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  • GST @ 5 Years: The Union Govt and States Can’t Ignore the Most Contentious Bits Any Longer

    GST @ 5 Years: The Union Govt and States Can’t Ignore the Most Contentious Bits Any Longer

    India’s goods and services tax (GST) regime was launched with much fanfare on July 1, 2017. It was marketed by many as the nation’s second ‘tryst with destiny’, a reform that would unify the country by creating a single market while ushering in excellent ease of doing business.

    It was said that gross domestic product (GDP) would rise by 1% to 2%, inflation would decline with the elimination of the cascading effect and the ‘black economy’ would be checked. It was supposed to benefit backward states which are consuming states since GST is a last-point tax – collected where the final sale occurs. It was pitched as a win-win situation.

    Government officials, writing on the occasion of the completion of five years of operation of GST, have enumerated the various benefits but admitted to some problems which they feel can be sorted out soon. The Congress has asked for a revamp of the GST since it is fundamentally flawed that a bit of tinkering cannot resolve. Many of the states have been expressing their concerns for some time, most recently in the just-concluded GST Council meeting.

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  • Hegemonic Regionalism (Indo-Pacific concept): As opposed to locally based Regional Cooperation (ASEAN and Bay of Bengal)

    Hegemonic Regionalism (Indo-Pacific concept): As opposed to locally based Regional Cooperation (ASEAN and Bay of Bengal)

    The late embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept by the United States further supports the position that it is being employed as a strategic instrument to counter a rising power and a potential challenger to its global quasi-hegemonic power position.

    Based on a consideration of capabilities, the United States is currently the only country that can be described as a potential global hegemon. Certainly, there are a number of other countries that have the potential, based on their capabilities, of being candidates to become regional hegemons. Notably, China is among them, but Japan, India, and Brazil are also potential candidates, though their individual capacities vary widely and one could argue, based on capacities, that China takes the lead among them. With the implication that China becomes the main target of the de facto global hegemon, the other potential contenders must be kept in sight, as well. While most recent academic and non-academic discussions about global power transfer are focusing on rising countries, on potential challengers to the existing global hegemon, China in particular, a focus on how the existing quasi-global hegemon, the United States, is reacting to challenges to its dominance, to preserve its leading position and influence, seems almost completely missing. This lack of emphasis constitutes a rather critical issue, because when we focus on global or regional power competition, what should be of interest to analysts is not only the behaviour and strategy of a rising county, i.e., a potential challenger to an existing hegemon, but also to analyse the response of the existing hegemon, as well. After all, when it comes to issues of global and regional stability, the actions of both the existing hegemon and the potential challenger must be taken into account.

    There is no doubt that an existing hegemon does not just ‘sit back’ and watch when its influence is challenged by a new contender for power. Even a declining hegemon will try to challenge a rising power contender, consequently, the potential for instability within the international system arises not only from a rising power but also from the actions of the country which possesses a quasi-hegemonic position, trying to defend its power position. In one of his earlier and most influential works, Mearsheimer (2001) points out that great powers always aim to maximise their share of power and are in constant competition with other power contenders, with the aim of maximising their own power. Therefore, the rise of a new competitor occurs in a dynamic context between the established and the rising hegemon. Ikenberry (2014) points out that, as the overwhelmingly global power once concentrated within the United States dispersed with the arrival of new power challengers in different parts of the world, new struggles over global rules and institutions are emerging. At the very least, as emphasised by Mearsheimer (2013), great powers do not trust one another, as they worry about other countries’ capabilities and intentions.

    Not without reason, Mearsheimer (2013) argues that the United States did not and does not tolerate peer competitors, adding that the United States has demonstrated this clearly during the twentieth century.

    For these reasons, we cannot expect that a hegemon will stay inactive when watching the rise of potential challengers. An established great power, holding an almost global hegemonic position as the United States does, has the capacity to respond to the challenges arising from power contenders, and there are clear indications, past and present, that it will act to preserve its dominant power position, even within an international system that has become more multilateral in comparison with the Cold War period. Not without reason, Mearsheimer (2013) argues that the United States did not and does not tolerate peer competitors, adding that the United States has demonstrated this clearly during the twentieth century. One just has to remember that in the late 1980s, when Japan was close to economically overtaking the United States. at the global level, various United States administrations actively worked against it, refusing Japan more decision-making rights within international organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, even though Japan had become a major donor to both organisations. Obviously, the previous Japanese challenge to the United States’ dominance was only economic. Neither will the United States allow other challengers to succeed in undermining its dominant position, even in distant regional settings. Mearsheimer (2001) reminds us that the dominant power will act at the regional level to ensure that no challenge to its own global position will take place, since the crucial task is to block potential peer competitors, even within distant regional settings.

    When evaluating the influence of a hegemon it is worth remembering that this goes beyond a focus on military capabilities, even though such capabilities are essential, and include the hegemon’s ability to disguise its ambitions and interests by pretending that it provides global public goods, which in reality satisfy primarily its own interests. More importantly, as pointed out by Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach (2002), all hegemonic states enjoy ‘structural power’, which permits the hegemon to occupy a central position within its own system, as well as shape other states’ preferences. As emphasised by Kupchan (2014), a hegemon also strives to generate a normative and ideological dominance, in support of its power dominance. Indeed, Gilpin, in his seminal influential work on war and change, emphasises that a major power aims to create social structures to serve its hegemonic interests, consequently supporting its domineering position with rules, institutions, and organisational principles, supporting, indeed screening and protecting, its power position with normative dominance (Gilpin 1981).

    one can also reasonably assume that when a hegemonic country introduces a new geopolitical or regional concept of space, such as the Indo-Pacific framework, will be of foremost importance to its own strategy of dominance. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific framework signals the re-mapping of geopolitical space, with little, if any, historical relevance.

    By considering these arguments describing the behaviour of a typical hegemonic power, it is rather consistent to assume that a country, such as the United States, which holds a nearly global like hegemonic position, will use its position and capabilities to support its own power position in different regional settings so as to ward off any potential competitor. For this reason, one can also reasonably assume that when a hegemonic country introduces a new geopolitical or regional concept of space, such as the Indo-Pacific framework, will be of foremost importance to its own strategy of dominance. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific framework signals the re-mapping of geopolitical space, with little, if any, historical relevance. From a historical perspective, the Indian and Pacific Oceans have been perceived as separate maritime spaces. What marries them into one geopolitical space is an invented geopolitical strategy facilitating the strategic power interests of the existing hegemon. What is more, a hegemon or hegemon-like state will not introduce or favour a new geopolitical concept if it goes against its own strategic interests.

    Indeed, from a United States perspective, the Indo-Pacific strategy not only re-strengthens, at least from a hegemonic perspective, its role within the older geopolitical concept of Asia-Pacific, but now extends this influence, from a conceptual perspective, to include the Indian Ocean, as well. One can further argue that the adoption of the Indo-Pacific approach by the United States comes at a time when we can observe considerable changes in the power configuration within East Asia (which encompasses Northeast and Southeast Asia) and to a lesser extent within South Asia. Certain changes in the regional power configuration, namely the rise of China – not only as an economic but increasingly as a military and especially as a maritime power – generate considerable challenges from the perspective of hegemonic power competition. While the strategic challenge that China, as a rising power, generates to the United States quasi hegemonic position is so far limited to a regional challenge, instead of a global challenge, still, based on hegemony theory, the existing hegemon cannot allow such a challenge to take place.

    The late embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept by the United States further supports the position that it is being employed as a strategic instrument to counter a rising power and a potential challenger to its global quasi-hegemonic power position. We may remember that the origin of the Indo-Pacific concept is associated with the previous Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ concept. Shinzo Abe mentioned it as early as 2007 when addressing the Indian parliament and began frequently restating it from 2016 onwards. This was part of his intention that Japan should take a more active role in East Asia and beyond. As such, the Indo-Pacific concept was born out of the political-strategic considerations of a regional actor within East Asia. Only later, around 2018, did the United States become considerably interested in the concept, at a time when the potential challenges from rising countries increased – not only from China; one may also consider India’s rise in this context. In 2018, the United States administration even changed the name of its Pacific Command to United States Indo-Pacific Command to highlight its changing geopolitical perspective and to address the increasing regional challenges it faced from a rising China. Not without reason was the replacement of the previous Asia-Pacific concept with the Indo-Pacific concept aimed at integrating India, another rising power in Asia, more firmly with the hegemonic interests of the United States. In academic terms, one could argue that this may represent a strategy of accommodation, in which an existing hegemon accommodates a rising power by offering political and strategic space for that country. It is a strategy the United States followed previously with China until China started to become a too fundamental strategic challenge to the United States hierarchic position. One may wonder if this may also happen to India, once India becomes too powerful to be contained within a United States hegemonic project. However, for the time being, India seems to feel quite comfortable within the geopolitical space it has been offered by the existing quasi-global hegemon. As revealed by Paul T.V (2016) the strategy of accommodation is not only quite a challenging undertaking – as the hegemon has to offer political status, leadership responsibilities, and even a sphere of influence to a rising country – but in the long run the implications are that this will weaken, if not undermine, the hegemon’s own position, thus indicating the limitation of such a strategy. After all, a hegemon is rather unwilling to give up its dominant position voluntarily, though a strategy of accommodation may buy some time and allow it to employ a strategy of divide-and-rule by offering support to a potential weaker power contender when addressing the challenges of a more powerful contender. There can be no less doubt that the ongoing border conflicts between India and China and the emerging regional power competition between them facilitate India’s readiness to become increasingly enveloped in a stronger relationship with the United States which, by the way, contradicts India’s previous entrenched national strategy of non-alignment in global power politics. Consequently, drafting India into its power orbit enhances the United States’ strategic influence in regions where it is not even a resident power, like East, Southeast, or South Asia.

    There can be no less doubt that the ongoing border conflicts between India and China and the emerging regional power competition between them facilitate India’s readiness to become increasingly enveloped in a stronger relationship with the United States which, by the way, contradicts India’s previous entrenched national strategy of non-alignment in global power politics.

    Therefore, a hegemonic state will try to manipulate even distant regional settings in its favour, to arrest the rise of potential challengers to its dominant position, even by facilitating the introduction of a new geopolitical concept, like the Indo-Pacific, which ignores local perceptions of regional cooperation dynamics, the Bay of Bengal approach or ASEAN. While there are some claims that the Indo-Pacific approach does not represent a challenge to ASEAN, a position that is widely disputed, the more specific issue is that the Indo-Pacific approach does not contribute or offer support to those local-based regional cooperation processes from a conceptual perspective. Therefore, while one has to recognise that more recent regional cooperation processes within the Bay of Bengal are less dynamic for the time being, it does not mean that such a regional cooperation process is altogether missing. As stated by Amrith (2013), Asian economic connections led to renewed interest in the Bay of Bengal as a focus for regional cooperation. Indeed, BIMSTEC[1] which was established in 1997, does provide focus on regional cooperation.

    BIMSTEC creates political space for economic cooperation by addressing common challenges like underdevelopment. Consequently, offering a strategic vision for national development to its member countries, a focus fundamentally different from the geopolitical outlook of the Indo-Pacific regional hegemonic project, with its focus on military and especially maritime power distribution. Another crucial difference is that, while the Indo-Pacific strategy is a rather recent invention, regional recognition of the Bay of Bengal as a particular and unique geographic location for regional cooperation, particularly as a centre for trade and cultural migration, goes back centuries, if not millennia. As such, the Bay of Bengal commands a rich history as a historically recognised cultural and trade-inspired region. Yet, with geopolitical concepts based on hegemonic interests, such home-grown sources of regional cooperation are not recognised or supported only if they would fit the interests of the hegemon. It is evident that the Indo-Pacific concept, from a conceptual perspective, also ignores the ASEAN regional cooperation process. As such, the Indo-Pacific approach represents an artificial strategic overlay, not linked with local beads regional cooperation dynamics, even when a regional cooperation process is very well established, as is the case with ASEAN. With regard to the Indo-Pacific concept, ASEAN’s statement on the Indo-Pacific (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019) clearly indicates that the perception of the Indo-Pacific area is a contiguous geographic space is misleading and not appropriate, even though the two geopolitical spaces are geographically connected. Indeed, while the Bay of Bengal and the ASEAN regional cooperation favour regional cooperation characterised by horizontal relationships, facilitating the cooperation of countries within the region to address common challenges, the Indo-Pacific approach represent a vertical power arrangement, where a dominant power is projecting its influence onto the regional level.

    However, it should not come as too much of a surprise that a hegemon’s regional strategy, which primarily focuses on supporting its own power interests, has little to say about regional cooperation processes initiated by the people living in that region. Indeed, a global acting hegemon has only a limited interest in the empowerment of independent regional cooperation projects, since they could signal the creation of a more independent political sphere. As Mearsheimer (2013) asserts, based on its superior standing and its need to defend this position, a hegemon has always an inclination to interfere in and re-order the political outlook of even distant regions. We may take into consideration what Mearsheimer (2013) made earlier, that the United States will ensure that it will dominate the commanding heights in Asia. For all these reasons, the Indo-Pacific approach should be recognised as the newest geopolitical strategy supporting the United States’ hegemonic position in Asia.

    Bibliography

    Mearsheimer, John J (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), W.W Norton & Company: New York

    Mearsheimer, John J (2013) Structural Realism. In: Dunne T, Kurki M., Smith S (eds) International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press: Oxford. pp. 77-93

    Ikenberry, G. J. (2014) Introduction: power, order, and change in world politics. In: Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) Power, order, and change in world politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.1-16.

    Griffiths, M, O’Callaghan T, Roach S T (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts 2nd; Martin Griffiths, Routledge

    Kupchan, C. A. (2014) Unpacking hegemony: the social foundations of hierarchical order. In: Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) Power, order, and change in world politics. Cambridge, University Press Cambridge, pp. 19-60.

    Gilpin, R. (2010) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

    Paul T.V. (2016) The accommodation of rising powers in world politics. In: Paul, T. V. (ed.) Accommodating rising powers past, present, and future. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 3 32.

    Amrith, S. S. (2013) Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The furies of nature and the fortunes of migrants By Sunil S. Amrith Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019, available at: https://asean.org/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/

    Notes

    [1] BIMSTEC has seven members: Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

    Feature Image credit: War on the Rocks

  • Higher Judiciary Needs to Take More Suo Motu Action

    Higher Judiciary Needs to Take More Suo Motu Action

    The higher judiciary must proactively exercise its powers to intervene suo motu to deal with a spate of incidents that rip the country’s social and communal fabric.

    On 14 June, six former judges of the Supreme Court and different high courts, along with six senior advocates, urged the Supreme Court to take suo motu action on the recent cases of bulldozing and demolition of houses of protestors against the remarks about the Prophet made by spokespersons of the Bharatiya Janata Party.

    In the appeal, directly addressing state actions in Uttar Pradesh, the letter states:

    [I]n its role as custodian of the Constitution, we … urge the Hon’ble Supreme Court to take immediate suo motu action to arrest the deteriorating law and order situation in Uttar Pradesh, specifically involving the high-handedness of the police and state authorities, and the brutal clampdown on the fundamental rights of citizens…

    We hope and trust the Supreme Court will rise to the occasion and not let the citizens and the Constitution down at this critical juncture.

    This may seem like an unprecedented appeal coming from legal luminaries, but action by the Supreme Court is well within the judicial realm, as the higher judiciary in India has the mandate to initiate proceedings on its own, without being petitioned by a claimant or party.

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  • Roe overturned: What you need to know about the American Supreme Court abortion decision

    Roe overturned: What you need to know about the American Supreme Court abortion decision

    Despite the terminal decline of the American Empire or the Deep State, the American Republic still remains an inspiration for people across the world, for reasons of its vibrant democracy and peoples’ liberty ensured through robust institutions, law and order, and the strong constitutional process. To paraphrase Johan Galtung – ‘the US is a fabulous Republic but a terrible empire’. But even that seems to be changing as society’s democratic values, ethics, and morals are in serious decline.  The rise of right wing politics has led to a decline in the standards and values, and in the independence of institutions most notably the Judiciary. Separation of the Church and the State is a core tenet of the American Constitution and governance. That seems to be compromised as many judges bring their personal and religious beliefs in to their work. This was in demonstration in the American Supreme Court’s judgement that ends one of the most critical fundamental rights of women to their bodies and their choices for abortion. 

    After half a century, Americans’ constitutional right to get an abortion has been overturned by the Supreme Court.The ruling in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization – handed down on June 24, 2022 – has far-reaching consequences. There is a strong religious influence to this judgement. This could influence many other countries, particularly in an environment where right wing politics, influenced by narrow religious overtones,  is on the upswing in many countries across the world, including the world’s largest Democracy, India. Fortunately, India’s abortion laws are governed by medical advice and womens’ safety (and so it is termed MTP – Medical termination of Pregnancy). The MTP Act of 1971 was further liberalised through an Amendment Act of 2021 wherein the gestation limit for abortions is raised from 20 to 24 weeks. While India’s laws are considerate by supporting abortion decision to rape and incest survivors, the American judgement will deny this freedom or choice to the victim women.

     Nicole Huberfeld and Linda C. McClain, health law and constitutional law experts at Boston University, explain what just happened, and what happens next. This article was published earlier in The Conversation. TPF is happy to republish this article under the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivatives 4.0-International (CC BY-ND 4.0).

    – TPF Editorial Team

    What did the Supreme Court rule?

    The Supreme Court decided by a 6-3 majority to uphold Mississippi’s ban on abortion after 15 weeks of pregnancy. In doing so, the justices overturned two key decisions protecting access to abortion: 1973’s Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, decided in 1992.

    The court’s opinion, written by Justice Samuel Alito, said that the Constitution does not mention abortion. Nor does the Constitution guarantee abortion rights via another right, the right to liberty.

    The opinion rejected Roe’s and Casey’s argument that the constitutional right to liberty included an individual’s right to privacy in choosing to have an abortion, in the same way that it protects other decisions concerning intimate sexual conduct, such as contraception and marriage. According to the opinion, abortion is “fundamentally different” because it destroys fetal life.

    The court’s narrow approach to the concept of constitutional liberty is at odds with the broader position it took in the earlier Casey ruling, as well as in a landmark marriage equality case, 2015’s Obergefell v. Hodges. But the majority said that nothing in their opinion should affect the right of same-sex couples to marry.

    Alito’s opinion also rejected the legal principle of “stare decisis,” or adhering to precedent. Supporters of the right to abortion argue that the Casey and Roe rulings should have been left in place as, in the words of the Casey ruling, reproductive rights allow women to “participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.”

    The ruling does not mean that abortion is banned throughout the U.S. Rather, arguments about the legality of abortion will now play out in state legislatures, where, Alito noted, women “are not without electoral or political power.”

    States will be allowed to regulate or prohibit abortion subject only to what is known as “rational basis” review – this is a weaker standard than Casey’s “undue burden” test. Under Casey’s undue burden test, states were prevented from enacting restrictions that placed substantial obstacles in the path of those seeking abortion. Now, abortion bans will be presumed to be legal as long as there is a “rational basis” for the legislature to believe the law serves legitimate state interests.

    In a strenuous dissent, Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor faulted the court’s narrow approach to liberty and challenged its disregard both for stare decisis and for the impact of overruling Roe and Casey on the lives of women in the United States. The dissenters said the impact of the decision would be “the curtailment of women’s rights, and of their status as free and equal citizens.” They also expressed deep concern over the ruling’s effect on poor women’s ability to access abortion services in the U.S.

    Where does this decision fit into the history of reproductive rights in the U.S.?

    This is a huge moment. The court’s ruling has done what reproductive rights advocates feared for decades: It has taken away the constitutional right to privacy that protected access to abortion.

    This decision was decades in the making. Thirty years ago when Casey was being argued, many legal experts thought the court was poised to overrule Roe. Then, the court had eight justices appointed by Republican presidents, several of whom indicated readiness to overrule in dissenting opinions.

    Instead, Republican appointees Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O’Connor and David Souter upheld Roe. They revised its framework to allow more state regulation throughout pregnancy and weakened the test for evaluating those laws. Under Roe’s “strict scrutiny” test, any restriction on the right to privacy to access an abortion had to be “narrowly tailored” to further a “compelling” state interest. But Casey’s “undue burden” test gave states wider latitude to regulate abortion.

    Even before the Casey decision, abortion opponents in Congress had restricted access for poor women and members of the military greatly by limiting the use of federal funds to pay for abortion services.

    In recent years, states have adopted numerous restrictions on abortion that would not have survived Roe’s tougher “strict scrutiny” test. Even so, many state restrictions have been struck down in federal courts under the undue burden test, including bans on abortions prior to fetal viability and so-called “TRAP” – targeted regulation of abortion provider – laws that made it harder to keep clinics open.

    President Donald Trump’s pledge to appoint “pro-life” justices to federal courts – and his appointment of three conservative Supreme Court justices – finally made possible the goal of opponents of legal abortion: overruling Roe and Casey.

    What happens next?

    Even before Dobbs, the ability to access abortion was limited by a patchwork of laws across the United States. Republican states have more restrictive laws than Democratic ones, with people living in the Midwest and South subject to the strongest limits.

    Thirteen states have so-called “trigger laws,” which greatly restrict access to abortion. These will soon go into effect now that the Supreme Court has overturned Roe and Casey, requiring only state attorney general certification or other action by a state official.

    Nine states have pre-Roe laws never taken off the books that significantly restrict or ban access to abortion. Altogether, nearly half of states will restrict access to abortion through a variety of measures like banning abortion from six weeks of pregnancy – before many women know they are pregnant – and limiting the reasons abortions may be obtained, such as forbidding abortion in the case of fetal anomalies.

    Meanwhile, 16 states and the District of Columbia protect access to abortion in a variety of ways, such as state statutes, constitutional amendments or state Supreme Court decisions.

    None of the states that limit abortion access currently criminalize the pregnant person’s action. Rather, they threaten health care providers with civil or criminal actions, including loss of their license to practice medicine.

    Some states are creating “safe havens” where people can travel to access an abortion legally. People have already been traveling to states like Massachusetts from highly restrictive states.

    The court’s decision may drive federal action, too.

    The House of Representatives passed the Women’s Health Protection Act, which protects health care providers and pregnant people seeking abortion, but Senate Republicans have blocked the bill from coming up for a vote. Congress could also reconsider providing limited Medicaid payment for abortion, but such federal legislation also seems unlikely to succeed.

    President Joe Biden could use executive power to instruct federal agencies to review existing regulations to ensure that access to abortion continues to occur in as many places as possible. Congressional Republicans could test the water on nationwide abortion bans. While such efforts are likely to fail, these efforts could cause confusion for people who are already vulnerable.

    The Supreme Court’s rolling back a right that has been recognized for 50 years puts the U.S. in the minority of nations, most of which are moving toward liberalization.

    What does this mean for people in America seeking an abortion?

    Unintended pregnancies and abortions are more common among poor women and women of color, both in the U.S. and around the world.

    Research shows that people have abortions whether lawful or not, but in nations where access to abortion is limited or outlawed, women are more likely to suffer negative health outcomes, such as infection, excessive bleeding and uterine perforation. Those who must carry a pregnancy to full term are more likely to suffer pregnancy-related deaths.

    The state-by-state access to abortion resulting from this decision means many people will have to travel farther to obtain an abortion. And distance will mean fewer people will get abortions, especially lower-income women – a fact the Supreme Court itself recognized in 2016.

    But since 2020, medication abortion – a two-pill regimen of mifepristone and misoprostol – has been the most common method of ending pregnancy in the U.S. The coronavirus pandemic accelerated this shift, as it drove the Food and Drug Administration to make medication abortions more available by allowing doctors to prescribe the pills through telemedicine and permitting medication to be mailed without in-person consultation.

    Many states that restrict access to abortion also are trying to prevent medication abortion. But stopping telehealth providers from mailing pills will be a challenge. Further, because the FDA approved this regimen, states will be contradicting federal law, setting up conflict that may lead to more litigation.

    The Supreme Court’s rolling back a right that has been recognized for 50 years puts the U.S. in the minority of nations, most of which are moving toward liberalization. Nevertheless, even though abortion is seen by many as essential health care, the cultural fight will surely continue.

    Featured Image Credit: Evening Standard

  • Ukraine Crisis and India’s Rejection of Western Binary Construct

    Ukraine Crisis and India’s Rejection of Western Binary Construct

    “India has already chosen a side, its own, where it is happy, willing and most importantly capable of staying put”

    The current crisis in Ukraine has, or at least threatened to, shift the focus away from two equally urgent geopolitical conundrums – the Taliban usurping power in Afghanistan and China increasing its assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. One almost gets the feeling that the timings of these events couldn’t have been better scripted. Needless to say, all three of them are intertwined in a complex web of events where the major world players are looking to outmanoeuvre each other. These events hold serious ramifications for India, a country which under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has looked to continuously raise its international profile as a major and responsible power in the region. Out of the three, India is a serious stakeholder in the Afghan equation and the Indo-Pacific construct, with even the Ukraine crisis putting the world’s focus on India.

    Derek Grossman, writing for the Foreign Policy magazine, observes that due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing crisis, “Modi’s multipolar Moment Has Arrived”. He even sees India as ‘the clear beneficiary of Russia’s war’. Grossman says that by not condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and refusing to toe the Western line in sanctioning Moscow, India has in fact elevated its global stature. He suggests each of the major powers from the US to China to Russia has been vying to have India on its ‘side’. This assumption is not limited to just Grossman alone but many Western analysts assume that India is vying for a side. But this is exactly where Grossman fails to understand the basic objective of India’s foreign policy. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s remarks at the recent GLOBESEC 2022 Bratislava Forum throw light on this ‘misunderstanding’ on the part of Grossman and analysts of his ilk. Jaishankar, to a question regarding the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict that in case India must pick a side, who India will side with – the US or China, quipped “I don’t accept that India has to join either the US axis or the China axis. We are one-fifth of the world’s population, the fifth or sixth-largest economy in the world, and India is entitled to have its own side and make her own choices devoid of cynical transactions but based on India’s values and interests.” In the same forum, he also remarked that India is not “sitting on the fence” on the Ukraine issue (a reference to Biden’s remark of India being ‘shaky’) and is in fact merely “sitting on its ground”. Jaishankar’s remarks emphasize India’s policy of strategic autonomy and of India not being a lackey of any power or axis. Meaning India has already chosen a side, its own, where it is happy, willing and most importantly capable of staying put.

    “Somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.”

    But what Grossman does get right is in his usage of the term ‘Multipolar’. India indeed views the world as multipolar today. Instead of clinging to either pole of the binary world order, India desires to be one of the poles itself. So, then what explains the West’s adamancy or incapability to understand India? Even this has been partly answered by Jaishankar himself as he says, “Somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” And this is exactly why I mentioned Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific at the very outset. It is not to say that an India desiring to be a globally recognised power shouldn’t be concerned about Ukraine, but to understand the fact that, for India, a “messy” US withdrawal from Afghanistan and an ever-aggressive China lurking large on its borders are far greater challenges that cannot be met by choosing sides, rather India has to meet those challenges on its own strength. India simply doesn’t have the luxury of joining Axis A against Axis B or vice versa. Among many other things, India needs Russia to balance out China and for its strategic interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia; India needs the US to cement its role in the Indo-Pacific and create a strong deterrence against China; while India also needs to partner with China and Russia in climate change politics as well as limit Western dominance over the global financial system.

    But it is also true that today, India’s strategic interests find greater convergence with that of the US, ranging from countering extremism in the Af-Pak region to checking China’s rise and securing a free and open Indo-Pacific with the help of “like-minded” nations in the region like Japan and Australia in the QUAD grouping. With regards to Russia, relations between the two traditional partners have cooled down a little especially because of Russia’s hobnobbing with Pakistan to secure its interests in Afghanistan and India’s growing ties to the US. Given the fact that Russia is speculated to become increasingly dependent on China as the war in Ukraine wages on, India’s manoeuvrability stands even more limited. Ever since the start of the war, India has tirelessly tried to explain to its Western counterparts the need to re-focus on the Indo-Pacific. Perhaps the bigger challenge for the democratic world is China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the region. Russia’s threat is largely military in nature and is a headache majorly for its European neighbours. But the Chinese threat is global and all-encompassing ranging from economic to military to security to cultural. Additionally, for India, the Taliban in power next door doesn’t evoke any pleasant memories as anti-India forces might be on the loose given the Taliban’s proximity to Pakistan and its ties with anti-India forces.

    India must solidly guard against being labelled in any camp and should steadfastly pursue its own path. India’s recent actions of abstentions in the UN against Russian aggression at the same time as Prime Minister Modi making a whirlwind tour of Europe to calm Western nerves augur well for its strategic objectives. The signing of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in the recently held QUAD summit in Tokyo also serves India well vis-à-vis China. A recent visit of an Indian delegation to Afghanistan, ostensibly to oversee aid distribution, suggests that New Delhi may be willing to work with the Taliban regime, thus providing the latter with some legitimacy and the former some flexibility. To be recognised as a major global power, India should de-link from all geopolitical binaries and work towards becoming the Third Pole, maybe taking a cue from the Himalayas.

    Feature Image Credits: Economic Times

  • Is the sheen of overseas higher education still compelling?

    Is the sheen of overseas higher education still compelling?

    We may not have easy and clear answers as to when, why, and how Indian students began going abroad to study — particularly in the realm of higher education, but this process has been on for generations. It is essential to draw attention to the fact that ancient India has had at least two reputed ‘universities’, Nalanda and Taxila (the erstwhile Takshashila now located in Pakistan), which indeed attracted students from outside the subcontinent.

    Overseas education is a centuries-old phenomenon in India. Quality of education, variety of courses, and comparatively low fees are some of the influencing factors

    While during the ancient times the concept, as well as the content of education, was quite at variance and different from what evolved and spread widely during the modern period, the urge to seek knowledge has been ubiquitous and pervasive right from the time institutionalised form of imparting education emerged. However, we do have to recognise and acknowledge that ‘education’ in some form or the other has always been the sine qua non throughout the existence of Homo sapiens, howsoever family- or community-driven, and informal it may have been, and irrespective of the level of economic and socio-cultural development of a given society in any part of the world.

    The very first three ‘modern’ universities, namely Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, got established in India during the colonial period in 1857, though some undergraduate degree colleges did precede the establishment of these universities in the three presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. For those aspiring for a higher degree, a kind of avenue existed, in general, in the British universities, because of the colonial scenario, though it was not uncommon for some to go to universities in the United States too.

    Thus, ‘studying abroad’ — that magic phrase in educational circles today — is not really a recent phenomenon; it has been an educational trajectory for at least some sections of students in India for at least 150 years.

    Those who could afford paid for these overseas ventures, and for the less privileged but talented scholarships came in handy. Today, however, it has become rather easy to obtain bank loans which many are able to pay back given the rise in the income of both the lower classes as well as the middle classes. Also, quite a few philanthropic organisations are coming forward to disburse scholarships as well as loans at really soft interest rates. This has strengthened many a student from the erstwhile underprivileged and minority groups, including women students, to benefit from such good deeds and opportunities.

    Unavailability of some courses, and the lack of appropriate ambience for higher education, in general, were indeed reasons for going abroad, at least during the very early period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

    It is also true that a lot of prominence and significance has all through been attached to the better quality of education prevalent abroad. It was invariably held that degrees from a foreign university were superior to those from the home universities

    Though this argument was true given the state of higher education in India during the said period, there, nevertheless, prevailed a notion that anything associated with the colonial rulers and their country was qualitatively better than things (including academic degrees) that were homespun. It is not out of place to point out that in some circles in India — in the contemporary context too — this notion of the superiority of a foreign degree is still given quite a high level of leverage. Some of the recently-established private universities swear by and recruit only faculty with a foreign doctoral degree!

    The surveys that rank universities in different countries as per their ‘performance’ have emerged rather recently, but do seem, at least in the present context, to add to the long-existing bias that exists in India in favour of better quality of outcomes vis-à-vis overseas universities. True, that though Indian universities do not feature anywhere in the top echelons in the ranking of higher educational institutions, and many an academic, not just in India but elsewhere too, question the methodology adopted in these processes, the fact remains that going by the various criteria and parameters adopted, most Indian universities do not make the cut.

    This is because there exists a truly uneven range of quality across departments and centres. Reasons for such a state are many but nepotism and corruption in the recruitment of faculty is indeed a prime reason.

    I must hasten to add that many higher educational institutions in India do have departments and centres that have done exceedingly well, and are undoubtedly abodes of excellence in the central and state university spheres; so also some departments in private universities. What our higher educational institutions suffer from in terms of not measuring up in totality when all the departments and centres are weighed together at the pan-institutional level. This is because there exists a truly uneven range of quality across departments and centres. Reasons for such a state are many but nepotism and corruption in the recruitment of faculty is indeed a prime reason.

    We also need to examine the developments during the last few decades, particularly as regards students going abroad for medical education to China, the Philippines, Russia, Ukraine, and other East European countries, and do not get surprised, even Pakistan! It is clear that the much sought-after medical degrees come at a much cheaper cost, almost at a fraction of what they would have to pay in private Indian medical colleges.

    The beeline that is made to go abroad for a medical degree in this particular realm is out and out a cost-cutting mechanism.

    Those who are after such medical degrees are mainly students who fail to obtain a high ranking in the currently prevalent National Eligibility Entrance Test (NEET) for admission to the MBBS and BDS courses, in State-run medical and dental colleges where the fees are substantially low. The beeline that is made to go abroad for a medical degree in this particular realm is out and out a cost-cutting mechanism.

    However, students who obtain a medical degree from an overseas institution must clear the Foreign Medical Graduate Examination (FMGE) if they wish to practice in India. So much for a foreign degree.

    So, today the lure of foreign universities is not just due to the sheen or quality alone, which probably was so some time back, but currently, there are many other reasons as delineated above.

     

    This article was published earlier in moneycontrol.

    Feature Image Credit: The Free Press Journal

  • Politics and Technology

    Politics and Technology

    Book Name: Politics and Technology

    Author: John Street

    Publisher: The Guilford Press

    Year of Publication: September 1992

    Pages: 224

    The eighties and the early nineties of the twentieth century witnessed seismic shifts like the globalisation of technology (viz. FAX machines) coupled with tumultuous political events like the Tiananmen protests, the Kuwait war etc. This highlighted the increasing significance of politics and technology, providing the backdrop for John Street’s work in the early nineties. However, Street departs from similar works by illustrating not merely how technology and politics are important but rather the diverse ways in which both are intricately enmeshed with each other.

    The relationship between technology and politics constitutes the major theme underlying this work. While the exponents of autonomous technology believe in a notion of technological rationality, technological determinists argue that technology influences the division of labour, which ultimately shapes state functions. On the other end of the spectrum, political determinists argue that politics is prior to technology, contending that the state functions as a customer, regulator and underwriter of technology. However, he is careful not to wade into simplistic conclusions, arguing that there are wide differences in the way states perform these functions, depending on their respective political structures. He uses a diverse range of examples from the UK and the US to Russia across a range of technological sectors from nuclear to medical.

    A second but interrelated theme in this book is the interrelationship between politics and science. This is illustrated using various aspects of science like the scientific method, the concerns, language and ideology of science, the interests of scientists etc. For instance, the feminist critique of science argues that science, in an ideological sense, is masculinist, marginalising the experiences of women. This interrelationship is linked to the larger normative question he seeks to address – how to ensure democratic control of technology. In order to answer this, he addresses the dual themes of the political implications of technology as well as the factors that confront us while making choices based on technology. He is not short of nuance here as well, arguing in detail how technology can result in myriad political manifestations in the respective spheres of dependence, choices, inequalities, experiences, side effects etc. The second theme of the choice of technology is conditional on institutional, evaluative and informational factors.

    Setting the backdrop for the question of democratic use of technology, he examines the two prevalent contrasting political approaches to technology. Devoting a detailed section to green politics, he underlines how this brand of politics is antithetical to technology to such an extent that it has to be either renounced or radically reformed. The opposing strand of the technical fix seeks to ensure the subservience of technology to politics.

    The theoretical contribution he makes to the technology-politics literature is an ‘eclectic’ third approach whereby he argues for an understanding of technological and political change in constant flux. Rather than providing definitive answers, he argues for a different approach, where he encourages the reader to question the very dichotomy between politics and technology. Using a powerful example of how supposedly technical notions like accuracy are political, he argues how technology in itself is shaped by politics. Similarly, in the context of mass communication in democracy, he argues that the democratisation of technology depends on the outcome, design and content of technology.

    What makes ‘Politics and Technology’ remarkable is the sheer breadth of his analysis. This extends not only to the myriad illustrations of technology to substantiate his arguments but also to the nuances related to the technology-politics interface. The illustrations are wide-ranging and colourful, encompassing technology from mere hedges (to block protests) to the various formal dimensions of technology like medical, biotechnology, information technology, nuclear technology etc. His treatment of politics is no different – embracing a wide range of both philosophical positions from Bell to Heidegger as well as ideological standpoints from feminism to Marxism.

    Those probing for definitive answers are likely to be disappointed. He addresses questions of politics and technology like a seasoned academic, exhausting the whole breadth of interactions between both while resisting simplistic conclusions. For instance, he resists the simplistic proclivity to link non-democratic regimes (e,g, Russia) to attitudes of secrecy on nuclear spillover, by highlighting contradictory attitudes of democratic regimes like the UK. He further grapples with notions like democracy, technology etc. which we take for granted, examining, unravelling and distilling nuanced, crystal-clear definitions in the process. This is evidenced by his detailed description of technology as having not merely material and intellectual dimensions, but a social aspect as well.

    However, barring exceptions like Tiananmen and the Bhopal tragedy, the illustrations used are overwhelmingly skewed towards the Global North. Further, through a critical lens, one could argue that the endeavour to explain the politics of science while exhaustive and enriching in itself, doesn’t offer much in his emancipatory democratic project.

    However, none of these glitches is significant enough to derail his larger project. In a society embarking on the Industrial Revolution 4.0 and the looming possibilities of “an AI war”, the fundamental normative project to democratise technology remains more relevant than ever. Even from a philosophical standpoint, his project remains relevant. The post-humanist strand of thought, which seeks to fuse the human-technology assemblage to conceptualise cyborgs and its relationship vis-à-vis the social-political realm, is based on very similar assumptions of dissolving the divide between the human and technology. Thus, it is safe to argue that ‘Politics and Technology’ remains one of the most relevant and exhaustive ‘gateway’ works for students probing the myriad and complex interconnections between politics, science and technology.

    About the Author:

    JOHN STREET is a professor of politics in the School of Politics, Philosophy, Language and Communication Studies. He is the author or co-author of seven books and some 80 articles. The third edition of his Media, Politics and Democracy was published in 2021. He is currently the Principal Investigator on an AHRC project: ‘Our Subversive Voice? The history and politics of the English protest song. The other members of the research team are Alan Finlayson (UEA), Oskar Cox Jensen (UEA), Angela McShane (Warwick University) and Matthew Worley (Reading University).

    He supervises PhD students working on a range of topics, including the politics of music, new forms of political communication, and participatory democracy. He is a member of the Political Studies Association, the Subcultures Network, the International Association for the Study of Popular Music, and MeCCSA. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences and a Fellow of the Higher Education Academy. He was until recently an Honorary Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne.

  • The Dark Side of Sindhi Nationalism in Pakistan

    The Dark Side of Sindhi Nationalism in Pakistan

    “If Sindhudesh is created, the feudal lords will kill us”1.

    These were the words of the late veteran Sindhi leader Rasool Baksh Palijo. As a Marxist, he had fully dedicated himself to the popular causes, fighting for the constitutional and legal rights of Bengalis, Balochs, Sindhis and minorities. His almost life-long antagonism to Sindhi Secessionism underlines the structural problems plaguing the province of Sindh, caste being at the centre of it. The problems have manifested themselves politically in numerous instances, beginning with the separation of Sindh from Bombay Province in 1936, and the Pakistan Movement itself. After the Partition, the Ashrafiya-Savarna alliance2 –which views the Sindhi society in terms of non-antagonistic Hindu-Muslim binary, while comfortably brushing casteism under the carpet– has been at the forefront of this. In fact, the alliance is a recent (re)construction, which happened as a result of the marginalisation of Ashraf Sindhis at the hands of Mohajir and Punjabi elites that began immediately after independence. Similarly, Sindh’s turn to Sufism, which mostly took place in the colonial era3, and was later adopted by Sindhi Secessionists as one of the most defining identities of the Sindhi nation, itself has its underpinnings in the caste system. It is then no surprise that a section of Sindhis –mostly of the lower castes– has opposed the idea of Sindhudesh.

    For the last few years, Indians have been at the receiving end of the BJP-sponsored narrative of Pakistan being on the brink of breaking up into four or five states, one of them being Sindhudesh. Indian Sindhis (like myself) are thrilled with such conceptions. Little is known about the sociological background of the Sindhi National Movement. A look into that might answer why the movement has not succeeded politically. In this article, I discuss the cases of two communities that have largely stayed out of the nationalist movement: the Haris and Dalits.

    Are Sindhis Casteless people?

    The vehement assertion, especially by the Sindhi diaspora, of Sindhis being casteless is remotely the truth. Sindhis, both Hindus and Muslims, practise the caste system as religiously as the rest of the Indian society.

    The vehement assertion, especially by the Sindhi diaspora, of Sindhis being casteless is remotely the truth. Sindhis, both Hindus and Muslims, practise the caste system as religiously as the rest of the Indian society. In Muslims, the Syeds –who claim to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad– occupy the top-most strata, followed by other Ashrafis belonging to Central Asian, Iranian and Arab descent, as well as the Balochs and Pathans communities. The Pirs or spiritual leaders, who have wielded considerable political power during the colonial period, also largely fall into the upper castes. They are followed by Waderas and Sammats who constitute the landowning class, that has traditionally wielded the socio-economic power in rural Sindh. Then there is the Hari community, composed of landless labourers. Among Hindus, there are, among others, the Brahmins, Rajputs, Amils – the civil servant caste, Bhaibands – the caste of businessmen, and Dalits. While most Amils and Bhaibands migrated to India after the partition, some Brahmins, Rajputs and Dalit pockets remain intact. Some districts –Tharparkar, Tando Allahyar and Mirpurkhas– have a huge population of Dalits.

    Around 59 upper castes –both Muslim and Hindu– and 22 feudal families make up the ruling class in rural Sindh.4 Since Pakistan has no custom of caste census, we do not know how much they are over-represented in its political institutions. However, an analysis by Ghulam Hussein in his paper Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism in Sindh, Pakistan states that the Dalit community is highly underrepresented in Sindh Provincial Assembly –with only one out of nine reserved seats for minorities going to a Dalit; though the number is higher in local bodies. After the partition, as analysed by Hussein, the Syeds were the beneficiaries of the Hindu Migration to India as far as representation in the assemblies is concerned, since they occupied most of the seats vacated by Caste Hindus. The number of Scheduled Castes representatives, however, remained the same as that before the partition, despite them becoming the majority within the minority. Similarly, Pasmanda Muslims, that are unacknowledged by Pakistan to be existent, are also under-represented. Furthermore, more than a quarter of Sindh’s Members of Provincial Assembly (MPAs) in the 12th Assembly were professional landlords5.

    Casteism makes no appearance in Sindhi nationalist debates. One argument given by the Sindhi nationalists is that being a predominantly Islamic society, caste is non-existent among Sindhis.

    Casteism makes no appearance in Sindhi nationalist debates. One argument given by the Sindhi nationalists is that being a predominantly Islamic society, caste is non-existent among Sindhis. Instead, many ‘progressive’ Sindhi writers have displayed sympathy for the working classes instead of the lower castes. For Hindu communities, though they acknowledge the presence of caste, they quickly turn towards the benefits of reservation. Hussein writes, “In the Sindhi nationalist historical imaginary, casteism does not seem as problematic as sectarianism, religious bigotry and ethnolinguistic discord”6. In some instances, the Sindhi community as a whole is presented as Untouchables within Pakistan, thereby drawing a parallel between oppression of the Dalits and state oppression of Sindhi Secessionists/Nationalists7.

    The Rural Setting of Sindh: The oppression of the Hari Community

    Mohammed Ibrahim Joyo, another Marxist leader of Sindh during the colonial era, in his short book, Save Sind, Save the Continent (From Feudal Lords, Capitalists and their Communalisms), wrote about the exploitative nature of the rural setting dominated by Pirs, Waderas and Syeds. He, much like Palijo, identifies the local Syeds, Pirs, Hindu moneylenders, Zamindars etc., and not the Europeans, as the real enemies of the people of Sindh. For him, the Zamindars and Jagirdars, present themselves as “semi-gods to their peasant slaves”. Their only mission in life is to “vitiate the entire social fabric of life around”. “Periodically, they bestir themselves and make themselves available for snatching votes and forcing consent from the people, so that they could rule over them ‘democratically’”. For the Haris, he writes, ‘‘the only duty they know is to work like bullocks for their landlords and money-lenders, to touch the feet of their Zamindar-Masters and Pirs, and worship them literally as living gods, and lastly to instruct their children to do likewise’’8

    Ghulam Murtaza Syed (hereafter referred to as Syed), the Father of Sindhi Nationalism and a product of the ruling class in Sindh, attributes the setting to the administrative measures of the colonisers, which led to coming into “existence [of] a limited new hierarchy of fat landlords, absentee, indifferent, unenlightened and in some cases oppressive and tyrannical”9. “The great community of peasants became a crowd of ‘tenants at will’ without any permanent or substantial stake in its own occupation.” Syed, in his speeches and writings, is heavily critical of the established elite and seems to favour the upliftment of the conditions of the Haris. He places a ‘potentiality for evil’10 upon the Zamindars, who are involved in most of the crimes, some of which include kidnapping the women of the Haris.

    Despite the concern shown by Syed in his disquisitions, many Sindhi leaders remained suspicious and mistrustful of him. Though Palijo, Joyo and a few other leftist Sindhi leaders were once his companions, and despite them having some ideological affinities with him, they were largely opposed to his goals. They viewed Islam and the notion of Social Justice it emanates as a panacea of all social ills, as opposed to Syed who detested, at least after 1973, the role of religion in a modern state. They, nonetheless, remained on good personal terms with Syed. Their antipathy to Syed’s ideas stemmed, among others, from his personal conduct. Despite all the sympathetic speeches and writings, Syed continued to behave as an Ashrafiya, wearing white clothes to display his purity and detachment from worldly matters. The peasants who worked for the leader regularly touched his feet to ask for favours11.

    Hamida Khuhro, another associate of Syed to later part ways, describes it as ‘Syedism’, which, according to her, was his first and most constant ideology12. It is similar to the politics of patronage that characterises the entire subcontinent, but with some Sindhi blend of reverence of Syeds and Pirs. As per Oskar Vekaaik, author of Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan, Syed was brought up with the idea of Syed as a spiritual hero to the Hari working for him. “Rather than the people of flesh and blood working on his fields, however, he soon took the Hari as an abstract or imagined category including all landless Muslim peasants in Sindh. He saw the Haris as an exploited and backward people, who needed to be freed and uplifted. To him, this was the main task of the Syed”13.

    The province of Sindh is (in)famous for being one of the last strongholds of feudalism. During the British conquest of Sindh in 1843, the province had one of the most repressive feudal systems in the entire subcontinent. The British, having no coherent and consistent agrarian policy –they first introduced the ryotwari system only to abandon it later– didn’t endeavour to undo the socio-economic control of Waderas. These Waderas performed, and still do, many functions in rural Sindh, including quasi-judicial and tax collection. The system served the limited purpose of the British to collect taxes and transportation of raw materials. Charles Napier even regarded them as Sindh’s natural aristocracy. Thus, the dovetailed interests of Waderas and the British led the landlord class to flourish14. The power of Waderas grew so much during British rule that at the time of partition, around 80% of the province’s arable land was owned by them.15

    To be fair, the concerns of the Hari community did occupy, though didn’t dominate, some mainstream Sindhi political debates. Syed, as one of the proponents of their upliftment, has been a vocal critic of their oppression. Other leaders, such as Hyder Baksh Jatoi, M.A. Khuhro, etc. had built their careers on issues of Haris. However, the social background of Sindhi Nationalist leaders, and their daily actions that go against their words, have prevented the landless labourers from supporting their cause. This is corroborated by what Imdad Qazi, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Pakistan, told Hussein in an interview, “Marxists, both Leninists and Maoists, parted ways with the nationalists in the 1970s. When the barrage-lands were allotted to peasants, Nationalists stood with Marxists, but when Marxists spoke about land reforms, Nationalists left us”16

    It is, thus, the rural setting of Sindh which makes leaders like Palijo suspicious of, and even antagonistic to, the intentions of Sindhi secessionists. The Syed-Pir-Wadera alliance which has continuously exploited the Haris for centuries has made them committed, though dissenting, citizens of Pakistan.

    Manifestation of Nationalism

    The predilection of Sindhi nationalists towards Ashrafiya-Savarna symbolism is conspicuous. For instance, in his book, and otherwise as well, Paigham-e-Latif, G.M. Syed not only declared Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, a Syed, as the national poet of Sindh but went as far as to justify his own genealogical superiority by tracing his lineage to the late mediaeval poet17. Furthermore, in his book A Nation in Chains- Sindhudesh, he first propounded the idea of Raja Dahir, the Brahmin king during the invasion led by Muhammad bin Qasim in 711 AD, as a national hero (which was a response to the state-sponsored narrative of tracing the history of Pakistan to the invasion).18

    The issues were taken up by Sindhi nationalists who also represent the Ashrafiya-Savarna bias. Take for instance the issue of religious conversion of Sindhi Hindus. By confining their opposition to conversion under the bracket of religious freedom, they conveniently bypass their Dalit identity –since most of the converted people are Dalits– thereby serving Savarna Hindu causes. Another example is the incursion of Punjabis and Army personnel (Pakistan has a policy of allocating land to retired army men) which is, perhaps, most detested by Sindhi nationalists. Punjabis, who have been migrating and settling in Sindh for more than a century, and have developed agricultural practices that yield more than those employed by Sindhi feudal lords, are seen as a major threat to Ashrafiya domination. Thus, the issue of Punjabis settling in rural Upper Sindh becomes one of the most potent rallying points.

    Sufism is perhaps the most defining feature of Sindhi Nationalism. Nationalists project Sindh as a land of Sufi saints, with some figures, such as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, being identified with the Sindhi nation itself. Sufism, however, is used as a soft power by the Syeds to perpetuate their domination.

    Sufism is perhaps the most defining feature of Sindhi Nationalism. Nationalists project Sindh as a land of Sufi saints, with some figures, such as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, being identified with the Sindhi nation itself. Sufism, however, is used as a soft power by the Syeds to perpetuate their domination. The Pirs, most of whom are Syeds and local agents of Sufism, have traditionally had more power than the local Mulla. Their huge following has given them enormous influence over the lives of ordinary people. In fact, to be a be-Pir, or without a Pir, was traditionally seen as tantamount to being a non-believer. With such hegemonic power of Sufism of the local Pirs –described as Political Sufism– renders irrelevant caste one of the most important factors in micropolitics. Sufism, furthermore, augments the power of the Syeds, who already have huge amounts of land gifted to them by successive rulers, including the British.19

    Conclusion

    Since the death of G.M. Syed in 1995, the Sindhudesh Movement has been dying out. Since then, the movement has suffered blows from the Pakistani Army that, among others, led to the poisoning (most probably by ISI) of Bashir Ahmad Qureshi in 2012. Moreover, it stands divided, with numerous factions of Syed’s Jeay Sindh Mahaz propping up since the 1980s. However, the core support bank of the movement –the rural Syed, Pirs and Waderas remain, more or less, supportive of the movement. Though electorally, they desert the nationalists and vote for Bhutto’s People’s Party of Pakistan. The movement, however, still remains less popular amongst the Haris and Dalits. The latter has been deemed politically absent by the nationalists. The former, though appearing in nationalist discourses, have been disenchanted with their conduct, which contradicts their words. The writers and leaders of the movement have carefully projected their struggle narrowly against the actions of, what they deem as, Punjabi-dominated Pakistan. Their concerns regarding the injustices being done by the state far outweigh the concerns for the injustices they themselves have been unleashing upon their fellow Sindhis for centuries.

    References

    1. “Biggest problem is structural: Palijo” The Dawn, August 19, 2003

    https://www.dawn.com/news/135713/biggest-problem-is-structural-palijo

    2. The term is borrowed from Hussain, Ghulam. “Appropriation of Caste Spaces in Pakistan: The Theo-Politics of Short Stories in Sindhi Progressive Literature” Religions 10, no. 11: 627. 2019 https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10110627

    3. Boivin, Michel. The Sufi Paradigm and the Makings of a Vernacular Knowledge in Colonial India: The Case of Sindh (1851–1929). Palgrave Macmillan. 2020

    4. Hussain, Ghulam. “Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism in Sindh, Pakistan”. Journal of Asian and African Studies Vol 1 Issue 30. 2019

    5. Kronstadt K. A. “Pakistan’s Sindh province”. Congressional Research Service. 2015. October 29 https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/sindh.pdf

    6. Hussain, Ghulam.. “Appropriation of Caste Spaces in Pakistan: The Theo-Politics of Short Stories in Sindhi Progressive Literature” Religions 10, no. 11: 627. 2019 https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10110627

    7. Ibid.

    8. Joyo, Ibrahim M. Save Sind, Save the Continent (From Feudal Lords, Capitalists and their Communalisms). Karachi. 1946.

    9. Ibid

    10. Ibid.

    11. Verkaaik, Oskar. “Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan.” International Review of Social History, vol. 49, 2004, pp. 65–86. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26405524. Accessed 6 Jun. 2022.

    12. Ibid.

    13. Ibid

    14. “Sind and Its Pirs up to 1843.” Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947, by Sarah F. D. Ansari, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 9–35.

    15. Kronstadt K. A. “Pakistan’s Sindh province”. Congressional Research Service. Washington D.C. 2015. October 29. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/sindh.pdf

    16. Hussain, Ghulam. “Ethno-Nationality of Caste in Pakistan: Privileged Caste Morality in Sindhi Progressive Literature and Politics”. Critical Sociology. 2021. 48(1):127-149

    17. Ibid

    18. Syed, Ghulam M. A Nation in Chains- Sindhudesh. 1974.

    19. Ansari, Sarah F.D. Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

  • Agnipath Might have Adverse Consequences

    Agnipath Might have Adverse Consequences

    It takes a soldier a long time to emotionally and physically get moulded into his unit groove, become infused with his unit’s ethos and, thus, be prepared to lay down his life for the unit’s honour

    The government this week announced a recruitment model, Agnipath, for the short-term induction of personnel into the armed forces. As a veteran, who has worn the nation’s uniform with pride for 41 years, I wish the new scheme all success. But due to my loyalty to my motherland, shared by all veterans, I also have some misgivings about the new recruitment programme.

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  • China’s Growing Space Power Significant for India

    China’s Growing Space Power Significant for India

    Space has become an arena of competition for power and influence. Big powers have invested heavily in their military space capabilities. Amid an accelerated militarisation of space, China’s space capabilities have grown by leaps and bounds. China has identified Space as a critical domain in the perspective of its global ambitions. The rapid growth in China’s Space capabilities and its articulated ambitions are of significant importance to India’s Space security and national interests.

    Space has become an enormously important facet of our daily life. The increasing utility and critical need for space-based services have made it a rapidly-growing economic and technological arena. Space capabilities now symbolise a nation-state’s growing economic power. Innovation and disruptive technologies are now characterising the growth of the space industry, both in the private and public sectors. In all this, play the most important role as space has become an arena of competition for power and influence.

    Traditionally, military uses of space technologies have revolved around advanced communication, precise navigation, improved Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and meteorology. Further developments have enabled these technologies to be used in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), advanced sensors, early warning systems, and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.

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