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  • Absence of Persons with Impeccable Integrity at the Helm is the Bane of India’s Democracy

    Absence of Persons with Impeccable Integrity at the Helm is the Bane of India’s Democracy

    Gandhiji said that institutions reflect what the people are, and that they cannot function as they are intended to unless those manning them are people of integrity. 

    A Supreme Court Constitution bench recently said that the Chief Election Commissioner should be one “with character” and who would not get “bulldozed” – a self-evident truth. Further, it suggested that the selection committee for the post should consist of an independent person like the Chief Justice of India (‘CJI’). It added that people like bureaucrat and former Chief Election Commissioner late T.N. Seshan, who could act independently, “happen once in a while”.

    Perhaps without meaning to, these comments indict the election commissioners appointed since Seshan’s time. Therefore, they have given voice to recent public concerns about the independence of the institution.

    Integrity of Constitutional Authorities

    Will the CJI’s presence in the committee to appoint the Election Commissioners make a difference? The CJI is a member of the committee to appoint the Director of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). But the Supreme Court itself has called the CBI a “caged parrot”. The problem arises since the party in power would prefer a sympathetic person as an Election Commissioner, not an independent person.

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  • Understanding the ‘Xi Jinping’ thought on Rule of Law: Future Substance of Lawfare and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific

    Understanding the ‘Xi Jinping’ thought on Rule of Law: Future Substance of Lawfare and Challenges in the Indo-Pacific

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    Abstract

    Lawfare aims at using the law and legal systems to hurt or discredit opponents or stop them from reaching their political goals. It is seen that the rule of law has been used to shape the future course of the war as an alternative to traditional military means. Regimes worldwide have started using the law to constrain behaviour, contest circumstances, confuse legal precedents, and gain an advantage. In this paper, the author looks at how China uses “lawfare” in its own country, worldwide and lessons for India.

    Introduction

    While the world focused on the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, China and Solomon Island signed an inter-governmental security pact1 which has been raising concerns regarding the rule-based order2 in the Indo-Pacific region. China, as a rising power, is undoubtedly becoming a significant adversary to various countries bordering it, including India; its growth aims at unipolar Asia, which is causing enormous uncertainty in the region.

    Due to this, it becomes important to understand the multipolar distribution of power in the region since the Indo-Pacific is becoming a site for political contestation and the rise of ‘lawfare’. It is seen that in order to contest for leadership, China has been active on the front to demonstrate, influence, and ideate with different nations. It is actively setting rules and terms of compliance for it through a set of carefully crafted strategies of ‘lawfare’.

    This paper seeks to examine the theoretical underpinnings of lawfare, its internal dimension that influences China’s domestic policy, and its external dimension that has a bearing on China’s strategic and international standing, and finally how China uses lawfare to intimidate other nations and what the world can learn from it.

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  • Women in Afghanistan: The Fight Back

    Women in Afghanistan: The Fight Back

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    Introduction:

    Women and men undergo varied experiences in the event of an absolute collapse of the socio-political order. When combined with a catastrophic political transformation, their exposure to systemic abuse and violence dramatically increases. The vulnerability of women and their exposure to such violence is much more pronounced compared to what men face. This paper attempts to map the violence and abuse of rights women in Afghanistan are facing under the new Taliban rule after the American withdrawal. It also focusses on their response to the same. 

    Women under Taliban 1.0

    Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country with a diverse population. Women’s issues have always had a central role in the governance system. From the beginning of the birth of modern-day Afghanistan, different monarchs have played a key role in determining the status of women in society, in line with their Islamic worldview. However, though women were considered inferior to men, they had their share of rights that were in no way meant to keep them confined to their houses. Instead, their free movement was hardly restricted. Covering their heads or wearing a burqa was not mandatory. There were organizations like the Anjuman-I-Himayat-I-Niswan(Organization for Women Protection), which worked to encourage women into reporting any kind of injustice meted to them. 

    After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, women’s rights were further amplified with universities in most cities, especially Kabul admitting them. After the departure of the Soviets in May 1988, the Mujahedeen overturned all that the Soviet Union had stood for, which included women’s rights regarding employment and education. Women were pushed away from public life and forced to wear a burqa. Fewer women were visible on television.

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  • Russia: The Migration Dimension of the War in Ukraine

    Russia: The Migration Dimension of the War in Ukraine

    Abstract

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 has drastically changed both the internal situation in the Russian Federation (RF) and the country’s relationship with the international community. The impact of these developments is multidimensional and has a significant human dimension, including the formation of new migration flows marked by high shares of young people, males, and members of various elite groups. The elite migrant flow generally includes four major categories of migrants: academic personnel, highly skilled workers (including representatives of professional, business, creative, and athletic elites), students, and so-called investment migrants.

    Economic Impact

    Shrinking economic output1 and the withdrawal of numerous transnational companies from the RF have threatened the jobs and livelihoods of a large segment of the Russian population, hurting first and foremost its elite segments. Indeed, the introduction of new sanctions cut the long-term international ties established in the economic, political, academic, artistic, and athletic spheres, to name just a few, impacting the lives of millions of people, chief among them the representatives of various professional, business, academic, cultural, and athletic elites.

    This negative impact has been aggravated by both the transborder transfers of transnational corporations’ offices and the flight of numerous Russian businesses, as well as individual enterpreneurs, to locations outside the RF. These movements, mostly economically and professionally motivated, have been supplemented by the emigration of people opposing the war as a matter of principle.

    Second Wave Exceeds First

    The second wave of emigration, significantly larger than the first, formed as a direct consequence of the declaration by Russian President Vladimir Putin on September 21 of a 300,000-strong “partial” mobilization and the subsequent announcement by RF Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that up to 25 million Russian citizens might be eligible for mobilization orders—an announcement that de facto involved in the war the majority of the RF’s population (between the potential reservists and their family members). These developments and the subsequent mishandling of the mobilization process, marked by disorganization and numerous widely reported instances of corruption and abuse, acted as additional push factors of migration, which took on an increasingly politicized character.

    Thus, the migration flow in 2022 has essentially consisted of two—separate and consecutive—subflows. These are far from the only large-scale population movements in post-Soviet Russian history: they follow the “brain drain” of the 1990s and the smaller in scale but consistent population movements of the first two decades of the current century. Yet there are huge differences between the current developments and previous trends.

    Historical Perspective

    Russia saw its position in the global migration chain change drastically after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. In its aftermath, the RF quickly became an active participant in the globalization process, following the general trend among those states that were previously the centers of multinational empires: the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and especially the territorially contiguous empires (Germany, Austria, and Turkey) have received, since their empires’ collapse, considerable migrant flows of two major types. The first wave was the permanent—and mostly politically motivated—return migration of the representatives of the former “imperial” nation to their ethnic homelands (the Britons, French, Spaniards, Turks, etc.). They were soon followed by migrants from developing countries—primarily the former colonies of the metropole. These were people who spoke its language, knew its culture, and could rely on the support there of their long-established ethnic diasporas.

    As a result, Russia—previously one of the most isolated countries in the world—quickly became, after 1991, the center of a vast Eurasian migration system that was one of the four largest in the world (alongside those in North America; Western Europe; and the Middle East, centered on the Persian Gulf). By 2010, more than 12 million RF residents (about 8.5% of its population) had been born outside the country. In 2015, Russia ranked third in the world—after India and Mexico—in terms of its number of emigrants: 10.5 million.2 While most of these migrants moved within the post-Soviet space, in 1991–2005 alone, more than 1.3 million Russian citizens obtained permits for permanent emigration to the West.3 Overall, the number of those who were born in Russia but currently live in countries outside the former USSR is estimated at approximately 3,000,000.4

    This flow was generated by both the “pull” and “push” factors of migration. In the case of emigration outside the post-Soviet region, an important role was played by the liberalization of the migration regime and the emergence of opportunities to work and study abroad; higher living standards; prospects for professional growth; and the genearally welcoming atmosphere for Russian scholars, students, and professionals at that time. “Push” factors included the economic and political instability in Russia, specifically the rapid degradation of Russian state-run industry and of the academic sphere. Research expenditure as a share of Russian GDP was 0.50% in 1992 and 0.24% in 2000 (representing 2.43% and 1.69% of the federal budget, respectively). During this period (1992–2000), the number of those employed by the academic institutions fell from 1,532,000 to 887,729 (a 42% drop), while the number of researchers declined from 804,000 to 425,954 (a 47% drop).5

    With the economic and political stabilization of the early Putin years, budgetary expenditures increased, peaking in 2015 at 2.81% of the federal budget (0.53% of GDP).

    These processes led to the formation of significant elite Russian diasporas in the major receiving countries. Already by 2010–11, more than 660,000 university educated Russians were living abroad, putting the RF into the category of states with large elite diasporas (300,000 to 1,000,000 migrants with a university degree)—along with such countries as Mexico, South Korea, Vietnam, Iran, Taiwan, Morocco, and Colombia.6 Of particular importance was the massive emigration of Russian scholars and educators: I previously estimated the size of this elite diaspora at about 300,000–350,000 in 2012, including, as of 2015, approximately 56,000 students studying abroad. The academic flow was heavily dominated by basic and technical sciences experts, while specialists in social sciences and the humanities accounted for just 6.1% of the total in 2002–03.7 The flow was also skewed geographically toward the two highly developed Global North regions of North America and Western Europe, which respectively accounted for 30.4% and 42.4% of the intellectual migration flow. The largest receiving countries were the United States (28.7%) and Germany (19%); these two states also held first and second place, respectively, among receiving countries in practically all academic subfields.8

    With the economic and political stabilization of the early Putin years, budgetary expenditures increased, peaking in 2015 at 2.81% of the federal budget (0.53% of GDP). This served to slow down the academic personnel decline and the elite outflow: between 2000 and 2019, the number of those employed in the academic sphere declined from 887,729 to 682,464 (or by 23.1%), while the number of researchers fell from 425,954 to 348,221 (or by 18.2%9 —see Figures 1a and 1b below and Table 1 on p. 11). While the number of Russian students studying abroad remained relatively stable at 50,000–60,000, the RF during that period rebuilt its position as one of the leading hubs for international students—ranking sixth in the world behind the US, the UK, Australia, France, and Germany.10 Their numbers grew steadily, from 153,800 in 2010/2011 to 298,000 in the 2019/2020 academic year.11

    Figure 1a: Russian R&D Dynamics, 1992–2019: Personnel (mln.)

    Figure 1b: Russian R&D Dynamics, 1992–2019: Expenditures

    Source: Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, “Rossiia v Tsifrakh—2020,” 2021, https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b20_11/Main.htm; Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2009 (Moscow, 2009), 543, 553; Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2020 (Moscow, 2020), 495–6, https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Ejegodnik_2020.pdf; Gosudarstvennyi komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii po statistike, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2003 (Moscow, 2003), 531.

    Russia, while losing its elite migrants to the more developed countries of the Global North, was at least partially substituting for their loss with immigration from less developed states, primarily those in the post-Soviet space.

    Overall, it could be concluded that Russia transformed in the early 2000s from the country in deep economic and social crisis—and source of massive elite outflows— that it had been in the 1990s into a state with a moderate level of development that played multiple roles in the world migration chain: both sending and receiving migrants as well as acting as a migrant transit country. Russia, while losing its elite migrants to the more developed countries of the Global North, was at least partially substituting for their loss with immigration from less developed states, primarily those in the post-Soviet space. The impact of the “pull” factors of migration increased, while that of the “push” factors decreased, at least in relative terms.

    After the Invasion

    This multiplicity of roles was for the most part retained by the RF after the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 (even under the conditions of the expanding sanctions
    regime) and during the general decline of migration activity worldwide as a result of COVID-19 restrictions. Yet the events of 2022 have drastically changed the migration environment, returning it to a crisis level, with the “push” factors of migration (such as the deteriorating political situation, sharp disagreements with governmental policies among certain segments of society, the unwillingness of many to serve in the RF military, the fear of losing jobs and sources of income, etc.) coming to the forefront.

    When it comes to the contrast between current migration flows and previous post-Soviet flows, the following points should be noted:

    • The 2022 migration waves are defined primarily by “push” factors, which have frequently forced people to leave even in the absence of adequate preparation
      (previous experience of work or study abroad, personal or professional networks) or clear prospects in destination countries.
    • Migration in 2022 is frequently directed toward smaller and economically weaker countries than in the 1990s, including those in Eastern Europe, the post-Soviet space (Central Asia, the Caucasus), and the Persian Gulf, as well as Turkey and Mongolia. This may lead to the reversal of the trends that have dominated (especially elite) migration patterns in Central Eurasia for the last three decades. This reversal, which has important symbolic value, may create significant long-term labor-market and demographic problems for the RF.
    • In contrast to previous migration waves, the current ones are marked by their hectic, spontaneous character and the heavy presence in the flow of young people working in the IT and business sectors, who are relatively flexible and could either seek jobs or create private-sector businesses. At the same time, there is also a significant share of people, especially within the academic bloc, who hold Humanities and Social Sciences degrees and have very limited prospects of finding jobs that correspond to their qualifications. Thus, even under the current crisis conditions, substantial return migration can be expected.
    • In 2022, movement is further complicated by the heritage of the COVID-19 pandemic and the new limitations resulting from the 2022 sanctions— these are related to the blocking of RF-issued credit cards, the break-up of direct transportation links with most European countries, complications with getting visas, and frequently prohibitive airfare rates. An additional complication is presented by the recent proposals, in a number of Western countries, to arrest RF citizens or confiscate their property.
    • A particular feature of the 2022 flows has been their “explosive,” emergency character, marked by very high intensity in the initial weeks and a relatively
      quick decline thereafter.

    There also exist visible differences between the flow that followed the developments of February 2022 and the flow that followed the events of September 2022. In particular,

    • A noticeable discrepancy exists in terms of their scale and gender structure. The first flow was on the order of 100,000–150,000 people and was relatively balanced in gender terms, frequently including whole families with children. The second, which followed Putin’s mobilization announcement, has been heavily dominated by young males. This in itself poses significant problems for Russia’s demographic and economic future.
    • The first flow was directed, first and foremost, toward all the countries neighboring Russia. The current one, meanwhile, is taking place under the conditions of
      changing public attitudes and governmental policies toward RF citizens, even those who oppose Putin’s actions. This dynamic could lead to general change in the direction of migration flows.
    • The flow of the first half of 2022 was marked by heavy presence of foreign citizens and people with dual citizenship or other legal status, who moved to the countries where they held such status. The participants in the current flow, who are primarily RF citizens, face additional legal problems in receiving countries by comparison.
    • The original flow included large numbers of people who worked in the RF offices of transnational companies that relocated, along with their personnel, to other countries. These people had some social guarantees, had experience of work for a TNC, and could rely on their companies’ support. People emigrating in the newest waves lack these opportunities.
    • The large-scale arrival of migrants in countries with relatively weak infrastructure and limited economic capacity (the states of the Baltic, the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia) has put significant pressure on these states’ economies and labor markets. Successive waves of migrants will therefore increasingly  encounter competition, economic hardship, and negative public attitudes.

    While there exist huge discrepancies in the estimates of migration flows made by various entities—both governmental agencies and non-governmental organization —in Russia as well as the receiving states, it is clear that the most recent flow has been much larger than the one in the first half of 2022. The most frequently cited figure is on the order of 700,000 people.12 How-ever, a major problem is that most estimates rely on the statistical data of the national border guard services, which report the number of border crossings in a particular period of time without accounting for repeat crossings, return migration, movement to the third countries, “shuttle” activities, irregular migration, etc.13 Because of these limitations, it is likely that the overall number of migrants in the “second wave” is currently in the range of 350,000–450,000. Thus, the overall number of migrants who have left the RF in the two urgent and chaotic waves of 2022 can be estimated at about 500,000. Even this figure represents a substantial potential loss for a country—particularly one like Russia that was already experiencing population decline.14 It is a special concern considering the skewed gender, age, and qualification structure of those currently leaving the RF.

    Table 1: Russian R&D Dynamics, 1992–2019

    Source: Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, “Rossiia v Tsifrakh—2020,” 2021, https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b20_11/Main.htm; Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2009 (Moscow, 2009), 543, 553; Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2020 (Moscow, 2020), 495–6, https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Ejegodnik_2020.pdf; Gosudarstvennyi komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii po statistike, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2003 (Moscow, 2003), 531.

    While these factors represent some very important arguments for putting an immediate end to the military action, it is clear that demographic, labor market, and socio-economic considerations are of minor significance for Vladimir Putin. More than that, following Alexander Lukashenka’s example in Belarus following the protests there in 2020, the RF leadership could perceive the current migration outflows as politically useful, ridding it of opponents to the war and regime and further weakening the country’s civil society. Thus, the disastrous 2022 policies might continue, aggravating both the domestic socio-economic situation and the RF’s position in the world.

    References:

    1. In particular, Russia’s industrial output in September 2022 was 9% of that in September 2021 (Federal’naia Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki, “Operativnye Pokazateli,” 2022, https://rosstat.gov.ru/).
    2. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Trends in International Migration Stock: The 2015 Revi- sion (New York: United Nations, 2015).
    3. Anatolii Vishnevskii, , Naseleniie Rossii 2003-2004: Odinnadtsatyi-dvenadtsatyi ezhegodnyi demograficheskii doklad (Moscow: Nauka, 2006), 325.
    4. “‘Meduza’ ob emigratsii iz Rossii,” Demoscope 945–6 (17–30 May 2022), http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/2022/0945/gazeta01.php.
    5. Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, “Rossiia v Tsifrakh—2020,” 2021, https://gks.ru/bgd/regl/b20_11/Main.htm; Gosudarst- vennyi komitet Rossiiskoi Federatsii po statistike, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2003 (Moscow, 2003),
    6. This group is second to that of countries with extra-large diasporas (more than 1,000,000 people). As of 2015, that group included India (2,080,000), China (1,655,000), the Philippines, the UK, and See Irina Dezhina, Evgeny Kuznetsov, and Andrei Korobkov, Raz- vitie Sotrudnichestva s Russkoiazychnoi Diasporoi: Opyt, Problemy, Perspektivy (Moscow, 2015), http://russiancouncil.ru/upload/Report- Scidiaspora-23-Rus.pdf, 18.
    7. V. Korobkov and Zh. A. Zaionchkovskaya, “Russian Brain Drain: Myths and Reality,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45, no. 3-4 (September-December 2012): 332.
    8. , 335–6. See also Andrei Korobkov, “Russian Academic Diaspora: Its Scale, Dynamics, Structural Characteristics, and Ties to the RF,” in Migration from the Newly Independent States: 25 Years After the Collapse of the USSR, ed. Mikhail Denisenko, Salvatore Strozza, and Matthew Light (New York: Springer, 2020), 299–322.
    9. Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, “Rossiia v Tsifrakh—2020;” Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Rossiiskii Stat- isticheskii ezhegodnik 2020 (Moscow, 2020), 495–6, https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Ejegodnik_2020.pdf.
    10. “Mezhdunarodnye studenty,” Unipage, 2019, https://unipage.net/ru/student_statistics.
    11. Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, “Rossiia v Tsifrakh—2020;” Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Rossiiskii Stat- isticheskii ezhegodnik 2020, 206, https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/Ejegodnik_2020.pdf.
    12. See, for instance, “Forbes: posle ob”iavleniia mobilizatsii Rossiiu pokinuli primerno 700 chelovek,” Kommersant, October 4, 2022, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5594533.
    13. For example, the Interior Ministry of Kazakhstan reported at the beginning of October that in the wake of the mobilization announcement by Vladimir Putin on September 21, 2022, more than 200,000 people had crossed the country’s border with Russia, of whom just seven had been deported back to the At the same time, this report noted that 147,000 of them had already left Kazakhstan within a period of less than two weeks. See Mikhail Rodionov, “V Kazakhstan s 21 sentiabria v”ekhali bolee 200 tysiach rossiian. Deportirovali semerykh,” Gazeta. ru, October 4 2022, https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2022/10/04/15571807.shtml.
    14. In 2019, the fertility rate in Russia was 1.504. See Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, “Rossiia v Tsifrakh—2020;” Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii ezhegodnik 2020, 103.

    This article was originally published at the Center for Security Studies (CSS)

    Featured Image Credits: Politico

  • Xi’s third term, the 20th Party Congress and Implications for India

    Xi’s third term, the 20th Party Congress and Implications for India

    The historic 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded on October 23rd. The week-long extravagant event – beginning on October 16th – has brought new faces of the Chinese political elite to the forefront along with a few surprises. Xi’s report before the 20th National Party Congress (NPC) at the opening ceremony and his appointments to the highest posts in the country are very telling of what his third term could look like for the world. Most importantly, the implications for India cannot be clearer – politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily. India will need to acquaint herself with these new appointments and developments and come up with a strategy to level the playing field.

    What the report says and implies

    Xi’s report to the 20th NPC was in stark contrast to the report delivered in 2017 to the 19th NPC. In 2017, Xi was triumphant of all that China had achieved and hoped to achieve in the future – particularly on the economic front and of its growing international influence. He was proud of China’s assertive foreign policy and soft power. That sentiment has not necessarily changed in the 20th NPC report. However, Xi’s report did strike a sombre tone, predicting a tough future for China – “…strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent and uncertainties and unforeseen factors are rising. Various “black swan” and “grey rhino” events may occur at any time.” His speech and report come across as a rallying call meant to safeguard the primacy and authority of the CPC and their way of life against external interference.

    “China’s overall development objectives for the year 2035 are as follows: Significantly increase economic strength, scientific and technological capabilities, and composite national strength; substantially grow the per capita GDP to be on par with that of a mid-level developed country”.              – Xi Jinping in his address to the 20th Party Congress.

    The importance of “national security” (mentioned 81 times) and China’s external and regional challenges is given highest priority and significance. Other key phrases that find frequent mention in the report are “military”, “strategic/strategy” and “risks”. There is a concerted focus on military modernisation and ramping R&D. Simultaneously, Xi is also realistic of the economic challenges ahead of China – “…many bottlenecks hindering high-quality development, and China’s capacity for scientific and technological innovation is not yet strong enough. Many major issues need to be resolved in order to guard against financial risks and ensure that food, energy, and industrial and supply chains are secure and reliable.” Interestingly, China’s economy was not in the spotlight. There was a glaring omission of the development of and plans for the BRI; mentioned only twice in the entire report. Predictably, there was no change in China’s policy towards Taiwan except a veiled threat directed at the US for its interference in its neighbourhood. It appears that Xi’s plans for his third term are to focus on China’s security and strategic challenges through assertive diplomacy.

    Xi stacks the deck in his favour

    Xi Jinping’s appointment as General Party Secretary of the CPC for a third term was the least surprising outcome from the 20th NPC; owing to constitutional amendments made in his previous term i.e., the removal of the constraint of a term limit. He also retains his position as Chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). His appointments to the state’s top bodies have broken with the CPC’s age norm of ‘7-up, 8-down’; officials eligible to serve another term at 67 years have been given the boot while people like Zhang Youxia (VC of the CMC), at 72 years, has been given another term when he should ideally have been retired.

    The reshuffling of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) appears to have only one important criterion – loyalty to Xi Jinping. The move is also an indication of the concentration of power that now rests with Xi and his men. With the introduction of the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards”, Xi elevated himself to be on par with Mao Zedong and above Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Indeed, the inclusion of Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the Party Constitution along with the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” has cemented Xi Jinping as the core of the CPC. His appointments to the PBSC reflect this. Premier Li Keqiang, widely believed to be a dissenter and protégé of former President Hu Jintao was dropped. Hu Chunhua, slated for a position in the PBSC and considered for the premiership was unable to secure a position in the 7-member powerful body and was even dropped from the Politburo. Other members to be removed were Wang Yang, Han Zheng and Li Zhangshu. Both Wang Yang and Han Zheng were closely linked to Li Keqiang and former President Jiang Zemin respectively. The new members of PBSC are Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi. Zhao Leji and ideology tsar Wang Huning were the only members to retain their seats; having closely aligned themselves with Xi Jinping in the period between the 19thNPC and 20th NPC. The composition of the 20th PBSC indicates Xi’s success in removing all factional opposition present within the Party. All the members who were left off the PBSC were a part of the Communist Youth League and rose within its ranks to become powerful men. Their removal, along with Hu Jintao being escorted out during the 20th National Congress is both a signal to Xi’s loyalists and opposition.

    Similarly, the selection of people into the 24-member Politburo and Central Committee are all Xi loyalists and will have a direct impact on China’s domestic and foreign policies going forward. Xi’s prioritisation of security and S&T is reflected in some of the new appointments to the Politburo – Chen Wenqing (an intelligence officer and former minister of the Ministry of State Security), engineers with specialisation in aerospace Ma Xingrui and Yuan Jiajin, Li Ganjie (nuclear engineering), Zhang Youxia (VC of the CMC), Hei Weidong (VC of the CMC and Commander of CMC’s Joint Command Center), Chen Jining (environmental sciences), and Yin Li (public health expert). Notably, both the PBSC and Politburo have no women participation.

    The backgrounds of the appointees to these bodies are also an indicator of the growing premium Xi is placing on technocrats. Beyond party and political loyalty, they are expected to fall in line with his policy agenda and thus, have backgrounds in aerospace, technology, finance, economics, engineering, and advanced manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors. 

    The backgrounds of the appointees to these bodies are also an indicator of the growing premium Xi is placing on technocrats. Beyond party and political loyalty, they are expected to fall in line with his policy agenda and thus, have backgrounds in aerospace, technology, finance, economics, engineering, and advanced manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors. The number of officials with backgrounds in S&T in the Central Committee is at par with Jiang Zemin’s first term in 1992. According to a study by the Brookings Institution, 81 seats in the 20th Central Committee – around 40% – are occupied by Chinese officials with technical expertise. The belief that technocrats generally lack political factions, prefer working in silos and are solution-oriented also works in Xi’s favour.

     

    A stronger and more loyal CMC

    The new CMC appointees stand out for several reasons. For one, Xi has broken with the established retired norms by placing Army veteran Zhang Youxia as VC of the CMC. Further, the placement of He Weidong as the second VC of the CMC is unusual since he has essentially jumped two grades without serving as either a member of the CMC or Central Committee of the CPC. Second, Xi appears to have rewarded those that he has personal and familial connections with.

    Zhang Youxia’s father, Zhang Zongxun was a founding member of the PLA and served with Xi’s father, Xi Zongxun in the 1940s. General Zhang’s decorated career, combat experience (Sino-Vietnamese war in the 1980s) and position as head of the Equipment Development Department of the CMC make him one of Xi’s most trusted allies in the PLA. On the other hand, General He Weidong’s catapult to second VC is significant given his operational experience with both the Western Theatre Command (WTC) and Eastern Theatre Command (ETC) ground forces. Reportedly, both Xi and He are also close friends owing to the time they both spent in Fujian province and Zhejiang province during Xi’s days working in the provincial government.

    The other new appointment with operational and combat experience is General Liu Zhenli. He takes over as Chief of the Joint Staff Committee of the CMC and was previously Chief of Staff and Commander of the PLA Army and Chief of Staff of the PAP. His experience in the Sino-Vietnam border skirmishes in the 1980s as well as his stint with the PAP makes him an important addition to the CMC.

    Finally, General Li Shangfu’s (potentially Minister of National Defense) elevation to the CMC is notable in that it signals a close linkage between the aerospace domain and the military. Li is a technocrat and is widely regarded as the man behind China’s manned and unmanned space program. His time as Deputy Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force and his current appointment as Director of the Equipment Development Department reflects Xi’s aim of achieving the centenary goal of the PLA Army and modernising its military and national defence.

    The other two members to retain their position in the CMC are Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. They both rose through the ranks in the Political Work Department as political commissars. Admiral Miao will continue to head the Political Work Department. He is also a close ally of Xi from when they both served in the Fujian province in the 1990s and 2002. No doubt his work as a political commissar in the PLA Navy makes him a strong candidate for a second term in the CMC. Similarly, General Zhang continues to head the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as he serves in the PLA Rocket Force. His appointment is particularly significant given the fact that he replaced Du Jincai who was being investigated with then VC’s Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou on corruption. Zhang Shengmin’s retainment signals, one, Xi’s trust in him and two, that his anti-corruption campaign is far from over.

    Other appointments such as Airforce General Xu Qilang and PLA Generals Wei Fenghe and Li Zuocheng to the State Commission indicate an overwhelming prioritisation of the WTC and ETC, meaning India and Taiwan – China’s two biggest security challenges. The appointment of several serving chiefs of the ground forces will have far-reaching implications for the LAC and India’s national security.

    The combination of technocrats and veterans in the CMC is a nod towards Xi’s vision for the Chinese military – “…continue integrated development of the military through mechanization, informatization, and the application of smart technologies and work faster to modernize military theory, organizational forms, personnel, and weaponry and equipment. We will enhance the military’s strategic capabilities for defending China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests…”.

    However, the success of these appointments remains to be seen given the relatively limited operational experience some of the members have.

     What do we make of China’s economy?

    The “common prosperity for all” is another major tenet at the heart of China’s domestic economic policy. Whilst outlining all the strides the CPC has made in the last five years to the 20th NPC, Xi is also aware of the economic challenges China faces – the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, the rise of unilateralism and protectionism, a sluggish global economy and regional conflicts and disturbances. To combat these challenges, China is pursuing the “dual circulation” strategy and “high-quality development”. Notably, these two mechanisms have made their way to the Party Constitution. The dual circulation strategy is aimed at improving domestic demand, building secure and resilient supply chains, and reducing China’s dependency on foreign trade for its economic growth.

    China is pursuing the “dual circulation” strategy and “high-quality development”. Notably, these two mechanisms have made their way to the Party Constitution. The dual circulation strategy is aimed at improving domestic demand, building secure and resilient supply chains, and reducing China’s dependency on foreign trade for its economic growth.

    Along with a faster recovery of its industrial production equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing, China’s GDP grew by 3.9% in the third quarter. However, this does not take away from the fact that, presently, China’s exports have diminished. The strict zero-covid policy that China continues to enforce is severely impacting its industries. The recent US Chips Act and export controls targeted at China are affecting foreign enterprises in the country as well as its tech industry.

    Further, the absence of market-reform oriented economists like Premier Le Keqiang, Vice Premier Liu He, head of the Central Bank Yi Gang, financial regulator Guo Shuqing and Finance Minister Liu Kun from the PBSC and Politburo will surely be felt. Li Qiang, the potential candidate for the Premiership does not have an economic background and it is likely that most of the heavy lifting will fall to He Lifeng (tapped for Vice Premier) in the Politburo. He is a supporter of Xi’s “self-reliance” policies and economic nationalism. He will have big shoes to fill as Liu He, the outgoing Vice Premier, had a powerful portfolio that included economic policy and the financial sector. The Harvard-trained economist was also Xi’s go-to man for trade negotiations with Washington.

    India’s continued economic growth is evidence contrary to what China dictates. Even as China seeks membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and uses the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), there are signs of decoupling with the Chinese economy emerging. Already, the US-imposed export controls are impacting China’s production and manufacturing. While China proposes a more “secure” and inward-looking economic policy, achieving this goal will take a long time. This is an opportunity for India to exploit. India becoming the next manufacturing hub for the world will challenge China’s position in Asia and thus, presents an obstacle for the latter.

    China’s wolf-warrior diplomacy to continue

    With Yang Jiechi’s retirement, the position of head of China’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission is set to move to Wang Yi, another seasoned career diplomat. His appointment to the Politburo, at 69 years of age, is yet another display of Xi’s disregard for the Party age norms. But it also indicates that Xi looks to Wang’s expertise as China enters its most challenging period of international engagements. Wang has been the face of China’s foreign policy for quite some time and is another ‘wolf-warrior diplomat’. His appointment signals the continuity of the wolf-warrior diplomacy that China practices. With Wang Yi at the helm, it is expected that Qin Gang, the current ambassador to the US, will become the next Foreign Minister. The other potential appointee to the position is Liu Haixing who is a career diplomat specialising in European affairs and served multiple postings in China’s embassy in France. He is also the Deputy Director of the Office of the National Security Commission (NSC). Other diplomats on the roster are Liu Jianchao and Qi Yu. Liu Jianchao was recently made Director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCID) this June and it is unlikely to change so soon. He also previously served at the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission (FAC). Qi Yu, serving as Party Secretary of the Foreign Ministry has no diplomatic experience.

    The choice between Liu Haixing and Qin Gang will also dictate the future direction of China’s foreign policy. The choice of diplomats to the Central Committee also indicates the importance Xi places on public relations. China’s need to sway public opinion, both domestically and internationally, is reflected in the choice of Liu Jianchao and Qin Gang. Both have ample experience serving as spokespersons for the Party and the PRC respectively. Further, Liu Jianchao’s and Liu Haixing’s elevation to the Central Committee also indicates the importance of serving in Party Commissions. Their time at the FAC and NSC, respectively, within the last five years has earned them a fast-tracked promotion to the Central Committee. The path to the top is even closer for Liu Haixing given the fact that his senior, Cai Qi who served in the NSC, now sits in the PBSC.

    The road ahead for India

    The appointments to the PBSC, Politburo and CMC are a reflection of China’s assertiveness on the international stage. The military appointees are of particular importance to India. The overwhelming emphasis on ground forces and service chiefs with experience in the WTC could mean more skirmishes along the LAC and a concerted focus towards engaging in hybrid warfare. The LAC is a priority security concern for India as well and the nationalistic fervour that Xi exemplified in his speech to the 20th NPC is no different from what Prime Minister Modi engages in. That said, India’s military forces must be prepared for an escalation along the LAC at any point in time.

    The Central Committee of 205 members, the majority of whom hold doctorates, includes 47 military leaders. This is reflective of China’s governance structure that is techno-military focused along with the necessary expertise in political, economic, and social domains.

    However, leaving aside the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the West, it is important for India to recognise the competence; educational qualifications, experience, and expertise; and the varied techno-military-politico composition of the Chinese leadership. CCP’s Central Committee consists of 205 full committee members from which are chosen the top leadership forming the Politburo of 24 members inclusive of the apex standing committee of seven members and the Central Military Commission of seven members. All 205 members are highly qualified in various disciplines such as economics, education, politics, philosophy, sciences, engineering, medicine, aerospace, nuclear, space, telecommunications, sociology, history, management, international relations, law, jurisprudence, geopolitics etc. The majority hold doctorates in their chosen fields. Xi Jinping holds a degree in Chemical Engineering and a doctorate in Marxian philosophy and Political Science. In addition, the leadership has a significant presence of military leadership, both serving and veterans that includes 27 Generals and 17 Lieutenant Generals out of the 205 members.

    China’s economic downturn and security-oriented economic policy that Xi has propounded is an opportunity for India to become the next manufacturing hub in Asia. However, India must remain cautious of what competition with China could look like for the neighbourhood.

    The changes to the diplomatic cadre in the 20th NPC do not take away from the fact that India’s standing and position are stronger and more sure-footed than it has ever been. Our diplomacy in the face of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war showcases that. India’s strategic autonomy, respect for international law and norms and growing strategic partnerships with the Indo-Pacific countries are an advantage to her engagement with Beijing.

    Feature Image Credit: orcasia.org

  • India’s Unorganised Sector Is Being Engulfed, Further Marginalised

    India’s Unorganised Sector Is Being Engulfed, Further Marginalised

    The organised sector must consider how much can the unorganised sector be run down without hurting its own interest.

    The corporate sector is doing well, as indicated by the stock market which reflects its health. But the corporates represent only a few thousand businesses out of the crores operating in the country. Ninety-nine percent of the businesses are in the unorganised sector and reports suggest that they are declining. The official GDP for Q1 of the current financial year 2022-23 was 3.3% above its pre-pandemic level. Yet, the stock markets are close to their historic high achieved in 2021. This disjuncture between the stock market and the economy reflects the surge in corporate profits in a stagnant economy – and there is a story behind it.

    The Reserve Bank of India data on around 2,700 non-government, non-financial companies released in August 2022 shows that the sales of these companies surged 41% and net profits increased by 24% over the last year. Even if these figures are deflated by the wholesale price index (WPI) which has been rising at above 10% during this period, the corporate sector surge far exceeds the growth of the economy. If one component of the economy is rising so rapidly, the other part, the non-corporate sector in industry, must be shrinking. The difficulty with the official data is that it does not independently capture the decline of the unorganised sector (it is proxied by the growing organised sector). If the true rate of growth could be obtained, the disjuncture between the official growth rate and the rise in the stock market would be even greater.

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  • BRICS Real Value: One Step Towards New World Order

    BRICS Real Value: One Step Towards New World Order

    While “BRICS” has been a frequently occurring acronym in our discourse in recent years, not many seem to have grasped the reality of Brics and its actual utility.

    The post-Cold War era has seen the economic and political rise of a host of nations — Brazil, China and India being foremost among them. Since 2000 and the advent of Vladimir Putin, Russia has with some help from soaring oil prices made impressive economic gains. The new South Africa, based equally on the industrial inheritance of the robust but unequal and exploitative apartheid regime and the bounty of nature, now finds itself as an advancing economic power. Unlike Nigeria, which has frittered its oil wealth and has been looted by its native kleptocracy, South Africa has been a relative symbol of responsible government and probity in public life. Each one of these nations is now a major economic player and some already have bigger GDPs than many countries in the Group of Seven. Together, in the next two decades, Brics is likely to outstrip the G-7.

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  • The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The port of Chabahar is a seaport in south-eastern Iran, located on the Gulf of Oman, at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is situated in Sistan-va-Baluchestan, one of Iran’s least developed provinces. Contrary to Bandar Abbas, the busiest port in Iran, Chabahar is a deep-water port with direct access to the Indian Ocean that is outside the Hormuz Strait. It is Iran’s only seaport and consists of two separate ports called Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari. The last Shah of Iran proposed the port’s development in 1973. Work in Chabahar began when the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, was in power. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 hindered the development of this port. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, US firms involved in various infrastructure investments fled the country. The new government took on these projects. The port of Chabahar grew in importance during the Iran-Iraq war of 1983 when ships were hesitant to enter the Strait of Hormuz. The port’s first phase opened during the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran began shifting maritime trade up the east coast toward the Pakistani border to reduce the reliance on Persian Gulf ports which were susceptible to attack by the Iraq Air Force. Chabahar is substantial for its fishing industry and will serve as a major trade hub designed to connect South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Chabahar can emerge as a potential global trading hub – and an arena for geopolitical competition. Chabahar is vital for both India and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Suez Canal for transporting cargo to Europe. Chabahar is a strategic port from an Indian perspective. Apart from being easily accessible from India’s western coasts, it serves several important functions. For starters, by having access to the port, India can reduce its commute time to Central Asia by one-third. Second, a link between Afghanistan and India could be built without going through Pakistan and this could help the already established diplomatic, security and economic relationship between New Delhi and Kabul. Third, India gains road access to four cities in Afghanistan via Chabahar: Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif. This will help India strengthen its trade with Afghanistan (“Chabahar and Beyond” 2016). However, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 gives rise to a certain level of uncertainty. The current geopolitical environment, both regional and global, creates opportunities for India to overcome possible uncertainties.

    New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets.

    Being one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, expansion of trade relations and access to new markets is a necessity for India. As an investor, New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets. Pakistan’s Gwadar port is one possible route for India to access Central Asian markets, India has long aimed for alternative routes due to its adversarial relationship with Pakistan (“Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan,” n.d.). Additionally, the port will strengthen relations between India and Iran, which may help counterbalance strong Sino-Pakistani cooperation. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MEA), India and Iran share close historical and civilizational ties, “Our bilateral relations are marked by strong linkages across institutions, cultures and people-to-people ties,” the MEA said in a statement. Afghanistan also seeks to explore new trade routes to reach international markets. It aims to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, which handles most of the Afghan trade due to the country’s landlocked status. 

    Afghanistan is crucial for India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ strategy. India assisted Afghanistan in becoming a full member state of SAARC in 2007. It signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with Kabul in 2003 following the establishment of the interim government post the US’s intervention in 2001. Under the North-South Transport Corridor framework, India, Afghanistan, and Iran signed the Chabahar port agreement in 2003, allowing all three countries to use the Chabahar port as a trade hub. India is working on constructing the Chabahar port primarily to compete with the Gwadar port project and to connect it to Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). India has already built a 218-km-long road from Delaram to Zaranj (“India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan” 2008) and now plans to connect this road to Chabahar port and deliver goods through this route. India is also keen on using the Chabahar port to connect the oil-rich Central Asian countries by road connectivity via the Milak (Iran) and Zaranj-Dilaram (Afghanistan) roads. For India, the port, which is only 940 kilometers from Mundra in Gujarat, is about more than just facilitating the flow of trade with Afghanistan. Rather, the development of Chabahar is a crucial component of the country’s grand strategy to connect with Central Asia. India’s justification for wanting to develop the Chabahar Port goes beyond its interest in Afghanistan. Enhancing regional trade and connectivity as well as thwarting China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean are other top priorities for Indian foreign policy (“What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses,” n.d.).

    Geopolitical Challenges

    The port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    The competition for regional dominance between India and China can be seen in the development of ports in the regions. Indian involvement in the Chabahar port is important in securing India’s interest in the region. A calculative China will seize any opportunity that India might present in the port facility. If China moves in, Indian investments in the Chabahar port may be unfavorably affected (Pant and Mehta, 2018). A significant barrier is the complex nature of India-Iran relations, in which the former does not hold a privileged position. Given India’s priorities in the Middle East, it is unlikely that the relationship with Iran could compete with the comprehensive partnership that China and Pakistan share, which includes a strong defence and security arrangement. Iran may find it challenging to ignore or exclude China, its largest foreign investor, from the Chabahar project. Additionally, China has successfully completed several infrastructure projects in Iran, including the Tehran Metro, and has allocated US$ 1.5 billion through its EXIM Bank for the electrification of the Tehran-Mashhad railway line (“$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project” 2017).

    Peace and stability in Afghanistan will also impact the performance of the Chabahar Port. The tumultuous security situation in Afghanistan could jeopardise trilateral efforts between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to operate the Chabahar Port facility. And finally, the port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    References

    “$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project.” 2017. Financial Tribune. July 25, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/68986/update-15b-china-loan-for-iranian-rail-project.

    Amirthan, Shawn. 2016. “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement?” Strategic Analysis 41 (1): 87–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1249184.

    “Chabahar and Beyond.” 2016. Www.thehindubusinessline.com. May 25, 2016. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/chabahar-and-beyond/article8646239.ece.

    “Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan.” n.d. Thediplomat.com. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/chabahar-port-a-step-toward-connectivity-for-india-and-afghanistan/.

    “India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan.” 2008. Development News from Afghanistan, August 24, 2008. https://afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2008/08/24/india-completes-zaranj-delaram-highway-in-afghanistan/.

    Pant, Harsh V., and Ketan Mehta. 2018. “India in Chabahar.” Asian Survey 58 (4): 660–78. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.4.660.

    “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.” n.d. Idsa.in. https://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/40_1/india-iran-and-afghanistans-benefits-from-the-chabahar-port-agreement.

    Featured Image Credit: Lowy Institute

  • India’s Self-Inflicted Economic Catastrophe

    India’s Self-Inflicted Economic Catastrophe

    Noted economist Jayati Ghosh reviews India’s economic recovery from the impact of the pandemic. She asserts that the major economic problems of unemployment, poverty, and inadequate healthcare are due to poor strategies and policies implemented by the government. In her analysis, COVID-19’s devastating impact on India has been compounded by the BJP government’s disastrous decision to impose nationwide lockdowns without providing any support to workers. Instead, the BJP used the pandemic to consolidate its power and suppress dissent. Even with existing socio-political constraints, she says India can do much better as there is scope for different economic strategies.

    This article was published earlier in Project Syndicate. The views expressed are the author’s own.

                                                                                                                                                                          -TPF Editorial Team

    Nearly 80% of the estimated 70 million people around the world who fell into extreme poverty at the onset of COVID-19 in 2020 were from India, a recent World Bank report has revealed. But even this shocking figure could be an underestimate, as the lack of official data makes it difficult to assess the pandemic’s human costs.

    What accounts for this alarming rise in Indian poverty? COVID-19 was undoubtedly India’s worst health calamity in at least a century. But the pandemic’s economic and social consequences go beyond the direct effects on health and mortality. As I argue in my recent book, The Making of a Catastrophe: The Disastrous Economic Fallout of the COVID-19 Pandemic in India, very significant policy failures – owing to government action and inaction – were responsible for widespread and significant damage to Indian livelihoods and for the country’s decline in terms of many basic indicators of economic well-being.

    But the devastating impact of the pandemic on India has been compounded by economic policies that reflected the country’s deeply-embedded inequalities.

    This judgment may seem excessively harsh. After all, India’s government did not cause the pandemic, and many other countries experienced economic setbacks after they failed to control the virus. But the devastating impact of the pandemic on India has been compounded by economic policies that reflected the country’s deeply-embedded inequalities.

    To be sure, the pandemic did not create India’s many economic vulnerabilities. But it did highlight India’s many societal fissures and fault lines. And while the country already suffered from glaring inequalities of income, wealth, and opportunities long before COVID-19, the government’s pandemic response has taken them to unimaginable extremes.

    Even as Indian workers faced poverty, hunger, and ever-greater material insecurity due to the pandemic, money and resources continued to flow from the poor and the middle class to the country’s largest corporations and wealthiest individuals. The intersecting inequalities of caste, gender, religion, and migration status have become increasingly marked and oppressive. The result has been a major setback to social and economic progress.

    At the beginning of the pandemic, the central government imposed a prolonged nationwide lockdown with little notice. It then adopted containment strategies that were clearly unsuited to the Indian context, with immediately devastating effects on employment and livelihoods.

    The grim state of affairs reflects the priorities of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) response. At the beginning of the pandemic, the central government imposed a prolonged nationwide lockdown with little notice. It then adopted containment strategies that were clearly unsuited to the Indian context, with immediately devastating effects on employment and livelihoods.

    Instead of using the breathing space provided by the lockdown to bolster local health systems, the central government left state authorities to manage as best they could with minimal and inadequate resources. And when the resulting economic disaster threatened to spiral out of control, the government eased restrictions to “unlock” the economy even as the number of cases mounted, thereby putting more people at risk.

    At a time when governments worldwide were significantly increasing public spending to fight the pandemic and mitigate its economic impact, the Indian government preferred to control expenditures (after adjusting for inflation) as its revenues declined.

    But at the heart of India’s self-inflicted economic catastrophe is the government’s decision to provide very little compensation or social protection, even as COVID-19 lockdowns deprived hundreds of millions of their livelihoods for several months. At a time when governments worldwide were significantly increasing public spending to fight the pandemic and mitigate its economic impact, the Indian government preferred to control expenditures (after adjusting for inflation) as its revenues declined.

    But in a country where median wages are too low to provide more than the most basic subsistence, losing even a week’s income could lead millions to the brink of starvation. Given that more than 90% of all workers in India are informal – without any legal or social protection – and that around half of those are self-employed, the effect was immediate and devastating.

    The government’s decision not to increase spending aggravated the shock of the lockdown, generating a humanitarian crisis that disproportionately affected women and marginalized groups, including millions of migrant workers who were forced to return home under harrowing conditions.

    But the effects of the official response to the pandemic are only one side of the story. COVID-19 safety measures have been a natural fit for the country’s still-pervasive caste system, which has long relied on forms of social distancing to enforce the socioeconomic order and protect those at the top. It also further entrenched India’s persistent patriarchy.

    Instead of taking appropriate countermeasures, like providing greater support to the population, the BJP used the pandemic to consolidate its power and suppress dissent. This, in turn, limited the central government’s ability to generate the widespread social consensus and public trust needed to contain the virus.

    Even within India’s deep-seated social and political constraints, there is scope for a different economic strategy that would enable a just, sustainable, and more equitable recovery.

    None of this was inevitable. Even within India’s deep-seated social and political constraints, there is scope for a different economic strategy that would enable a just, sustainable, and more equitable recovery. To ensure that most Indians, not just the stock market or large companies, benefit from growth, India’s voters must reject the BJP’s policies, which threaten to impoverish them further.

    Feature Image Credit: textilevaluechain.in

  • Right to Work: Feasible and Indispensable for India to be a Truly Civilized and Democratic Nation

    Right to Work: Feasible and Indispensable for India to be a Truly Civilized and Democratic Nation

    Executive Summary of
    Report of People’s Commission on Employment and Unemployment
    Set up by Desh Bachao Abhiyan

    Introduction

    When society faces a problem and is unable to resolve it, it implies that something basic is wrong. One needs to look for its basic causes to solve the problem. The causes may lie in the system that has evolved over time and which conditions the dominant social and political thinking in society. The onus of finding the solution and rectifying the problem is on the rulers. Their failure to do so over time implies a lack of motivation/commitment to solve the problem.

    All this applies to the issue of employment generation and unemployment in India which has been growing over time and affects the vast majority of the citizens.

    The Basic Issue

    Gandhi said that India is the only country capable of giving a civilizational alternative. The time has come to take this seriously since unemployment has become a critical issue that needs to be urgently tackled. The issue is multi-dimensional since it is a result of multiple causes and has widespread implications. It impacts the growth of the economy, inequality, poverty, etc. It has a gender dimension and impacts the marginalized sections adversely reflecting a lack of social justice. It is entrenched among the youth. The more educated they are greater the unemployment they face. Consequently, it has political and social implications, like, social relations.

    The rapidly growing incomes of the top 1% in the income ladder indicate that the economy has the resources but they are mal-distributed. The rich at the top has created a system that enables them to capture most of the gains from development with little trickling down to the rest.

    This Report presents a framework that spells out the causes, consequences, and possible remedies. Further, it looks at the historical process underlying the evolution of policies so as to understand how they can be changed.

    If any form of distortion persists over a long period, as unemployment in India, its origins lie in society’s perceptions and priorities. In India, these can be traced to the adoption of state capitalism and persisting feudal tendencies of the elite policy makers who in their own self-interest adopted a trickle-down model of development.

    Further, Capitalism has globally taken the form of marketization which promotes `profit maximisation’. But is it then legitimate to keep workers unemployed? It implies loss of output and therefore reduces the size of the economy which leads to a lower level of profits. So, by the logic of individual rationality, the system should create productive employment for all.

    The market’s notion of `efficiency’ is status quoist since it seeks to perpetuate the historical injustice in society. `Consumer sovereignty’ implies that individuals should be left free to do whatever they wish. The collectivity should not intervene in their choices no matter how socially detrimental they may be. It promotes the notion that if I have the money I can do what I like. The ratio of incomes is 10,000 times and more between the big businessmen and the poor workers. The market sees nothing wrong in this; in fact, society has come to celebrate it.

    Marketization is determining society’s choices through its principles penetrating all aspects of society. One of these principles is the `dollar vote’. The policy makers accept it and prioritize the choices of the well-off over those of the marginalized. The well-off dictate the social judgments of policy makers. Consequently, not only equality is not on the agenda even equity is not.

    With marketization stripping off the social aspect of life, individuals become automatons. Their individual distress and situation in life are no one’s or society’s concern. Unemployment becomes just a switching off of a machine. No social concern need to be attached to it. In fact, capitalists welcome unemployment as an efficient’ device to discipline labour and neo-classical economics considers it as natural. Inflation further weakens large numbers of workers as they lose purchasing power.

    In essence, whether or not society should aim to give productive employment to all reflects its view of individuals. Society needs to choose what is more important – profits or the welfare of the marginalized majority. The Gandhian view, largely rejected by the Indian elite, was `last person first’ which defined what the priority should be.

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