The Peninsula Foundation

Category: National Security & Foreign Policy

  • Intelligence: The Crux of Targetted Assassinations

    Intelligence: The Crux of Targetted Assassinations

    The USA has followed targetted assassination strategy since WW II days. It has cooped its allies such as Israel, Australia, and the UK. Targetted killings in the Middle East has been led by Israel with active intelligence support by the USA. With modern ISR capabilities, targets can be monitored or looked for on 24/7 basis for all 365 days of the year. A world that is integrated by common communications protocols and digital standards for ease of normal business becomes vulnerable to intelligence agencies by the same process of commonality. 

     

    On July 31, 2022, Osama bin Laden’s successor as the global head of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, stepped out onto the balcony of his Taliban safe house in Kabul’s tony Wazir Akbar Khan area to catch a breath of fresh air and a bit of sunshine. About 40,000 feet above an American Predator B (aka Reaper MQ-9) drone, loitering to get a glimpse of him, caught him in its camera, and after its operators in Nevada, USA confirmed it with facial identification technology, ordered it to fire its single Hellfire R9X missile. The Hellfire is a small 100 lbs and five feet long air-to-ground missile (AGM) that races down a reflected laser beam with unerring accuracy. It costs about $ 150,000. The R9X, which was developed at the express request of Barack Obama, who wanted to minimise collateral damage due to an explosive charge, is a kinetic weapon that unsheathes multiple blades from its fuselage as it approaches the target at almost 900 mph like a whirling swordsman. Al-Zawahiri didn’t stand a chance.

    The USA and some other countries have bevvies of space satellites orbiting at preselected trajectories to watch over areas of interest. These satellites not only listen to targets but also track them and identify faces and vehicles by their plates. Osama bin Laden never looked up while on his morning walk at his Abbottabad residence but he was recognised by his height and the length of his shadow at the time of the day and by his gait. Al-Zawahari was either careless or underestimated America’s appetite for his head. He still had a $ 25 million reward, appetising enough for any informants.

    The number of active mobile phones worldwide exceeded 15 billion, which means that many people have more than a couple. Of these 7.2 billion are smartphones connecting people with huge reservoirs of information and content. India has 1.28 billion and China has 1.9 billion phones. The USA follows with 327 million and a dysfunctional country like Pakistan has 125 million. Even in countries with little semblance of a government or a state, like Somalia and Afghanistan or Mali or Libya, there are functioning mobile phone networks.

    As of June 30, 2021, there were about 4.86 billion internet users worldwide. Of these 44.8% were in Asia, 21.5% in Europe and 11.4% in all of North America. India was one of the last countries operating a telegraph service and as of end 2021, even that is in the past. Literally, it’s all up in the air now.

    But since data exchanged on cellular and internet networks fly through the ether and not as pulses racing through copper wires, they are easier to net by electronic interception. But these nets catch them in huge numbers. This is where the supercomputers come in. The messages that are netted every moment are run through sieves of sophisticated and complex computer programs that can simultaneously decode, detect and unravel, and by further analyzing the incoming and outgoing patterns of calls and data transfers for the sending and receiving terminals or phones, can with a fair probability of accuracy tell the agency seeking information about what is going on and who is up to what?

    The problem is that since this information also goes through mobile phone networks and Internet Service Providers (ISP), and the data actually gets decoded from electronic blips into voice and digital data, the private players too can gain access to such information.

    A few years ago we had the case of the infamous Amar Singh CDs, which titillated so many with their graphic content and low-brow conversations featuring the likes of Anil Ambani, Jayaprada, Bipasha Basu and some others. Then we had the episode of the Radia tapes where we were privy to the machinations of Tata’s corporate lobbyist in the national capital fixing policy, positioning ministers and string-pulling media stars. But more useful than this, a mobile phone, by nature of its technology, is also a personalised GPS indicator. It tells them where that phone is at any instant it is on. The Al Qaeda terrorist and US citizen Anwar el-Awlaki was blasted by a Hellfire missile fired from a CIA Predator drone flying over Yemen with the coordinates provided by Awlaki’s mobile phone.

    Since a mobile phone is usually with you it tells the network ( and other interested parties) where you are or were, and even where you are headed. If you are on a certain street since it reveals where exactly you are and the direction of your movement, it can tell you where the next pizza place is or where and what is on sale. This is also a breach of privacy, but often useful to you. But if you are up to no good, then a switched-on mobile phone is a certain giveaway.

    That’s what gave away Osama bin Laden in the end. A momentary indiscretion by a trusted courier and bodyguard and a name gleaned from a long-ago water-boarding session was all it took. To know what happened next see “Zero Dark Thirty” by Katherine Bigelow (now on Netflix and YouTube).

    The NSA is all hi-tech. NSA collects intelligence from four geostationary satellites. These satellites track and monitor millions of conversations and the NSA’s banks of high-speed supercomputers process all these messages for certain phrases and patterns of conversations to decide if the persons at either end were worthy of further interest.

    The NSA’s eavesdropping mission includes radio broadcasting, both from various organisations and individuals, the internet, telephone calls, and other intercepted forms of communication. Its secure communications mission includes military, diplomatic, and all other sensitive, confidential or secret government communications. The NSA is all hi-tech. NSA collects intelligence from four geostationary satellites. These satellites track and monitor millions of conversations and the NSA’s banks of high-speed supercomputers process all these messages for certain phrases and patterns of conversations to decide if the persons at either end were worthy of further interest. Link this information with the data from the CIA’s spinning satellites watching the movements of groups, individuals and vehicles, and you have a broad picture of what the people are doing.

    According to the Washington Post, “every day, collections systems at the National Security Agency intercept and store 1.7 billion e-mails, phone calls and other types of communications.” The NSA and CIA together comprise the greatest intelligence-gathering effort in the world. The overall U.S. intelligence budget is now declared to be $62.8 billion.

     

    Feature Image Credit: E-International Relations

    Article Image Credit: www.twz.com

     

  • Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

     

    TPF Occasional Paper: 10/2024

    Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    Maj Gen Alok Deb (Retd)

    On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi’[i]. The item went on to specify that the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic minority rebels from the states of Chin, Rakhine and Kachin bordering India had been invited to a seminar in mid-November, to be hosted by the Delhi-based Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a foreign policy think tank funded by the Government of India. The piece was also carried by some major Indian newspapers with its origin attributed to Reuters. At the time of writing, there has been no acknowledgement or rebuttal of this report by any government agency. Neither has the ICWA posted this on its website as a forthcoming event. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

    A Summary of India’s Act East Policy

    India’s ‘Act East’ policy of 2014 is an initiative that takes off from its earlier ‘Look East’ policy. ‘Act East’ envisages initiatives at multiple levels with the nations of ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific region. These initiatives are to be taken forward through a process of continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, thereby providing enhanced connectivity in its broadest sense, including political, economic, cultural and people-to-people relations.[ii]

    To successfully implement the ‘Act East’ policy, the Indian government is working to make the North East its strategic gateway to ASEAN. Accordingly, it has increased the allocation for the region’s development by more than four times over the last 10 years.[iii]  The North East is also poised to benefit from initiatives from countries like Japan which earlier this year had proposed developing an industrial hub in Bangladesh with supply chains to the North East, Nepal and Bhutan.[iv]

    As the North East becomes India’s gateway to ASEAN,  the centrality of Myanmar to our Act East becomes apparent. It is the key link in the road connectivity between India’s North East and other ASEAN nations whereby the free flow of inland goods, services and other initiatives to and from these nations to India can be ensured. The success or otherwise of Act East is thus directly affected by the security environment in Myanmar. Instability here will negatively impact our North Eastern states sharing borders with that country. The internal situation in Myanmar therefore becomes an area of prime concern for India, warranting close attention.

    For similar reasons, another neighbour, Bangladesh, is equally important for the success of India’s Act East Policy. India’s North East has benefitted from good ties with Bangladesh, both security-wise and economically. Militancy in the North East has reduced over the last decade and a half. With Bangladesh agreeing to provide access to its ports in the Bay of Bengal for the movement of Indian goods, the North Eastern states have a shorter route to the sea. Additionally, states bordering Bangladesh such as Assam and Meghalaya have developed trade links with that country for mutual benefit. The  BBIN (Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic was signed in 2015 to ‘ promote safe, economically efficient and environmentally sound road transport in the sub-region and … further help each country in creating an institutional mechanism for regional integration’  is another mechanism for implementing our Act East and Neighbourhood First policies[v]. The role of Bangladesh here is pivotal.

    State of the Civil War in Myanmar

    Fighting in Myanmar is now in its fourth year. The military junta continues to suffer reverses on the battlefield. Large portions of Rakhine State and certain portions of Chin State are now under the control of the Arakan Army (AA). International Crisis Group has recently averred that ‘..in just a few months, the Arakan Army has created the largest area in Myanmar under the control of a non-state armed group – in terms of both size and population – and is now on the verge of securing almost all of Rakhine’[vi].

    In Shan state to the North, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) of three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) had by December 2023, captured over 20,000 square kilometres of territory, including key border crossings and trade routes between China and Myanmar in Operation 1027[vii].  On 07 March 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) launched Operation 0307 and successfully captured certain military posts across  Kachin State close to the Chinese border. This forced the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) to redeploy, further thinning out forces[viii]. Fighting also continues in other states and regions across the country, notably Sagaing and Kayah.

    Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..’.The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. 

    Notwithstanding these losses, there is no let-up in the Tatmadaw’s efforts to combat the rebels. The Junta has resorted to conscription to stem rising attrition, activating an old law in this regard. Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..’ [ix] To further contextualise, the same article stated the rebel National Unity Government’s (NUG) claim that more than 14,000 troops have defected from the military since the 2021 seizure of power. The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. The Chins fear that they too will be acted upon similarly.[x]

    To overcome the asymmetry of force especially in artillery and airpower, the rebels have acquired large numbers of drones. These are being used to bomb military positions, contributing significantly towards the successes of the CNA’s operations[xi].  To summarise, Myanmar’s civil war continues to see-saw with no signs of ebbing. The Junta continues to make periodic peace overtures to the NUG with conditionalities that the latter is unwilling to accept[xii]. With the multiplicity of actors and issues involved, there are no clear indications of how and when the conflict will be resolved.

    Impact of the  Myanmar Conflict on India’s North-East

    The impact of Myanmar’s internal situation on India’s border states has progressively worsened. Initially, after the Junta takeover, it was Mizoram which bore the brunt. The state government citing common ethnicity and humanitarian concerns accepted the influx of Chins from Myanmar as a moral responsibility and initiated rehabilitation measures. These refugees along with earlier refugees from Bangladesh recently joined Kukis from Manipur, number around 44000 and continue to remain in refugee camps.[xiii] The Central government has had to reconcile its policy of preventing infiltration across borders with the societal realities of Mizoram. A positive outcome of this approach is that there has been no violence in Mizoram.

    In Manipur, by September 2024, the 18-month-long ethnic conflict had resulted in over 225 deaths and some 60,000 people displaced.[xiv] The administration has been derided by both sides, more so with recent warnings about impending threats to law and order[xv] followed by retractions[xvi]. People of either community have been uprooted from their homes and moved to safe areas separated by buffer zones guarded by security forces.  So great is the mutual suspicion that on the clamour of the Meiteis to replace the Assam Rifles, two battalions of this central force have been withdrawn and replaced by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), against the wishes of the Kukis[xvii].

    Voices for an independent ‘Kukiland’ for the Kuki Zo peoples are being raised,[xviii] which are variously interpreted as a demand for greater autonomy within Manipur or for a separate union territory. The current happenings also dredge up the old ghost of ‘Zale’n-gam’ or Kuki nation, comprising the Chin Kuki Zomi peoples (including Mizos) residing across India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Zale’n- gam has few takers and appears restricted to a YouTube channel[xix]. Today both sides fight each other with a variety of weapons including improvised rockets and drones. Hostage-taking is the latest tactic that has been adopted.[xx]

    Tension between the Nagas of Manipur and other communities is discernible with some reports of violence against the former.[xxi] As of now Nagas have kept out of the Kuki-Meitei dispute; also, other than the insurgent National Socialist Council of Nagaland ( Isak Muviah) faction (NSCN-IM) that is observing a ceasefire with the Centre, no other party has demanded integration of all Naga inhabited areas in India ( Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur) and Myanmar – the idea of  Greater Nagalim.

    At the state level, the responses of Mizoram and Manipur to the Myanmar crisis vary. This can be best seen in their reactions to the Centre’s recent notification to fence the entire 1643 Km Myanmar border and its earlier decision to end the Free Movement Regime that permits movement on both sides of the border for up to a distance of 16 km.[xxii]  While the Mizoram government and tribes living in both states oppose the decisions, the Manipur government clamours for its implementation. Currently, only around 30 Km of the border has been fenced.

    Since the Tatmadaw now has limited control over its border areas, it has become imperative for India to commence a structured dialogue with other warring parties in Myanmar’s border regions. This, with a view to restoring the situation in Manipur (and on the border) through mutually acceptable solutions at least for the short to medium term, is necessary. Only then can a modicum of security on the border be guaranteed. This involves navigating a maze of ethnic, religious, historical and societal issues with great sensitivity. The importance of such a dialogue cannot be overemphasised, more so because of recent developments in Bangladesh.

    The Impact of Bangladesh’s ‘Second Liberation’

    The events of 5 August 2024  that witnessed the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina’s government have proved to be yet another watershed in India-Bangladesh relations. India has invested more in the India-Bangladesh relationship than with any other neighbour in South Asia. A glance at the website of our Ministry of External Affairs[xxiii], where details of various agreements and summaries from the last Prime Ministerial meeting in Delhi in June 2024 are provided, will suffice to show just how strong and all-encompassing this relationship has become.

    Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen. Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners.

    At the time of writing, it is two months since the interim government headed by Chief Advisor Mohammed Yunus assumed charge.  The country continues to make efforts to reestablish the rule of law. All wings of the armed forces have been given magisterial powers[xxiv]. The functioning of the judiciary, higher civil services, local administration, police, security agencies, banking, economy, and higher education, is under review. Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen.[xxv] The Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners. Commissions have been set up to suggest reforms in the constitution, electoral system, police, judiciary, public administration and in tackling corruption.  Elections do not seem to be on the horizon yet. The advisers ( as the ministers are currently known) are new faces, not well known in India.

    While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here.

    With the removal of Sheikh Hasina, the India-Bangladesh relationship is undergoing a major reset. Statements of certain public figures and sentiments of a section of the population in that country suggest that a different perspective on the evolution of Bangladesh as a nation from 1971 onwards is emerging. While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here. This will make it an arduous task for both countries to go back to the trusted, cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship that existed. As mentioned, the list of achievements for both countries is far too numerous –  settlement of land and oceanic borders,  road, rail and riverine connectivity (including use of ports), economy and business ( both government and private), education including educational scholarships, technology, disaster management, border management, maritime security, military to military cooperation, improved people to people contacts, culture and health. As per records, of the 16 lakh visas issued by India for Bangladesh nationals in 2023, 4.5 lakhs were for medical treatment alone[xxvi]. Economies are so embedded that everyday necessities like onions are exported regularly to Bangladesh ( approximately 6 to 7 lakh tonnes annually).

    Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

    A parallel reality, however, is that negative perceptions about India have historically found space in sections of Bangladesh’s polity. These have received a huge fillip after the change of regime with even settled agreements prone to misunderstanding. A recent example pertains to a tripartite agreement dating back to the Hasina period whereby electricity is to be imported from Nepal via India to Bangladesh. The agreement was signed in Kathmandu in the first week of  October 2024. Newspaper reports from Bangladesh indicate that there is palpable resentment over the condition that Indian transmission systems inside Indian territory be utilised for this purpose since it increases costs per unit of electricity in Bangladesh.[xxvii] Another issue currently bedevilling relations is the state of minorities in Bangladesh who have faced attacks on their homes, businesses and religious places with some loss of life, since the protests in July. India’s concerns in this regard have been conveyed at the highest level. Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

    Larger Implications for India

    Bangladesh and Myanmar are pivotal for India’s Act East policy from the security, economic and connectivity angles. The issues pertaining to Myanmar and Manipur have been brought out earlier. A common concern affecting both nations and  India is the Rohingya crisis. Despite international pressure and requests from Bangladesh for China to intercede with Myanmar on its behalf, there has been no positive response from Myanmar. Bangladesh, which currently hosts close to one million refugees,[xxviii] has publicly expressed its inability to accommodate any more Rohingyas and asked for a speedy ‘third country settlement’ [xxix]. A detailed report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) in October 2023[xxx]provides details of activities of militant organisations like the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) which are involved in drug running from Myanmar along with Bangladeshi syndicates for sale of the product in that country. Their participation in violent crime and other illegal activity has become a pressing concern within Bangladesh. Rohingyas have infiltrated into India as well, and have been identified as far North as Jammu. The security implications of such migration for both Bangladesh and India are apparent. The insensitivity of the Myanmar Junta on this account is heightening security risks for India and Bangladesh and merits diplomatic intervention.

    With the situation in Bangladesh evolving by the day, it is prudent for India to take a strategic pause as it weighs its options for pursuing its Act East policy. While giving the new regime in Bangladesh its due, India has to consider the impact of resurgent forces aided by inimical powers that aim to derail the India-Bangladesh relationship beyond repair. Even as both countries attempt to reestablish strong ties, the old adage preached by educated Bangladeshis in the context of support to Sheikh Hasina’s regime that ‘India should not put all its eggs in one basket’ resonates. While Myanmar geographically cannot provide the singular advantages that Bangladesh can, it is time for India to press for securing Myanmar’s cooperation to complete pending projects in that country, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Port Project (KMMPP) via Sittwe and Paletwa, that provides an alternate route to our North East, as well as the Trans Asian Highway (TAH) that provides connectivity with the rest of ASEAN, amongst others.

    To summarise, two possible reasons for inviting rebel Myanmar groups to Delhi could be: first, the relative viability of either Bangladesh or Myanmar to help implement the Act East policy in light of the emerging situation in Bangladesh and the state of the civil war in Myanmar. The second, ensuring security on the India-Myanmar border, to prevent aggravating the situation in India’s border states.

     

    Notes:

    [i] ‘Exclusive: India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar’s anti-junta forces, sources say’ Wa Lone and Devjyot Ghoshal Reuters September 23, 2024

    [ii] ‘Govt aims to make Northeast gateway of ‘Act East Policy’: President Murmu’ Press Trust of India 27 June 2024.

    [iii] Ibid.

    [iv] ‘Japan to tie landlocked Northeast India with Bangladesh’  Saleem Samad  The Daily Messenger 05 March 2024.

    [v] Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Shipping note dated  10 June 2015

    ‘Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic amongst BBIN’

    [vi]   ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State Asia Report N°339 | 27 August 2024’ International Crisis Group (Executive Summary).

    [vii]   ‘As Myanmar’s Junta Loses Control in the North, China’s Influence Grows’  Jason Tower, United States Institute for Peace, August 1, 2024.

    [viii] Ibid.

    [ix]   ‘Facing setbacks against resistance forces, Myanmar’s military government activates conscription law ‘ Associated Press, February 12, 2024.

    [x] ‘India’s ‘Forgotten Partition’ and the Myanmar Refugee Crisis’  Swapnarka Arnan The Diplomat  11 May 2024.

    [xi] ‘We killed many … drones are our air force’: Myanmar’s rebels take on the junta from above. Aakash Hassan and Hannah Ellis-Petersen  The Observer 20 January 2024.

    [xii] ‘Armed Groups Snub Myanmar Junta ‘Peace’ Offer’  The Irrawaddy 28 September 2024

    [xiii] ‘Centre provides 1,379 MT rice to Mizoram for Manipur, Myanmar, B’desh refugees’ Morung Express 25 September 2024.

    [xiv] ‘Ethnic violence in India’s Manipur escalates, six killed’  Tora Agarwala Reuters  September 7, 2024

    [xv] ‘900 Kuki militants infiltrated Manipur from Myanmar, says Security Advisor’ India Today NE September 20 2024.

    [xvi] ‘Input on infiltration by 900 Kuki militants could not be substantiated on the ground, says Manipur security advisor’ Vijaita Singh The Hindu 26 September 2024.

    [xvii] ‘Kukis call removal of Assam Rifles from 2 Manipur areas ‘biased, appeasement’, Meiteis call it ‘victory’  Ananya Bhardwaj  The Print 04 August 2024.

    [xviii]‘ Manipur: Kuki-Zo organizations hold rallies, demand separate ‘Kukiland’ for peace  by Northeast News

    August 31, 2024.

    [xix] YouTube channel titled ‘Zalengam Media’.

    [xx] ‘Kuki militants seek release of ‘secessionist’ in Manipur’ Prawesh Lama and Thomas Ngangom Hindustan Times Sep 30, 2024.

    [xxi] ‘Keep us out of your war, Manipur Naga body warns two warring communities’  The Hindu Bureau 06 February 2024

    [xxii] ‘Government sanctions ₹31,000 crore to fence Myanmar border’   The Hindu

    Published – September 18, 2024

    [xxiii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India website mea.gov.in.

    [xxiv] ‘Navy, the air force also granted magistracy powers’  The Daily Star September 30 2024

    [xxv] ‘Bank accounts of Joy Putul Bobby frozen’ Dhaka Tribune 30 Sep 2024.

    [xxvi] ‘Indian High Commission in Dhaka, facing protests & threats, returns 20,000 visa applicants’ passports ‘ Ananya Bhardwaj  The Print   29 September 2024.

    [xxvii] ‘Bangladesh delegation in Nepal to sign the contract to import 40 MW electricity’ Dhaka Tribune 30 September 2024.

    [xxviii] Operational Data Portal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for Bangladesh.

    [xxix] ‘Bangladesh calls for faster resettlement process for Rohingya’ Ruma Paul  Reuters  September 8, 2024

    [xxx] ‘Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis’ International Crisis Group Autumn Update 04 October 20223.

     

    Feature Image Credit: What does Sheikh Hasina’s resignation mean for India-Bangladesh relations? – aljazeera.com 

    Map Credit: National Online Project

    Bangladesh Parliament Image: The Shattered Identity of a Nation: From Liberation to Chaos – borderlens.com

    Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Statue: Bangabandhu to Toppled Statue: Mujibur Rahman’s contested legacy post Bangladesh upheaval – Economic Times

     

  • UARCs: The American Universities that Produce Warfighters

    UARCs: The American Universities that Produce Warfighters

    America’s military-industrial complex (MIC) has grown enormously powerful and fully integrated into the Department of Defense of the US Government to further its global influence and control. Many American universities have become research centres for the MIC. Similarly, American companies have research programs in leading universities and educational institutions across the world, for example in few IITs in India. In the article below, Dr Sylvia J. Martin explores the role of University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) in the U.S. military-industrial complex. UARCs are institutions embedded within universities, designed to conduct research for the Department of Defense (DoD) and other military agencies. The article highlights how UARCs blur the lines between academic research and military objectives, raising ethical questions about the use of university resources for war-related activities. These centres focus on key areas such as nano-technology, immersive simulations, and weapons systems. For example, the University of South California’s Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) was created to develop immersive training simulations for soldiers, drawing from both science and entertainment, while universities like Johns Hopkins and MIT are involved in anti-submarine warfare and soldier mobility technologies. Sylvia Martin critically examines the consequences of these relationships, particularly their impact on academic freedom and the potential prioritization of military needs over civilian research. She flags the resistance faced by some universities, like the University of Hawai’i, where concerns about militarisation, environmental damage and indigenous rights sparked protests against their UARCs. As UARCs are funded substantially, it becomes a source of major influence on the university. Universities, traditionally seen as centres for open, unbiased inquiry may become aligned with national security objectives, further entrenching the MIC within academics.

    This article was published earlier in Monthly Review.

    – TPF Editorial Team

    UARCs: The American Universities that Produce Warfighters

    Dr Sylvia J Martin

    The University of Southern California (USC) has been one of the most prominent campuses for student protests against Israel’s campaign in Gaza, with students demanding that their university “fully disclose and divest its finances and endowment from companies and institutions that profit from Israeli apartheid, genocide, and occupation in Palestine, including the US Military and weapons manufacturing.”

    Students throughout the United States have called for their universities to disclose and divest from defense companies with ties to Israel in its onslaught on Gaza. While scholars and journalists have traced ties between academic institutions and U.S. defense companies, it is important to point out that relations between universities and the U.S. military are not always mediated by the corporate industrial sector.1 American universities and the U.S. military are also linked directly and organizationally, as seen with what the Department of Defense (DoD) calls “University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs).” UARCs are strategic programs that the DoD has established at fifteen different universities around the country to sponsor research and development in what the Pentagon terms “essential engineering and technology capabilities.”2Established in 1996 by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, UARCs function as nonprofit research organizations at designated universities aimed to ensure that those capabilities are available on demand to its military agencies. While there is a long history of scientific and engineering collaboration between universities and the U.S. government dating back to the Second World War, UARCs reveal the breadth and depth of today’s military-university complex, illustrating how militarized knowledge production emerges from within the academy and without corporate involvement. UARCs demonstrate one of the less visible yet vital ways in which these students’ institutions help perpetuate the cycle of U.S.-led wars and empire-building.

    The University of Southern California (USC) has been one of the most prominent campuses for student protests against Israel’s campaign in Gaza, with students demanding that their university “fully disclose and divest its finances and endowment from companies and institutions that profit from Israeli apartheid, genocide, and occupation in Palestine, including the US Military and weapons manufacturing.”3  USC also happens to be home to one of the nation’s fifteen UARCs, the Institute of Creative Technology (ICT), which describes itself as a “trusted advisor to the DoD.”4  ICT is not mentioned in the students’ statement, yet the institute—and UARCs at other universities—are one of the many moving parts of the U.S. war machine that are nestled within higher education institutions, and a manifestation of the Pentagon’s “mission creep” that encompasses the arts as well as the sciences.5

    Institute of Creative Technologies – military.usc.edu

    Significantly, ICT’s remit to develop dual-use technologies (which claim to provide society-wide “solutions”) entails nurturing what the Institute refers to as “warfighters” for the battlefields of the future, and, in doing so, to increase warfighters’ “lethality.6 Established by the DoD in 1999 to pursue advanced modelling and simulation and training, ICT’s basic and applied research produces prototypes, technologies, and know-how that have been deployed for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. From artificial intelligence-driven virtual humans deployed to teach military leadership skills to futuristic 3D spatial visualization and terrain capture to prepare these military agencies for their operational environments, ICT specializes in immersive training programs for “mission rehearsal,” as well as tools that contribute to the digital innovations of global warmaking.7  Technologies and programs developed at ICT were used by U.S. troops in the U.S.-led Global War on Terror. One such program is UrbanSim, a virtual training application initiated in 2006 designed to improve army commanders’ skills for conducting counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, delivering fictional scenarios through a gaming experience.8  From all of the warfighter preparation that USC’s Institute researches, develops, prototypes, and deploys, ICT boasts of generating over two thousand academic peer-reviewed publications.

    I encountered ICT’s work while conducting anthropological research on the relationship between the U.S. military and the media entertainment industry in Los Angeles.9  The Institute is located not on the university’s main University Park campus but by the coast, in Playa Vista, alongside offices for Google and Hulu. Although ICT is an approximately thirty-minute drive from USC’s main campus, this hub for U.S. warfighter lethality was enabled by an interdisciplinary collaboration with what was then called the School of Cinema-Television and the Annenberg School for Communications, and it remains entrenched within USC’s academic ecosystem, designated as a unit of its Viterbi School of Engineering, which is located on the main campus.10  Given the presence and power of UARCs at U.S. universities, we can reasonably ask: What is the difference between West Point Military Academy and USC, a supposedly civilian university? The answer, it seems, is not a difference in kind, but in degree. Indeed, universities with UARCs appear to be veritable military academies.

    What Are UARCs?

    UARCs are similar to federally funded research centres such as the Rand Corporation; however, UARCs are required to be situated within a university, which can be public or private.11  The existence of UARCs is not classified information, but their goals, projects, and implications may not be fully evident to the student bodies or university communities in which they are embedded, and there are differing levels of transparency among them about their funding. DoD UARCs “receive sole source funds, on average, exceeding $6 million annually,” and may receive other funding in addition to that from their primary military or federal sponsor, which may also differ among the fifteen UARCs.12  In 2021, funding from federal sources for UARCs ranged “from as much as $831 million for the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab to $5 million for the University of Alaska Geophysical Detection of Nuclear Proliferation.”13  Individual UARCs are generally created after the DoD’s Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering initiates a selection process for the proposed sponsor, and typically are reviewed by their primary sponsor every five years for renewed contracts.14  A few UARCs, such as Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Lab and the University of Texas at Austin’s Applied Research Lab, originated during the Second World War for wartime purposes but were designated as UARCs in 1996, the year the DoD formalized that status.15

    UARCs are supposed to provide their sponsoring agency and, ultimately, the DoD, access to what they deem “core competencies,” such as MIT’s development of nanotechnology systems for the “mobility of the soldier in the battlespace” and the development of anti-submarine warfare and ballistic and guided missile systems at Johns Hopkins University.16  Significantly, UARCs are mandated to maintain a close and enduring relationship with their military or federal sponsor, such as that of ICT with the U.S. Army. These close relationships are intended to facilitate the UARCs’ “in-depth knowledge of the agency’s research needs…access to sensitive information, and the ability to respond quickly to emerging research areas.”17  Such an intimate partnership for institutions of higher learning with these agencies means that the line between academic and military research is (further) blurred. With the interdisciplinarity of researchers and the integration of PhD students (and even undergraduate interns) into UARC operations such as USC’s ICT, the question of whether the needs of the DoD are prioritized over those of an ostensibly civilian institute of higher learning practically becomes moot: the entanglement is naturalized by a national security logic.

    Table 1 UARCs: The American Universities that Produce Warfighters

    Primary Sponsor University UARC Date of Designation (*original year established)
    Army University of Southern California Institute of Creative Technologies 1999
    Army Georgia Institute of Technology Georgia Tech Research Institute 1996 (*1995)
    Army Massachusetts Institute of Technology Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies 2002
    Army University of California, Santa Barbara Institute for Collaborative Biotechnologies 2003
    Navy Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 1996 (*1942)
    Navy Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory 1996 (*1945)
    Navy University of Texas at Austin Applied Research Laboratories 1996 (*1945)
    Navy University of Washington Applied Physics Laboratory 1996 (*1943)
    Navy University of Hawai’i Applied Research Laboratory 2004
    Missile Defense Agency Utah State University Space Dynamics Laboratory 1996
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security University of Maryland, College Park Applied Research Laboratory for Intelligence and Security 2017 (*2003)
    Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Stevens Institute of Technology Systems Engineering Research Center 2008
    U.S. Strategic Command University of Nebraska National Strategic Research Institute 2012
    Department of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Threat Reduction and Control) University of Alaska Fairbanks Geophysical Detection of Nuclear Proliferation 2018
    Air Force Howard University Research Institute for Tactical Autonomy 2023
    Sources: Joan Fuller, “Strategic Outreach—University Affiliated Research Centers,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), June 2021, 4; C. Todd Lopez, “Howard University Will Be Lead Institution for New Research Center,” U.S. Department of Defense News, January 23, 2023.

    A Closer Look

    The UARC at USC is unique from other UARCs in that, from its inception, the Institute explicitly targeted the artistic and humanities-driven resources of the university. ICT opened near the Los Angeles International Airport, in Marina del Rey, with a $45 million grant, tasked with developing a range of immersive technologies. According to the DoD, the core competencies that ICT offers include immersion, scenario generation, computer graphics, entertainment theory, and simulation technologies; these competencies were sought as the DoD decided that they needed to create more visually and narratively compelling and interactive learning environments for the gaming generation.18  USC was selected by the DoD not just because of the university’s work in science and engineering but also its close connections to the media entertainment industry, which USC fosters from its renowned School of Cinematic Arts (formerly the School of Cinema-Television), thereby providing the military access to a wide range of storytelling talents, from screenwriting to animation. ICT later moved to nearby Playa Vista, part of Silicon Beach, where the military presence also increased; by April 2016, the U.S. Army Research Lab West opened next door to ICT as another collaborative partner, further integrating the university into military work.19  This university-military partnership results in “prototypes that successfully transition into the hands of warfighters”; UARCs such as ICT are thus rendered a crucial link in what graduate student worker Isabel Kain from the Researchers Against War collective calls the “military supply chain.”20

    universities abandon any pretence to neutrality once they are assigned UARCs, as opponents at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa (UH Mānoa) asserted when a U.S. Navy-sponsored UARC was designated for their campus in 2004. UH Mānoa faculty, students, and community members repeatedly expressed their concerns about the ethics of military research conducted on their campus, including the threat of removing “researchers’ rights to refuse Navy directives”

    USC was touted as “neutral ground” from which the U.S. Army could help innovate military training by one of ICT’s founders in his account of the Institute’s origin story.21  Yet, universities abandon any pretence to neutrality once they are assigned UARCs, as opponents at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa (UH Mānoa) asserted when a U.S. Navy-sponsored UARC was designated for their campus in 2004. UH Mānoa faculty, students, and community members repeatedly expressed their concerns about the ethics of military research conducted on their campus, including the threat of removing “researchers’ rights to refuse Navy directives.”22  The proposed UARC at UH Mānoa occurred within the context of university community resistance to U.S. imperialism and militarism, which have inflicted structural violence on Hawaiian people, land, and waters, from violent colonization to the 1967 military testing of lethal sarin gas in a forest reserve.23 Hawai’i serves as the base of the military’s U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, where “future wars are in development,” professor Kyle Kajihiro of UH Mānoa emphasizes.24

    Writing in Mānoa Now about the proposed UARC in 2005, Leo Azumbuja opined that “it seems like ideological suicide to allow the Navy to settle on campus, especially the American Navy.”25 A key player in the Indo-Pacific Command, the U.S. Navy has long had a contentious relationship with Indigenous Hawaiians, most recently with the 2021 fuel leakage from the Navy’s Red Hill fuel facility, resulting in water contamination levels that the Hawai’i State Department of Health referred to as “a humanitarian and environmental disaster.”26  Court depositions have since revealed that the Navy knew about the fuel leakage into the community’s drinking water but waited over a week to inform the public, even as people became ill, making opposition to its proposed UARC unsurprising, if not requisite.27  The detonation of bombs and sonar testing that happens at the biennial international war games that the U.S. Navy has hosted in Hawai’i since 1971 have also damaged precious marine life and culturally sacred ecosystems, with the sonar tests causing whales to “swim hundreds of miles, rapidly change their depth (sometimes leading to bleeding from the eyes and ears), and even beach themselves to get away from the sounds of sonar.”28  Within this context, one of the proposed UARC’s core competencies was “understanding of [the] ocean environment.”29

    In a flyer circulated by DMZ Hawai‘i, UH Mānoa organizers called for universities to serve society, and “not be used by the military to further their war aims or to perfect ways of killing or controlling people.”30  Recalling efforts in previous decades on U.S. campuses to thwart the encroachment of military research, protestors raised questions about the UARC’s accountability and transparency regarding weapons production within the UH community. UH Mānoa’s strategic plan during the time that the Navy’s UARC was proposed and executed (2002–2010) called for recognition of “our kuleana (responsibility) to honour the Indigenous people and promote social justice for Native Hawaiians” and “restoring and managing the Mānoa stream and ecosystem”—priorities that the actions of the U.S. Navy disregarded.31  The production of knowledge for naval weapons within the auspices of this public, land-grant institution disrupts any pretension to neutrality the university may purport.

    while the UH administration claimed that the proposed UARC would not accept any classified research for the first three years, “the base contract assigns ‘secret’ level classification to the entire facility, making the release of any information subject to the Navy’s approval,” raising concerns about academic freedom, despite the fanfare over STEM and rankings

    Further resistance to the UARC designation was expressed by the UH Mānoa community: from April 28 to May 4, 2005, the SaveUH/StopUARC Coalition staged a six-day campus sit-in protest, and later that year, the UH Mānoa Faculty Senate voted 31–18 in favour of asking the administration to reject the UARC designation.32  According to an official statement released by UH Mānoa on January 23, 2006, at a university community meeting with the UH Regents in 2006, testimony from opponents to the UARC outnumbered supporters, who, reflecting the neoliberal turn of universities, expressed hope that their competitiveness in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) would advance with a UARC designation, and benefit the university’s ranking.33  Yet in 2007, writing in DMZ Hawai‘i, Kajihiro clarified that while the UH administration claimed that the proposed UARC would not accept any classified research for the first three years, “the base contract assigns ‘secret’ level classification to the entire facility, making the release of any information subject to the Navy’s approval,” raising concerns about academic freedom, despite the fanfare over STEM and rankings.34  However, the campus resistance campaign was unsuccessful, and in September 2007, the UH Regents approved the Navy UARC designation. By 2008, the U.S. Navy-sponsored Applied Research Laboratory UARC at UH Mānoa opened.

    “The Military Normal”

    Yet with the U.S. creation of the national security state in 1947 and its pursuit of techno-nationalism since the Cold War, UARCs are direct pipelines to the intensification of U.S. empire

    UH Mānoa’s rationale for resistance begs the question: how could this university—indeed, any university—impose this military force onto its community? Are civilian universities within the United States merely an illusion, a deflection from education in the service of empire? What anthropologist Catherine Lutz called in 2009 the ethos of “the military normal” in U.S. culture toward its counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—the commonsensical, even prosaic perspective on the inevitability of endless U.S.-led wars disseminated by U.S. institutions, especially mainstream media—helps explain the attitude toward this particular formalized capture of the university by the DoD.35  Defense funding has for decades permeated universities, but UARCs perpetuate the military normal by allowing the Pentagon to insert itself through research centres and institutes in the (seemingly morally neutral) name of innovation, within part of a broader neoliberal framework of universities as “engines” and “hubs,” or “anchor” institutions that offer to “leverage” their various forms of capital toward regional development in ways that often escape sustained scrutiny or critique.36  The normalization is achieved in some cases given that UARCs such as ICT strive to serve civilian needs as well as military ones with dual-use technologies and tools. Yet with the U.S. creation of the national security state in 1947 and its pursuit of techno-nationalism since the Cold War, UARCs are direct pipelines to the intensification of U.S. empire. Some of the higher-profile virtual military instructional programs developed at ICT at USC, such as its Emergent Leader Immersive Training Environment (ELITE) system, which provides immersive role-playing to train army leaders for various situations in the field, are funnelled to explicitly military-only learning institutions such as the Army Warrant Officer School.37

    The fifteenth and most recently created UARC, at Howard University in 2023—the first such designation for one of the historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs)—boasts STEM inclusion

    The military normal generates a sense of moral neutrality, even moral superiority. The logic of the military normal, the offer of STEM education and training, especially through providing undergraduate internships and graduate training, and of course funding, not only rationalizes the implementation of UARCs, but ennobles it. The fifteenth and most recently created UARC, at Howard University in 2023—the first such designation for one of the historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs)—boasts STEM inclusion.38  Partnering with the U.S. Air Force, Howard University’s UARC is receiving a five-year, $90 million contract to conduct AI research and develop tactical autonomy technology. Its Research Institute for Tactical Autonomy (RITA) leads a consortium of eight other HCBUs. As with the University of Hawai’i, STEM advantages are touted by the UARC, with RITA’s reach expanding in other ways: it plans to supplement STEM education for K–12 students to “ease their path to a career in the fields of artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, tactical autonomy, and machine learning,” noting that undergraduate and graduate students will also be able to pursue fully funded research opportunities at their UARC. With the corporatization of universities, neoliberal policies prioritize STEM for practical reasons, including the pursuit of university rankings and increases in both corporate and government funding. This fits well with increased linkages to the defence sector, which offers capital, jobs, technology, and gravitas. In a critique of Howard University’s central role for the DoD through its new UARC, Erica Caines at Black Agenda Reportinvokes the “legacies of Black resistance” at Howard University in a call to reduce “the state’s use of HBCUs.”39  In another response to Howard’s UARC, another editorial in Black Agenda Report draws upon activist Kwame Ture’s (Stokely Carmichael’s) autobiography for an illuminative discussion about his oppositional approach to the required military training and education at Howard University during his time there.40

    With their respectability and resources, universities, through UARCs, provide ideological cover for U.S. war-making and imperialistic actions, offering up student labour at undergraduate and graduate levels in service of that cover. When nearly eight hundred U.S. military bases around the world are cited as evidence of U.S. empire and the DoD requires research facilities to be embedded within places of higher learning, it is reasonable to expect that university communities—ostensibly civilian institutions—ask questions about UARC goals and operations, and how they provide material support and institutional gravitas to these military and federal agencies.41  In the case of USC, ICT’s stated goal of enhancing warfighter lethality runs counter to current USC student efforts to strive for more equitable conditions on campus and within its larger community (for example, calls to end “land grabs,” and “targeted repression and harassment of Black, Brown and Palestinian students and their allies on and off campus”) as well as other reductions in institutional harms.42  The university’s “Minor in Resistance to Genocide”—a program pursued by USC’s discarded valedictorian Asna Tabassum—also serves as mere cover, a façade, alongside USC’s innovations for warfighter lethality.

    the Hopkins Justice Collective at Johns Hopkins University recently proposed a demilitarization process to its university’s Public Interest Investment Advisory Committee that cited Johns Hopkins’s UARC, Applied Physics Lab, as being the “sole source” of DoD funding for the development and testing of AI-guided drone swarms used against Palestinians in 2021

    Many students and members of U.S. society want to connect the dots, as evident from the nationwide protests and encampments, and a push from within the academy to examine the military supply chain is intensifying. In addition to Researchers Against War members calling out the militarized research that flourishes in U.S. universities, the Hopkins Justice Collective at Johns Hopkins University recently proposed a demilitarization process to its university’s Public Interest Investment Advisory Committee that cited Johns Hopkins’s UARC, Applied Physics Lab, as being the “sole source” of DoD funding for the development and testing of AI-guided drone swarms used against Palestinians in 2021.43  Meanwhile, at UH Mānoa, the struggle continues: in February 2024, the Associated Students’ Undergraduate Senate approved a resolution requesting that the university’s Board of Regents terminate UH’s UARC contract, noting that UH’s own president is the principal investigator for a $75 million High-Performance Computer Center for the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory that was contracted by the university’s UARC, Applied Research Laboratory.44  Researchers Against War organizing, the Hopkins Justice Collective’s proposal, the undaunted UH Mānoa students, and others help pinpoint the flows of militarized knowledge—knowledge that is developed by UARCs to strengthen warfighters from within U.S. universities, through the DoD, and to different parts of the world.45

    Notes

    1. ↩ Jake Alimahomed-Wilson et al., “Boeing University: How the California State University Became Complicit in Palestinian Genocide,” Mondoweiss, May 20, 2024; Brian Osgood, “U.S. University Ties to Weapons Contractors Under Scrutiny Amid War in Gaza,” Al Jazeera, May 13, 2024.
    2. ↩ “Collaborate with Us: University Affiliated Research Center,” DevCom Army Research Laboratory, arl.devcom.army.mil.
    3. ↩ USC Divest From Death Coalition, “Divest From Death USC News Release,” April 24, 2024.
    4. ↩ USC Institute for Creative Technologies, “ICT Overview Video,” YouTube, 2:52, December 12, 2023.
    5. ↩ Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, Mission Creep: The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy?(Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).
    6. ↩ USC Institute for Creative Technologies, “ICT Overview Video”; USC Institute for Creative Technologies, Historical Achievements: 1999–2019 (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, May 2021), ict.usc.edu.
    7. ↩ Yuval Abraham, “‘Lavender’: The AI Machine Directing Israel’s Bombing Spree in Gaza,” +972 Magazine.
    8. ↩ “UrbanSim,” USC Institute for Creative Technologies.
    9. ↩ Sylvia J. Martin, “Imagineering Empire: How Hollywood and the U.S. National Security State ‘Operationalize Narrative,’” Media, Culture & Society 42, no. 3 (April 2020): 398–413.
    10. ↩ Paul Rosenbloom, “Writing the Original UARC Proposal,” USC Institute for Creative Technologies, March 11, 2024.
    11. ↩ Susannah V. Howieson, Christopher T. Clavin, and Elaine M. Sedenberg, “Federal Security Laboratory Governance Panels: Observations and Recommendations,” Institute for Defense Analyses—Science and Technology Policy Institute, Alexandria, Virginia, 2013, 4.
    12. ↩ OSD Studies and Federally Funded Research and Development Centers Management Office (FFRDC), Engagement Guide: Department of Defense University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs) (Alexandria, Virginia: OSD Studies and FFRDC Management Office, April 2013), 5.
    13. ↩ Christopher V. Pece, “Federal Funding to University Affiliated Research Centers Totaled $1.5 Billion in FY 2021,” National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, National Science Foundation, 2024, ncses.nsf.gov.
    14. ↩ “UARC Customer Funding Guide,” USC Institute for Creative Technologies, March 13, 2024.
    15. ↩ “Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) and University Affiliated Research Centers (UARC),” Department of Defense Research and Engineering Enterprise, rt.cto.mil.
    16. ↩ OSD Studies and FFRDC Management Office, Engagement Guide.
    17. ↩ Congressional Research Service, “Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFDRCs): Background and Issues for Congress,” April 3, 2020, 5.
    18. ↩ OSD Studies and FFRDC Management Office, Engagement Guide, 18.
    19. ↩ “Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT),” USC Military and Veterans Initiatives, military.usc.edu.
    20. ↩ USC Institute for Creative Technologies, Historical Achievements: 1999–2019, 2; Linda Dayan, “‘Starve the War Machine’: Workers at UC Santa Cruz Strike in Solidarity with Pro-Palestinian Protesters,” Haaretz, May 21, 2024.
    21. ↩ Richard David Lindholm, That’s a 40 Share!: An Insider Reveals the Origins of Many Classic TV Shows and How Television Has Evolved and Really Works (Pennsauken, New Jersey: Book Baby, 2022).
    22. ↩ Leo Azambuja, “Faculty Senate Vote Opposing UARC Preserves Freedom,” Mānoa Now, November 30, 2005.
    23. ↩ Deployment Health Support Directorate, “Fact Sheet: Deseret Test Center, Red Oak, Phase I,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Defense (Health Affairs), health.mil.
    24. ↩ Ray Levy Uyeda, “U.S. Military Activity in Hawai’i Harms the Environment and Erodes Native Sovereignty,” Prism Reports, July 26, 2022.
    25. ↩ Azambuja, “Faculty Senate Vote Opposing UARC Preserves Freedom.”
    26. ↩ Kyle Kajihiro, “The Militarizing of Hawai’i: Occupation, Accommodation, Resistance,” in Asian Settler Colonialism, Jonathon Y. Okamura and Candace Fujikane, eds. (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2008), 170–94; “Hearings Officer’s Proposed Decision and Order, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law,” Department of Health, State of Hawai‘i vs. United States Department of the Navy, no. 21-UST-EA-02 (December 27, 2021).
    27. ↩ Christina Jedra, “Red Hill Depositions Reveal More Details About What the Navy Knew About Spill,” Honolulu Civil Beat, May 31, 2023.
    28. ↩ “Does Military Sonar Kill Marine Wildlife?,” Scientific American, June 10, 2009.
    29. ↩ Joan Fuller, “Strategic Outreach—University Affiliated Research Centers,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), June 2021, 4.
    30. ↩ DMZ Hawai‘i, “Save Our University, Stop UARC,” dmzhawaii.org.
    31. ↩ University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, Strategic Plan 2002–2010: Defining Our Destiny, 8–9.
    32. ↩ Craig Gima, “UH to Sign Off on Navy Center,” Star Bulletin, May 13, 2008.
    33. ↩ University of Hawai’i at Mānoa, “Advocates and Opponents of the Proposed UARC Contract Present Their Case to the UH Board of Regents,” press release, January 23, 2006.
    34. ↩ Kyle Kajihiro, “The Secret and Scandalous Origins of the UARC,” DMZ Hawai‘i, September 23, 2007.
    35. ↩ Catherine Lutz, “The Military Normal,” in The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual, or Notes on Demilitarizing American Society, The Network of Concerned Anthropologists, ed. (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009).
    36. ↩ Anne-Laure Fayard and Martina Mendola, “The 3-Stage Process That Makes Universities Prime Innovators,” Harvard Business Review, April 19, 2024; Paul Garton, “Types of Anchor Institution Initiatives: An Overview of University Urban Development Literature,” Metropolitan Universities 32, no. 2 (2021): 85–105.
    37. ↩ Randall Hill, “ICT Origin Story: How We Built the Holodeck,” Institute for Creative Technologies, February 9, 2024.
    38. ↩ Brittany Bailer, “Howard University Awarded $90 Million Contract by Air Force, DoD to Establish First-Ever University Affiliated Research Center Led by an HCBU,” The Dig, January 24, 2023, thedig.howard.edu.
    39. ↩ Erica Caines, “Black University, White Power: Howard University Covers for U.S. Imperialism,” Black Agenda Report, February 1, 2023.
    40. ↩ Editors, “Howard University: Every Black Thing and Its Opposite, Kwame Ture,” The Black Agenda Review (Black Agenda Report), February 1, 2023.
    41. ↩ David Vine, Base Nation: How U.S. Military Bases Abroad Harm America and the World (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2015).
    42. ↩ USC Divest from Death Coalition, “Divest From Death USC News Release”; “USC Renames VKC, Implements Preliminary Anti-Racism Actions,” Daily Trojan, June 11, 2020.
    43. ↩ Hopkins Justice Collective, “PIIAC Proposal,” May 4, 2024.
    44. ↩ Bronson Azama to bor.testimony@hawaii.edu, “Testimony for 2/15/24,” February 15, 2024, University of Hawai’i; “UH Awarded Maui High Performance Computer Center Contract Valued up to $75 Million,” UH Communications, May 1, 2020.
    45. ↩ Isabel Kain and Becker Sharif, “How UC Researchers Began Saying No to Military Work,” Labor Notes, May 17, 2024.

     

    Feature Image: Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) at Johns Hopkins Advanced Physical Laborotory, A UARC facility – www.jhuapl.edu

  • China and the US: Conventional and Nuclear Military Strategies

    China and the US: Conventional and Nuclear Military Strategies

    Occasional Paper: 9/2024

    China and the US: Conventional and Nuclear Military Strategies

    Abstract

    China’s military strategy focuses on developing asymmetric capabilities to counter the United States’ technological advantages and superior military budget by investing in precision missiles, advanced targeting systems, and system destruction warfare. The US initiated the Defence Innovation Initiative to prioritise autonomous learning systems and high-speed projectiles; however, it diminished under the Trump administration, leaving the US reliant on legacy weapons systems vulnerable to new-generation autonomous and hypersonic weapons. Despite China’s advancements, the US maintains a significant advantage in nuclear warheads, with 5,800 compared to China’s 320 in 2020, consistent with Mao’s “minimum deterrent” strategy. While China’s nuclear arsenal primarily comprises strategic weapons, the US possesses both tactical and strategic types. The US complacency regarding China’s military challenge may stem from its nuclear superiority; however, as China progresses technologically, the US risks falling behind by relying on outdated weapons systems, often maintained due to their economic significance in key congressional districts.

    Key Words: #nuclear warheads, #hypersonic weapons, #precision weapons, #asymmetric capabilities, #system destruction warfare, #autonomous learning systems 

     

    Introduction

    Since the beginning of the millennium, China has decided to outsmart the United States’ military strength through a very particular strategy. It aimed at overcoming America’s technological advantages and much superior military budget by investing significant resources in asymmetrical capabilities. As Mark Leonard wrote, China was attempting to become an “asymmetric superpower” outside the realm of conventional military power (Leonard, 2008, p. 106).

    Asymmetric superpower

    Conscious that the Soviet Union had driven itself into bankruptcy by accepting a ruinous competition for military primacy with the US, China looked for cheaper ways to compete. As a result, it invested billions in an attempt to make a generational leap in military capabilities, able to neutralize and trump America’s superior conventional forces. In other words, instead of rivalling the United States on its own game, it searched to engage it in a different game altogether. It was the equivalent of what companies like Uber, Netflix, Airbnb or Spotify did in relation to the conventional economic sectors with which they competed. A novel by P.W. Singer and August Cole depicts how, through surprise and a whole array of asymmetric weapons, China defeats the superior forces of the United States (Singer and Cole, 2016).

    In essence, these weapons are dual-focused. On the one hand, they emphasize long and intermediate-range precision missiles and advanced targeting systems, able to penetrate battle network defences during the opening stages of a conflict. On the other hand, they aim at systems destruction warfare, able to cripple the US’ command, control, communication and intelligence battle network systems. The objective in both cases is to target the US’ soft spots with weapons priced at a fraction of the armaments or systems that they strive to destroy or render useless. The whole notion of asymmetric weapons, indeed, is based on exploiting America’s military weaknesses (like its dependence on information highways or space satellites) while neutralizing its strengths (like its fleet of aircraft carriers). Michael Pillsbury describes this situation in graphic terms: “For two decades, the Chinese have been building arrows designed to find a singular target – the Achilles’ heel of the United States” (Pillsbury, 2015, p. 196).

    America’s military legacy systems

    To counter China’s emerging military threat, the Obama administration put in motion what it called the Defence Innovation Initiative. This was also known as the Third Offset Strategy, as it recalled two previous occasions in the 1950s and the 1970s when, thanks to its technological leaps, the US could overcome the challenges posed by the Soviet military. Recognizing that the technological superiority, which had been the foundation of US military dominance for years, was not only eroding but was being challenged by China, the Pentagon defined a series of areas to be prioritized. Among them were the following: Autonomous learning systems, human-machine collaborative decision-making, network-enabled autonomous weapons, and high-speed projectiles (Ellman, Samp and Coll, 2017).

    However, as with many other initiatives representing the Obama legacy, this one began fading into oblivion with Trump’s arrival to power. As a result, the vision of significantly modernizing America’s military forces also faded (McLeary, 2017). This implied reverting to the previous state of affairs, which still lingers nowadays. In Raj M. Shah and Christopher M. Kirchhoff’s words: “We stand at the precipice of an even more consequential revolution in military affairs today. A new way of war is bearing down on us. Artificial-intelligence-powered autonomous weapons are going global. And the US military is not ready for them (…). Yet, as this is happening, the Pentagon still overwhelmingly spends its dollars on legacy weapons systems. It continues to rely on an outmoded and costly technical production system to buy tanks, ships and aircraft carriers that a new generation of weapons – autonomous and hypersonic – can demonstrably kill” (Shah and Kirchhoff, 2024).

    Legacy systems -aircraft carriers, fighter jets, tanks – are deliberately manufactured in key congressional districts around the country so that the argument over whether a weapons system is needed gets subsumed by the question of whether it produces jobs

    Indeed, as Fareed Zakaria put it: “The United States defence budget is (…) wasteful and yet eternally expanding (…). And the real threats of the future -cyberwar, space attacks- require different strategies and spending. Yet, Washington continues to spend billions on aircraft carriers and tanks” (Zakaria, 2019). A further quote explains the reason for this dependence on an ageing weapons inventory: “Legacy systems -aircraft carriers, fighter jets, tanks – are deliberately manufactured in key congressional districts around the country so that the argument over whether a weapons system is needed gets subsumed by the question of whether it produces jobs” (Sanger, 2024, p. 193). Hence, while China’s military advances towards a technological edge, America’s seems to be losing both focus and fitness.

    Minimum deterrence nuclear strategy

    Perhaps this American complacency concerning China’s disruptive weapons and overall military challenge could be explained by an overreliance on its nuclear superiority. Indeed, in 2020, in the comparison of nuclear warheads, the United States possessed overwhelming superiority with 5,800 against China’s 320 (Arms Control Association, 2020). This was consistent with the legacy of Mao’s “minimum deterrent” strategy. Within the above count, two kinds of nuclear weapons are involved – tactical and strategic. The former, with smaller explosive capacity, are designed for use in battlefields. With a much larger capacity, the latter aims at vital targets within the enemy’s home front. In relation to tactical nuclear weapons, America’s superiority is total, as China doesn’t have any. Nonetheless, in terms of long-range, accuracy, and extensive numbers, China’s conventional ballistic missiles (like the DF-26, also known as the Guam killer) can become an excellent match to the US’ tactical nuclear weapons (Roblin, 2018). The big difference between both countries, thus, is centred on America’s overwhelming superiority in strategic nuclear warheads.

    China’s minimum deterrent nuclear strategy was based on the assumption that, within cost-benefit decision-making, a limited nuclear force, able to target an adversary’s strategic objectives, could deter a superior nuclear force. This required retaliatory strike capacities that can survive a first enemy attack. In China’s case, this is attainable through road-mobile missiles that are difficult to find and destroy, and by way of missiles based on undetectable submarines. Moreover, Beijing’s hypersonic glide vehicle -whose prototype was successfully tested in July 2021- follows a trajectory that American systems cannot track. All of these impose restraint in the use of America’s more extensive arsenal and undermine its ability to carry out nuclear blackmail.

    there is no US defence that “could block” China’s hypersonic glide vehicle “not just because of its speed but also due to its ability to operate within Earth’s atmosphere and to change its altitude and direction in an unpredictable manner while flying much closer to the Earth’s surface”

    For the above aim, Beijing has developed new nuclear ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and a sea-based delivery system. These include the DF-41 solid-fuel road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (with a range of 15,000 kilometres) or the submarine-launched JL-3 solid-fuel ballistic missile (whose range is likely to exceed 9,000 kilometres). To launch the JL-3 missiles, China counts with four Jin-class nuclear submarines, with an upgraded fifth under construction, each armed with twelve nuclear ballistic missiles (Huang, 2019; Panda, 2018). On top of that, there is no US defence that “could block” China’s hypersonic glide vehicle “not just because of its speed but also due to its ability to operate within Earth’s atmosphere and to change its altitude and direction in an unpredictable manner while flying much closer to the Earth’s surface” (Sanger, 2024, p. 190). All of this shows that America’s overwhelming superiority in terms of strategic nuclear warheads results in more theoretical than practical. What might justify a first American strategic nuclear strike on the knowledge that a Chinese retaliatory one could destroy New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or all of the three together?

    Matching the US’ overkill nuclear capacity

    Being an asymmetric superpower while sustaining a minimum but highly credible deterrent nuclear strategy implied much subtility in terms of military thinking. One, in tune with the best Chinese traditions exemplified by Sun Tsu’s The Art of War and Chan-Kuo T’se’s Stratagems of the Warring States. However, in this regard, as in many others, Xi Jinping is sowing rigidity where subtility and flexibility prevailed. A perfect example of this is provided by its intent to match the US in terms of strategic nuclear warheads. In David E. Sanger’s words: “But now, it seemed apparent, Chinese leaders had changed their minds. Xi declared that China must ‘establish a strong strategic deterrence system’. And satellite images from near the cities of Yumen and Hami showed that Xi was now ready to throw Mao’s ‘minimum deterrent’ strategy out of the window” (Sanger, 2024, p. 200).

    Three elements attest to the former. Firstly, 230 launching silos are under construction in China. Secondly, these silos are part of a larger plan to match the US’ “triad” of land-launched, air-launched, and sea-launched nuclear weapons. Thirdly, it is estimated that by 2030, China will have an arsenal of 1,000 strategic nuclear weapons, which should reach 1,500 by 2035. The latter would imply equalling the Russian and the American nuclear strategic warheads (Sanger, 2024, p. 197; Cooper, 2021; The Economist, 2021; Hadley, 2023). 

    Xi Jinping is thus throwing overboard the Chinese capability to neutralize America’s strategic nuclear superiority at a fraction of its cost, searching to match its overkill capacity. In essence, nuclear arms seek to fulfil two main objectives. In the first place, intimidating or dissuading into compliance a given counterpart. In the second place, deterring by way of its retaliatory capacity, any first use of nuclear weapons by a counterpart.

    As seen, the second of those considerations was already guaranteed through its minimum deterrence strategy. In relation to the first, China already enjoys a tremendous dissuading power and the capacity to neutralize intimidation in its part of the world. Indeed, it holds firm control over the South China Sea. This is for three reasons. First, through its possession and positioning there, of the largest Navy in the world. Second, by way of the impressive firepower of its missiles, which includes the DF21/CSS-5, capable of sinking aircraft carriers more than 1,500 miles away. Third, via the construction and militarization of 27 artificial islands in the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. All of this generates an anti-access and denial of space synergy, capable of being activated at any given time against hostile maritime forces. In other words, China cannot be intimidated into compliance by the United States in the South China Sea scenario (Fabey, 2018, pp. 228-231). Nor, in relation to Taiwan, could America’s superior nuclear forces dissuade Beijing to invade if it so decides. The US, indeed, would not be willing to trade the obliteration of Los Angeles or any other of its major cities by going nuclear in the defence of Taiwan.

    Simultaneously confronting two gunfighters

    It was complicated enough during the Cold War to defend against one major nuclear power. The message of the new [Chinese] silos was that now the United States would, for the first time in its history, must think about defending in the future against two major nuclear powers with arsenals roughly the size of Washington’s – and be prepared for the possibility that they might decide to work together

    Matching the US’ nuclear overkill capacity will not significantly alter the strategic equation between both countries. If anything, it would only immobilize in easy-to-target silos, the bulk of its strategic nuclear force. However, Xi’s difficult-to-understand decision makes more sense if, instead of thinking of two nuclear powers, we were to think of a game of three. This would entail a more profound strategic problem for the United States that David E. Sanger synthesizes: “It was complicated enough during the Cold War to defend against one major nuclear power. The message of the new [Chinese] silos was that now the United States would, for the first time in its history, must think about defending in the future against two major nuclear powers with arsenals roughly the size of Washington’s – and be prepared for the possibility that they might decide to work together” (Sanger, 2024, p. 201). This working together factor should be seen as the new normal, as a revisionist block led by China and Russia confronts America’s system of alliances and its post-WWII rules-based world order.

    Although the United States could try to increase the number of its nukes, nothing precludes its two competitors from augmenting theirs as well, with the intention of maintaining an overwhelming superiority. According to Thomas Schelling, leading Game Theory scholar and Economics Nobel Prize winner, the confrontation between two nuclear superpowers, in parity conditions, was tantamount to that of two far-west gunfighters: Whoever shot first had the upper hand. This is because it can destroy a significant proportion of its counterpart’s nuclear arsenal (Fontaine, 2024). In the case in point, Uncle Sam would have to simultaneously confront two gunfighters, each matching his skills and firepower. Although beyond a certain threshold, there wouldn’t seem to exist a significant difference in the capacity of destruction involved, nuclear blackmail could be imposed upon the weakest competitor. In this case, the United States.

    Conclusion

    From an American perspective, overreliance on its challenged nuclear power makes no sense. Especially if it translates into a laid-back attitude in relation to the current technological revolution in conventional warfare. If Washington doesn’t go forward with a third offset military strategy, it could find itself in an extremely vulnerable position. Just two cases can exemplify this. Aircraft carriers are becoming obsolete as a result of the Chinese DF21-CSS5 missile, able to sink them 1,500 miles away, in the same manner in which war in Ukraine is showing the obsolescence of modern tanks when faced with portable Javelins and drones. If the US is not able to undertake a leap forward in conventional military weapons and systems, it will be overcome by its rivals in both conventional and nuclear forces. For Washington, no doubt about it, this is an inflexion moment.

     

    References:

    Arms Control Association (2020). “Nuclear weapons: Who has what at a glance”, August.

    Cooper, Helene (2021). “China could have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, Pentagon says”. The New York Times, November 3.

    Ellman, Jesse, Samp, Lisa, Coll, Gabriel (2017). “Assessing the Third Offset Strategy”. Center for Strategic & International Studies, CSIS, March.

    Fabey, Michael (2018) Crashback: The Power Clash Between US and China in the Pacific. New York: Scribner.

    Fontaine, Phillipe (2024). “Commitment, Cold War, and the battles of self: Thomas Schelling on Behavior Control”. Journal of the Behavioral Sciences, April.

    Hadley, Greg (2023). “China Now Has More ICBM Launchers than the US”. Air & Space Forces Magazine. February 7.

    Huang, Cary (2019). “China’s show of military might risk backfiring”. Inkstone, October 19.

    Leonard, Mark (2008). What Does China Think? New York: HarperCollins.

    McLeary, Paul (2017). “The Pentagon’s Third Offset May be Dead, But No One Knows What Comes Next”. Foreign Policy, December 18.

    Panda, Ankit (2018). “China conducts first test of new JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile”. The Diplomat, December 20.

    Pillsbury, Michael (2015). The Hundred-Year Marathon. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

    Roblin, Sebastien (2018). “Why China’s DF-26 Missile is a Guam Killer”. The National Interest, November 9.

    Sanger, David E. (2024). New York: Crown Publishing Books.

    Shah, Raj M. and Kirchhoff, Christopher M. (2024). “The US Military is not Ready for the New Era of Warfare”. The New York Times, September 13.

    Singer, P.W. and Cole, August (2016). Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War. Boston: Eamon Dolan Book.

    The Economist (2021). “China’s nuclear arsenal has been extremely modest, but that is changing”, November 20.

    Zakaria, Fareed (2019). “Defense spending is America’s cancerous bipartisan consensus”. The Washington Post, July 18.

     

    Feature Image Credit: NikkeiAsia

    Text Image: AsiaTimes.com

  • Decoding Quantum Computing: Understanding the Basics

    Decoding Quantum Computing: Understanding the Basics

     

    Quantum computing has the potential to revolutionise the field of computing and has far-reaching implications for the future of technology. It is a complex and rapidly evolving field that requires a deep understanding of quantum mechanics and computer science.

    Quantum Computing and Moore’s Law

    Quantum computing is set to revolutionise the field of computation by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. While classical computing, which follows Moore’s Law, is approaching its physical limits, quantum computing offers a way to surpass these boundaries. Moore’s Law states that the number of transistors on a microchip doubles approximately every two years, leading to exponential growth in computing power. However, this trend cannot continue indefinitely due to the physical limitations of classical hardware.

    Nature Simulation with Quantum Processors

    Unlike classical bits, quantum bits (qubits) can exist in multiple states simultaneously, thanks to a property known as superposition. This means that a quantum computer can process a vast number of possibilities all at once. For example, in a maze, a classical computer would explore each path one by one, while a quantum computer could explore all paths simultaneously. This is illustrated in the following diagram:

    Quantum computing exploits entanglement and superposition to perform calculations at unprecedented speeds. This capability makes it particularly suited for simulating natural processes at the atomic and molecular levels, tasks that classical computers struggle with.

    Challenges in Quantum Computing

    Quantum computing, despite its promising potential, encounters notable obstacles primarily stemming from the delicate nature of qubits. Qubits, the fundamental units of quantum information, exhibit high sensitivity to external factors, rendering them susceptible to coherence loss caused by thermal noise. This susceptibility results in increased error rates during computation. Preserving qubit coherence presents a significant challenge, as even minimal disturbances can induce decoherence, disrupting quantum operations.

    In addition to superconducting qubits, other quantum computing methods also face significant challenges. For instance, trapped ion qubits are highly susceptible to environmental noise and require extremely precise laser control to maintain coherence, which is technically demanding and resource-intensive. Topological qubits, while theoretically more robust against local perturbations, are still in nascent stages of experimental realisation, and creating and manipulating these qubits remains a formidable challenge. Photonic qubits rely on maintaining precise control over individual photons, which is difficult due to losses and the need for high-fidelity detectors and sources. Quantum dot qubits face issues with variability in dot size and composition, affecting their uniformity and coherence times. Each of these methods requires sophisticated error correction techniques and significant advancements in material science and engineering to overcome their respective challenges.

    Remarkably, natural quantum processes (Quantum Biology) operate seamlessly at room temperature, a phenomenon that remains elusive in terms of being replicated effectively in artificial quantum systems.

    If these significant technical challenges can be overcome, quantum computing promises unprecedented computational power and transformative applications across various fields.

    Ultimate Applications of Quantum Computing

    Quantum computing holds the promise of facilitating groundbreaking advancements across various disciplines. Research literature underscores its potential in drug discovery, where quantum computers exhibit superior efficacy in modelling intricate molecular structures compared to classical counterparts. Similarly, in financial modelling, quantum algorithms demonstrate the capacity to optimise portfolios with unparalleled precision.

    Military Advancements

    Quantum sensing and communication technologies have the potential to significantly revolutionise military capabilities. Quantum radar systems, for instance, possess the capability to detect stealth aircraft, overcoming the limitations of conventional radar systems. Additionally, secure Quantum communication could provide robust defences against cyber threats, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information.

    Elevating Humanity

    The applications of quantum computing have the potential to propel humanity towards a Type II civilization on the Kardashev Scale, endowed with the capability to harness and manage energy on a planetary scale. By manipulating quantum processes, we stand poised to address pressing global challenges such as climate change and energy scarcity.

    Green Revolution and Sustainability

    Among the most auspicious applications of quantum computing is its potential to revolutionise artificial photosynthesis, thereby paving the way for sustainable energy solutions. Quantum computers are poised to streamline nitrogen capture processes, indispensable for enhancing agricultural productivity and potentially instigating a second green revolution. Such advancements hold the promise of ameliorating food security concerns and accommodating the burgeoning global population, echoing the transformative impact of the initial green revolution.

    How the Race Started

    The Inception and Influence of Peter Shor’s Algorithm

     The quest for quantum supremacy gained significant momentum with the groundbreaking work of Peter Shor, a mathematician and theoretical computer scientist. In 1994, Shor developed an algorithm that fundamentally challenged the security of classical cryptographic systems. Shor’s algorithm, designed to run on a quantum computer, efficiently factors large integers—a task that is exponentially time-consuming for classical computers. This capability poses a direct threat to widely used cryptographic schemes, such as RSA, which rely on the difficulty of factoring large numbers for security.

    Shor’s discovery was a pivotal moment that captured the attention of both the academic community and government agencies, particularly those concerned with national security, such as the National Security Agency (NSA). Recognizing the profound implications for encryption and data security, the NSA and other entities significantly increased their investments in quantum computing research and development.

    This breakthrough ignited international competition, with major world powers like the United States, China, and the European Union vying for dominance in the field. Each nation adopted different technological approaches in their pursuit of quantum supremacy. For example, Google and IBM focus on superconducting qubits, IonQ employs trapped ion technology, and Microsoft explores the potential of topological qubits.

    These diverse methodologies reflect the broad and multifaceted efforts to harness the unprecedented computational power promised by quantum computing.

    Race of the 21st Century

    The quest for quantum supremacy is the new frontier in technological competition, reminiscent of past races like the nuclear arms race (peaking in the 1950s) and the space race1 (culminating in the 1969 moon landing). However, the stakes in the quantum race are arguably higher. Estimates suggest the global quantum computing market could reach $50 billion by 2030. Achieving quantum supremacy, the ability of a quantum computer to outperform a classical computer for a specific task, is not just a scientific milestone but a potential economic and strategic game-changer.

    The country that first achieves and leverages quantum supremacy is poised to become a global leader in innovation, economic growth, and, potentially, military dominance. This potential has spurred fierce international competition, with nations like China, the United States, and the European Union investing heavily in quantum research and development.

    References

    – Kaku, Michio. Quantum Supremacy: The Quest to Build the World’s Most Powerful Computer. New York: Doubleday, 2023

    – (2017) “Feeding the World with Die Rolls: Potential Applications of Quantum Computing,” Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science: Vol. 20: No. 1, Article 9.

    – Shor algorithm

    –  Quantum computational chemistry

    – Quantum computing research trends report

     

  • “And Now to some serious Governance”

    “And Now to some serious Governance”

    A time comes for each leader and government to rise above pettiness, discarding ill will and hatred towards all. For the BJP, now uniquely in its third term, this is the time to show the nation that it is a party with a difference. For the opposition equally, this is the time to cooperate with the government on critical issues impacting the country.  

     

    Since my retirement from active service, I have avoided politics and political writings like the plague, but the avoidable happenings of the past few months have caused me, like am sanguine would have to millions of our countrymen, pain and a sense of despair.

    India has conducted over 18   general elections to its Parliament since 1952 with a lot of fury and vibrancy, but the Lok Sabha 2024 general elections were indeed an example of abysmally low-level politics transcending our better senses.

            How the world’s largest democracy indulged in its Lok Sabha 2024 elections was hardly complimenting to it considering the unquestionable fact that among the emerging nations in the world, call it from the Global South, the conduct of our elections showed some among those participating in poor light. Between competing political parties, enlightened debates and mutual civility were sadly lacking.   India has conducted over 18   general elections to its Parliament since 1952 with a lot of fury and vibrancy, but the Lok Sabha 2024 general elections were indeed an example of abysmally low-level politics transcending our better senses. India, which carries a fair amount of moral authority and is considered an example of a true and vibrant democracy, cannot let its hallowed image be sullied attributable to the selfish electoral games of some of its political leaders. The party in power at the Centre, the principal Opposition party and all those regional parties at the helm in the states have to display adequate maturity and a modicum of propriety and civility towards each other and not politicize each and every aspect of governance or national issues impacting India. The opposition, as it shows the mirror to the government on critical issues of governance, must not criticise each and every act of the government as a matter of routine.

             With the outcome of the general elections now done and dusted and the previous BJP government back in power, albeit with a clear reduction in its seats tally from 303 down to 240, it must get down to the exacting business of good governance from the Centre. That the same government, with its experience of the last ten continuous years in power, fielding more or less the same faces in the Cabinet in critical ministries and importantly serviced by the same bureaucrats should have, relatively speaking, not such an arduous task in governance. However, the thrust for fair, equitable, and sensitive handling of all critical matters across the nation has to come from the top political leadership. All our states must never feel discrimination by the Centre, especially in financial allocations urgently required for developmental works and disaster management. Additionally, the new government must take stern measures to keep rising inflation and unnecessary governmental expenditure under check before the economy takes a severe nose-dive.

             The Modi government, with the continuous experience of the last ten years, will have more than a good idea of the systemic improvements required and about areas needing additional financial resources and effort. It is unnecessary to worry too much about criticisms from the opposition but to carry on regardless in developmental works, without fear or favour, and with impartiality towards all the states in the true spirit of federalism. A time comes for each leader and government to rise above pettiness, discarding ill will and hatred towards all. For the BJP, now uniquely in its third term, this is the time to show the nation that it is a party with a difference. For the opposition equally, this is the time to cooperate with the government on critical issues impacting the country.

             New Delhi’s hands will be full of the nation’s diverse and formidable challenges, requiring attention and effectiveness. On the foreign policy front, India will have to walk the tightrope of maintaining strategic autonomy and sustaining its good relations with both the US and Russia. However, as it determinedly confronts an overly assertive China, India needs to use its economic clout and sophisticated diplomacy to get its South Asian neighbourhood closer to it and each other, avoiding the debt trap diplomacy and financial machinations of China.

    The number of terror-related incidents in J&K has gone up substantially in the last three months, and Pakistan will have to be kinetically chastened.

          India must, at the appropriate level, convey to China that their confrontationist attitude towards us will be harmful to the Chinese, too and may propel India to rethink its existing Tibet policy. Nevertheless, India must maintain the utmost vigil along the 3485 km Line of Actual Control/ IB, which it shares with  China. Meanwhile, Pakistan once again needs to be cautioned against stepping up terror activities in J&K  or elsewhere in the Indian hinterland. India is in full knowledge of Pakistan’s many fault lines. Still, it has refrained from exploiting these, and Pakistan must also cooperate in ensuring a peaceful and prosperous South Asian neighbourhood independent of China’s wily stratagems. The number of terror-related incidents in J&K has gone up substantially in the last three months, and Pakistan will have to be kinetically chastened.

    Meanwhile, India’s preparations to successfully improve its security capabilities to confront a two-front war must go ahead with realism and an unfailing determination. Measures to augment capital expenditure for major defence acquisitions must be identified. Transformative defence reforms like the introduction of integrated theatre commands will need the attention of the Centre. In addition, India must take all steps to restore peace in our restive NE states.

             The Modi government has come in for some criticism abroad on its human rights record and dealings with its Muslim population. This unjust criticism must be dealt with judiciously and with maturity. India’s overall inclusiveness and celebration of its diversity are unique examples for the entire world, especially the nations of the Global South. We must never deviate or be even seen to shift from this noble orientation.

    Reduction of the yawning gap between the countless ultra-rich and those millions in abject poverty is essential as we boast of becoming the 5th largest economy in the world. The many human indices where we are faltering also need to be addressed.

             As economic strength is the pillar that propels and sustains progress, the Modi government must take measures to improve our economic health. Reduction of the yawning gap between the countless ultra-rich and those millions in abject poverty is essential as we boast of becoming the 5th largest economy in the world. The many human indices where we are faltering also need to be addressed.

             By all yardsticks, India is deservingly on the cusp of acquiring a seat on the global high table. Let us not squander away this golden opportunity by internal squabbling but instead work together in addressing crucial issues that affect our nation; we must seize this opportunity.

    Feature Image Credit:  vskbharat.com    

    Cartoon Credit: Times of India

  • Can a Muscular Response deter Chinese Aggression?

    Can a Muscular Response deter Chinese Aggression?

    The Sino-Indian War of 1962, which is seen as a humiliating defeat for India, continues to rankle all Indians. Clearly, it is seen as a result of poor leadership both at the political and military levels. In hindsight, many believe that the PLA could have been routed had India regrouped its Army and used the IAF in a massive counterattack. It was November, and with the onset of winter and the closing of the Himalayan passes, the PLA could have been demolished completely. That we didn’t even think of it shows the serious vacuum in strategic thinking. More than half a century later, and with the Indian military much stronger and battle-hardened, it is inexplicable why India’s leadership is shy of following an aggressive strategy, including the use of force proactively against China. Brigadier Deepak Sinha, a vetran and TPF’s Senior Fellow, raises this question while correlating the current situation with that of 1962.

    There is an urgent need for us all to shed our divisive politics, long-held dogmas and skewed perceptions, forget fanciful visions and face reality, especially when it comes to the question of national security. The last thing we need is for petty politics and fragile egos to control our nation’s destiny. Nothing can be more consequential, traumatic or shameful than being bested by a rival on the battlefield. The consequences of our “defeat” in the Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 continue to rankle and haunt us to this day.

    Quite clearly, the fear psychosis that permeates our higher military and political leadership is palpable.

    Indeed, our reluctance, for fear of escalation, to launch a quid-pro-quo riposte and grab disputed territory elsewhere as a bargaining chip following the PLA’s blatant land grab of disputed territory in Eastern Ladakh is a clear indication of this. This was reinforced by an earlier interview with ANI by our Foreign Minister, who stated, “Look, they (China) are the bigger economy. What am I going to do? As a smaller economy, I am going to pick up a fight with the bigger economy? It is not a question of being reactionary, it’s a question of common sense….” Quite clearly, the fear psychosis that permeates our higher military and political leadership is palpable.

    On the other hand, the Chinese leadership has a very different perception of our capabilities as was reflected back in 1959 following the Longju incident. A declassified United States document of that time points out that “the late August clashes point to a mode of thought which has remained an ingredient in the Chinese leaders’ calculations on the border dispute: ‘When the Indians show a temperament to advance on the ground, we must alter their frame of mind by letting military action take over political caution. Besides, military risk itself is negligible because we are the stronger side.” Obviously, over the years, they have been given no reason to believe otherwise. In order to understand what ails us, it is worth briefly examining the course of the 1962 conflict to get a clearer idea of the extent of our loss at the hands of the Chinese. That should help us understand why, over fifty years later, we continue to remain so traumatised and fearful.

    The opening skirmish of that conflict occurred in the North East with the capture, on 8th Sept, of the isolated Assam Rifles post at Dhola, on the southern slopes of the Thag La ridgeline. This post was surrounded and completely dominated by PLA positions on higher ground, and its loss was a foregone conclusion. The actual conflict commenced at approximately 0500 hours on 20th October, when the PLA launched a massive infantry attack, supported by artillery, on the 7 Infantry Brigade positions. The Brigade was deployed in a tactically unsound manner on direct orders of GOC 4 Corps, Lt Gen B M Kaul, along the Southern banks of the Namka Chu River over a 20 Km frontage instead of on the heights overlooking the river.

    The battalions were deployed in platoon penny pockets, lacking mutual support, in temporary positions with no overhead cover. Artillery support was restricted to just one battery of Heavy Mortars and a troop of two field guns with limited ammunition. No intelligence was available to the Brigade Headquarters or any of the other higher headquarters as to PLA force levels or their intentions. The assault came as a surprise and just four hours later, by 0900 Hours, the Brigade ceased to exist as a fighting force. Within just another 96 Hours, the strategic border town of Tawang, approximately 100 Km in-depth, held by an understrength battalion, was attacked and captured without a fight.

    Almost simultaneously in the Northern Theatre, isolated forward positions at Aksai Chin and the Pangong Tso area were also cleared after a brief skirmish. After an administrative pause of approximately a month, the PLA launched the next phase of its offensive with its assault on the Walong positions on 16th Nov and on the main defences of the 4 Infantry Division at Bomdi La, Se La and on the Division Headquarters at Dirang Dzong. Simultaneously, on 20th Nov, Chushul came under attack by an Infantry Divison. On 21st Nov the Chinese announced a unilateral ceasefire and subsequently withdrew to positions occupied by them prior to the commencement of the conflict.

    There are three main deductions that can be drawn from an examination of the facts. Firstly, that the conflict was, in essence, extremely limited in terms of time, space and force levels involved. From an army of 550,000 personnel, approximately 20,000 personnel were committed into this conflict, primarily due to our limited logistical capabilities. The conflict was primarily restricted to the tactical level only, at battalion level and below. While the conflict itself was spread over one month, the tactical engagements themselves lasted a few hours at best, and on one or two occasions where stiffer resistance was put up, extending to 48-72 Hours. Unfortunately, given the terrain, lack of field fortifications, etc, casualties suffered were relatively high, with approximately fifteen hundred killed, similar numbers wounded, two thousand missing and another 4000 taken prisoner. The Air Force, which could have played a critical role in blunting the PLA attacks and destroying their lines of communications, was deliberately confined to the logistics role for reasons that are still not clear, while the Navy remained a bystander.

    Sadly, our military and political leadership exhibited an utter lack of moral courage, determination and willpower by quietly acquiescing to the unilateral ceasefire, thereby kicking the main irritant of the demarcation of borders further up the road, where it has once again come to bite us on our posteriors.

    Secondly, far from being a major defeat, as has been commonly made out, it was at best a temporary reverse that could, and should, have been countered with the use of fresh troops under a more determined and professional leadership. More importantly, the PLA understood this fact and, therefore, undertook a unilateral withdrawal to its earlier pre-war line of defences. It must have been fully cognisant that if hostilities were to continue, it would find itself in an increasingly untenable position with its supply lines already badly stretched and being further impacted with the onset of winter. It would only have been a matter of time before the Indian Army got over its shock, regrouped and reorganised itself and launched a counter-offensive to recapture lost territory. Sadly, our military and political leadership exhibited an utter lack of moral courage, determination and willpower by quietly acquiescing to the unilateral ceasefire, thereby kicking the main irritant of the demarcation of borders further up the road, where it has once again come to bite us on our posteriors.

    Thirdly, what continues to remain totally inexplicable is the reasons why our military and political leadership continue to remain so traumatised and scared to this day. The truth is that the narrative that emanated following the reverses was set by officers and men belonging to units that, for the most part, had withdrawn before coming in contact with the PLA. They were low on morale and had come to believe the Chinese were supermen who could not be stopped by mere mortals. It was from amongst the experience and perception of these personnel that pamphlets on the tactics and capabilities of the PLA were subsequently formulated that continue to be relied on to this day, thereby giving further credence to that distorted narrative.

    The fact of the matter is that in any future conflict, the PLA will be fighting over 2000 Kms away from its home bases, supported along communication lines that run over some of the most difficult and inhospitable terrain in the world. They are also easily susceptible to interdiction, given the nature of the terrain. In addition, they would have to contend with a hostile and badly oppressed population not just within Tibet but in Xingjian as well, which could revolt if a suitable opportunity arose. This would require the PLA to deploy additional forces for rear area security to prevent disruption of the lines of communication.

    Moreover, while there are sizeable disparities in aspects such as force levels and capabilities, infrastructure development and economic strength, one needs to be cognizant of the fact that we have also made tremendous strides with regard to infrastructure development, logistics and offensive capabilities. Our forces still hold the edge vis-à-vis combat experience and operating in mountains, while the Air Force continues to hold the upper hand in the TAR purely on account of terrain profile and radius of action. Most importantly, the availability of two Mountain Strike Corps gives us immense flexibility, if properly utilized, to grab the initiative and force a decision dilemma on the PLA. In the circumstances, the reason for our extreme reluctance to stand up against the Chinese bully must lie elsewhere. One distinct possibility is that our political leadership lacks faith in the military leadership and its ability to fight and win.

    This will seem at odds with the fact that the military has a splendid history of having always successfully completing any task given to it. If anything, it has been grossly misused by the Central and State Governments to carry out tasks that are not in their ambit, whether these be organizing the Commonwealth Games or construction of railway over-bridges, because the concerned departments and agencies have been unable to produce the requisite results. Clearly, this mistrust, primarily in the sphere of civil-military relations, has more pernicious roots and is very deeply embedded in the politico-bureaucratic psyche.

     Interestingly, in the Official History of the 1962 Conflict with China, available in the public domain but yet to be published, the Chief Editor, Dr S N Prasad, concludes that the chief reason for our defeat was that the political establishment was unable to avoid war while it was in the process of transforming the military establishment. Given Prime Minister Nehru’s apprehensions about the military taking control, he wanted to change it from being, as Mr Prasad puts it, a “close-knit professional body, deliberately isolated from the citizen. Its predominant motive force remained esprit de corps and not identification with the people… Perhaps he wanted to model it after the People’s Liberation Army of China, more egalitarian, flexible, closer to the people………Such basic changes required a committed, or at least a pliant, band of army officers in key positions. So mediocre Thapar was selected instead of the doughty Thorat as Army Chief, and Bijji Kaul was made CGS……. “

      He further goes on to add that “To carry out this transformation of the national defence set up, a decade of peace was absolutely essential. For establishing indigenous weapons manufacture, money had to be found by cutting arms imports. The armed forces would be short of equipment and stores for several years till the new arms factories started producing. The officer cadre was a house divided within itself till the new breed fully took over. A period of transition was inevitable, during which the fighting machine would not be fully efficient and would be vulnerable………Therein seems to lie the basic cause of the debacle of 1962. India failed to avoid a war during the transition period. Lulled by faulty political assessment and wrong intelligence forecasts, the country got caught in a war when it was least prepared.”

    With Mr Modi’s ascension to power, we came a full circle as he took it upon himself to steer it away from its apolitical and secular character towards a more ideologically compatible institution that would be in sync with his Party’s long-held vision of making India into a Hindu Rashtra.

    Fortuitously for the country, Nehru’s vision for a transformed military was stymied by the 1962 Conflict and the most important lesson that his successors assimilated quickly was to stay away from interfering in the internal affairs of the military as that could gravely damage internal cohesion and morale. With Mr Modi’s ascension to power, we came a full circle as he took it upon himself to steer it away from its apolitical and secular character towards a more ideologically compatible institution that would be in sync with his Party’s long-held vision of making India into a Hindu Rashtra.

    Towards this end Mr Modi has smartly used the concept of “deep selection” to ensure key senior appointments were filled by officers displaying an affinity for his government’s ideology, regardless of existing rules, seniority or merit. This, in turn, made them personally beholden to him, and he was thus able to use them to take ownership and deflect criticism from initiatives that were pushed through by his government regardless of their adverse impact on long-standing and cherished customs and traditions or on the operational capabilities of the Services. This has led to schisms within the institution, damaged the integrity and cohesion of the chain of command and cast a big question mark on the apolitical and secular character of the Services.

    In this context, a politically compromised Chief of Defence Staff and other senior officers shamefully endorsed the PMO, thrusting down the ill-conceived Agnipath Scheme on the military with not a single objection being raised. This scheme has all but destroyed the basic ethos of our fighting arms, ensuring that the deeply entrenched and effective Regimental System has been severed at the roots. Given their ignorance of matters military, they would have been ignorant of Winston Churchill’s wise advice that “Regiments are not like houses. They cannot be pulled down and altered structurally to suit the convenience of the occupier or the caprice of the owner. They are more like plants; they grow slowly if they are to grow strong…and if they are blighted or transplanted, they are apt to wither.”

    And wither they have, the resulting adverse impact on morale is not difficult to gauge. This is undoubtedly being further exacerbated by the considerable voids in manpower, with combat units reportedly functioning at less than 75% of their authorised strength, and truncated peace tenures to fill up operational voids in Eastern Ladakh, Manipur and Jammu & Kashmir. In addition, the government’s emphasis on the ‘Atman Nirbhar Abhiyan’ and ‘Make in India Scheme’ has resulted in deficiencies, even if temporary, in the holdings of weapons systems, ammunition and other warlike stores. Given all these factors, the military obviously finds itself in an extremely precarious situation, committed to its fullest capacity with limited options available. Ironically, a government that lays such a great emphasis on our Hindu origins, culture and history has managed to display a profound ignorance of statecraft and warfare, as brought out in Kautilya’s Arthashastra. In this classic, Chanakya points to the necessity for a strong army because, for all nation-states, there are only two states of being: either conquer or be conquered.

    …at the present time, we are once again confronted with an extremely turbulent geopolitical situation, with the world’s attention on the ongoing crises in Europe and the Middle East. The situation today, in many ways, is clearly reminiscent of the period on the eve of the 1962 Conflict. For reasons not very different from then, the Indian Military finds itself in a very similar situation as well.In these circumstances, the real question that we should be asking ourselves is not whether we can overcome our past traumas and face down the PLA, but more importantly, whether China will seize this opportunity to recalibrate the Sino-Indian relationship through the use of force.

    Interestingly, in 1962, China launched major operations against us at the end of the campaigning season, which could have been jeopardised by unseasonal snow. Obviously, this was because, at that time, the world’s attention was riveted to the Cuban Missile Crisis. Similarly, at the present time, we are once again confronted with an extremely turbulent geopolitical situation, with the world’s attention on the ongoing crises in Europe and the Middle East. In addition, the United States is deeply immersed in its own internal problems with presidential elections just around the corner and with little time for other matters.

    The situation today, in many ways, is clearly reminiscent of the period on the eve of the 1962 Conflict. Moreover, at that time, Chairman Mao was under intense pressure as his Great Leap Forward experiment had failed, and he had been removed from his appointment as State President. Today, President Xi also finds himself under similar pressure following his disastrous Zero Covid and hard-line economic policies that have tanked the economy. For reasons not very different from then, the Indian Military finds itself in a very similar situation as well.

    Undoubtedly, the political leadership and the military top brass must be fully cognizant of this state of affairs. Clearly, they are in no position to stare down the PLA. What makes matters worse is that following the General Elections, Mr. Modi’s authority and standing have been greatly diminished. Where does this leave those senior officers who have progressed by hanging on to his ideological coat-tails? Has the authority and credibility of the CDS, an out-and-out political appointee and loyalist, been affected within the Chiefs of Staff Committee of which he is the Chairman? What will be its impact on the move towards the establishment of theatre commands? In these circumstances, the real question that we should be asking ourselves is not whether we can overcome our past traumas and face down the PLA, but more importantly, whether China will seize this opportunity to recalibrate the Sino-Indian relationship through the use of force.

     

    Feature Image Credit: Border Clashes between India and China ‘regularly covered up’  The Telegraph

    Namka Chu and Dhola Post Picture credit: www.indiasentinels.com

  • Xi Jinping: Assessing his Foreign Policy

    Xi Jinping: Assessing his Foreign Policy

    All foreign policies must aim at attaining purpose, credibility, and efficiency. Purpose defines the main objectives that the country wishes to achieve through its international relations. Credibility comes from international recognition of its actions in this field. And efficiency allows implementation, at the lowest possible cost, of the desired purpose. These three notions, although interwoven and influencing each other, keep their own specificity.

             How does Xi Jinping’s foreign policy qualify in these three areas?

    Purpose

    Its purpose, in tune with that of the Chinese Communist Party before his arrival to power, is sufficiently clear. By 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic, China should have achieved a prominence commensurate to its glorious past. According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, China marches towards the perception of its global destiny with a clear strategy in mind. Such destiny is none other than the resurrection of its historical glory (Rudd, 2017). Projects such as the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation, Made in China 2025, and the Belt and Road Initiative, converge in defining concrete goals that lead in that direction. This includes China’s “Great Unification” with Taiwan, the consolidation of a hegemonic position within the South China Sea, making China the epicentre of an Asian-led world economic order, and creating a global infrastructure and transportation network with China at its head. Xi Jinping visualizes the next ten to fifteen years as a window of opportunity to shift China’s correlation of power with the United States. Hence, Beijing seeks the convergence of energies and political determination towards this window of opportunity. The strategic compass of Xi’s foreign policy could not be more precise. Few countries show a clearer sense of its purpose.

    Credibility

             His foreign policy credibility presents a more mixed result. Vis-à-vis the Western World and several of its neighbours, China’s credibility is at a very low point. However, the situation is different in relation to the Global South, where Xi’s foreign policy promotes four interconnected initiatives to expand China’s influence. Besides the Belt and Road, whose objective is creating a China-led global infrastructure and transportation network, there is also the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. The first, the Global Development Initiative, aims to contrast the unequal distribution of benefits that characterize the West-led development projects with the inclusiveness and balanced nature of this China-led multilateral development project [Hass, 2023]. The other two initiatives, global security and global civilization, present rational and balanced options clearly differentiated from America’s overbearing approach to these areas. In the former case, China’s proposal promotes harmonious solutions to differences among countries through dialogue and consultation [Chaziza, 2023]. The Global Civilization Initiative, on its side, fosters cooperation and interchange between different civilizations, whereby the heterogeneity of cultures and the multiplicity of identities is fully respected [Hoon and Chan, 2023].

    The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka is one of thousands project that China has helped finance in recent years – Image Credit: The Brussels Times (The so-called China’s debt-trap is a narrative trap).

           However, three dark areas emerge in Beijing’s credibility with respect to the Global South. Number one is the frustration prevailing in many of these smaller and underdeveloped nations, resulting from the contradiction between China’s openness as a lender and its severity as a creditor. This has given rise to the suspicion of a hidden agenda on its part and has led to the coining of the phrase “debt trap diplomacy”. Number two derives from the arrogance shown by Beijing towards the rights of several of its weakest neighbours, disregarding international law. This seems to delineate a tributary vision of its relations with them. Although this only affects China’s neighbourhood, it projects a haughtiness that contradicts its formulations about a more harmonious, equitable and inclusive world order. Number three is the apparent contradiction between Beijing’s proclamation regarding the value of the heterogeneity of cultures and the diversity of identities and its treatment of non-Han Chinese minorities at home. A feature susceptible to reproducing itself abroad. All the above generates a distance between words and deeds that casts a shadow of doubt concerning China’s sincerity. Hence, even within the Global South, China’s credibility shows a mixed result.

    Efficiency

    Finally, there is the area of efficiency. It is a very complex one, particularly given China’s over-ambitious purpose. It must be said that until 2008, Beijing succeeded in rising as a significant power without alarming neighbours or the rest of the world. It even attained the geopolitical miracle of doing so without alarming the United States. Indeed, few countries have made such a systematic and conscious effort to project a constructive international image as China has done to this date. This included the notion of “peaceful rise”, which implied a path different from that followed by Germany before World War I and Japan during World War II when they tried to overhaul the international political landscape. China’s path, on the contrary, relied upon reciprocity and the search for mutual benefit with other countries. It was a brilliant soft power marketing strategy that gave China huge goodwill dividends (Cooper Ramo, 2007).

    “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” – Deng Xioping

    Regarding its reunification with Taiwan, it relied on “one country, two systems” and the economic benefits of their interconnection as the obvious means to propitiate their joining together. Regarding its maritime disputes in the South China Sea, after having deferred the resolution of this issue to a more propitious moment, it proposed a Code of Conduct to handle it in the least contentious possible manner. In general, similar approach was evident in Beijing’s handling of various contentious issues.  Beijing’s leadership followed Deng Xiaoping’s advice to his successors: “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” (Kissinger, 2012, p. 441).

    “Like Europe, it has many twenty-first century qualities. Its leaders preach a doctrine of stability and social harmony. Its military talks more about soft than hard power. Its diplomats call for multilateralism rather than unilateralism. And its strategy relies more on trade than war to forge alliances and conquer new parts of the world” – Mark Leonard on China in 2008

    Writing in 2008, before the change towards a more assertive foreign policy materialized, Mark Leonard said about China: “Like Europe, it has many twenty-first century qualities. Its leaders preach a doctrine of stability and social harmony. Its military talks more about soft than hard power. Its diplomats call for multilateralism rather than unilateralism. And its strategy relies more on trade than war to forge alliances and conquer new parts of the world” (Leonard, 2008, p. 109). This phrase encapsulates well how China was perceived worldwide, including by the Western World. Not surprisingly, a 2005 world survey on China by the BBC stated that most countries in five continents held a favourable view of that nation. Even more significant was the fact that even China’s neighbours viewed it favourably (Oxford Analytica, 2005). It was a time when all doors opened to China.

    2008 represented a turning point. The convergence of several events that year changed China’s perception of its foreign policy role, making it more assertive. Among such events the most significant was the global economic crisis of 2008, the worst crisis since 1929, resulting from America’s financial excesses; other important events were the sweeping efficiency with which China avoided contagion; the fact that China’s economic growth was the fundamental factor in preserving the world from a major economic downturn; and the boost to Chinese self-esteem after the highly successful Beijing Olympic games of that year. In sum, the time in which China had to keep hiding its strengths seemed to have ended.

    Although this turning point materialized under Hu Jintao, changes accelerated dramatically after Xi Jinping’s ascend to power. He not only sharpened the edges of the country’s foreign policy but made it more aggressive, even reckless. Xi’s eleven years’ tenure in office has translated into a proliferation of international trouble spots. His overreach and overbearing style misfired, generating a concerted and strong reaction against China. As a result, the costs linked to attaining China’s purpose have skyrocketed. This deserves a more detailed analysis of China’s foreign policy efficiency under Xi.

    Intimidatory policies and actions

             Xi Jinping’s intimidatory policies and actions on international affairs have been extensive, bringing with them immense resistance.

    After dusting off a plan that had remained on paper for years, Xi decided to build seven artificial islands on top of the South China Sea coral reefs. After assuring President Obama they would not be militarized, he proceeded otherwise. Contravening international maritime law, he assigned 12 nautical miles of Territorial Sea and 200 miles of Exclusive Economic Zone to these artificial outposts.

    Under the protection of the People’s Liberation Navy, an oil rig was built in the waters claimed by Vietnam as its EEZ. Disrespecting the International Court of Justice’s ruling about the Philippines’ waters in the South China Sea, China has forcefully enforced its exclusionary presence in them. China’s Coast Guard is now authorized to use lethal force against foreign vessels operating within maritime areas under its jurisdiction claims. This, notwithstanding that China’s claimed jurisdiction, goes far beyond what is recognized by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice while disputed by several other countries.

    The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began to ignore the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which it had respected for decades. Frequent and increasingly bold incursions within Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone and reiterated calls to the PLA to prepare for war in Taiwan have become the new normal. The Senkaku-Diaoyu islands, disputed with Japan, have been declared one of China’s core interests, thus closing the door to a negotiated solution. This has translated into the systematic incursion of Chinese maritime law enforcement ships and planes into the territorial and contiguous maritime space of these islands, currently occupied by Japan. Beijing unilaterally imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone over two-thirds of the East China Sea, forcing foreign aircraft to identify themselves under threat of “defensive measures” by the PLA Air Force.

             Since 2017, China has reneged on the quite borders with India and engaged in a series of border skirmishes. It has resorted to intrusions into border regions under dispute resulting in a major skirmish in Ladakh with significant casualties, the first since 1987. In 2023, China released an official standard map showing India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast India and Askai Chin plateau in the Indian territory of Ladakh in the west, as official parts of its territory, despite India’s objections. At the same time, it renamed 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh with Chinese names. When South Korea decided to deploy the US Army’s THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence) ballistic missile defence, as protection against the growing North Korean threat, China put in motion an economic boycott of South Korean products and services. When Australia and New Zealand protested against Chinese interference in their domestic political systems, Beijing openly threatened to impose economic sanctions on governments or private actors criticising China’s behaviour. A few years later, it effectively banned most Australian exports when Canberra proposed an international scientific investigation on the origins of COVID-19. When Canada detained Huawei’s heiress, Meng Wanzhou, answering an American judicial request, Beijing jailed and presented accusations against two Canadian businessmen based in China (releasing them hours after Meng was released).

    Antagonizing Americans and Europeans

             Xi’s rhetoric in relation to the U.S. has been highly aggressive. Reversing the terms of Deng Xiaoping’s advice to his successors to hide China’s strengths while bidding for right time, Xi has alerted America about its intent to challenge and displace it as the foremost power soon. He has repeatedly referred; to the primacy of China in the emerging world order as its most important objective, to the next ten to fifteen years as the inflexion point when a change in the correlation of power between the two countries should be taking place, to the need to overcome the U.S.’ technological leadership, to the necessity for the PLA to ready itself to wage and win wars, and to the next ten years as a time of confrontation and dangerous storms.

    Xi Jinping starts his European tour in Paris on May6, 2024, his first in five years as China-EU trade relation have hit a low. Picture Source: Sky News.

             China’s actions have also antagonized the Europeans. These relate to China’s refusal to use the term “invasion” when referring to Russia’s actions in Ukraine; supporting the arguments provided by Russia concerning the causes of the war; placing the responsibility of the conflict on the US and the NATO; abstaining from voting in the U.N. on the West’s resolutions against Russia; demonstrating its strong strategic relations with Russia that is described as “partnership without limits”; the conduct of military exercises with Russia while war rages on in Ukraine; and providing indirect support for Russia’s war effort through surveillance drones, computer chips, and other critical components for its defence industry. Though all of the above are sovereign decisions of China, Europe, as China’s major trading partner, expects some support to their position and a neutral approach to the conflict from China.

    For the most part, Beijing’s above foreign policy actions were duly accompanied by a bellicose so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy”. It aggressively reacted to perceived criticism of the Chinese government.

    Domestic actions impacting its Image Abroad

    However, with its aggressive display in the international arena, some domestic actions have negatively permeated abroad. Brushing aside Deng Xiaoping’s commitment to respect Hong Kong’s autonomy for a period of fifty years, Xi reclaimed complete jurisdiction over such territory since his arrival to power. Within a process of actions and reactions, accelerated by the progressive strangulation of Hong Kong’s liberties, Beijing finally imposed a National Security Law over the territory. This ended the Hong Kong Basic Law, which guaranteed its autonomy. By burying the principle of “one country, two systems” established by Deng, Beijing was, at the same time, closing out any possibility of Taiwan’s willing accession to the People’s Republic. Henceforward, only force may accomplish that result.

    On the other hand, the brutal Sinicization of Xinjiang Province has shaken the liberal conscience of Western countries, with particular reference to Europe. The Uyghur population re-education camps have been compared to the Soviet’s Gulag. Beijing’s combative reaction to any foreign criticism in this regard, has compounded China’s image crisis in Europe.

    Any remaining trace of the so-called peaceful emergence of China has completely disappeared under Xi Jinping. Under his rudder, China has brought to the limelight a revisionist and tributary vision of the international order. Not surprisingly, interwoven policies and decisions emanating from different geographical points have been converging to contain China. In an unnecessary way, Beijing under Xi has been instrumental in multiplying the barriers to realising its purpose.

    Keeping China at bay

    The number of initiatives to keep China at bay has multiplied. Its list includes the following. The U.S., Japan, Australia and India created a strategic quadrilateral forum known as the Quad, which is none other than a factual alliance aimed at the containment of China. More formally, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States gave birth to a strategic military alliance with the same goal. On its side, Japan and Australia signed a security cooperation agreement.

    Leaving aside its restrained post-war defence policy, Japan doubled its defence budget to 2 per cent of its GDP. This will transform Japan to number three position worldwide regarding military expenditure, just behind the U.S. and China. Within the same context, Japan and the U.S. established a joint command of its military forces while agreeing to create a shared littoral force equipped with the most modern anti-ship missiles. Meanwhile, Japan is set to arm itself with state-of-the-art missiles. Overcoming their longstanding mutual mistrust, Japan and South Korea, jointly with the U.S., established a trilateral framework to promote a rules-based Indo-Pacific region. On the same token, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. held a first-ever trilateral summit aimed at defence cooperation and economic partnership. They pledged to protect freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China and East China Seas. Several joint naval exercises have taken place in the South China Sea to defend the principle of freedom of navigation, with France participating in the latest one.

    After several fruitless years of attempting to mollify China’s position concerning their maritime dispute in the South China Sea, the Philippines decided to renew its Mutual Defence Treaty with the U.S., which had elapsed in 2016. Meanwhile, most Southeast and East Asian countries on China’s periphery are rapidly increasing their military spending while  still continuing to support the U.S. security umbrella. Although pledging to remain neutral, even Vietnam, a traditional de facto ally of China, decided to upgrade its diplomatic relations with Washington to the highest level.

    America’s several decades policy of “strategic ambiguity” in relation to Taiwan evaporates as a result of China’s increasing threats and harassment to the island. On top of unambiguous support to Taipei by the President and the Congress, the Pentagon has formulated a military doctrine for  Taiwan’s defence in case of invasion. The idea of defending Taiwan if invaded is also taking shape in Japan.

    The European Union adhered to the U.S., the United Kingdom and Canada in sanctioning the Chinese authorities involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang (the first such European sanction since Tiananmen in 1989). Equally, and for the same reasons, the European Parliament refused to ratify the long-time negotiated investment agreement between China and the European Union. China’s aggressive reaction to such a decision only toughened the European position further. Significantly, European contacts with Taiwan have increased as its democratic nature, and China’s harassment of it are providing a new light on the subject. In that context, the European Parliament officially received Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

    A gigantic containment Bloc

    France and Germany sent warships to navigate the South China Sea in defiance of Beijing’s claimed ownership of 90 per cent of the Sea. NATO’s updated “Strategic Concept” document, which outlines primary threats to the alliance, identified China for the first time as a direct threat to its security: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values (…) It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the Space, Cyber and Maritime domains (…)The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests” (NATO, 2022). Not surprisingly, NATO’s last summit included the heads of state and governments of Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.

    As a result of Xi Jinping’s actions and policies, China is now being subjected to a gigantic geostrategic containment force—a true block integrated by nations and organizations from four continents. For a country like China, which traditionally identified with political subtlety and enjoyed universal goodwill until not so long ago, this change in its strategic environment is not a small development. Xi’s calculations that acting boldly had become possible as China was powerful enough, its economy big enough, its neighbours dependent on it, and the U.S. resolve as uncertain have proved wrong and grossly misfired. At this point, China’s conundrum might leave China with few options short of war. According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, the 2020s have become the “decade of living dangerously”, as, within it, a war between China and the U.S. will most probably erupt (Rudd, 2022, chapter 16).

    In sum

    An evaluation of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, using the notions of purpose, credibility, and efficiency as bases, would present the following result. Its purpose is crystal clear, which translates into a high mark. Credibility, on its part, shows mixed results: Not entirely unsatisfactory nor satisfactory. In terms of efficiency, though, Xi Jinping has openly failed. The lack of efficiency associated with his outreach adversely affects the attainment of China’s foreign policy purpose, creating countless barriers to its fulfilment. This lack of efficiency affects the country’s credibility as well. The downturn has been dramatic when comparing the current situation of China’s foreign policy to the one that prevailed before 2008 and, more precisely, to Xi Jinping’s ascension to power.

     

     

    References:

    Chaziza, M. (2023) “The Global Security Initiative: China’s New Security Architecture for the Gulf”, The Diplomat, May 5.

    Cooper Ramo, J. (2007). Brand China. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

    Hass, R. (2023) “China’s Response to American-led ‘Containment and Suppression’”, China Leadership Monitor, Fall, Issue 77.

    Hoon, C.Y. and Chan, Y.K., (2023) “Reflections on China’s Latest Civilisation Agenda”, Fulcrum, 4 September.

    Kissinger, H. (2012). On China. New York: Penguin Books.

    Leonard, M. (2008). What Does China Think? New York: Public Affairs.

    NATO (2022). “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, June 29.

    Oxford Analytica (2005). “Survey on China”, September 20th.

    Rudd, K. (2022). The Avoidable War. New York: Public Affairs.

    Rudd, K. (2017). “Xi Jinping offers a long-term view of China’s ambitions”, Financial Times, October 23.

     

    Feature Image: bloomberg.com – Xi Jinping on visit to Belgrade, Serbia on 07 May 2024 (Xi says China will “never forget” the U.S. bombing of its Embassy)

  • Houthi’s attacks in the Red Sea: What does this mean for the world?

    Houthi’s attacks in the Red Sea: What does this mean for the world?

    The Houthis started in the 1990s as an armed group in Yemen, fighting against corruption. They belong to a community called Zaidis, who are a part of the Shia-Muslim minority. Along with Hamas and Hezbollah, the Houthis have declared themselves to be a part of the Iranian-led “axis of resistance” against Israel, the US, and the larger West.1 The Houthis have been attacking commercial ships passing through the lower Red Sea, and this has dramatically increased since mid-November in retaliation to Israel’s bombardment of Gaza. Due to these events, the Red Sea trade route is significantly affected, impacting the flow of global trade and having the potential to cause further damage. With ships attacked and stranded in one of the leading shipping routes of the world, countries seem to find themselves in yet another geopolitical fix. As the war continues between Israel and Gaza, the Red Sea has become a renewed hotspot for geopolitical and military tensions.

    Situated between Africa and West Asia, the Red Sea is a seawater entrance to the Indian Ocean in the south and goes through the Gulf of Aden and the Bab El Mandeb Strait, meeting the Gulf of Suez in the north. Countries like the US, France, Japan, and China have military bases in the region, including in Djibouti and many along the Horn of Africa, with considerable deployment of ships, weapons, and personnel. Establishing such bases conveys how critical it is to have control of the area as a measure of regional power and as a way of asserting their dominance internationally. Big players, including the Cold War rivals, have long struggled to gain presence and influence in West Asia. Having a military and economic presence in Africa with proximity to the Red Sea was necessary, for it provides access to almost 12% of the world’s trade, including nearly 40% of the trade between Europe and Asia.2 

    Until recently, the Houthis had been targeting ships heading towards Israel or ones that Israelis owned. However, recent developments showing attacks on ships bound for Israel with flags of various countries have raised grave concerns for global trade and security in the immediate future. The US, along with countries like the UK, France, and Bahrain, have tried to stop Houthi attacks on ships passing through the Red Sea under what Washington calls the “Operation Prosperity Guardian”. On the first day of the new year, The US military released a statement conveying that they killed at least 10 Houthi rebels and sabotaged three Houthi ships. Although the US was successful in deterring the Houthis from their attempt to attack, it did not do much to stop the group from being involved in disrupting peaceful navigation through the Red Sea.

    Private shipping companies such as Maersk, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and MSC have begun to avoid using the Red Sea route due to the imminent threat from Houthis.3  The ongoing supply chain disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could further escalate due to the Red Sea crisis and cause severe concerns for world trade and consumer goods supply. With the suspension of trade via the Suez Canal, traffic through the Red Sea has dropped by 35%.4  The Houthis have raised the shipping cost internationally, imposing additional costs on commerce when trouble at the Panama Canal due to low water levels has already made shipping more complicated and central banks worry about a new inflationary spike. While trade hasn’t wholly stopped, most ships can choose the longer but safer route around Africa through the Cape of Good Hope to reach Europe and Asia from either side. This option imposes significant costs on shipping and, therefore, to consumers and affects local states in the region if the Houthi “blockade” persists. In the worst-case scenario, crude oil prices would rise in 2024 if oil shipments through the canal were stopped entirely, and this could cause a significant disturbance.

    Image Credit: washingtoninstitute.org

    Surprisingly, though, Russian ships have enjoyed free navigation through the Red Sea. Russian ships travel to Asia through the Black Sea, connecting to the Mediterranean Sea, passing through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and joining the Indian Ocean. With sanctions from Europe and the US amid the war in Ukraine, Russia cannot afford to lose its markets in Asia, particularly India and China, since these two countries buy almost 90% of Russia’s oil exports.5  The free navigation of Russian ships could possibly be due to its close relationship with Iran or due to the adoption of a similar stance with the Houthis on the war between Israel and Gaza. In the unlikely scenario that Russia does not have access to the Red Sea, it leaves them with the only other option of travelling through the Cape of Good Hope, adding 8,900 kilometres with an additional two weeks of travel. Such delays in oil shipments and a highly possible hike in price may prompt countries like India and China to start looking for other alternatives to their oil requirement, given the pre-existing energy crisis. Most probable alternatives include Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries that do not need to pass the Red Sea to reach the Indian Ocean and thus Asian markets since they have ports in the Persian Gulf with access to the Arabian Sea.

    The disruption in trade has caused an impact on Indian imports and exports as well. Indian exports traverse the Indian Ocean and reach the Suez Canal through the Arabian Sea to reach European markets. Trade between India and Europe has been rising, at an all-time high in 2022, with goods traded worth $130 Billion.6   As of 2021, India engaged in trade worth $200 Billion through the Suez Canal, making the EU one of India’s main export destinations, with a Free trade agreement in the talks.7  India also procures its oil from Russia using the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. A slowdown or possible pause of oil imports may cause severe concerns amid the ongoing energy crisis. At such a juncture for the Indian economy, if the situation persists, trade will likely take a hit along with India’s domestic economy. If the condition fails to change decisively, the higher fees and the expense of prolonged travel duration will also put inflationary pressure on the global economy and India.

    The Houthis will most likely continue to put pressure on Israel to stop its onslaught in Gaza, and they are likely to keep attacking until they reach their goal. By taking control of the Red Sea and indirectly and directly hurting countries irrespective of their size and power, Houthis pressurize the international community to, in turn, put pressure on Israel. This also means that the group is unlikely to agree on any other way of settlement. Not only does this fall on Israel to stop their attacks but also on the US since the latter has always portrayed itself as a peace negotiator in the Middle East and, therefore, has the responsibility to restore order in the region. The Houthis possess a plethora of Iranian-supplied weaponry, ranging from precision drones to anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles that can strike a moving vessel hundreds of kilometres away. What makes the Houthis more dangerous is the enormous stockpile that can help them continue their campaign indefinitely.

    The attacks have also prompted an unanticipated return of Somali piracy in international seas. As a result, increased expenses are now a worry for merchant shipping lines and seafarer safety for governments worldwide. The ship Lila Norfolk, under the Liberian flag and carrying six Filipinos and fifteen Indians, was taken over by Somali pirates on January 4th, 2024. The Indian navy had already deployed four warships patrolling the Indian Ocean, including INS Chennai, which was involved in the rescue operation during the recent highjack of ship Lila Norfolk. Even though the Indian Navy’s intervention allowed for the sailors’ rescue, it caused further concerns for India’s security and economy. The spill over of these attacks onto the Indian Ocean may threaten India’s security.

    Countries must monitor developments in the Red Sea and, for India, the Indian Ocean. Although India has not joined any Western-led operations on this matter, the country must push the international community to ensure freedom of navigation and the territorial integrity of countries over their sea is upheld under the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas.

     

    References

    [1] Who are the Houthi rebels and why are they attacking Red Sea ships? (2023, December 23). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67614911

    [2] Yerushalmy, J. (2023, December 19). Red Sea crisis explained: what is happening and what does it mean for global trade? The Guardian.

    [3] A new Suez crisis threatens the world economy. (2023, December 16). The Economist. https://www.economist.com/international/2023/12/16/a-new-suez-crisis-threatens-the-world-economy

    [4] Graham, R., Murray, B., & Longley, A. (2023, December 19). Houthi Red Sea Attacks Start Shutting Down Merchant Shipping. Bloomberg.com. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-12-18/houthi-attacks-start-shutting-down-red-sea-merchant-shipping

    [5] Russia: crude oil shipments by destination 2023 | Statista. (2023, September 14). Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1350506/russia-crude-oil-shipments-by-destination/

    [6] I. (n.d.). First India-EU Trade and Technology Council: Significant Milestone in India-EU Relations – Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India). https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=3&ls_id=9416&lid=6112#:~:text=The%20EU%20is%20India’s%202nd,EU%20total%20trade%20in%20goods.

    [7] Ibid.

     

    Feature Image Credit: dailynewsegypt.com

  • The Indian Military: Five Issues for the immediate Future

    The Indian Military: Five Issues for the immediate Future

    While much has happened in 2023, new developments in the security dynamic warrant a relook at the transformation process. India now has to be prepared to prosecute both short and prolonged wars. Clearly defined political aims must be translated into achievable military objectives on the borders.

    2023 was an eventful year. In addition to ongoing conflicts in Africa, Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine, it witnessed the start of yet another war in the Gaza Strip, which by early 2024 had expanded across West Asia. The Red Sea region is witnessing duels between the Houthis and the West. Israel and Hezbollah are skirmishing in Lebanon. Iran has carried out strikes in Iraq and Syria. The US has blamed Iranian proxies for causing the deaths of its service personnel in Jordan and retaliated accordingly across Iraq and Syria. Iran and Pakistan have carried out tit-for-tat missile strikes. While conflicts such as Nagorno Karabakh have ended for now, other potential trouble spots in the Balkans and South and East China Seas continue to make headlines.

    This uncertain security environment has put trade, supply chains and, in some cases, national sovereignty at risk. At home, long-festering structural issues in the India-China relationship have come to a head. China’s belligerence is on full display along our Northern borders even as it makes further inroads in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In 2024, Maldives has displayed a pronounced anti-India tilt. Pakistan’s intractability and support for terrorism, despite its precarious internal situation and volatile borders on its West, remains a cause for concern. In Myanmar, the civil war rages on, while the outcome of ethno-religious conflict, which has spilled across international borders in Manipur and Mizoram, poses a different challenge.

    Despite 20 rounds of Corps Commanders talks, the Army is completing its fourth winter of ‘mirror deployment’ along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Small-scale operations at the LAC have continued at least till 2022, as citations for gallantry in respect of individual soldiers on Republic Day indicate. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) announced in his annual press conference in January that there will be no reduction in troop levels until the return to the ‘status quo ante as of mid-2020. Concurrently, the Army continues to battle terrorists on both sides of the Pir Panjal ranges in Jammu and Kashmir. The Air Force remains highly alert even as the Navy is committed full time in the Western Arabian Sea and East coast of Africa, successfully protecting Indian shipping ( and ships of other nations) from piracy and other threats. In sum, the Indian military is committed to ensuring the nation’s security full-time.

    The Indian Army had labelled 2023 as its ‘Year of Transformation’, based on the five pillars of Force Structuring & Optimisation, Modernisation & Technology Infusion, Systems, Processes & Functions, Human Resource Management and Jointness & Integration. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), in its 2023 Year End Review, has listed various proposals totalling over Rs 3.50 lakh crores that were approved to enhance operational preparedness. These cover a wide range of equipment and upgrades – from procurement of light combat helicopters to indigenous upgradation of Su-30 MKI aircraft, purchase of medium-range anti-ship missiles for the Navy and acquisition of towed gun systems for the Army. Other notable items are procurement of Sea/ Sky Guardian drones (31 of these since approved for sale by the US State Department in February 2024), utility helicopters, light armoured multi-purpose vehicles, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), Very Short Range Air Defence Systems (VSHORAD) and cadet training ships. Improvements in other spheres – progress towards Atmanirbharta, indigenisation, border infrastructure, roads, induction and career management of women, and welfare of veterans- have also been covered. The individual services have also listed their achievements in enhancing operational capabilities and overall efficiency.

    While much has happened in 2023, new developments in the security dynamic warrant a relook at the transformation process. India now has to be prepared to prosecute both short and prolonged wars. Clearly defined political aims must be translated into achievable military objectives on the borders. The nature of these conflicts will be difficult to determine. With elements of both the conventional and non-conventional employment of weapon systems across all five domains with simultaneous conduct of information operations, they will be genuinely hybrid and constantly mutating, based on whichever element achieves more significant success.

    As a first step, it becomes necessary to incorporate fresh thought and prepare a fully fleshed-out tri-service Indian military doctrine. The integrated doctrine issued by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2017 requires review to incorporate analysis and lessons learnt from Nagorno Karabakh, Ukraine, Gaza and our current experiences on the Northern borders, with the ‘collusive threat’ now a reality. Given that doctrine is essentially a set of principles that tells us ‘how to do’, i.e. how to achieve desired effects and not specifically ‘what to do’, capability development logically flows from doctrine analysis. Here, there has to be a consensus between the services on capabilities necessary to fulfil the military’s mandate – new platforms or technology, organisational issues, enhancement of joint or single service logistic capability, training and human resource aspects or upgrades.

    For the short to medium term, increasing focus on new technology must be balanced with the capacity to absorb technology and the context in which such weapons are envisaged to be employed. While incorporation of  AI, quantum computing, electronic warfare, stealth technology, space warfare and the like will be very much on the cards, all these can truly be incorporated once there is greater clarity and broader consensus upon two issues – what is the right weapon mix for a country like India to have, in terms of the proportion of latest generation weapons vis a vis what remains in the inventory and can be employed effectively now and in the immediate future, to thwart the enemy’s perceived designs? This is especially important when we look at the options available to incorporate new technology in terms of the time required for indigenous self-development and the secretive mindset of foreign suppliers with respect to sharing the intricacies of technologies that power such costly weapon systems. Secondly, a holistic consideration of the number of technologies that need to be developed in this time frame as part of capability development becomes necessary when we analyse the weapon/capability mix required to defend against an attacker – including one whose political and military objectives at the start of a conflict remain opaque, and whose capabilities and pattern of operations are possibly more overhyped than actual.

    The above issues become even more relevant when we look at the allocations for defence in the interim budget presented in Parliament on 01 February this year. Detailed analyses on the defence aspect will likely be published in days to come. In the context of this article, just two examples are highlighted. First, the 30 per cent higher allocation for Border Roads is hugely appropriate as it fits into future planning and enhances capability and capacities. Second, the deployment of the budget of Rs 23,855 crores to the DRDO and planned funding of a Rs 1 Lakh crore corpus for R&D projects, including ‘deep defence’ technology, while a positive step, must be carefully thought out, based on the aspects highlighted in the preceding paragraphs.Industry start-ups are doing a valuable job introducing the latest generation of weapons and technology to the military in concert with organisations like the Army Design Bureau. The incorporation of new technology and subsequent production of new weapons will be predicated on answers to these issues.

    Organisational aspects are another area for the military’s focus in 2024. Work on integrated theatre commands continues and will surely see the light of day. Notwithstanding the non-availability of a National Security Strategy, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) has to list out with absolute clarity what the mission of each theatre command is, in synchronicity with national aims. How to ensure optimal efficiency of these integrated resources for mission accomplishment has to be carefully thought out through multiple iterations with all stakeholders. This will have to be subject to rigorous validation in several tabletop and ground variety exercises to arrive at a common and operationally validated solution.

    Human resource issues will compete equally for the military’s attention. The Agniveer experiment has completed a little over one year. The performance of these soldiers in operations has been on par with their counterparts of yesteryears (of the same seniority). However, it is their performance in garrison soldiering that is yet to be fully gauged. As mentioned by the COAS, their assessment at multiple levels has to be continuously finetuned to remove any traces of subjectivity. Close monitoring of this scheme is necessary before pronouncing judgement on its success or otherwise, specifically its impact on regimental ethos and overall effect on unit efficiency. Employment of increasing numbers of woman Agniveers and woman officer intakes is another area which will occupy the minds of Commanding Officers (COs) of the three services. The recent decision of the Karnataka High Court in January 2024 striking down the provision of the Indian Military Nursing Services Ordinance 1943, which gives 100% reservation for women in nursing officer posts, is another spinoff in the battle for gender equality. This lends further urgency to the need to evolve an Indian model for the successful integration of women into the armed forces. Gender sensitisation of both sexes in uniform is of utmost priority.

    Managing high quality men and women drawn from all corners of India mandates a high degree of personal and professional integrity, sense of balance, and strength of character in military leaders at every level, specially so in an era where misinformed (or deliberate) inputs on social media can wreak havoc in society.

    Finally, as always, the military has to continue focusing on reinforcing institutional values. All militaries are dynamic. They must be nurtured and motivated by caring, professional and impartial leadership. A quote attributed to Sir Winston Churchill in his address to the House of Commons in 1923 says ‘…the armed forces.. are living things, if they are bullied, they sulk, if they are unhappy, they pine, if they are harried, sufficiently they get feverish, if they are sufficiently disturbed, they will wither and dwindle and almost die…’.Preserving the health of their respective services along with enhanced operational preparedness is the foremost task of the service chiefs. This comes about by careful selection of higher leadership, strict adherence to the culture, ethics and norms of the Indian military while forswearing all else at the altar of professionalism. Managing high quality men and women drawn from all corners of India mandates a high degree of personal and professional integrity, sense of balance, and strength of character in military leaders at every level, specially so in an era where misinformed (or deliberate) inputs on social media can wreak havoc in society. The responsibility of the Chiefs in this regard is onerous indeed and cannot be overemphasised. All else follows from this.

    Feature Image Credit: scroll.in