The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Regions

  • Xi’s third term, the 20th Party Congress and Implications for India

    Xi’s third term, the 20th Party Congress and Implications for India

    The historic 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded on October 23rd. The week-long extravagant event – beginning on October 16th – has brought new faces of the Chinese political elite to the forefront along with a few surprises. Xi’s report before the 20th National Party Congress (NPC) at the opening ceremony and his appointments to the highest posts in the country are very telling of what his third term could look like for the world. Most importantly, the implications for India cannot be clearer – politically, economically, diplomatically, and militarily. India will need to acquaint herself with these new appointments and developments and come up with a strategy to level the playing field.

    What the report says and implies

    Xi’s report to the 20th NPC was in stark contrast to the report delivered in 2017 to the 19th NPC. In 2017, Xi was triumphant of all that China had achieved and hoped to achieve in the future – particularly on the economic front and of its growing international influence. He was proud of China’s assertive foreign policy and soft power. That sentiment has not necessarily changed in the 20th NPC report. However, Xi’s report did strike a sombre tone, predicting a tough future for China – “…strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges are concurrent and uncertainties and unforeseen factors are rising. Various “black swan” and “grey rhino” events may occur at any time.” His speech and report come across as a rallying call meant to safeguard the primacy and authority of the CPC and their way of life against external interference.

    “China’s overall development objectives for the year 2035 are as follows: Significantly increase economic strength, scientific and technological capabilities, and composite national strength; substantially grow the per capita GDP to be on par with that of a mid-level developed country”.              – Xi Jinping in his address to the 20th Party Congress.

    The importance of “national security” (mentioned 81 times) and China’s external and regional challenges is given highest priority and significance. Other key phrases that find frequent mention in the report are “military”, “strategic/strategy” and “risks”. There is a concerted focus on military modernisation and ramping R&D. Simultaneously, Xi is also realistic of the economic challenges ahead of China – “…many bottlenecks hindering high-quality development, and China’s capacity for scientific and technological innovation is not yet strong enough. Many major issues need to be resolved in order to guard against financial risks and ensure that food, energy, and industrial and supply chains are secure and reliable.” Interestingly, China’s economy was not in the spotlight. There was a glaring omission of the development of and plans for the BRI; mentioned only twice in the entire report. Predictably, there was no change in China’s policy towards Taiwan except a veiled threat directed at the US for its interference in its neighbourhood. It appears that Xi’s plans for his third term are to focus on China’s security and strategic challenges through assertive diplomacy.

    Xi stacks the deck in his favour

    Xi Jinping’s appointment as General Party Secretary of the CPC for a third term was the least surprising outcome from the 20th NPC; owing to constitutional amendments made in his previous term i.e., the removal of the constraint of a term limit. He also retains his position as Chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission (CMC). His appointments to the state’s top bodies have broken with the CPC’s age norm of ‘7-up, 8-down’; officials eligible to serve another term at 67 years have been given the boot while people like Zhang Youxia (VC of the CMC), at 72 years, has been given another term when he should ideally have been retired.

    The reshuffling of the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) appears to have only one important criterion – loyalty to Xi Jinping. The move is also an indication of the concentration of power that now rests with Xi and his men. With the introduction of the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards”, Xi elevated himself to be on par with Mao Zedong and above Deng Xiaoping, Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Indeed, the inclusion of Xi Jinping’s Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the Party Constitution along with the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” has cemented Xi Jinping as the core of the CPC. His appointments to the PBSC reflect this. Premier Li Keqiang, widely believed to be a dissenter and protégé of former President Hu Jintao was dropped. Hu Chunhua, slated for a position in the PBSC and considered for the premiership was unable to secure a position in the 7-member powerful body and was even dropped from the Politburo. Other members to be removed were Wang Yang, Han Zheng and Li Zhangshu. Both Wang Yang and Han Zheng were closely linked to Li Keqiang and former President Jiang Zemin respectively. The new members of PBSC are Li Qiang, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang and Li Xi. Zhao Leji and ideology tsar Wang Huning were the only members to retain their seats; having closely aligned themselves with Xi Jinping in the period between the 19thNPC and 20th NPC. The composition of the 20th PBSC indicates Xi’s success in removing all factional opposition present within the Party. All the members who were left off the PBSC were a part of the Communist Youth League and rose within its ranks to become powerful men. Their removal, along with Hu Jintao being escorted out during the 20th National Congress is both a signal to Xi’s loyalists and opposition.

    Similarly, the selection of people into the 24-member Politburo and Central Committee are all Xi loyalists and will have a direct impact on China’s domestic and foreign policies going forward. Xi’s prioritisation of security and S&T is reflected in some of the new appointments to the Politburo – Chen Wenqing (an intelligence officer and former minister of the Ministry of State Security), engineers with specialisation in aerospace Ma Xingrui and Yuan Jiajin, Li Ganjie (nuclear engineering), Zhang Youxia (VC of the CMC), Hei Weidong (VC of the CMC and Commander of CMC’s Joint Command Center), Chen Jining (environmental sciences), and Yin Li (public health expert). Notably, both the PBSC and Politburo have no women participation.

    The backgrounds of the appointees to these bodies are also an indicator of the growing premium Xi is placing on technocrats. Beyond party and political loyalty, they are expected to fall in line with his policy agenda and thus, have backgrounds in aerospace, technology, finance, economics, engineering, and advanced manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors. 

    The backgrounds of the appointees to these bodies are also an indicator of the growing premium Xi is placing on technocrats. Beyond party and political loyalty, they are expected to fall in line with his policy agenda and thus, have backgrounds in aerospace, technology, finance, economics, engineering, and advanced manufacturing in sectors like semiconductors. The number of officials with backgrounds in S&T in the Central Committee is at par with Jiang Zemin’s first term in 1992. According to a study by the Brookings Institution, 81 seats in the 20th Central Committee – around 40% – are occupied by Chinese officials with technical expertise. The belief that technocrats generally lack political factions, prefer working in silos and are solution-oriented also works in Xi’s favour.

     

    A stronger and more loyal CMC

    The new CMC appointees stand out for several reasons. For one, Xi has broken with the established retired norms by placing Army veteran Zhang Youxia as VC of the CMC. Further, the placement of He Weidong as the second VC of the CMC is unusual since he has essentially jumped two grades without serving as either a member of the CMC or Central Committee of the CPC. Second, Xi appears to have rewarded those that he has personal and familial connections with.

    Zhang Youxia’s father, Zhang Zongxun was a founding member of the PLA and served with Xi’s father, Xi Zongxun in the 1940s. General Zhang’s decorated career, combat experience (Sino-Vietnamese war in the 1980s) and position as head of the Equipment Development Department of the CMC make him one of Xi’s most trusted allies in the PLA. On the other hand, General He Weidong’s catapult to second VC is significant given his operational experience with both the Western Theatre Command (WTC) and Eastern Theatre Command (ETC) ground forces. Reportedly, both Xi and He are also close friends owing to the time they both spent in Fujian province and Zhejiang province during Xi’s days working in the provincial government.

    The other new appointment with operational and combat experience is General Liu Zhenli. He takes over as Chief of the Joint Staff Committee of the CMC and was previously Chief of Staff and Commander of the PLA Army and Chief of Staff of the PAP. His experience in the Sino-Vietnam border skirmishes in the 1980s as well as his stint with the PAP makes him an important addition to the CMC.

    Finally, General Li Shangfu’s (potentially Minister of National Defense) elevation to the CMC is notable in that it signals a close linkage between the aerospace domain and the military. Li is a technocrat and is widely regarded as the man behind China’s manned and unmanned space program. His time as Deputy Commander of the PLA Strategic Support Force and his current appointment as Director of the Equipment Development Department reflects Xi’s aim of achieving the centenary goal of the PLA Army and modernising its military and national defence.

    The other two members to retain their position in the CMC are Admiral Miao Hua and General Zhang Shengmin. They both rose through the ranks in the Political Work Department as political commissars. Admiral Miao will continue to head the Political Work Department. He is also a close ally of Xi from when they both served in the Fujian province in the 1990s and 2002. No doubt his work as a political commissar in the PLA Navy makes him a strong candidate for a second term in the CMC. Similarly, General Zhang continues to head the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection as he serves in the PLA Rocket Force. His appointment is particularly significant given the fact that he replaced Du Jincai who was being investigated with then VC’s Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou on corruption. Zhang Shengmin’s retainment signals, one, Xi’s trust in him and two, that his anti-corruption campaign is far from over.

    Other appointments such as Airforce General Xu Qilang and PLA Generals Wei Fenghe and Li Zuocheng to the State Commission indicate an overwhelming prioritisation of the WTC and ETC, meaning India and Taiwan – China’s two biggest security challenges. The appointment of several serving chiefs of the ground forces will have far-reaching implications for the LAC and India’s national security.

    The combination of technocrats and veterans in the CMC is a nod towards Xi’s vision for the Chinese military – “…continue integrated development of the military through mechanization, informatization, and the application of smart technologies and work faster to modernize military theory, organizational forms, personnel, and weaponry and equipment. We will enhance the military’s strategic capabilities for defending China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests…”.

    However, the success of these appointments remains to be seen given the relatively limited operational experience some of the members have.

     What do we make of China’s economy?

    The “common prosperity for all” is another major tenet at the heart of China’s domestic economic policy. Whilst outlining all the strides the CPC has made in the last five years to the 20th NPC, Xi is also aware of the economic challenges China faces – the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, the rise of unilateralism and protectionism, a sluggish global economy and regional conflicts and disturbances. To combat these challenges, China is pursuing the “dual circulation” strategy and “high-quality development”. Notably, these two mechanisms have made their way to the Party Constitution. The dual circulation strategy is aimed at improving domestic demand, building secure and resilient supply chains, and reducing China’s dependency on foreign trade for its economic growth.

    China is pursuing the “dual circulation” strategy and “high-quality development”. Notably, these two mechanisms have made their way to the Party Constitution. The dual circulation strategy is aimed at improving domestic demand, building secure and resilient supply chains, and reducing China’s dependency on foreign trade for its economic growth.

    Along with a faster recovery of its industrial production equipment manufacturing and high-tech manufacturing, China’s GDP grew by 3.9% in the third quarter. However, this does not take away from the fact that, presently, China’s exports have diminished. The strict zero-covid policy that China continues to enforce is severely impacting its industries. The recent US Chips Act and export controls targeted at China are affecting foreign enterprises in the country as well as its tech industry.

    Further, the absence of market-reform oriented economists like Premier Le Keqiang, Vice Premier Liu He, head of the Central Bank Yi Gang, financial regulator Guo Shuqing and Finance Minister Liu Kun from the PBSC and Politburo will surely be felt. Li Qiang, the potential candidate for the Premiership does not have an economic background and it is likely that most of the heavy lifting will fall to He Lifeng (tapped for Vice Premier) in the Politburo. He is a supporter of Xi’s “self-reliance” policies and economic nationalism. He will have big shoes to fill as Liu He, the outgoing Vice Premier, had a powerful portfolio that included economic policy and the financial sector. The Harvard-trained economist was also Xi’s go-to man for trade negotiations with Washington.

    India’s continued economic growth is evidence contrary to what China dictates. Even as China seeks membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and uses the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), there are signs of decoupling with the Chinese economy emerging. Already, the US-imposed export controls are impacting China’s production and manufacturing. While China proposes a more “secure” and inward-looking economic policy, achieving this goal will take a long time. This is an opportunity for India to exploit. India becoming the next manufacturing hub for the world will challenge China’s position in Asia and thus, presents an obstacle for the latter.

    China’s wolf-warrior diplomacy to continue

    With Yang Jiechi’s retirement, the position of head of China’s Central Foreign Affairs Commission is set to move to Wang Yi, another seasoned career diplomat. His appointment to the Politburo, at 69 years of age, is yet another display of Xi’s disregard for the Party age norms. But it also indicates that Xi looks to Wang’s expertise as China enters its most challenging period of international engagements. Wang has been the face of China’s foreign policy for quite some time and is another ‘wolf-warrior diplomat’. His appointment signals the continuity of the wolf-warrior diplomacy that China practices. With Wang Yi at the helm, it is expected that Qin Gang, the current ambassador to the US, will become the next Foreign Minister. The other potential appointee to the position is Liu Haixing who is a career diplomat specialising in European affairs and served multiple postings in China’s embassy in France. He is also the Deputy Director of the Office of the National Security Commission (NSC). Other diplomats on the roster are Liu Jianchao and Qi Yu. Liu Jianchao was recently made Director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCID) this June and it is unlikely to change so soon. He also previously served at the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission (FAC). Qi Yu, serving as Party Secretary of the Foreign Ministry has no diplomatic experience.

    The choice between Liu Haixing and Qin Gang will also dictate the future direction of China’s foreign policy. The choice of diplomats to the Central Committee also indicates the importance Xi places on public relations. China’s need to sway public opinion, both domestically and internationally, is reflected in the choice of Liu Jianchao and Qin Gang. Both have ample experience serving as spokespersons for the Party and the PRC respectively. Further, Liu Jianchao’s and Liu Haixing’s elevation to the Central Committee also indicates the importance of serving in Party Commissions. Their time at the FAC and NSC, respectively, within the last five years has earned them a fast-tracked promotion to the Central Committee. The path to the top is even closer for Liu Haixing given the fact that his senior, Cai Qi who served in the NSC, now sits in the PBSC.

    The road ahead for India

    The appointments to the PBSC, Politburo and CMC are a reflection of China’s assertiveness on the international stage. The military appointees are of particular importance to India. The overwhelming emphasis on ground forces and service chiefs with experience in the WTC could mean more skirmishes along the LAC and a concerted focus towards engaging in hybrid warfare. The LAC is a priority security concern for India as well and the nationalistic fervour that Xi exemplified in his speech to the 20th NPC is no different from what Prime Minister Modi engages in. That said, India’s military forces must be prepared for an escalation along the LAC at any point in time.

    The Central Committee of 205 members, the majority of whom hold doctorates, includes 47 military leaders. This is reflective of China’s governance structure that is techno-military focused along with the necessary expertise in political, economic, and social domains.

    However, leaving aside the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the West, it is important for India to recognise the competence; educational qualifications, experience, and expertise; and the varied techno-military-politico composition of the Chinese leadership. CCP’s Central Committee consists of 205 full committee members from which are chosen the top leadership forming the Politburo of 24 members inclusive of the apex standing committee of seven members and the Central Military Commission of seven members. All 205 members are highly qualified in various disciplines such as economics, education, politics, philosophy, sciences, engineering, medicine, aerospace, nuclear, space, telecommunications, sociology, history, management, international relations, law, jurisprudence, geopolitics etc. The majority hold doctorates in their chosen fields. Xi Jinping holds a degree in Chemical Engineering and a doctorate in Marxian philosophy and Political Science. In addition, the leadership has a significant presence of military leadership, both serving and veterans that includes 27 Generals and 17 Lieutenant Generals out of the 205 members.

    China’s economic downturn and security-oriented economic policy that Xi has propounded is an opportunity for India to become the next manufacturing hub in Asia. However, India must remain cautious of what competition with China could look like for the neighbourhood.

    The changes to the diplomatic cadre in the 20th NPC do not take away from the fact that India’s standing and position are stronger and more sure-footed than it has ever been. Our diplomacy in the face of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war showcases that. India’s strategic autonomy, respect for international law and norms and growing strategic partnerships with the Indo-Pacific countries are an advantage to her engagement with Beijing.

    Feature Image Credit: orcasia.org

  • Hegemonic Regionalism (Indo-Pacific concept): As opposed to locally based Regional Cooperation (ASEAN and Bay of Bengal)

    Hegemonic Regionalism (Indo-Pacific concept): As opposed to locally based Regional Cooperation (ASEAN and Bay of Bengal)

    The late embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept by the United States further supports the position that it is being employed as a strategic instrument to counter a rising power and a potential challenger to its global quasi-hegemonic power position.

    Based on a consideration of capabilities, the United States is currently the only country that can be described as a potential global hegemon. Certainly, there are a number of other countries that have the potential, based on their capabilities, of being candidates to become regional hegemons. Notably, China is among them, but Japan, India, and Brazil are also potential candidates, though their individual capacities vary widely and one could argue, based on capacities, that China takes the lead among them. With the implication that China becomes the main target of the de facto global hegemon, the other potential contenders must be kept in sight, as well. While most recent academic and non-academic discussions about global power transfer are focusing on rising countries, on potential challengers to the existing global hegemon, China in particular, a focus on how the existing quasi-global hegemon, the United States, is reacting to challenges to its dominance, to preserve its leading position and influence, seems almost completely missing. This lack of emphasis constitutes a rather critical issue, because when we focus on global or regional power competition, what should be of interest to analysts is not only the behaviour and strategy of a rising county, i.e., a potential challenger to an existing hegemon, but also to analyse the response of the existing hegemon, as well. After all, when it comes to issues of global and regional stability, the actions of both the existing hegemon and the potential challenger must be taken into account.

    There is no doubt that an existing hegemon does not just ‘sit back’ and watch when its influence is challenged by a new contender for power. Even a declining hegemon will try to challenge a rising power contender, consequently, the potential for instability within the international system arises not only from a rising power but also from the actions of the country which possesses a quasi-hegemonic position, trying to defend its power position. In one of his earlier and most influential works, Mearsheimer (2001) points out that great powers always aim to maximise their share of power and are in constant competition with other power contenders, with the aim of maximising their own power. Therefore, the rise of a new competitor occurs in a dynamic context between the established and the rising hegemon. Ikenberry (2014) points out that, as the overwhelmingly global power once concentrated within the United States dispersed with the arrival of new power challengers in different parts of the world, new struggles over global rules and institutions are emerging. At the very least, as emphasised by Mearsheimer (2013), great powers do not trust one another, as they worry about other countries’ capabilities and intentions.

    Not without reason, Mearsheimer (2013) argues that the United States did not and does not tolerate peer competitors, adding that the United States has demonstrated this clearly during the twentieth century.

    For these reasons, we cannot expect that a hegemon will stay inactive when watching the rise of potential challengers. An established great power, holding an almost global hegemonic position as the United States does, has the capacity to respond to the challenges arising from power contenders, and there are clear indications, past and present, that it will act to preserve its dominant power position, even within an international system that has become more multilateral in comparison with the Cold War period. Not without reason, Mearsheimer (2013) argues that the United States did not and does not tolerate peer competitors, adding that the United States has demonstrated this clearly during the twentieth century. One just has to remember that in the late 1980s, when Japan was close to economically overtaking the United States. at the global level, various United States administrations actively worked against it, refusing Japan more decision-making rights within international organisations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, even though Japan had become a major donor to both organisations. Obviously, the previous Japanese challenge to the United States’ dominance was only economic. Neither will the United States allow other challengers to succeed in undermining its dominant position, even in distant regional settings. Mearsheimer (2001) reminds us that the dominant power will act at the regional level to ensure that no challenge to its own global position will take place, since the crucial task is to block potential peer competitors, even within distant regional settings.

    When evaluating the influence of a hegemon it is worth remembering that this goes beyond a focus on military capabilities, even though such capabilities are essential, and include the hegemon’s ability to disguise its ambitions and interests by pretending that it provides global public goods, which in reality satisfy primarily its own interests. More importantly, as pointed out by Griffiths, O’Callaghan and Roach (2002), all hegemonic states enjoy ‘structural power’, which permits the hegemon to occupy a central position within its own system, as well as shape other states’ preferences. As emphasised by Kupchan (2014), a hegemon also strives to generate a normative and ideological dominance, in support of its power dominance. Indeed, Gilpin, in his seminal influential work on war and change, emphasises that a major power aims to create social structures to serve its hegemonic interests, consequently supporting its domineering position with rules, institutions, and organisational principles, supporting, indeed screening and protecting, its power position with normative dominance (Gilpin 1981).

    one can also reasonably assume that when a hegemonic country introduces a new geopolitical or regional concept of space, such as the Indo-Pacific framework, will be of foremost importance to its own strategy of dominance. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific framework signals the re-mapping of geopolitical space, with little, if any, historical relevance.

    By considering these arguments describing the behaviour of a typical hegemonic power, it is rather consistent to assume that a country, such as the United States, which holds a nearly global like hegemonic position, will use its position and capabilities to support its own power position in different regional settings so as to ward off any potential competitor. For this reason, one can also reasonably assume that when a hegemonic country introduces a new geopolitical or regional concept of space, such as the Indo-Pacific framework, will be of foremost importance to its own strategy of dominance. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific framework signals the re-mapping of geopolitical space, with little, if any, historical relevance. From a historical perspective, the Indian and Pacific Oceans have been perceived as separate maritime spaces. What marries them into one geopolitical space is an invented geopolitical strategy facilitating the strategic power interests of the existing hegemon. What is more, a hegemon or hegemon-like state will not introduce or favour a new geopolitical concept if it goes against its own strategic interests.

    Indeed, from a United States perspective, the Indo-Pacific strategy not only re-strengthens, at least from a hegemonic perspective, its role within the older geopolitical concept of Asia-Pacific, but now extends this influence, from a conceptual perspective, to include the Indian Ocean, as well. One can further argue that the adoption of the Indo-Pacific approach by the United States comes at a time when we can observe considerable changes in the power configuration within East Asia (which encompasses Northeast and Southeast Asia) and to a lesser extent within South Asia. Certain changes in the regional power configuration, namely the rise of China – not only as an economic but increasingly as a military and especially as a maritime power – generate considerable challenges from the perspective of hegemonic power competition. While the strategic challenge that China, as a rising power, generates to the United States quasi hegemonic position is so far limited to a regional challenge, instead of a global challenge, still, based on hegemony theory, the existing hegemon cannot allow such a challenge to take place.

    The late embracing of the Indo-Pacific concept by the United States further supports the position that it is being employed as a strategic instrument to counter a rising power and a potential challenger to its global quasi-hegemonic power position. We may remember that the origin of the Indo-Pacific concept is associated with the previous Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ concept. Shinzo Abe mentioned it as early as 2007 when addressing the Indian parliament and began frequently restating it from 2016 onwards. This was part of his intention that Japan should take a more active role in East Asia and beyond. As such, the Indo-Pacific concept was born out of the political-strategic considerations of a regional actor within East Asia. Only later, around 2018, did the United States become considerably interested in the concept, at a time when the potential challenges from rising countries increased – not only from China; one may also consider India’s rise in this context. In 2018, the United States administration even changed the name of its Pacific Command to United States Indo-Pacific Command to highlight its changing geopolitical perspective and to address the increasing regional challenges it faced from a rising China. Not without reason was the replacement of the previous Asia-Pacific concept with the Indo-Pacific concept aimed at integrating India, another rising power in Asia, more firmly with the hegemonic interests of the United States. In academic terms, one could argue that this may represent a strategy of accommodation, in which an existing hegemon accommodates a rising power by offering political and strategic space for that country. It is a strategy the United States followed previously with China until China started to become a too fundamental strategic challenge to the United States hierarchic position. One may wonder if this may also happen to India, once India becomes too powerful to be contained within a United States hegemonic project. However, for the time being, India seems to feel quite comfortable within the geopolitical space it has been offered by the existing quasi-global hegemon. As revealed by Paul T.V (2016) the strategy of accommodation is not only quite a challenging undertaking – as the hegemon has to offer political status, leadership responsibilities, and even a sphere of influence to a rising country – but in the long run the implications are that this will weaken, if not undermine, the hegemon’s own position, thus indicating the limitation of such a strategy. After all, a hegemon is rather unwilling to give up its dominant position voluntarily, though a strategy of accommodation may buy some time and allow it to employ a strategy of divide-and-rule by offering support to a potential weaker power contender when addressing the challenges of a more powerful contender. There can be no less doubt that the ongoing border conflicts between India and China and the emerging regional power competition between them facilitate India’s readiness to become increasingly enveloped in a stronger relationship with the United States which, by the way, contradicts India’s previous entrenched national strategy of non-alignment in global power politics. Consequently, drafting India into its power orbit enhances the United States’ strategic influence in regions where it is not even a resident power, like East, Southeast, or South Asia.

    There can be no less doubt that the ongoing border conflicts between India and China and the emerging regional power competition between them facilitate India’s readiness to become increasingly enveloped in a stronger relationship with the United States which, by the way, contradicts India’s previous entrenched national strategy of non-alignment in global power politics.

    Therefore, a hegemonic state will try to manipulate even distant regional settings in its favour, to arrest the rise of potential challengers to its dominant position, even by facilitating the introduction of a new geopolitical concept, like the Indo-Pacific, which ignores local perceptions of regional cooperation dynamics, the Bay of Bengal approach or ASEAN. While there are some claims that the Indo-Pacific approach does not represent a challenge to ASEAN, a position that is widely disputed, the more specific issue is that the Indo-Pacific approach does not contribute or offer support to those local-based regional cooperation processes from a conceptual perspective. Therefore, while one has to recognise that more recent regional cooperation processes within the Bay of Bengal are less dynamic for the time being, it does not mean that such a regional cooperation process is altogether missing. As stated by Amrith (2013), Asian economic connections led to renewed interest in the Bay of Bengal as a focus for regional cooperation. Indeed, BIMSTEC[1] which was established in 1997, does provide focus on regional cooperation.

    BIMSTEC creates political space for economic cooperation by addressing common challenges like underdevelopment. Consequently, offering a strategic vision for national development to its member countries, a focus fundamentally different from the geopolitical outlook of the Indo-Pacific regional hegemonic project, with its focus on military and especially maritime power distribution. Another crucial difference is that, while the Indo-Pacific strategy is a rather recent invention, regional recognition of the Bay of Bengal as a particular and unique geographic location for regional cooperation, particularly as a centre for trade and cultural migration, goes back centuries, if not millennia. As such, the Bay of Bengal commands a rich history as a historically recognised cultural and trade-inspired region. Yet, with geopolitical concepts based on hegemonic interests, such home-grown sources of regional cooperation are not recognised or supported only if they would fit the interests of the hegemon. It is evident that the Indo-Pacific concept, from a conceptual perspective, also ignores the ASEAN regional cooperation process. As such, the Indo-Pacific approach represents an artificial strategic overlay, not linked with local beads regional cooperation dynamics, even when a regional cooperation process is very well established, as is the case with ASEAN. With regard to the Indo-Pacific concept, ASEAN’s statement on the Indo-Pacific (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019) clearly indicates that the perception of the Indo-Pacific area is a contiguous geographic space is misleading and not appropriate, even though the two geopolitical spaces are geographically connected. Indeed, while the Bay of Bengal and the ASEAN regional cooperation favour regional cooperation characterised by horizontal relationships, facilitating the cooperation of countries within the region to address common challenges, the Indo-Pacific approach represent a vertical power arrangement, where a dominant power is projecting its influence onto the regional level.

    However, it should not come as too much of a surprise that a hegemon’s regional strategy, which primarily focuses on supporting its own power interests, has little to say about regional cooperation processes initiated by the people living in that region. Indeed, a global acting hegemon has only a limited interest in the empowerment of independent regional cooperation projects, since they could signal the creation of a more independent political sphere. As Mearsheimer (2013) asserts, based on its superior standing and its need to defend this position, a hegemon has always an inclination to interfere in and re-order the political outlook of even distant regions. We may take into consideration what Mearsheimer (2013) made earlier, that the United States will ensure that it will dominate the commanding heights in Asia. For all these reasons, the Indo-Pacific approach should be recognised as the newest geopolitical strategy supporting the United States’ hegemonic position in Asia.

    Bibliography

    Mearsheimer, John J (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001), W.W Norton & Company: New York

    Mearsheimer, John J (2013) Structural Realism. In: Dunne T, Kurki M., Smith S (eds) International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity, 3rd ed., Oxford University Press: Oxford. pp. 77-93

    Ikenberry, G. J. (2014) Introduction: power, order, and change in world politics. In: Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) Power, order, and change in world politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.1-16.

    Griffiths, M, O’Callaghan T, Roach S T (2002) International Relations: The Key Concepts 2nd; Martin Griffiths, Routledge

    Kupchan, C. A. (2014) Unpacking hegemony: the social foundations of hierarchical order. In: Ikenberry, G. J. (ed.) Power, order, and change in world politics. Cambridge, University Press Cambridge, pp. 19-60.

    Gilpin, R. (2010) War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

    Paul T.V. (2016) The accommodation of rising powers in world politics. In: Paul, T. V. (ed.) Accommodating rising powers past, present, and future. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 3 32.

    Amrith, S. S. (2013) Crossing the Bay of Bengal: The furies of nature and the fortunes of migrants By Sunil S. Amrith Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific 2019, available at: https://asean.org/asean-outlook-on-the-indo-pacific/

    Notes

    [1] BIMSTEC has seven members: Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka.

    Feature Image credit: War on the Rocks

  • Vietnam: Economic Prospects in Post Second Wave Covid-19

    Vietnam: Economic Prospects in Post Second Wave Covid-19

    The global community is into the ninth month of the COVID-19 pandemic and international efforts to develop a vaccine are at advanced stages.  Meanwhile in Russia over 250 Moscow residents received a dose of Sputnik V[i] and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has announced that the vaccine will be ready by November this year.[ii]Similarly, many American, British, European, and Indian companies are developing the vaccine which is at different levels of trials.  While the above progress is very encouraging, the global COVID-19 infections continue to rise and as on 13 October, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the total confirmed cases of COVID-19 were 37,601,848 people including 1,077,799 deaths.[iii] The top four countries with the highest infections were the US, India, Brazil and Russia.

    Vietnam’s COVID response since 23 January 2020, when the first case was detected, has been noteworthy. It successfully contained the spread of the virus by instituting local quarantine measures in early stages, declaring a state of emergency in February, and banning flights to and from China. For the next two months, Vietnam maintained strict COVID related measures including national lockdown and it was only in late April that some restrictions were removed in localities if they had contained the virus; but non-essential public services remained suspended. The opening up continued slowly with the resumption of flights to select destinations and cross-border travel restrictions were lifted. Meanwhile, Vietnam registered to buy a Russian Covid-19 vaccine as also developing vaccine on its own.

    In August, the second largest COVID-19 outbreak (after Danang) was reported in Quang Nam Province. The ‘second wave’ has now been successfully controlled.

    However, in July, Danang, a tourist hotspot, reported several new cases and a massive evacuation of nearly 80,000 tourists was undertaken. In August, the second largest COVID-19 outbreak (after Danang) was reported in Quang Nam Province. The ‘second wave’ has now been successfully controlled. As of 15 September, in Vietnam (total population 95,540,000) there were 1063 cases; 35 deaths; 261,004 tests had been conducted, and 11cases per million was recorded.[iv]

    Vietnam’s economic outlook in the ‘post-COVID Second Wave’ is a mixed bag of opportunities and challenges. There are at least four issues which merit attention. First, the Vietnamese economy, like any other global economies, suffered due to the pandemic. The 2020 first-half growth was about 1.8% compared with 7% in 2019 (year-on-year), but the Vietnamese economy has shown enormous resilience when compared with major global economies who have recorded negative growth. This is due to the proficient handling of the pandemic and the country is now on a quick and steady recovery path. The HSBC has revised Vietnam’s 2020 growth forecast from 1.6% to 3.0%.[v]

    It is also important to mention that the Vietnamese government has offered attractive incentives to multinational investors to help them “move up the value chain” and build supply chains in the country.

    Second, there are clear signs that Vietnam continues to be an attractive destination for foreign investments. This trend is not only due to global conglomerates moving out of China and seeking new destinations with attractive options for setting up of their businesses, but Vietnamese handing of the pandemic has provided them enormous business confidence in the country. According to the Ministry of Planning and Investment, total foreign investment in the first half was worth US$18.47 billion.[vi] Japanese (Panasonic), South Korean (LG Electronics), US (Foxconn; Apple) and the European (Heineken) companies moved to Vietnam. It is also important to mention that the Vietnamese government has offered attractive incentives to multinational investors to help them “move up the value chain” and build supply chains in the country.

    Third, is about renewable energy. Vietnam’s current energy generation mix is skewed towards coal (18,516 MW) and hydrocarbons (8,978 MW). Notwithstanding the COVID-19, the country’s average electricity consumption per day during the first few months of 2020 was 615 million KWh, an increase of 7.5 per cent compared with 2019.[vii] It is estimated that “Vietnam’s energy demand will increase by over 10 per cent by the end of 2020, followed by an eight per cent growth per year in 2021 to 2030.” The “government wants to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by eight per cent by 2030” for which investments in renewable sources of energy such as solar and wind would have to be made,

    Fourth, is about immersion in Industry 4.0 technologies. There are now clear trends of widespread digital transformation across the globe and is impacting every aspect of the industry from commercial operations, technology management, use in fintech to support banking and financial services, new business models through analytics, and human resource management.  These technologies can potentially boost productivity and improve Vietnam’s GDP. For that innovative national policies for growth are needed. Also, the human resource would require ‘up-skilling, reskilling and retooling’ to embrace these technologies.  The industry leaders too have to recognize the importance of educating themselves and using new technologies as also adopting innovative models for their operations.

    Vietnam should build upon its successes of handling the COVID-19 pandemic and ‘build back better’ by offering long-term stimulus for investments and accord high priority to zero-carbon technologies to spur inclusive and resilient growth.

    Finally, Vietnam should build upon its successes of handling the COVID-19 pandemic and ‘build back better’ by offering long-term stimulus for investments and accord high priority to zero-carbon technologies to spur inclusive and resilient growth. It must adopt strategies for investments in technologies, products and services as also create new jobs tailored for Industry 4.0.

     

    Notes

    [i] “Russia Covid-19 vaccine: Over 250 people in Moscow get inoculated, says report”, https://www.livemint.com/news/world/russia-covid-19-vaccine-over-250-people-in-moscow-get-inoculated-says-report-11600085464168.html  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [ii] “China coronavirus vaccine may be ready for public in November: Official”, https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/china-coronavirus-vaccine-may-be-ready-for-public-in-november-official/story-1DzVCBrdOwleJXxuw0wvyI.html  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [iii] “WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard”, https://covid19.who.int/?gclid=CjwKCAjwzIH7BRAbEiwAoDxxTlG5T6XZYiHVHBesW5cmAa9DKUytaVgH01haDH10TpmFA3OP-2s_phoCk9sQAvD_BwE  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [iv] “Southeast Asia Covid-19 Tracker”, https://www.csis.org/programs/southeast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0#National%20Responses  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [v] “Vietnam’s positive growth in Q2 defies market expectations: HSBC”, http://hanoitimes.vn/vietnam-positive-growth-in-q2-defies-market-expectations-hsbc-313035.html  (accessed 16 September 2020).
    [vi] “Vietnam expects imminent new wave of foreign investment”, https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30392781?utm_source=homepage&utm_medium=internal_referral  (accessed 15 September 2020).
    [vii] “Assessing Vietnam’s Economic Prospects for Foreign Investors After COVID-19”, https://www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/assessing-vietnams-economic-prospects-foreign-investors-after-covid-19.html/  (accessed 15 September 2020).

    Image: Ho chi-min City

  • US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

    US-China Tensions Could Spill Into Lancang-Mekong River Basin

     The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    A recent US government-funded study has noted that in 2019 China held back large amounts of water upstream in dams on the Mekong River which caused a  severe drought in the downstream countries,[1] prompting a US ambassador in the region accusing China of “hoarding” water and “harming the livelihoods of millions of people in downstream countries”.[2] Likewise, another report by Stimson Centre, a Washington-based think tank, has corroborated the above and pointed that in 2019 “upstream dams at Nuozhadu and Xiaowan had restricted around 20 billion cubic meters of water between July and November” and that current “satellite images show those dams are once again poised to restrict a similar amount of water from July 2020 through the end of this year … Portions of the Mekong mainstream are once again dropping to historically low levels,”[3]

    China has dismissed the reports and the Global Times in an article cited a report by the Tsinghua University and clarified that the “river dams in China [instead] helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong”; furthermore, in November 2019, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) had concluded that “the drought was caused by insufficient rainfall during the wet season with a delayed arrival and earlier departure of the monsoon rain and an El Niño event that led to abnormally high temperatures and high evapotranspiration”.[4]

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.

    At the heart of this problem is that China has built as many as 11 dams on the 4,800 kilometres long Lancang-Mekong River that originates in the Tibetan Plateau.  The Lancang-Mekong River is the 12th longest river and runs through six countries i.e. China (upper riparian), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian)and finally discharges into South China.

    China has been reluctant to share hydrological data particularly during the dry seasons and releases water during rainy seasons causing flooding in lower riparian countries. This is despite the 2002 MoU under which China had agreed to provide daily river flow and rainfall data from two monitoring stations in Yunnan Province during the wet season, and the periodic MRC Heads of Government meeting over a Summit which is held every four years.

    Earlier this year, the Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had assured that his country would “give positive consideration to share the full-year hydrological information with Mekong countries and enhance cooperation under the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) framework to ensure reasonable and sustainable use of water resources”.[5]

    Perhaps a recent statement by the MRC may temporarily obviate suspicions over China not sharing hydrological information on the Lancang-Mekong River which notes that it welcomes China’s sharing of data “ throughout the year” as also for the “ establishment of an information-sharing platform for water resources cooperation led by China and Myanmar”.[6] Also, during the 3rd Mekong-Lancang Cooperation (MLC) Leaders’ Meeting, the Global Center for Mekong Studies (GCMS) has been tasked to study the potential benefits from “aligning and synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor with a vast market”.[7]

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement.

    In 1995, the upper and lower riparian countries had adopted Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin which lays out “principles and norms of regional cooperation in managing the river basin”. A formal dialogue process under the MRC was instituted to address issues relating to Mekong River and the Member States agreed to “promote common procedures and practices throughout the region for data collection, storage and analysis to support data sharing and integration of existing data management systems based on the voluntary participation of countries and institutions.”[8] In 2001, they adopted the “Procedures for Data and Information Exchange and Sharing,” or PDIES to enable the Member States to share data ‘to provide real-time water level information and more accurate flood forecasting.

    It has been observed that although the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin is legally binding, it “does not have a compliance mechanism such as punitive measures on the party that violates the spirit and principles of the Agreement. The conflict resolution mechanism is also not clearly stipulated”.[9] This is one of the many reasons for discord among the Parties which needs to be addressed by the MRC whose mandate includes dispute resolution.

    Be that as it may, the lower Mekong countries have set up the Mekong Water Data Initiative, and at the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) in 2017 to ‘create a robust, integrated, and transparent platform for collecting, sharing, and managing data on the Mekong River system.’[10]

    there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea.

    At another level, there are fears that the Lancang-Mekong River issue is slowly shaping into a major ASEAN-China bilateral issue similar to the contestation in the South China Sea; and the current situation is being described as “becoming a geopolitical issue, much like the South China Sea, between the United States and China,”[11] Perhaps the biggest worry is that the Lancang-Mekong River should not attract contestation between the US and China which surely is going to make the region more turbulent. It would thus be prudent that ASEAN and China work on a Code of Conduct to manage the river affairs or add more robustness in the existing dialogue mechanism over the Lancang-Mekong River.

     
    End Notes
    [1] “China could have choked off the Mekong and aggravated a drought, threatening the lifeline of millions in Asia”, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/28/china-choked-off-the-mekong-which-worsened-southeast-asia-drought-study.html  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [2] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [3] “The next US-China battleground: Chinese dams on the Mekong River?”,https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3095581/next-us-china-battleground-chinese-dams-mekong-river  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [4] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [5] “River dams in China helped alleviate drought along Lancang-Mekong, research finds”, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1194654.shtml  (accessed 10 September 2020).
    [6] “Lancang-Mekong cooperation provide stronger impetus for regional development and prosperity”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/hzdt_1/t1812281.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020)
    [7] “Full text of Co-chairs’ Statement on Cooperation of Synergizing the MLC and the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor of the Third MLC Leaders’ Meeting”, http://www.lmcchina.org/eng/zyxw_5/t1808947.htm  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [8] “Joint Statement To Strengthen Water Data Management and Information Sharing in The Lower Mekong”,
    https://www.lowermekong.org/news/joint-statement-strengthen-water-data-management-and-information-sharing-lower-mekong (accessed 14 April 219)
    [9] “Code of Conduct for the Mekong”,https://vannarithchheang.com/2018/04/04/code-of-conduct-for-the-mekong/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
    [10] “Mekong River Commission keen to improve data sharing and management in the Lower Mekong Basin”, https://mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/mrc-keen-data-management-in-mekong-basin/  (accessed 12 September 2020.
    [11] “Water wars: Mekong River another front in U.S.-China rivalry”, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/07/25/asia-pacific/mekong-river-us-china/  (accessed 12 September 2020).
     
    Image: Mekong Riverside, Phnom Penh-Cambodia

  • Poverty, Inequality, and Marginalisation as Forms of Structural Violence in Pre-Conflict Syria

    Poverty, Inequality, and Marginalisation as Forms of Structural Violence in Pre-Conflict Syria

    The injustice and inequality built into the structural institutions of the Syrian society can be referred to, what has been called as the ‘structural violence’, by the well-known Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung.  

    The ongoing civil war in Syria that has resulted in large-scale loss of lives, and forced displacement of millions across the region, is being seen as one of the bloodiest conflicts of this century. While countries continue to witness the horrors of visible atrocities and war crimes, the underlying layers of structural and cultural violence continue to buttress the egregious brutality which is often more direct, and physical.

     

    Although the war is often seen as a result of the outburst of pro-democracy protests in 2011, a close examination of the country’s socio-economic structures would enable one to get a detailed insight into the underlying layers of frustration caused due to large-scale poverty, inequality, and marginalisation. One would also find that the relatively peaceful structure, which existed before the protests of 2011, was held intact largely due to the existence of single-party dominance, where one actor (Hafez al-Assad, and later Bashar al-Assad) held all power and authority, while those existing in lower ranks of society continued to lack resources, as well as opportunities to challenge the dominant power.

    The Syrian economic crisis has existed long before the commencement of the civil war.

    The injustice and inequality built into the structural institutions of the Syrian society can be referred to, what has been called as the ‘structural violence’, by the well-known Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung.  The violence, here, is reflective of a position “higher up or lower down in a hierarchy of exploitation-repression-alienation”, where the parties involved are determined either to keep the hierarchy intact or to completely obliterate it. In the case of Syria, the deprivation of the most basic and non-negotiable needs, which threatened the citizens’ need for survival, has been the primary cause for aggression to come into existence. The factors that, thus, led to the conflict in Syria can be seen rooted in years of repression, poverty, and lack of representative institutions, which manifested in the form of protests, or the Arab Spring of 2011.

    The Syrian economic crisis has existed long before the commencement of the civil war. Since the beginning of the economic crisis, Syria’s institutional structures have failed to meet the rising needs and rights of its population. In the 1980s, the country was trapped in a downward spiral of a fiscal crisis, as a result of large-scale drought, and due to both, domestic and external factors. The crisis led to high food deficit, and an increase in the cost of living, leading to a rise in patronage networks which provided small circles of elites with profitable businesses. These networks became increasingly popular in real estate and land management, leaving out large sectors of Syria underdeveloped.

    While the country witnessed a decreasing overall debt and a noticeable rise in the GDP in the 2000s, large sections of the population were excluded from benefitting from these growth rates due to differences in wage rates and declining job opportunities. Increasing inequality was reflected in a paper published by the UNDP, which claimed that 65.6% of all labour in Syria belonged to the informal sector in 2010, with Aleppo and Idlib ranking first with over 75% of their workforce belonging to the informal sector. Further, the four years of drought between 2006 and 2011, and the consequent failed economic policies led to a significant decline in the agricultural sector’s output, forcing 2 million to 3 million Syrians into abject poverty.

    Additionally, the oil revenues fell from more than 14% of GDP in the early 2000s to about 4% in 2010 due to depleting reserves. According to a report, overall poverty in Syria in 2007 impacted 33.6% of the population, of which 12.3% were estimated to be living under extreme poverty. Noting the degree of inequality in Syria in 1997, the report found out that the lower 20% of the population had a share of only 8% in expenditure, while the richest 20% of the population share about 41% of the expenditure. The degree of inequality further decreased in 2004. Moreover, the widely disputed region of North-Eastern Syria witnessed highest levels of inequality in 2007, in addition to deprivation of living standards, and worst levels of illiteracy, and access to safe water, just four years before the outbreak of the civil war. The unequal access to resources was also starkly reflected in the housing situation of the country before the war, where over 40% of the population lived under informal housing conditions, – through squatting, or on lands obtained without legal contracts.

    In addition to the economic crisis, Syrians have been the victims of decades-long political repression, in the form of restrictions on freedom of expression, torture, and enforced disappearances. The political institutions have historically been unstable, with three military coups taking place in 1949 alone, followed by one more in 1954, in addition to the Ba’athist-led coups of 1963 and 1966. The Syrian security forces (Mukhabarat) are known to have detained citizens without proper warrants even before 2010, many of whom have reportedly been tortured in prisons. In their attempts to keep the hierarchy of power relations intact, the centralised institutions are known to clamp down on any public demonstrations, with frequent arrests and employment of state violence.

    The conflict which started with citizens demanding their basic needs and rights has been sustained over the years by the involvement of foreign states, and increased state brutality which has been responded to by an increasingly similar, if not equal, force by the rebellion groups.

    Years of conflict have exacerbated the economic crisis, pushing both the state and its citizens, into chaos, with more than 80 per cent of the Syrian population living below the poverty line, with an unemployment rate of at least 55 per cent in 2018. With most of the business networks now being controlled by the selected few elites, the population at large continues to suffer the brunt of both structural, and direct violence.

    The conflict which started with citizens demanding their basic needs and rights has been sustained over the years by the involvement of foreign states, and increased state brutality which has been responded to by an increasingly similar, if not equal, force by the rebellion groups. The country, now, witnesses itself entangled in a cycle of conflict, where the war has led to steep economic deterioration, political repression, and physical violence, which in turn has led to further widespread cataclysm.

    Image Credit: Photo – Aleppo-Syria destruction in 2019 and  Syria Map – Adobe Stock

  • Lebanon’s Food Security Crisis

    Lebanon’s Food Security Crisis

    Security has been a buzzword in the arena of International Politics since the Cold War, and this is widely recognized to be the subject’s genesis as articulated by Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen in their book, The Evolution of International Security Studies. The traditional view of security as largely related to military is the aspect that is given the most prominent focus in discourses on the subject. However, since the 1990s, “societal security” and concepts related to people are broader and sub-concepts such as food security have gained in importance. Food security looks at how much food is available, the access and affordability of food to all people in a country. Food security is also the ability of the country to keep sufficient food available during tough times, such as inflation, disasters, and other such hardships. The Food Climate Research Network speaks of the five factors of food security; availability of food, access to food, utilization of food, stability, and malnutrition. Perhaps food security is one of the most essential forms of security, as the lack of food leads to starvation. This is the reason one hears of bread riots and bread in many protest slogans; ‘bread’ symbolizes food security and represents people’s survival. The economic meltdown of Lebanon and the failure of governance has created a human catastrophe of instability and poverty. The recent Beirut explosion has highlighted not only the failure of the government but a complete breakdown of safety and social security for its common citizens. Under the current circumstances, Lebanon’s food security situation is a major cause for concern.

    Hikes in Food Prices

    Lebanon today is a country with massive debt, income inequality, with much of its revenue going towards servicing of national debts. In addition, Lebanon has been facing high inflation for the last few months, making it very difficult for families to access food. As a result, basic food items are overpriced and in short supply; for instance, a pat of butter costs 9.4 Euros.  Meat, fruits and other commodities have become luxuries for most Lebanese citizens. There are huge breadlines across Lebanon, and many grocery stores cannot afford to buy food to sell to consumers. The COVID-19 crisis has compounded the economic crisis. Prices of eight basic food items have increased by 56%. Lebanon’s food crisis is so grave that parents are bartering their children’s toys and furniture for food online.

     Economic collapse and Food Security

    The most circulated pictures over the last few weeks on media are of the explosion in Beirut and the spillage of grains. This blast occurred because of the unsafe storage of ammonium nitrate and has led to the death of over 200 people, with over 6,000 injured so far. There are many still missing. For Lebanon, this is a triple layer of burden, as the country is fighting a mismanaged economy, a pandemic, and now the horrific aftermath of the explosion. Post the explosion, many countries and global institutions have rushed emergency support by providing minimal aid and funding to facilitate fast recovery from this catastrophe.  While the world has come together to help Lebanon, the situation remains grim because of the shortage of various necessities like medicine and food. The second-largest port in Lebanon, Tripoli has some storage of flour; however, this suffices to cover just one month’s requirements. Beirut port, the largest in Lebanon, is virtually unusable because of the blast. The port infrastructure is severely damaged, thus hurting imports. Lebanon is a country that relies hugely on imports; it imports 85% of its food from outside, making this a major crisis . By one estimate the blast has destroyed 120,000 metric tons of grains, and this could affect food availability as well as sky-rocketing of food prices. The United Nations Food Program reiterated that Lebanon is in a grim situation regarding food security. The current assessment is that the grains can sustain them for less than a month.

    Grim Outlook and Tough Challenges

    The looming food security crisis is a direct fall-out of the economic collapse and multiple crises facing the country. Discontent with the government in Lebanon is not new, since the protests have been on since last October. The explosion and its resulting loss of life and property have triggered waves of protests again, forcing Hassan Diab, the Prime Minister of Lebanon, to step down from his office on 10th August. Decades of poor governance, entrenched kleptocracy, corrupt political class, criminal negligence, incompetence and economic mismanagement have led to the current catastrophe. The former economy minister, Nasser Saidi, says that ‘Lebanon is on the brink of the abyss of depression, with GDP declining by 25% this year, growing unemployment, hyperinflation, and humanitarian disaster with poverty exceeding half the population. The growing food crisis and poverty could lead to famine conditions’. The government will need to address income inequality, large-scale corruption, and the role of foreign players in contributing to the economic collapse.  Financial institutions and other creditors, more often foreign powers, need to suspend debt repayments and allow the Lebanese economy to recoup; since a considerable portion of the revenue goes into debt servicing, which is unsustainable for long.  International funding agencies, while sympathetic to the common peoples’ plight, are hesitant to go ahead with aid due to the poor governance track record of the political class. By some estimates, they put the immediate requirement for humanitarian aid and the cost of rebuilding essential infrastructure post the blast at USD 15 billion. This pales compared to the even bigger mess in the financial system. Ghazi Wazni, the country’s finance minister who quit with the rest of the government last week, has put the total losses in the banking system at $83 billion, and a black hole in the central banking system of $50 billion. The people are displaying discontent over the sectarian politics that have afflicted the country for decades and are the root cause of endemic corruption. Last year’s protests led to a new government in December, which was forced to resign post the explosion.

    Amidst the political crisis, food security is increasingly the major problem in Lebanon for months now. The blast has left 300,000 people homeless.  International Organizations and Civil Society Organizations, Ukraine, Russia, and the United States are enabling and mobilizing food supplies.

    Poverty is the immediate concern; there are already one million Lebanese in poverty, with the likelihood of more than half of the Lebanese population falling into poverty. Food shortages will most likely result in starvation, malnutrition, and death. Looking at the five tenets of food security mentioned above, Lebanon satisfies neither of the five criteria. Lebanon is an example of how decades of factional strife, warlordism, corruption, and power in the hands of the kleptocratic elite can push a country and its people into the abyss of poverty. While resolving Lebanon’s food security crisis is possible through immediate international aid and support, resolving the larger problem of its economic mess and humanitarian catastrophe will need international intervention.

  • Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    Consolidating India-ASEAN Strategic Partnership under Chairmanship of Vietnam

    During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.    

    Vietnam’s Chairmanship of the ASEAN comes at a time of immense turbulence marked by COVID-19 pandemic, disruption in the global supply chains resulting in economic recession among major economies, and strategic instability in the Indo-Pacific region marked by high tensions between the United States and China in the South China Sea. However, the ASEAN calendar of engagements with its Partner countries has remained busy, and Vietnam has spearheaded the Organisation with adeptness and alacrity and sustained the momentum of the ASEAN’s mandate through meetings and conversations.  During the first six months of the year, there were 26 meetings and most of these were through video-conferencing, exhibiting a high degree of commitment by the ASEAN under the Chairmanship of Vietnam.

     On 16 June 2020, at the 20th ASEAN-India Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting, through a video conference, India and the ASEAN “reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthen and deepen their cooperation.” Both sides noted the progress made for the implementation of the ASEAN-India Plan of Action (2016-2020), and “shared their commitment to complete the development of the new Plan of Action for 2021-2025 to further strengthen their strategic partnership over the next five years”.[i]

    A month later Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India, participated in the 22nd annual meeting of the Senior officials of ASEAN countries and India, and commended Viet Nam’s ASEAN chairmanship. Both sides “agreed to continue assisting each other’s citizens affected by the coronavirus outbreak”; provide “ASEAN countries with detailed information about the Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative proposed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the 16th ASEAN-India Summit in 2019”; welcomed “ASEAN bringing into play its role in fostering cooperation, dialogue and trust building in the region”; and conveyed India’s support for “efforts to seriously and fully implement the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea and build an efficient and effective Code of Conduct in the waters in line with international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea”.[ii]

    COVID-19 Pandemic

    India and ASEAN are confronted with COVID-19 pandemic and there is ample evidence that both sides have conveyed their intention to fight the pandemic together. Prime Minister Modi engaged the leaders of Indonesia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam through telephonic conversations and assured support to ASEAN Member States. Likewise, Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla has had weekly tele-conversations with counterparts from US, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Vietnam to share ideas and best practices in the Indo-Pacific region for responding to COVID-19 pandemic.[iii]

    It is an opportune moment for the officials of the health departments in India and ASEAN to set up a dedicated virtual platform/dashboard designated as ‘India-ASEAN Meeting for Health Development (AI-MHD) that can be pluggedinto the ‘ASEAN Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Network, the ASEAN Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Centre, the ASEAN Bio Diaspora Virtual Center (ABVC) and the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) for future public health emergencies’.

     India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jayashankar, in his remarks at the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT), noted that “the impact of the Coronavirus has been beyond our collective imagination. Current estimates put the cumulative loss in the range of USD 5.8-8.8 trillion or approximately 6.5-9.7% of the global GDP.[iv]

    ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP)

    India has acknowledged the importance of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and New Delhi is committed to “explore cooperation in the key areas outlined in the AOIP, covering maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development and economic cooperation, in order to contribute to the maintenance of peace, freedom and prosperity in the region”.[v] Similarly, ASEAN has endorsed synergies in various sectors and promoted regional frameworks under India’s Act East Policy, and SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision. Although health and pandemic issues are conspicuously absent in the AIOP and SAGAR, but these are surely part of the broader thematic issues contained therein.

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea.

    On November 04, 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI) at the East Asia Summit held in Bangkok, Thailand.[vi] It is an “ an open global initiative” and “ draws on existing regional cooperation architecture and mechanisms to focus on seven central pillars conceived around Maritime Security; Maritime Ecology; Maritime Resources; Capacity Building and Resource Sharing; Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; and Trade Connectivity and Maritime Transport.”

    Cooperation, Dialogue and Trust Building

    India is committed to positive contribution to ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). It is a staunch believer of ‘rule of law’ and India believes that a Code of Conduct is a useful solution to reduce tensions in the South China Sea. India’s Foreign Minister has stated that India is working in conjunction with Vietnam and “responses to that (CoC) are being handled by the Vietnamese and that is the way it should be,” [vii]

                Finally, it has been noted that “as we come out of this pandemic, let us be clear on one fact. The world will never be the same again. That means new thinking, fresh ideas, more imagination and greater openness. We need to go beyond orthodoxies, whether of trade, politics or security. These are domains that all of you debate regularly and I am sure today you will have a very productive discussion.”[viii]  It is useful for ASEAN and India to explore commonalities and convergences in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific (AOIP) and the Indo Pacific Oceans’ Initiative (IPOI). In this context, Vietnam has the unique opportunity to further expand, deepen and strengthen the ASEAN India Strategic Partnership.

     

    Notes

    [i] “ASEAN, India strengthen cooperation”, https://asean.org/asean-india-strengthen-cooperation/ (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [ii] “ASEAN, Indian senior officials gather at online 22nd meeting”, https://www.asean2020.vn/xem-chi-tiet1/-/asset_publisher/ynfWm23dDfpd/content/asean-indian-senior-officials-gather-at-online-22nd-meeting (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    [iii] “Cooperation among select countries of the Indo-Pacific in fighting COVID-19 pandemic”, https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/32691/Cooperation+among+select+countries+of+the+IndoPacific+in+fighting+COVID19+pandemic (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [iv] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”,https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT(accessed 20 August 2020).

    [v] “ASEAN Outlook On The Indo-Pacific” https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [vi] “Ministry of External Affairs Indo-Pacific Division Briefs”, https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indo_Feb_07_2020.pdf (accessed 20 August 20200.

    [vii] “Incident between Indian, Chinese militaries was ‘not skirmish but face-off’: Jaishankar”,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/incident-between-indian-chinese-militaries-was-not-skirmish-but-face-off-  (accessed 20 August 2020).

    [viii] “Remarks by EAM during the 6th Roundtable Meeting of ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks (AINTT)”, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32904/Remarks_by_EAM_during_the_6th_Roundtable_Meeting_of_ASEANIndia_Network_of_Think_Tanks_AINTT (accessed 20 August 2020).

     

    Image Credit: Asia Times

  • India-China Trade In Ancient Times: Southern Silk Route

    India-China Trade In Ancient Times: Southern Silk Route

    To follow the Silk Road is to follow a ghost. It flows through the heart of Asia, but it has officially vanished leaving behind the pattern of its restlessness: counterfeit borders, unmapped peoples. The road forks and wanders wherever you are. It is not a single way, but many: a web of choices.

    Colin Thubron, Shadow of the Silk Road.

    Introduction

    India and China, two Asian giants, share a lot of similarities in terms of history and culture. Both countries represent age old civilizations and unique history. Cultural and economic ties between the two countries date back to about 2000 years ago. The Silk Route, which is an ancient network of trade routes, formally established by the Han Dynasty, served as a connection between the two countries. It was also through this route that Buddhism spread to China and East Asia from India. The routes were more than just trade routes; it was the carrier of ideas, innovations, inventions, discoveries, myths and many more.
    The earliest mention of China can be found in the Indian text “Arthashastra” which was written by Kautilya in the fourth century BC. Kautilya made a remark about Cinapattasca Cinabhumjia (Cinapatta is a product of China)[1]. Whereas, the earliest mention of India in Chinese records dates between 130 and 125 BC. Zhang Qian, a Chinese envoy to Central Asia, referred to India as Shendu, in his report about India to Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty.
    This article will look into the ancient trade route that existed between South Western China and India’s North East region via Myanmar and the future of the trade route.

    Ancient trade links between India and China

    Shiji, which is the first Chinese dynastic history, compiled between 104 and 87 BCE talks about the existence of a trading route between India and South West China. According to Chinese records, Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, tried to establish a trade route from Changan, the Chinese capital to North East India through Yunnan and adjoining areas. However, the rulers of Yunnan were against the idea of establishing a direct trade between India and China and Emperor Wu failed to establish the trade route. Even though the trade route failed to take off, the trade in Cinapatta and Chinese square bamboo continued without any hindrance.

    Political Geography of the Southern Silk Route

    The Southern Silk route (SSR), one of the least studied overland route, is a trade route which is about 2000 km long and linked East and North East India with Yunnan Province of China via Myanmar. This is a relatively unknown, ancient trade route that is considered a part of the larger web of Silk Roads. This route existed before the Central Asian Silk route became popular. This trade route between Eastern India and China came to be known during the early 3rd century BCE, and it became popular by the 2nd century BCE. By 7th century AD various other branches of the SSR emerged to create web of trading routes.
    Traders carried silk from Yunnan through Myanmar, across India and joined the main silk route in Afghanistan. In addition, silk was also transported from South West China through the Shan states and North Myanmar into East India and then down to the Coromandel Coast.
    The Qing dynasty which ruled China from 1644-1912, recorded the cross cultural exchanges that took place across SSR. This route contributed to cultural exchanges between China and the West. It also promoted interactions among different nationalities.
    Indian sources have failed to provide abundant evidence about the SSR and the interaction that took place across this route but there is enough evidence that indicates that trade and migration did take place in the Eastern India-Upper Myanmar-Yunnan region. For example, modern scholars believed that the Tai Ahoms were originally from Yunnan but they migrated to North East India and founded a small kingdom around 13th century, which grew to become the powerful Ahom Kingdom of Assam.
    The areas through which the SSR passed were inhabited by various ethnic groups whose political, social and economic organizations were primitive and backward. As a result, the safety of the route was often questioned. Archeological evidences have been found along the Southern banks of Brahmaputra up to Myanmar border, which shows that trade did exist along this route.
    The main items that were exported from China via this route included Silk, Sichuan cloth, Bamboo walking sticks, ironware and other handicrafts items. Sichuan, a South Western province was the main source of silk. Glass beads, jewels, emeralds etc were some of the items that were imported to China.
    Another important trade route is the South West Silk route or the Sikkim Silk route, which connected Yunnan, and India through Tibet. A section of the route from Lhasa crossing Chumbi Valley, Nathu La Pass connected to the Tamralipta Port (present day Tamluk in West Bengal). From the Tamralipta port, this trade route took to the sea to traverse to Sri Lanka, Bali, Java and other parts of the Far East. Another section of the route crossed Myanmar and entered India through Kamrup (Assam) and connected the ports of Bengal and present day Bangladesh.
    Over time, the Southern Silk Route lost its prominence and it was in 1885 that it re- emerged as a strategic link as the British tried to control some parts of the route in order to access and gain control over Southern China.
    The strategic importance of the route increased during World War II. In 1945, Ledo Road or Stilwell Road was constructed from Ledo, Assam to Kunming, Yunnan to supply aid and troops to China for the war with Japan. Ledo Road is the shortest land route between North East India and South West China. However, after the war the road was left unused and in 2010, BBC reported that much of the Ledo road has been swallowed up by jungle.
    The Assam-Myanmar-Yunnan road is very difficult to traverse not only in the present times but also during the ancient times. However, despite the hard conditions, it is through this route that a golden triangle of drug trafficking, movement of terrorist and smuggling functions today.

    Future Potential: Reviving the Southern Silk Route Economy

    North-East India and the Yunnan province share many similarities. Both are landlocked as well as under developed regions. Both are home to a large number of ethnic groups and have witnessed secessionist movement from time to time. Apart from this, Yunnan and North East India are geographically isolated from their political capitals.
    Yunnan and North East India, home to rich varieties of subtropical fruits with high nutritional values and medicinal plants, can cooperate and transform the hills of North East India and South West China into plantations, factories, laboratories to produce processed food products and lifesaving drugs that can find a huge market in developing and developed countries.
    In a bid to revive the Southern Silk route, Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar, signed the Kunming Initiative, a sub-regional organization, in 1999. This initiative was replaced by the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) in 2015. The BCIM-EC was announced by China as a part of its Belt-Road Initiative, which has been boycotted by India since the beginning. In 2019, the BCIM-EC was dropped from the list of 35 projects that are to be undertaken under BRI, indicating that China has disreagrded the project. However, in the same year India has sought to keep the BCIM-EC project alive.
    If the BCIM-EC project does take place, it will reduce the travel time, cut transportation cost, open up markets, provide way for joint exploration and development of natural resources and create production bases along the way. Before the BCIM-EC takes off, it is important to develop the roadways infrastructure of India’s North East region.
    Even though the BCIM-EC promises to elevate the economic conditions of the backward North-East region of India, it has not gained sufficient steam as both China and India have different apprehensions. China sees India’s reluctance to support BRI as the barrier for any progress in the project. Given the current stand-off in Ladakh, India’s apprehensions about China seeking to exploit the insurgent groups operating in the region gains significance. Either way realizing the Southern Silk Road as a viable project in the form of BCIM-Economic Corridor looks distant now.
    [1]Haraprasad Ray, “Southern Silk Route: A Perspective,” in The Southern Silk Route : Historical Links and Contemporary Convergences (Routledge, 2019).

    References

    Ray, Haraprasad. “Southern Silk Route: A Perspective.” Essay. In The Southern Silk Route: Historical Links and Contemporary Convergences. Routledge, 2019.
    “Continental and Maritime Silk Routes: Prospects of India- China Co-operations.” In Proceedings of the 1st ORF-ROII Symposium. Kunming, 2015.
    Mukherjee, Rila. “Routes into the Present.” Essay. In Narratives, Routes and Intersections in Pre-Modern Asia, 37–40. Routledge, 2017.
    UNESCO. Accessed June 20, 2020. https://en.unesco.org/silkroad/content/did-you-know-great-silk-roads.
    “The Silk Route.” Accessed June 21, 2020. http://www.sikkimsilkroute.com/about-silk-route/.
    Ray, Haraprasad. Introduction. In North East India’s Place in India-China Relations and Its Future Role in India’s Economy, n.d.
    Chowdhury, Debasish Roy. “’Southern Silk Road’ Linking China and India Seen as Key to Boosting Ties.” South China Morning Post, October 23, 2013.
    “China Wants to Revive ‘Southern Silk Road’ with India.” The Times of India, June 9, 2013.

    Image: Stilwel Road from Ledo in Northeast India to Kunming in Yunnan province, China

  • India-Australia Strategic Partnership: Leveraging Aerospace Capacity

    India-Australia Strategic Partnership: Leveraging Aerospace Capacity

    Category : India India’s, Military, India-Australia Relations
    Title : India-Australia strategic partnership: Leveraging aerospace capacity
    Author : M Matheswaran 02-06-2020

    The forthcoming virtual summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison assumes considerable significance for an India-Australia strategic partnership, particularly as it comes against the backdrop of heightened friction with China for both countries. Enhanced defence cooperation between the two countries could be an important signal to Beijing of the costs of overly assertive strategic behaviour – whether in the Himalaya or in trade. For some years, defence cooperation has largely focused on the naval relationship. Now is the time for enhanced air-power cooperation.

    Read More

  • ASEAN Unity Critical for South China Sea: But Time to Address Newer Issues

    ASEAN Unity Critical for South China Sea: But Time to Address Newer Issues

    Perhaps the most defining character of the ASEAN in the last six decades of its existence has been ‘Unity’ among its Member States who have scrupulously adhered to the fundamental principles contained in the various treaties signed by the Member States. The ‘ASEAN Way’ is unique and helps them to remain ‘united’ despite diversity in their political systems, national economic indicators, development levels, and military capabilities. ASEAN has also done well to be labelled as the ‘driver of regional integration’ and promoted a variety of regional political, security and economic initiatives to ensure peace and stability. It has managed with sophistication and alacrity relations with its partner countries bilaterally as also through multilateral structure.

    The ‘ASEAN Way’ is unique and helps them to remain ‘united’ despite diversity in their political systems, national economic indicators, development levels, and military capabilities.

    ASEAN’s engagements with China are through various political and diplomatic exchanges such as Summits and several ASEAN led mechanisms also provide opportunities to its Member States to engage China. The free trade agreement (FTA) is particularly important and catalytic for trade and both sides have taken upon themselves to accelerate negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

    At the strategic level, ASEAN Member States have been quite disillusioned with China over its intention to resolve disputes in South China Sea; but the ASEAN leadership has assiduously pursued the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea and succeeded in completing the first reading of the Single Draft COC Negotiating Text. It is now putting pressure on China to quickly conclude the CoC in the stipulated timeframe to ensure region remains peaceful and stable to enable member countries to invest in national and regional development.

    Ironically some ASEAN Member States have not been keen to openly making reference to Chinese reclamation in South China Sea and near continuous buildup of military infrastructure on islands and features in the Parcels and the Spratly group of islands.

    The report card of ASEAN Unity vis a vis China, so far, has been just about quite decent with at least two exceptions when China was suspected of interfering in ASEAN matters; first in 2012, Cambodia resisted reference to South China Sea in the Chairman’s statement, and again in 2016 soon after the South China Sea Arbitration award.[i]

    Ironically some ASEAN Member States have not been keen to openly making reference to Chinese reclamation in South China Sea and near continuous buildup of military infrastructure on islands and features in the Parcels and the Spratly group of islands. While Vietnam and the Philippines have openly confronted China over their claims in South China Sea, Malaysia chose to pursue “quiet diplomacy” but has stubbornly displayed “lawfare in the South China Sea”;[ii] Brunei has remained quiet because its policy makers “see little choice but to remain quiescent about its dispute with China,” Notwithstanding that, the Chairman’s Statement of the 36th ASEAN Summit 26 June 2020 is a clear display of their ‘unity’ and they have collectively expressed concerns on the Chinese activities and recognised the seriousness of a series of incident at sea which have eroded trust and confidence.

    To some extent ASEAN has succeeded in internationalising the Chinese non-compliance of international treaties such as the 1982 UNCLOS to which Beijing is a signatory.

    Today, South China Sea issue has made global headlines. The US has unabashedly rejected Chinese claims over South China Sea and China is accused of not adhering to internal law. To some extent ASEAN has succeeded in internationalizing the Chinese non-compliance of international treaties such as the 1982 UNCLOS to which Beijing is a signatory as also retained a “minimal formal consensus on the South China Sea, rejecting the pernicious idea that the waterway is only the concern of littoral states, and resisting Chinese pressures to avoid discussion of the issue in ASEAN -led forums, certainly contributed to this outcome.”[iii]

    Perhaps it is time for the ASEAN to bring to the forefront the Lachang-Mekong river issue. Several trans-boundary river management issues and concerns between China (the upper riparian and Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (the lower riparian) have emerged over the years. China has been building dams on the river and its tributaries; has avoided sharing full hydrological data particularly during dry seasons; and released river water untimely. The lower riparian states have called for a ‘code of conduct’ and a ‘rule based trans-boundary resource management’ mechanism for the Mekong River between the upper and the lower riparian states.[iv]

    It is tempting to believe that China has successfully stifled lower riparian member states concerns through sops and infrastructure development projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. Interestingly, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC), the most active forum is dominated by China.

    Non-riparian ASEAN members are accused of “minimal interest” in the Lancang-Mekong issues and they “generally do not participate”. Even attempts to interest the rest of ASEAN on Mekong issues “are met with only the pretense of polite interest”. [v]

      If ASEAN is to preserve ‘unity’ it must see maritime and continental Southeast Asia as one strategic space and take into account challenges faced by ASEAN Member States who border China on land particularly Myanmar who has accused China of interfering in its internal politics and arming the ethnic armed groups operating near the Chinese border,[vi]  and Laos[vii] that is economically and militarily weak to fend off Chinese pressures unlike Vietnam which has withstood Chinese pressures on land and at sea. Otherwise, China will open yet another contentious front for the ASEAN.  Finally, under the circumstances, prudence necessitates that ASEAN should prepare to incorporate newer issues other than the South China Sea in its agenda!

    Notes:
    [i] “ASEAN deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia blocks statement, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-ruling-asean/asean-deadlocked-on-south-china-sea-cambodia-blocks-statement-idUSKCN1050F6 (accessed 18 July 2020).
    [ii] “US-China tensions: why is Malaysia so quiet about the South China Sea?”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3093715/us-china-tensions-why-malaysia-so-quiet-about-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).
    [iii] “Why Asean should treat the Mekong like the South China Sea”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3093546/why-asean-should-treat-mekong-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).
    [iv] Chheang Vannarith, “Code of conduct for the Mekong”, https://www.khmertimeskh.com/298648/code-of-conduct-for-the-mekong/ (accessed 19 July 2020).
    [v]“Why Asean should treat the Mekong like the South China Sea”, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3093546/why-asean-should-treat-mekong-south-china-sea (accessed 18 July 2020).
    [vi] “After ASEAN & India, Now Myanmar Accuses China of Creating trouble on the Border”, https://eurasiantimes.com/now-myanmar-accuses-china-for-creating-trouble-in-the-country/ (accessed 19 July 2020).
    [vii] China also claims its right over a large part of Laos on historical precedents (China’s Yuan Dynasty, 1271-1368). “China faces territorial issues with 18 nations; check details”, https://zeenews.india.com/world/china-faces-territorial-issues-with-18-nations-check-details-2292826.html (accessed 19 July 2020).

    Image: Adobe Stock