The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Americas

  • Venezuela’s Collapsing Economy: Victim of Geopolitical Games

    Venezuela’s Collapsing Economy: Victim of Geopolitical Games

    Manjari Balu and M Matheswaran                                                                     June 23, 2019/Analysis

    The collapse of Latin America’s oil-rich country, Venezuela, epitomises the probable debacle of a socialist regime while the geopolitical strategies espouse the power struggle at the cost of the economy. After the death of Hugo Chavez in 2013, Nicolas Maduro, the hand-picked successor of Chavez took overthe office to preserve the “petrostate” status of Venezuela.  USA, backed by Brazil, Canada and many other countries, have recognized the opposition led by Juan Guaido as the interim president and have questioned the legitimacy of the Maduro government. Venezuela’seconomy depends to the extent of 95 per cent on oil exports and the dwindling oil prices in 2014 deepened the latent crisis, an inevitable consequence for a socialist government with illiberal economic agendas. Chavizmo rose to fame with a brand of Bolivarian revolution that promised to reduce poverty and deter the US in interfering in the country’s functioning.

    Economic Collapse: Paradox of Largest Oil Reserves and Economic Mismanagement

    Venezuela is a prime example of what economic mismanagement, impractical socialist measures, and corruption can do to a country that is wealthy with natural resources. At 300, 878 million barrels of proven oil reserves, Venezuela has the largest amount of proven oil reserves in the world. The country’s economy is largely tied to its oil wealth and was one of the richest in Latin America until a few years ago. Economic collapse has led to a huge humanitarian crisisunseen in the country’s modern history. IMF has predicted that Venezuela’s inflation rate will reach 10 million per cent in 2019, becoming one of the worst cases of hyperinflation in modern history.

    TheTransformation Index that evaluates the political and economic transformation of a country, has ranked Venezuela 110 out of 129 nations with a score of 3.27 out of 10. In addition to criticizing the poor state of the economy, it also reported that the state-sanctioned crime rates have spiralled. The current catastrophic economic crisis and political chaos is the result of a pervasive economic mismanagement and an economy rooted in a single commodity, petroleum.

    Inflation was 1,30,000 per cent in 2018 and the economy has contractedby 22.5 per cent, indicating the dire status of the economy. The economic future of the country continues to be bleak and the debate has converged to the geopolitical relevance of the issue. Data on money supply is a key element to understand the inflation rates in an economy and Venezuela has refused to publish money supply data in the past years. A recent data suggests that  12 trillion BsF (Bolivares Fuertes) were printed exposing the economic ruination.

    Initial denial by the Venezuelan government about the crisis never let aid flow in, recent acceptance of humanitarian aidhas tripled the aid budget. With poor socio-economic indicators as a major challenge, Venezuela is further saddled with huge external debt as a problem to be solved by the new dispensation, be it Maduro led government or any other successor. Currently, Venezuela’s external debt stands at  150 per cent of the total GDP.

    American Sanctions, Food Imports, and Falling Aid

    Few consider the problem to be homegrown in Venezuelaand many blame the US for artificially creating the hyperinflation.  The US justified the economic sanctions to bring down Maduro regime and accused him to have caused upheavals since 2014 and the controversies besieging election manipulation by Maduro’s party substantiate the allegation. Political funding for a coup against the regime change in Venezuela was extensively promoted by the Bush administration. The protraction of political interest led to imposition of anti-democratic sanctions,  and reiterates the hegemonic strategy that the US continues to pursue.

    The recent economic sanctions imposed on the state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PdVSA)  by the US has exacerbated Venezuela’s problems in its oil production- the output is expected to fall by 33 per cent in 2019. Investigation of Venezuela’s oil production before and after the economic sanctions suggests the production has been on downtrend even before the sanctions.  

    Private investments and productivity in agriculture dropped alarmingly as the socialist government led by Chavez nationalized agribusiness and industries and encouraged food imports.  Seventy per cent of the food requirements were met by imports. According to the United States Department of Agriculture, Venezuela is one of the potential markets for the US to export agricultural produce, and accounted for 21 per cent of total agricultural imports of Venezuela. However, as the economy collapsed, over-dependence on imports for food began to tell. In 2016, food imports fell by 72 per cent and reports state that people have lost an average of 8.6 kgs of weight due to food scarcity.

     

    China’s Extractive Relationship with Venezuela

    Majority of the loans are from China and Russia and their servicing or repayments are tied with its oil revenue. It is estimated that Venezuela owes around 13.5 billion USD to China as of 2019. Under Chavez leadership, China and Venezuela laid a financial foundation by crafting  “China-Venezuela Joint fund” known as the FCCV. The central bank of China alone loaned 42.5 billion US dollars from 2007-2012 to Venezuela. The compounded bilateral interest incentivized China to support even when the Venezuelan economy faltered in 2014. China further escalated its commercial interest byloaning a sum of $4 billion as cash for oil deal paying little attention to the projected contraction in the Venezuelan economy. In the year 2017, Maduro announced ambitious planning to spend 70 percent of the total budget on social schemes to address food scarcity. While the quixotic socialist paradigm was impressive during Chavez’s tenure the public soon realized the huge dent made in the economy by imprudent  social spending.

    The defensive lending strategy adopted by China post Maduro’s electoral victory shifted the focus of investments to oil and oil-related infrastructure. Although China’s recent intervention in Venezuela’s domestic affairs is evident from the endorsement for Maduro,  oil supply has always been its priority over political rivalry in Venezuela. As China became more sceptical about Venezuela’s ability to repay the loans because of low oil production and the adverse impact of US sanctions, its capital flow to Venezuela shrunk.  Maduro had viewed relations with China to be based on ideological common ground, but China was focused on leveraging its abundant resources, which, in turn, contributed to the crippling of the economy of Venezuela. This asymmetric relationship between Venezuela and China thwarted expectations of Maduro to acquire more credit from China.

    For China, endorsing Maduro is not an option as far as its economic interest is concerned; increasing rebellion of Venezuelan people portends a threat to the Maduro government that could bring in democracy in Venezuela, which could make it a potential defaulter of past debts. The Chinese government is considered culpable for Venezuela’s crisis by many American policymakers, and are accused to have followedthe “debt trap diplomacy”. The investment strategy in Venezuela resembles the Angola model- Chinese government extends credit tied with oil. However, in the case of Venezuela, China is bearing the cost of overestimating the performance of Venezuelan economy.

    Russia’s All-Weather Ties

    As we see a pragmatic China becaming more cautious about the failing economy of Venezuela, Russia’s interest and the relationship go beyond just the commercial narrative. Russia ties with Venezuela are deep-rooted since the time of Chavez, and it has continued to bolster the failing Venezuelan apparatus for clear geopolitical reasons. Vladimir Putin has invested strongly on  Russia’s international image and prestige, especially while rebuilding Russia post the Yeltsin years. The first credit line of arms relations between Russia and Venezuelawas signed in 2006. Although the export of military equipment to Venezuela have reduced drastically by nearly 96 per cent in the past few years, Venezuela has been the largest buyer of Russian arms in the Western Hemisphere with a total estimate of $4 billion during Chavez years. Russia has made consistent efforts to support Maduro by deploying military presence in Caracas even as Venezuela’s economy took a downturn.

    Chavez and Putin deepened their political ties on common grounds of  supporting a multipolar world order, and Chavez expected tangible benefits for Venezuela out of this agreement. Oil deals between both the countries advanced asRussia’s largest crude oil producer, Rosneft, partnered with PdVSA for several projects. Rosneft holds 40 percent shares and plays an instrumental role in pivoting Russia’s foreign policy through sound investments in the West. Venezuela agreed to commit 49.9 percent of its share in Citgo, American subsidiary company in exchange for credit from Rosneft. Russian emphasis on the “strategic” importance of the alliance with Venezuela reveals Russia’s intention to strengthen its geopolitical presence in USA’s backyard. Putin’s domestic political image has become sharper with his strategic take on Venezuela.

    However, sanctions on Venezuela has severely restricted the ability of Rosneft to borrow or invest, thus escalating tensions between Russia and the US.  Much like in Syria, Putin has sent a strong signal to the US by deploying a small contingent of Russian military personnel in Venezuela.

    Pawn on the Chessboard of Great Power Politics

    Venezuela has become the strategic battlegroundfor geopolitical struggle between the USA, Russia, and China. Collapse of the Venezuelan economy does not augur well for China in the long-term. However, China will look to strengthen its ties with Venezuela through economic support as its energy needs have a critical link with Venezuela. USA’s ‘Manroe Doctrine’ and its ‘Roosevelt Corollary’  has fiercely opposed any external powers’ strategic presence in the Western Hemisphere. This policy has led the USA to be an interventionist in Latin American countriessince the 1960s. Not much has changed since then. Chavez’s Venezuela has been a major opponent of US hegemony  Putin’s Russia is looking to strengthen its presence in South America, and support to Venezuela forms the lynchpin of this strategy. While international community looks for peaceful resolution of the rapidly deteriorating situation in Venezuela, geopolitical competition of external players has ensured  power tussle continues in Venezuela. Political Victory of either Maduro or opposition would represent the triumph of their Global supporters, Russia or the USA.  The socialist seed sown by Hugo Chavez is haunting Venezuela with a dented economy and a crisis in leadership. The “Petrostate” desperately needs economic reforms and international support to rebuild its economy. Structural reforms to remove the bottlenecks of growth in the post-crisis period and opportune investments in potential areas would rescue Venezuela in the following years.

    Manjari Balu is a Research Analyst at ‘The Peninsula Foundation’.

    Air Marshal M Matheswaran (retd) is the President of TPF.

    Image Credit: BBC News

  • Will Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections End the Deadlock?

    Will Venezuelan Parliamentary Elections End the Deadlock?

    Andrei Korobkov                                                                                   March 05, 2019/Analysis

    The crisis in Venezuela grows more complex with each passing day. At first, President Nicolas Maduro declared that he was willing to consider the possibility of early parliamentary elections. But it is clear that this proposal is absolutely unacceptable for the opposition, which already wields a majority in the legislature and has the US firmly behind it. The opposition is urging the President to resign and takes a dim view of an early presidential election, no matter how rapidly it can be organized. The “interim president” appointed by parliament, Juan Guaido, is counting on the West’s financial and political support. He is feeling increasingly confident now that the US has frozen Venezuela’s government bank accounts and announced that the pretender president would be given control of them. This means that the government will immediately lose $7 billion deposited in US banks and another $11 billion in expected revenues from 2019 oil sales. Given that, Guaido, dizzy as he is with what he sees as his success, is unlikely to be willing to agree to serious talks or compromises, although he can suggest holding simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections. Maduro, for his part, is not going to surrender and has already issued a warning that the growing confrontation and the mounting Western interference in his country’s internal affairs could lead to a civil war.

    There are a number of reasons why the current crisis in Venezuela is of such great interest and may have far-reaching political consequences. The US has always regarded Latin America as its backyard where it is free to lay down the law and punish disobedient. The 1823 Monroe Doctrine, in effect, introduced a “limited sovereignty” model that became increasingly pertinent during the Cold War.

     The United States has made huge investments in Latin American economies; Latin elites have been educated in the US for generations; the Americans have trained Latin militaries and supplied them with arms for centuries. The region is highly dependent on the US technologically. Besides, Venezuela is one of America’s main oil suppliers. The Americans are exasperated not only by the demonstrative independence of Venezuelan foreign policy but also by the 20 years of leftist reforms under the Chavez and Maduro governments. The same is true of the increasingly noticeable political, economic and military presence of Russia and China in the country. Of no small importance, too, is Venezuela’s good relationship with Cuba.After the Cold War, the Americans initially decided to at least formally follow the rules and refrain from toppling democratically elected governments in the region. Instead they used other, more flexible methods to influence the situation in individual Latin American countries. The exceptions were the abortive coup attempts in Honduras in 2009 and Venezuela (against Chavez) in 2002. From this point of view, the attempt to displace Maduro is relatively out of step with the new US policy in the region and may signal yet another revision of regional strategy.

    One more specific feature of the current situation in Venezuela is that the US line consists of an eclectic array of approaches that the US has used in a number of Latin American countries over the last 60 years. The contras’ failed landing in the Bay of Pigs in 1961 is one notorious example. A more obscure aspect of the story is how the CIA thought about the operation. After all, no one expected that the team in question would be able to launch a large-scale operation and fight Fidel Castro’s government. The plan was for them to dig in on a limited territory, proclaim an alternative government that would be immediately recognized by Washington, and request US troops be sent in to “support the legitimate government.” The gambit was a scandalous failure, but the “alternative government” idea is still alive and being used in Caracas in the form of a constitutional coup.

    Another precedent was set in Chile in 1973. Older people remember well the TV footage of well-fed and clearly not overworked housewives banging pots and pans at protests in Santiago and shouting that they were starving. The same tactics are being used today. The US has introduced economic sanctions and is intentionally destabilizing the economic situation in a country that has already been weakened by the government’s experiments with “Bolivarian socialism” to accuse Maduro of being an ineffective leader and to arouse popular disaffection. (But even today, Maduro’s opponents are failing to turn the lower strata that form the majority in that developing country against him: these people remember that it was Chavez and Maduro after him who gave them access to education and healthcare and enabled them to enjoy far better living standards).

    A third model still in the works is based on the 1989 Panama operation. If the first two options don’t work, outbursts of violence will be provoked through assassination attempts against opposition leaders or assaults on US nationals. This would lay the groundwork for a US invasion under the pretext of restoring law and order and guaranteeing the safety of US citizens.

    The first two models have been tested in Venezuela, without much success. The question is whether the third option will be attempted. This also raises two more interesting questions. Latin American coups usually become possible if military leaders turn on the government, but in Venezuela they continue to support Maduro. Moreover, it was the military who saved Hugo Chavez in 2002 and thwarted the coup masterminded from outside the country. The question is whether this support endures and whether the US succeeds in offering military leaders enough “carrots” for them to change their outlook.

    The second question concerns the US president. Donald Trump took over two years ago with his coterie of right-wing political reformers determined to fundamentally alter both America’s domestic and foreign policy. In the foreign policy arena, this new approach was based on renouncing interventionism, shifting emphasis towards domestic growth, acknowledging that the center of the world system was migrating from the northern Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific, and recognizing China as the major geopolitical threat to the United States. The last point implies that the US must create a new system aimed at containing China, which, in turn, requires better relations with Russia as a counterweight to China, the start of tariff wars against the PRC, and the destabilization of the WTO and the free trade system as a whole, which allegedly are more beneficial for China than for the United States. But, seen by the US elite (and not without reason) as a systemic threat, Trump is under continuous attack and unable to implement many of these ideas (with the greatest obstacles put in the way of his attempts to improve US-Russia relations). Gradually, the majority of the right-wing reformers left his administration (the biggest loss was the departure of Steve Bannon and Sebastian Gorka) to be replaced by traditional neocons and interventionists like John Bolton, the current national security advisor.

    Along with the loss of Republican control of the House of Representatives in November 2018, the approach of the presidential primaries, growing stock market volatility, relatively low presidential approval ratings, and unending attacks on Trump from the political establishment and the “elite” press, this is strengthening the hand of those who are urging the president to stage a “small victorious war” of his own. After all, Trump is still the only US president in two generations who has not yet launched a single new military intervention. Meanwhile, Trump himself is between a rock and a hard place, as he is being pressured by both the traditional US right, who dream of the US flexing its military might and toppling the disobedient regime, and the Democrats, who hope to force the president to break his election promises, mire him in a protracted military conflict and thus discredit and politically weaken him ahead of his re-election campaign.

    The current situation has yet another, broader international dimension. The international community is divided over Venezuela. The United States is supported by Canada, Brazil, and many European and Latin American countries. But that is a far cry from unity. Many right-wing governments in Europe, including Italy, whose government is very close to Trump ideologically, have been skeptical of attempts to give Venezuela away to a different suitor.

    An even more important factor is that the new leftist president of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, is well aware of the possibility that Mexico will be the next target, if a constitutional coup is allowed to happen in Venezuela. Moreover, opposing Trump is a win-win for any Mexican politician amid the growing US-Mexican friction over immigration, tariffs, and much else. President Erdogan in Turkey is thinking along the same lines.

    Most important, of course, is the stance taken by Russia and China. Both have actively cooperated with Venezuela in recent years, with Chinese investment in the Venezuelan economy exceeding Russia’s by almost 400 percent. Nevertheless, China is very cautious about its moves, as it is currently under pressure from the US and unwilling to furnish Trump with another pretext to accuse it of growing expansionism.

    This is why the initiative in supporting President Maduro will most likely remain in Russian hands. Though inferior to China in terms of investment, Russia is the main arms supplier to Venezuela (with sales totaling $12 billion). Russia has also invested heavily in Venezuela’s oil industry and a number of other sectors.Thus, the current situation includes many unknowns linked to actors’ moves both in Venezuela and the United States, as well as Russia, China and a number of other countries. As such, both the course of the conflict and its outcome can be of global importance, influencing, among other things, the prospect of whether the US reverts to its traditional imperial interventionism or opts for a somewhat different policy.

    The course of this crisis and its outcome may also have serious impact on the domestic political situation in the United States. The potential for a “controlled crisis” looms large in this situation, because the chances of a political provocation aimed at drawing the Trump administration into a military conflict are sufficiently high. Therefore, the dynamics of the Venezuelan drama may decide the fate of both Maduro and Trump himself in the long run.

    Dr Andrei Korobkov is Professor of Political Science at the Middle Tennessee State University, and is Non-Resident Visiting Distinguished Fellow at TPF. This article is the English translation of the original published earlier in Valdai Discussion Club.

    The views expressed are the author’s own.

  • The San Juan Incident

    The San Juan Incident

    K N Sushil   December 08, 2017

    The ARA San Juan disappeared a few hundred kilometers off Argentina’s coast on November 15, and despite an extensive air and sea search no sign of the sub has been found. Eight days after the sub vanished, the Vienna-based Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty Organisation said that it had detected hydro-acoustic anomaly” about 30 nautical miles (60km) north of the sub’s last-known position at 10:31 (13:31 GMT) few hours after the sub’s last contact. The analysis of the acoustic incident was reported as follows.

    The acoustic signal associated with the loss of the Argentina Submarine ARA SANJUAN confirms the following:

    That acoustic signal originated near 46-10S, 59-42W at 1358Z (GMT) on 15 November 2017. It was produced by the collapse (implosion) of the ARA SAN JUAN pressure-hull at a depth of 1275-feet. Sea pressure at the collapse depth was 570 PSI. The frequency of the collapse event signal (bubble-pulse) was about 4.4Hz. The energy released by the collapse was equal to the explosion of 12,500 pounds of TNT at the depth of 1275-feet. That energy was produced by the nearly instantaneous conversion of potential energy (sea-pressure) to kinetic energy, the motion of the intruding water-ram which entered the SAN JUAN pressure-hull at a speed of about 1800 mph.
    The entire pressure-hull was completely destroyed (fragmented/compacted) in about 40 milliseconds (0.040s or 1/25th of a second), the duration of the compression phase of the collapse event which is half the minimum time required for cognitive recognition of an event. Although the crew may have known collapse was imminent, they never knew it was occurring. They did not drown or experience pain. Death was instantaneous.
    The SAN JUAN wreckage sank vertically at an estimated speed between 10 and 13 knots. Bottom impact would not have produced an acoustic event detectable at long range

    The ARA San Juan was an IKL(German) designed type 1700 submarine built by TKMS in their Essen yard in 1985 at about the same time the Indian type 1500 was being built at HDW(Kiel). Both the submarines have great deal of similarities. Therefore, having commanded two type 1500s I will venture to hazard a guess on what could have afflicted the submarine.

    Facts as gleaned from various reports.

    15 Nov 0030Hrs. Submarine surfaced to report Water ingress through snort system causing a short circuit in the forward battery group. The forward battery group was isolated. The submarine charged her batteries on surface

    At 0600 The message is transmitted through normal communication channels.

    At 0730 the Captain informs base that he intend to continue his passage dived (Presumably because the sea was rough) At 1031, according to the CTBT report the submarine imploded at a depth of 1275 ft.

    From the above it would appear that the submarine was snorting before she surfaced at 0030hrs. If there was water ingress through the snort mast that caused a short in the forward battery group then the submarine was unable to maintain snorting depth, because the sea may have been too rough and the “head valve” (that prevents water from coming into the mast, when the mast dips even momentarily) was not functioning. As part of the SOP the snort induction drain, which drains into the bilges is kept open for the duration of the snort.  In any case during the snorting, the diesel engines are used to create the suction that draws all the foul air from all over the submarine. The fresh air coming from the snort mast merely spreads to fill the vacuum. Therefore flooding through the snort system would normally have no effect on the battery groups.

    The submarine remained on surface for seven hours post an incident of fire and smoke, which was attributed to short circuiting of the forward battery group. The crew, it seems, did not see any fire but managed to clear the smoke after isolating the forward battery group.

    A fire in a battery group is one of the most dreaded emergencies on board any submarine. Therefore the damage control actions and subsequent analysis would have been painstakingly thorough. If there was a fire in the battery pits the firefighting system would have been activated (manually or automatically). Once the system is activated the battery pits are to be kept in a sealed condition for at least one hour. Thereafter the pit is ventilated for at least an hour before inspecting it. In these types of submarines one has to lie down on a trolley and manoeuvre manually over the batteries. If the sea is rough it becomes extremely difficult and dangerous.  It may therefore be possible that they may have dispensed with the inspection whilst on surface.

    In the seven hours on surface the crew must have thoroughly examined the power distribution network and come to the conclusion that the problem was contained, and the submarine was reasonably safe to continue dived with a single battery group. They may even have considered that it would be safer and easier to inspect the battery pit while the submarine is underwater.

    The submarine dived at 0730 hrs. After 3 hours it appears to have imploded at a depth of 388 Meters. 388 Meters is of course below the normal operating depth but well above the crushing depth. If the submarine did indeed implode at that depth the inescapable inference is that there were severe structural problems that had weakened the pressure hull. The Argentinean Navy must have known if any structural limitations were reported or imposed.

    If the structural problems were not severe enough then some event that occurred in the 3 hours she was submerged must have been responsible. That event was so catastrophic that the submarine was unable to prevent an uncontrolled descent. Given the background situation the captain would have ordered the submarine to dive to 50 Meters. As soon as he settled down to that depth, he would have ordered the inspection of the battery pit. Unless there are clear tell tale signs, it is possible to miss some things which may have the potential to cause damage. Anyhow the inference and action post this inspection is not known. Did they reconnect the forward group? We will never know. The inspection would have taken about 45 minutes to an hour. The fact that they did not surface immediately after the inspection indicates that they did not notice anything alarming.

    In the three hours that the submarine was under water, if there had been a gradual flooding, the crew would have taken action to mitigate the effects, and would have ample reaction time to surface. Therefore loss of control must have been triggered by a sudden event. A pressure hull breech and flooding that must have cause to rapidly lose depth. The most immediate response is to use speed to create dynamic vectors to aid depth control. Since the submarine had only one battery group connected the speed of the submarine would be restricted to about 8 Knots ahead and about 4 Knots astern.  This would not be sufficient to delay the descent so that de-ballasting and pumping out capacities can effectively annul or reduce the rate of flooding. The rate of flooding keeps on increasing with depth.

    Now we have a situation where the submarine with the forward (or all) ballast tank probably blown going down. At depths greater than 180 meters the effect of blowing ballast with High Pressure air (250Bar)is painstakingly slow. The next stage is when the submarine crosses 15 meters more than the operational depth the Hydrazine emergency de-ballasting system will be triggered. This system is designed to clear the forward and aft main ballast tanks in 12 seconds at any depth. The problem would be if the Ballast tanks already contain air the Hydrazine will cause an explosion in the ballast tanks. If that happens there is nothing left to create positive buoyancy.

    The Next question is why did the submarine implode at 388 meters? As brought out earlier it clearly points to structural weakness in the pressure. If such a situation did not pre-exist then it may be possible that the battery pit event may have cause massive spillage of acid into the pit causing the pit to corrode in the almost 10 hours this corrosion may have weakened the hull sufficiently to cause a substantial breech in the pressure hull. The flooding of the pits could an explosion as the water level reaches to short the terminal connectors.  This is only a conjecture.

    San Juan went down without a trace. The crew did not even have the time or opportunity to release the systems and tell tale indicators that were meant tell the outside world that the submarine is in distress.

    It is said what goes up must come down. Submariners know that what goes down need not necessarily come up. San Juan RIP.

    In the language of the submarine community San Juan is on eternal patrol.

    Vice Admiral K N Sushil (retd) is a Indian Navy Veteran, and the former Flag Officer commanding-in-Chief of Southern Naval Command.[/vc_column_text][/vc_column][/vc_row]