The Peninsula Foundation

Category: Opinion/Commentary

  • Chinese Roulette: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?

    Chinese Roulette: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?

    The 2022 campaigning season along the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC) opens up in just a matter of months. By all reckoning, the situation is likely to continue remaining extremely volatile, uncertain and tense. While some believe that it may have been this Government’s abrogation of Article 370 and the Home Minister’s statement in Parliament that invited a strong response from the Chinese, the truth is that we are yet to fully comprehend the Chinese leadership’s motivation for damaging, if not jettisoning, over three decades of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and growing economic ties, though the latter seems not to have been impacted in the short term, by resorting to unprovoked aggressive action in Eastern Ladakh and elsewhere.

    In addition, we continue to see a steady build-up of forces and infrastructure, as well as cartographic aggression in the form of renaming of villages in Arunachal Pradesh and the passage of the Land Border Law, effective from 1st January 2022. All of this strongly suggests that the situation will get much worse before it gets better, and we are more likely to see increased Chinese assertiveness and determination to settle territorial disputes on its own terms. Moreover, by its actions in Eastern Ladakh, it has already occupied territory up to its Claim Line of 1959. This begs the question, obviously difficult to answer with any degree of certainty, as to whether there is a likelihood of further Chinese escalation leading to a limited conflict?

    Clearly, the Government is also seized of the problem, as is obvious from the Defence Minister’s statement, while inaugurating border infrastructure, that “We faced our adversary in the northern Sector recently with grit and determination. It could not have been done without proper infrastructural development. In today’s uncertain environment, the possibility of any kind of conflict cannot be ruled out.”i It must be emphasised that conflict is not something that we either desire or is in our interest, especially given the Omicron tsunami that appears to be gathering momentum and the adverse impact that the pandemic has already had on our economy.

    It is therefore quite apparent from the Modi Government’s actions that it has been extremely circumspect and cautious in its response following China’s occupation of our territory, by some estimates extending over a 1600 Sq. Km. Clearly, it has no intention of either attempting to push back the PLA from the intrusion sites, or for that matter, occupying territory elsewhere, as a quid pro quo and bargaining chip for later. However, there is a view that occupying Indian claimed territory in Aksai Chin as a quid pro quo is not a bargain but an acknowledgement that Aksai Chin is alien territory. Therefore this Government has attempted to engage China in talks, both at the diplomatic and military level, though with little success to show for its efforts. Given the mismatch in force levels, this level of military and diplomatic engagement is understandable, though Mr. Modi’s unwillingness to personally call out the Chinese for their provocative behaviour may well give, them and the world at large, an impression of an eagerness to crawl, when just asked to bend.

    However, a deeper examination of events does suggest that the Government has not taken Chinese bullying lightly, and has, in fact, responded in an extremely measured manner, militarily. Following the Galwan incident, it has mirrored Chinese troop accretions by deploying additional forces in Eastern Ladakh, along with armour and other supporting elements. Its pro-active occupation of the Kailash Heights, though these troops were subsequently withdrawn as a part of reciprocal action by the PLA in the Pangong Tso Sector, hinted at the possibility of similar, but more offensive actions, being replicated elsewhere. The reorientation of the Army with the earmarking of a second Mountain Strike Corps for offensive operations has substantially added to the Army’s capabilities and would adversely impact the PLA’s force ratio dynamics. Most importantly, the upgrade of communication infrastructure, not just in Ladakh but elsewhere along the LAC as well, has been greatly speeded up and is coming to fruition, thereby significantly enhancing our defensive capabilities.

    To help us understand if China is likely to resort to force in the ongoing stand-off, an examination of historical precedent may give us some vital clues. As Prof M Taylor Pravel of MIT notes, two characteristics have defined China’s use of force. Firstly, “along its continental border, China has employed force in frontier disputes where it has faced militarily powerful opponents (i.e., states that could possibly challenge its otherwise strong claims). Although the local military balance is difficult to measure with precision, China has on average been vastly stronger in the overall military balance…. India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam in the early 1980s. At the same time, China has refrained from employing force against its weaker continental neighbours. Second, China has used force in disputes where the strength of its claims have been weak, especially when it has occupied little or none of the contested territory. In these disputes, China has been sensitive to any further decline in its bargaining power.”ii

    This suggests that even with neighbours that de facto accept Chinese interpretations of its territorial claims, China is still extremely wary of actions that they may undertake to change the existing relative balance of power along with its disturbed periphery, and prefers to use force against them to delay/stop their progress. For example, there is evidence to suggest Nehru’s Forward Policy and the refuge given to the Dalai Lama were a serious cause of concern to the Chinese leadership. This is borne out by declassified United States documents pertaining to the capture of Longju in August 1959, which reveal that “the late August clashes point of a mode of thought which has remained an ingredient in the Chinese leaders’ calculations on the border dispute: ‘When the Indians show a temperament to advance on the ground, we must alter their frame of mind by letting military action take over political caution. Besides, military risk itself is negligible, because we are the stronger side’.”iii A perception within the Chinese leadership that appears to have remained unchanged in the intervening years, and is especially pertinent at the present time, given President Xi Jinping’s penchant for following in the footsteps of late Chairman Mao Zedong.

    In addition, there are some other factors that have a bearing on this issue of force escalation. For one, it is fairly common for autocratic governments to attempt to conjure up external threats to unify the people against a common enemy, and divert their attention from serious domestic challenges that may lead to unrest or hurt their own leadership position. In this context, as Kalpit Mankikar, a Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation who focuses on China points out, prior to the 1962 Conflict Chairman Mao faced serious internal dissension against his leadership and it had more to do with the intra-CCP power struggle. Mao’s Great Leap Forward (GLP) had been criticised, and for the first time, he had to demit office as State President, forced to hand over to his heir apparent Liu Shaoqi, which came as a huge jolt to him.

    President Xi now finds himself in rather similar circumstances as the economy stutters, in no small measure due to his government’s crackdown on multiple Chinese sectors and companies that have been mascots of growth over the years. His emphasis has been on the idea of “common prosperity” or “reasonable adjustment of excessive incomes and encouraging high-income groups and businesses to return more to society”iv, a blatantly populist measure, that was initially very well received by the average Chinese citizen. However, the enforcement of new regulations in this regard, the so-called “Three Red Lines”, has had a devastating impact on real estate companies such as Evergrande, which hold approximately 75% of all retail investments, bringing them to the verge of bankruptcy, and creating internal turmoil, uncertainty and dissent as the average citizen sees his savings completely wiped out. The likelihood of a domino effect on other facets of the economy cannot be wished away and is bound to adversely impact President Xi’s efforts to stay in power after the end 2022, when his term officially ends.

    In these circumstances creating and tackling an external threat along its borders, as the prevailing situation along the LAC is made out to be, will certainly divert attention and may very well pay great dividends. For example, while President Xi would have preferred to undertake actions to integrate Taiwan, he is hampered by the very real likelihood of The United States and its allies coming to the aid of Taiwan. Taking on India at the LAC is a relatively easier option, as interference by the United States and its allies is likely to be restricted to providing moral and material support at best. Furthermore, it could be viewed as a dress-rehearsal that would allow the PLA to gain vital operational experience, something it has been bereft of since the Sino- Vietnam Conflict of 1979, apart from ensuring a protected flank. Moreover, a successful termination of such a campaign would setback Indian aspirations by decades and severely dent Mr. Modi’s reputation and popularity, much as 1962 did in the case of Pandit Nehru. Not only would such action have a sobering impact on Taiwan’s dealings with the Chinese, but also in the manner other South East and Central Asian neighbours respond to Chinese hegemonistic designs as well.

    It is in this context that the new Land Border Law, now in effect, is likely to be extremely problematic for two reasons, and may well act as the trigger for any future conflict. Firstly, it attempts to give Chinese acts of cartographic aggression, such as differing perceptions on the exact alignment of the LAC, renaming of towns and villages in Arunachal Pradesh, and its acts of ‘salami- slicing’ over the years, a veneer of legality. Secondly, there is a clause in the Law that can be interpreted to suggest that it prohibits the construction of permanent facilities in the vicinity of the LAC without sanction from Chinese authorities, which would obviously be unacceptable to any sovereign state, especially given the manner in which it is rapidly developing communication infrastructure and settlements bordering the LAC.

    Increasing troop concentrations, especially in terms of armour and ballistic/air-defence missiles, in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) along with the external and internal difficulties confronting President Xi suggests a high possibility of a conflict breaking out within the year. There are analysts, including some in this country, who believe that the PLA will be able to achieve a decisive victory given the over-all force disparity, especially in cyber, space and missile capabilities, as was the case in the 1962 Conflict. However, they have tended to disregard the adverse impact of climate and altitude, both on personnel and equipment, that gives a distinct advantage to a military fighting internal lines.

    The PLA can hardly afford to ignore its extended and extremely vulnerable lines of communication, however well developed, and the uncertain internal security environment within TAR and Xingjian. Most importantly, the PLAAF will be operating with greatly reduced capabilities from bases within TAR because of the altitudes involved, while being adversely impacted while operating from bases outside the Region given the extended ranges involved. Finally, the Indian Military does have a sizeable force, reasonably well-equipped with two Mountain Strike Corps and a Division plus of Special Operations Forces in place for offensive operations that will act as a deterrent to Chinese misadventure.

    It understands, however contrarian its public pronouncements may be, that the Indian Armed Forces are a very different force from what they encountered in 1962. Not only is the Indian Army far more experienced and battle-hardened in high altitude and mountain warfare than the PLA, but it will be the Indian Air Force, not utilised in 1962, that will be the battle-winning factor in any conflict. In addition, the employment of the Tibetan manned Special Frontier Force (SFF) in the Kailash Ranges, which received worldwide accolades, would have certainly caused immense disquiet within the Chinese leadership. The SFFs actions and rise of the Taliban have surely given an immense boost to the Independence Movements in both TAR and Xinjiang. Most importantly President Xi and his acolytes must be fully aware that anything other than a decisive victory, will for all intents and purposes, be perceived as a defeat and be the final nail in his coffin.

    Will all of this be sufficient to deter the Chinese from escalating the stand-off? The truth is that while we are inherently placed in an advantageous position, primarily due to location and circumstance, neither deterrence nor success is guaranteed. The fact of the matter is that over the past two decades the military has not just been neglected, but has also been deliberately discriminated against by the political and bureaucratic establishment. The damage that has been done, both to its organisational culture, morale and capabilities will need focus, effort and time to reverse. Most importantly, threats of this nature are best tackled by a nation that is united and willing to place its complete trust in its political leadership. Does our political establishment have the maturity, foresight, integrity and vision to provide the leadership we deserve and need? To quote the poet, philosopher and singer, Bob Dylan, “the answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind”…

    i The Times of India, New Delhi 29 December 2021, p 19.

    ii M Taylor Fravel, Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes, International Security, Winter 2007/2008, Vol 32 No 3, p 56

    https://www.jstor.org/stable/30130518?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

    iii The Sino-Indian Dispute, Section 1:1950-59, DD/I Staff Study, CIA/RSS March 02, 1963, Approved for Release May 2007, p 33.

    iv Bloomberg News, China Eyes Wealth Redistribution in Push for ‘Common Prosperity’, 18 August 2021

    The article was originally published in Indian Defence Review, Jan – Mar 2022, Vol 37 (1) Pg 50.

    Featured Image Credits: CNBC

  • Vietnam-China Relations in 2022: Continuity and No Change

    Vietnam-China Relations in 2022: Continuity and No Change

    The year 2022 has begun on a positive note for Vietnam and China, and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee Nguyen Phu Trong and General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and President Xi Jinping exchanged Spring Festival congratulatory messages.

     President Xi Jinping impressed on upholding the “spirits of good neighbours, good friends, good comrades and good partners, consolidate traditional friendship ….push for new achievements in China-Vietnam relations, elevate regional cooperation to new heights, and build a community with a shared future for mankind”.….”, and  General Secretary of CPV Nguyen Phu Trong emphasised on “promoting the sustainable, sound and stable development of relations both between the two parties and between the two countries… inject new impetus into the efforts to push Vietnam-China good-neighbourly friendship and comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation to a higher level.”

    Both leaders expressed satisfaction with the state of relations between the CPV and CPC, and, looking ahead to 2022, hoped to maintain close communication. Also, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Premier Li Keqiang agreed to “properly manage differences, to push forward the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership”.  While that may be so, the bilateral relationship between the two countries presents a mixed bag of economic opportunities as well as strategic challenges. 

    the China-Vietnam freight train (launched in August 2017) run by the China Railway Nanning Group Co Ltd is a success story. It connects South China’s Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region with the Vietnam border and carries a variety of goods between China and ASEAN countries. In 2021, as many as 346 train trips were made, representing an increase of over 108 per cent from the previous year

     As far as bilateral economic relations are concerned, bilateral trade has grown.  In this regard, the China-Vietnam freight train (launched in August 2017) run by the China Railway Nanning Group Co Ltd is a success story. It connects South China’s Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region with the Vietnam border and carries a variety of goods between China and ASEAN countries. In 2021, as many as 346 train trips were made, representing an increase of over 108 per cent from the previous year. A total of 400 China-Vietnam freight train trips are expected to be made in 2022. China is also willing to provide more “customs clearance convenience for Vietnam’s high-quality agricultural products”, particularly durians, mangosteens, and longans.

     

     

    Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Premier Li Keqiang have agreed to give a boost to their bilateral ties through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that came into force earlier this year. China has assured Vietnam that it is ready to “push for the effective implementation of the agreement, promote the regional economic integration to a higher level and bring more benefits to the people in the region”.

    at the strategic level, Vietnam continues to confront contentious initiatives by China, particularly on the issue of the South China Sea

     However, at the strategic level, Vietnam continues to confront contentious initiatives by China, particularly on the issue of the South China Sea. On March 7, pursuant to Hainan Maritime Safety Administration’s announcement on China’s military drills in the East Sea, Vietnam requested China to “respect and not to violate the nation’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, and not to take actions that complicate the situation, thereby contributing to maintaining peace, security and stability in the East Sea area. Vietnam has exchanged views with China on this issue”.

     Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Thi Thu Hang observed that part of the area where Chinese military drills are planned is under the jurisdiction of Vietnam (exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Vietnam) and reiterated that Vietnam always adheres to international law, especially the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This has been refuted by China and it’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian defended the military exercises by stating that the drill is lawful…“China’s military exercise on its own doorstep is reasonable and lawful. It is beyond reproach.” It is now learnt that China may have cordoned a part of the sea area close to Vietnam ostensibly to salvage a crashed military aircraft “while its forces searched for it, and also to conduct drills”.

     

     

    Notwithstanding the above challenges, it is fair to argue that the trajectory of Vietnam-China bilateral relations will not change in 2022 and can be expected to follow trends of the last year.  Vietnam is steadfast in its adherence to the one-China principle and supports China to play a greater role in regional and international affairs. This should go as a signal to the US which can be expected to send many political-diplomatic-military delegations to Vietnam in 2022 to influence the leadership, but Hanoi can be expected to pursue an independent foreign policy. 

    Feature Image: The Independent

    Map: www.isanrealestate.com

  • The Russia-Ukraine War: Putin’s Reasons, Objectives and the Way Out

    The Russia-Ukraine War: Putin’s Reasons, Objectives and the Way Out

    In 3 weeks since Russia’s president, Putin ordered on February 24 this year, a “special military operation” against Ukraine, many questions were asked on his reasons and goals.

    Putin answered those questions in the early morning address to the nation on February 24. He referred to Russia’s particular concern and anxiety over the NATO expansion to the east and the US policy of containment of Russia through the military “settlement” of the Ukrainian territory. Transformation of Ukraine, historically a part of the Russian state, into an “anti-Russia” controlled and guided by the U.S. was nothing less, in Putin’s view than a real threat to Russia’s very existence.

    Putin went on to mention Ukraine’s use of armed forces against the pro-Russian separatists in Donbas, the potential threat that the Ukrainian nationalists could present for Russia-annexed Crimea, and Kyiv’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons. “Russia’s clash with these forces is inevitable.”

    This was the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Few of us believed it would actually happen, but it did, nonetheless. Let’s start by trying to understand, why.

    Russia’s red lines

    According to John Mearsheimer, the West, and especially America, is principally responsible for the current crisis, which actually started at NATO’s Bucharest summit in April 2008, with the US pushing the alliance to announce a plan for Ukraine and Georgia’s prospective membership. Russian leaders characterized the move as an existential threat to Russia and promises to thwart it. Putin warned the West then and there: “if Ukraine joins NATO, it will do so without Crimea and the eastern regions. It will simply fall apart.”

    Nobody listened, or paid attention, thus underscoring the second point from Putin’s pre-invasion speech: the West no longer treats Russia as a great power and will do whatever it deems necessary without taking heed of Russia’s legitimate interests. Instead, Ukraine was actively encouraged to expand its collaboration with NATO and crush the pro-Russian rebellion in Donbas by force. The U.S. and NATO supplied lethal weapons for Ukraine’s civil war, trained its armed forces and turned a blind eye to reports of atrocities that Kyiv and Kyiv-affiliated militias had committed in the region.

    Ukraine started hosting joint land-based and naval exercises with NATO countries, effectively blocking Russia’s Black Sea fleet in its base in Sevastopol. In July 2021, Ukraine and America co-hosted a major naval exercise in the Black Sea region involving navies from 32 countries. In November 2021, the U.S. conducted its annual Global Thunder 22 exercises, which included strategic aviation practising nuclear strikes against Russia over the Black Sea and only 20 km from Russia’s borders. In parallel to that, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defense announced his country’s aspirations to put as many US/NATO training centers in Ukraine as possible, which effectively amounted to a request for additional U.S. military personnel in the country.

    As John Mearsheimer observed, Ukraine was fast becoming a de facto member of NATO. It wanted to use NATO’s rearmaments and the US political and strategic back-up to crush the separatist rebellion in Donbas and ensure “de-occupation and reintegration” of Crimea, now an integral part of the Russian Federation, by all necessary means, not excluding “military measures.” Russia’s fears of NATO’s ballistic missiles appearing on the Ukraine-Russia border, within 7-8 minutes of flying time to Moscow no longer seemed overly exaggerated. Putin described such a potentiality as NATO’s holding a knife to Russia’s throat and made an explicit connection between Ukraine’s aspirations of NATO membership and Kyiv’s plan to return Donbas and Crimea by force. Both were equally unacceptable.

    Russia’s goals

    According to the Russian leader, if Ukraine joined NATO, it would be tempted to implement its “de-occupation strategy” for Crimea through the use of force. NATO would then be obliged to help Ukraine under its Article V mutual defence clause. “This means that there will be a military confrontation between Russia and NATO,” Putin said. Such a war would soon turn nuclear. The Kremlin came to a conclusion that a pre-emptive strike on Ukraine was the only way to stave off a future Russia-NATO war over Crimea.

    We haven’t seen it coming. It was hard to anticipate because Ukraine’s turning away from Russia and drawing closer to NATO did not start yesterday. Ukraine’s Yavoriv training ground hosted the first joint manoeuvres with NATO back in 1995. In 1997, Ukraine and NATO signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership. In 2000, the Ukrainian parliament ratified the Status of Forces Agreement, which enabled the stationing of NATO troops on Ukrainian soil. In 2002, Ukraine’s goal of eventual NATO membership was first voiced by its President; that goal has since become a part of the country’s official foreign policy doctrine. Ukraine’s forces took part in numerous NATO-led operations and missions over the years, from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan to Iraq. And Russia observed all of these developments over the period of near 20 years with calm and reserve, leaving an impression that Ukraine is free to proceed as it wants.

    Moscow’s calm evaporated after Ukraine’s Maidan revolution of 2014 deposed Russia-leaning president Yanukovych and, through the revolutionary powers’ first acts, indicated a clear break with the last memories of the Russian influence. Symbolically, the very first move was to strip the Russian language of its semi-official status in the areas where significant numbers of Russian-speaking minorities lived. A clear indication was given as to the status of the Russian Black Sea Fleet naval base in Sevastopol – the new powers would prefer the Russian navy relocate to Russia proper at its earliest convenience. Plans were underway to offer these naval facilities to NATO.

    Putin moved on to annex Crimea, which, in his view, was an act of strategic necessity. He apparently anticipated Ukraine’s eventually acquiescing to the fact.

    It did not happen. Instead, Ukraine grew more nationalistic, and a significant number of its nationalists embraced anti-Russianism together with far-right politics and symbology. Hence, the Russian goals in the present war include “de-Nazification,” which must be read as Ukraine’s abandonment of anti-Russian nationalism and return to the quasi-Soviet ideology of “one people” with Russians and Belarusians. In other words, Russia would seek to reaffirm, if not impose, a version of the Ukrainian identity that was supported through both the imperial and the Soviet times — Ukrainians as a junior kinfolk to the Russian “older brother.”

    The way out

    With Ukraine’s capital Kyiv under assault and the southern port of Mariupol nearing utter destruction, calls for peace have intensified on all sides, including from Russia’s most important backers in China. Unfortunately, the search for a working compromise has not yet started in earnest. Ukraine’s original position at peace talks focused on the immediate withdrawal of all Russian troops from all of Ukraine, Crimea and Donbas included. From the Russian perspective, that would be equal to capitulation and surrender of a part of its own territory (Crimea), plus legal denunciation of a friendship and support treaty just concluded with Donbas.

    Russia’s present terms for ending the war are equally unrealistic. They include Ukraine’s adoption of a neutral status and the abandonment of its hopes for NATO membership; acknowledgement of the Russian sovereignty over Crimea and the independence of separatist regions in the country’s east; and demilitarization. The objective of the regime change, disguised by the “de-Nazification” rhetoric, has not been voiced much as of recent.

    Given the very fact of the ongoing war with Russia, the demand for demilitarization is clearly a non-starter. Russia’s insistence on Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality could, perhaps, be taken back to Ukraine’s parliament for a serious discussion; however, a ceasefire must be reached first for such a discussion to happen. As for Ukraine’s acknowledgement of Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea or independence of Donbas, these Russia-pushed items look more like the terms of surrender and cannot form the basis of a peace agreement.

    A more plausible ground for a compromise could be the two states’ mutual pledge to refrain from all attempts to solve any outstanding issues by force in the future. That would stop short from Ukraine’s recognition of either Crimea or Donbas but would assure Russia that Ukraine has no plans to regain the lost territories by force. Russia would need to withdraw its army from all areas of Ukraine proper. Ukraine would have to accept that its fight for the return of Crimea and Donbas would now be restricted in its choice of means to mostly diplomatic and legal instruments. The assurances of a non-aligned, non-bloc status that Ukraine could give to Russia should be matched with Russia’s assurances of full compensation for the losses that this war inflicted on Ukraine’s economy and society. While such a compromise will most probably draw the rage of hawkish nationalists on both sides, it might actually form the foundation of a peace agreement that everyone needs.

    Image Credits:

    Feature Image: www.militarytimes.com

    Putin Image: Al Jazeera

    Map: Al Jazeera

  • 100 Years after the End of the First World War: Are we slipping again into a World War?

    100 Years after the End of the First World War: Are we slipping again into a World War?

    In view of the developments in Ukraine, the question arises whether there could be a repetition of the First World War in slipping into a new World War that no one intended. This original thesis is accentuated in different ways, whether in the form that European politicians behaved like “somnambulists (Clark) or just failed (Münkler). The blame for the war was also sought in Serbia or Vienna. Hereby the original thesis of the main war guilt of Germany is questioned, as it was fixed in the Treaty of Versailles and by the historian Fritz Fischer as the “grip on the world power” of Germany. However, if the causes of the First World War and, above all, its escalation are no longer seen in the German Empire alone, but are more or less equally distributed among the major European powers, this does not mean that “nothing and nobody” is responsible for the primordial catastrophe of the 20th century: Nationalism, arms race, industrialized warfare, pure power politics – all these are factors that contributed decisively to the First World War. Moreover, it should be emphasized, which even today is far from being overcome in many parts of the world. Against the backdrop of the Ukraine War, a much-discussed book by the highly influential American political scientist Robert Kagan takes on a whole new relevance. Kagan suggests the idea that Europeans could live in a paradise of peace and order after World War II only because the Americans were prepared to confront possible threats to that peace decisively and violently. Thanks to America’s power, Europeans could have indulged in the belief that (military) power was no longer important. But does the principle follow from this that law and order must be upheld in dealings with one another, but in the violent “jungle, we must follow the laws of the jungle”? Or, conversely, is it not the case that state warfare and the exercise of violence that does not adhere to its self-imposed conventions and limitations will stir up more violent resistance than they, in turn, can fight?

    Kagan is partly correct. All modern states are based on the state’s monopoly on the use of force, and almost all of them have emerged through a violent process-remember the English, American, and French Revolutions, the German wars of unification, the wars of decolonization, and the emergence of new nation-states after World Wars I and II. Therefore, however, states do not as such embody an order of violence. Hegel had argued that violence is the appearing beginning of the state, but not its substantial principle. Nor is order powerlessness, as Robert Kagan’s much-discussed book on “Power and Powerlessness” in the New World Order suggests. Does political power come from the barrels of guns, as Mao Tse Tung suggested? If so, the Soviet Union should never have collapsed because gun barrels were more than enough for the Red Army.

    Kagan assigns the opposition of power and order thinking to contemporary American and European thinking but admits this has not always been the case. As he points out, the situation was just the opposite for a long time. The Americans up to Woodrow Wilson at the beginning of the last century, he says, were committed to thinking of order and a world-political idealism of spreading human rights, while the Europeans remained committed to pure thinking of power until World War II. What is astonishing, if we take Kagan’s own analysis seriously, is why he does not ask to what final conclusion this “pure power thinking” among Europeans led – to nothing other than the catastrophes of World War I and World War II. Kagan may be right about one thing: in view of the “state-failure” problems in numerous Third World states on the one hand (emphasized by the Europeans in the anti-terror struggle) and those of the so-called “rogue states” on the other (on which American interest focused under Bush), illusions about the end of history and a largely peaceful, because economically determined, 21st century is fast fading. However, this cannot mean developing a new metaphysics of struggle and self-assertion that only force can enforce.

    Historical Traditions

    In determining the political sphere in categories of power or order, Kagan finds himself in a long ancestral line of the history of political ideas. Dolf Sternberger distinguished three different roots of the concept of politics: cooperation, following Aristotle; demonology, starting from Machiavelli; and eschatology, as he essentially saw it realized in Marxism, starting from the church father, Augustine. Sternberger’s distinction is phenomenological still valid today, even if his evaluations are problematic because he saw himself in the tradition of the Aristotelian concept of politics and – as the term demonology already shows – fiercely fought the opposite position.

    How are these distinctions to be understood? Here are two quotations: Aristotle begins his work on politics with the definition: “Everything that is called state is obviously a kind of community, and every community is formed and exists for the purpose of obtaining some good.” In contrast, Jean Bodin, perhaps the most important constitutionalist of the 16th century, referred directly to Aristotle. However, his position should be read as his deliberate inversion: “Republic is a lawful government over several households and what is common to them, with sovereign power.” Precisely because Bodin modelled his work on Aristotle’s, the contrast between the two determinations jumps out all the more clearly: on the one hand, a community for the sake of a common goal; on the other, rule endowed with sovereign power. Marx’s eleventh Feuerbach thesis best describes the third dimension of Sternberger’s distinction: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; what matters is to change it.” In contrast to Sternberger’s notion of demonology, however, one side of this line of tradition is by no means “Machiavellianism,” a struggle for power for power’s sake. Instead, it claims to constitute an (absolute) power out of insight into the violence of human nature, which prevents the struggle of all against all.

    Sternberger emphasizes the fundamental difference between the first two concepts of politics when he asks in summary: “Is it the conflict of interests, powers, beliefs, and wills that thus characterizes the political in its peculiar essence? Or is it rather the balance, the compromise, the contract, the common rule of life. And conversely asked: should we interpret peace – civil peace as well as peace among nations – as the abolition and overcoming, as the negation of politics, or, on the contrary, as its completion?”

    Struggle for power and domination, on the one hand, negotiation and the establishment of order on the other, are the two opposite definitions of the essence of politics that run through the history of political ideas. As antipodes may be mentioned only: Thucydides and Plato resp. Aristotle, Machiavelli and Erasmus of Rotterdam, Hegel and Kant, Schmitt and Arendt, recently Foucault, resp. Luhmann and Habermas.

    If we take a closer look at this line of ancestors, it should be enough reason to warn us not to reduce politics to pure power politics. Thomas Hobbes, for example, with his conception of the state monopoly on the use of force, justified internal peace and the avoidance of civil war, but at the same time advocated an absolute sovereign. And Carl Schmitt stands paradigmatically for the problem of reducing politics to pure power politics. For it was not personal opportunism or immoderate ambition that justified his closeness to the National Socialists, but the extreme consequence of his reduction of the political to the distinction between friend and foe in a crisis-ridden world-historical situation. Carl Schmitt wrote in this regard: A total state “does not allow any anti-state, state-inhibiting or state-dividing forces to arise within it. It does not think of handing over the new means of power to its own enemies and destroyers. Such a state can distinguish friend from foe.” The reduction of the political to only one of two sides, the exercise of power or reliance on the establishment of order, has always led to problematic consequences in historical development. Against the false alternative between power or order and their immediate connection in order of power, the “middle” between power and order has to be found again. Violence cannot establish peace, but it can limit other violence to such an extent that other than violent structures come into play. Perhaps America and Europe have more to learn from each other than either side realizes.

    Developments after September 11

    Especially after the attacks of September 11, hardly any author in his assessment of the events could do without reference to Carl Schmitt’s world-famous definition of the political as the distinction between friend and foe. Even before the attacks, however, the political theory had already noted the shift from “Kant to Schmitt” as a consequence of the crisis of the political. Finally, George W. Bush elevated Schmitt’s definition of the political to a quasi-official governmental program in the United States. In this perspective, Robert Kagan denies that Europe and the USA still have a common view of the world at all. “Americans are from Mars, and Europeans are from Venus.” By this, he means that Europe lives in a Kantian fantasy world of eternal peace, while America is called upon and alone empowered to create order in Hobbesian anarchy on a global scale.

    Schmitt as the “mastermind” of the Western world? The tendency to refer back to Schmitt is not unproblematic, however. The possible linking of politics and political theory to Carl Schmitt’s definition of the political cannot, in principle, disregard Schmitt’s temporary proximity to the National Socialists. For it was not personal opportunism or immoderate ambition that justified this closeness, but the extreme consequence of his reduction of the political to the distinction between friend and foe in a crisis-like world-historical situation. Carl Schmitt wrote about this, as indicated: A total state “does not allow any anti-state, state-inhibiting or state-dividing forces to arise within it. It does not think of handing over the new means of power to its own enemies and destroyers……. Such a state can distinguish friend from foe.” Are we not already living in such a total surveillance state?

    The reduction of the political to a pure struggle for power, to a pure friend-enemy distinction, has problematic consequences, as is revealed especially in Schmitt. Conversely, the reduction of the political to the establishment of the agreement, of acting together, leads either to “apolitical” idealism or violent utopianism, as was shown especially in Marxism/communism. But which is now the solution? The distinction between friend and foe is a precondition of political action, but it is not its goal – the goal of politics regarding war and violence is the “mediation” of friend and foe. Or as Yitzhak Rabin described it: Peace is not made with friends, but with enemies! This is the art of politics, to enable a peaceful conflict resolution with opponents instead of falling into the traps of pure power politics – this is the lesson of the First World War then and today.

    Feature Image Credit: powervertical.org 

     

  • US Foreign Policy Is a Cruel Sport

    US Foreign Policy Is a Cruel Sport

    The Russia- Ukraine conflict escalated into a full-blown as Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered special military operations into Ukraine. In this global geopolitical chessboard, Ukraine is a pawn and a tragic victim. However, the causes of this war lie squarely in the decades-long aggressive strategy employed by the US and its European allies in expanding NATO at the expense of Russia’s security and strategic interests. Henry Kissinger’s, in his 2014 article, sounded prophetic – “if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.” He categorically stated Ukraine must not join NATO. Diana Johnston’s article clearly brings out the reasons for the current mess and how the USA’s aggressive and deeply self-centred foreign policy has created much of the mess in today’s world.

    The Peninsula Foundation is happy to republish this article with the author’s permission. The opinions expressed are the author’s own.

    The article was published earlier in Consortium News.

    – Editorial Team

     

    In the time of the first Queen Elizabeth, British royal circles enjoyed watching fierce dogs torment a captive bear for the fun of it.  The bear had done no harm to anyone, but the dogs were trained to provoke the imprisoned beast and goad it into fighting back.  Blood flowing from the excited animals delighted the spectators.

    This cruel practice has long since been banned as inhumane.

    And yet today, a version of bear baiting is being practised every day against whole nations on a gigantic international scale.  It is called United States foreign policy. It has become the regular practice of the absurd international sports club called NATO.

    United States leaders, secure in their arrogance as “the indispensable nation,” have no more respect for other countries than the Elizabethans had for the animals they tormented. The list is long of targets of U.S. bear-baiting, but Russia stands out as a prime example of constant harassment.  And this is no accident.  The baiting is deliberately and elaborately planned.

    As evidence, I call attention to a 2019 report by the RAND Corporation to the U.S. Army chief of staff entitled “Extending Russia.” Actually, the RAND study itself is fairly cautious in its recommendations and warns that many perfidious tricks might not work.  However, I consider the very existence of this report scandalous, not so much for its content as for the fact that this is what the Pentagon pays its top intellectuals to do: figure out ways to lure other nations into troubles U.S. leaders hope to exploit.

    The official U.S. line is that the Kremlin threatens Europe by its aggressive expansionism, but when the strategists talk among themselves the story is very different.  Their goal is to use sanctions, propaganda and other measures to provoke Russia into taking the very sort of negative measures (“over-extension”) that the U.S. can exploit to Russia’s detriment.

    The RAND study explains its goals:

    “We examine a range of nonviolent measures that could exploit Russia’s actual vulnerabilities and anxieties as a way of stressing Russia’s military and economy and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad. The steps we examine would not have either defense or deterrence as their prime purpose, although they might contribute to both. Rather, these steps are conceived of as elements in a campaign designed to unbalance the adversary, leading Russia to compete in domains or regions where the United States has a competitive advantage, and causing Russia to overextend itself militarily or economically or causing the regime to lose domestic and/or international prestige and influence.”

    Clearly, in U.S. ruling circles, this is considered “normal” behaviour, just as teasing is normal behaviour for the schoolyard bully, and sting operations are normal for corrupt FBI agents.

    This description perfectly fits U.S. operations in Ukraine, intended to “exploit Russia’s vulnerabilities and anxieties” by advancing a hostile military alliance onto its doorstep, while describing Russia’s totally predictable reactions as gratuitous aggression.  Diplomacy involves understanding the position of the other party.  But verbal bear baiting requires total refusal to understand the other, and constant deliberate misinterpretation of whatever the other party says or does.

    What is truly diabolical is that, while constantly accusing the Russian bear of plotting to expand, the whole policy is directed at goading it into expanding!  Because then we can issue punishing sanctions, raise the Pentagon budget a few notches higher and tighten the NATO Protection Racket noose tighter around our precious European “allies.”

    For a generation, Russian leaders have made extraordinary efforts to build a peaceful partnership with “the West,” institutionalized as the European Union and above all, NATO. They truly believed that the end of the artificial Cold War could produce a peace-loving European neighbourhood. But arrogant United States leaders, despite contrary advice from their best experts, rejected treating Russia as the great nation it is and preferred to treat it as the harassed bear in a circus.

    The expansion of NATO was a form of bear-baiting, the clear way to transform a potential friend into an enemy. That was the way chosen by former U.S. President Bill Clinton and following administrations.  Moscow had accepted the independence of former members of the Soviet Union.  Bear-baiting involved constantly accusing Moscow of plotting to take them back by force.

    Russia’s Borderland

    An unpaved road to Lysychansk, Lugansk, March 2015. (Rosa Luxemburg-Stiftung, Flickr, CC BY 2.0)

    Ukraine is a word meaning borderlands, essentially the borderlands between Russia and the territories to the West that were sometimes part of Poland, or Lithuania, or Habsburg lands.  As a part of the U.S.S.R., Ukraine was expanded to include large swaths of both.  History had created very contrasting identities on the two extremities, with the result that the independent nation of Ukraine, which came into existence only in 1991, was deeply divided from the start.  And from the start, Washington strategies, in cahoots with a large, hyperactive anti-communist anti-Russian diaspora in the U.S. and Canada, contrived to use the bitterness of Ukraine’s divisions to weaken first the U.S.S.R. and then Russia.  Billions of dollars were invested in order to “strengthen democracy” – meaning the pro-Western west of Ukraine against its semi-Russian east.

    The 2014 U.S.-backed coup that overthrew President Viktor Yukanovych, solidly supported by the east of the country, brought to power pro-West forces determined to bring Ukraine into NATO, whose designation of Russia as the prime enemy had become ever more blatant. This caused the prospect of an eventual NATO capture of Russia’s major naval base at Sebastopol, on the Crimean peninsula.

    Since the Crimean population had never wanted to be part of Ukraine, the peril was averted by organizing a referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Crimeans voted to return to Russia, from which they had been severed by an autocratic Khrushchev ruling in 1954.  Western propagandists relentlessly denounced this act of self-determination as a “Russian invasion” foreshadowing a program of Russian military conquest of its Western neighbours – a fantasy supported by neither facts nor motivation.

    Appalled by the coup overthrowing the president they had voted for, by nationalists threatening to outlaw the Russian language they spoke, the people of the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk declared their independence.

    March 2015: Civilians pass by as OSCE monitors the movement of heavy weaponry in eastern Ukraine. (OSCE, CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

    Russia did not support this move but instead supported the Minsk agreement, signed in February 2015 and endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution. The gist of the accord was to preserve the territorial integrity of Ukraine by a federalization process that would return the breakaway republics in return for their local autonomy.

    The Minsk agreement set out a few steps to end the internal Ukrainian crisis. First, Ukraine was supposed to immediately adopt a law granting self-government to eastern regions (in March 2015). Next, Kyiv would negotiate with eastern territories over guidelines for local elections to be held that year under OSCE supervision.  Then Kyiv would implement a constitutional reform guaranteeing eastern rights. After the elections, Kyiv would take full control of Donetsk and Lugansk, including the border with Russia.  A general amnesty would cover soldiers on both sides.

    However, although it signed the agreement, Kyiv has never implemented any of these points and refuses to negotiate with the eastern rebels.  Under the so-called Normandy agreement, France and Germany were expected to put pressure on Kyiv to accept this peaceful settlement, but nothing happened. Instead, the West has accused Russia of failing to implement the agreement, which makes no sense inasmuch as the obligations to implement fall on Kyiv, not on Moscow.  Kyiv officials regularly reiterate their refusal to negotiate with the rebels, while demanding more and more weaponry from NATO powers in order to deal with the problem in their own way.

    Meanwhile, major parties in the Russian Duma and public opinion have long expressed concern for the Russian-speaking population of the eastern provinces, suffering from privations and military attack from the central government for eight years. This concern is naturally interpreted in the West as a remake of Hitler’s drive to conquest neighbouring countries.  However, as usual, the inevitable Hitler analogy is baseless. For one thing, Russia is too large to need to conquer Lebensraum.

    You Want an Enemy?  Now You’ve Got One

    Germany has found the perfect formula for Western relations with Russia: Are you or are you not a “Putinversteher,” a “Putin understander?” By Putin, they mean Russia, since the standard Western propaganda ploy is to personify the targeted country with the name of its president, Vladimir Putin, necessarily a dictatorial autocrat.   If you “understand” Putin or Russia, then you are under deep suspicion of disloyalty to the West.  So, all together now, let us make sure that we DO NOT UNDERSTAND Russia!

    Image Credit: metro.co.uk

    Russian leaders claim to feel threatened by members of a huge hostile alliance, holding regular military manoeuvers on their doorstep?  They feel uneasy about nuclear missiles aimed at their territory from nearby NATO member states?  Why, that’s just paranoia, or a sign of sly, aggressive intentions.  There is nothing to understand.

    So, the West has treated Russia like a baited bear.  And what it’s getting is a nuclear-armed, militarily powerful adversary nation led by people vastly more thoughtful and intelligent than the mediocre politicians in office in Washington, London and a few other places.

    U.S. President Joe Biden and his Deep State never wanted a peaceful solution in Ukraine, because troubled Ukraine acts as a permanent barrier between Russia and Western Europe, ensuring U.S. control over the latter.  They have spent years treating Russia as an adversary, and Russia is now drawing the inevitable conclusion that the West will accept it only as an adversary.  The patience is at an end. And this is a game-changer.

    First reaction: the West will punish the bear with sanctions!  Germany is stopping certification of the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline.  Germany thus refuses to buy the Russian gas it needs in order to make sure Russia won’t be able to cut off the gas it needs some time in the future.  Now that’s a clever trick, isn’t it!  And meanwhile, with a growing gas shortage and rising prices, Russia will have no trouble selling its gas somewhere else in Asia.

    When “our values” include refusal to understand, there is no limit to how much we can fail to understand.

    To be continued.

     

    Feature Image: nato.int

  • Changing Socio-Economic Situation of UP over the past Decade

    Changing Socio-Economic Situation of UP over the past Decade

    Elections have been announced and UP will be crucial. Parties have been campaigning for them for at least the last 6. The media has been awash with advertisements portraying a rosy picture of UP. They needed this unprecedented blitzkrieg to overcome the negativity due to the poor of the COVID second wave. Anyway, the and the government try to present a positive image of their work. Other state governments followed the UP, to the delight of media which is garnering much revenue.

    What is the reality on the ground in UP? Farmers, workers and have been protesting. Why this protest if the situation is as rosy as is projecting? Where does lie? Citizens need to know, to make up their minds about who to vote for. Since there has been growth. Even when it is small but positive, will be visible in socio-economic parameters, like, education, longevity, etc. There will be more roads, bridges, agricultural production, and so on.

    So, it is no brainer that the last 5 years would show progress compared to the immediately preceding 5 years and the ones before that, etc.. The meaningful comparison has to be based on changes in the ratios and growth rates between the earlier period and the present one. That tells us whether matters will improve faster or stagnate. Also, comparisons with all India figures would yield a picture of where UP stands compared to other states.

    If the present regimes 5 years are compared to the 5 years earlier this would be unfair since the last two years have been unusual – hit by the pandemic and the lockdown. The economy as a whole experienced a downturn and so did UP. A meaningful comparison would be between the pre-pandemic three years and the 5 years before them.

    Growth has Decreased

    A difficulty arises regarding measuring the growth of the economy since the Indian economy’s data is suspect, especially after demonetization. A disjuncture has been created between the organized and unorganized sectors while the data is largely from the former. So, the latter goes largely unrepresented and this causes a large error in the growth rates.

    Ignoring this aspect for the moment, let us analyse the official data, assuming it to be correct. It shows that out of the 20 major states, UP’s position remains at 19 in the last 10 years. In effect, there is no relative improvement in UP’s situation at the all India level.

    This is because the official growth rate was 11.8% in 2016-17 and has fallen to 6.3% in 2018-19 before the pandemic. The decline is also visible in the real income per person. Between 2012-13 and 2016-17, it increased by 27.63%. If we take the average over three years it increased by 16.6%. Leaving out the pandemic year of 2020-21, it rose by 9.23% (including the pandemic year it was 0.43%, that is it hardly grew). Including inflation also the per-person income growth slowed down. It was 25% during 2017–21 as compared to an increase of 65% during 2012–17.

    Slower Structural Transformation

    UP’s income (GSDP) was Rs.19 lakh crore out of GDP of Rs.190 lakh crore in 2019-20 – 10% of the country’s income. But its population share is estimated at 17%. The situation has not changed in the last 5 years and that is why the per-person income capita income rank or UP remains at 19th out of the 20 major states.

    One of the factors underlying the slow growth of UP is that it has structurally not transformed as much as has happened for the country as a whole. In UP, the share of agriculture is 24% while that of services is 50%. The all-India figures are 19.7% and 54.3% respectively. So, UP’s structural transformation is lagging behind that of all of India. Since agriculture cannot grow as fast as the services sector, the state’s growth rate is bound to be less than that for the nation. This feature is also the reason for weak employment generation in UP because agriculture cannot absorb more workers, in fact, it is characterized by mechanization and disguised unemployment.

    UP employed 57.13 lakh under MGNREGS, in May 2020 which was the highest in India. This points to high rural unemployment in UP. The large scale migration of workers from other states to UP in 2020 is an indication of the weak employment generation in UP which forced many to look for work elsewhere. No wonder the state faced the biggest impact of Coronavirus in India both in terms of employment and health aspects.

    Unfortunately, data invisibilizes the unorganized sector and hence the poor. The country has suffered policy induced crisis due to demonetisation, implementation of GST, NBFC crisis and the pandemic induced lockdown. This has deeply impacted the unorganized sectors of the economy and they have suffered massive losses during 2016-17 to 2020-21. The total loss for the unorganized sector in UP is estimated at 10% of the national loss during this period and amounts to Rs. 7.1 lakh crore. That is an average loss per annum of Rs. 1.78 lakh crore. This loss is far more than what the social welfare schemes of the government give. In any case, the schemes are mired in corruption and inefficiency and do not reach everyone uniformly. So, the poor are the net losers in spite of the government schemes.

    Government’s Efforts Slowing

    Are the government schemes expanding? How much are they able to help UP develop and catch up with the other states of India?

    No doubt, the absolute budgetary expenditures rise with inflation and growth. So, on most items more is spent than in earlier years. But to know whether these expenditures will help improve the situation or not, one has to compare the expenditures as a ratio of the state’s income (GSDP). On this score, the Budget data shows:

    a) Development expenditure peaked in 2015-16 at 16.66% and declined to 13.28% in 2019-20. This signifies that development is decelerating.

    b) Non-Development expenditure rose from 6.81% in 2015-16 to 8.49% in 2018-19 and was at 7.12% in 2019-20. This reflects the expenditure on grandiose show schemes of the state government which resulted in a decline in developmental expenditures mentioned above.

    c) No wonder expenditure on Education, etc. peaked in 2016-17 at 4.21% and fell to 3.07% in 2018-19 and was at 3.3% in 2019-20. The target should have been 6% of GSDP on public education. Instead of moving towards that goal, there is retrogression.

    d) Similarly, health expenditure peaked in 2016-17 at 0.84% and fell to 0.79% in 2019-20. It should have been raised to at least 3% of GSDP and instead, it fell. The impact of this was visible during the pandemic with poor health facilities in large parts of the hinterland and unnecessary deaths.

    e) Budgetary Capital outlay peaked in 2015-16 at 5.66% and fell to 3.55% in 2019-20. This slows down infrastructure development and adversely impacts private investment.

    In brief, as the economy expands, there will be development in a state – more hospitals, schools, colleges and so on. Further, development may be skewed and leave the poor behind as is the case in recent times. The real picture becomes clear when one looks at the ratios and compares them with other states. In these respects, UP has lagged behind both its past performance and other states. The virtual campaigning required due to the spread of Omicron would marginalize the less tech-savvy parties and give BJP an advantage in painting a glorious image of itself, in spite of its recent indifferent performance.

    This article was published earlier in hwnews.in

    Feature Image Credit: www.dnaindia.com

  • The power of poetry in politics and indigenous people of India

    The power of poetry in politics and indigenous people of India

    O ancestral spirits!
    How now do we escape,
    From the conspiracies of time,
    Concocted on the flames
    That from the sweltering earth rise?
    Where all is slowly being roasted alive,
    The air, the forests, and the soil,
    And man – in body and in mind?

    – Lament in Songs (Geeton Ke Bilaap) through Jacinta Kerketta

    A profound political philosopher of ancient Athens whose administrational academics left people in admiration and aghast protested against poets and critiqued poetries. He feared the passion or public emotion evoked by poets, and he reckoned that rational thought could be ravaged by public passion.

    “For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him.”

    ― Plato

    Poetry is one of the ancient art forms, the earliest kinds of poems were recited and passed on orally before the evolution of scripts. Administrative and ancestral accounts were more merely to remember due to the poem’s rhythmic and repetitious nature.

    Influence of poetry in politics

    Through triumph and terror or from pain to power, poetry allows people to paint different shades of human emotions. Poetry has served as a significant tool to convey meanings and messages since the beginning. It is also used as a channel to cast awareness on sound socio-economic concerns and personify political questions. Poems play a pivotal role in collective resonation to specific themes and it embraces the efficiency of words which could be serene as a sea or sharp as a sword.

    In the year 1821 Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote eloquently in his essay A Defence of Poetry that the poet creates humane values and imagines the forms that shape the social order and“Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world.” Political poetries pave a path to discuss injustice in the societies and build a bridge between the emotive expression of the state administrators and its citizens. Political poetries are not definitive they are not bureaucratic blueprints or literary balms either, they imprint the cyclic endurance of the past, present, and future. They massively represent the public’s fear and anguish or equip the endangered with empowerment.

    Adrienne Rich compellingly stated in a commentary that –

    “I’m both a poet and one of the “everybodies” of my country. I live with manipulated fear, ignorance, cultural confusion and social antagonism huddling together on the faultline of an empire”.

     

    Profile and position of indigenous people of India

    Histories have created many poets and many poets have influenced histories, traditionally archiving their histories through songs, folklore, and myths. Adivasis have aced their way through their ancestral accounts accumulation. Adivasis are folks who function their lives through flourishing flora and fauna encapsulated with enriching cultures and practices and lives among the areas of the Indian sub-continent. Adivasi is a common term that was coined in the 1930s to address the indigenous groups of India, while the legal term ”scheduled tribes” is used in the constitution. They are the most prehistoric inhabitants of the sub-continent who are a heterogeneous group with diverse ethnicity and linguistics. Post the Aryan intervention the Adivasis began to trade with people of the plains, it was during the mid-eighteenth century that the indigenous people of the east revolted against the political British and its intrusive regulation upon the mainlands of the indigenous folks.

    This renounced the defenceless position of the land and its people. Even, today the Adivasis encounter various forms of social discrimination, political power lash, and remain economically stagnant.

    Balance between battles and banquets- Political poetries of the past and the present

    Songs, myths, and folklore revolving around landscapes, political relations among the Adivasis or with the non-Adivasis, human emotions were all oral histories being passed on to the next generation. The stories of Adivasis were massively written by people who did not belong to the Adivasi community, the literary endeavours of the tribes were not adequately acknowledged due to the lack of recognition of languages amongst the state. The poems written by the poets or writers of the community have an extensive influence over the political lives of Adivasis in terms of the political periphery.  In most poems by the Adivasis, the muscles of metaphors were majorly merged with nature or the environment. The largest of them are written in their indigenous languages like Kotas, Santali, and Ho & others where some are translated to other vernacular languages and some are not. Many political poetries raise questions against the havoc harboured by a biased notion of “progress”. The following are a few poetical works of indigenous people of India which brought out Adivasi’s political proximity.

    The editor of Chandini Magazine, Susheela Samad was one of the earliest Adivasi writers in the 1920s, where two of her poetry were published in the 1940s. In the year 1960 several stories of Alice Ekka were published in the Adivasi Patrika who was also the first female Adivasi writer.

    The very famous Temsüla Ao an Ao Naga tribal poet and an ethnographer who worked on Oral histories published plenty of poetry from 1988 to 2007 shedding light on the word “song” in all her titles emphasizing the essence of poems in tribal song culture and expressing the voices of her community against land & cultural alienation.

    Referring to the violence in the valley, the poet says

      ” But to-day

       I no longer know my hills,

       The birdsong is gone,

       Replaced by the staccato

       Of sophisticated weaponry. ” (“My Hills” 19-23)

    The poet laments the loss of peace and verdure in her region.

    The director of Adivasi Bhasha Shodh Sansthan (Tribal Language Research Institute) Ushakiran Atram is a Koitur poet and a writer who held compelling narratives on patriarchal injustice and political vocalization from a woman’s scope of the lens.

    “Bata maan, main kiski hun? Baba-Bhaiya ki? Mere Shauhar ki? Sawkaar-Ranger-Patil ki? Jameendaar-Darzi-Sonaarki? Kiski hun main?”—Tell me, mother, whose am I? Father’s or brother’s? My husband’s? Moneylenders-Rangers-Patils? Landlords-Tailors-Goldsmiths? Whose am I?

    the mentioned poem is from one of her books named ‘Motiyarin’ A Gonti term which means a position given to a woman leader who supervises the overall activities in Gotul.

    “Unless you speak their dialect, you’re an outsider,” says Lakshmanan who accompanied Tamil Nadu Pazhankudi Makkal Sangam, a movement that worked for indigenous welfare. In 2010, he also wrote an anthology of poems titled ‘Odiyan’ which means the evil spirit through which he paints the colours of pain and anguish of the Irular community which was partly in their language.

     

    Jacinda Kerketta a young poet and a journalist of the Oraon tribe raises questions about the standpoint on “development” on tribal lands, In the poem “Oh Shahar” (Oh City) she writes

    Leaving behind their homes,

    Their soil, their bales of straw,

    Fleeing the roof over their heads, they often ask,

    O, City!

    Are you ever wrenched by the very roots?

    In the name of so-called progress?

    The author brings out the intensity of anthropocentrism imposed upon the Adivasi arena and all her poems do not victimize their position instead evokes thought-provoking questions.

     

     

     

    Recently, Arivu a resounding rapper and a political poet brought out many problematic political practices of history and the present against his community through his album called ‘Therukural’ (voices of the streets), and in 2021 the song “Enjoy Enjaami” which is a blend of Rap and ‘oppari'(lament song sung during mourning )took over the stage of multi-media, the artist poetically and politically protested in all his works intending to enlighten the traces of civilization before caste and issues of inequality.

     

     

     

    Waharu Sonavane, a Bhilli poet and an activist whose “Stage” was an icebreaker that questioned the leadership of a major movement – Narmada Bachao Andolan and indigenous representation in bearing the torch.

     

     

     

     

    Will the mainstream history intersect Adivasi’s ancestral accounts? or will they contradict? Poetical poems fade along with time, they lose their essence of eventual happenings but strikingly hold the public psychology of the period. Political poems of indigenous tribes of India pose their position into viewing history from a different lens – meaning to revisit the history not just from conventional collectives but also to learn from our oral archives, songs and stories.

    The following poem was written by Waharu Sonavane; translated by Bharat Patankar, Gail Omvedt, and Suhas Paranjape –

    Stage

     We didn’t go to the stage,

    nor were we called.

    With a wave of the hand

    we were shown our place.

    There we sat

    and were congratulated,

    and “they”, standing on the stage,

    kept on telling us of our sorrows.

    Our sorrows remained ours,

    they never became theirs.

    When we whispered out doubts

    they perked their ears to listen,

    and sighing,

    tweaking our ears,

    told us to shut up,

    apologize; or else…

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.climatescorecard.org

  • RCEP, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Vietnam

    RCEP, Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and Vietnam

    The World Bank projection for the RCEP is indeed very impressive and the Member States will see GDP increase by 1.5 per cent. Furthermore, by some estimates, the RCEP could add almost US$ 200 billion to the global economy by 2030.

    ASEAN Member States, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand have heralded the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 01 January 2022. This 15 Member consortium is the largest economic grouping and constitutes nearly 30 per cent of the global population which relates to a market of 2.3 billion people with an output value of about US$26.2 trillion with over a quarter in world exports. The World Bank projectionfor the RCEP is indeed very impressive and the Member States will see GDP increase by 1.5 per cent. Furthermore, by some estimates, the RCEP could add almost US$ 200 billion to the global economy by 2030.

    Infographics Credit: Vietnam Investment Review

    As far as Vietnam is concerned, the leaders in Hanoi must be happy to see the RCEP take concrete shape given that it was signed in November 2020 during the ASEAN Summit under Vietnam’s chairship. Vietnam, according to Fitch Solutions, is expected to benefit enormously from the RCEP particularly the IT, footwear, agriculture, automobiles, and telecommunications sectors being the major export categories. The RCEP will also provide Vietnam access to huge consumer markets which could be double the size of those included in the CPTPP. Vietnam can potentially move to become a high-tech manufacturer, and the RCEP can facilitate “local firms increase exports and attract high-quality goods for its consumers. Likewise, agriculture and fisheries product exports will benefit”.

    Vietnam, according to Fitch Solutions, is expected to benefit enormously from the RCEP particularly the IT, footwear, agriculture, automobiles, and telecommunications sectors being the major export categories

    Vietnam’s economic outlook for 2022 is positive with numerous growth opportunities. The National Assembly has identified (2021-2025 period) focus areas in sectors such as “digital economy, hi-tech industries, developing the urban economy, strengthening regional connectivity, strengthening the role of key economic zones, and restructuring to achieve a green and sustainable economy among others”. These sectors can be expected to grow given that the country has strong economic indicators notwithstanding the downturn in economic growth due to COVID-19. This is premisedon “investor-friendly policies, relative economic and political stability, cost efficiency, and consumer demand prospects, supply chains restructuring in Asia” which will attract both old and new investors.

    However, Vietnam should also be prepared for the ongoing and impending geo-economic and geopolitical triggers emerging from contestation between the US and China. During the East Asia Summit in October 2021, President Biden announced that the US was considering a major trade and economic initiative in the form of an “Indo-Pacific economic framework”. Soon thereafter Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo visited Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea to “begin discussions on potential negotiations that could start in early 2022”. Besides some Members of Congress, the new framework is also inspired by Australia and Japan, who had called for a “more active U.S. trade policy, including U.S. leadership in regional trade initiatives”. Above all, the initiative should be seen as a move by the Biden Administration to put to rest any doubts in the minds of regional leaders that the US “lacks an economic and trade strategy sufficient to counter China’s increasing economic influence” in the aftermath of President Trump decision to withdraw from the proposed 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017.

    The new US economic framework, it is hoped, will also lessen fears in the minds of regional countries arising from the geopolitical-geostrategic issues between the US and China. The US’ “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy which pivots on ‘rule of law’ is essentially diplomatic and military and is symbolized by the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the US, Japan, India, and Australia (the Quad) and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security partnership.

    The Quad has made significant progress and the first-ever in-person Leaders’ Summit was held in September 2021. It was agreed to advance practical cooperation on 21st-century challenges such as “ ending the COVID-19 pandemic, including by increasing production and access to safe and effective vaccines; promoting high-standards infrastructure; combatting the climate crisis; partnering on emerging technologies, space, and cyber security; and cultivating next-generation talent”. The leaders also called for building quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region which was targeted against China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).  As far as the AUKUS is concerned, the rationale is quite clear and is driven by the growing Chinese assertiveness amid fears of extreme coercion against regional countries particularly Taiwan and the claimants of the South China Sea.

    The RCEP and the “Indo-Pacific economic framework” are significant developments but can potentially pose a dilemma for Vietnam

    The RCEP and the “Indo-Pacific economic framework” are significant developments but can potentially pose a dilemma for Vietnam. There are numerous economic benefits to be accrued from the RCEP, but at the same time there are both economic and strategic rewards from the “Indo-Pacific economic framework”.  The US Indo-Pacific strategy has not found much favour in Hanoi; instead, Vietnam has chosen to support and pursue the ASEAN Outlook for Indo Pacific (AOIP) which envisages ASEAN Centrality and the East Asia Summit (EAS), as the underlying principle for promoting cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

     

    Feature Image Credit: worldakkam.com

  • The Cold War that Wasn’t

    The Cold War that Wasn’t

    US President Joe Biden has repeatedly cast his country’s rivalry with China as a battle between democracy and autocracy, an ideological clash reminiscent of the Cold War. This narrative is inaccurate – the United States and China are locked in a competition for strategic dominance – and all but precludes resolution. Whereas demands related to tangible assets and security concerns can be accommodated, ideological struggles typically end one way: with the unconditional defeat of one of the parties

    The US should not be attempting to “defeat” China, as it did the Soviet Union, because, first and foremost, China is not on a quest to spread “socialism with Chinese characteristics” around the world. When Chinese President Xi Jinping declared in 2017 that “war without the smoke of gunpowder in the ideological domain is ubiquitous, and the struggle without armament in the political sphere has never stopped,” he was mainly demanding that outsiders respect China’s institutions and cultural traditions.

    The US is an exhausted power, and it is now being challenged by a rising one. To ensure that this well-known geopolitical dynamic does not end in war, the US must abandon jingoistic rhetoric and replace megaphone diplomacy with wise and creative statesmanship.

    This partly reflects Chinese nationalism, fed by historical narratives, especially the memory of the “century of humiliation” (1839-1949), during which China faced interventions and subjugation by Western powers and Japan. But it is also pragmatic: The Communist Party of China recognizes that some domestic trends could destabilize the country and eventually even undermine the CPC’s rule.

    For example, China’s economic rise has produced an educated, well-connected, and fast-growing middle class. If these increasingly powerful consumers rejected restrictions on private-sector activity or limits to free expression, the CPC would have trouble on its hands. Given this, the CPC views US advocacy of political freedom and human rights in China as an effort to subvert its rule.

    Even America’s drive to export liberal democracy to Asia and Africa has been less an ideological problem for China than a strategic one. Functioning democracies are likely to be harder bargaining partners for China and might even be brought into US-led anti-Chinese alliances.

    On this front, China’s fears have probably been assuaged by recent developments. With the from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s quick reconquest of the country, America’s democratic “crusade” – to borrow the language of former US President George W. Bush – seems to have reached an ignominious conclusion.

    But even if the US is not bringing new countries into the democratic fold, its existing alliance system is formidable, and Biden is committed to strengthening it further. For example, he has worked to resuscitate NATO; created , a new defense and technology alliance with the United Kingdom and Australia; and deepened security cooperation among key democracies in the Indo-Pacific (Australia, India, Japan, and the US, known as the “Quad”).

    This focus on alliances is probably the biggest difference between Biden’s China policy and that of his predecessor, Donald Trump, who spearheaded the shift toward confrontation. (Prior to Trump, recent US presidents largely attempted to maintain good working relations with China, not least because they clung to the assumption that the country’s economic rise would gradually bring about political change.)

    For China, this difference is worrying. Though the US cannot contain China alone, it can apply strong diplomatic pressure if it has other powers on its side, and China is in no position to create an alliance system that can match that of the US. Far from stabilizing the situation, however, this imbalance could fuel China’s insecurity, making constructive engagement all the more difficult

    America’s position is hardly unassailable, either. Biden’s touted exposed the limits of ideology as a mobilizing tool for a global anti-China coalition. It does not help that America’s own democracy is plagued by polarization, paralysis, and discontent. Add to that the world’s highest numberof COVID-19 deaths, and the “shining city on a hill” has lost its luster, to say the least.

    While the US is no ancient Rome – not least because it retains extraordinary advantages in crucial areas, from defense and diplomacy to technology and finance – it is suffering from what the historian Edward Gibbon described as “the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness.” It has failed to adapt its democratic institutions to meet the needs of its population and its responsibilities as a world power.

    Ultimately, the US is an exhausted power, and it is now being challenged by a rising one. This dynamic is as longstanding as it is dangerous. As the ancient historian Thucydides explained, the rise of Athens, and the fear that this instilled in Sparta, made the catastrophic Peloponnesian War inevitable. Harvard’s Graham Allison notes that there have been 16 similar cases in the last 500 years. War broke out in 12 of them.

    To avoid what Allison calls the Thucydides Trap, the US must abandon jingoistic rhetoric and Manichean thinking, replacing megaphone diplomacy with wise and creative statesmanship. The choice is not between capitulating to China and crushing it. The US must recognize China’s legitimate concerns and aspirations, and it must be prepared to negotiate accordingly. (Sooner or later, it will have to do the same with regard to the West’s current showdown vis-à-vis Russia over Ukraine and NATO’s expansion.)

    The US must accept that the days of American hegemony are over. In today’s multipolar world, different political cultures and systems will have to learn to coexist. The ideological defeat of the Soviet Union did not exactly usher in a liberal democracy. Perhaps more important, even if China somehow suddenly became a liberal democracy, its historical grievances and territorial aspirations would remain, as is the case with Russia today. In this sense, ideological competition is beside the point.

    This article was originally published by Project Syndicate.

    Feature Image Credit: The Hill

  • Infrastructure development is high priority for Vietnam-Lao PDR relations

    Infrastructure development is high priority for Vietnam-Lao PDR relations

    The year 2022 is singularly important for Vietnam-Lao PDR relations. It marks the 60th anniversary of the bilateral diplomatic relations, and 45 years of the Vietnam-Laos Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Both sides have accorded high priority to the current year, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh extended the invitation to Lao Prime Minister Phankham Viphavanh to visit to commemorate the above events.  Accordingly, Prime Minister Viphavanh is in Vietnam and is leading a high-level delegation.

    Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, according to reports, will also co-chair the 44th meeting of the Vietnam-Laos Inter-Governmental Committee and launch the Vietnam-Laos Solidarity and Friendship Year 2022. This would help to “get a better understanding of each other’s socio-economic situation, development orientations and external policies” particularly during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

    The visit is also intended to boost Vietnam-Laos cooperation strategy for the 2021-2030 period and the five-year cooperation plan for the 2021-2025 period that are now into the second year and involve bilateral engagements in multiple domains such as politics, diplomacy, security-defence, economy, science-technology, culture, and education-training.

    COVID-19 would be high on the agenda of both leaders given that the pandemic is impacting their countries. They are in the midst of the fourth wave with 8,236 and 354,075 active cases (as of 05 Jan 2022) respectively.

    In December 2021, the Lao government announced opening up of the country for trade and tourism in three phases: First phase – January 1, 2022; Second phase – April 1, 2022; and the Third phase July 1, 2022. In the first phase, 17 countries, including Vietnam and many neighbouring ASEAN countries, besides some European countries, China, the US, Australia and Canada would be welcomed. The Lao economy is impacted by COVID-19 and was projected to grow at 3 per cent, a figure lower than 4 per cent as approved by the Laotian National Assembly. This attributed to the pandemic and prolonged lockdowns that disrupted economic activities and companies, retail and wholesale shops had to shut down.

    Leaders in Vientiane recognize the importance of regional development particularly in the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA)

    Vietnam and Lao PDR are also engaged in major connectivity projects. Lao is a landlocked country and ports in Vietnam provide the country access to the sea to engage in international seaborne commerce.

    Last year, during President Nguyen Xuan Phuc visit to Laos, 14 agreements spanning a wide range of issues were signed. The leaders agreed to fast-track joint projects including Vung Ang No.1, 2, 3 port projects, the Hanoi-Vientiane Expressway, Vientiane-Vung Ang Railway, Lao-Vietnam Friendship Park in Vientiane, Nongkhang Airport and hospitals in Lao Houaphan and Xiangkhouang Provinces.

    One of their flagship joint projects is the 1,450 kilometres long East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC). It is a road-building project and is supported by the Asia Development Bank (ADB). Its western leg includes Thailand, and in the east, it terminates at the Vietnamese port of Da Nang which is a major gateway to the Pacific.

    Similarly, the 555 kilometres railway link (452 kilometres in Laos and 103 kilometres in Ha Tinh central province in Vietnam) between Vientiane and the Vietnamese deep-water port of Vung Ang is important. It gives Laos yet another access to the sea. Importantly, it is being jointly developed and Laos would hold a 60% stake in the project, and Vietnam with 40%.

    China is also engaged in connectivity projects in Laos. In December 2021, after six years of construction, the Laos-China Railway project was finally operationalized. It is a complex project and includes 61 kilometres of bridges and 198 kilometres of tunnels and reduce travel time between Vientiane to the Chinese border from 15 hours by road to four hours. It will be operated by the Laos-China Railway Co., a joint venture between China Railway group and two other Chinese government-owned companies with a 70% stake and a Laotian state company with 30%.

    Vietnam offers Laos an alternative to Chinese infrastructure investments and it ranks third among investors in Lao with total investments of US$ 5.16 billion in 209 projects. There are fears that the Chinese funded projects do not generate economic benefits for Laos, instead these only benefit China.

    There are geopolitical dynamics at play in the CLV-DTA that are targeted against China, and Cambodia and Laos acknowledge Vietnam’s leadership

    Vietnam cannot match up with the Chinese investments in Laos, but leaders in Vientiane recognize the importance of regional development particularly in the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA). Vietnam for example has invested nearly US$ 4 billion in Cambodia and as noted above over US$ 5 billion in Laos. It is fair to assume that there are geopolitical dynamics at play in the CLV-DTA that are targeted against China, and Cambodia and Laos acknowledge Vietnam’s leadership.

    Images Credit: Vietnam times