The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Regions

India-China Trade In Ancient Times: Southern Silk Route

To follow the Silk Road is to follow a ghost. It flows through the heart of Asia, but it has officially vanished leaving behind the pattern of its restlessness: counterfeit borders, unmapped peoples. The road forks and wanders wherever you are. It is not a single way, but many: a web of choices.

Colin Thubron, Shadow of the Silk Road.

Introduction

India and China, two Asian giants, share a lot of similarities in terms of history and culture. Both countries represent age old civilizations and unique history. Cultural and economic ties between the two countries date back to about 2000 years ago. The Silk Route, which is an ancient network of trade routes, formally established by the Han Dynasty, served as a connection between the two countries. It was also through this route that Buddhism spread to China and East Asia from India. The routes were more than just trade routes; it was the carrier of ideas, innovations, inventions, discoveries, myths and many more.
The earliest mention of China can be found in the Indian text “Arthashastra” which was written by Kautilya in the fourth century BC. Kautilya made a remark about Cinapattasca Cinabhumjia (Cinapatta is a product of China)[1]. Whereas, the earliest mention of India in Chinese records dates between 130 and 125 BC. Zhang Qian, a Chinese envoy to Central Asia, referred to India as Shendu, in his report about India to Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty.
This article will look into the ancient trade route that existed between South Western China and India’s North East region via Myanmar and the future of the trade route.

Ancient trade links between India and China

Shiji, which is the first Chinese dynastic history, compiled between 104 and 87 BCE talks about the existence of a trading route between India and South West China. According to Chinese records, Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, tried to establish a trade route from Changan, the Chinese capital to North East India through Yunnan and adjoining areas. However, the rulers of Yunnan were against the idea of establishing a direct trade between India and China and Emperor Wu failed to establish the trade route. Even though the trade route failed to take off, the trade in Cinapatta and Chinese square bamboo continued without any hindrance.

Political Geography of the Southern Silk Route

The Southern Silk route (SSR), one of the least studied overland route, is a trade route which is about 2000 km long and linked East and North East India with Yunnan Province of China via Myanmar. This is a relatively unknown, ancient trade route that is considered a part of the larger web of Silk Roads. This route existed before the Central Asian Silk route became popular. This trade route between Eastern India and China came to be known during the early 3rd century BCE, and it became popular by the 2nd century BCE. By 7th century AD various other branches of the SSR emerged to create web of trading routes.
Traders carried silk from Yunnan through Myanmar, across India and joined the main silk route in Afghanistan. In addition, silk was also transported from South West China through the Shan states and North Myanmar into East India and then down to the Coromandel Coast.
The Qing dynasty which ruled China from 1644-1912, recorded the cross cultural exchanges that took place across SSR. This route contributed to cultural exchanges between China and the West. It also promoted interactions among different nationalities.
Indian sources have failed to provide abundant evidence about the SSR and the interaction that took place across this route but there is enough evidence that indicates that trade and migration did take place in the Eastern India-Upper Myanmar-Yunnan region. For example, modern scholars believed that the Tai Ahoms were originally from Yunnan but they migrated to North East India and founded a small kingdom around 13th century, which grew to become the powerful Ahom Kingdom of Assam.
The areas through which the SSR passed were inhabited by various ethnic groups whose political, social and economic organizations were primitive and backward. As a result, the safety of the route was often questioned. Archeological evidences have been found along the Southern banks of Brahmaputra up to Myanmar border, which shows that trade did exist along this route.
The main items that were exported from China via this route included Silk, Sichuan cloth, Bamboo walking sticks, ironware and other handicrafts items. Sichuan, a South Western province was the main source of silk. Glass beads, jewels, emeralds etc were some of the items that were imported to China.
Another important trade route is the South West Silk route or the Sikkim Silk route, which connected Yunnan, and India through Tibet. A section of the route from Lhasa crossing Chumbi Valley, Nathu La Pass connected to the Tamralipta Port (present day Tamluk in West Bengal). From the Tamralipta port, this trade route took to the sea to traverse to Sri Lanka, Bali, Java and other parts of the Far East. Another section of the route crossed Myanmar and entered India through Kamrup (Assam) and connected the ports of Bengal and present day Bangladesh.
Over time, the Southern Silk Route lost its prominence and it was in 1885 that it re- emerged as a strategic link as the British tried to control some parts of the route in order to access and gain control over Southern China.
The strategic importance of the route increased during World War II. In 1945, Ledo Road or Stilwell Road was constructed from Ledo, Assam to Kunming, Yunnan to supply aid and troops to China for the war with Japan. Ledo Road is the shortest land route between North East India and South West China. However, after the war the road was left unused and in 2010, BBC reported that much of the Ledo road has been swallowed up by jungle.
The Assam-Myanmar-Yunnan road is very difficult to traverse not only in the present times but also during the ancient times. However, despite the hard conditions, it is through this route that a golden triangle of drug trafficking, movement of terrorist and smuggling functions today.

Future Potential: Reviving the Southern Silk Route Economy

North-East India and the Yunnan province share many similarities. Both are landlocked as well as under developed regions. Both are home to a large number of ethnic groups and have witnessed secessionist movement from time to time. Apart from this, Yunnan and North East India are geographically isolated from their political capitals.
Yunnan and North East India, home to rich varieties of subtropical fruits with high nutritional values and medicinal plants, can cooperate and transform the hills of North East India and South West China into plantations, factories, laboratories to produce processed food products and lifesaving drugs that can find a huge market in developing and developed countries.
In a bid to revive the Southern Silk route, Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar, signed the Kunming Initiative, a sub-regional organization, in 1999. This initiative was replaced by the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) in 2015. The BCIM-EC was announced by China as a part of its Belt-Road Initiative, which has been boycotted by India since the beginning. In 2019, the BCIM-EC was dropped from the list of 35 projects that are to be undertaken under BRI, indicating that China has disreagrded the project. However, in the same year India has sought to keep the BCIM-EC project alive.
If the BCIM-EC project does take place, it will reduce the travel time, cut transportation cost, open up markets, provide way for joint exploration and development of natural resources and create production bases along the way. Before the BCIM-EC takes off, it is important to develop the roadways infrastructure of India’s North East region.
Even though the BCIM-EC promises to elevate the economic conditions of the backward North-East region of India, it has not gained sufficient steam as both China and India have different apprehensions. China sees India’s reluctance to support BRI as the barrier for any progress in the project. Given the current stand-off in Ladakh, India’s apprehensions about China seeking to exploit the insurgent groups operating in the region gains significance. Either way realizing the Southern Silk Road as a viable project in the form of BCIM-Economic Corridor looks distant now.
[1]Haraprasad Ray, “Southern Silk Route: A Perspective,” in The Southern Silk Route : Historical Links and Contemporary Convergences (Routledge, 2019).

References

Ray, Haraprasad. “Southern Silk Route: A Perspective.” Essay. In The Southern Silk Route: Historical Links and Contemporary Convergences. Routledge, 2019.
“Continental and Maritime Silk Routes: Prospects of India- China Co-operations.” In Proceedings of the 1st ORF-ROII Symposium. Kunming, 2015.
Mukherjee, Rila. “Routes into the Present.” Essay. In Narratives, Routes and Intersections in Pre-Modern Asia, 37–40. Routledge, 2017.
UNESCO. Accessed June 20, 2020. https://en.unesco.org/silkroad/content/did-you-know-great-silk-roads.
“The Silk Route.” Accessed June 21, 2020. http://www.sikkimsilkroute.com/about-silk-route/.
Ray, Haraprasad. Introduction. In North East India’s Place in India-China Relations and Its Future Role in India’s Economy, n.d.
Chowdhury, Debasish Roy. “’Southern Silk Road’ Linking China and India Seen as Key to Boosting Ties.” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2013.
“China Wants to Revive ‘Southern Silk Road’ with India.” The Times of India, June 9, 2013.

Image: Stilwel Road from Ledo in Northeast India to Kunming in Yunnan province, China

July 23, 2020
India-Australia Strategic Partnership: Leveraging Aerospace Capacity

Category : India India’s, Military, India-Australia Relations
Title : India-Australia strategic partnership: Leveraging aerospace capacity
Author : M Matheswaran 02-06-2020

The forthcoming virtual summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison assumes considerable significance for an India-Australia strategic partnership, particularly as it comes against the backdrop of heightened friction with China for both countries. Enhanced defence cooperation between the two countries could be an important signal to Beijing of the costs of overly assertive strategic behaviour – whether in the Himalaya or in trade. For some years, defence cooperation has largely focused on the naval relationship. Now is the time for enhanced air-power cooperation.

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July 22, 2020
ASEAN Unity Critical for South China Sea: But Time to Address Newer Issues

Perhaps the most defining character of the ASEAN in the last six decades of its existence has been ‘Unity’ among its Member States who have scrupulously adhered to the fundamental principles contained in the various treaties signed by the Member States. The ‘ASEAN Way’ is unique and helps them to remain ‘united’ despite diversity in their political systems, national economic indicators, development levels, and military capabilities. ASEAN has also done well to be labelled as the ‘driver of regional integration’ and promoted a variety of regional political, security and economic initiatives to ensure peace and stability. It has managed with sophistication and alacrity relations with its partner countries bilaterally as also through multilateral structure.

The ‘ASEAN Way’ is unique and helps them to remain ‘united’ despite diversity in their political systems, national economic indicators, development levels, and military capabilities.

ASEAN’s engagements with China are through various political and diplomatic exchanges such as Summits and several ASEAN led mechanisms also provide opportunities to its Member States to engage China. The free trade agreement (FTA) is particularly important and catalytic for trade and both sides have taken upon themselves to accelerate negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

At the strategic level, ASEAN Member States have been quite disillusioned with China over its intention to resolve disputes in South China Sea; but the ASEAN leadership has assiduously pursued the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and succeeded in completing the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text. It is now putting pressure on China to quickly conclude the CoC in the stipulated timeframe to ensure region remains peaceful and stable to enable member countries to invest in national and regional development.

Ironically some ASEAN Member States have not been keen to openly making reference to Chinese reclamation in South China Sea and near continuous buildup of military infrastructure on islands and features in the Parcels and the Spratly group of islands.

The report card of ASEAN Unity vis a vis China, so far, has been just about quite decent with at least two exceptions when China was suspected of interfering in ASEAN matters; first in 2012, Cambodia resisted reference to South China Sea in the Chairman’s statement, and again in 2016 soon after the South China Sea Arbitration award.[i]

Ironically some ASEAN Member States have not been keen to openly making reference to Chinese reclamation in South China Sea and near continuous buildup of military infrastructure on islands and features in the Parcels and the Spratly group of islands. While Vietnam and the Philippines have openly confronted China over their claims in South China Sea, Malaysia chose to pursue “quiet diplomacy” but has stubbornly displayed “lawfare in the South China Sea”;[ii] Brunei has remained quiet because its policy makers “see little choice but to remain quiescent about its dispute with China,” Notwithstanding that, the Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit 26 June 2020 is a clear display of their ‘unity’ and they have collectively expressed concerns on the Chinese activities and recognised the seriousness of a series of incident at sea which have eroded trust and confidence.

To some extent ASEAN has succeeded in internationalising the Chinese non-compliance of international treaties such as the 1982 UNCLOS to which Beijing is a signatory.

Today, South China Sea issue has made global headlines. The US has unabashedly rejected Chinese claims over South China Sea and China is accused of not adhering to internal law. To some extent ASEAN has succeeded in internationalizing the Chinese non-compliance of international treaties such as the 1982 UNCLOS to which Beijing is a signatory as also retained a “minimal formal consensus on the South China Sea, rejecting the pernicious idea that the waterway is only the concern of littoral states, and resisting Chinese pressures to avoid discussion of the issue in ASEAN -led forums, certainly contributed to this outcome.”[iii]

Perhaps it is time for the ASEAN to bring to the forefront the Lachang-Mekong river issue. Several trans-boundary river management issues and concerns between China (the upper riparian and Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian) have emerged over the years. China has been building dams on the river and its tributaries; has avoided sharing full hydrological data particularly during dry seasons; and released river water untimely. The lower riparian states have called for a ‘code of conduct’ and a ‘rule based trans-boundary resource management’ mechanism for the Mekong River between the upper and the lower riparian states.[iv]

It is tempting to believe that China has successfully stifled lower riparian member states concerns through sops and infrastructure development projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. Interestingly, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), the most active forum is dominated by China.

Non-riparian ASEAN members are accused of “minimal interest” in the Lancang-Mekong issues and they “generally do not participate”. Even attempts to interest the rest of ASEAN on Mekong issues “are met with only the pretense of polite interest”. [v]

If ASEAN is to preserve ‘unity’ it must see maritime and continental Southeast Asia as one strategic space and take into account challenges faced by ASEAN Member States who border China on land particularly Myanmar who has accused China of interfering in its internal politics and arming the ethnic armed groups operating near the Chinese border,[vi] and Laos[vii] that is economically and militarily weak to fend off Chinese pressures unlike Vietnam which has withstood Chinese pressures on land and at sea. Otherwise, China will open yet another contentious front for the ASEAN. Finally, under the circumstances, prudence necessitates that ASEAN should prepare to incorporate newer issues other than the South China Sea in its agenda!

Notes:

[i] “ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean/asean-deadlocked-on-south-china-sea-cambodia-blocks-statement-idUSKCN1050F6 (accessed 18 July 2020).

[ii] “US-China tensions: why is Malaysia so quiet about the South China Sea?”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3093715/us-china-tensions-why-malaysia-so-quiet-about-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).

[iii] “Why Asean should treat the Mekong like the South China Sea”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3093546/why-asean-should-treat-mekong-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).

[iv] Chheang Vannarith, “Code of conduct for the Mekong”, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/298648/code-of-conduct-for-the-mekong/ (accessed 19 July 2020).

[v]“Why Asean should treat the Mekong like the South China Sea”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3093546/why-asean-should-treat-mekong-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).

[vi] “After ASEAN & India, Now Myanmar Accuses China of Creating trouble on the Border”, https://eurasiantimes.com/now-myanmar-accuses-china-for-creating-trouble-in-the-country/ (accessed 19 July 2020).

[vii] China also claims its right over a large part of Laos on historical precedents (China’s Yuan Dynasty, 1271-1368). “China faces territorial issues with 18 nations; check details”, https://zeenews.india.com/world/china-faces-territorial-issues-with-18-nations-check-details-2292826.html (accessed 19 July 2020).

Image: Adobe Stock

July 22, 2020
What After The Galwan Incident?

As one writes, a phase of the events in the Galwan valley near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has come to an end. Inputs from government, media and private commentators, have provided a perspective of the events preceding the incidents of 15/16 June and thereafter till the current day. For the world, the occasion has provided the opportunity yet again to witness the fighting spirit and junior leadership of all ranks of the Indian Army, who despite being outnumbered, were able to inflict far greater casualties on their adversaries, in inhospitable terrain under fading light conditions. The sacrifices of the men of 16 BIHAR, 3 PUNJAB, 3 Medium Regiment, and individual personnel from 81 Field Regiment, Corps of Signals and the Army Medical Corps have added lustre to the reputation of the Indian military. Their deeds shall remain enshrined in the memory of a grateful nation. At this watershed moment, we salute them.
China is contesting control over settled areas (Galwan), exploiting laid down rules and norms of border management by resorting to use of primitive weapons instead of firearms, and pushing the envelope on the ground in attempting to increase areas under control such as at Hot Springs and Pangong Tso – all actions just short of war.
One theory gaining currency in attempting to understand China’s recent behaviour, pertains to its unhappiness over what it perceives as alteration of the status quo on the LAC by designating Ladakh as a Union Territory – resulting in active collusion with Pakistan which shares Beijing’s sentiments on this issue, amongst others. However, there is no doubt that the strategy applied by China in East Ladakh comes straight out of its manual on Grey Zone Warfare. It is contesting control over settled areas (Galwan), exploiting laid down rules and norms of border management by resorting to use of primitive weapons instead of firearms, and pushing the envelope on the ground in attempting to increase areas under control such as at Hot Springs and Pangong Tso – all actions just short of war.

While the situation on the Pangong Tso awaits resolution, what is amply clear is that the era of explaining away patrol clashes on the LAC to the Indian public, in terms of ‘varying perceptions held by both sides’, is past. By its perfidious actions in East Ladakh this year, China has shredded in letter and spirit the border agreements built up over the last three decades. The recent incidents have brought greater clarity to the public mind, with a consensus that China’s salami slicing tactics cannot be tolerated any further. Indian soldiers see the LAC as a line marked on the map. Commanders are clear that the areas up to that line are to be either physically occupied or patrolled at will from bases in the vicinity, supplemented by other forms of surveillance. As per media reports, the Government has over the weekend ‘revised the Rules of Engagement’, giving ‘a free hand to the Army’ to deal with occurrences of this nature. By implication, in future if patrols cannot resolve their face offs peacefully, there will be no resorting to hand to hand scuffles with primitive weapons – unsuccessful efforts at border management will give way to border defence, through resort to tactical military operations.
As per media reports, the Government has over the weekend ‘revised the Rules of Engagement’, giving ‘a free hand to the Army’ to deal with occurrences of this nature. By implication, in future if patrols cannot resolve their face offs peacefully, there will be no resorting to hand to hand scuffles with primitive weapons – unsuccessful efforts at border management will give way to border defence, through resort to tactical military operations.
Response to this new paradigm places another set of challenges before the Indian Army. Prior to May 2020, Galwan was not in the category of disputed areas, as understood in LAC parlance. Neither had any Chinese activity been sensed in the preceding years. While construction of the DSDBO road could be the trigger, the fact that an area where the LAC had lain undisturbed since 1962 could become the scene of such a violent action, warrants scrutiny of PLA intent across the board. Previous assumptions with respect to the PLAs likely areas of interest across the entire Northern border, therefore, certainly warrants a relook. Conclusions drawn would mandate contingency planning and consequent tasking at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Such plans doubtless exist. However, it is obvious that their scope, timelines, and imperatives for successful implementation will need review in conjunction with the other services.
Outcomes of such reviews would inevitably renew the focus on capability building and in the middle term, might even alter priorities for the same. Substantial enhancements in the areas of surveillance, tactical and strategic air mobility and real time communication links continue to retain their importance. Induction of greater varieties of kinetic non-contact weapon systems, complemented by force multipliers such as cyber warriors and special forces too remain on top of the list. Also, the continued ceasefire violations on the Line of Control to the West, and the relentless tempo of counter terrorist operations in the Valley during this period smack of collusion and tell a tale which defence planners must take note of. Developing the desired capability will be predicated on guaranteed funding and fast track procedures. It is heartening to peruse reports in the Economic Times of 22 June that the Government has granted emergency financial powers up to Rs 500 crore per procurement project to each service for buying weapons and ammunition. Even if new projects cannot be initiated immediately because of fund constraints imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic and otherwise, it is time for stalled ones like the Mountain Strike Corps to be quickly completed. The example of the PLA which has almost completed its reorganisation for fighting wars of the future and tested the response of its field force during the Covid-19 pandemic, must be taken note of.
Thanks to the Galwan episode, the vital aspect of border infrastructure has gained nationwide attention. There is perceptive increase in the pace of development over the last few years. The sequence and methodology however are dictated essentially by two factors – availability of resources (funds and specialist equipment) and the need for calibrating messages implicit in such actions to China. Despite Covid-19 constraints, the current crisis mandates that funds currently earmarked for infrastructure development continue to flow so that development progresses, albeit at a slower pace. As regards messaging to China, we have reached a watershed moment. As high level military talks continue and spell out the Indian position on the ground to the Chinese, creating an ‘all of nation approach’ for tackling China becomes necessary.
Galwan incident has ensured that the negative perception of China worldwide is now shared by almost all sections of Indian society. This bitterness is fuelled by the sheer brutality of the Chinese military and duplicity of the Chinese government, bringing back memories of 1962 for many who have only heard of that era. It is driven further by a realisation of the scale of India’s dependence on China, be it in the import of manufactured goods of all hues, or technology, and the consequent harm to Indian interests and livelihoods. Awareness has spread amongst Indians that China’s constant working against India’s interests in world fora, be it in vetoing expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council for ‘technical reasons’, blocking its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group or introducing discussions on Kashmir are all part of its plan to obstruct India’s progress to its rightful place in the comity of nations. In attempting to correct an unequal economic relationship, ensuring that India retains its position in the region and preventing erosion of its influence in South Asia and beyond, all elements of the Indian state have their tasks cut out. It becomes imperative now to prepare a different toolkit with a wider range of options (including those not envisaged earlier) to manage India-China relations. Such options now require to be coordinated at all levels of the government and intimated to stakeholders including industry and other influencers for implementation. This coordination is long overdue. Resetting the economic relationship will not be easy. However, announcement of a practical time bound and holistic road map which has been thought through with all stakeholders would be a beginning.
Galwan incident has ensured that the negative perception of China worldwide is now shared by almost all sections of Indian society.
To supplement the proposed policy outlined above, articulation of a holistic Strategic Narrative vis-a-vis China becomes necessary. Such a narrative would pertain to as many aspects as possible – bilateral issues (including border management), local and regional matters, so that consistent, coherent and long term views are voiced, keeping in mind the national interest. information operations would be a subset of such a narrative, and briefings organised as frequently as possible would be useful force multipliers. It might be necessary for the concerned sections in the newly formed Department of Military Affairs and the Department of Defence to coordinate these aspects. India must also actively consider the possibilities that other forms of conflict, including hybrid warfare, are necessary to exploit and invest in the same. Here too, employment of such methodologies by China is an example. China has been refining its doctrine of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ since the early 90s. The effects are there to see in South China Sea and elsewhere. It is executing certain aspects of this strategy against India on the Northern borders.
Managing relations with China is destined to remain the major preoccupation for Indian strategic thinkers in coming years. Tensions along the LAC are but one manifestation of this problem. Both nations are hostage to geography. China’s behaviour over the last decade has influenced Indian foreign and military policies like no other, causing India to take decisions that were not in the realms of possibility earlier. Articulating a holistic China strategy through an all of government approach within the overall ambit of a National Security Strategy to ensure that India achieves its rightful place, has never been so important.
Image Credit: ASPI:The Strategist – Nathan Ruser

July 21, 2020
China’s support to Syria: In Conflict and Redevelopment

China is looking to ramp up relations with Syria both as part of its strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but also to take advantage of the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort that is expected to materialise following the gradual winding down of the war.

Syria is an ancient civilisation and also an important part of the ancient silk route, with cities such as Palmyra, Aleppo and Damascus playing an important role in trade and travel between the East and the West. While the discovery of a maritime route between Europe and Asia has to some extent diminished its importance in this regard, Syria is still strategically important. China is looking to ramp up relations with Syria both as part of its strategic Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) but also to take advantage of the multi-billion dollar reconstruction effort that is expected to materialise following the gradual winding down of the war.

China’s non-interference policy is an integral aspect of its involvement and role in the Middle East. During the course of the Syrian war, China has consistently supported the Bashar Al Assad government on the diplomatic front – through the exercise of the veto power against the resolutions introduced in the United Nations Security Council either condemning the Syrian government, calling for ceasefire or for imposing sanctions on suspected war criminals. While negotiating the renewal of border crossings for aid, China agreed on the need for humanitarian assistance but emphasised on state sovereignty. China’s policy of non-interference has served it well in strengthening bilateral relations and advancing its interests.

One of the reasons for the diplomatic support extended by China to the Syrian government is also the involvement of the Uighur fighters in the Syrian conflict which has greatly bothered China. While it has never got directly involved militarily in the Syrian conflict there are unconfirmed media reports which suggested that China was sharing military intelligence with the Syrian government and also sent its military advisors to Syria to help it in its fight against the rebels. In this sense, it saw Syria as a key player in its fight against religious extremism thereby preventing its export to its own volatile Xinjiang province.

With the Syrian conflict slowly winding down and Bashar Al Assad’s hold on Syria greatly strengthened more than at any other time since the beginning of the civil war, China is ramping up its diplomatic efforts in Syria using trade as an important policy tool to ramp up the relations between the two great civilisations.

Based on Chinese government’s invitation Syria has participated in the second BRI summit held in Beijing in April 2019. Previously in 2018, China held a Trade Fair on Syrian reconstruction projects which was attended by nearly one thousand Chinese companies and which saw investment proposals of nearly USD two billion. The collapse of most of the industry in Syria due to the war has also resulted in a significant increase of cost-effective Chinese imports into Syria ranging from toys to car parts and industrial machinery and equipment.

China is also leveraging its economic strength fully by using aid as a foreign policy tool. In 2019, Xinhua reported on the that an economic cooperation agreement was signed between Syria’s Planning and International Cooperation Commission (PICC) and the Chinese embassy in Damascus. As part of this agreement, a donation will be set aside to fund a series of humanitarian projects as agreed upon by both sides.

The collapse of most of the industry in Syria due to the war has also resulted in a significant increase of cost-effective Chinese imports into Syria ranging from toys to car parts and industrial machinery and equipment.

China is expected to be a key player in the international reconstruction and development effort that is expected to take place in Syria due to its strong bilateral ties with not only Syria but also its alignment with Russian and Iranian position on Syria , these two players being the major supporters of Bashar Al Assad’s government in the civil war. While Russia and Iran are surely expected to carve out a large part of the reconstruction contracts between themselves, their capacity to make the huge investments in these projects, estimated to be worth anywhere between USD 200 million to USD 1 trillion is doubtful. This creates the ripe opportunity for China to enter the reconstruction business effort either by themselves or, as is more likely, in partnership with Russian and Iranian governments or businesses.

Beyond the business opportunities provided by the potential reconstruction of Syria, China is also strategically interested in Syria. China was always interested in securing access to the Ports of Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Such an access is expected to complement Beijing’s interests in the Greek port Piraeus (COSCO shipping, the Chinese state-owned shipping and logistics services supplier company in the Port authority) and the Israeli port of Haifa, in securing a trade route to Europe. In alignment with these strategic interests, Chinese companies’ area also exploring the possibility of upgrading the deep seaport of Tripoli, Lebanon to allow it to accommodate larger vessels and also the possibility of building a railroad that would connect Beirut and Tripoli in Lebanon to Homs and Aleppo in Syria.

Beyond the business opportunities provided by the potential reconstruction of Syria, China is also strategically interested in Syria. China was always interested in securing access to the Ports of Tartus and Latakia on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.

Chinese investments into and trade ties with Syria however, risk the attraction of US sanctions on Syria. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou, Chief Financial Officer of Huawei, , in Canada, based on a request by the United States highlights the extent of these risks. “The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act”, also known as “The Caesar Act”, a United States legislation that sanctions the Syrian government, including Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, for war crimes against the Syrian population, parts of which are now incorporated in the “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020” greatly tightened the sanctions environment against the Syrian government and a number of its industries potentially impacting the Chinese investments and trade ties. While China has called for an end to sanctions stating they were “inhuman,” they have been wary of being targeted by sanctions and further straining their relations with the US. However, it is unlikely that the sanctions would have a significant effect on China given the size of China’s economy and its ability to circumvent sanctions while dealing with Iran and North Korea. China, as part of its ‘mask diplomacy,’ is increasingly providing aid to the Syrian government in their efforts against Covid-19. This serves the dual purpose of strengthening China-Syria relations and strengthening China’s narrative of Covid-19.

To conclude, China has been a staunch supporter of the incumbent Syrian government of Bashar Al Assad during the almost decade long Syrian civil war and is set to reap the benefits from the post-war Syrian reconstruction effort in conjunction with the Russians and the Iranians to advance its interests.

Image: Middle East Institute

July 10, 2020
Lebanon’s Economic Crisis and Political Unrest

The Lebanon crisis illustrates the outcome of an inefficiently regulated market economy, shaped by long-term instant gratification of economic policies. Economy is run by corrupt institutions with ingrained crony capitalism, bureaucratic regulations and over-reliance on foriegn exchange.

Lebanon is a free market economy in West Asia, bordered by Syria and Israel and the Mediterranean Sea, and hence, was a frequent recipient of spillovers of unrest and refugee crisis from the neighbouring countries. It is a service-sector dominated (majorly, banks and tourism) economy with a GDP of $56.9 billion─ growth rate of 0.2%, compared to 0.6% the previous year and a workforce of 2.4 million out of which 30 percent include Syrian refugees. The country relies heavily on imports (consumer goods, machinery and equipment etc) with a low dependence on exports (vegetables, non-precious metals and textiles). For years, Lebanon used foreign remittances such as transfers from non-resident Lebanese, foreign deposits and high government loans to balance the trade deficit. Lebanon exchange rate had been kept fixed at 1500 pounds per dollar which was also a fiduciary currency in Lebanon. Thus the higher demand for dollars to fixate the exchange rate, and meet the domestic demand for dollars, is levelled using foreign deposits by offering high yield rates, which had to be further funded by more deposits at even higher interest rates. These faulty policies had sustained the economy until interest payments had snowballed into heavy burden.

Figure 1: trend of GDP per capita in Lebanon

Source: Trading Economics

Lebanese economy is also characterized by high government debt, substantially from domestic banks, borrowed primarily for reconstruction of the economy post civil war (1975-90). Over the years, the government relied more heavily on deficit financing to meet government spending, while the weak governance and corrupt politicians moved along with unfulfilled reforms and poor economic development. There was an underprovision of basic necessities like hassle-free electricity supply, regular water and waste management. On the other hand, crony capitalism had built up, with favours laid out to private businesses which were ultimately owned by rich, exploitative politicians. The debt-to-GDP ratio peaked to 150% by 2019, with a budget deficit of 11.5% of GDP and 50% of the revenues are consumed in debt servicing. This led to an economic crisis, followed by a political crisis, and ultimately snowballed into a financial crisis, rendered vulnerable and in desperate need of foreign aid to see the day.

Evidently, though Lebanon crisis started in late 2019, it is the result of long term economic policies mismanaged by corrupt political elite; when the government proposed to tax ‘free-calls in Whatsapp’ to meet the mounting budget deficit in October 2019, protests erupted across the country, catapulting into political unrest and ousting the prime minister. Investors and citizens lost confidence in the system, and led to reducing capital inflows.

Their sovereign bonds were rated as highly risky assets (probable default), leading to interest rates as high as 15%. The political uncertainty and the liquidity crunch, led to freezing of external deposits, while the steady domestic and foreign demand for dollars persisted, leading to a shortage of USD. The banks levied restrictions (weekly quotas) on dollar withdrawals, the dollar rate spiked, depreciating the pound, and reducing the purchasing power of the pound. This had squeezed the middle and low income strata the most, draining their last pounds of savings, since their debts substantially constituted dollar repayments. Businesses relying on dollars for most part were affected as the price of imports sky-rocketed, and the oil crunch tightened until the central government stepped in to ease the situation. The condition degraded further by the onset of Coronavirus and the lockdown, which led to widespread unemployment and inflation. The World Bank estimated that 50% of Lebanese population could be pushed below the poverty line by 2020 if immediate action is not taken.

The debt of Lebanon has built up to 124464 billion LBP, i.e nearly $82 billion and the country has become the 3 ^rd most indebted country in the world. In March 2020, Lebanon government, as a decisive step to prioritize the domestic concerns of the country and retain sustainable foreign exchange reserves in the economy, had defaulted on the Eurobond debt of $1.2 billion for the first time. The ailing economy seeks to restructure the other outstanding debts amounting to $31 billion and has been seeking advice, especially from the IMF on debt restructuring measures. There is a need for an ‘economic rescue plan’ to protect the depositors from this worst economic crisis Lebanon has faced.

Figure 2: trend of Lebanon government’s debt

Source: Trading Economics

Foreign aid from the institutions is a big responsibility, as it would demand austerity measures from the economy that had dwelled in capitalistic pleasures for so long. Though, CEDRE and foreign countries like France and UK have promised ‘soft’ loans to the Lebanese government, economists believe that external aid would be unproductive, and will become an additional debt burden on the already bleeding financial system unless government inculcates greater transparency and accountability to the public, ousting corruption and following through on long-term economic policies with commitment. Lebanon government is also seeking aid from the IMF. But this would certainly entail strict reform targets linked to the outflow of credit and hence, is very unlikely.

For the immediate future, Lebanon’s economic policies should be directed towards increasing self-reliance in the economy, with higher focus on manufacturing sectors to create employment. Financial policies to stabilize the economy are of primary concern. It is time to make up for the blunders of non-performing investments in the electricity industry. Investments on infrastructural development should be realized and substantial attention should be given to improving socio-economic conditions of the people. Construction and manufacturing industries should be supported. Actions should be taken to handle the refugee situation, and check the drain of human capital out of the country. It could be said that Lebanon’s government has a long way to go before it can regain the confidence of its people and the foreign investors in order to stabilize the economy.

Current Scenario

Covid 19 has a destructive and deleveraging impact on all the economies, and Lebanon is no exception. The economy is heavily dependent on the service sector, especially tourism, and foreign remittances. The impact of the coronavirus pandemic has been devastating on the money the expats send home, which makes up nearly 12.7% of the GDP, making Lebanon the second-most remittances dependent middle-eastern country, only behind Palestine. Amid the collapsing economy and the disruption triggered by the Covid-19 pandemic, the only certainty is the gathering pace of Lebanon’s political unrest.

REFERENCES

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/15/world/middleeast/lebanon-protests-economy.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/10/world/middleeast/lebanon-economic-crisis.html

https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/what-s-behind-lebanon-s-economic-crisis-35874

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/world/middleeast/lebanon-debt-financial-crisis.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/world/middleeast/lebanon-protests-corruption.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/07/lebanon-to-default-on-debt-for-first-time-amid-financial-crisis

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/world/middleeast/lebanon-debt-financial-crisis.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/23/world/middleeast/lebanon-protests.html

DATA- https://data.worldbank.org/country/lebanon

https://www.britannica.com/place/Lebanon/Trade

https://tradingeconomics.com/lebanon/government-debt

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May 22, 2020
Multilateralism in the Indian Ocean Region

A number of multilateral initiatives have emerged in the last two decades in the Indian Ocean Region. The composition has been varied, comprising of inside powers, some comprise of a combination of inside and outside powers, given the geographical construct of the region. Their efficiency has been varied. As such, trends indicate that the older, post-world war II multilateral institutions are gradually losing relevance. Newer coalitions appear to hold promise, some to deal with the foregoing challenges and other to facilitate economic aspirations. Dr Sunod Jacob makes an assessment of multilateralism contributing to an inclusive rule based order in the IOR.

This article is being published as a chapter in the book titled – “Foreign Policy Perspectives for Sri Lanka 2021”.
Image Credit: Photo by Kyle Glenn on Unsplash.

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May 12, 2020
The Law of Armed Conflict and its continuing relevance to the South Asian Region

The South Asian region has had its share of recent historical experiences with large scale violations as well as allegations of large scale violations of international humanitarian law (IHL).2 This applies as much to instances of international and non-international armed conflict as it does to the situations created by new threats to peace and security such as terrorism. Memories of some of these unfortunate events have not faded over the years. For the sake of convenience, the paper is divided into two parts. The first part elaborates specific examples of IHL related issues in South Asia and also deals with some of the major thematic issues in the context of the region. The second part highlights the challenges to IHL application and implementation in this region. The conclusion summarizes the main strands in IHL’s relevance to the South Asian context. The most interesting aspect of our enquiry that stares us in the face is the fact that IHL related issues apply to almost all South Asian countries. The degree of intensity may differ but the fact remains that acts that attract universally applicable IHL provisions are found aplenty in the region.

Image Credit: New York Times

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May 3, 2020
Taiwan Elections 2020: Emphasising Taiwan’s Democracy, Nationalism and Sovereignty

Taiwan’s first female President, Tsai Ing-Wen of the pro-democratic DPP Party won a landslide victory for second term in the national elections held in January. China condemns Tsai’s victory by reiterating its “one country, two systems model.
Election Results: Voice for Democracy and Sovereignty

Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen won re-election on January 11rth by a historic landslide, a decisive result widely seen as a rebuke to Beijing’s efforts to integrate Taiwan into the ‘one-China’ concept. The DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), rode on Tsai’s popularity and maintained control of the Legislative Yuan, the country’s parliament. DPP has consistently taken a very ‘Taiwan nationalistic’ approach and has been a strong opponent of Beijing’s ‘one-China policy’ and the so-called ‘1992-consensus’. This landslide victory and a second term gives Tsai the power to uphold Taiwan’s commitment to democracy. Taiwanese voted to reject China’s “one country, two systems model” while still maintaining support for Tsai’s stand on the “1992 consensus”, which would dictate the Cross-Strait ties based on “peace, parity, democracy and dialogue”.

On winning the elections, President Tsai remarked – China must ‘face reality’ of Taiwan’s independence and called on China to ‘review’ it’s current policy toward the de facto nation that Beijing claims is part of its territory.

China refuses to acknowledge the victory of pro-democratic forces and maintains that this development would not alter its “one-China” principle. China’s Foreign Ministry stated that “regardless of what happens in Taiwan, the basic facts won’t change: there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is part of China.”

In the voting week, Xi Jinping ushered in a range of measures “to further promote economic and cultural exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait”. Despite these positive announcements, he sent a Chinese aircraft carrier to sail through the Straits to intimidate, should Tsai’s victory initiate a declaration of independence.

The Chinese army also conducted a naval and air force drill on 9-10 February in a threatening attempt to which Washington responded with the US Air Force sending two surveillance planes as an expression of solidarity with Taiwan.

Election results and impact on KMT

In the aftermath of the astounding defeat in January, the opposition KMT has been forced to re-examine its policies and priorities. The party elected Mr Johnny Chiang, a 48-year old lawyer, as its president in March first week. Chiang represents the younger generation who are more focused on separate Taiwan identity, reflecting DPP’s resonance across the young voters. KMT has some serious issues to resolve if it wants to remain relevant in Taiwan. It is constrained by its linkage to the inconvenient history of Taiwan and a support base that is seen as focused on benefitting from cross-Strait engagement, and in some cases, unique access to the CCP through party-to-party ties. The main internal issue is the party’s cross-Strait policy with China, whether 1992 consensus will endure as the foundation for official mechanisms. Chiang is seen as one who will most likely ‘discard’ the 1992 consensus arguing that the consensus has lost its utility and undergone ‘distortion’ when linked with the ‘one country, two systems’ model used in Hong Kong.

Background: 1992 Consensus – discarded by rising Taiwanese identity?

Taiwan was ruled for more than three decades by the nationalist army, the Kuomintang (KMT),which fled to the island in 1949 after being defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and created a rival government, the Republic of China, better known as today’s Taiwan. It has since transformed into a multiparty democracy, under a government and political system, completely separate from China’s. KMT’s position stems from the legacy of the Chinese civil war with the CCP, which is a complicated history of KMT and CCP vying to represent ‘one China’ as the ‘Republic of China’ by KMT and the ‘People’s Republic of China’ by CCP. KMT, in view of this history, is seen as the most pro-mainland of Taiwan’s two major political parties. In contrast, the DPP has always maintained much tougher stance with Beijing. It has played a prominent role in democratisation of Taiwan and places greater emphasis on uniqueness of Taiwanese identity and a history of more than 100 years that is separate from that of China’s. From the late 1980s when democratisation of Taiwan began, more and more Taiwanese are embracing a Taiwanese consciousness and favouring independence even though maintaining status quo still remains the majority priority for the moment. Majority of the youth, and 60-70% of Taiwanese are fiercely conscious of their Taiwanese identity, and view Taiwan as an independent and sovereign nation-state. This also means that the idea and legacy of nationalist party’s ROC is seen as impractical, in consonance with geopolitical realities.

The 1992 Consensus, seen as having enabled the growth of Taipei-Beijing cooperation, revolves around the issue of ‘one-China’ interpretation – ‘that there is only one China and that Taipei and Beijing agree to disagree on which government is its legitimate representative’ has been the foundation of cross-Strait relations. It was curated by the KMT and the PRC wherein in principle they agree that there is “One China”. However, the contentious terminology “One China” can be interpreted by either side having accorded its own meaning. The CCP believes “one China” is the “People’s Republic of China,” while Taiwan believes “one China” should mean the ROC established in 1912 and hitherto exists.

The KMT government in 2008-16, led by Ma Ying-jeou used the so-called 1992 Consensus to strengthen economic, trade and cultural relations between Taiwan and PRC. It led to rapid development of economic links and integration with PRC while political issues were kept away. Trade, indirect investment, and travel via Hong Kong grew steadily. By 2014, over 40% of Taiwan’s trade was with the mainland, and some 80% of its foreign direct investment (FDI) went to China; Taiwan businesses operated more than one hundred thousand businesses on the mainland. Taiwan-China two ay trade in 2019 was USD 244.35 billion. The trade balance has, consistently been in Taiwan’s favour.

KMT’s strategy, under Ma’s leadership, focused on reviving Chinese nationalism and was aimed at anchoring Taiwan in the Chinese nation, bridging the gap with PRC, opposing Taiwan independence, favouring reconciliation and eventually unification between the two sides of the Straits. By 2012-13 this approach gave rise to suspicions amongst the Taiwanese about Ma’s rapprochement policy. Paradoxically it strengthened the predominance of Taiwanese identity, which is stronger amongst the youth. This resulted in KMT’s internal fractures in 2012-13, its loss in local elections of 2014, the turbulence of the Sunflower revolution of 2014, and its huge loss to DPP in the presidential elections of 2016.

The ideological battle between the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) has persisted since 2016 (when Tsai became President) and the DPP refused to recognise the “1992 consensus”. In 2000, Tsai as the minister of Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) said, “The so-called ‘one China, differing interpretations’ is only a usage by our side to describe the process of the meeting. It is a way of description that the new government can accept, but it does not mean that we have accepted Beijing’s ‘one-China, two models principle.’

Though DPP lost the local elections in 2018 to the pro-China Kuomintang party (KMT), and had no hopes of winning the presidential 2020 elections, Tsai has been trying to replace the Chinese identity with the Taiwanese identity by promising people that the Taiwanese sovereignty will be protected. By articulating “maintenance of status quo”, she indicates that she may not actually pursue outright independence in order to maintain a peaceful environment that helps growth and development; in effect allowing PRC to see it as a support for “One China” in principle and being open to cross-Strait dialogue. But she makes it clear to rest of the world – “we don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan.”

Diversifying Economic and Trade Strategies

During her presidency in 2016, she had initiated “new south-bound policy (NSP)” to strengthen relations with selected countries in South and South-East Asia and gain entry into regional blocs. As the US unveiled its Indo-Pacific strategy of Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Taiwan saw great benefits in dove-tailing it’s NSP strategy into the Indo-Pacific. The NSP has made notable gains in the first term, and Tsai’s re-election offers great opportunity to diversify the gains in the second term. The Chinese have been aggressively countering this strategy by compelling nations to switch allegiance to China. This had resulted in Taiwan having only close to 16 diplomatic allies which include small nations like Belize and Naru. Despite this, major nations have come around the issue to strengthen ties with Taiwan through economic and cultural centres. Nevertheless, the ‘New South-bound Partnership’ strategy is a conscious effort by Taiwan to reduce its economic dependency on the mainland. Taiwan has aggressively pursued economic partnerships with countries like India, and has encouraged investments by Taiwanese companies. Its investments in South-East Asia has more than doubled in this period.

China has also been accused of meddling with local Taiwanese elections in 2018, according to Wang William Liqiang, a self-identified Chinese spy presently seeking political asylum in Australia. As a counter-strategy and to prevent foreign influence in the country’s elections, Taiwan’s legislature passed the anti-infiltration act on 31 December 2019, which criminalises external meddling. According to MAC Chief Chen Ming-tong, “[the act] aims to counter infiltration”. He added that it acts “as a corrective measure to ensure normal cross-Strait exchanges and reduce politically-motivated infiltration and intervention by Beijing. The Act prevents hostile external powers from engaging, through local collaborators, in illegal lobbying and election campaigning, disrupting rallies and assemblies, and making political donations.”

Rising anti-Chinese sentiment has gained momentum due to the recent protests in Hongkong. Young voters have been deeply influenced by this and are supporting Tsai. This is supplanted by the economic slowdown which affected Taiwan and has divided the Taiwanese voters—those who support the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China and those who don’t.

Taiwan had also altered its economic policy since the election of DPP in 2016, wherein industrial restructuring has resulted in a large businesses (heavy industries) moving to China in order to reduce the labour cost. This has led to an increase in trade and investment in China. However, the catch is that since both governments don’t recognise each other, the Taiwanese companies are exposed to high risk and no dispute settlement is prevalent currently nor is it guided by international norms. China continues to be Taiwan’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly 30% of the island’s total trade. However, Taiwan’s investment into the mainland has been declining over the last five years, and so also mainland’s investment in Taiwan.

The Future

The ‘one-China policy’ is a zero-sum game between the PRC and the ROC. China has always reiterated that only by accepting China’s authoritarian rule can the Taiwanese people attain prosperity and peace. From the beginning of 2005, the “carrots and sticks” policy has been predominant in the Cross-Strait relations. Since China’s policy has backfired, she is capable of adopting coercive measures—economic crippling, isolation by cutting off diplomatic allies, direct invasion or meddling with internal politics. If Beijing decides to use force, it could spiral into a regional conflict inviting Taiwan’s allies and heavy economic repercussions.

China’s isolation strategy with respect to Taiwan is a constant challenge, which influences majority of the Taiwanese to maintain status quo in current environment. Status quo can mean different things to different people. Chinese president Xi’s aggressive articulation in 2019 of ‘one-China policy’ with respect to Taiwan and the events in Hong Kong has triggered a massive nationalistic fervour in support of democracy and Taiwan identity amongst the younger population.

China has repeatedly said that it will bring Taiwan under its authority by any means necessary, including force. Analysts believe Xi Jinping aims to achieve that by 2049, the deadline for the country to achieve its ‘great rejuvenation’. Beijing’s refusal of renouncing the possible use of force for unification is reflected in the continued military build-up on the Fujian coast. By 2014, PLA had over 1500 ballistic and cruise missiles targeting Taiwan, ten times more than in 2000, and more accurate and destructive than in 2000.

Chinese state media have downplayed President Tsai’s election, but there is no doubt that China considers it as a major setback to its reunification efforts. The election has resulted in a cooling off period for cross-Strait relations, and the global ‘Corona Virus pandemic’ has only added to put this off any priority for some time.

Only time will tell if Taiwan and China manage to engage in dialogue and come to a consensus regarding their irreconcilable differences. As democracy and pro-democratic forces continue to strengthen and sustain Taiwanese identity and nationalism, Taiwan’s functioning as a sovereign independent state is stronger than ever, while Beijing’s strategy of geo-economic boxing-in Taiwan into accepting its ‘one-China’ policy looks less probable. On the other hand, giving legitimacy to Tsai’s government will be a tricky call for many countries as they have to walk a tight rope in order not to rupture relations with China. How different nations recognise and engage with the new Taiwanese government will definitely be a contributing factor in determining Taiwan’s future.

March 18, 2020
Modi’s move to engage SAARC on COVID-19 shows his capacity to surprise

Category : Global Health/SAARC

Title : Modi’s move to engage SAARC on COVID-19 shows his capacity to surprise

Author : Kanwal Sibal 16-03-2020

Former foreign secretary, Kanwal Sibal, observes that Prime Minister Modi’s initiative to organise a video-conference of Saarc leaders to develop together a roadmap to fight the challenge of COVID-19 is a well thought out strategy and shows his capacity to surprise. Modi’s move could inject new life into Saarc, just when India was seen as downgrading the Saarc platform for stronger regional cooperation and promoting Bimstec.

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March 16, 2020