The Peninsula Foundation

Category: National Security & Foreign Policy

  • Advantage India, after Balakot air strike

    Advantage India, after Balakot air strike

    G Parthasarathy                                                                                     March 8, 2019/Op-Ed

    After the precision air strikes by the Indian Air Force on the small town of Balakot in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, public attention in India is now focused on bringing the leaders of the Jaish-e- Mohammed, including Jaish Supremo Maulana Masood Azhar to justice.

    Ironically, Azhar would not have been such a threat today if we did not cravenly release him after being blackmailed, during the Kandahar hijacking of IC 814. Those then released, included terrorists like Omar Syed Sheikh, who funded the 9/11 hijackers in the US and murdered American journalist Daniel Pearl.

    Recurring pattern

    The mass killing of Indians in terrorist strikes organised by the ISI has been a continuing feature of Pakistani policies, since the Mumbai bomb blasts on March 12, 1993. People seem to forget that 253 people were killed and 713 injured in the terrorist strikes in Mumbai in 1993. These killings were organised by the then ISI Chief Lt. General Javed Nasir, who incidentally enjoyed the patronage of Nawaz Sharif for years.

    The mastermind of the 1993 bomb blasts, Dawood Ibrahim, lives under heavy security protection, in the elite locality of Clifton in Karachi. There is conclusive evidence that the attack on India’s Parliament in December 13, 2001 was organised by Maulana Masood Azhar’s Jaish-e-Mohammed.

    A former ISI Chief Lt. General Javed Akhtar admitted this, in March 2004, in Pakistan’s Parliament. In the Kargil conflict in 1999, 527 Indian soldiers had been killed and 453 wounded, which was ostensibly designed to disrupt India’s supply lines to its forces in Siachen.

    When the Jaish-e-Mohammed, thereafter, briefly receded into the background, the ISI backed Lashkar-e-Taiba mounted yet another terrorist attack on November 26, 2008 on Mumbai, when 139 Indians died and 256 were injured. This received huge international attention, as the casualties included citizens of countries like US, UK, France, Germany and Israel.

    Yet, within a few months, we were back to a “Composite Dialogue” with Pakistan, after the Sharm el Sheikh Summit, where the focus of attention was not the 26/11 terrorist strike on Mumbai, but unfounded Pakistani allegations of Indian involvement in the freedom struggle in Baluchistan! Sadly, this was a manifestation of Indian diplomacy, at its worst.

    The Balakot Air Strikes by IAF Mirage 2000 aircraft was marked by the use of precision guided Israeli Spice 2000 bombs, which function with deadly accuracy. There is now conclusive evidence that the target was a Jaish-e-Mohammed Madrassa, which was badly damaged.

    Hundreds of Jaish Jihadis, preparing for “martyrdom” in Jammu and Kashmir, were motivated and trained in Balakot, for “Jihad” in Kashmir. The training was embellished with promises of an after life in a heavenly abode. Our government would, however, have been better advised, if unverified claims of hundreds of casualties were not prematurely made, or publicised.

    What will, however, please our Russian friends, is the fact that an upgraded frontline American F-16 equipped with highly sophisticated AAM-RAM missiles, was shot down by a 1970s-1980s vintage, Russian Mig 21 BIS of the IAF. This incident again exposed the notorious inefficiency of our Defence Ministry, which has delayed a proposal for modernisation of the IAF’s fighter fleet for over two decades.

    Successive Defence Ministers must accept constitutional responsibility for the cavalier manner the entire issue of modernisation of our fighter fleet has been handled. More importantly, the decision-making organisational structure in our Defence Ministry, dominated by a generalist bureaucracy, needs to be drastically restructured and reformed.

    Pakistan should be made to realise that India’s air strike in Balakot marks only the beginnings of a new approach, which India will now undertake.

    Upgrade covert actions

    Firstly, it is time for decision-makers in New Delhi to realise that our covert actions capabilities on foreign soil need to be upgraded. I had occasion to recently read a book by journalist Sandeep Unnithan, due for release shortly, on how Prime Minister Indira Gandhi personally supervised covert actions in Bangladesh in 1971, which virtually destroyed maritime communications facilities there, even before the conflict started in December 1971.

    The Israelis spent years developing capabilities to seek out the perpetrators of the Second World War “Holocaust,” across the world. Their Iranian rivals have developed similar capabilities, which one saw recently, when Iran responded to a terrorist attack from Pakistani soil, which killed 29 Iranian Revolutionary Guards, near the border between Pakistani Baluchistan and the Sunni majority Iranian Province of Sistan-Baluchistan, where the port of Chabahar is located.

    In an almost immediate Iranian counter-strike, across the border, over eight Pakistani soldiers were killed and a large number injured.

    The time for developing capabilities for counter-strikes is now ripe. The global political, diplomatic and economic scenario in India and Pakistan has changed drastically, over the past two decades.

    Pakistan remains, in international perspectives, an economically bankrupt and politically dysfunctional country, which is ostensibly democratic, but run by a military elite, which is given to promoting religious extremism across its neighbourhood. Its actions, like hosting Osama bin Laden secretly for over a decade, promoting Taliban extremism in Afghanistan and using internationally discredited terrorist groups for Jihad abroad, have irreparably sullied its international image and reliability.

    Islamabad is addicted to seeking doles from rich Arab neighbours, China and international financial institutions like the IMF, Asian Development Bank and the World Bank. Pakistan is constantly dependent on these countries and international institutions, for its economic survival.

    In contrast, India is seen today as a country with the fastest growing economy in the world, which is increasingly attractive for foreign investment. India is at peace and enjoys excellent relations with all countries (except Pakistan) in its Indian Ocean neighbourhood.

    It has multiple free trade and comprehensive economic cooperation agreements within SAARC and with members of Bimstec and Asean. There are, likewise, Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements with South Korea and Japan.

    Across its western maritime frontiers, India is the only country, which enjoys excellent relations at the same time, with the oil rich Arab Gulf States, Iran and Israel. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has publicly expressed India’s thanks for American understanding and support in recent days.

    These developments now need, in course of time, to be augmented by moves to engage people in Pakistan, making it clear that India wishes them well.

    They have to be made to realise that their present miseries are the result of actions by a power hungry and rogue army, which is undermining democracy and leading the country to economic disaster and international isolation.

    Ambassador G Parthasarathy IFS (Retd) is a former High Commissioner in Pakistan, and is a Trustee of ‘The Peninsula Foundation’. Views expressed are author’s own.

    This article was published earlier in ‘The Hindu-Businessline‘. 

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  • Reaping the Whirlwind: Pulwama and After

    Reaping the Whirlwind: Pulwama and After

    Deepak Sinha                                                                                                         01 Mar 2019

    It was the military disaster of 1971 that forced the Pakistani establishment, the military which runs the country for all practical purposes, to face up to the fact that it could never win a conventional war against India. If it was to avenge its humiliation and cut India down to size, it had little choice but to fight through proxies, bleed India through a thousand cuts.

                This idea must surely have germinated from its successful employment of Islamic militants, the forerunners of the Taliban, used to oppose the rule of the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) that had deposed President Mohammed Daud Khan in what came to be known as the Saur or April Revolution of 1978, It was this Pakistani fomented insurgency which finally led to the Soviet intervention and occupation of Afghanistan in Dec 1979. Incidentally, while conventional wisdom would have us believe that it was the CIA that came up with the idea of using militants to fight the Soviets, facts show that they came to the party much later and only added their considerable resources to the techniques perfected by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence in the use of irregulars for its own ends.

                Thus from the early Eighties Pakistan commenced its support for secessionist elements within India that were involved in fighting against the State, firstly the Khalistan Movement and subsequently, with greater success, in Jammu and Kashmir. It clearly had advantages as there was credible deniability, economy of effort with the dirty work being done by proxies keeping Indian Security Forces tied down and finally, the most important of all, creating fear and anxiety within the general population that impacted every aspect of our democratic way of life.

                There is of course one major disadvantage of using proxies, they tend to have a mind of their own and often times respond inappropriately and at cross purposes to what its mentors may be wishing to achieve. The Pulwama suicide attack falls in this category. There have been numerous statements over the past four years that have made clear that Pakistan prefers to deal with Indian Governments run by the more “liberal and secular” parties compared to having to deal with the more conservative, Hindutva driven BJP. With elections around the corner and with the BJP facing the very real likelihood of a serious decline, if the recent state elections were any indication, it would have been in Pakistan’s best interest to maintain a low profile.

                Masood Azhar, the Jaish- e- Mohammed supremo, obviously had a different view. Not only did his organization carry out the suicide attack that led to the death of 45 policemen, but also went on to claim credit for the action. Thus, in one thoughtless act he not only destroyed the Pakistan Government’s attempts at deniability, but he also made Imran Khan’s call for India to provide credible evidence infructuous. Most importantly, the timing of the devastating attack left the Modi Government with little choice but to respond overtly and with speed, if it was to still retain any hope of doing well at the hustings. There was also the possibility that if India responded in an effective manner to the outrage, the Governments stock would go up rapidly and that would enhance Mr. Modi’s reputation and chances of return to power, just as the earlier cross- border strike helped the BJP in the Uttar Pradesh elections. This could hardly have been to Pakistan’s advantage and in the event it was facilitated by the Army, then General Bajwa has certainly made a serious miscalculation.

                Regardless of the number of casualties that the Indian Air Force’s attack on terror camps deep inside Pakistan may have caused, the very fact that the Indian Government displayed the intent to take on terrorists inside Pakistan has clearly changed the narrative prevalent for the past four decades. It has also shown up Pakistan’s repeated threats of a nuclear riposte as sheer hyperbole and bluster. More importantly the initiative has finally shifted in India’s favour along with world opinion which has had enough of Pakistan’s duplicitous behaviour. Moreover, any escalation above a perfunctory retaliation, which was to be expected to assuage domestic opinion, by Pakistan, would destroy the fig leaf of deniability it has used over the years. Most importantly, it would force their military into a direct confrontation, something that the proxy war waged by them over the years allowed them to avoid.

                In this context one can only hope better sense will prevail and we will be able to avoid a serious escalation of the conflict which can hardly help either side given the huge challenges that we face in lifting vast swathes of our population out of the twin evils of poverty and illiteracy.  However, it must be emphasized that true progress will only occur as and when Pakistan starts to wind up the Jihad factory it has built over these years. In any case the Indian cross- border raid cannot be a one- off affair and we must be willing to do all that it takes to neutralize the Jihadi network and its vast army of financiers, mangers and facilitators.

                Finally, while all our attention may be taken in dealing with the issue at hand, the fact as to what led to the Pulwama attack must not be lost sight off. For this serious lapse on the part of our intelligence services, it is imperative that heads must roll. There have also been clear indications that despite increasing numbers of militants being neutralized in the Valley the Army and other Security Forces were being increasingly marginalized, especially in South Kashmir, because of popular discontent. They had consequently lost their ability to dominate the countryside, thereby losing out on intelligence. These aspects continued to be ignored by the Central Government and the military hierarchy. Little thought was given to the necessity for reviewing either counter insurgency strategies or tactical procedures and the leadership continued to be swayed by tactical successes with little attempt to resolve the growing disillusionment and radicalization within the population, especially the youth. This must certainly change.

     

    The writer, a military veteran is a Consultant with the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi and Senior Visiting Fellow with The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai.

    This article was also published in the Pioneer https://www.dailypioneer.com/2019/columnists/stifle-the-jihadi-network.html. Opinions expressed in the article are those of the author alone.

  • Looking Beyond the Rafale Imbroglio

    Looking Beyond the Rafale Imbroglio

    The tenor of the debate, especially in the election year, can hardly be expected to be moderate or mature. While wild assertions made by the politicians in hope of swaying the electorate is to be expected and accepted, there is also a vital need for politicians to ensure that matters pertaining to National Security are kept out of the ambit of politics. Just as Georges Clemenceau, French Prime Minister during the Great War, commented that “War is too serious a matter to entrust to military men”, so too is the case with entrusting national security to just politicians. But politicians being politicians care little for such niceties, which explains why allegations of wrongdoing are flying so thick and fast in the ongoing Rafale procurement imbroglio, who, unfortunately, have been joined by respected academics and researchers, who should know better.

    Attempts to garner the limelight and the few minutes of fame that goes with it is understandable in the case of politicians, but for academics to do so by drawing conclusions based on speculation that passes for facts and little else, seems to be rather hasty, if not downright fallacious and unprofessional.  A respected academic, for example, has concluded that the decision to procure just 36 jets instead of the original 126 with the attendant increase in unit cost shows “extraordinary ineptitude can only be explained by the circumvention of laid down procedures.” He further  goes on to equate the manner in which this decision was made to that of demonetization, berates the Government for being “parsimonious and incompetent” and suggests that their action was “worse than a crime—it was a blunder.”

    He may well be proved right in his conclusions subsequently, but the truth is that it is one thing to question the Governments’ motivation or influence in the selection of the aircraft or the offset partners, but quite another to question the decisions it takes, however much we may disagree with them. For one, Mr. Modi was elected by a substantial majority to do just that, since that is what is expected of a leader. Moreover, we are wholly unaware as to circumstances that led to the Government to take the decision that it did, and therefore to question his decisions clearly smacks of arrogance, if not an ulterior motive. It is all very well to rant about the ineptitude and incompetence of this Government and its adverse impact on defence modernization, but what then are we to conclude at the previous Governments’ inability to push through the earlier deal in the seven years that it had to do so? Surely ineptitude or Incompetence may be too mild a term in their case.

    There is no gainsaying the fact that defence procurement and corruption have had a symbiotic relationship ever since Independence and our first procurement scandal, the infamous “Jeep Scandal” of 1948. Politicians have always seen defence procurement as a lucrative source of funds and as long as our political funding regulations remain opaque, nothing is going to change. Therefore, if this Government has actually resorted to underhand means as alleged, despite it being a government to government deal, then they have only trod on the well-beaten path of their illustrious predecessors. Thus, if precedent is to be our guide, then all the brouhaha on the issue will only result in a setback for the Air Force while politicians and their minions involved getting away, as we saw in the Bofors case.

    If it is accountability that we are interested in, then we need to look beyond this specific issue of procurement and ask ourselves as to why the Air Force finds itself in such desperate straits today, with regard to its combat strength. The fact that its combat strength has fallen from its authorized forty-two squadrons to the present thirty plus, over the past two decades, was neither unanticipated nor unexpected.  Like all machines, aircraft have a quantifiable life span, which while possible to extend with mid-life upgrades, will at a point in time require replacement by the next generation, if the Air Force is to be able to match and overcome the adversary’s capabilities. This does not call for either vision or foresight, just common sense and a practical understanding of the facts, which somehow the Government of India with its vast resources was unable to do. Surely someone must be held accountable for this negligence because not only does it put our national security at risk but endangers pilots who are expected to make do with shoddy outdated aircraft.

    While the Air Force hierarchy must carry some of the blame, not least for lack of moral fibre for its inability to stand up for its rights, governments over the years, especially the Ministry of Defence and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) that it controls, have much to answer for. For the most part, much of our current problems can be traced to the utter failure of HAL to produce the hugely over-budget, inordinately delayed and ostensibly indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, the Tejas. In this context, the existing perceptions within the Air Force that quality control in HAL is all but non- existent have been borne out by the recent crash of the Mirage 2000 aircraft undergoing upgradation. Initial reports doing the rounds suggest that the nose wheel broke while it was taking off resulting in the tragic death of two test pilots, the best of the best.  It also brings to mind a similar case when three paratroopers slithering down from a HAL manufactured Advanced Light Helicopter at the Army Day Parade in January 2018 fell and were grievously injured because the “strong point” to which their rope was tied broke and separated from the aircraft’s body. The question that needs answering is not just how many such cases have happened in the past, but also how many in HAL have been held accountable for such shoddy work?

    This also explains to a large extent the previous governments’ inability to successfully close the deal for the 126 aircraft. It was reportedly blocked by the unwillingness of the Air Force hierarchy to accept aircraft manufactured by HAL without certification by Dassault Aviation, the manufacturers of the Rafale, something they refused to do.  That they would prefer to work with an untried and untested offset partner, allegedly thrust on them, rather than with HAL speaks volumes about what they think of the capabilities of this Defence PSU!

    Therefore, politicians and academics critical of this governments’ decision to keep HAL out of the loop in this case, especially their accusation that by doing so we have lost out on technology transfer, are either being deliberately obtuse or completely out of touch with reality. In this context, Mr. Rahul Gandhi has been particularly vocal, even to the extent of meeting workers of HAL. It would be wonderful if he took the initiative to volunteer to fly in one of these aircraft or take time off to interact with the pilots who do. Maybe, just maybe, he would have a change of heart and leave national security issues out of the realm of politics.  Finally, our leaders would do well to remember that even after these aircraft are inducted into service, they will continue to be confronted by that gargantuan problem, where will the other hundred-odd aircraft desperately need come from? After all what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander!

     

    Brigadier Deepak Sinha (retd), an Army veteran, is a Visiting Senior Fellow at the TPF and is also a Consultant at ORF, New Delhi.

    This article was published earlier in the Times of India. The views expressed are the author’s own. 

  • Nuclear Stability in Asia and South Asia: the Dynamics of a Fragile Stability

    Nuclear Stability in Asia and South Asia: the Dynamics of a Fragile Stability

    Download Here for Full Report

    M. Matheswaran

    India-Pakistan-China relations determine South Asia’s strategic stability. Recent events and disputes have heightened regional tensions, and have drawn the world’s attention on the region’s potential for conflict. The fact that all three nuclear weapon states have long-standing border disputes has been used by the non-proliferation lobbies to consistently highlight South Asia as a nuclear flash point. The intractable Kashmir dispute continues to be cited as the potential trigger for any nuclear escalation. These concerns were brought to the fore as the world witnessed the two nuclear armed adversaries fight it out on the Himalayan heights of Kargil in May 1999. While India fought the war firmly, and displayed significant escalation control and management of international opinion, it must be acknowledged that both countries kept the conflict below the nuclear threshold, thus questioning the nuclear flash point theory.

     

    Download Here to read more…

     

    *This article was published in Indian Foreign Affairs Journal – Apr-Jun 2018.

  • A step closer to N-triad deterrent

    A step closer to N-triad deterrent

    PM Modi announced with justifiable national pride on November 6 that India’s first nuclear-propelled submarine, INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, was now operational as an integral part of its nuclear deterrent. India earlier had the capabilities to launch nuclear weapons from the air, mounted largely on its Mirage 2000 and Jaguar, and by land-based missiles, ranging from Agni 1 (700-900 km) to Agni 5 missiles (5,500 km). Its aim has been to develop a ‘credible nuclear deterrent’, with capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons from multiple locations to strategic areas in its nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Pakistan.

    Arihant provides India with a capability to hit either neighbour from 300 m under the sea. The sea-based missiles envisaged for this purpose are Sagarika (750 km range) and K-4 (3,500 km). While land-based missile sites can be destroyed, a submarine-based deterrent is virtually impregnable against a missile attack. India is the only country with a sea-based N-deterrent, which is not a Permanent Member of the UNSC. India will soon operationalise a second nuclear submarine (Arighat), and is expected to have a fleet of four by 2022.

    According to US Federation of Nuclear Scientists, India currently possesses 130-140 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has 140-150 and China 280. While India tested its first nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan’s first test was in 1990, on Chinese soil.

    In a recent book, Thomas Reed, a US nuclear weapons designer and former Secretary of the US air force, stated that China’s ‘Pakistan nuclear connection’ can be explained in the following words: ‘India was China’s enemy and Pakistan was India’s enemy. The Chinese did a massive training of Pakistani scientists, brought them to China for lectures, even gave them the design of the CHIC-4 device, which was a weapon that was easy to build — a model for export.’ Gary Milhollin, another expert, remarked: ‘Without China’s help, Pakistan’s bomb would not exist.’ China has also provided Pakistan the designs of its nuclear weapons, upgraded its ‘inverters’ for producing enriched uranium in Kahuta and provided it with plutonium reactors to build tactical nuclear weapons in Khushab and Fatehjang. Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles are replicas of Chinese missiles.

    India’s N-doctrine stated that its weapons would only be used in retaliation against a major attack on Indian territory, or on its forces anywhere, in which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are used. But Pakistan does not have a formal doctrine. The long time head of its Nuclear Command Authority, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, however, said over a decade ago that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were ‘aimed solely at India’ and Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquered a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroyed a large part of its land and air forces. He also held out the possibility of the use of weapons if India tried to ‘economically strangle’ it, or pushed it to political destabilisation. Pakistan’s statements in recent years have, however, indicated that it would not be averse to using tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with India.

    China, like India, also had proclaimed that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. But it has been ambiguous if this applied to India. China has maintained a measure of ambiguity on its ‘no-first-use’ pledge. This became evident when China’s foreign ministry spokesman (in 2004) rejected a suggestion from External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh that both countries should adopt a ‘common’ nuclear doctrine. Subsequent discussions between Indian and Chinese experts have suggested that China maintains deliberate ambiguity on its doctrine when it comes to dealing with India. Many ask if this is meant to signal to Pakistan that China will come to its aid in any nuclear exchange Pakistan may have with India, even if initiated by Pakistan. This ambiguity adds to India’s determination to strengthen its ‘triad’ of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons. Agni 5 missiles can target China’s populous east coast. Within the next four years, we would have an adequate sea-based deterrent to deter China from holding out credible nuclear assurances to Pakistan that it would intervene should India choose to respond to use, or threats of use, of tactical weapons by Pakistan.

    While India has a streamlined nuclear command structure headed by the PM and Cabinet Committee on Security, it needs to revamp the archaic structure of its Ministry of Defence (MoD). The key military figure in the command structure is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who generally holds office for less than a year; hardly enough time for him to become familiar with the complexities of the command. Repeated proposals, including from defence committees and task forces, recommending the appointment of a full-time Chief or Defence Staff, or Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, who will hold charge of the command and report to the political authority, have gathered dust in the offices of the MoD bureaucracy.

    The MoD needs to be reorganised. Recommendations for such change, even from the Parliament Standing Committee of Defence, lie unimplemented. We recently acquired our desperately needed first batch of artillery guns after the ’80s’ Bofors controversy. This happened even as detailed designs for 155 mm Howitzers provided by Sweden were gathering dust for two decades. There is also surely something wrong if it takes over a decade to acquire fighter aircraft, even as the IAF is facing a shortage of around 30 per cent in the sanctioned strength.

    Ambassador G Parthasarathy  IFS (Retd) is the former High Commissioner to Pakistan and is a trustee of TPF. 

    This Op-Ed was published earlier in ‘The Tribune’ on November 15th.

  • Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    Indian Air Force at 86: Challenges of Sustaining Credible Force Structure

    The Indian Air Force celebrates its 86th anniversary on this October 8th, making it one of the oldest and large air forces of the world. Despite many challenges, most of which relate to inefficiencies of political decision making and inadequate financial support to modernisation, the IAF has come out with flying colours to continue to demonstrate its operational capabilities and strategic reach. The recent ‘Gaganshakti’ high intensity exercise  is an outstanding example. While the IAF continues to grapple with its huge problems of obsolescence, the last decade and a half has also been testimony to some major transformations underway in the IAF. As the 21st century dawned, the IAF began a rapid transformation from being largely a tactical air force to a strategic force, with significant expeditionary capability.

    Isolation to Outward Engagement

                 For more than half a century, outward engagement of the three services was limited to participation in UN peace-keeping missions. As India began its transformation with economic liberalisation in 1991, it began to dismantle its inward looking licence raj, and with it a global outlook started to emerge. As Indian economy accelerated into an overdrive by the late 1990s, and as India’s strategic image strengthened with  the overt declaration of its nuclear weapon status, the government encouraged military to military interactions and defence diplomacy. IAF’s international engagement expanded significantly from the 2000s. Major bilateral exercises were carried out on regular basis with major air forces – USA, UK, France, Singapore, South Africa, Oman, and Malaysia. Also, the IAF became a regular participant in USAF’s multinational exercises such as Cope Thunder and Red Flag. Recently the IAF has expanded its international exercises to involve Israel, Russia, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia. For over a decade, the Singapore Air Force carries out its two month long annual training from one of IAF bases on the eastern coast. Joint exercises for humanitarian assistance, involving multinational forces, is now a regular feature. These interactions and engagements have highlighted IAF’s high quality operational expertise, its global standing, and in turn, has contributed immensely to IAF’s growth in its international understanding. Today, the world sees the IAF as the sharp edge of India’s military power as well as the primary instrument of its humanitarian assistance capability worldwide.

    Enhancing its Reach

                 Although the IAF inducted the Jaguar from 1979, its air-to-air refuelling capability was kept inactive. Induction of Mirage 2000 in 1985 met the same fate. The importance of aerial refuelling in extended range operations by the USA in its Libyan strike, Osirak nuclear reactor strike by Israel, and Falklands operations by the UK was not lost on the IAF, and it decided in favour of this force multiplier in the late 1990s. Although the IAF was one of the last major air forces to induct the aerial refueler, its pace of operationalisation was probably the fastest. In less than a decade IAF fighters were flying across Atlantic Ocean to participate in international exercises like the ‘Red Flag’ and ‘Cope Thunder’. Within the last decade the IAF has demonstrated its extended operational reach through all its major exercises. Aerial refuelers form critical component of IAF’s operational capability in terms of reach and penetration. An expansion of this fleet is now long overdue.

    Technological and Operational Transformation

                 Airpower, by its very nature is technology intensive. The IAF embarked on major operational reorientation through induction of major technologies from the early 2000s. This began with induction of precision weapons, UAVs, electro-optical systems, and sensors. The IAF initiated its first upgrade program in the mid 1990s, for 125 MiG-21 Bis aircraft, by stitching together a complex avionics upgrade involving three nations – Russia, France, and Israel. The success of this program has established an irreversible upgrade culture as a cost-effective strategy for sustaining its force structure. This upgrade strategy has also contributed immensely to  indigenisation capability of Indian industry. The Jaguar fleet went through a series of comprehensive upgrades, giving rise to significant expansion of its capabilities. The Su-30 MKI is an excellent result of IAF’s conceptualisation and implementation of avionics suites and mission optimisation. Between 2004 and now, the IAF’s upgrade strategies have given fresh lease of life to various aircraft fleet and weapon systems: AN-32, MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar, Mirage-2000, and air defence missile systems. More programs involving upgrades of Su-30 MKI fighters and IL-76 transport aircraft are likely to be taken up soon.

    The IAF moved to transform its air defence operations through the induction of AWACS platforms. Selecting the proven IL-78 platform, the IAF again masterminded a complex three nation development program to evolve a modern, state-of-the art AWACS platform by 2009. The three AWACS platforms inducted in phase I have been utilised extensively to bring in major operational transformation of its air defence operations in a very short time-frame. The AWACS has certainly given the IAF a significant operational edge vis-à-vis the PLAAF challenge across the Himalayas. Simultaneously, the IAF has supported the indigenous program of AEW aircraft development based on Embraer-145 platform.

    Indo-US strategic partnership manifested itself in significant transformation in IAF’s airlift capability. By 2012, the IAF inducted and operationalised C-130J Hercules aircraft for special operations, which is also the IAF’s first 20 tonne airlift aircraft; and C-17 Globemaster heavy lift aircraft. These are going to be joined by Chinook heavy lift helicopters and Apache attack helicopters. By 2012 large numbers of Russian Mi-17 1V helicopters entered service. With these inductions, the IAF’s airlift capability has truly attained transcontinental proportions.

    The air defence missile segment, afflicted by long delays and overruns in terms of cost and time, has finally started showing results. The IAF, inducted its first squadrons of LLQRM (short range air defence missiles) based on Israeli systems, while simultaneously inducting indigenous Akash missile systems. This still indicated huge gaps, which is sought to be filled by the long-delayed MRSAM, jointly developed by India and Israel. With the projected signing of the contract for the Russian S-400 long-range SAMs the air defence will be on stronger operational capability.

    The most significant operational and technological capability of the IAF is its net-work centric warfare capability, which is underway for more than a decade. The IAF is the most significantly networked military force amongst the three services. It first established its primary communication grid, AFNET (Air Force Network), and  simultaneously established its air defence network inclusive of vital command and control network, IACCS (Integrated Air Command and Control System). The IACCS integrated all its ground based radar sensors and other inputs to create a common operational picture for real-time command and control to become effective. This was a pioneering transformation. The culminating transformation is its ‘airborne network’, which involved evolving NCW concepts based on  futuristic ‘self-organising, master-less, node-less, architecture’. The concepts were validated through a three-year long pilot project in 2013. Centred on the SDR (Software Defined Radio) the IAF is focused on indigenous solution. However, interim acquisition of limited numbers of SDR to kickstart operationalisation has stalled for nearly four years due to our infamous acquisition procedural delays. NCW operationalisation is a huge challenge that involves significantly large number of legacy aircraft and systems.

    The transformation of the IAF as an aerospace force began in the aftermath of Kargil war. IAF has been at the forefront of transforming the ISR domain through its operational strategies involving various ISR assets – UAVs, tactical and strategic reconnaissance systems, and satellites. It has played a stellar  role in defining the roadmap for developing and deploying space assets. It is matter of time before the IAF leads the tri-service aerospace command in true measure to formalise and operationalise India’s Space security strategy.

    IAF as the instrument of India’s Global Power

                 The rise of India and China is the major transformative process of the 21st century international system. That India aspires to be a global power is well known and well founded. India’s march to global power status in the 21st century will be a challenging and arduous task. Rise to great power status is not one of just prestige and power but comes with huge responsibilities. These responsibilities come with significant costs. A great power should be willing to share and shoulder the costs of providing public goods to the global community. This is precisely what the USA is now complaining about, as it finds the costs of sustaining itself as a hegemon is becoming prohibitively expensive. The USA is clearly signalling that aspiring great powers should share the costs of global public goods albeit without upsetting an international order crafted to its advantage. This is where India must rise to the challenge by rising as a benign power with the right balance of hard and soft power to influence the course of emerging power politics.

    The IAF, on its 86th anniversary, is at the cross roads of evolving as the instrument of India’s global power. As the 21st century progresses, the centrality of aerospace power in the national power of major countries has become unquestionable. Joint or integrated warfare has been necessitated by the critical role of aerospace power in all domains, be it precision, reach, rapidity of application, and intelligence through ISR. The viability of conventional deterrence comes from aerospace power’s ability to deter through the fear of precise punishment. It becomes obvious that the IAF has to be the cutting edge instrument of India’s hard military power. This obviously calls for the right combination of force structure with cutting edge technologies and weapon systems with significantly long reach. A serious introspection would reveal that the IAF, as it enters its 87th year, faces daunting challenges of building and sustaining the requisite force structure.

    IAF’s Force Structure Challenges

     IAF has been grappling with problems of obsolescence and dwindling force structure for more than two decades. Long drawn out and unending MMRCA acquisition process is an example of leaving operational capability gaps unactioned as well as loss of opportunities to enhance industrial and technological capabilities. Time and cost overruns in the indigenous Tejas-LCA program is again an operational shortfall for the IAF. The IAF today is at an all-time low of 32 fighter squadrons. An analysis of the history of IAF’s force structure would reveal a story of crisis management to sustain minimum force levels. Much of the blame must go to the political leadership for failure to grasp the importance of sustaining credible conventional force structures, while part of the blame must certainly fall on services themselves.

    JRD Tata committee, set up in the aftermath of 1962 humiliation against China, recommended an IAF force structure of 65 combat squadrons. This was accepted by the government but was pruned down to 39.5 squadrons as an interim measure on account of resource constraints. This figure has remained more or less permanent, till the government approved a figure of 42 squadrons in 2005. Even though the IAF has enhanced its combat capability with the induction of force multipliers, and networked air defence capability, its approved force structure may fall short of meeting India’s requirements of functioning effectively as a global player. In the modern, net-centric aerospace environment, the IAF will be India’s main instrument of conventional deterrence. Tata committee recommendations look more apt for India, given India’s emerging stature and global responsibilities expected of it. However, the immediate requirement is to get IAF’s force structure back to the approved 42 combat squadron strength. Given the large number of aircraft that need to be replaced, this would take at least 15 years if only done on war-footing.

    Modernisation and Indigenisation Imperatives

    As it celebrates its 86th anniversary the IAF would do well to do some serious introspection. Modernisation processes for all militaries in all countries face the challenges of timely resource availability, particularly for capital-intensive service like the Air Force. In India the problem is compounded by inadequate aerospace industrial and technology base. Indian military power, and IAF in particular, is heavily import dependent. Despite more than 70 years of indigenisation efforts, not much has changed in critical areas. A major cause for this state of affairs is the lack of adequate involvement of the user service in project management and technology development. The IAF will have to take a leaf out of the USAF model to make a major impact on indigenisation. This will need the following to be done on a time bound basis:

    • IAF needs to create a cadre of research personal. It also needs to operate aerospace research laboratories. These will focus on research and development of aerospace technologies. Ideally the IAF needs to exercise command and control over laboratories such as ADE, DARE, CABS, etc.
    • Programs like the Tejas-LCA should have been managed by the user service, the IAF, after the technology demonstration phase. Program management by the user service is an absolute must as it will be driven by operational needs balancing technology, cost, and time factors. As a corollary, it becomes obvious that the IAF must create the necessary expertise to manage its programs.
    • IAF’s involvement in DRDO driven programs must clearly define them as those that are technology development oriented and those that are user driven weapon system development. The latter programs must clearly be managed by the IAF while the former must be enabled by IAF support.
    • The IAF must clearly lay down a 20 year strategic roadmap for the government wherein all aircraft and major weapon systems are made completely free of foreign OEM dependence.

     

    Conclusion

                India’s security environment cannot be viewed simply as just border and territorial disputes with Pakistan and China. Its strategic challenges in a fast changing 21st century world are increasing by the day. China’s aerospace capability has leapfrogged significantly over the last two decades, and it poses a major challenge to India. The IAF will need to spearhead India’s aerospace capability to balance China’s dominance.

    IAF’s long-term force structure strategy could revert to its earlier ‘auxiliary air force’ format, albeit in a new form. Indian government wound up the auxiliary air forces post 1962, while it retained the ‘Territorial Army’ model. The benefits of this scheme is well established. It provides huge opportunities to a large segment of qualified young people to do military service, provides a ready reserve, and forms an important component of second rung security structure. With slight modification this could be created as Air National Guards, much like the US system. The objective should be to achieve one squadron of Air National Guards for each state in a defined time period based on financial and technical resources. These squadrons should be equipped with Tejas aircraft. Over a period of time this could become a win-win situation for the IAF, civil society, and the country as a whole. A comprehensive approach to force structure could see the IAF as the foremost air force in Asia and a major powerful force in the world by 2032, that will be IAF’s centenary year.

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     The author, Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (Retd) is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Policy, Plans & Force Development).

  • US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    US and China Compete over AI-enabled Military Hardware

    Vijay Sakhuja September 02, 2018

    There is a sense of urgency among the militaries of United States and China to gain ascendency in the field of artificial intelligence and machine learning. The United States Department of Defence has set upJoint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) that will help the US military to “preserve and expand military advantage” as also pursue “AI applications with boldness and alacrity while ensuring strong commitment to military ethics and AI safety.” The JAIC will costan estimated $1.7 billion over the next six years. It will work on nearly 600 AI projects in partnershipwith the industry, academia and allies, and will have oversight over almost all service and defense agency AI efforts.

    Defense Secretary Jim Mattis has urgedPresident Donald Trumpto consider formulating a national strategy for artificial intelligence. Meanwhile, the US Army has establishedan AI Task Force and given itself three months to identify “specific skill sets that we’re going to need to be relevant and to thrive in this environment that will include AI and machine learning.”

    Likewise, the Chinese government is pursuing an aggressive policy for the development of artificial intelligence at the national level. In December 2017, the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology through Circular No. 315called on all agencies under the Central Government to implement ‘Made in China 2025’ and ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ and ‘ accelerate the development of artificial intelligence industry, promote the deep integration of artificial intelligence and real economy” It also laid out a ‘Three-Year Action Plan for Promoting the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry ( 2018 – 2020).

    According to a reporttitled “China’s AI Development Report 2018” released by Tsinghua University, the China’s artificial intelligence (AI) market touched 23.7 billion yuan ($3.5 billion) in 2017, with the growth rate expected to reach 75 percent in 2018. Further, China emerged as the ‘most attractive country for AI investment and financing’ and in the last five years since 2013 the Chinese AI industry accounted for 60 percent of the world’s total including 18,232 AI technology research experts  accounting ‘for 8.9 percent of the world’s total and was second only to the United States, which accounted for 13.9 percent’.

    In China, AI is used in a number of sectors like robotics, drones, autonomous vehicles such as cars and trucks, in manufacturing white goods including marketing services. Perhaps what merits attention is that China is investingin AI-related devices and systems that range from the anodyne to the dystopian wherein the military is looking to the technology to work in concert with its military strategy? Further, experts believethat the Chinese are “making their machines more creative” and “A little bit of automation gives the machines a tremendous boost” which can be characterized as “remote warfare”.

    The US is visibly concerned about losing military edge to China in the field of artificial intelligence. The PLA Navy presents different challenges with significant investments made in weapons such as the Electromagnetic Railgun (EMRG), Solid State Lasers (SSLs) and other systems and sensors.As noted earlier, AI technologies are also being incorporated into a new generation of anti-ship missiles through autonomous targeting capabilities. Similarly, autonomous air and underwater drones and miniaturized assault boats would soon be part of its force structure It is quite plausible that the PLA Navy may have begun to conduct exercises based on AI and ML and assimilated commonly used and commercially available communication devices such as smart phones, tablets and hybrid devices into its naval strategy.

    AI is surely adding to the war fighting tool kit of both the US Navy and the PLA Navy through stealthy ‘robotic trimaran’(Sea hunter and D3000 respectively)thatcould result in a dangerous escalations of a new kind of competition between the two navies. Similarly, China is developing autonomous robotic submarines which are likely to be ready for operations by the early 2020s and supplement regular human-operated submarines. This is sure to pose another set of challenge to the US Navy.

    Dr Vijay Sakhuja is a Trustee of TPF.

  • The Challenges of AI-enabled Underwater Platforms

    The Challenges of AI-enabled Underwater Platforms

    Vijay Sakhuja  Aug 03, 2018

    The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is likely to acquire a new type of submarine by the early 2020s. According to the South China Morning Post, the Shenyang Institute of Automation under the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is engaged in developing a series of extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle (XLUUV) that will feature Artificial Intelligence (AI). The vessels will be capable of performing a number of tasks without “human intervention,” “handle their assignments and return to base on their own,” and carry out reconnaissance, surveillance, combat operations against enemy targets, and undertake activities such as whale tracking. It will be possible to integrate these vessels with other manned and unmanned platforms and systems at sea, in air as also on land to carry out coordinated missions.

    Lin Yang, the project director and a marine technology specialist, has noted that Chinese interest in these platforms is prompted by US plans to acquire XLUUVs capable of carrying “a variety of payloads, from sensors to weapons.” Two prototype units have been contracted, one to Lockheed Martin and the other to Boeing, and they have been granted US$ 43.2 million and US$ 42.3 million, respectively for research, design, and testing in 2020. The winner will receive orders for production of up to five platforms. Unlike China and the US, Russia is developing the Status-6 autonomous torpedo capable of delivering 100-megaton warhead capable of “wiping out all living things” within a 1,500 km radius.

    These developments are clear signs of the role of AI-enabled underwater platforms and weapons in the future, and add a new dimension to underwater operations. There are at least four issues concerning them that merit attention.

    First is naval warfare. Navies have traditionally employed conventional submarines for intelligence gathering, laying mines, attacking enemy submarines and ships, and more recently, conducting strikes against shore targets by using land attack cruise missiles. The usual tactic for conventional submarine has been the ‘lie-in-wait’ position at the entrance to harbours or close to choke points and attack the enemy. Like their conventional counterparts, AI-enabled platforms can serve as scouts, and smaller platforms can masquerade as decoys to attract the enemy, forcing it to expose its position. If necessary, the AI-tool kit should be able to detect, track, generate high speed, and attack the enemy like a torpedo.

    It is useful to mention that the US’ XLUUVs will “operate autonomously for weeks or even months, periodically phoning home to check for new orders,” giving the US Navy a significant advantage in tactical operations. Similarly, the Status-6 autonomous torpedo can be used by the Russian defence ministry’s special division for deep-sea research and deliver “deep-sea equipment or installing surveillance devices.”

    Second, the XLUUVs may entail new legal challenges. There is an ongoing debate raging over regulating lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), including a call to ban fully autonomous weapon systems centered on the Principle of Non-Delegation of the Authority to Kill by non-human mechanisms. A global campaign – Coalition to Stop Killer Robots – has called for an international ban on ‘killer robots’, and “a treaty for emerging weapons.” There is a belief that morality and generally accepted ethics need to be injected into the use of AI-enabled weapon systems given that “inanimate machines cannot understand or respect the value of life.” If the XLUUVs are put to combat operations, it would result in the weaponisation of AI, and this empowers humans to absolve themselves of any moral consequences of killing or using these for self-defence.

    It is important to mention that engineers and scientists from the technology industry signed a pledge in Stockholm at the 2018 International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) and called upon “governments and government leaders to create a future with strong international norms, regulations and laws against lethal autonomous weapons.” They have since been joined by corporates such as Google DeepMind, the XPRIZE Foundation, University College London, ClearPath Robotics/OTTO Motors, the European Association for AI, and the Swedish AI Society.

    Third, the XLUUVs rely primarily on AI to conduct operations. These platforms would transit long distances passing through a variety of undersea topography, ie ridges, mounts, trenches, rocks, slopes and basins, and would be vulnerable to collisions, detection by civilian research and survey vessels, enemy submarines and warship, and underwater military detection systems including those used for seismic warnings. Further, underwater activity such as laying of oil and gas pipelines and fiber optic cables can impact their safety. Besides, natural occurrences such as currents and tides can result in drift and cause considerable difficulty to being positioned in the designated destination.

    Fourth regards the impact of AI-enabled underwater platforms on the marine environment, particularly marine life such as whales, sharks, dolphins and other migratory species. Sonar transmissions by XLUUVs can cause potential damage to mammals’ sensory organs resulting in disorientation or death. Whales may even misunderstand sonar waves as that of an attacker, and panic can drive them towards the platform.

    The development of XLUUVs presents clear dangers and could have potentially destabilising consequences for all countries. Further, their impact on marine life and the associated ecosystem – which is already witnessing stress due to pollution and plastic – does not appear to have been taken into consideration. Finally, an international treaty for emerging AI-enabled underwater platforms needs to be prepared, debated, and signed.

    This article was originally published in IPCS.

    http://ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5497