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  • An Identity Crisis: Book Review of “The Battle of Belonging”

    An Identity Crisis: Book Review of “The Battle of Belonging”

    Book Name: The Battle Of Belonging: On Nationalism, Patriotism, And What It Means To Be Indian

    Author: Shashi Tharoor

    Publisher: Aleph Book Company

    Year of Publication: October 2020

    Pages: 462

     

     

    The cataclysm of Right-wing extremism has seized global politics. From the United States to Britain and New Zealand, the agenda appears dominant. Among them, in the present context, India is no exception. From cow vigilantism to scathing attacks on minority groups, the question of what it means to be an Indian is contested and debated as never before. Dr Shashi Tharoor, Member of Parliament for the Tiruvananthapuram constituency, in his latest book, ‘The Battle of Belonging’ attempts to redefine what exactly it meant to be an Indian and addresses the present identity crisis in India. Dr Tharoor writes about the subtle mechanism which provides more space for civic nationalism in India in the present times.

    From multiple angles, The Battle of Belonging comes out as a sequel to his previous books, ‘Why I am a Hindu’ and ‘The Paradoxical Prime Minister’. In this book, Tharoor addresses the concept of nationalism and patriotism. According to him, the concept of nationalism in India is flawed unlike the concept of nationalism enshrined in the Indian constitution. Through this book, the author asks the readers to dive into the Indian constitution and understand its rationale. He raises key questions such as, ‘has India’s nationalism really been reshaped?’ and stresses the pitfalls that India would face in the future as the plague of extremism spreads. He also envisions a space for civic nationalism, as envisioned by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, B R Ambedkar, and Rabindranath Tagore. The book is divided into six volumes and each section narrates the evolution of nationalism till the current phase.

    According to Tharoor, civic nationalism is cemented on the principles of liberal democracy and equality for all. However, ethnic nationalism or ethnocentric nations erode these principles and peddles a path for Majoritarianism.

    In the first phase, Tharoor unravels the evolution of the concept of ‘Nationalism’ and distinguishes it from the concept of ‘Patriotism’. To furnish a literary overview of the concept, the author espouses the visions of Kautilya, Thomas Hobbes, Ernest Hemmingway, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, and Rabindranath Tagore. He also takes insights from his former diplomatic career. In this very section, Tharoor offers different typologies of nationalism. Among them ‘ethnic nationalism’ and ‘civic nationalism’ dominates the discourse. According to him, civic nationalism is cemented on the principles of liberal democracy and equality for all. However, ethnic nationalism or ethnocentric nations erode these principles and peddles a path for Majoritarianism. Throughout the book, he lashes out at the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) for breaking the fabric of civic nationalism.

    The second section of the book is vast and extensively researched. In this section, the author gleans several facts on the concepts of unity in diversity. The book also extensively discusses the difference between Hinduism and Hindutva, where the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) is fabricating a new ethos of Hindu Dominance. The book also advances in a way all Indians are a minority in one way or other from a vantage point of view. The author raises the question of an individual’s right to choose his identity regardless of his caste, gender, or whatsoever criteria. 

    The third section explores the Hindutva version of India, investigating how right-wing fringe groups attempt to fabricate a dawn of Hindutva society, where minorities are pushed aside. Here in part, the author delves into the philosophies of Savarkar, Golwankar, and Deen Dayal Upadhaya and how they opposed the Indian constitution. B R Ambedkar envisioned a society that opened space for all. On the other hand, the aforesaid champions envisioned a ‘Hindu Rashtra’, that was contrary to the ideas of Gandhi, Nehru, Ambedkar, and Tagore. In this section, Tharoor speaks on one of his controversial comments, ‘Hindu Pakistan’. He expresses his prolonged anxiety about the possibility of India turning into an autocratic nation like Pakistan. Even though the concept is far-fetched, the ruling party’s majority in the lower house provides no guarantee in this matter.

    India has a prolonged history of accommodating persecuted minorities, whether it be Jews, Parsis and Bangladeshis, and offering them a platform to instil their roots in India and be a part of the nation.

    The fourth section of the book talks about recent events such as the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), the issue of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), the act of imposing Hindi on the non-Hindi speaking states and the case of the Ayodhya Ram temple. Tharoor condemns the act of imposing Hindi onto the shoulders of non-Hindi speaking states. He also questions the flag bearers of Hindi on whether they will dare to take up the challenge of learning another language other than Hindi.

    The CAA and the NRC shook the nation, creating a wave of panic among citizens. The author claims that the freedom struggle of India was to secure a nation that accommodated all, regardless of their identity. India has a prolonged history of accommodating persecuted minorities, whether it be Jews, Parsis and Bangladeshis, and offering them a platform to instil their roots in India and be a part of the nation. It is also an evident reality that the documentation system is a flawed mechanism and that the poor and uneducated who are not aware of this mechanism are the ones who will suffer in the process of NRC. Tharoor claims that these acts of the ruling party are against the concept of liberal constitutionalism.

    He later discusses the much-debated Kashmir issue. This piece clearly indicates just how well-versed Tharoor is in the Constitution of India. Tharoor strongly condemns the act of abrogating Article 370 without consulting the cabinet members and the manner it was passed in the parliament. The author sees it as a clear violation of democracy. Subsequently, the author discusses the Ayodhya dispute. He sees the verdict as dubious, where the demolition of the mosque is condemned as ‘criminal vandalism’ and on the other side, the land is awarded to the ones who perpetuated the act. He also sees this act as remoulding India against the backdrop of Hindutva ideology.

    India is a nation that accommodates all sorts of diversity, and it is a sheer act of intolerance, where a majoritarian idea is imposed over a minority group.

    In the sixth section, the author addresses the ‘Anxiety of Nationhood’, where Indian nationalism is undergoing fundamental changes. Shashi Tharoor, in the first part of this section, narrates the stark contrast between the idea of Hinduism by Mahatma Gandhi and the current Hindutva ideology. Gandhi was a champion of inclusive nationalism.  He even went to the extent of declaring himself as an amalgamation of all religions. His views are very relevant in today’s climate of intolerance. Tharoor, then takes up the contest between the concepts of Bharat and India. The author strongly condemns fringe groups asserting their ideology. India is a nation that accommodates all sorts of diversity, and it is a sheer act of intolerance, where a majoritarian idea is imposed over a minority group. He also claims that the crux of Indian thought is liberal and tolerant in nature which accepts all faiths as its own.

    The author raises a key question on whether the constitution will be able to tame the Hindutva monologue in the present circumstances. Going further, Tharoor narrates how the right-wing groups condemned the constitution for being anglophone in context and their belief that the constitution does not resonate with the Hindu culture of India. Tharoor also raises his apprehension regarding a Hindutva infused constitution on the pile of a majoritarian ideologue. In the Conclusion, the author also explores how the internet has wrapped India into its network. It is indeed true that social media aids Indians to socialise and raise various issues with the public. However, on the flip side, the author also points out and condemns the social media groups that play an active role in spreading fake news and in inciting violence.

    In the final part, Tharoor speaks on how the soul of India can be reclaimed. Here, the author dwells on the ethos of Indian Nationalism that is built on the foundation of diversity and pluralism, and how it is now being tampered with, and how it can be retrieved. Tharoor raises the clarion call against ethno-religious nationalism, which would distort the future of India’s democracy. He also asserts that it is the responsibility of Indians to reclaim India’s diversity and plurality. He foresees an India that respects all regions with patriotism stemming from unity.

    Shashi Tharoor’s ‘Battle of Belonging’ would definitely interest those who love to analyse facts and information thoroughly. It is indeed a thoroughly researched book, and his arguments are supported by a vast amount of facts. The most interesting aspect of this book is the way Tharoor has sewed his thoughts with impeccable and strong language. To summarise, the book takes the reader through the soul and heart of India.

  • The Great Chips War

    The Great Chips War

    The supply chain disruptions for semiconductor chips and the increasing sanctions imposed by the US on high-tech chips access to China and Russia has signalled the critical relevance of control over this technology and process for national security. Chip design and manufacture involve heavy capital investments and access to special machinery that is monopolised by very few American-controlled/influenced companies in Europe and East Asia. India, having missed the boat earlier due to poor investment decisions, has recognised chip manufacturing as a critical strategic industry and is investing efforts to establish significant capabilities. This could take years as challenges still remain.  – TPF Editorial Team

    Following the US Commerce Department’s announcement of severe new restrictions on sales of advanced semiconductors and other US high-tech goods to China, the Sino-American rivalry has entered an important new phase. Even under the best circumstances, China will have a difficult time adapting to its new reality.

    In addition to dealing with the fallout from open warfare in eastern Europe, the world is witnessing the start of a full-scale economic war between the United States and China over technology. This conflict will be highly consequential, and it is escalating rapidly. Earlier this month, the US Commerce Department introduced severe new restrictions on the sale of advanced semiconductors and other US high-tech goods to China. While Russia has used missiles to try to cripple Ukraine’s energy and heating infrastructure, the US is now using export restrictions to curtail China’s military, intelligence, and security services.

    The new chip war is a war for control of the future.

    Moreover, in late August, US President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS Act, which includes subsidies and other measures to bolster America’s domestic semiconductor industry. Semiconductors are and will remain, at the heart of the twenty-first-century economy. Without microchips, our smartphones would be dumb phones, our cars wouldn’t move, our communications networks wouldn’t function, any form of automation would be unthinkable, and the new era of artificial intelligence that we are entering would remain the stuff of sci-fi novels. Controlling the design, fabrication, and value chains that produce these increasingly important components of our lives is thus of the utmost importance. The new chip war is a war for control of the future.

    The semiconductor value chain is hyper-globalized, but the US and its closest allies control all the key nodes. Chip design is heavily concentrated in America, and production would not be possible without advanced equipment from Europe, and fabrication of the most advanced chips – including those that are critical for AI – is located exclusively in East Asia. The most important player by far is Taiwan, but South Korea is also in the picture.

    In its own pursuit of technological supremacy, China has become increasingly reliant on these chips, and its government has been at pains to boost domestic production and achieve “self-sufficiency.” In recent years, China has invested massively to build up its own semiconductor design and manufacturing capabilities. But while there has been some progress, it remains years behind the US; and, crucially, the most advanced chips are still beyond China’s reach.

    It has now been two years since the US banned all sales of advanced chips to the Chinese telecom giant Huawei, which was China’s global technology flagship at the time. The results have been dramatic. After losing 80% of its global market share for smartphones, Huawei was left with no choice but to sell off its smartphone unit, Honor, and reorient its corporate mission. With its latest move, the US is now aiming to do to all of China what it did to Huawei.

    This dramatic escalation of the technology war is bound to have equally dramatic economic and political consequences, some of which will be evident immediately, and some of which will take some time to materialize. China most likely has stocked up on chips and is already working to create sophisticated new networks to circumvent the sanctions. (After Huawei spun it off in late 2020, Honor quickly staged a comeback, selling phones that use chips from the US multinational Qualcomm.)

    Still, the new sanctions are so broad that, over time, they will almost certainly strike a heavy blow not only to China’s high-tech sector but also to many other parts of its economy. A European company that exports to China now must be doubly sure that its products contain no US-connected chips. And, owing to the global nature of the value chain, many chips from Taiwan or South Korea also will be off-limits.

    The official aim of the US policy is to keep advanced chips out of the Chinese military’s hands. But the real effect will be to curtail China’s development in the sectors that will be critical to national power in the decades ahead.

    The official aim of the US policy is to keep advanced chips out of the Chinese military’s hands. But the real effect will be to curtail China’s development in the sectors that will be critical to national power in the decades ahead. China will certainly respond with even stronger efforts to develop its own capabilities. But even under the best circumstances, and despite all the resources it will throw at the problem, any additional efforts will take time to bear fruit, especially now that US restrictions are depriving China of the inputs that it needs to achieve self-sufficiency.

    The new chips war eliminates any remaining doubt that we are witnessing a broader Sino-American decoupling. That development will have far-reaching implications – only some of them foreseeable – for the rest of the global economy.

    Ukraine is already repairing and restarting the power stations that have been hit by Russian missile barrages since the invasion began in February. But it will be much more difficult for China to overcome the loss of key technologies. As frightening as Russia’s twentieth-century-style war is, the real sources of power in the twenty-first century do not lie in territorial conquest. The most powerful countries will be those that master the economic, technological, and diplomatic domains.

    This article was published earlier in Project Syndicate.

    Images Credit: Globaltimes.cn

  • Ghosts in the Machine: The Past, Present, and Future of India’s Cyber Security

    Ghosts in the Machine: The Past, Present, and Future of India’s Cyber Security

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    Introduction

    When the National Cybersecurity Policy was released in 2013, the response from experts was rather underwhelming [1], [2]. A reaction to a string of unpalatable incidents, from Snowden’s revelations [3] and massive compromise of India’s civilian and military infrastructure [4] to the growing international pressure on Indian IT companies to fix their frequent data breaches [5], the 2013 policy was a macro example of weak structures finding refuge in a haphazard post-incident response. The next iteration of the policy is in formulation under the National Cybersecurity Coordinator. However, before we embark upon solving our cyber-physical domain’s future threat environment, it is perhaps wise to look back upon the perilous path that has brought us here.  

    Early History of Electronic Communications in India

    The institutional “cybersecurity thinking” of post-independence Indian government structures can be traced to 1839 when the East India Company’s then Governor-General of India, Lord Dalhousie, had asked a telegraph system to be built in Kolkata, the then capital of the British Raj. By 1851, the British had deployed the first trans-India telegraph line, and by 1854, the first Telegraph Act had been passed. Similar to the 2008 amendment to the IT Act which allowed the government to intercept, monitor and decrypt any information on any computer, the 1860 amendment to the Telegraph Act too granted the British to take over any leased telegraph lines to access any of the telegraphs transmitted. After all, the new wired communication technology of the day had become an unforeseen flashpoint during the 1857 rebellion.

    Post-independence, under the socialist fervour of Nehruvian politics, the government further nationalised all foreign telecommunications companies and continued the British policy of total control over telecommunications under its own civil service structure, which too came pre-packaged from the British.

    Historians note that the telegraph operators working for the British quickly became targets of intrigues and lethal violence during the mutiny [6], somewhat akin to today’s Sysadmins being a top social engineering priority for cyber threat actors [7]. One of the sepoy mutineers of 1857, while on his way to the hangman’s halter, famously cried out at a telegraph line calling it the cursed string that had strangled the Indians [8]. On the other side of affairs, after having successfully suppressed the mutiny, Robert Montgomery famously remarked that the telegraph had just saved India [9]. Within the telegraph system, the problems of information security popped up fairly quickly after its introduction in India. Scholars note that commercial intelligence was frequently peddled in underground Indian markets by government telegraph clerks [10], in what can perhaps be described as one of the first “data breaches” that bureaucrats in India had to deal with. 

    British had formulated different rules for telecommunications in India and England. While they did not have the total monopoly and access rights over all transmissions in Britain, for the purpose of maintaining political control, in India they did [11]. Post-independence, under the socialist fervour of Nehruvian politics, the government further nationalised all foreign telecommunications companies and continued the British policy of total control over telecommunications under its own civil service structure, which too came pre-packaged from the British.

    The Computer and “The System”

    Major reforms are often preceded by major failures. The government imported its first computer in 1955 but did not show any interest in any policy regarding these new machines. That only changed in 1963, when the government under the pressure to reform after a shameful military defeat and the loss of significant territory to China, instituted a Committee on Electronics under Homi Jehangir Bhabha to assess the strategic utilities that computers might provide to the military [12].  

    In 1965, as punitive sanctions for the war with Pakistan, the US cut off India’s supply of all electronics, including computers. This forced the government to set up the Electronics Committee of India which worked alongside the Electronics Corporation of India (ECIL), mandated to build indigenous design and electronic manufacturing capabilities. But their approach was considered highly restrictive and discretionary, which instead of facilitating, further constrained the development of computers, related electronics, and correspondingly useful policies in India [13]. Moreover, no one was even writing commercial software in India, while at the same the demand for export-quality software was rising. The situation was such that ECIL had to publish full-page advertisements for the development of export-quality software [12]. Consequently, in the early 1970s, Mumbai-based Tata Consultancy Services managed to become the first company to export software from India. As the 1970s progressed and India moved into the 1980s, it gradually became clearer to more and more people in the government that their socialist policies were not working [14]. 

    In 1984, the same year when the word ‘Cyberspace’ appeared in a sci-fi novel called Neuromancer, a policy shift towards computing and communications technologies was seen in the newly formed government under Rajiv Gandhi [12]. The new computer policy, shaped largely by N. Sheshagiri who was the Director General of the National Informatics Centre, significantly simplified procedures for private actors and was released within twenty days of the prime minister taking the oath. Owing to this liberalisation, the software industry in India took off and in 1988, 38 leading software companies in India came together to establish the National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) with the intent to shape the government’s cyber policy agendas. As we are mostly concerned about cybersecurity, it should be noted that in 1990, it was NASSCOM that carried out probably the first IT security-related public awareness campaign in India which called for reducing software piracy and increasing the lawful use of IT [5].   

    Unfortunately, India’s 1990s were mired by coalition governments and a lack of coherent policy focus. In 1998, when Atal Bihari Vajpayee became the Prime Minister, the cyber policy took the most defining turn with the development of the National IT Policy. The IT Act, thus released in 2000 and amended further in 2008, became the first document explicitly dealing with cybercrime. Interestingly, the spokesman and a key member of the task force behind the national IT policy was Dewang Mehta, the then president of NASSCOM. Nevertheless, while computer network operations had become regular in international affairs [15], there was still no cyber policy framework or doctrine to deal with the risks from sophisticated (and state-backed) APT actors that were residing outside the jurisdiction of Indian authorities. There still is not.  

    In 2008, NASSCOM established the Data Security Council of India (DSCI), which along with its parent body took it upon itself to run cybersecurity awareness campaigns for law enforcement and other public sector organisations in India. However, the “awareness campaign” centric model of cybersecurity strategy does not really work against APT actors, as became apparent soon when researchers at the University of Toronto discovered the most massive infiltration of India’s civilian and military computers by APT actors [4]. In 2013, the Snowden revelations about unrestrained US spying on India also ruffled domestic feathers for lack of any defensive measures or policies [3]. Coupled with these surprise(?) and unpalatable revelations, there was also the increasing and recurring international pressure on Indian IT to put an end to the rising cases of data theft where sensitive data of their overseas customers was regularly found in online underground markets [16].  

    Therefore, with the government facing growing domestic and international pressure to revamp its approach towards cybersecurity, MeitY released India’s first National Cybersecurity Policy in 2013 [17]. Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) also released detailed guidelines “in the wake of persistent threats” [18]. However, the government admitted to not having the required expertise in the matter, and thus the preparation of the MHA document was outsourced to DSCI. Notwithstanding that, MHA’s document was largely an extension of the Manual on Departmental Security Instructions released in 1994 which had addressed the security of paper-based information. Consequently, the MHA document produced less of a national policy and more of a set of instructions to departments about sanitising their computer networks and resources, including a section on instructions to personnel over social media usage. 

    The 2013 National Cybersecurity Policy proposed certain goals and “5-year objectives” toward building national resilience in cyberspace. At the end of a long list of aims, the 2013 policy suggested adopting a “prioritised approach” for implementation which will be operationalised in the future by a detailed guide and plan of action at national, sectoral, state, ministry, department, and enterprise levels. However, as of this writing the promised implementation details, or any teeth, are still missing from the National Cybersecurity Policy. As continued APT activities [19] show, the measures towards creating situation awareness have also not permeated beyond the technical/collection layer.

    In 2014, the National Cyber Coordination Centre (NCCC) was established, with the primary aim of building situational awareness of cyber threats in India. Given the underwhelming response to the 2013 policy [1], [2], the National Cybersecurity Policy was surmised to be updated in 2020, but as of this writing, the update is still being formulated by the National Cybersecurity Coordinator who heads the NCCC. The present policy gap makes it an opportune subject to discuss certain fundamental issues with cyber situation awareness and the future of cyber defences in the context of the trends in APT activities. 

    Much to Catch Up

    Recently, the Government of India’s Kavach (an employee authentication app for anyone using a ‘gov.in’ or ‘nic.in’ emails-id) was besieged by APT36 [20]. APT36 is a Pak-affiliated actor and what one might call a tier-3 APT i.e., what they lack in technical sophistication, they try to make up for that with passion and perseverance. What makes it interesting is that the malicious activity went on for over a year, before a third-party threat observer flagged it. Post-pandemic, APT activities have not just increased but also shown an inclination towards integrating online disinformation into the malware capabilities [21]. APT actors (and bots), who have increasingly gotten better at hiding in plain sight over social networks, have now a variety of AI techniques to integrate into their command and control – we’ve seen the use of GANs to mimic traffic of popular social media sites for hiding command and control traffic [22], an IoT botnet that had a machine-learning component which the attacker could switch on/off depending upon people’s responses in online social networks [21], as well as malware that can “autonomously” locate its command and control node over public communication platforms without having any hard-coded information about the attacker [23]. 

    Post-pandemic, APT activities have not just increased but also shown an inclination towards integrating online disinformation into the malware capabilities.

    This is an offence-persistent environment. In this “space”, there always exists an information asymmetry where the defender generally knows less about the attacker than the opposite being true. Wargaming results have shown that unlike conventional conflicts, where an attack induces the fear of death and destruction, a cyber-attack generally induces anxiety [24], and consequently, people dealing with cyber attacks act to offset those anxieties and not their primal fears. Thus, in response to cyber-attacks, their policies reflect risk aversion, not courage, physical or moral. It need not be the case if policymakers recognise this and integrate it into their decision-making heuristics. Unfortunately, the National Cybersecurity Policy released in 2013 stands out to be a fairly risk-averse and a placeholder document. Among many other, key issues are: 

    • The policy makes zero references to automation and AI capabilities. This would have been understandable in other domains, like poultry perhaps, but is not even comprehensible in present-day cybersecurity.   
    • The policy makes zero references to hardware attacks. Consequently, developing any capability for assessing insecurity at hardware/firmware levels, which is a difficult job, is also overlooked at the national level itself. 
    • There are several organisations within the state, civilian and military, that have stakes and roles of varying degrees in a robust National Cybersecurity Policy. However, the policy makes zero attempts at recognising and addressing these specific roles and responsibilities, or any areas of overlap therein.
    • The policy does not approach cyber activity as an overarching operational construct that permeates all domains, but rather as activity in a specific domain called “cyberspace”. Consequently, it lacks the doctrinal thinking that would integrate cyber capabilities with the use of force. A good example of this is outer space, where cyber capabilities are emerging as a potent destabiliser [25] and cybersecurity constitutes the operational foundation of space security, again completely missing from the National Cybersecurity Policy.   
    • The policy is also light on subjects critical to cybersecurity implementation, such as the approach towards internet governance, platform regulation, national encryption regime, and the governance of underlying technologies. 

    A Note on the Human Dimension of Cybersecurity

    There exist two very broad types of malicious behaviour online, one that is rapid and superficial, and another that are deep and persistent. The present approaches to building situation awareness in cyberspace are geared towards the former, leading to spatiotemporally “localised and prioritised” assessments [26], matters pertaining to the immediate law and order situations and not stealthy year-long campaigns. Thus, while situation awareness itself is a psychological construct dealing with decision-making, in cybersecurity operations it overwhelmingly has turned into software-based visualisation of the incoming situational data. This is a growing gap that must also be addressed by the National Cybersecurity Policy. 

    The use of computational tools and techniques to automate and optimise the social interactions of a software agent presents itself as a significant force multiplier for cyber threat actors.

    In technology-mediated environments, people have to share the actual situation awareness with the technology artifacts [27]. Complete dependence on technology for cyber situation awareness has proven to be problematic, for example in the case of Stuxnet, where the operators at the targeted plant saw on their computer screens that the centrifuges were running normally, and simply believed that to be true. The 2016 US election interference only became clearer at the institutional level after several months of active social messaging and doxing operations had already been underway [28], and the story of Telebots’ attack on Ukrainian electricity grids is even more telling – a powerplant employee whose computer was being remotely manipulated, sat making a video of this activity, asking his colleague if it could be their own organisation’s IT staff “doing their thing” [29].

    This lack of emphasis on human factors has been a key gap in cybersecurity, which APTs never fail to exploit. Further, such actors rely upon considerable social engineering in initial access phases, a process which is also getting automated faster than policymakers can play catchup to [30]. The use of computational tools and techniques to automate and optimise the social interactions of a software agent presents itself as a significant force multiplier for cyber threat actors. Therefore, it is also paramount to develop precise policy guidelines that implement the specific institutional structures, processes, and technological affordances required to mitigate the risks of malicious social automation on the unsuspecting population, as well as on government institutions.  

    Concluding Remarks

    There is a running joke that India’s strategic planning is overseen by accountants and reading through the document of National Cybersecurity Policy 2013, that does not seem surprising. We have had a troubling policy history when it comes to electronics and communications and are still in the process of shedding our colonial burden. A poorly framed National Cybersecurity Policy will only take us away from self-reliance in cyberspace and towards an alliance with principal offenders themselves. Notwithstanding, an information-abundant organisation like NCCC has undoubtedly to make some choices about where and what to concentrate its attentional resources upon, however, the present National Cybersecurity Policy appears neither to be a component of any broader national security strategy nor effective or comprehensive enough for practical implementation in responding to the emerging threat environment. 

    References

    [1] N. Alawadhi, “Cyber security policy must be practical: Experts,” The Economic Times, Oct. 22, 2014. Accessed: Sep. 14, 2022. [Online]. Available: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/cyber-security-policy-must-be-practical-experts/articleshow/44904596.cms

    [2] A. Saksena, “India Scrambles on Cyber Security,” The Diplomat, Jun. 18, 2014. https://thediplomat.com/2014/06/india-scrambles-on-cyber-security/ (accessed Sep. 18, 2022).

    [3] C. R. Mohan, “Snowden Effect,” Carnegie India, 2013. https://carnegieindia.org/2013/06/19/snowden-effect-pub-52148 (accessed Sep. 18, 2022).

    [4] R. Dharmakumar and S. Prasad, “Hackers’ Haven,” Forbes India, Sep. 19, 2011. https://www.forbesindia.com/printcontent/28462 (accessed Sep. 18, 2022).

    [5] D. Karthik and R. S. Upadhyayula, “NASSCOM: Is it time to retrospect and reinvent,” Indian Inst. Manag. Ahmedabad, 2014.

    [6] H. C. Fanshawe, Delhi past and present. J. Murray, 1902.

    [7] C. Simms, “Is Social Engineering the Easy Way in?,” Itnow, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 24–25, 2016.

    [8] J. Lienhard, “No. 1380: Indian telegraph,” Engines Our Ingen., 1998.

    [9] A. Vatsa, “When telegraph saved the empire – Indian Express,” Nov. 18, 2012. http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/when-telegraph-saved-the-empire/1032618/0 (accessed Sep. 17, 2022).

    [10] L. Hoskins, BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA. ROUTLEDGE, 2020.

    [11] D. R. Headrick, The invisible weapon: Telecommunications and international politics, 1851-1945. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1991.

    [12] B. Parthasarathy, “Globalizing information technology: The domestic policy context for India’s software production and exports,” Iterations Interdiscip. J. Softw. Hist., vol. 3, pp. 1–38, 2004.

    [13] I. J. Ahluwalia, “Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation Since the Mid-Sixties,” J. Asian Stud., vol. 48, pp. 413–414, 1989.

    [14] R. Subramanian, “Historical Consciousness of Cyber Security in India,” IEEE Ann. Hist. Comput., vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 71–93, 2020.

    [15] C. Wiener, “Penetrate, Exploit, Disrupt, Destroy: The Rise of Computer Network Operations as a Major Military Innovation,” PhD Thesis, 2016.

    [16] N. Kshetri, “Cybersecurity in India: Regulations, governance, institutional capacity and market mechanisms,” Asian Res. Policy, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 64–76, 2017.

    [17] MeitY, “National Cybersecurity Policy.” Government of India, 2013.

    [18] MHA, “NATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY AND GUIDELINES.” Government of India, 2014.

    [19] S. Patil, “Cyber Attacks, Pakistan emerges as China’s proxy against India,” Obs. Res. Found., 2022.

    [20] A. Malhotra, V. Svajcer, and J. Thattil, “Operation ‘Armor Piercer:’ Targeted attacks in the Indian subcontinent using commercial RATs,” Sep. 23, 2021. http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/09/operation-armor-piercer.html (accessed Sep. 02, 2022).

    [21] NISOS, “Fronton: A Botnet for Creation, Command, and Control of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior.” May 2022.

    [22] M. Rigaki, “Arming Malware with GANs,” presented at the Stratosphere IPS, Apr. 2018. Accessed: Oct. 19, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.stratosphereips.org/publications/2018/5/5/arming-malware-with-gans

    [23] Z. Wang et al., “DeepC2: AI-Powered Covert Command and Control on OSNs,” in Information and Communications Security, vol. 13407, C. Alcaraz, L. Chen, S. Li, and P. Samarati, Eds. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022, pp. 394–414. doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-15777-6_22.

    [24] J. Schneider, “Cyber and crisis escalation: insights from wargaming,” 2017.

    [25] J. Pavur, “Securing new space: on satellite cyber-security,” PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 2021.

    [26] U. Franke and J. Brynielsson, “Cyber situational awareness – A systematic review of the literature,” Comput. Secur., vol. 46, pp. 18–31, Oct. 2014, doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2014.06.008.

    [27] N. A. Stanton, P. M. Salmon, G. H. Walker, E. Salas, and P. A. Hancock, “State-of-science: situation awareness in individuals, teams and systems,” Ergonomics, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 449–466, Apr. 2017, doi: 10.1080/00140139.2017.1278796.

    [28] “Open Hearing On The Intelligence Community’s Assessment on Russian Activities and Intentions in the 2016 U.S. Elections.” Jan. 10, 2017. Accessed: Dec. 22, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-intelligence-communitys-assessment-russian-activities-and-intentions-2016-us#

    [29] R. Lipovsky, “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures of the World’s Most Dangerous Attackers,” presented at the Microsoft BlueHat 2020, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LAFV6XDctY

    [30] D. Ariu, E. Frumento, and G. Fumera, “Social engineering 2.0: A foundational work,” in Proceedings of the Computing Frontiers Conference, 2017, pp. 319–325.

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  • Undue focus on Hindi can lead to National Isolation and International Seclusion

    Undue focus on Hindi can lead to National Isolation and International Seclusion

    The Committee of Parliament on Official Language’s recommendations that Hindi replace English as the sole language of instruction in central institutions, and that regional languages be used in state universities and other non-central educational institutions will have far-reaching adverse consequences

    Contrary to what is frequently bandied about in certain influential political circles, and nationalist Right-wing cliques, India does not have a national language. The Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India has a list of 22 languages, which are all designated as ‘official languages’. Hindi is one of those, and so is English.

    It is disconcerting that in the official website of the Committee of Parliament on Official Language we come across the following nomenclature: “Department of Official Language – MHA”! How come? What has happened to the 22 listed and designated languages as official languages that the singular ‘language’ has been adopted here?

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  • Security through Deterrence and Power Projection

    Security through Deterrence and Power Projection

    Having lost out big time due to short-sighted piecemeal procurements, India’s acquisition process needs an overhaul and improve its track-record. With correct lessons derived and applied diligently, India can truly emerge as a globally competitive defence manufacturer and achieve control over critical technologies.

    This October 8th the IAF completes 90 years of glorious service to the nation. The past nine-decades is a saga of critical contribution to nation-building, warfighting, support to civil administration, air defence, international cooperation and peace keeping, military diplomacy, and deterrence of adversaries. The demand on these roles of the IAF have increased substantially in recent decades. Kargil to Balakot and Ladakh exemplify the value of the IAF as a critical tool of state power. In the 21st century, aerospace power has emerged as the critical tool of deterrence and power projection. The ability of the IAF to provide an array of choices to the national leadership depends on its force structure and the pace of modernisation. IAF’s 100th anniversary is just ten years away and there are, as Robert Frost said, miles to go. Modernisation is a continuous process. Sustaining the optimal force structure despite the delays of modernisation should remain the paramount task.

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  • The Meaning of War in the 21st Century

    The Meaning of War in the 21st Century

    War is, as Clausewitz said, a continuation of politics…or to be precise it is part of geopolitical machinations.  The complexity of the conflict in Ukraine can be understood only if one examines the many dimensions at play in 21st-century wars.  French journalist and political scientist, Thierry Meyssan delivers some thoughts on the evolution of the human dimension of war. The end of industrial capitalism and the globalization of exchanges do not only transform our societies and our ways of thinking but the meaning of all our activities, including wars.                                          – TPF Editorial Team

     

     

     

    The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not part of any military strategy. Japan had already intended to surrender. The United States just wanted them not to surrender to the Soviets who were beginning to pour into Manchuria, but to themselves.

     

     

     

    Since the end of World War II 77 years ago, Europeans (except for the former Yugoslavs) have known peace on their soil. They have forgotten this distant memory and discovered war with horror in Ukraine. The Africans of the Great Lakes, the ex-Yugoslavs and the Muslims from Afghanistan to Libya, passing through the Horn of Africa, look at them with disgust: for many decades, the Europeans ignored their sufferings and accused them of being responsible for the misfortunes they were suffering.

    The war in Ukraine started with Nazism according to some, eight years ago according to others, but it is only two months old in the consciousness of Westerners. They see some of the sufferings it causes, but they do not yet perceive all its dimensions. Above all, they misinterpret it according to the experience of their great-grandparents and not according to their own experience.

    Wars only a Succession of Crimes

     As soon as it starts, war forbids nuances. It forces everyone to position themselves in one of the two camps. The two jaws of the beast immediately crush those who do not comply.
    The ban on nuances forces everyone to rewrite events. There are only “good guys”, us, and “bad guys”, those on the other side. War propaganda is so powerful that after a while, no one can distinguish the facts from the way they are described. We are all in the dark and no one knows how to turn on the light.
    War causes suffering and death without distinction. It doesn’t matter to which side you belong. It doesn’t matter if you are guilty or innocent. One suffers and dies not only from the blows of those on the other side, but also collaterally from those on one’s own side. War is not only suffering and death, but also injustice, which is much more difficult to bear.
    None of the rules of civilized nations remain. Many give in to madness and no longer behave like humans. There is no longer any authority to make people face the consequences of their actions. Most people can no longer be counted on. Man has become a wolf for man.

    Something fascinating is happening. If some people turn into cruel beasts, others become luminous and their eyes enlighten us.

    I spent a decade on the battlefields and never went home. Although I now flee from suffering and death, I am still irresistibly drawn to those looks. That is why I hate war and yet I miss it. Because in this tangle of horrors there is always a sublime form of humanity.

    The Wars of the 21st Century

    I would now like to offer you some thoughts that do not commit you to this or that conflict and even less to this or that side. I will just lift a veil and invite you to look at what it hides. What I am about to say may shock you, but we can only find peace by accepting reality.

    Wars are changing. I am not talking about weapons and military strategies, but about the reasons for conflicts, about their human dimension. Just as the transition from industrial capitalism to financial globalization is transforming our societies and pulverizing the principles that organized them, so this evolution is changing wars. The problem is that we are already incapable of adapting our societies to this structural change and therefore even less capable of thinking about the evolution of war.

     War always seeks to solve the problems that politics has failed to solve. It does not happen when we are ready for it, but when we have eliminated all other solutions.

    This is exactly what is happening today. The US Straussians have inexorably cornered Russia in Ukraine, leaving it no option but to go to war. If the Allies insist on pushing her back, they will provoke a World War.

    The periods between the two eras, when human relationships must be rethought, are conducive to this kind of disaster. Some people continue to reason according to principles that have proven their effectiveness but are no longer adapted to the world. They are nevertheless advancing and can provoke wars without wanting to.

     

     

     

    On the night of May 9, 1945, the US air force bombed Tokyo. In one night more than 100,000 people were killed and more than 1 million were left homeless. It was the largest massacre of civilians in history.

     

     

     

     

    If in peacetime, we distinguish between civilians and soldiers, this way of reasoning no longer makes sense in modern warfare. Democracies have swept away the organization of societies into castes or orders. Everyone can become a combatant. Mass mobilizations and total wars have blurred the lines. From now on, civilians are in charge of the military. They are no longer innocent victims but have become the first responsible for the general misfortune of which the militaries are only the executors.

    In the Western Middle Ages, war was the business of the nobles and of them alone. In no case did the population participate. The Catholic Church had enacted laws of war to limit the impact of conflicts on civilians. All this does not correspond anymore to what we live and is not based on anything.

    The equality between men and women has also reversed the paradigms. Not only are soldiers now women, but they can be civilian commanders too. Fanaticism is no longer the exclusive domain of the so-called stronger sex. Some women are more dangerous and cruel than some men.

    We are not aware of these changes. In any case, we do not draw any conclusions from them. This leads to bizarre positions such as the refusal of Westerners to repatriate the families of jihadists they have let go to the battlefields and to judge them. Everyone knows that many of these women are far more fanatical than their husbands were. Everyone knows that they represent a much greater danger. But nobody says so. They prefer to pay Kurdish mercenaries to keep them and their children in camps, as far away as possible.

    Only the Russians have repatriated the children, who were already contaminated by this ideology. They entrusted them to their grandparents, hoping that the latter would be able to love and care for them.

    For the past two months, we have been receiving Ukrainian civilians fleeing the fighting. They are only women and children who suffer. So we do not take any precautions. However, a third of these children have been trained in the summer camps of the Banderites. There they learned the handling of weapons and the admiration of the criminal against humanity, Stepan Bandera.

    The Geneva Conventions are only a vestige of the time when we reasoned as humans. They do not stick to any reality. Those who apply them do so not because they believe they are obliged to, but because they hope to remain human and not sink into a sea of crimes. The notion of “war crimes” is meaningless, since the purpose of war is to commit successive crimes in order to achieve the victory that could not be obtained by civilized means, and in a democracy, each voter is responsible.

    In the past, the Catholic Church forbade strategies directed against civilians, such as the siege of cities, on pain of ex-communication. Besides the fact that today there is no moral authority to enforce rules, no one is shocked by “economic sanctions” affecting entire peoples, even to the point of causing murderous famines, as was the case against North Korea.

    Given the time we need to draw conclusions from what we are doing, we continue to consider certain weapons as prohibited while using them ourselves. For example, President Barack Obama explained that the use of chemical or biological weapons is a red line that should not be crossed, but his Vice President Joe Biden has installed a large research system in Ukraine. The only people who have forbidden themselves any weapon of mass destruction are the Iranians since Imam Ruhollah Khomeini morally condemned them. Precisely, they are the ones we accuse of wanting to build an atomic bomb, as they do nothing of the kind.

     In the past, wars were declared in order to take over territories. In the end, a peace treaty was signed to modify the land register. In the age of social networks, the issue is less territorial and more ideological. The war can only end with the discrediting of a way of thinking. Although territories have changed hands, some recent wars have resulted in armistices, but none in a peace treaty and reparations.

    We can see that, despite the dominant discourse in the West, the war in Ukraine is not territorial, but ideological. President Volodymyr Zelensky is the first warlord in history to speak several times a day. He spends much more time talking than commanding his army. He writes his speeches around historical references. We react to the memories he evokes and ignore what we don’t understand. To the English, he speaks like Winston Churchill, they applaud him; to the French, he reminds them of Charles De Gaulle, and they applaud him; etc… To all, he concludes “Glory to Ukraine!”, they do not understand the allusion which they find pretty.

    Those who know the history of Ukraine recognize the war cry of the Banderites. The one they shouted while massacring 1.6 million of their fellow citizens, including at least 1 million Jews. But how could a Ukrainian call for the massacre of other Ukrainians and a Jew for the massacre of Jews?

    Our innocence makes us deaf and blind.

     

    For the first time in a conflict, one side censored the enemy media before the war started. RT and Sputnik were shut down in the European Union because they could have challenged what was to come. After the Russian media, opposition media are beginning to be censored. The Voltaire Network’s website, Voltairenet.org, has been censored in Poland for a month by decision of the National Security Council.

     

     

     

    War is no longer limited to the battlefield. It becomes essential to win over the spectators. During the war in Afghanistan, US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair considered destroying the satellite TV channel Al-Jazeera. It had no impact on the belligerents, but it gave pause to viewers in the Arab world.

    It is worth noting that after the 2003 war in Iraq, French researchers imagined that military warfare might turn into cognitive warfare. If the nonsense about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction only lasted a few months, the way in which the United States and the United Kingdom managed to get everyone to believe it was perfect. In the end, Nato added a sixth domain to its usual five (air, land, sea, space and cyber): the human brain. While the Alliance is currently avoiding confrontation with Russia in the first four domains, it is already at war in the last two.

    As the areas of intervention expand, the notion of a belligerent is fading. It is no longer men who confront each other, but systems of thought. War is thus becoming globalized. During the Syrian war, more than sixty states that had nothing to do with this conflict sent weapons to the country, and today, twenty states are sending weapons to Ukraine. As we do not understand the events live, but interpret them in the light of the old world, we believed that the Western weapons were used by the Syrian democratic opposition while they were going to the jihadists and we are convinced that they are going to the Ukrainian army and not to the Banderites.

    The road to hell is paved with good intentions.

     

    This article was published earlier in voltairenet.org and is republished under Creative Commons License 4.0.

    Feature Image Credit: Proxy Wars and 21st Century Merchants of Death.

     

  • Killing in War – Between Striving for Power and Self-Preservation

    Killing in War – Between Striving for Power and Self-Preservation

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    Introduction:

    How does it come about that humans kill each other en masse in wars? Within the animal kingdom, they seem to have a special position in this respect. Many animal species have a killing taboo within the species, but at the same time, there is a displacement competition, which is often decided by fights. This displacement of conspecifics corresponds to the formation of communities as well as processes of belonging to or exclusion from them. If the displaced conspecifics do not succeed in forming or joining their own communities, they usually perish, for example, because they are denied access to food sources. The displacement of conspecifics serves their own survival and the formation of a group that enables this survival directly or in the transmission of the biological heritage.

    Living and surviving in the community, exclusion and displacement of conspecifics not belonging to the community – this can be considered as a basic pattern of conflicts within a species. In the animal kingdom, such conflicts are usually ritualized rank fights in which the killing of the opponent is usually avoided. However, this cannot hide the fact that killing also takes place here – for example, when the inferior is forced into a territory where he has no chance of survival (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1984). While in the animal kingdom the right of the physically stronger is almost unrestricted, there is a special feature in humans. Because of their intelligence, they are able to recognize that displacement from the community means immediate death and makes biological reproduction impossible (Orywal et al., 1995).

    Recognition of the connection between displacement from the community (or displacement of one’s own by competing communities) and personal death or restriction of reproductive opportunity is the decisive reason for the skipping of the killing taboo within the human species.

    Recognition of the connection between displacement from the community (or displacement of one’s own by competing communities) and personal death or restriction of reproductive opportunity is – according to my central hypothesis – the decisive reason for the skipping of the killing taboo within the human species. In addition, there is in the human being the ability, also developed by his mind, that the weakest or a group of weaker can kill the strongest. This happens with the help of tools, above all weapons, but also by “cunning and trickery”, i.e. by the use of intelligence. At the same time, this basic constellation also gives rise to the possible realization that a fight to the death can lead to the downfall of one’s own community. At a certain point in the conflict, it may therefore be more advisable to abandon the struggle and secure one’s own survival through other efforts – e.g., through improved food production, development of new technical processes, etc. (this is the core idea of Hegel’s struggle for recognition; Herberg-Rothe, 2007).

    Defensive also appears in cases where the militant preservation of one’s identity is not a reaction to an attack from outside but means an attempt to prevent the internal disintegration of one’s community. When a community is threatened by internal tensions, war may serve to stabilize it by fighting an external enemy. Paradigmatic for this is the well-known dictum of Kaiser Wilhelm II at the beginning of World War I that he no longer knew any parties, he only knew Germans.

    Likewise, wars are waged in order to establish a community with its own identity in the first place. Here, the war is supposed to constitute the political greatness through whose anticipated existence it legitimizes itself. This motif emerges most clearly in the national-revolutionary liberation movements, whose strategy is to establish in the struggle the nation for which the war is waged. The talk of the purifying power of war (Ernst Jünger) or the purifying function of violence (Frantz Fanon) acquires its political content here. In the struggle, the community is to be “forged together” (Münkler calls this the existential dimension of war; Münkler, 1992).

    This keeps people in its clutches by no means exclusively because war is essentially determined by feelings (van Creveld, 1998 and Ehrenreich, 1997), but because it subjectively or objectively serves the material as well as ideal self-preservation of communities internally and externally. It is true that feelings play an essential, if not often even decisive role within wars – but the respective decision to go to war is in the rarest cases dominated by feelings alone.  With this determination, however, only one side is mentioned. Defence and self-preservation appear as the real core of war only insofar as it is determined by the aspect of fighting. If, on the other hand, we take more account of its “original violence”, the first moment of Clausewitz’s “whimsical trinity”, and the membership of the combatants in a comprehensive community, war remains equally determined by the aspect of the violent “wanting to have more” (Plato) of material or ideal goods as by the preservation (or creation) of one’s own identity in the struggle, in the displacement competition of communities.

    Let us recapitulate why this cut-throat competition is violent. In a non-violent competition between communities, one of them can be defeated. In order to preserve its physical or symbolic existence, the side that subjectively or objectively sees itself as the loser resorts to violent means. This is the fear of the physical or symbolic death of one’s own community, which can be maintained solely by struggle and, in the last resort, by war. Contrary to the assumption of Thomas Hobbes, the founder of modern political theory, according to my hypothesis, the fear of one’s own death does not lead to the abandonment of the struggle for life and death, but rather to its unleashing.

    While Hobbes’s assumption may be largely plausible with respect to single individuals, although it underestimates the momentum of self-definition through violence (Sofsky, 1996), it is fundamentally wrong with respect to communities. Here, many individuals put their lives on the line precisely because they thereby enable the “survival of the community” and thus their own symbolic or biological survival. The same mechanism of displacement competition, however, can also lead to the insight that the preservation and strengthening of one’s own community can be promoted much better by cooperative behaviour than by a violent conflict.

    If we apply this hypothesis to the interstate sphere, all those approaches fail that derive causes of war only from a single essence, for example from violent struggle (Hondrich, 2002), from the apparently aggressive nature of man or from the struggle for survival (sociobiological theories). The same is true, conversely, for attempts at explanation that see human beings as basically peaceable and seek the causes of wars solely in structures that have taken on an independent existence, such as the state, “capitalism,” the arms industry, dictatorships, or the lack of democratic participation.

    Rather, violence and war are a possibility of self-preservation inherent in human action and, at the same time, of self-delimitation (“wanting more” of material as well as ideal things) of communities. Since this possibility can never be completely excluded, the decisive task of political action is the limitation of violence and war in world society.

    Abolishing proximity and creating distance

    In his study on killing, former Colonel Dave Grossman describes his experiences with U.S. Army training programs that teach soldiers how to kill. He sees the decisive approach in switching off the soldiers’ thinking and automating their actions. Using historical examples, Grossman tries to prove that in a battle only 15-25% of soldiers actually have the willingness to kill others. Grossman concludes that there is an anthropological inhibition to kill others “eye to eye” (Grossman, 1995).  But 15-25 of those involved in war who kill, rape, maim are, in this perspective, either mentally ill to an even lesser degree or subject to a process of violence taking on a life of its own.  Violence is perhaps the drug that is most quickly addictive and considered “normal” by its practitioners.

    According to Grossman, there is an inhibition to killing due to the perceived anthropological sameness and the resulting proximity to the respective opponent, it is precisely this proximity that leads to explosive excesses of violence in mixed settlement areas.

    While, according to Grossman, there is an inhibition to killing due to the perceived anthropological sameness and the resulting proximity to the respective opponent, it is precisely this proximity that leads to explosive excesses of violence in mixed settlement areas. The conclusions drawn from this are extremely contradictory. While in cases of great (spatial or interpersonal) distance the killing inhibition is eliminated by the fact that the opponent is no longer perceived in his sameness as a human being, the use of force in complex and confusing civil war situations can contribute to the creation of distance between people. Last, however, distance can also lead to the limitation of violence. Proximity and distance thus structure the occurrence of violence in very different ways.

    Eliminating proximity between opponents to reduce the inhibition to kill can be done in very different ways. Systematically, three methods can be distinguished that have also played a major role historically: first, the creation of spatial distance, second, social distance, and third, the integration of the combatants into tightly knit communities in which it is no longer the individual who acts, but the group. Belonging to a group and its courses of action are then stronger than the individual’s inhibition to kill.

    One instrument for creating social distance is the degradation of the opponent by denying him his humanity. The demonization of the opponent is the prerequisite for his destruction.

    The creation of spatial distance between combatants is above all a characteristic of modern warfare and the development of distance weapons. The extent of interpersonal distance appears to be directly proportional to the range of the weapons. In the case of bows and arrows, the distance is still relatively small, as it was in the early development of rifles. Only in connection with another distancing principle, the integration into firmly established formations, did these weapons attain their historical significance. The situation is already different with weapons that have an effect at a greater distance, such as artillery in the Napoleonic Wars and World War I or the modern use of aircraft and rocket-propelled grenades. Bomber pilots can no longer see their opponent and perceive him as a human being. They drop their bombs on illuminated squares or leave target acquisition to the sensors of their weapons systems. In the most modern form of spatial distance, the enemy no longer appears as a human being at all, but only as a number and a diagram on computer screens.

    One instrument for creating social distance is the degradation of the opponent by denying him his humanity. The demonization of the opponent is the prerequisite for his destruction. Thus, in the metaphoric of the Nazi regime, political opponents mutated into vermin and rats. In the political propaganda between the world wars, the ideological opponent was also assigned animal characteristics (“Russian bear”). The stigmatization of the opponent as a “machine being” also belongs to this category. In all these cases, the humanity of the opponent is negated, on the one hand, in order to strengthen the sense of belonging to one’s own community by spreading fear and terror, and on the other hand, in order to lift anthropological inhibitions against killing.

    The Nazi concentration camps played a special role in the creation of social distance. In them, two mechanisms of action were applied: on the one hand, the organized and purposeful dehumanization of people, who were degraded to mere numbers by systematic terror. Their individuality was erased by pain and hunger to such an extent that in the end, they were only walking skeletons, “Muselmanen” (Sofsky, 1993, 229 ff.). On the other hand, a sophisticated form of “division of labour” was developed, especially in the pure extermination camps.

    Inhibition to kill was also lowered in groups whose coherence and inner structure had a stronger effect than individuality. The importance of group cohesion was particularly evident in World War I. For many men, the war was the only place “where men could love passionately” (Stephan, 1998, 34 f.) What is meant, however, is not primarily homosexual love (although it always played a major role in men’s alliances), but the intoxicating, emotional bond with the community (ibid.). These men did not fight out of fear of their superiors or of punishment, but primarily out of comradely feelings: Just as they could rely on their comrades, the comrades should be able to rely on them. Possibly, this bond to the group through stress and practiced movements is more important and obvious than abstract ideals or interests for which the individual goes into battle. The decisive factor then is the community on a small scale, which must be defended.

    The fear of one’s own death, the fear of being killed by another person, can only be countered in hopeless situations by killing the other person. The fear of one’s own death or the death of a member of the group leads directly to wanting to kill the cause of this fear of oneself. Fear of death and killing are directly related. The subjective impression arises, as if only the opponent brings one to kill oneself. In this case, the opponent seems to be responsible for the painful overcoming of one’s own inhibition to kill. This creates a boundless rage against him, because it is he through whose behaviour one’s own killing inhibition has been lifted. In the direct fight (“eye to eye”) for life and death, the fear of one’s own death becomes the furore of immoderate violence.

    This “automatic killing” out of fear of one’s own death is described most vividly in Erich Maria Remarque’s novel Nothing New in the West. It says: “I think nothing, I make no decision – I thrust furiously and feel only how the body twitches and then softens and slumps.” And further: “If we were not automata at this moment, we would remain lying, exhausted, will-less. But we have pulled forward again, will-less and yet madly furious, wanting to kill, for that there are our mortal enemies now, their guns and shells aimed at us. We are numb dead men who can still run and kill by a dangerous spell” (Remarque, 1998).

    If one assumes an anthropologically conditioned inhibition of killing in humans, one can furthermore interpret the mutilation of the opponent as a reaction to the fact that precisely despite the prohibition of killing “the other” was killed. The mutilation mitigates the guilt of killing a conspecific by the fact that this conspecific is no longer identifiable as a human being. In the act of killing a conspecific, its mutilation restores the distance between the opponents.

    Whether the “lust” for killing described by Remarque is the result of a drive remains to be seen. It is more likely that the feelings felt in the existential situation of struggle are an expression of triumph over death because one’s own fear of death had to be held down in order to be able to act (Sofsky, 2002). If one assumes an anthropologically conditioned inhibition of killing in humans, one can furthermore interpret the mutilation of the opponent as a reaction to the fact that precisely despite the prohibition of killing “the other” was killed. The mutilation mitigates the guilt of killing a conspecific by the fact that this conspecific is no longer identifiable as a human being. In the act of killing a conspecific, its mutilation restores the distance between the opponents. Especially in the desecration of the dead, as often occurs in massacres, the motive of one’s own “apology” is revealed in the attempt to rob the opponent of even the last vestige of humanity.

    Killing and proximity

    In the case of groups and communities that are closely connected spatially and through neighbourhood relations, emerging socio-economic, religious-cultural, ethnic or political conflicts that are no longer negotiable can turn into extreme mutual anger.

    So far, the creation of spatial and social distance has been discussed as a prerequisite for the individual as well as mass killing. In contrast, in situations characterized by great proximity, killing is often a means of re-establishing distance. It is a well-known fact that most murders committed by private individuals occur in the immediate social environment of the perpetrators. It is also no coincidence that the cruellest ethnic persecutions and exterminations take place between neighbouring or closely related population groups, as the example of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks teach us. Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, spoke of the “narcissism of small differences” (Freud, 2001): The closer individuals and groups of people are to each other, the more disappointed expectations of love and happiness, unfulfilled claims, and hurt feelings of self-esteem play a decisive role in the mutual relationship. One cannot be as disappointed and hurt by “strangers,” by those who are not the same as by those who are closest to one (Mentzos, 2002).

    Particularly in the case of groups and communities that are closely connected spatially and through neighbourhood relations, emerging socio-economic, religious-cultural, ethnic or political conflicts that are no longer negotiable can turn into extreme mutual anger. Because of manifold mutual dependencies, it may be necessary for such conflict situations to reassure oneself of one’s own identity by distancing oneself from the other group. One’s own self or that of the group finally experiences its own power and independence in a violent struggle, in which, precisely because of the dangerous proximity to other people or to the other group, not least one’s own elementary recognition is at stake (Altmeyer, 2002).

    Victims

    For Martin van Creveld, war does not begin when groups of people kill and murder others. Rather, a war begins at the point when the former risk being killed themselves. For van Creveld, those who kill for “base motives” are not belligerents, but butchers, murderers, and assassins (van Creveld 1998, 234-238). Despite all commonalities, the opinions of the theorists of the “New Wars” diverge widely at this point. While some emphasize the independence of violence, the excesses and irregularity of warfare, and pursue a culturally pessimistic approach (especially Sofsky), others primarily stress the aspect of the victim. War is understood here as an almost “sacred act” in defense of the existence of communities (van Creveld, 1998) and civilization (Keegan), characterized essentially by the soldierly willingness to sacrifice for the community (Ehrenreich, 1997 and Stephan, 1998). By considering only one side of the pair of opposites of victims and perpetrators, these theories transfigure war into a pure act of sacrifice, ultimately the most selfless of human activities (van Creveld, 1998).

    The blurring of the contrast between victims and perpetrators in war is summarized by Thomas Kühne in the concept of the victim myth. In modern military life, this myth takes on the task of making an active killing in war socially acceptable, and of dissolving the contradiction between killing and being killed in a sacred aura.

    The question, however, is who is a victim and who is a perpetrator in combat in wars. And when and where do the lines between the two blur? There is a long tradition of the myth of sacrifice, in which even the most barbaric destruction of the other was passed off as self-sacrifice for a higher cause. Heinrich Himmler, for example, spent some effort convincing his subordinates that the extermination of Jews in the gas chambers was in fact a heroic act. A distinguishing criterion obviously lies in whether one’s violent act is directed against the defenseless or against persons who have an opportunity for self-defense or escape. The blurring of the contrast between victims and perpetrators in war is summarized by Thomas Kühne in the concept of the victim myth. In modern military life, this myth takes on the task of making an active killing in war socially acceptable, and of dissolving the contradiction between killing and being killed in a sacred aura. The myth of sacrifice created a symbolic order in the moral and emotional conflict between the experience of death and killing, between feelings of omnipotence and powerlessness (Kühne, 1999 and 2001).

    We will not abolish war in the 21st century, but we must limit it for reasons of self-preservation.

    If we summarize, violence in war is possible because the other is no longer seen as equal, but a spatial or social distance makes it possible in the first place. Through our intelligence, even the physically weakest can defeat a stronger one and does not have to succumb to cut-throat competition. In part, violence also creates social distance in the first place, an aspect we find especially in civil wars. I am unsure whether violence has tended to increase or decrease in wars. Steven Pincker argued that, regardless of media portrayals, violence has decreased to a significant degree worldwide (Pinker, 2013) – to what extent the Ukraine war heralds a contrary trend is impossible to predict. What is likely, however, is that the wars of the future will revolve around ideas of order, around the resurgence of empires and civilizations that have been submerged in colonization and European-American hegemony and that are pushing onto the world stage (Herberg-Rothe & Son, 2018). Whether the possibility of overcoming violence or intensifying it follows from this will remain contested. A positive example could be the end of the Cold War, in which the countless overkill capabilities themselves overcame the antagonistic opposition between capitalism and communism, because the threat of the planet’s self-destruction made people realize not to fight a war with nuclear weapons. The other possibility remains that a new thirty-year war for recognition and order is looming. To be sure, war is not the “father of all things,” as Heraclitus opined. But its horrible destructiveness is nevertheless integrated with the dialectic of self-preservation – on the one hand through the increase of power and material, on the other hand, the preservation of an own physical or symbolic identity.  This dialectical development can also contribute to the self-preservation of humankind, as it succeeded in the nuclear arms race of the Cold War, albeit with great luck in some cases. War as a means of self-preservation is abolished in the nuclear age. Even at the micro level, unleashing violence would endanger humanity’s self-preservation. We will not abolish war in the 21st century, but we must limit it for reasons of self-preservation.

    References

    Altmeyer, Martin (2000), Narzissmus und Objekt, Göttingen.

    Ehrenreich, Barbara (1997), Blutrituale. Ursprung und Geschichte der Lust am Krieg, München.

    Creveld, Martin van (1998), Die Zukunft des Krieges, München.

    Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenäus (1984), Krieg und Frieden aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung, München.

    Gray, Chris Habbles (1997), Postmodern War, London.

    Grossman, Dave (1995), On Killing. The Psychological Costs of Learning to Kill in War and Society, Boston.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (2007), Clausewitz’s puzzle. Oxford.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas (2017), Der Krieg. 2. Aufl. Frankfurt.

    Herberg-Rothe, Andreas and Son, Key-young (2018), Order wars and floating balance. How the rising powers are reshaping our worldview in the twenty-first century. New York.

    Hondrich, Klaus (2002), Wieder Krieg, Frankfurt.

    Kühne, Thomas (1999), Der Soldat. In: Frevert, Ute/Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard (Hrsg.), Der

    Mensch des 20. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt New York, 344-372.

    Kühne, Thomas (2001), Lust und Leiden an der kriegerischen Gewalt.

    Traditionen und Aneignungen des Opfermythos, ungedruckter Vortragstext zur Jahrestagung des Arbeitskreises Historische Friedensforschung “Vom massenhaften gegenseitigen Töten – oder: Wie die Erforschung des Krieges zum Kern kommt”, Ev. Akademie Loccum, 2.-4. Nov. 2001.

    Mentzos, Stavros (2002), Der Krieg und seine psychosozialen Kosten, Göttingen.

    Münkler, Herfried (1992), Gewalt und Ordnung, Frankfurt.

    Orywal, Erwin u.a. (Hrsg.), (1995),, Krieg und Kampf. Die Gewalt in unseren Köpfen, Berlin.

    Pinker, Steven (2013), Gewalt. Eine neue Geschichte der Menschheit. Frankfurt

    Remarque, Erich Maria (1998), Im Westen nichts Neues, Köln.

    Sofsky, Wolfgang (2002), Zeiten des Schreckens, Frankfurt.

    Sofsky, Wolfgang (1993), Die Ordnung des Terrors, Frankfurt.

    Sofsky, Wolfgang (1996), Traktat über die Gewalt, 2. Aufl., Frankfurt.

    Stephan, Cora (1998), Das Handwerk des Krieges, Berlin.

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  • Time to be firm tackling Dragon on LAC Standoff & Human Rights

    Time to be firm tackling Dragon on LAC Standoff & Human Rights

    Both nations, according to reports, now have between 50,000 to 60,000 troops deployed along the LAC in Ladakh.

    The last couple of years, in particular, have seen the world torn apart by both the Covid-19 catastrophe and the emergence of a new Cold War. Nations have been pursuing their own selfish agendas on the global stage unmindful of the uncalled-for destruction of weaker societies with misery and turmoil being inflicted on the hapless. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine eight months ago, a conflict which threatens to escalate into a nuclear dimension, the world is yet to see any signs of a resolution. India, which is located in easily one of the world’s most geopolitically stressed regions, has its own share of diverse challenges, threatening its security and well-being, largely attributable to the hegemonistic and an overly assertive China.

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  • Search for Alternative Development Path: Relevance of Gandhian Thought

    Search for Alternative Development Path: Relevance of Gandhian Thought

    Frequency of extreme weather events has been increasing. Ferocious cyclones, severe droughts and floods, wild fires, melting glaciers and polar ice caps are reported all too frequently. The world needs to consider an alternative development path and Gandhi can be one starting point.

    Gandhi, tradition and modernity

    Gandhi is a hallowed figure in the world, not just in India. However, Gandhian thought has been increasingly pushed to the margins since his death in 1948. It survives in alternative spaces but is hardly practiced anywhere, including in India.

    This marginalisation is the result of Gandhians’ failure to create a milieu which could make Gandhi’s thoughts widely acceptable, especially to the youth. The dynamism required on their part to rapidly evolve their thought to meet the growing challenges in the world in the last 70 years has been missing. Gandhi himself was dynamic, ever-evolving with the changing social situation. In contrast, after his demise, his followers, wanting to remain true to what he had said, got frozen in the past.

    Gandhi was ahead of his time. During his lifetime he struggled to convince the public to pursue the path he propagated. Even the Indian national movement which he led veered off from the path he wanted India to pursue. In his India of my dreams, he argued that India could give a civilisational alternative to the Western civilization which he rejected as `evil’. He perhaps accepted later on that the Congress party was not willing to follow a different path than the path of western modernity.

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  • The Great Game in Ukraine is Spinning out of Control

    The Great Game in Ukraine is Spinning out of Control

    Former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski famously described Ukraine as a “geopolitical pivot” of Eurasia, central to both US and Russian power.  Since Russia views its vital security interests to be at stake in the current conflict, the war in Ukraine is rapidly escalating to a nuclear showdown.  It’s urgent for both the US and Russia to exercise restraint before disaster hits.

    The current conflict is, in essence, the Second Crimean War.  This time, a US-led military alliance seeks to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, so that five NATO members would encircle the Black Sea.

    Since the middle of the 19th Century, the West has competed with Russia over Crimea and more specifically, naval power in the Black Sea.  In the Crimean War (1853-6), Britain and France captured Sevastopol and temporarily banished Russia’s navy from the Black Sea.  The current conflict is, in essence, the Second Crimean War.  This time, a US-led military alliance seeks to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, so that five NATO members would encircle the Black Sea.

    The US has long regarded any encroachment by great powers in the Western Hemisphere as a direct threat to US security, dating back to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which states: “We owe it, therefore, to candour and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those [European] powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”

    In 1961, the US invaded Cuba when Cuba’s revolutionary leader Fidel Castro looked to the Soviet Union for support.  The US was not much interested in Cuba’s “right” to align with whichever country it wanted – the claim the US asserts regarding Ukraine’s supposed right to join NATO.  The failed US invasion in 1961 led to the Soviet Union’s decision to place offensive nuclear weapons in Cuba in 1962, which in turn led to the Cuban Missile Crisis exactly 60 years ago this month.  That crisis brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

    Yet America’s regard for its own security interests in the Americas has not stopped it from encroaching on Russia’s core security interests in Russia’s neighbourhood.  As the Soviet Union weakened, US policy leaders came to believe that the US military could operate as it pleases.  In 1991, Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz explained to General Wesley Clark that the US can deploy its military force in the Middle East “and the Soviet Union won’t stop us.” America’s national security officials decided to overthrow Middle East regimes allied to the Soviet Union and encroach on Russia’s security interests.

    In 1990, Germany and the US gave assurances to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that the Soviet Union could disband its own military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, without fear that NATO would enlarge eastward to replace the Soviet Union. It won Gorbachev’s assent to German reunification in 1990 on this basis.  Yet with the Soviet Union’s demise, President Bill Clinton reneged by supporting the eastward expansion of NATO.

    America’s dean of statecraft with Russia, George Kennan, declared that NATO expansion “is the beginning of a new cold war.”   

    Russian President Boris Yeltsin protested vociferously but could do nothing to stop it.  America’s dean of statecraft with Russia, George Kennan, declared that NATO expansion “is the beginning of a new cold war.”

    Under Clinton’s watch, NATO expanded to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999.  Five years later, under President George W. Bush, Jr. NATO expanded to seven more countries: the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the Black Sea (Bulgaria and Romania), the Balkans (Slovenia), and Slovakia.  Under President Barack Obama, NATO expanded to Albania and Croatia in 2009, and under President Donald Trump, to Montenegro in 2019.

    Russia’s opposition to NATO enlargement intensified sharply in 1999 when NATO countries disregarded the UN, attacked Russia’s ally Serbia, and stiffened further in the 2000s with the US wars of choice in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. At the Munich Security Conference in 2007, President Putin declared that NATO enlargement represents a “serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”

    “And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?  And what happened to the assurances [of no NATO enlargement] our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”  – Putin at the Munich Security Conference in 2007.

    Putin continued: “And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended?  And what happened to the assurances [of no NATO enlargement] our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?” Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience of what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee. Where are these guarantees?”

    In 2007, with the NATO admission of two Black Sea countries, Bulgaria and Romania, the US established the Black Sea Area Task Group (originally the Task Force East).  Then in 2008, the US raised the US-Russia tensions still further by declaring that NATO would expand to the very heart of the Black Sea, by incorporating Ukraine and Georgia, threatening Russia’s naval access to the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

    Also in 2007, with the NATO admission of two Black Sea countries, Bulgaria and Romania, the US established the Black Sea Area Task Group (originally the Task Force East).  Then in 2008, the US raised the US-Russia tensions still further by declaring that NATO would expand to the very heart of the Black Sea, by incorporating Ukraine and Georgia, threatening Russia’s naval access to the Black Sea, Mediterranean, and the Middle East.  With Ukraine’s and Georgia’s entry, Russia would be surrounded by five NATO countries in the Black Sea: Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Turkey, and Ukraine.

    Russia was initially protected from NATO enlargement to Ukraine by Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych, who led the Ukrainian parliament to declare Ukraine’s neutrality in 2010.  Yet in 2014, the US helped to overthrow Yanukovych and bring to power a staunchly anti-Russian government.  The Ukraine War broke out at that point, with Russia quickly reclaiming Crimea and supporting pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas, the region of Eastern Ukraine with a relatively high proportion of Russian population.  Ukraine’s parliament formally abandoned neutrality later in 2014.

    Ukraine and Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas have been fighting a brutal war for 8 years.  Attempts to end the war in the Donbas through the Minsk Agreements failed when Ukraine’s leaders decided not to honour the agreements, which called for autonomy for the Donbas.  After 2014, the US poured in massive armaments to Ukraine and helped to restructure Ukraine’s military to be interoperable with NATO, as evidenced in this year’s fighting.

    The Russian invasion in 2022 would likely have been averted had Biden agreed with Putin’s demand at the end of 2021 to end NATO’s eastward enlargement.  The war would likely have been ended in March 2022, when the governments of Ukraine and Russia exchanged a draft peace agreement based on Ukrainian neutrality.  Behind the scenes, the US and UK pushed Zelensky to reject any agreement with Putin and to fight on.  At that point, Ukraine walked away from the negotiations.

    The nuclear threat is not empty, but a measure of the Russian leadership’s perception of its security interests at stake. 

    Russia will escalate as necessary, possibly to nuclear weapons, to avoid military defeat and NATO’s further eastward enlargement.  The nuclear threat is not empty, but a measure of the Russian leadership’s perception of its security interests at stake.   Terrifyingly, the US was also prepared to use nuclear weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and a senior Ukrainian official recently urged the US to launch nuclear strikes “as soon as Russia even thinks of carrying out nuclear strikes,” surely a recipe for World War III.  We are again on the brink of nuclear catastrophe.

    President John F. Kennedy learned about nuclear confrontation during the Cuban missile crisis.  He defused that crisis not by force of will or US military might, but by diplomacy and compromise, removing US nuclear missiles in Turkey in exchange for the Soviet Union removing its nuclear missiles in Cuba.  The following year, he pursued peace with the Soviet Union, signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

    In June 1963, Kennedy uttered the essential truth that can keep us alive today: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy–or of a collective death-wish for the world.”  

    It is urgent to return to the draft peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine of late March, based on the non-enlargement of NATO.  Today’s fraught situation can easily spin out of control, as the world has done on so many past occasions – yet this time with the possibility of nuclear catastrophe.  The world’s very survival depends on prudence, diplomacy, and compromise by all sides.

     

    This article is republished with the permission of the author. It was published earlier in www.other-news.info

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