Inter-State Migrant Workman Act (ISMW), Labour Directorate, n.d.)

    1. Ensuring Education of Migrant Workers Children

    The state of Odisha has established seasonal hostels to ensure the education of children of migrant workers.  The children are enrolled in seasonal hostels during October-June, that is until their parents return home (Odisha Primary Education Programme Authority, n.d.).  The state has ensured the education of migrant children at their destination state by sending Odiya textbooks and Odiya teachers to residential schools in Andhra Pradesh (Inter-State Migrant Workman Act (ISMW), Labour Directorate, n.d.).

    1. Alternate Employment Opportunities: MGNREGA

    Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) was introduced in 2006 to provide guaranteed employment to rural poor with the objective of uplifting them from poverty and restricting distress migration.  A study analysing the performance of MGNREGA through secondary sources of data suggests that based on physical criteria of 100 Days of Wage Employment, Person-days generated, ST and Women person-days and financial performance in terms of total expenditure, total wages, average cost and average wage rate per day person, the performance of MGNREGA in KBK districts is better compared to Non- KBK districts.  But the region is lagging in rural employability criteria based on average days of employment provided per household and job cards issued (Sahoo et al., 2018).  Labour in the region is not interested to work under MGNREGA due to its dismal implementation in the state. Workers complain about the delay in receiving payments and instances of the creation of non-existent workers’ names among MGNREGA’s beneficiaries (KARMI, 2014).  Uncertain and low wages make these labourers favour migration to Brick Kilns in hope of better wages (Deep, 2018).

    1. Development Policies in KBK Region

    The KBK region has a high incidence of poverty owing to regional disparities in development and social exclusion based on caste. The main initiatives implemented by the state government for the upliftment of the KBK region are the Special Area Development Programme, Revised Long Term Action Plan (RLTAP), Biju KBK Plan, Backward Regions Grants Fund, Gopabandhu Gramin Yojana (GGY), Special Central Assistance (SCA) for tribal sub-plan (TSP) areas, Western Odisha Development Council (WODC) and Grants under Article 275(1) of the Constitution. Development projects to reduce poverty and regional disparities are obstructed by economic, social and institutional factors (Mishra, 2020).

     

    The state of Odisha has done positive interventions in the education of migrant children and health facilities of the migrant population. However, the distress migration is still prevalent owing to the social and economic exclusion and debt bondage situations in the region. Land grabbing in the name of development left the tribal communities poor and in distress. Structural inequalities induced by caste discrimination are enhanced with such landlessness.

     

     

     

    Policy Recommendations

    The state of Odisha has done positive interventions in the education of migrant children and health facilities of the migrant population. However, the distress migration is still prevalent owing to the social and economic exclusion and debt bondage situations in the region. Several initiatives and schemes have been enacted to address distress migration; however, their failure in reducing distress can be linked to dismal governance, poor implementation and misappropriation of schemes.

    The state must ensure migration to be safe and a viable coping strategy. From this study it is suggested the state of Odisha follow a multipronged approach to address the distress.

    Origin state (Odisha) interventions

    •         Short Term Interventions:
    1. The system of debt bondage should be completely abolished by the proper implementation of legislation. Different loopholes in implementation such as the delay in the release of funds, prosecution of accused and identification and registration of middlemen should be addressed. Apart from the financial aid, the state should intervene in providing a comprehensive livelihood plan for the rescued labourers. Abolishing the bonded labour system is essential to reduce distress and make migration safe.
    2. Informal sources of credit should be eliminated and formal credit and microfinance facilities should be made available. Such facilities would reduce the exploitation and prevent the creation of absurd debt. Formal credit provides opportunities for small and marginal farmers to indulge in productive investments. This enables them to cope with extreme climatic changes.
    3. Land grabbing in the name of development left the tribal communities poor and in distress. Structural inequalities induced by caste discrimination are enhanced with such landlessness. The provision of land ownership enables the communities to enjoy land-based benefits which further supports them to sustain their livelihood. Ownership of land also provides the indigenous community with a sense of social and economic significance.
    •         Long term interventions
    1. The state should engage in enhancing the skills of the people in the region. Vocational skill training and development schemes can be introduced. This could expand the opportunities available for employment and distribute labour across all the economic sectors.
    2. Rural development should be given higher priority. The state of Odisha has already initiated many schemes for the development of the KBK region. However, the state should study the economic and social factors that stagnate the process of development in the region. Chronic poverty, poor infrastructural and rural connectivity and dismal education and health facilities are some of the important areas that require attention.

    Host state intervention

    1.   The host state needs to create a database of migrants entering their state. A statistically significant database on migrants solves a huge array of issues faced by the migrant in the destination state. A comprehensive database helps in identifying and recognising migrants. It also allows for understanding the different characteristics of migrants and the sectors in which they are employed. This would be beneficial for monitoring and ensuring safe and favourable working conditions. A database also helps in ensuring the availability and accessibility of social security and entitlements in host states.

     

    1.   Migrant labour is as important to the destination state as it is to the origin state. Both origin and host state should cooperate towards making migration a viable livelihood strategy.

    Another important area where both the origin and host state should intervene together is creating awareness among workers about the existing provisions and rights available to them. Access to the same should be made easy.

    Conclusion

    The highly backward districts of the KBK region remain a major source of distressed migrants. Years of state initiative in reducing distress have had negligible impact. The area remains underdeveloped and migration is the only viable choice of employment. Migration can only be a viable coping strategy for seasonal migrants when the channel of migration is made legal and safe. The major drawback in any initiative attempted to resolve distress is the poor implementation. Administrative apathy, corruption and misappropriation of schemes have stagnated the progress of every initiative.

     

    References

    1. Acharya, A. K. (2020). Caste-based migration and exposure to abuse and exploitation: Dadan labour migration in India. Contemporary Social Science, 1-13.
    2. Avis, W. R. (2017). Scoping study on defining and measuring distress migration.
    3. Bhatta Mishra, R. (2020). Distress migration and employment in indigenous Odisha, India: Evidence from migrant-sending households. World Development, 136, 105047.
    4. Daniels, U. (2014). Analytical review of the market, state and civil society response to seasonal migration from Odisha. Studies, stories and a canvas seasonal labour migration and migrant workers from Odisha, 106-115.
    5. Deep, S. S. Seasonal Migration and Exclusion: Educational Experiences of children in Brick Kilns. Ideas, Peoples and Inclusive Education in India. National Coalition for Education, India. 2018.
    6. Directorate of Economics and Statistics (2021). Odisha Economic Survey 2020-21. Planning and Convergence Department. Government of Odisha. http://www.desOdisha.nic.in/pdf/Odisha%20Economic%20Survey%202020-21-1.pdf
    7. Giri, J. (2009). Migration in Koraput: “In Search of a Less Grim Set of Possibilities” A Study in Four Blocks of tribal-dominated Koraput District, Odisha. Society for Promoting Rural Education and Development, Odisha, 1.
    8. Inter-State Migrant Workman Act (ISMW) | Labour Directorate. (n.d.). Labour Directorate, Government of Odisha. Retrieved August 10, 2021, from https://labdirodisha.gov.in/?q=node/63%27%3B.
    9. Jaysawal, N., & Saha, S. (2018). Impact of displacement on livelihood: a case study of Odisha. Community Development Journal, 53(1), 136-154.j
    10. Jena, M. (2018, July 21). Distress migration: land ownership can put a break. The Pioneer. https://www.dailypioneer.com/2018/state-editions/distress-migration-land-ownership-can-put-a-break.html
    11. KARMI. (2014). Migration Study Report of Golamunda Block of Kalahandi District of Odisha. Pp.13. Kalahandi Organisation of AgKriculture and Rural Marketing Initiative (KARMI), Kalahandi Odisha.
    12. Kujur, R. (2019). Underdevelopment and patterns of labour migration: a reflection from Bolangir district, Odisha. research journal of social sciences, 10(1).
    13. Mahapatra, S. K., & Patra, C. (2020). Effect of migration on agricultural growth & development of KBK District of Odisha: A statistical assessment. Journal of Pharmacognosy and Phytochemistry, Sp, 9(2), 162-167.
    14. Mander, H., & Sahgal, G. (2010). Internal migration in India: distress and opportunities, a study of internal migrants to vulnerable occupations in Delhi.
    15. Meher, S. K. (2017). Distress seasonal migration in rural Odisha A case study of Nuapada District.
    16. Mishra, D. K. (2011, April). Behind dispossession: State, land grabbing and agrarian change in rural Odisha. In International conference on global land grabbing(Vol. 6, No. 8).
    17. Mishra, D. K. (2016). Seasonal migration from Odisha: a view from the field. Internal migration in contemporary India, 263-290.
    18. Mishra, S. (2016, January 13). Rescued migrant workers get raw deal from Govt. The Pioneer. https://www.dailypioneer.com/2016/state-editions/rescued-migrant-workers-get-raw-deal-from-govt.html
    19. Mishra, S. (2020). Regional Disparities in Odisha–A Study of the Undivided “Kbk” Districts. Research Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 11(4), 261-266.
    20. Nanda, S. K. (2017). Labour scenario in Odisha. Odisha Review, 73(10), 20-25.
    21. NCABL. (2016). Joint Stakeholders’ Report on Situation of Bonded Labour in India for Submission to United Nations Universal Periodic Review III. NATIONAL COALITION FOR ABOLITION OF BONDED LABOUR (NCABL), Bhubaneswar Odisha.
    22. Panda, A. (2017). Climate change, drought and vulnerability: A historical narrative approach to migration from Western Odisha, India. In Climate Change, Vulnerability and Migration(pp. 193-211). Routledge India.
    23. Post News Network. (2019, April 30). Elimination of bonded labour calls for cohesive action plan. Odisha News, Odisha Latest News, Odisha Daily – OdishaPOST. https://www.Odishapost.com/elimination-of-bonded-labour-calls-for-cohesive-action-plan/
    24. Sahoo, M., Pradhan, L., & Mishra, S. (2018). MGNREGA and Labour Employability-A Comparative Analysis of KBK and Non-KBK Regions of Odisha, India. Indian Journal of Economics and Development, 6(9), 1-8.
    25. Sethy, P. (2020). Changing Occupational Structure of Workers in KBK Districts of Odisha. Center for Development Economic, 6(06), 17-28.
    26. Singh, V. K. (2020, April 22). Opinion | The ‘nowhere people’ of COVID-19 need better legal safeguards. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/the-nowhere-people-of-covid-19-need-better-legal-safeguards/article31400344.ece
    27. Tripathy, S. N. (2015). Evaluating the role of micro-finance in mitigating the problems of distress out-migrants: A study in KBK districts of Odisha. The Micro Finance Review, Journal of the Centre for Micro Finance Research.
    28. Tripathy, S. N. (2021). Distress Migration Among Ultra-poor Households in Western Odisha. Journal of Land and Rural Studies, 23210249211001975.

     

    Feature Image: Tata Trusts