The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Science, Technology & Security

  • Advantage India, after Balakot air strike

    Advantage India, after Balakot air strike

    G Parthasarathy                                                                                     March 8, 2019/Op-Ed

    After the precision air strikes by the Indian Air Force on the small town of Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, public attention in India is now focused on bringing the leaders of the Jaish-e- Mohammed, including Jaish Supremo Maulana Masood Azhar to justice.

    Ironically, Azhar would not have been such a threat today if we did not cravenly release him after being blackmailed, during the Kandahar hijacking of IC 814. Those then released, included terrorists like Omar Syed Sheikh, who funded the 9/11 hijackers in the US and murdered American journalist Daniel Pearl.

    Recurring pattern

    The mass killing of Indians in terrorist strikes organised by the ISI has been a continuing feature of Pakistani policies, since the Mumbai bomb blasts on March 12, 1993. People seem to forget that 253 people were killed and 713 injured in the terrorist strikes in Mumbai in 1993. These killings were organised by the then ISI Chief Lt. General Javed Nasir, who incidentally enjoyed the patronage of Nawaz Sharif for years.

    The mastermind of the 1993 bomb blasts, Dawood Ibrahim, lives under heavy security protection, in the elite locality of Clifton in Karachi. There is conclusive evidence that the attack on India’s Parliament in December 13, 2001 was organised by Maulana Masood Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammed.

    A former ISI Chief Lt. General Javed Akhtar admitted this, in March 2004, in Pakistan’s Parliament. In the Kargil conflict in 1999, 527 Indian soldiers had been killed and 453 wounded, which was ostensibly designed to disrupt India’s supply lines to its forces in Siachen.

    When the Jaish-e-Mohammed, thereafter, briefly receded into the background, the ISI backed Lashkar-e-Taiba mounted yet another terrorist attack on November 26, 2008 on Mumbai, when 139 Indians died and 256 were injured. This received huge international attention, as the casualties included citizens of countries like US, UK, France, Germany and Israel.

    Yet, within a few months, we were back to a “Composite Dialogue” with Pakistan, after the Sharm el Sheikh Summit, where the focus of attention was not the 26/11 terrorist strike on Mumbai, but unfounded Pakistani allegations of Indian involvement in the freedom struggle in Baluchistan! Sadly, this was a manifestation of Indian diplomacy, at its worst.

    The Balakot Air Strikes by IAF Mirage 2000 aircraft was marked by the use of precision guided Israeli Spice 2000 bombs, which function with deadly accuracy. There is now conclusive evidence that the target was a Jaish-e-Mohammed Madrassa, which was badly damaged.

    Hundreds of Jaish Jihadis, preparing for “martyrdom” in Jammu and Kashmir, were motivated and trained in Balakot, for “Jihad” in Kashmir. The training was embellished with promises of an after life in a heavenly abode. Our government would, however, have been better advised, if unverified claims of hundreds of casualties were not prematurely made, or publicised.

    What will, however, please our Russian friends, is the fact that an upgraded frontline American F-16 equipped with highly sophisticated AAM-RAM missiles, was shot down by a 1970s-1980s vintage, Russian Mig 21 BIS of the IAF. This incident again exposed the notorious inefficiency of our Defence Ministry, which has delayed a proposal for modernisation of the IAF’s fighter fleet for over two decades.

    Successive Defence Ministers must accept constitutional responsibility for the cavalier manner the entire issue of modernisation of our fighter fleet has been handled. More importantly, the decision-making organisational structure in our Defence Ministry, dominated by a generalist bureaucracy, needs to be drastically restructured and reformed.

    Pakistan should be made to realise that India’s air strike in Balakot marks only the beginnings of a new approach, which India will now undertake.

    Upgrade covert actions

    Firstly, it is time for decision-makers in New Delhi to realise that our covert actions capabilities on foreign soil need to be upgraded. I had occasion to recently read a book by journalist Sandeep Unnithan, due for release shortly, on how Prime Minister Indira Gandhi personally supervised covert actions in Bangladesh in 1971, which virtually destroyed maritime communications facilities there, even before the conflict started in December 1971.

    The Israelis spent years developing capabilities to seek out the perpetrators of the Second World War “Holocaust,” across the world. Their Iranian rivals have developed similar capabilities, which one saw recently, when Iran responded to a terrorist attack from Pakistani soil, which killed 29 Iranian Revolutionary Guards, near the border between Pakistani Baluchistan and the Sunni majority Iranian Province of Sistan-Baluchistan, where the port of Chabahar is located.

    In an almost immediate Iranian counter-strike, across the border, over eight Pakistani soldiers were killed and a large number injured.

    The time for developing capabilities for counter-strikes is now ripe. The global political, diplomatic and economic scenario in India and Pakistan has changed drastically, over the past two decades.

    Pakistan remains, in international perspectives, an economically bankrupt and politically dysfunctional country, which is ostensibly democratic, but run by a military elite, which is given to promoting religious extremism across its neighbourhood. Its actions, like hosting Osama bin Laden secretly for over a decade, promoting Taliban extremism in Afghanistan and using internationally discredited terrorist groups for Jihad abroad, have irreparably sullied its international image and reliability.

    Islamabad is addicted to seeking doles from rich Arab neighbours, China and international financial institutions like the IMF, Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. Pakistan is constantly dependent on these countries and international institutions, for its economic survival.

    In contrast, India is seen today as a country with the fastest growing economy in the world, which is increasingly attractive for foreign investment. India is at peace and enjoys excellent relations with all countries (except Pakistan) in its Indian Ocean neighbourhood.

    It has multiple free trade and comprehensive economic cooperation agreements within SAARC and with members of Bimstec and Asean. There are, likewise, Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements with South Korea and Japan.

    Across its western maritime frontiers, India is the only country, which enjoys excellent relations at the same time, with the oil rich Arab Gulf States, Iran and Israel. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has publicly expressed India’s thanks for American understanding and support in recent days.

    These developments now need, in course of time, to be augmented by moves to engage people in Pakistan, making it clear that India wishes them well.

    They have to be made to realise that their present miseries are the result of actions by a power hungry and rogue army, which is undermining democracy and leading the country to economic disaster and international isolation.

    Ambassador G Parthasarathy IFS (Retd) is a former High Commissioner in Pakistan, and is a Trustee of ‘The Peninsula Foundation’. Views expressed are author’s own.

    This article was published earlier in ‘The Hindu-Businessline‘. 

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  • Looking Beyond the Rafale Imbroglio

    Looking Beyond the Rafale Imbroglio

    The tenor of the debate, especially in the election year, can hardly be expected to be moderate or mature. While wild assertions made by the politicians in hope of swaying the electorate is to be expected and accepted, there is also a vital need for politicians to ensure that matters pertaining to National Security are kept out of the ambit of politics. Just as Georges Clemenceau, French Prime Minister during the Great War, commented that “War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men”, so too is the case with entrusting national security to just politicians. But politicians being politicians care little for such niceties, which explains why allegations of wrongdoing are flying so thick and fast in the ongoing Rafale procurement imbroglio, who, unfortunately, have been joined by respected academics and researchers, who should know better.

    Attempts to garner the limelight and the few minutes of fame that goes with it is understandable in the case of politicians, but for academics to do so by drawing conclusions based on speculation that passes for facts and little else, seems to be rather hasty, if not downright fallacious and unprofessional.  A respected academic, for example, has concluded that the decision to procure just 36 jets instead of the original 126 with the attendant increase in unit cost shows “extraordinary ineptitude can only be explained by the circumvention of laid down procedures.” He further  goes on to equate the manner in which this decision was made to that of demonetization, berates the Government for being “parsimonious and incompetent” and suggests that their action was “worse than a crime—it was a blunder.”

    He may well be proved right in his conclusions subsequently, but the truth is that it is one thing to question the Governments’ motivation or influence in the selection of the aircraft or the offset partners, but quite another to question the decisions it takes, however much we may disagree with them. For one, Mr. Modi was elected by a substantial majority to do just that, since that is what is expected of a leader. Moreover, we are wholly unaware as to circumstances that led to the Government to take the decision that it did, and therefore to question his decisions clearly smacks of arrogance, if not an ulterior motive. It is all very well to rant about the ineptitude and incompetence of this Government and its adverse impact on defence modernization, but what then are we to conclude at the previous Governments’ inability to push through the earlier deal in the seven years that it had to do so? Surely ineptitude or Incompetence may be too mild a term in their case.

    There is no gainsaying the fact that defence procurement and corruption have had a symbiotic relationship ever since Independence and our first procurement scandal, the infamous “Jeep Scandal” of 1948. Politicians have always seen defence procurement as a lucrative source of funds and as long as our political funding regulations remain opaque, nothing is going to change. Therefore, if this Government has actually resorted to underhand means as alleged, despite it being a government to government deal, then they have only trod on the well-beaten path of their illustrious predecessors. Thus, if precedent is to be our guide, then all the brouhaha on the issue will only result in a setback for the Air Force while politicians and their minions involved getting away, as we saw in the Bofors case.

    If it is accountability that we are interested in, then we need to look beyond this specific issue of procurement and ask ourselves as to why the Air Force finds itself in such desperate straits today, with regard to its combat strength. The fact that its combat strength has fallen from its authorized forty-two squadrons to the present thirty plus, over the past two decades, was neither unanticipated nor unexpected.  Like all machines, aircraft have a quantifiable life span, which while possible to extend with mid-life upgrades, will at a point in time require replacement by the next generation, if the Air Force is to be able to match and overcome the adversary’s capabilities. This does not call for either vision or foresight, just common sense and a practical understanding of the facts, which somehow the Government of India with its vast resources was unable to do. Surely someone must be held accountable for this negligence because not only does it put our national security at risk but endangers pilots who are expected to make do with shoddy outdated aircraft.

    While the Air Force hierarchy must carry some of the blame, not least for lack of moral fibre for its inability to stand up for its rights, governments over the years, especially the Ministry of Defence and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) that it controls, have much to answer for. For the most part, much of our current problems can be traced to the utter failure of HAL to produce the hugely over-budget, inordinately delayed and ostensibly indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, the Tejas. In this context, the existing perceptions within the Air Force that quality control in HAL is all but non- existent have been borne out by the recent crash of the Mirage 2000 aircraft undergoing upgradation. Initial reports doing the rounds suggest that the nose wheel broke while it was taking off resulting in the tragic death of two test pilots, the best of the best.  It also brings to mind a similar case when three paratroopers slithering down from a HAL manufactured Advanced Light Helicopter at the Army Day Parade in January 2018 fell and were grievously injured because the “strong point” to which their rope was tied broke and separated from the aircraft’s body. The question that needs answering is not just how many such cases have happened in the past, but also how many in HAL have been held accountable for such shoddy work?

    This also explains to a large extent the previous governments’ inability to successfully close the deal for the 126 aircraft. It was reportedly blocked by the unwillingness of the Air Force hierarchy to accept aircraft manufactured by HAL without certification by Dassault Aviation, the manufacturers of the Rafale, something they refused to do.  That they would prefer to work with an untried and untested offset partner, allegedly thrust on them, rather than with HAL speaks volumes about what they think of the capabilities of this Defence PSU!

    Therefore, politicians and academics critical of this governments’ decision to keep HAL out of the loop in this case, especially their accusation that by doing so we have lost out on technology transfer, are either being deliberately obtuse or completely out of touch with reality. In this context, Mr. Rahul Gandhi has been particularly vocal, even to the extent of meeting workers of HAL. It would be wonderful if he took the initiative to volunteer to fly in one of these aircraft or take time off to interact with the pilots who do. Maybe, just maybe, he would have a change of heart and leave national security issues out of the realm of politics.  Finally, our leaders would do well to remember that even after these aircraft are inducted into service, they will continue to be confronted by that gargantuan problem, where will the other hundred-odd aircraft desperately need come from? After all what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander!

     

    Brigadier Deepak Sinha (retd), an Army veteran, is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the TPF and is also a Consultant at ORF, New Delhi.

    This article was published earlier in the Times of India. The views expressed are the author’s own. 

  • A step closer to N-triad deterrent

    A step closer to N-triad deterrent

    PM Modi announced with justifiable national pride on November 6 that India’s first nuclear-propelled submarine, INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, was now operational as an integral part of its nuclear deterrent. India earlier had the capabilities to launch nuclear weapons from the air, mounted largely on its Mirage 2000 and Jaguar, and by land-based missiles, ranging from Agni 1 (700-900 km) to Agni 5 missiles (5,500 km). Its aim has been to develop a ‘credible nuclear deterrent’, with capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons from multiple locations to strategic areas in its nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Pakistan.

    Arihant provides India with a capability to hit either neighbour from 300 m under the sea. The sea-based missiles envisaged for this purpose are Sagarika (750 km range) and K-4 (3,500 km). While land-based missile sites can be destroyed, a submarine-based deterrent is virtually impregnable against a missile attack. India is the only country with a sea-based N-deterrent, which is not a Permanent Member of the UNSC. India will soon operationalise a second nuclear submarine (Arighat), and is expected to have a fleet of four by 2022.

    According to US Federation of Nuclear Scientists, India currently possesses 130-140 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has 140-150 and China 280. While India tested its first nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan’s first test was in 1990, on Chinese soil.

    In a recent book, Thomas Reed, a US nuclear weapons designer and former Secretary of the US air force, stated that China’s ‘Pakistan nuclear connection’ can be explained in the following words: ‘India was China’s enemy and Pakistan was India’s enemy. The Chinese did a massive training of Pakistani scientists, brought them to China for lectures, even gave them the design of the CHIC-4 device, which was a weapon that was easy to build — a model for export.’ Gary Milhollin, another expert, remarked: ‘Without China’s help, Pakistan’s bomb would not exist.’ China has also provided Pakistan the designs of its nuclear weapons, upgraded its ‘inverters’ for producing enriched uranium in Kahuta and provided it with plutonium reactors to build tactical nuclear weapons in Khushab and Fatehjang. Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles are replicas of Chinese missiles.

    India’s N-doctrine stated that its weapons would only be used in retaliation against a major attack on Indian territory, or on its forces anywhere, in which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are used. But Pakistan does not have a formal doctrine. The long time head of its Nuclear Command Authority, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, however, said over a decade ago that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were ‘aimed solely at India’ and Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquered a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroyed a large part of its land and air forces. He also held out the possibility of the use of weapons if India tried to ‘economically strangle’ it, or pushed it to political destabilisation. Pakistan’s statements in recent years have, however, indicated that it would not be averse to using tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with India.

    China, like India, also had proclaimed that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. But it has been ambiguous if this applied to India. China has maintained a measure of ambiguity on its ‘no-first-use’ pledge. This became evident when China’s foreign ministry spokesman (in 2004) rejected a suggestion from External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh that both countries should adopt a ‘common’ nuclear doctrine. Subsequent discussions between Indian and Chinese experts have suggested that China maintains deliberate ambiguity on its doctrine when it comes to dealing with India. Many ask if this is meant to signal to Pakistan that China will come to its aid in any nuclear exchange Pakistan may have with India, even if initiated by Pakistan. This ambiguity adds to India’s determination to strengthen its ‘triad’ of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons. Agni 5 missiles can target China’s populous east coast. Within the next four years, we would have an adequate sea-based deterrent to deter China from holding out credible nuclear assurances to Pakistan that it would intervene should India choose to respond to use, or threats of use, of tactical weapons by Pakistan.

    While India has a streamlined nuclear command structure headed by the PM and Cabinet Committee on Security, it needs to revamp the archaic structure of its Ministry of Defence (MoD). The key military figure in the command structure is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who generally holds office for less than a year; hardly enough time for him to become familiar with the complexities of the command. Repeated proposals, including from defence committees and task forces, recommending the appointment of a full-time Chief or Defence Staff, or Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, who will hold charge of the command and report to the political authority, have gathered dust in the offices of the MoD bureaucracy.

    The MoD needs to be reorganised. Recommendations for such change, even from the Parliament Standing Committee of Defence, lie unimplemented. We recently acquired our desperately needed first batch of artillery guns after the ’80s’ Bofors controversy. This happened even as detailed designs for 155 mm Howitzers provided by Sweden were gathering dust for two decades. There is also surely something wrong if it takes over a decade to acquire fighter aircraft, even as the IAF is facing a shortage of around 30 per cent in the sanctioned strength.

    Ambassador G Parthasarathy  IFS (Retd) is the former High Commissioner to Pakistan and is a trustee of TPF. 

    This Op-Ed was published earlier in ‘The Tribune’ on November 15th.

  • Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    The Indian Air Force celebrates its 86th anniversary on this October 8th, making it one of the oldest and large air forces of the world. Despite many challenges, most of which relate to inefficiencies of political decision making and inadequate financial support to modernisation, the IAF has come out with flying colours to continue to demonstrate its operational capabilities and strategic reach. The recent ‘Gaganshakti’ high intensity exercise  is an outstanding example. While the IAF continues to grapple with its huge problems of obsolescence, the last decade and a half has also been testimony to some major transformations underway in the IAF. As the 21st century dawned, the IAF began a rapid transformation from being largely a tactical air force to a strategic force, with significant expeditionary capability.

    Isolation to Outward Engagement

                 For more than half a century, outward engagement of the three services was limited to participation in UN peace-keeping missions. As India began its transformation with economic liberalisation in 1991, it began to dismantle its inward looking licence raj, and with it a global outlook started to emerge. As Indian economy accelerated into an overdrive by the late 1990s, and as India’s strategic image strengthened with  the overt declaration of its nuclear weapon status, the government encouraged military to military interactions and defence diplomacy. IAF’s international engagement expanded significantly from the 2000s. Major bilateral exercises were carried out on regular basis with major air forces – USA, UK, France, Singapore, South Africa, Oman, and Malaysia. Also, the IAF became a regular participant in USAF’s multinational exercises such as Cope Thunder and Red Flag. Recently the IAF has expanded its international exercises to involve Israel, Russia, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. For over a decade, the Singapore Air Force carries out its two month long annual training from one of IAF bases on the eastern coast. Joint exercises for humanitarian assistance, involving multinational forces, is now a regular feature. These interactions and engagements have highlighted IAF’s high quality operational expertise, its global standing, and in turn, has contributed immensely to IAF’s growth in its international understanding. Today, the world sees the IAF as the sharp edge of India’s military power as well as the primary instrument of its humanitarian assistance capability worldwide.

    Enhancing its Reach

                 Although the IAF inducted the Jaguar from 1979, its air-to-air refuelling capability was kept inactive. Induction of Mirage 2000 in 1985 met the same fate. The importance of aerial refuelling in extended range operations by the USA in its Libyan strike, Osirak nuclear reactor strike by Israel, and Falklands operations by the UK was not lost on the IAF, and it decided in favour of this force multiplier in the late 1990s. Although the IAF was one of the last major air forces to induct the aerial refueler, its pace of operationalisation was probably the fastest. In less than a decade IAF fighters were flying across Atlantic Ocean to participate in international exercises like the ‘Red Flag’ and ‘Cope Thunder’. Within the last decade the IAF has demonstrated its extended operational reach through all its major exercises. Aerial refuelers form critical component of IAF’s operational capability in terms of reach and penetration. An expansion of this fleet is now long overdue.

    Technological and Operational Transformation

                 Airpower, by its very nature is technology intensive. The IAF embarked on major operational reorientation through induction of major technologies from the early 2000s. This began with induction of precision weapons, UAVs, electro-optical systems, and sensors. The IAF initiated its first upgrade program in the mid 1990s, for 125 MiG-21 Bis aircraft, by stitching together a complex avionics upgrade involving three nations – Russia, France, and Israel. The success of this program has established an irreversible upgrade culture as a cost-effective strategy for sustaining its force structure. This upgrade strategy has also contributed immensely to  indigenisation capability of Indian industry. The Jaguar fleet went through a series of comprehensive upgrades, giving rise to significant expansion of its capabilities. The Su-30 MKI is an excellent result of IAF’s conceptualisation and implementation of avionics suites and mission optimisation. Between 2004 and now, the IAF’s upgrade strategies have given fresh lease of life to various aircraft fleet and weapon systems: AN-32, MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000, and air defence missile systems. More programs involving upgrades of Su-30 MKI fighters and IL-76 transport aircraft are likely to be taken up soon.

    The IAF moved to transform its air defence operations through the induction of AWACS platforms. Selecting the proven IL-78 platform, the IAF again masterminded a complex three nation development program to evolve a modern, state-of-the art AWACS platform by 2009. The three AWACS platforms inducted in phase I have been utilised extensively to bring in major operational transformation of its air defence operations in a very short time-frame. The AWACS has certainly given the IAF a significant operational edge vis-à-vis the PLAAF challenge across the Himalayas. Simultaneously, the IAF has supported the indigenous program of AEW aircraft development based on Embraer-145 platform.

    Indo-US strategic partnership manifested itself in significant transformation in IAF’s airlift capability. By 2012, the IAF inducted and operationalised C-130J Hercules aircraft for special operations, which is also the IAF’s first 20 tonne airlift aircraft; and C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft. These are going to be joined by Chinook heavy lift helicopters and Apache attack helicopters. By 2012 large numbers of Russian Mi-17 1V helicopters entered service. With these inductions, the IAF’s airlift capability has truly attained transcontinental proportions.

    The air defence missile segment, afflicted by long delays and overruns in terms of cost and time, has finally started showing results. The IAF, inducted its first squadrons of LLQRM (short range air defence missiles) based on Israeli systems, while simultaneously inducting indigenous Akash missile systems. This still indicated huge gaps, which is sought to be filled by the long-delayed MRSAM, jointly developed by India and Israel. With the projected signing of the contract for the Russian S-400 long-range SAMs the air defence will be on stronger operational capability.

    The most significant operational and technological capability of the IAF is its net-work centric warfare capability, which is underway for more than a decade. The IAF is the most significantly networked military force amongst the three services. It first established its primary communication grid, AFNET (Air Force Network), and  simultaneously established its air defence network inclusive of vital command and control network, IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System). The IACCS integrated all its ground based radar sensors and other inputs to create a common operational picture for real-time command and control to become effective. This was a pioneering transformation. The culminating transformation is its ‘airborne network’, which involved evolving NCW concepts based on  futuristic ‘self-organising, master-less, node-less, architecture’. The concepts were validated through a three-year long pilot project in 2013. Centred on the SDR (Software Defined Radio) the IAF is focused on indigenous solution. However, interim acquisition of limited numbers of SDR to kickstart operationalisation has stalled for nearly four years due to our infamous acquisition procedural delays. NCW operationalisation is a huge challenge that involves significantly large number of legacy aircraft and systems.

    The transformation of the IAF as an aerospace force began in the aftermath of Kargil war. IAF has been at the forefront of transforming the ISR domain through its operational strategies involving various ISR assets – UAVs, tactical and strategic reconnaissance systems, and satellites. It has played a stellar  role in defining the roadmap for developing and deploying space assets. It is matter of time before the IAF leads the tri-service aerospace command in true measure to formalise and operationalise India’s Space security strategy.

    IAF as the instrument of India’s Global Power

                 The rise of India and China is the major transformative process of the 21st century international system. That India aspires to be a global power is well known and well founded. India’s march to global power status in the 21st century will be a challenging and arduous task. Rise to great power status is not one of just prestige and power but comes with huge responsibilities. These responsibilities come with significant costs. A great power should be willing to share and shoulder the costs of providing public goods to the global community. This is precisely what the USA is now complaining about, as it finds the costs of sustaining itself as a hegemon is becoming prohibitively expensive. The USA is clearly signalling that aspiring great powers should share the costs of global public goods albeit without upsetting an international order crafted to its advantage. This is where India must rise to the challenge by rising as a benign power with the right balance of hard and soft power to influence the course of emerging power politics.

    The IAF, on its 86th anniversary, is at the cross roads of evolving as the instrument of India’s global power. As the 21st century progresses, the centrality of aerospace power in the national power of major countries has become unquestionable. Joint or integrated warfare has been necessitated by the critical role of aerospace power in all domains, be it precision, reach, rapidity of application, and intelligence through ISR. The viability of conventional deterrence comes from aerospace power’s ability to deter through the fear of precise punishment. It becomes obvious that the IAF has to be the cutting edge instrument of India’s hard military power. This obviously calls for the right combination of force structure with cutting edge technologies and weapon systems with significantly long reach. A serious introspection would reveal that the IAF, as it enters its 87th year, faces daunting challenges of building and sustaining the requisite force structure.

    IAF’s Force Structure Challenges

     IAF has been grappling with problems of obsolescence and dwindling force structure for more than two decades. Long drawn out and unending MMRCA acquisition process is an example of leaving operational capability gaps unactioned as well as loss of opportunities to enhance industrial and technological capabilities. Time and cost overruns in the indigenous Tejas-LCA program is again an operational shortfall for the IAF. The IAF today is at an all-time low of 32 fighter squadrons. An analysis of the history of IAF’s force structure would reveal a story of crisis management to sustain minimum force levels. Much of the blame must go to the political leadership for failure to grasp the importance of sustaining credible conventional force structures, while part of the blame must certainly fall on services themselves.

    JRD Tata committee, set up in the aftermath of 1962 humiliation against China, recommended an IAF force structure of 65 combat squadrons. This was accepted by the government but was pruned down to 39.5 squadrons as an interim measure on account of resource constraints. This figure has remained more or less permanent, till the government approved a figure of 42 squadrons in 2005. Even though the IAF has enhanced its combat capability with the induction of force multipliers, and networked air defence capability, its approved force structure may fall short of meeting India’s requirements of functioning effectively as a global player. In the modern, net-centric aerospace environment, the IAF will be India’s main instrument of conventional deterrence. Tata committee recommendations look more apt for India, given India’s emerging stature and global responsibilities expected of it. However, the immediate requirement is to get IAF’s force structure back to the approved 42 combat squadron strength. Given the large number of aircraft that need to be replaced, this would take at least 15 years if only done on war-footing.

    Modernisation and Indigenisation Imperatives

    As it celebrates its 86th anniversary the IAF would do well to do some serious introspection. Modernisation processes for all militaries in all countries face the challenges of timely resource availability, particularly for capital-intensive service like the Air Force. In India the problem is compounded by inadequate aerospace industrial and technology base. Indian military power, and IAF in particular, is heavily import dependent. Despite more than 70 years of indigenisation efforts, not much has changed in critical areas. A major cause for this state of affairs is the lack of adequate involvement of the user service in project management and technology development. The IAF will have to take a leaf out of the USAF model to make a major impact on indigenisation. This will need the following to be done on a time bound basis:

    • IAF needs to create a cadre of research personal. It also needs to operate aerospace research laboratories. These will focus on research and development of aerospace technologies. Ideally the IAF needs to exercise command and control over laboratories such as ADE, DARE, CABS, etc.
    • Programs like the Tejas-LCA should have been managed by the user service, the IAF, after the technology demonstration phase. Program management by the user service is an absolute must as it will be driven by operational needs balancing technology, cost, and time factors. As a corollary, it becomes obvious that the IAF must create the necessary expertise to manage its programs.
    • IAF’s involvement in DRDO driven programs must clearly define them as those that are technology development oriented and those that are user driven weapon system development. The latter programs must clearly be managed by the IAF while the former must be enabled by IAF support.
    • The IAF must clearly lay down a 20 year strategic roadmap for the government wherein all aircraft and major weapon systems are made completely free of foreign OEM dependence.

     

    Conclusion

                India’s security environment cannot be viewed simply as just border and territorial disputes with Pakistan and China. Its strategic challenges in a fast changing 21st century world are increasing by the day. China’s aerospace capability has leapfrogged significantly over the last two decades, and it poses a major challenge to India. The IAF will need to spearhead India’s aerospace capability to balance China’s dominance.

    IAF’s long-term force structure strategy could revert to its earlier ‘auxiliary air force’ format, albeit in a new form. Indian government wound up the auxiliary air forces post 1962, while it retained the ‘Territorial Army’ model. The benefits of this scheme is well established. It provides huge opportunities to a large segment of qualified young people to do military service, provides a ready reserve, and forms an important component of second rung security structure. With slight modification this could be created as Air National Guards, much like the US system. The objective should be to achieve one squadron of Air National Guards for each state in a defined time period based on financial and technical resources. These squadrons should be equipped with Tejas aircraft. Over a period of time this could become a win-win situation for the IAF, civil society, and the country as a whole. A comprehensive approach to force structure could see the IAF as the foremost air force in Asia and a major powerful force in the world by 2032, that will be IAF’s centenary year.

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     The author, Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (Retd) is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy, Plans & Force Development).

  • US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    Vijay Sakhuja September 02, 2018

    There is a sense of urgency among the militaries of United States and China to gain ascendency in the field of artificial intelligence and machine learning. The United States Department of Defence has set upJoint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) that will help the US military to “preserve and expand military advantage” as also pursue “AI applications with boldness and alacrity while ensuring strong commitment to military ethics and AI safety.” The JAIC will costan estimated $1.7 billion over the next six years. It will work on nearly 600 AI projects in partnershipwith the industry, academia and allies, and will have oversight over almost all service and defense agency AI efforts.

    Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has urgedPresident Donald Trumpto consider formulating a national strategy for artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, the US Army has establishedan AI Task Force and given itself three months to identify “specific skill sets that we’re going to need to be relevant and to thrive in this environment that will include AI and machine learning.”

    Likewise, the Chinese government is pursuing an aggressive policy for the development of artificial intelligence at the national level. In December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology through Circular No. 315called on all agencies under the Central Government to implement ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ and ‘ accelerate the development of artificial intelligence industry, promote the deep integration of artificial intelligence and real economy” It also laid out a ‘Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry ( 2018 – 2020).

    According to a reporttitled “China’s AI Development Report 2018” released by Tsinghua University, the China’s artificial intelligence (AI) market touched 23.7 billion yuan ($3.5 billion) in 2017, with the growth rate expected to reach 75 percent in 2018. Further, China emerged as the ‘most attractive country for AI investment and financing’ and in the last five years since 2013 the Chinese AI industry accounted for 60 percent of the world’s total including 18,232 AI technology research experts  accounting ‘for 8.9 percent of the world’s total and was second only to the United States, which accounted for 13.9 percent’.

    In China, AI is used in a number of sectors like robotics, drones, autonomous vehicles such as cars and trucks, in manufacturing white goods including marketing services. Perhaps what merits attention is that China is investingin AI-related devices and systems that range from the anodyne to the dystopian wherein the military is looking to the technology to work in concert with its military strategy? Further, experts believethat the Chinese are “making their machines more creative” and “A little bit of automation gives the machines a tremendous boost” which can be characterized as “remote warfare”.

    The US is visibly concerned about losing military edge to China in the field of artificial intelligence. The PLA Navy presents different challenges with significant investments made in weapons such as the Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG), Solid State Lasers (SSLs) and other systems and sensors.As noted earlier, AI technologies are also being incorporated into a new generation of anti-ship missiles through autonomous targeting capabilities. Similarly, autonomous air and underwater drones and miniaturized assault boats would soon be part of its force structure It is quite plausible that the PLA Navy may have begun to conduct exercises based on AI and ML and assimilated commonly used and commercially available communication devices such as smart phones, tablets and hybrid devices into its naval strategy.

    AI is surely adding to the war fighting tool kit of both the US Navy and the PLA Navy through stealthy ‘robotic trimaran’(Sea hunter and D3000 respectively)thatcould result in a dangerous escalations of a new kind of competition between the two navies. Similarly, China is developing autonomous robotic submarines which are likely to be ready for operations by the early 2020s and supplement regular human-operated submarines. This is sure to pose another set of challenge to the US Navy.

    Dr Vijay Sakhuja is a Trustee of TPF.

  • The Centrality of MADness in Nuclear Doctrine

    The Centrality of MADness in Nuclear Doctrine

    Mohan Guruswamy August 24, 2018

    It has been reported that the defence acquisitions council (DAC), chaired by defence minister, Nirmala Sitharaman, has approved the “acceptance of necessity (AoN) for the acquisition of the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-II (NASAMS-II) worth around $1 billion from the US. However, in 2002 the USA had vetoed India’s bid to acquire the Israeli Arrow-2 missile interceptor system. Consequently, DRDO began developing the Prithvi Air Defense (PAD), which will provide long-range high-altitude ballistic missile interception during an incoming missile’s midcourse phase as well as interception during the terminal phase. At various times these systems had different monikers like ballistic missile defence (BMD) or anti-ballistic missile system (ABM).

    The people who decide on such things reside in New Delhi and understandably their safety gets priority. So it is the NCR that will get the expensive and exaggerated sense of protection such systems tend to generate. But no air defence system can be deemed impenetrable. The Americans and Russians realized much before the Cold War ended that the costs involved will be prohibitive, even for them and made a virtue of necessity. But the idea was seductive. Even as the Cold War was waning, Ronald Reagan toyed with the idea of a strategic defence initiative (SDI), which envisaged an ABM systems stationed deep in space that will launch on picking up a launch. It seemed far-fetched and futuristic that commentators took to calling it Star Wars.

    This thought has been high on the minds of our security establishment ever since it learned that on May 26, 1990 China tested a Pakistani derivative of its CHIC-4 design at the Lop Nor test site, with a yield in the 10 to 12 kiloton (kt) range. That yield estimate accords with recorded yields of Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests, which are somewhere between 5 and 12 kt. Refinements in boosting and efficient plutonium use are the normal next steps in weapon improvement, along with miniaturization of the warheads to fit into smaller and lighter reentry vehicles. Pakistan has done all of these to arm its cruise and ballistic missiles with lighter payloads. Once India deploys the PAD system around its capital, we can be assured that Pakistan too will deploy an ABM around Islamabad. We can also rest assured that China will assist it in “developing” such a capability.

    The International Panel on Fissile Materials has estimated that Pakistan has an inventory of approximately 3,100 kilograms (kg) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and roughly 170kg of weapon-grade plutonium This is enough to potentially produce 200 to 300 warheads. Pakistan has also frequently tested the ranges of about a dozen Chinese derived missiles from the Hatf (50 km) to Shaheen III (2750 km). There is little doubt that Pakistan has planned for all eventualities, from local battlefield use and to feed its desire to have a credible “Islamic” bomb capability, and for that its reach must include Tel Aviv.

    Long after the Cold War has ended, nuclear deterrence is still based on Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). This simply means that any sneak decapitating or debilitating first strike will be responded with a massive retaliation, the fear of which should instill good sense. That after almost three quarters of a century when the nuclear genie was uncorked from the bottle, we have not had a nuclear war or weapon use is living proof of its robust common sense. So much so, that when developments in ABM or BMD capability reached fruition, the two Cold War protagonists, the USA and now defunct USSR, had a treaty restricting these systems. Ironically even well before they had a treaty on reducing the number of nuclear bombs.

    The MAD doctrine was made painfully credible, by the development of nuclear arsenal survivability by widespread deployment (at the peak of the Cold War America and Russia each had over 30,000 nuclear bombs.) This credibility got its biggest boost when submarines, initially diesel and then nuclear powered, capable of firing nuclear armed missiles (SSBN) from the impenetrable dark recesses of the oceans were introduced. The first of these submarines was the Russian Zulu Class submarine capable of firing from underwater an early Scud missile (1955). The Americans were the first to deploy a long endurance, deep diving and very silent nuclear powered submarine – George Washington – in 1959. Since then MAD was ensured by the highly accurate missiles in the bellies of such submarines operated by the US, Russian, British, French, Chinese and India navies. Pakistan too is now reportedly testing nuclear capable missiles fired from underwater on modified diesel submarines.

    We need to learn from how nuclear weapons strategies evolved during the Cold War, instead of mimicking USA and Soviet follies. The notion of deterrence between the USA and USSR was based on no escape from MAD. The march of the Cold War follies peaked with the two protagonists together deploying almost 70,000 warheads each aimed at a specific target. At the height of this madness almost every open ground was targeted as possible tank marshaling or military logistics areas. The last thing we hence want is getting into a numbers game with Pakistan or China. Credibility depends on reducing the uncertainty of use from the opposite perspective. The Indian PAD missile defence system only increases them. India and Pakistan have ensured a modicum of confidence by not mating the warheads and delivery systems, giving a vital period to rollback the unleashing of Armageddon. But now both countries will have to evolve a launch on warning doctrine.

    Clearly, the two South Asian nuclear powers too have a local version of MAD in place. The Pakistani doctrine “commits itself” to use battlefield nuclear weapons if an Indian conventional assault threatens its essential nationhood and hence it has steadfastly refused to accept the notion of “no first use” (NFU). The Indian doctrine emphasizes NFU but also makes it explicit that any Pakistani use of nuclear weapons on India or its forces will be responded with a massive retaliation. India may have less nuclear weapons, not because it cannot make more, but what it has is enough to ensure the complete annihilation of Pakistan, which is geographically too a much smaller country. China has moved on from NFU to a doctrine now called “credible minimum deterrence”. But how much is credible?

    Mercifully, nuclear doctrines these days are couched in such abstractions as MAD requires a degree of predictability, ironically ensured by opacity. The USA’s “single integrated operational plan” (SIOP) began with the ominous words that its objective, after the outbreak of a general war with the then Soviet Union to turn it into a “smoking radiating ruin.” It was written by its the certifiable USAF chief, Gen. Curtis Lemay Jr., based on whom the character played by George C. Scott in the Stanley Kubrick classic “Dr. Strangelove” was created. But people like Lemay who gave MAD credibility. Since no one of a sane frame of mind would even contemplate the enormity of the disaster of a nuclear war, uncertainty of use was a key element of MAD. It has been written that Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev used to have sleepless nights thinking of a man like Richard Nixon with his finger on the button.

    India’s nuclear strategy documents in detail as to who the nuclear command would devolve to in the unlikely event of a decapitating first strike on New Delhi with the aim of eliminating its national leadership. It is said that chain of nuclear command keeps descending downwards to a Major General, a modern day Raja Parikshit so to say who will perform the final obsequies. At last count India had over 600 military officers at that level. Decapitating all of them is a near statistical and physical impossibility. It will take tens of thousands to precision nuclear weapons to annihilate India’s military chain of command, and it can be speculated whether even America or Russia can achieve that, let alone Pakistan?

    Ironically, the evocative acronym MAD doctrine is eminently sensible. Good sense should tell us that enough of this madness and leave MAD alone.

    This Op-Ed was originally published in Asian Age.

    Mohan Guruswamy is a Trustee of TPF.

  • The Military Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership – Panel Discussion at Stimson Centre

    The Military Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership – Panel Discussion at Stimson Centre

    Past Events July 24, 2018 The Military-Industrial Component of the U.S.-India Partnership
    JULY 24, 2018 | 12:15 PM
    Please join the Stimson South Asia program for a conversation with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, the former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff in the Indian Ministry of Defence, who will talk about the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership. Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Elliott School, and Benjamin Schwartz, Head of the Aerospace and Defense Program at the U.S.-India Business Council, will serve as discussants. Sameer Lalwani of the Stimson Center will moderate.
    WHAT: An on-the-record discussion with Air Marshal M. Matheswaran on the military-industrial component of the U.S.-India partnership.
    WHERE: The Stimson Center, 1211 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 8th Floor, Washington DC, 20036
    WHEN: Tuesday, July 24 from 12.15 to 2 pm. Lunch will be served at 12.15 and the discussion will begin at 12.30.
    RSVP: Click here to RSVP for the event.
    FOLLOW: @StimsonCenter on Twitter for event news and use #StimsonNow to join the conversation
    Featuring:
    Sameer Lalwani, Senior Associate and Co-Director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center (moderator)
    Sameer Lalwani is a Senior Associate and Co-Director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center where he researches nuclear deterrence, inter-state rivalry, and counter/insurgency. He is also an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University’s Elliott School and a Contributing Editor to War on the Rocks.
    Air Marshal M. Matheswaran, former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff, Indian Ministry of Defence
    Air Marshal M. Matheswaran retired from the Indian Air Force in 2014 after nearly 39 years of military service. In his last appointment, he was the Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff for 23 months at the tri-service headquarters in the Ministry of Defence, India. Since then, he has held defense and aerospace consulting positions at Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Reliance Defence. He is the Founder, Chairman, and President of the Peninsula Foundation, a think-tank for security policy research.
    Benjamin Schwartz, Head, Aerospace & Defense, U.S.-India Business Council
    Benjamin Schwartz leads the U.S.-India Business Council’s Defense and Aerospace program where he advocates for pro-trade policies before officials in the Indian and American governments. He previously served in a range of positions within the U.S. national security community, including at the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Defense, where he was Director for India in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    Joanna Spear, Associate Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University.
    Joanna Spear is Associate Professor of International Affairs and Director of the FAO Regional Sustainment Initiative at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Her areas of focus include U.S. and UK arms sales policies, U.S. counter-proliferation policies, and transatlantic relations. In 2012, she was a Senior Visiting Fellow at Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses New Delhi, working on India’s arms import policies and offset strategies.
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  • Defence Corridors

    Defence Corridors

    M Matheswaran August 19, 2018
    As a follow-up on the ‘Make in India’ strategy in the defence sector, the Government of India has announced its intensions to set up two defence corridors, one in Tamilnadu and another in Uttar Pradesh.The idea of defence corridors is a very sensible one. However, the challenges to it should not be underestimated. The economic viability and success of the defence corridor plan lies in its careful implementation through well thought out cluster strategy.

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  • The San Juan Incident

    The San Juan Incident

    K N Sushil   December 08, 2017

    The ARA San Juan disappeared a few hundred kilometers off Argentina’s coast on November 15, and despite an extensive air and sea search no sign of the sub has been found. Eight days after the sub vanished, the Vienna-based Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation said that it had detected hydro-acoustic anomaly” about 30 nautical miles (60km) north of the sub’s last-known position at 10:31 (13:31 GMT) few hours after the sub’s last contact. The analysis of the acoustic incident was reported as follows.

    The acoustic signal associated with the loss of the Argentina Submarine ARA SANJUAN confirms the following:

    That acoustic signal originated near 46-10S, 59-42W at 1358Z (GMT) on 15 November 2017. It was produced by the collapse (implosion) of the ARA SAN JUAN pressure-hull at a depth of 1275-feet. Sea pressure at the collapse depth was 570 PSI. The frequency of the collapse event signal (bubble-pulse) was about 4.4Hz. The energy released by the collapse was equal to the explosion of 12,500 pounds of TNT at the depth of 1275-feet. That energy was produced by the nearly instantaneous conversion of potential energy (sea-pressure) to kinetic energy, the motion of the intruding water-ram which entered the SAN JUAN pressure-hull at a speed of about 1800 mph.
    The entire pressure-hull was completely destroyed (fragmented/compacted) in about 40 milliseconds (0.040s or 1/25th of a second), the duration of the compression phase of the collapse event which is half the minimum time required for cognitive recognition of an event. Although the crew may have known collapse was imminent, they never knew it was occurring. They did not drown or experience pain. Death was instantaneous.
    The SAN JUAN wreckage sank vertically at an estimated speed between 10 and 13 knots. Bottom impact would not have produced an acoustic event detectable at long range

    The ARA San Juan was an IKL(German) designed type 1700 submarine built by TKMS in their Essen yard in 1985 at about the same time the Indian type 1500 was being built at HDW(Kiel). Both the submarines have great deal of similarities. Therefore, having commanded two type 1500s I will venture to hazard a guess on what could have afflicted the submarine.

    Facts as gleaned from various reports.

    15 Nov 0030Hrs. Submarine surfaced to report Water ingress through snort system causing a short circuit in the forward battery group. The forward battery group was isolated. The submarine charged her batteries on surface

    At 0600 The message is transmitted through normal communication channels.

    At 0730 the Captain informs base that he intend to continue his passage dived (Presumably because the sea was rough) At 1031, according to the CTBT report the submarine imploded at a depth of 1275 ft.

    From the above it would appear that the submarine was snorting before she surfaced at 0030hrs. If there was water ingress through the snort mast that caused a short in the forward battery group then the submarine was unable to maintain snorting depth, because the sea may have been too rough and the “head valve” (that prevents water from coming into the mast, when the mast dips even momentarily) was not functioning. As part of the SOP the snort induction drain, which drains into the bilges is kept open for the duration of the snort.  In any case during the snorting, the diesel engines are used to create the suction that draws all the foul air from all over the submarine. The fresh air coming from the snort mast merely spreads to fill the vacuum. Therefore flooding through the snort system would normally have no effect on the battery groups.

    The submarine remained on surface for seven hours post an incident of fire and smoke, which was attributed to short circuiting of the forward battery group. The crew, it seems, did not see any fire but managed to clear the smoke after isolating the forward battery group.

    A fire in a battery group is one of the most dreaded emergencies on board any submarine. Therefore the damage control actions and subsequent analysis would have been painstakingly thorough. If there was a fire in the battery pits the firefighting system would have been activated (manually or automatically). Once the system is activated the battery pits are to be kept in a sealed condition for at least one hour. Thereafter the pit is ventilated for at least an hour before inspecting it. In these types of submarines one has to lie down on a trolley and manoeuvre manually over the batteries. If the sea is rough it becomes extremely difficult and dangerous.  It may therefore be possible that they may have dispensed with the inspection whilst on surface.

    In the seven hours on surface the crew must have thoroughly examined the power distribution network and come to the conclusion that the problem was contained, and the submarine was reasonably safe to continue dived with a single battery group. They may even have considered that it would be safer and easier to inspect the battery pit while the submarine is underwater.

    The submarine dived at 0730 hrs. After 3 hours it appears to have imploded at a depth of 388 Meters. 388 Meters is of course below the normal operating depth but well above the crushing depth. If the submarine did indeed implode at that depth the inescapable inference is that there were severe structural problems that had weakened the pressure hull. The Argentinean Navy must have known if any structural limitations were reported or imposed.

    If the structural problems were not severe enough then some event that occurred in the 3 hours she was submerged must have been responsible. That event was so catastrophic that the submarine was unable to prevent an uncontrolled descent. Given the background situation the captain would have ordered the submarine to dive to 50 Meters. As soon as he settled down to that depth, he would have ordered the inspection of the battery pit. Unless there are clear tell tale signs, it is possible to miss some things which may have the potential to cause damage. Anyhow the inference and action post this inspection is not known. Did they reconnect the forward group? We will never know. The inspection would have taken about 45 minutes to an hour. The fact that they did not surface immediately after the inspection indicates that they did not notice anything alarming.

    In the three hours that the submarine was under water, if there had been a gradual flooding, the crew would have taken action to mitigate the effects, and would have ample reaction time to surface. Therefore loss of control must have been triggered by a sudden event. A pressure hull breech and flooding that must have cause to rapidly lose depth. The most immediate response is to use speed to create dynamic vectors to aid depth control. Since the submarine had only one battery group connected the speed of the submarine would be restricted to about 8 Knots ahead and about 4 Knots astern.  This would not be sufficient to delay the descent so that de-ballasting and pumping out capacities can effectively annul or reduce the rate of flooding. The rate of flooding keeps on increasing with depth.

    Now we have a situation where the submarine with the forward (or all) ballast tank probably blown going down. At depths greater than 180 meters the effect of blowing ballast with High Pressure air (250Bar)is painstakingly slow. The next stage is when the submarine crosses 15 meters more than the operational depth the Hydrazine emergency de-ballasting system will be triggered. This system is designed to clear the forward and aft main ballast tanks in 12 seconds at any depth. The problem would be if the Ballast tanks already contain air the Hydrazine will cause an explosion in the ballast tanks. If that happens there is nothing left to create positive buoyancy.

    The Next question is why did the submarine implode at 388 meters? As brought out earlier it clearly points to structural weakness in the pressure. If such a situation did not pre-exist then it may be possible that the battery pit event may have cause massive spillage of acid into the pit causing the pit to corrode in the almost 10 hours this corrosion may have weakened the hull sufficiently to cause a substantial breech in the pressure hull. The flooding of the pits could an explosion as the water level reaches to short the terminal connectors.  This is only a conjecture.

    San Juan went down without a trace. The crew did not even have the time or opportunity to release the systems and tell tale indicators that were meant tell the outside world that the submarine is in distress.

    It is said what goes up must come down. Submariners know that what goes down need not necessarily come up. San Juan RIP.

    In the language of the submarine community San Juan is on eternal patrol.

    Vice Admiral K N Sushil (retd) is a Indian Navy Veteran, and the former Flag Officer commanding-in-Chief of Southern Naval Command.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]

  • Investments In Genome Editing Technologies

    Investments In Genome Editing Technologies

    S Chandrasegaran   February 10, 2018

    Introduction

    India is soon poised to become the world’s most populous nation, overtaking China. India faces the critical challenge of producing sufficient food for a growing population living in a changing climate. Substantial research investments have been made to sequence, assemble, and characterize the genomes of major crop plants by other countries, which have led to important discoveries of crop genes and their functions. This knowledge will be valuable in increasing agricultural production by using synthetic biology and genome editing, technological advancements for precise plant engineering. Genome editing and synthetic biology are unprecedented technological breakthroughs, with great potential for crop improvement. Defining gene sequences from diverse species and cultivars has far outpaced our ability to alter those genes in crops. Recent advances in genome engineering (aka genome editing) make it possible to precisely alter DNA sequences in living cells, providing unprecedented control over a plant and animal genetic material.

    Potential future crops derived through gene editing and synthetic biology include those that better withstand pests, those that are salt and drought tolerant, that have enhanced nutritional value, and that are able to grow on marginal lands. In many instances, crops with such traits will be created by altering only a few nucleotides among the billions that comprise plant genomes. With the appropriate regulatory structures and oversight in place, crops created through genome editing might prove to be more acceptable to the public than plants that carry foreign DNA in their genomes. Public perception and the performance of the engineered crop varieties will determine the extent to which genome editing and synthetic biology contribute towards securing the world’s food supply.

    It is critical for India to make substantial investments in these technologies to make them readily available to indigenous Indian scientists so that they can be part of the upcoming revolution in agriculture. Government of India needs to embrace policies that lift all barriers towards the potential applications of these breakthrough technologies for crop and animal improvement. Such forward thinking policies will not only assure India’s food and economic security, but also to insure that it can compete with other Western nations and China in industrial innovation and production and remain self-reliant.

    What is genome editing?

    Programmable nucleases, such as zinc finger nucleases (ZFNs), transcription activator like effector nucleases (TALENs) and RNA-guided CRISPR-associated Cas9 nuclease, induce a DNA double-strand break (DSB) at a user-defined genomic site of living cells. Since DSBs are lethal to cells, they are immediately repaired through one of the two evolutionarily conserved pathways: (1) non-homologous end joining (NHEJ), which is error prone; or (2) homology-directed repair (HDR). Using these repair processes (Figure 1), scientists have been able to disrupt specific genes, or correct mutations in disease-causing genes, or insert exogenous DNA sequences at a pre-determined locus within the genome of living cells, which were not possible prior to the creation of programmable nucleases. As a result, the genome editing technologies have revolutionized life sciences research as well as biotechnology and biomedical fields. These disruptive technologies have the potential to have a great impact on agriculture through precise crop engineering, animal husbandry in the near future and on human therapeutics through engineered autologous cell-based therapies in the future.


    What is synthetic biology?

    Synthetic biology can be broadly defined as the design and construction of novel artificial biological pathways or organisms, or the redesign of existing natural biological systems. It is an emerging discipline where artificially synthesized genetic material from nucleotides, are introduced into an organism. Synthetic biology brings the application of engineering principles to biology; it aims to design and fabricate biological components and systems that do not already exist in the natural world. Synthetic genomics is a sub-discipline of synthetic biology; it refers to the synthetic assembly of complete chromosomal DNA that is designed from natural genomic sequences. The power of these techniques lies in the use of interchangeable and standardized bio-parts to construct complex genetic networks that include sensing, information processing and effector modules and in the creation of redesigned chromosomes and genomes. They have the potential to create complex new organisms with novel biological pathways and genes constructed to user specifications. Synthetic biology has great potential in biotechnology, agriculture and regenerative medicine.

    Work done by us in genome editing and synthetic genomics:

    I have been very fortunate to be involved in two exciting areas of life sciences research over 30-year career in the Department of Environmental Health Sciences at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health. First is the creation of zinc finger nucleases (ZFNs), which was a culmination of seven year research effort on the study of FokI restriction endonuclease. Later, in collaboration with Dana Carroll lab, we showed stimulation of gene targeting by a ZFN-induced targeted double-strand break using frog oocytes as a model system, which ushered in the era of genome editing. We have continued this research to date, with the current focus being on the generation and genetic correction of disease-specific human induced pluripotent stem cells for human therapeutics.

    Second is the total synthesis of a functional designer eukaryotic (yeast) chromosome III (aka synIII). We have embarked on the creation of a synthetic yeast genome (Sc2.0), in collaboration with Jef Boeke at NYU and several other international collaborators. Our lab reported the creation of the first fully functional synthetic 272-kb synIII yeast chromosome with numerous changes compared to the native chromosome. Currently, our focus is on completing another designer yeast chromosome IX (aka synIX).

    Project 1: Genome Engineering using Programmable Nucleases

    Our lab originally showed that FokI, a type IIs endonuclease, is comprised of two separable protein domains: a sequence- specific DNA binding and non-specific nuclease domain. We then reported the creation of custom zinc finger nucleases (ZFNs). Later, in collaboration with Dana Carroll’s lab in Utah, we showed stimulation of gene targeting by a ZFN-induced targeted double-strand break, using frog oocytes as a model. Recently, we have shown generation and genetic correction of human pluripotent stem cells using designer ZFNs/TALENs. Our contribution includes the application of ZFN/TALEN/Cas9 technology for targeted modification of human induced pluripotent stem cells. Recently, we reported the generation of precisely targeted genetically well-defined disease-specific hiPSCs using TALENs. Our current focus is on genetic engineering of patient-specific hiPSCs to achieve functional disease correction of monogenic diseases either by targeted genome editing (i.e. gene correction) of the defective gene or by targeted insertion of wild-type therapeutic gene to the CCR5 locus of patient-specific hiPSCs (Ramalingam et al 2013; 2014). The precisely targeted genetically well-defined disease-specific hiPSCs will be very valuable for disease modeling and for drug discovery by screening small compound libraries against the disease-specific hiPSCs. The ZFN/TALEN/Cas9-mediated approach is widely applicable to a variety of other mammalian cells as well and to generate various animal disease models to study and treat human disease in the future. We are currently conducting research to develop a hiPSC-derived HSPCs-based therapy as a curative alternative to the expensive non-curative GCase enzyme replacement therapy (ERT) to treat type 1 GD.

    Key Publications:
    Chandrasegaran S and Carroll D. (2016). Origins of Programmable Nucleases for Genome Engineering. J. Mol. Biol. 428: 963-989. PMID: 26506267
    Ramalingam S, Annaluru N, Kandavelou K and Chandrasegaran S. (2014) TALEN-mediated generation and genetic correction of disease-specific human induced pluripotent stem cells. Current Gene Therapy 14: 461-472. PMID: 25245091
    Ramalingam S, London V, Kandavelou K, Cebotaru L, Guggino W, Civin CI and Chandrasegaran S. (2013). Generation and genetic engineering of human induced pluripotent stem cells using designed zinc finger nucleases. Stem Cells and Development 22: 595-610. PMID: 22931452
    Bibikova M, Carroll D, Segal DJ, Trautman JK, Smith J, Kim YG and Chandrasegaran S. (2001) Stimulation of homologous recombination through targeted cleavage by chimeric nucleases. Mol. Cell Biol. 21: 289-297. PMID: 11113203
    Smith J, Bibikova M, Whitby FG, Reddy AR, Chandrasegaran S and Carroll D. (2000) Requirements for double-strand cleavage by chimeric restriction enzymes with zinc finger DNA-recognition domains. Nucleic Acids Res 28: 3361-3369. PMID: 10954606
    Kim YG, Cha J and Chandrasegaran S (1996) Hybrid restriction enzymes: zinc finger fusions to Fok I cleavage domain. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 93: 1156-1160. PMID: 8577732
    Kim Y-G and Chandrasegaran S (1994) Chimeric restriction endonuclease. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 91: 883-887. PMID: 7905633
    Li L, Wu LP and Chandrasegaran S. (1992) Functional domains in Fok I restriction endonuclease. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 89: 4275‑4279. PMID: 1584761
    Project 2: Creation of a synthetic yeast (Sc2.0)

    In a 2014 Science paper, our lab reported a synthetic designer version of yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae chromosome III (synIII) with numerous changes, including a built-in recombination system (SCRaMbLE) for inducing genome alterations of the synIII strain [Annaluru et al 2014; 2015; Richardson et al 2016]. The design changes had no impact on cell fitness and phenotype, suggesting plasticity of the yeast genome to the changes introduced. The Sc2.0 consortium, which comprises of a group of international scientists, have recently reported synthesis of five more yeast chromosomes in April, 2017. The ultimate goal of Sc2.0 consortium is to create a designer synthetic yeast genome. Our lab is currently working to complete the synthetic yeast chromosome IX (synIX). The final streamlined minimal yeast genome would serve as a valuable ‘chassis’ organism for the industrial production of biochemical and biological products, including nutraceuticals.

    Key Publications:
    Richardson SM, Mitchell LA, Stracquadanio G, Yang K, Dymond JS, et al. (2017) Design of a synthetic yeast genome. Science 355: 1040-1044. PMID: 28280199
    Annaluru N, Ramalingam S and Chandrasegaran S. (2015) Rewriting the blueprint of life by synthetic genomics and genome engineering. Genome Biology 16: 125-136. PMID: 26076868
    Annaluru N, Müller H, Mitchell L, Ramalingam S, et al. (2014) Total synthesis of a functional designer eukaryotic chromosome. Science 344: 55-58. PMID: 24674868
    Dymond J, Richardson S, Coombes C, Muller H, Narayana A, Blake W, Wu J, Dai J, Lindstrom D, Boeke A, Gottschling D, Chandrasegaran S, Bader J and Boeke J. (2011) Synthetic chromosome arms function in yeast and generate phenotypic diversity by design. Nature 477: 471-476. PMID: 21918511
    Dr S Chandrasegaran is a Senior Professor at the Bloomberg School of Public Health in John Hopkins University, Baltimore. He is a Trustee of TPF.