The Peninsula Foundation

Category: National Security & Foreign Policy

  • Xi Jinping: Assessing his Foreign Policy

    Xi Jinping: Assessing his Foreign Policy

    All foreign policies must aim at attaining purpose, credibility, and efficiency. Purpose defines the main objectives that the country wishes to achieve through its international relations. Credibility comes from international recognition of its actions in this field. And efficiency allows implementation, at the lowest possible cost, of the desired purpose. These three notions, although interwoven and influencing each other, keep their own specificity.

             How does Xi Jinping’s foreign policy qualify in these three areas?

    Purpose

    Its purpose, in tune with that of the Chinese Communist Party before his arrival to power, is sufficiently clear. By 2049, the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic, China should have achieved a prominence commensurate to its glorious past. According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, China marches towards the perception of its global destiny with a clear strategy in mind. Such destiny is none other than the resurrection of its historical glory (Rudd, 2017). Projects such as the Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation, Made in China 2025, and the Belt and Road Initiative, converge in defining concrete goals that lead in that direction. This includes China’s “Great Unification” with Taiwan, the consolidation of a hegemonic position within the South China Sea, making China the epicentre of an Asian-led world economic order, and creating a global infrastructure and transportation network with China at its head. Xi Jinping visualizes the next ten to fifteen years as a window of opportunity to shift China’s correlation of power with the United States. Hence, Beijing seeks the convergence of energies and political determination towards this window of opportunity. The strategic compass of Xi’s foreign policy could not be more precise. Few countries show a clearer sense of its purpose.

    Credibility

             His foreign policy credibility presents a more mixed result. Vis-à-vis the Western World and several of its neighbours, China’s credibility is at a very low point. However, the situation is different in relation to the Global South, where Xi’s foreign policy promotes four interconnected initiatives to expand China’s influence. Besides the Belt and Road, whose objective is creating a China-led global infrastructure and transportation network, there is also the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. The first, the Global Development Initiative, aims to contrast the unequal distribution of benefits that characterize the West-led development projects with the inclusiveness and balanced nature of this China-led multilateral development project [Hass, 2023]. The other two initiatives, global security and global civilization, present rational and balanced options clearly differentiated from America’s overbearing approach to these areas. In the former case, China’s proposal promotes harmonious solutions to differences among countries through dialogue and consultation [Chaziza, 2023]. The Global Civilization Initiative, on its side, fosters cooperation and interchange between different civilizations, whereby the heterogeneity of cultures and the multiplicity of identities is fully respected [Hoon and Chan, 2023].

    The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka is one of thousands project that China has helped finance in recent years – Image Credit: The Brussels Times (The so-called China’s debt-trap is a narrative trap).

           However, three dark areas emerge in Beijing’s credibility with respect to the Global South. Number one is the frustration prevailing in many of these smaller and underdeveloped nations, resulting from the contradiction between China’s openness as a lender and its severity as a creditor. This has given rise to the suspicion of a hidden agenda on its part and has led to the coining of the phrase “debt trap diplomacy”. Number two derives from the arrogance shown by Beijing towards the rights of several of its weakest neighbours, disregarding international law. This seems to delineate a tributary vision of its relations with them. Although this only affects China’s neighbourhood, it projects a haughtiness that contradicts its formulations about a more harmonious, equitable and inclusive world order. Number three is the apparent contradiction between Beijing’s proclamation regarding the value of the heterogeneity of cultures and the diversity of identities and its treatment of non-Han Chinese minorities at home. A feature susceptible to reproducing itself abroad. All the above generates a distance between words and deeds that casts a shadow of doubt concerning China’s sincerity. Hence, even within the Global South, China’s credibility shows a mixed result.

    Efficiency

    Finally, there is the area of efficiency. It is a very complex one, particularly given China’s over-ambitious purpose. It must be said that until 2008, Beijing succeeded in rising as a significant power without alarming neighbours or the rest of the world. It even attained the geopolitical miracle of doing so without alarming the United States. Indeed, few countries have made such a systematic and conscious effort to project a constructive international image as China has done to this date. This included the notion of “peaceful rise”, which implied a path different from that followed by Germany before World War I and Japan during World War II when they tried to overhaul the international political landscape. China’s path, on the contrary, relied upon reciprocity and the search for mutual benefit with other countries. It was a brilliant soft power marketing strategy that gave China huge goodwill dividends (Cooper Ramo, 2007).

    “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” – Deng Xioping

    Regarding its reunification with Taiwan, it relied on “one country, two systems” and the economic benefits of their interconnection as the obvious means to propitiate their joining together. Regarding its maritime disputes in the South China Sea, after having deferred the resolution of this issue to a more propitious moment, it proposed a Code of Conduct to handle it in the least contentious possible manner. In general, similar approach was evident in Beijing’s handling of various contentious issues.  Beijing’s leadership followed Deng Xiaoping’s advice to his successors: “Observe carefully; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership” (Kissinger, 2012, p. 441).

    “Like Europe, it has many twenty-first century qualities. Its leaders preach a doctrine of stability and social harmony. Its military talks more about soft than hard power. Its diplomats call for multilateralism rather than unilateralism. And its strategy relies more on trade than war to forge alliances and conquer new parts of the world” – Mark Leonard on China in 2008

    Writing in 2008, before the change towards a more assertive foreign policy materialized, Mark Leonard said about China: “Like Europe, it has many twenty-first century qualities. Its leaders preach a doctrine of stability and social harmony. Its military talks more about soft than hard power. Its diplomats call for multilateralism rather than unilateralism. And its strategy relies more on trade than war to forge alliances and conquer new parts of the world” (Leonard, 2008, p. 109). This phrase encapsulates well how China was perceived worldwide, including by the Western World. Not surprisingly, a 2005 world survey on China by the BBC stated that most countries in five continents held a favourable view of that nation. Even more significant was the fact that even China’s neighbours viewed it favourably (Oxford Analytica, 2005). It was a time when all doors opened to China.

    2008 represented a turning point. The convergence of several events that year changed China’s perception of its foreign policy role, making it more assertive. Among such events the most significant was the global economic crisis of 2008, the worst crisis since 1929, resulting from America’s financial excesses; other important events were the sweeping efficiency with which China avoided contagion; the fact that China’s economic growth was the fundamental factor in preserving the world from a major economic downturn; and the boost to Chinese self-esteem after the highly successful Beijing Olympic games of that year. In sum, the time in which China had to keep hiding its strengths seemed to have ended.

    Although this turning point materialized under Hu Jintao, changes accelerated dramatically after Xi Jinping’s ascend to power. He not only sharpened the edges of the country’s foreign policy but made it more aggressive, even reckless. Xi’s eleven years’ tenure in office has translated into a proliferation of international trouble spots. His overreach and overbearing style misfired, generating a concerted and strong reaction against China. As a result, the costs linked to attaining China’s purpose have skyrocketed. This deserves a more detailed analysis of China’s foreign policy efficiency under Xi.

    Intimidatory policies and actions

             Xi Jinping’s intimidatory policies and actions on international affairs have been extensive, bringing with them immense resistance.

    After dusting off a plan that had remained on paper for years, Xi decided to build seven artificial islands on top of the South China Sea coral reefs. After assuring President Obama they would not be militarized, he proceeded otherwise. Contravening international maritime law, he assigned 12 nautical miles of Territorial Sea and 200 miles of Exclusive Economic Zone to these artificial outposts.

    Under the protection of the People’s Liberation Navy, an oil rig was built in the waters claimed by Vietnam as its EEZ. Disrespecting the International Court of Justice’s ruling about the Philippines’ waters in the South China Sea, China has forcefully enforced its exclusionary presence in them. China’s Coast Guard is now authorized to use lethal force against foreign vessels operating within maritime areas under its jurisdiction claims. This, notwithstanding that China’s claimed jurisdiction, goes far beyond what is recognized by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea or the International Court of Justice while disputed by several other countries.

    The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began to ignore the median line in the Taiwan Strait, which it had respected for decades. Frequent and increasingly bold incursions within Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone and reiterated calls to the PLA to prepare for war in Taiwan have become the new normal. The Senkaku-Diaoyu islands, disputed with Japan, have been declared one of China’s core interests, thus closing the door to a negotiated solution. This has translated into the systematic incursion of Chinese maritime law enforcement ships and planes into the territorial and contiguous maritime space of these islands, currently occupied by Japan. Beijing unilaterally imposed an Air Defence Identification Zone over two-thirds of the East China Sea, forcing foreign aircraft to identify themselves under threat of “defensive measures” by the PLA Air Force.

             Since 2017, China has reneged on the quite borders with India and engaged in a series of border skirmishes. It has resorted to intrusions into border regions under dispute resulting in a major skirmish in Ladakh with significant casualties, the first since 1987. In 2023, China released an official standard map showing India’s state of Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast India and Askai Chin plateau in the Indian territory of Ladakh in the west, as official parts of its territory, despite India’s objections. At the same time, it renamed 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh with Chinese names. When South Korea decided to deploy the US Army’s THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence) ballistic missile defence, as protection against the growing North Korean threat, China put in motion an economic boycott of South Korean products and services. When Australia and New Zealand protested against Chinese interference in their domestic political systems, Beijing openly threatened to impose economic sanctions on governments or private actors criticising China’s behaviour. A few years later, it effectively banned most Australian exports when Canberra proposed an international scientific investigation on the origins of COVID-19. When Canada detained Huawei’s heiress, Meng Wanzhou, answering an American judicial request, Beijing jailed and presented accusations against two Canadian businessmen based in China (releasing them hours after Meng was released).

    Antagonizing Americans and Europeans

             Xi’s rhetoric in relation to the U.S. has been highly aggressive. Reversing the terms of Deng Xiaoping’s advice to his successors to hide China’s strengths while bidding for right time, Xi has alerted America about its intent to challenge and displace it as the foremost power soon. He has repeatedly referred; to the primacy of China in the emerging world order as its most important objective, to the next ten to fifteen years as the inflexion point when a change in the correlation of power between the two countries should be taking place, to the need to overcome the U.S.’ technological leadership, to the necessity for the PLA to ready itself to wage and win wars, and to the next ten years as a time of confrontation and dangerous storms.

    Xi Jinping starts his European tour in Paris on May6, 2024, his first in five years as China-EU trade relation have hit a low. Picture Source: Sky News.

             China’s actions have also antagonized the Europeans. These relate to China’s refusal to use the term “invasion” when referring to Russia’s actions in Ukraine; supporting the arguments provided by Russia concerning the causes of the war; placing the responsibility of the conflict on the US and the NATO; abstaining from voting in the U.N. on the West’s resolutions against Russia; demonstrating its strong strategic relations with Russia that is described as “partnership without limits”; the conduct of military exercises with Russia while war rages on in Ukraine; and providing indirect support for Russia’s war effort through surveillance drones, computer chips, and other critical components for its defence industry. Though all of the above are sovereign decisions of China, Europe, as China’s major trading partner, expects some support to their position and a neutral approach to the conflict from China.

    For the most part, Beijing’s above foreign policy actions were duly accompanied by a bellicose so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy”. It aggressively reacted to perceived criticism of the Chinese government.

    Domestic actions impacting its Image Abroad

    However, with its aggressive display in the international arena, some domestic actions have negatively permeated abroad. Brushing aside Deng Xiaoping’s commitment to respect Hong Kong’s autonomy for a period of fifty years, Xi reclaimed complete jurisdiction over such territory since his arrival to power. Within a process of actions and reactions, accelerated by the progressive strangulation of Hong Kong’s liberties, Beijing finally imposed a National Security Law over the territory. This ended the Hong Kong Basic Law, which guaranteed its autonomy. By burying the principle of “one country, two systems” established by Deng, Beijing was, at the same time, closing out any possibility of Taiwan’s willing accession to the People’s Republic. Henceforward, only force may accomplish that result.

    On the other hand, the brutal Sinicization of Xinjiang Province has shaken the liberal conscience of Western countries, with particular reference to Europe. The Uyghur population re-education camps have been compared to the Soviet’s Gulag. Beijing’s combative reaction to any foreign criticism in this regard, has compounded China’s image crisis in Europe.

    Any remaining trace of the so-called peaceful emergence of China has completely disappeared under Xi Jinping. Under his rudder, China has brought to the limelight a revisionist and tributary vision of the international order. Not surprisingly, interwoven policies and decisions emanating from different geographical points have been converging to contain China. In an unnecessary way, Beijing under Xi has been instrumental in multiplying the barriers to realising its purpose.

    Keeping China at bay

    The number of initiatives to keep China at bay has multiplied. Its list includes the following. The U.S., Japan, Australia and India created a strategic quadrilateral forum known as the Quad, which is none other than a factual alliance aimed at the containment of China. More formally, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States gave birth to a strategic military alliance with the same goal. On its side, Japan and Australia signed a security cooperation agreement.

    Leaving aside its restrained post-war defence policy, Japan doubled its defence budget to 2 per cent of its GDP. This will transform Japan to number three position worldwide regarding military expenditure, just behind the U.S. and China. Within the same context, Japan and the U.S. established a joint command of its military forces while agreeing to create a shared littoral force equipped with the most modern anti-ship missiles. Meanwhile, Japan is set to arm itself with state-of-the-art missiles. Overcoming their longstanding mutual mistrust, Japan and South Korea, jointly with the U.S., established a trilateral framework to promote a rules-based Indo-Pacific region. On the same token, Japan, the Philippines, and the U.S. held a first-ever trilateral summit aimed at defence cooperation and economic partnership. They pledged to protect freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China and East China Seas. Several joint naval exercises have taken place in the South China Sea to defend the principle of freedom of navigation, with France participating in the latest one.

    After several fruitless years of attempting to mollify China’s position concerning their maritime dispute in the South China Sea, the Philippines decided to renew its Mutual Defence Treaty with the U.S., which had elapsed in 2016. Meanwhile, most Southeast and East Asian countries on China’s periphery are rapidly increasing their military spending while  still continuing to support the U.S. security umbrella. Although pledging to remain neutral, even Vietnam, a traditional de facto ally of China, decided to upgrade its diplomatic relations with Washington to the highest level.

    America’s several decades policy of “strategic ambiguity” in relation to Taiwan evaporates as a result of China’s increasing threats and harassment to the island. On top of unambiguous support to Taipei by the President and the Congress, the Pentagon has formulated a military doctrine for  Taiwan’s defence in case of invasion. The idea of defending Taiwan if invaded is also taking shape in Japan.

    The European Union adhered to the U.S., the United Kingdom and Canada in sanctioning the Chinese authorities involved in human rights abuses in Xinjiang (the first such European sanction since Tiananmen in 1989). Equally, and for the same reasons, the European Parliament refused to ratify the long-time negotiated investment agreement between China and the European Union. China’s aggressive reaction to such a decision only toughened the European position further. Significantly, European contacts with Taiwan have increased as its democratic nature, and China’s harassment of it are providing a new light on the subject. In that context, the European Parliament officially received Taiwan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.

    A gigantic containment Bloc

    France and Germany sent warships to navigate the South China Sea in defiance of Beijing’s claimed ownership of 90 per cent of the Sea. NATO’s updated “Strategic Concept” document, which outlines primary threats to the alliance, identified China for the first time as a direct threat to its security: “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values (…) It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the Space, Cyber and Maritime domains (…)The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests” (NATO, 2022). Not surprisingly, NATO’s last summit included the heads of state and governments of Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea.

    As a result of Xi Jinping’s actions and policies, China is now being subjected to a gigantic geostrategic containment force—a true block integrated by nations and organizations from four continents. For a country like China, which traditionally identified with political subtlety and enjoyed universal goodwill until not so long ago, this change in its strategic environment is not a small development. Xi’s calculations that acting boldly had become possible as China was powerful enough, its economy big enough, its neighbours dependent on it, and the U.S. resolve as uncertain have proved wrong and grossly misfired. At this point, China’s conundrum might leave China with few options short of war. According to former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, the 2020s have become the “decade of living dangerously”, as, within it, a war between China and the U.S. will most probably erupt (Rudd, 2022, chapter 16).

    In sum

    An evaluation of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, using the notions of purpose, credibility, and efficiency as bases, would present the following result. Its purpose is crystal clear, which translates into a high mark. Credibility, on its part, shows mixed results: Not entirely unsatisfactory nor satisfactory. In terms of efficiency, though, Xi Jinping has openly failed. The lack of efficiency associated with his outreach adversely affects the attainment of China’s foreign policy purpose, creating countless barriers to its fulfilment. This lack of efficiency affects the country’s credibility as well. The downturn has been dramatic when comparing the current situation of China’s foreign policy to the one that prevailed before 2008 and, more precisely, to Xi Jinping’s ascension to power.

     

     

    References:

    Chaziza, M. (2023) “The Global Security Initiative: China’s New Security Architecture for the Gulf”, The Diplomat, May 5.

    Cooper Ramo, J. (2007). Brand China. London: The Foreign Policy Centre.

    Hass, R. (2023) “China’s Response to American-led ‘Containment and Suppression’”, China Leadership Monitor, Fall, Issue 77.

    Hoon, C.Y. and Chan, Y.K., (2023) “Reflections on China’s Latest Civilisation Agenda”, Fulcrum, 4 September.

    Kissinger, H. (2012). On China. New York: Penguin Books.

    Leonard, M. (2008). What Does China Think? New York: Public Affairs.

    NATO (2022). “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, June 29.

    Oxford Analytica (2005). “Survey on China”, September 20th.

    Rudd, K. (2022). The Avoidable War. New York: Public Affairs.

    Rudd, K. (2017). “Xi Jinping offers a long-term view of China’s ambitions”, Financial Times, October 23.

     

    Feature Image: bloomberg.com – Xi Jinping on visit to Belgrade, Serbia on 07 May 2024 (Xi says China will “never forget” the U.S. bombing of its Embassy)

  • The Indian Military: Five Issues for the immediate Future

    The Indian Military: Five Issues for the immediate Future

    While much has happened in 2023, new developments in the security dynamic warrant a relook at the transformation process. India now has to be prepared to prosecute both short and prolonged wars. Clearly defined political aims must be translated into achievable military objectives on the borders.

    2023 was an eventful year. In addition to ongoing conflicts in Africa, Afghanistan, Syria and Ukraine, it witnessed the start of yet another war in the Gaza Strip, which by early 2024 had expanded across West Asia. The Red Sea region is witnessing duels between the Houthis and the West. Israel and Hezbollah are skirmishing in Lebanon. Iran has carried out strikes in Iraq and Syria. The US has blamed Iranian proxies for causing the deaths of its service personnel in Jordan and retaliated accordingly across Iraq and Syria. Iran and Pakistan have carried out tit-for-tat missile strikes. While conflicts such as Nagorno Karabakh have ended for now, other potential trouble spots in the Balkans and South and East China Seas continue to make headlines.

    This uncertain security environment has put trade, supply chains and, in some cases, national sovereignty at risk. At home, long-festering structural issues in the India-China relationship have come to a head. China’s belligerence is on full display along our Northern borders even as it makes further inroads in Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. In 2024, Maldives has displayed a pronounced anti-India tilt. Pakistan’s intractability and support for terrorism, despite its precarious internal situation and volatile borders on its West, remains a cause for concern. In Myanmar, the civil war rages on, while the outcome of ethno-religious conflict, which has spilled across international borders in Manipur and Mizoram, poses a different challenge.

    Despite 20 rounds of Corps Commanders talks, the Army is completing its fourth winter of ‘mirror deployment’ along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Small-scale operations at the LAC have continued at least till 2022, as citations for gallantry in respect of individual soldiers on Republic Day indicate. The Chief of Army Staff (COAS) announced in his annual press conference in January that there will be no reduction in troop levels until the return to the ‘status quo ante as of mid-2020. Concurrently, the Army continues to battle terrorists on both sides of the Pir Panjal ranges in Jammu and Kashmir. The Air Force remains highly alert even as the Navy is committed full time in the Western Arabian Sea and East coast of Africa, successfully protecting Indian shipping ( and ships of other nations) from piracy and other threats. In sum, the Indian military is committed to ensuring the nation’s security full-time.

    The Indian Army had labelled 2023 as its ‘Year of Transformation’, based on the five pillars of Force Structuring & Optimisation, Modernisation & Technology Infusion, Systems, Processes & Functions, Human Resource Management and Jointness & Integration. The Ministry of Defence (MoD), in its 2023 Year End Review, has listed various proposals totalling over Rs 3.50 lakh crores that were approved to enhance operational preparedness. These cover a wide range of equipment and upgrades – from procurement of light combat helicopters to indigenous upgradation of Su-30 MKI aircraft, purchase of medium-range anti-ship missiles for the Navy and acquisition of towed gun systems for the Army. Other notable items are procurement of Sea/ Sky Guardian drones (31 of these since approved for sale by the US State Department in February 2024), utility helicopters, light armoured multi-purpose vehicles, anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), Very Short Range Air Defence Systems (VSHORAD) and cadet training ships. Improvements in other spheres – progress towards Atmanirbharta, indigenisation, border infrastructure, roads, induction and career management of women, and welfare of veterans- have also been covered. The individual services have also listed their achievements in enhancing operational capabilities and overall efficiency.

    While much has happened in 2023, new developments in the security dynamic warrant a relook at the transformation process. India now has to be prepared to prosecute both short and prolonged wars. Clearly defined political aims must be translated into achievable military objectives on the borders. The nature of these conflicts will be difficult to determine. With elements of both the conventional and non-conventional employment of weapon systems across all five domains with simultaneous conduct of information operations, they will be genuinely hybrid and constantly mutating, based on whichever element achieves more significant success.

    As a first step, it becomes necessary to incorporate fresh thought and prepare a fully fleshed-out tri-service Indian military doctrine. The integrated doctrine issued by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2017 requires review to incorporate analysis and lessons learnt from Nagorno Karabakh, Ukraine, Gaza and our current experiences on the Northern borders, with the ‘collusive threat’ now a reality. Given that doctrine is essentially a set of principles that tells us ‘how to do’, i.e. how to achieve desired effects and not specifically ‘what to do’, capability development logically flows from doctrine analysis. Here, there has to be a consensus between the services on capabilities necessary to fulfil the military’s mandate – new platforms or technology, organisational issues, enhancement of joint or single service logistic capability, training and human resource aspects or upgrades.

    For the short to medium term, increasing focus on new technology must be balanced with the capacity to absorb technology and the context in which such weapons are envisaged to be employed. While incorporation of  AI, quantum computing, electronic warfare, stealth technology, space warfare and the like will be very much on the cards, all these can truly be incorporated once there is greater clarity and broader consensus upon two issues – what is the right weapon mix for a country like India to have, in terms of the proportion of latest generation weapons vis a vis what remains in the inventory and can be employed effectively now and in the immediate future, to thwart the enemy’s perceived designs? This is especially important when we look at the options available to incorporate new technology in terms of the time required for indigenous self-development and the secretive mindset of foreign suppliers with respect to sharing the intricacies of technologies that power such costly weapon systems. Secondly, a holistic consideration of the number of technologies that need to be developed in this time frame as part of capability development becomes necessary when we analyse the weapon/capability mix required to defend against an attacker – including one whose political and military objectives at the start of a conflict remain opaque, and whose capabilities and pattern of operations are possibly more overhyped than actual.

    The above issues become even more relevant when we look at the allocations for defence in the interim budget presented in Parliament on 01 February this year. Detailed analyses on the defence aspect will likely be published in days to come. In the context of this article, just two examples are highlighted. First, the 30 per cent higher allocation for Border Roads is hugely appropriate as it fits into future planning and enhances capability and capacities. Second, the deployment of the budget of Rs 23,855 crores to the DRDO and planned funding of a Rs 1 Lakh crore corpus for R&D projects, including ‘deep defence’ technology, while a positive step, must be carefully thought out, based on the aspects highlighted in the preceding paragraphs.Industry start-ups are doing a valuable job introducing the latest generation of weapons and technology to the military in concert with organisations like the Army Design Bureau. The incorporation of new technology and subsequent production of new weapons will be predicated on answers to these issues.

    Organisational aspects are another area for the military’s focus in 2024. Work on integrated theatre commands continues and will surely see the light of day. Notwithstanding the non-availability of a National Security Strategy, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) has to list out with absolute clarity what the mission of each theatre command is, in synchronicity with national aims. How to ensure optimal efficiency of these integrated resources for mission accomplishment has to be carefully thought out through multiple iterations with all stakeholders. This will have to be subject to rigorous validation in several tabletop and ground variety exercises to arrive at a common and operationally validated solution.

    Human resource issues will compete equally for the military’s attention. The Agniveer experiment has completed a little over one year. The performance of these soldiers in operations has been on par with their counterparts of yesteryears (of the same seniority). However, it is their performance in garrison soldiering that is yet to be fully gauged. As mentioned by the COAS, their assessment at multiple levels has to be continuously finetuned to remove any traces of subjectivity. Close monitoring of this scheme is necessary before pronouncing judgement on its success or otherwise, specifically its impact on regimental ethos and overall effect on unit efficiency. Employment of increasing numbers of woman Agniveers and woman officer intakes is another area which will occupy the minds of Commanding Officers (COs) of the three services. The recent decision of the Karnataka High Court in January 2024 striking down the provision of the Indian Military Nursing Services Ordinance 1943, which gives 100% reservation for women in nursing officer posts, is another spinoff in the battle for gender equality. This lends further urgency to the need to evolve an Indian model for the successful integration of women into the armed forces. Gender sensitisation of both sexes in uniform is of utmost priority.

    Managing high quality men and women drawn from all corners of India mandates a high degree of personal and professional integrity, sense of balance, and strength of character in military leaders at every level, specially so in an era where misinformed (or deliberate) inputs on social media can wreak havoc in society.

    Finally, as always, the military has to continue focusing on reinforcing institutional values. All militaries are dynamic. They must be nurtured and motivated by caring, professional and impartial leadership. A quote attributed to Sir Winston Churchill in his address to the House of Commons in 1923 says ‘…the armed forces.. are living things, if they are bullied, they sulk, if they are unhappy, they pine, if they are harried, sufficiently they get feverish, if they are sufficiently disturbed, they will wither and dwindle and almost die…’.Preserving the health of their respective services along with enhanced operational preparedness is the foremost task of the service chiefs. This comes about by careful selection of higher leadership, strict adherence to the culture, ethics and norms of the Indian military while forswearing all else at the altar of professionalism. Managing high quality men and women drawn from all corners of India mandates a high degree of personal and professional integrity, sense of balance, and strength of character in military leaders at every level, specially so in an era where misinformed (or deliberate) inputs on social media can wreak havoc in society. The responsibility of the Chiefs in this regard is onerous indeed and cannot be overemphasised. All else follows from this.

    Feature Image Credit: scroll.in

  • The Impact of Domestic Politics on Foreign Policy: The Colombian Case Study

    The Impact of Domestic Politics on Foreign Policy: The Colombian Case Study

    Introduction

    Colombia is amongst the world’s highly polarised states and has endured conflict for decades. The country witnessed around 50 years of armed struggle between militant groups, the government, and the drug cartels and has seen various forms of human rights violations in these years. The country saw more than 220,000 people killed in the conflict, roughly 25000 kidnapped or disappeared and more than 5 million displaced citizens (García-Perdomo, Harlow & Brown, 2022). However, after much pressure from the people and the government, the guerrilla factions and the ruling party convened to sign a peace agreement that essentially brought the active warring factions to a pause. On November 24, 2016, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army, or FARC, signed a landmark peace agreement, which also saw the militants present a public apology to the people of Colombia for their violent actions (Georgi, 2022).

    Since the end of the Second World War, Colombia has seen various governments adopt different stances and approaches to their foreign policies. Multiple domestic actors – state and non-state- have strongly influenced the country’s diplomacy. For example, between 1998 – 2002, Colombia moved from the narrative of remaining a failed state and developed ties with the US (Monroy & Sanchez, 2017). The Republic of Colombia has had 17 presidents since 1946, most of whom belong to Right-Wing conservative parties. The current President, Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego, is the first President from a liberal and leftist political party (Tickner, 2022, 8:10) in decades. The country has never had a progressive-left leader in its political history, and his government has been making waves on all fronts concerning ties with neighbouring countries, attempting to resolve the internal conflict, and dealing with economic disparities within the population.

    A state’s foreign policy primarily focuses on interactions with other states and international actors and is essential to its political agenda. Given the interdependence of these two domains, domestic politics play a vital role in determining a state’s foreign policy. Foreign policy refers to a state’s approach and actions internationally. In contrast, domestic politics refers to the political processes, institutions, and actors within a state that affect the country’s policies. This essay uses Colombia as a case study to investigate how the country’s domestic politics and conflicts have affected its foreign policy. The timeline under revision is from the end of the Second World War to the present.

    This paper will look at the following factors as critical points of discussion. Determining the success of a policy is done by evaluating its efficiency and the evident improvement of situations. The paper will examine 1. How has the evolution of state leadership impacted Colombia’s foreign policy? 2. What role did the insurgents and drug lords play in this scenario? The state leadership (Hey, 1997), the insurgents, and the drug lords are critical players in Colombia’s political landscape and the evolution of its foreign policy. King, Keohane and Verba (1994, p.76) define causality as “a theoretical concept independent of the data used to learn about it”. It is difficult to draw causal inferences in a limited paper. Still, by examining the players mentioned earlier, this paper hopes to attract inferences between domestic politics and the direction of the country’s foreign policy.

    State Leadership and Foreign Policy

    There is a crisp scent of dependency theory when exploring literature about the foreign policies of Latin American countries (Hey, 1997). Similarly, Colombia – a state that witnessed long years of violent conflicts, deaths, kidnappings and illegal drug production continued on the same path as the rest of the countries in the continent. Significant economic disparities and multiple right-wing presidencies saw the inequality between people grow larger and larger (Hey, 1997). These were all critical factors in shaping how the country’s foreign policy presented itself to the world. After the end of the Second World War, Colombia maintained a low profile with respect to its foreign policy (Drekonja-Kornat, 1983). However, Colombia did have a traditional foreign policy – as in a Ministry to oversee relations and maintain ties with neighbouring countries, especially since border disagreements were high. Colombia had closer ties with the US than its immediate neighbouring states. At the same time, there appeared to be a consensus on the state leadership directing policies to suit principles of capitalistic democracy, free trade and markets; Colombia’s external affairs seemed to feed off of international support, especially from the United States of America. The US, in its quest to spread its capitalist democracy, assisted the various presidencies with aid and other means to combat guerrilla movements and insurgent activities. In turn, Colombia helped the US in the Korean War and stood by the US during the Cold War years, too. Drekonja-Kornat (1983) says Colombia was the only Latin American Country involved in the Korean conflict. During Turbay’s presidency, the US-Colombia ties grew closer, and US assistance helped establish his regime further (Hey, 1997). He held office from 1978 – 1982.

    The state’s leadership, in return, adopted and often tailored policies to suit strategic and international partners, particularly the US. Examples of presidencies adopting such policies include supporting the US stance on drugs (Hey, 1997), committing to recognise threats and terrorist activities as adjudged by the US and the EU, etc. (United States Department of State, 2021). Colombia’s constant internal security dilemma accentuates the existence of a dependency theory of Foreign Policy.

    Impact of the Internal Conflict on Colombia’s Foreign Policy

    The insurgents, guerrilla groups, and drug cartels played a role in shaping the foreign policy of Colombia. The entry of drugs into neighbouring countries, particularly the US, brought an international player into Colombia’s domestic issues (Gomez-Suarez & Newman, 2013). The United States desperately tried to solve the drug menace, which led to fighting the drug cartels and networks. America aided and supported the governments in curbing the cartel’s activities and eliminating insurgents who pushed for a more communist ideology, primarily in the Cold War period. Colombia’s alignment with the US on account of the Cold War influenced its domestic politics, which had a more significant say in shaping the country’s foreign policy. The United States of America is Colombia’s largest aid donor; listed below are some of the aid packages received by Colombia:

    1. The US has provided more than $1 billion in direct and indirect support for implementing peace in Colombia since 2016. (United States Department of State, 2021).
    2. The US provided roughly $700 million to assist Colombia with the Venezuelan migrant crisis and host approximately 1.8 million refugees in Colombia. (United States Department of State, 2021).

    Viewing the case from a realist perspective, much of Colombia’s foreign affairs has been dictated by the ebbs and flow of the insurgency. With Colombia’s development and domestic affairs requiring external support, it lacked the necessary flexibility to implement social development schemes as dependency on external aid was high (Monroy & Sanchez, 2017). Colombia became an instrument of the American War on Drugs, almost a pawn to the American foreign policy in Latin America (Tickner, 2011).

    While examining the history of how the state’s leadership handled its foreign policy directives and its domestic issues, there is space for some leniency. Many attempts to broker a peace agreement between the insurgents and the state were met with strong reluctance from the general public and a lack of participation from insurgent groups. Furthermore, corruption in various levels of government offices withheld any progress that could have been made. One could interpret the constant repetition of right-wing presidencies as people’s reluctance to move away from conservative rules, much to the dismay of insurgents, ultimately rendered the public most affected in the struggle for domestic power in the country.

    The Way Forward

    Gustavo Petro became the first leftist President of Colombia on June 19, 2022, in decades (Freeman, 2023). His Presidential victory also marked the first-ever Afro-Colombian, Francia Marquez, to take office as Vice President. Unlike his liberal predecessors, the change in power was smooth from his rightist counterparts. As a leftist, there were questions about his merit and reputation as the country’s leftists were primarily likened to insurgents and militants. While the 2016 Peace Accords dismantled and disarmed most militants from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC, the associations took longer to change.

    President Petro, however, is having quite the start to office. He is leading a policy of ‘Total Peace’, an effort to include all factions and players in the internal conflict and arrive at an end to the insurgency; his presidency plans to shift Colombia’s economic dependency on trade from the US, fossil fuels and the illicit drug trade to a more sustainable approach (Freeman, 2023), that would be similar to the Green Theory. One can interpret his actions as playing on both sides of the solid and historical US-Colombia ties (Santa Eulalia, 2022). Owing to the associations with his left-leaning tendencies, his moves are somewhat open to more scrutiny by the public. After all, no incumbent President has been re-elected to office in the last 15 elections (Freeman, 2023).

    A significant part behind his election to office has been the general public’s displeasure at rising economic inequalities between people, the inability of the previous government to provide and implement social welfare schemes and the financial toll caused by inactivity during the Covid-19 pandemic. While Drekonja-Konrat (1986) argues that most Latin-American countries can shape their foreign policies to the extent that it doesn’t hurt US interests, Petro is challenging the very notion of keeping his voters happy (Santa Eulalia, 2022). The truth in the details is that they are pretty co-dependent; Colombia needs the support of the US in tackling drug issues and the matter of the guerrilla militant groups, while the US views Colombia as a key strategic partner in the region. Accordingly, Petro has to carefully cater to his vote-bank’s anti-Americanism and yet maintain cordial ties with the US. It is a fragile line to tread, but the room to navigate and keep the US and the public happy is also quite small. Political revisionism is prevalent, given Petro is trying to appease both sides of support, constantly showing evident links as to how a country’s domestic politics can affect its foreign policy.

    References

    Drekonja-Kornat., G. (1983). Colombia: Learning the Foreign Policy Process, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 25(2). Pp- 229-250.

    Drekonja-Kornat., G. (1986). The rise of Latin America’s foreign policy: Between hegemony and autonomy. Latin American Research Review, 21(1), 239-259.

    Freeman, W. (February 2023). Colombia tries a transformative Left Turn, Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/article/colombia-tries-transformative-left-turn

    García-Perdomo, V.,  Harlow, S. & Brown, D. K., (2022). Framing the Colombian Peace Process: Between Peace and War Journalism, Journalism Practice.

    Georgie, R. (2022). Peace that antagonises: Reading Colombia’s peace process as a hegemonic crisis, Security Dialogue, pp – 1-19.

    Gomez-Suarez, A. & Newman, J., (2013). Safeguarding Political Guarantees in the Colombian Peace Process: have Santos and FARC learnt the lessons from the past?, Third World Quarterly, 34(5), pp – 819-837.

    Hey, J. A. K. (1997). Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy, Third World Quarterly, 18(4), pp -631-658.

    King, G., Keohane, R.O, & Verba, S. (1994). Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.

    Monroy, M. C. & Sánchez, F. (2017) Foreign Policy Analysis and the Making of Plan Colombia, Global Society, 31(2), pp – 245-271.

    Santaeulilah, I. (October 2022). Petro Playing Both Sides in Colombia-US Relations, El Pais. Retrieved from: https://english.elpais.com/international/2022-10-26/petro-playing-both-sides-in-colombia-us-relations.html

    Feature Image Credit: Foreign Policy

     

  • Indian Air Force at 91: Challenges and Opportunities

    Indian Air Force at 91: Challenges and Opportunities

    The Indian Air Force, created on October 8, 1932, completes 91 years of glorious service as it celebrates the Air Force Day today, October 8, 2023. As the IAF celebrates its annual day with customary elan, it is a time to reflect and assess the future in terms of challenges and opportunities. On the operational front, the die is already cast with two nuclear-powered neighbours, one in political and economic turmoil and the other continuing an aggressive posture. A three-yearlong standoff on the northern border with no signs of reconciliation makes the environment precarious.

    China, with its goal of becoming the leading military power with global reach by 2049, has moved fast to replace and transform its antiquated equipment, systems, and organizations, especially after observing the 1991 Gulf War. Reorganization of the PLA in the last decade, consolidation of forces under one command to oversee military operations against India and creation a Special Support Group (SSG) has enhanced its force application capabilities. Specifically, the upgradation of military infrastructure, airfields, and helipads just north of India is a matter of concern. Robust military hardware production for modern systems and investment in R&D in new-era fields like quantum computing, quantum radars, artificial intelligence, and aircraft and weapon systems development have facilitated significant growth in PLA’s capabilities. Qualitatively and quantitatively, India cannot match the Chinese economy, military hardware, military industry, or infrastructure in the foreseeable future. The only way forward for India is to use its resources in a focused manner to achieve its well-defined strategic goals commensurate with available resources. Lessons from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, a contest between unequal forces, are relevant in our context.

    Force Structure Challenges to Overcome

    Besides the operational challenges the Indian Air Force faces on the borders, there are issues related to equipment and organization.

     

    The salience of combat aircraft in battlespace is well known. However, combat aircraft numbers are declining worldwide, with older systems paving the way for modern and more capable platforms. In India, the decline has been rather steep, and replacements are not potent enough to offset the quantity quality. Against an authorization of over 1000 combat aircraft, the Indian armed forces are now in the region of 600. This decline will continue, and by 2030, IAF combat aircraft strength will be down to 450 with the phase-out of MiG-21, MiG-29, Jaguar, and Mirage-2000 fleets. The induction of 36 Rafales, the prolonged induction of LCA, and the planned acquisition of more Su30MKIs will not be able to reverse the declining trend. The ambitious plans for India’s fifth-generation aircraft, AMCA, are still far away. Given this reality, the IAF must make do with, at best, 34-36 fighter squadrons in the 2035 timeframe. It must work on operational strategies based on superior tactics and a local favourable balance of power in case a war is inevitable during this period.

    In the critical area of force multipliers, the numbers have been nearly static since their initial induction in 2003 concerning IL-78 In-Flight Refuellers and in 2010 concerning AWACS. The number of long-range weapons is somewhat limited. And in the surveillance and space domains, the resources are meagre. The situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

    There are positive changes regarding airlift capability, and single-wave airlift capability is gradually increasing with the commencement of induction of the first of the 56 new C-295 transport aircraft replacing vintage Avro. Despite the gradual phase-out of heavy lift Il-76 and light transport aircraft An-32, the fleet of C-17 and C-130 will sustain the requisite airlift capability that enabled the rapid deployment of Indian Army units in Ladakh against PLA build-up. Similarly, the enhanced number of more versatile and potent indigenous helicopters, ALH and LCH, will increase local mobility and firepower.

    The area that is yet to take centre stage is the Unmanned systems. Although the numbers and types increase due to imports, recent conflicts have demonstrated their hugely versatile utility. This aspect needs more attention to offset the capability deficit owing to the reduced number of combat aircraft. Tasks like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and ground and maritime attack can be effectively performed by unmanned aerial systems, resulting in the release of aircraft for other roles.

    New and more capable radars and integrated networks are replacing the older systems, giving a robust defensive capability. These need to be backed by long-range and quick-reaction surface-to-air weapon systems. Currently, the numbers are limited, and the area to be covered is extensive. Agility in planning, deployment and redeployment is the key to effective defence with limited resources.

    Evolving Battlespace and the Imperative of Jointness

    The battle space is evolving. Conflict hybridization has accelerated the expansion of battlespace, leading to enhanced significance of battlespace transparency. Induction of hypersonic systems, fast relocation of combat elements, and reduced times for systems operationalization have compressed the reaction time. This time-compression for action has tilted the offence-defence balance in favour of the offence. The concept of operations needs to factor in these realities, especially when dealing with a potent and stronger adversary with significant reverse capability.

    Organisationally, the integration of three wings of the Indian armed forces will likely pick up pace in the coming year(s). Integration is now an operational necessity and needs to be fast-tracked. Once theatre commands come into being, the most critical factor will be the allocation and plan of utilization of various combat assets that are limited in numbers but can operate seamlessly between multiple sectors. Will the integration model follow the complex assignment of such resources? That will be suboptimal and possibly counterproductive to enhancing combat capability through integration. IAF will have to make a holistic plan to exploit the full combat potential of its assets, irrespective of how the integration model pans out. Organisationally, this will be the most significant challenge for the men and women in blue in the coming year(s).

    Conclusion

    In the last five decades, India has taken the pole position in money spent on military hardware imports. Saudi Arabia is a distant second, spending less than half of Indian expenditure in this sector. How did India reach here? Public sector monopoly in defence has not yielded the desired results for the last seven decades. Inadequate focus and investment in R&D, captive customers, the Indian armed forces not hand-holding the industry, restrictive policies, monopoly of the public sector, dependency on imported military hardware and inability to leverage large imports for technology access are the factors contributing to this state. Atamnirbhar, from being a rhetoric, is gradually taking shape with orders being placed on Indian enterprises. The policy of earmarking part of the capital budget for Indian manufacturers will undoubtedly encourage the Indian defence industry. Although production efficiency and quality control have been a concern regarding the public sector, things are likely to improve as they face competition from the private sector. The lack of control over critical technologies in areas of aero engines, air-launched weapons, and electronic warfare systems remains a severe vulnerability. Opening the defence sector for private entities, allowing DRDO to share available testing facilities and technology, and creating defence manufacturing corridors are steps in the right direction.

    Capability differential and information differential between the competing sides form the basis of military operations. A classical information matrix about the opposing force includes intent, strategy, military doctrine, and military objectives; besides the overall direction that military strategy gives, an operational plan and its execution are based on an information matrix to achieve defined goals with the least cost or in the minimum possible timeframe. IAF, with its new doctrine IAP2000-22, endeavours to capture the essence of these changes. Indian Air Force needs to be ready with its limited assets and deter war. IAF must augment its limited resources with courage, ingenuity and clever resource employment to outwit the adversary. Given the limited resources and challenges ahead, the IAF will need to be a smart force for efficient management of resources and clever exploitation of force application.

    Photo Credits: Sunil Jain

    The views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the TPF or the IAF.

  • Trump followed four years later by Trump: Would America’s trustiness and system of alliances survive?

    Trump followed four years later by Trump: Would America’s trustiness and system of alliances survive?

    Ambassador Alfredo Toro Hardy examines, in this excellently analysed paper, the self-created problems that have contributed to America’s declining influence in the world. As he rightly points out, America helped construct the post-1945 world order by facilitating global recovery through alliances, and mutual support and interweaving the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments. The rise of neoconservatism following the end of the Cold War, particularly during the Bush years from 2000 to 2008, led to American exceptionalism, unipolar ambitions, and the failure of American foreign policy.  Obama’s Presidency was, as Zbigniew Brezinski said, a second chance for restoring American leadership but those gains were nullified in Donald Trump’s 2016-20 presidency leading to the loss of trust in American Leadership. In a final analysis that may be questionable for some, Ambassador Alfredo sees Biden’s administration returning to the path of liberal internationalism and recovering much of the lost trust of the world.  His fear is that it may all be lost if Trump returns in 2024.                               – Team TPF

     

    TPF Occasional Paper   9/2023    

    Trump followed four years later by Trump: Would America’s trustiness and system of alliances survive?

     

     

    According to Daniel W. Drezner: “Despite four criminal indictments, Donald Trump is the runaway frontrunner to win the GOP nomination for president. Assuming he does, current polling shows a neck-and-neck race between Trump and Biden in the general election. It would be reckless for other leaders to dismiss the possibility of a second Trump term beginning on January 20, 2025. Indeed, the person who knows this best is Biden himself. In his first joint address to Congress, Biden said that in a conversation with world leaders, he has ‘made it known that America is back’, and their responses have tended to be a variation of “but for how long?”. [1]

    A bit of historical context

    In order to duly understand the implications of a Trump return to the White House, a historical perspective is needed. Without context, it is difficult to comprehend the meaning of the “but for how long?” that worries so many around the world. Let’s, thus, go back in time.

    Under its liberal internationalist grand vision, Washington positioned itself at the top of a potent hegemonic system. One, allowing that its leadership could be sustained by the consensual acquiescence of others. Indeed, through a network of institutions, treaties, mechanisms and initiatives, whose creation it promoted after World War II, the United States was able to interweave the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments. Its alliances were a fundamental part of that system. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, though, the Soviet Union established its own system of alliances and common institutions.

                In the 1970s, however, America’s leadership came into question. Two reasons were responsible for it. Firstly, the Vietnam War. The excesses committed therein and America’s impotence to prevail militarily generated great discomfort among several of its allies. Secondly, the crisis of the Bretton Woods system. As a global reserve currency issuer, the stability of the U.S. currency was fundamental. In a persistent way, though, Washington had to run current account deficits to fulfil the supply of dollars at a fixed parity with gold. This impacted the desirability of the dollar, which in turn threatened its position as a reserve currency issuer. When a run for America’s gold reserves showed a lack of trust in the dollar, President Nixon decided in 1971 to unhook the value of the dollar from gold altogether.

                Notwithstanding these two events, America’s leadership upon its alliance system would remain intact, as there was no one else to face the Soviet threat. However, when around two decades later the Soviet Union imploded, America’s standing at the top would become global for the same reason: There was no one else there. Significantly, the United States’ supremacy was to be accepted as legitimate by the whole international community because, again, it was able to interweave the exercise of its power with international institutions and legal instruments.

    Inexplicable under the light of common sense

                In 2001, however, George W. Bush’s team came into government bringing with them an awkward notion about the United States’ might. Instead of understanding that the hegemonic system in place served their country’s interests perfectly well, the Bush team believed that such a system had to be rearranged in tandem with America’s new position as the sole superpower. As a consequence, they began to turn upside down a complex structure that had taken decades to build.

    The Bush administration’s world frame became, indeed, a curious one. It believed in unconditional followers and not in allies’ worthy of respect; it believed in ad hoc coalitions and “with us or against us” propositions where multilateral institutions and norms had little value; it believed in the punishment of dissidence and not in the encouragement of cooperation; it believed in preventive action prevailing over international law.

    In proclaiming the futility of cooperative multilateralism, which in their perspective just constrained the freedom of action of America’s might, they asserted the prerogatives of a sole superpower. The Bush administration’s world frame became, indeed, a curious one. It believed in unconditional followers and not in allies’ worthy of respect; it believed in ad hoc coalitions and “with us or against us” propositions where multilateral institutions and norms had little value; it believed in the punishment of dissidence and not in the encouragement of cooperation; it believed in preventive action prevailing over international law. Well-known “neoconservatives” such as Charles Krauthammer, Robert Kagan, and John Bolton, proclaimed America’s supremacy and derided countries not willing to follow its unilateralism.

                But who were these neoconservatives? They were the intellectual architects of Bush’s foreign policy, who saw themselves as the natural inheritors of the foreign policy establishment of Truman’s time. The one that had forged the fundamental guidelines of America’s foreign policy during the Cold War, in what was labelled as the “creation”. In their view, with the United States having won the Cold War, a new creation was needed. Their beliefs could be summed up as diplomacy if possible, force if necessary; U.N. if possible, ad hoc coalitions, unilateral action, and preemptive strikes if necessary. America, indeed, should not be constrained by accepted rules, multilateral institutions, or international law. At the same time, the U.S.’ postulates of freedom and democracy, expressions of its exceptionalism, entailed the right to propitiate regime change whenever necessary, in order to preserve America’s security and the world order.

    Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, while deriding and humiliating so many around the world, America’s neoconservatives undressed the emperor. By taking off his clothes, they made his frailties visible for everyone to watch.

    Inexplicable, under the light of common sense, the Bush team disassociated power from the international structures and norms that facilitated and legitimized its exercise. As a consequence, America moved from being the most successful hegemonic power ever to becoming a second-rate imperial power that proved incapable of prevailing in two peripheral wars. Bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, while deriding and humiliating so many around the world, America’s neoconservatives undressed the emperor. By taking off his clothes, they made his frailties visible for everyone to watch.

                At the beginning of 2005, while reporting a Pew Research Center poll, The Economist stated that the prevailing anti-American sentiment around the world was greater and deeper than at any other moment in history. The BBC World Service and Global Poll Research Partners, meanwhile, conducted another global poll in which they asked, “How do you perceive the influence of the U.S. in the world?”. The populations of some of America’s traditional allies gave an adverse answer in the following percentages: Canada 60%; Mexico 57%; Germany 54%; Australia 52%; Brazil 51%; United Kingdom 50%. With such a negative perception among Washington’s closest allies, America’s credibility was in tatters.[2]

             Is the liberal international order ending? what is next? dailysabah.com

     While Bush’s presidency was reaching its end, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote a pivotal book that asserted that the United States had lost much of its international standing. This felt, according to the book, particularly disturbing. Indeed, as a result of the combined impact of modern technology and global political awakening, that speeded up political history, what in the past took centuries to materialize now just took decades, whereas what before had taken decades, now could materialize in a single year. The primacy of any world power was thus faced with immense pressures of change, adaptation and fall. Brzezinski believed, however, that although America had deeply eroded its international standing, a second chance was still possible. This is because no other power could rival Washington’s role. However, recuperating the lost trust and legitimacy would be an arduous job, requiring years of sustained effort and true ability. The opportunity of this second chance should not be missed, he insisted, as there wouldn’t be a third one. [3]

    A second chance

                Barak Obama did certainly his best to recover the space that had been lost during the preceding eight years. That is, the U.S.’s leading role within a liberal internationalist structure. However, times had changed since his predecessor’s inauguration. In the first place, a massive financial crisis that had begun in America welcomed Obama, when he arrived at the White House. This had increased the international doubts about the trustiness of the country. In the second place, China’s economy and international position had taken a huge leap ahead during the previous eight years. Brzezinski’s notion that no other power could rival the United States was rapidly evolving. As a result, Obama was left facing a truly daunting challenge.

                To rebuild Washington’s standing in the international scene, Obama’s administration embarked on a dual course of action. He followed, on the one hand, cooperative multilateralism and collective action. On the other hand, he prioritized the U.S.’ presence where it was most in need, avoiding unnecessary distractions as much as possible. Within the first of these aims, Obama seemed to have adhered to Richard Hass’ notion that power alone was simple potentiality, with the role of a successful foreign policy being that of transforming potentiality into real influence. Good evidence of this approach was provided through Washington’s role in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in relation to Iran, in the NATO summits, in the newly created G20, and in the summits of the Americas, among many other instances. By not becoming too overbearing, and by respecting other countries’ points of view, the Obama Administration played a leading influence within the context of collective action. Although theoretically being one among many, the United States always played the leading role.[4]

    Within this context, Obama’s administration followed a coalition-building strategy. The Trans-Pacific Partnership represented the economic approach to the pivot and aimed at building an association covering forty per cent of the global economy. There, the United States would be the first among equals. As for the security approach to the pivot, the U.S. Navy repositioned its forces within the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans.

                To prioritize America’s presence where it was most needed, Obama turned the attention to China and the Asia-Pacific. While America was focusing on the Middle East, China enjoyed a period of strategic opportunity. His administration’s “pivot to Asia” emerged as a result. This policy had the dual objective of building economic prosperity and security, within that region. Its intention was countering, through facts, the notion that America was losing its staying power in the Pacific. Within this context, Obama’s administration followed a coalition-building strategy. The Trans-Pacific Partnership represented the economic approach to the pivot and aimed at building an association covering forty per cent of the global economy. There, the United States would be the first among equals. As for the security approach to the pivot, the U.S. Navy repositioned its forces within the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. From a roughly fifty-fifty correlation between the two oceans, sixty per cent of its fleet was moved to the Pacific. Meanwhile, the U.S. increased joint exercises and training with several countries of the region, while stationing 2,500 marines in Darwin, Australia. As a result of the pivot, many of China’s neighbours began to feel that there was a real alternative to this country’s overbearing assertiveness.[5]

                Barak Obama was on a good track to consolidating the second chance that Brzezinski had alluded to. His foreign policy helped much in regaining international credibility and standing for his country, and the Bush years began to be seen as just a bump on the road of America’s foreign policy. Unfortunately, Donald Trump was the next President. And Trump coming just eight years after Bush, was more than what America’s allies could swallow.

    Dog-eat-dog foreign policy

                The Bush and Trump foreign policies could not be put on an equal footing, though. The abrasive arrogance of Bush’s neoconservatives, however distasteful, embodied a school of thought in matters of foreign policy. One, characterized by a merger between exalted visions of America’s exceptionalism and Wilsonianism. Francis Fukuyama defined it as Wilsionanism minus international institutions, whereas John Mearsheimer labelled it as Wilsionanism with teeth. Although overplaying conventional notions to the extreme, Bush’s foreign policy remained on track with a longstanding tradition. Much to the contrary, Trump’s foreign policy, according to Fareed Zakaria, was based on a more basic premise– The world was largely an uninteresting place, except for the fact that most countries just wanted to screw the United States. Trump believed that by stripping the global system of its ordering arrangements, a “dog eat dog” environment would emerge. One, in which his country would come up as the top dog. His foreign policy, thus, was but a reflection of gut feelings, sheer ignorance and prejudices.[6]

                Trump derided multilateral cooperation and preferred a bilateral approach to foreign relations. One, in which America could exert its full power in a direct way, instead of letting it dilute by including others in the decision-making process. Within this context, the U.S.’ market leverage had to be used to its full extent, to corner others into complying with Washington’s positions. At the same time, he equated economy and national security and, as a consequence, was prone to “weaponize” economic policies. Moreover, he premised on the use of the American dollar as a bullying tool to be used to his country’s political advantage. Not only China but some of America’s main allies as well, were targeted within this approach. Dusting off Section 323 of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act, which allowed tariffs on national security grounds, Trump imposed penalizations in every direction. Some of the USA’s closest allies were badly affected as a result.

                Given Trump’s contempt for cooperative multilateralism, but also aiming at erasing Obama’s legacy, an obsessive issue with him, he withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in relation to Iran. He also withdrew his country from other multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations’ Human Rights Commission and, in the middle of the Covid 19 pandemic, from the World Health Organization. Trump threatened to cut funding to the U.N., waged a largely victorious campaign to sideline the International Criminal Court, and brought the World Trade Organization to a virtual standstill. Even more, he did not just walk away from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in relation to Iran, but threatened its other signatories to impose sanctions on them if, on the basis of the agreement, they continued to trade with Iran.

    Trump followed a transactional approach to foreign policy in which principles and allies mattered little, and where trade and money were prioritized over security considerations.

                Trump followed a transactional approach to foreign policy in which principles and allies mattered little, and where trade and money were prioritized over security considerations. In 2019, he asked Japan to increase fourfold its annual contribution for the privilege of hosting 50,000 American troops in its territory, while requesting South Korea to pay 400 percent more for hosting American soldiers. This, amid China’s increasing assertiveness and North Korea’s continuous threats. In his relations with New Delhi, a fundamental U.S. ally within any containment strategy to China, he subordinated geostrategic considerations to trade. On the premise that India was limiting American manufacturers from access to its market, Trump threatened this proud nation with a trade war.[7]

                Irritated because certain NATO member countries were not spending enough on their defence, Trump labelled some of Washington’s closest partners within the organization as “delinquents”. He also threatened to reduce the U.S.’ participation in NATO, calling it “obsolete”, while referring to Germany as a “captive of Russia”. At the same time, Trump abruptly cancelled a meeting with the Danish Prime Minister, because she was unwilling to discuss the sale of Greenland to the United States. This, notwithstanding the fact that this was something expressively forbidden by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, represents the cornerstone of European stability. The European Union, in his view, was not a fundamental ally, but a competitor and an economic foe. Deliberately, Trump antagonized European governments, including that of London at the time, by cheering Brexit. Meanwhile, he imposed tariffs on steel and aluminium on many of its closest partners and humiliated Canada and Mexico by imposing upon them a tough renegotiation of NAFTA. One, whose ensuing accord did not bring significant changes. Moreover, he fractured the G7, a group integrated by Washington’s closest allies, leaving the United States standing alone on one side with the rest standing on the other.

    In June 2018, Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, expressed his bewilderment at seeing that the rules-based international order was being challenged precisely by its main architect and guarantor– the United States. Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf summoned up all of this, by expressing that under Trump the U.S. had become a rogue superpower.

                Unsurprisingly, thus, America’s closest allies reached the conclusion that they could no longer trust it. Several examples attested to this. In November 2017, Canberra’s White Paper on the security of Asia expressed uncertainty about America’s commitment to that continent. In April 2018, the United Kingdom, Germany and France issued an official statement expressing that they would forcefully defend their interests against the U.S.’ protectionism. On May 10, 2018, Angela Merkel stated in Aquisgran that the time in which Europe could trust America was over. On May 31, 2018, Justin Trudeau aired Canada’s affront at being considered a threat to the United States. In June 2018, Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, expressed his bewilderment at seeing that the rules-based international order was being challenged precisely by its main architect and guarantor– the United States. In November 2019, in an interview given to The Economist, Emmanuel Macron stated that the European countries could no longer rely on the United States, which had turned its back on them. Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf summoned up all of this, by expressing that under Trump the U.S. had become a rogue superpower.[8]

    The return of liberal internationalism

    Politically and geopolitically Biden rapidly went back to the old premises of liberal internationalism. Cooperative multilateralism and collective action were put back in place, and alliances became, once again, a fundamental part of America’s foreign policy. 

               As mentioned, George W. Bush followed a few years later by Donald Trump was more than what America’s allies could handle. Fortunately for that country, and for its allies, Trump failed to be re-elected in 2020, and Joe Biden came to power. True, the latter’s so-called foreign policy for the middle classes kept in place some of Trump’s international trade policies. However, politically and geopolitically he rapidly went back to the old premises of liberal internationalism. Cooperative multilateralism and collective action were put back in place, and alliances became, once again, a fundamental part of America’s foreign policy.  Moreover, Biden forcefully addressed some of his country’s main economic deficiencies, which had become an important source of vulnerability in its rivalry with China. In sum, Biden strengthened the United States’ economy, its alliances, and its international standing.

                Notwithstanding the fact that Biden had to fight inch by inch with a seemingly unconquerable opposition, while continuously negotiating with two reluctant senators from his own party, he was able to pass a group of transformational laws. Among them, are the Infrastructure Investment and Job Act, the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act. Together, these legislations allow for a government investment of a trillion dollars in the modernization of the country’s economy and its re-industrialization, including the consolidation of its technological leadership, the updating of its infrastructures and the reconversion of its energy matrix towards clean energy. Private investments derived from such laws would be gigantic, with the sole CHIPS Act having produced investment pledges of more than 100 billion dollars. This projects, vis-à-vis China’s competition, an image of strength and strategic purpose. Moreover, before foes and friends, these accomplishments prove that the U.S. can overcome its legislative gridlocks, in order to modernize its economy and its competitive standing.

                Meanwhile, Washington’s alliances have significantly strengthened. In Europe, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Washington’s firm reaction to it had important consequences. While the former showed to its European allies that America’s leadership was still indispensable, the latter made clear that the U.S. had the determination and the capacity to exercise such leadership. Washington has indeed led in response to the invasion, in the articulation of the alliances and the revitalization of NATO, in sanctions on Russia, and in the organization of the help provided to Ukraine. It has also been Kyiv’s main source of support in military equipment and intelligence, deciding at each step of the road what kind of armament should be supplied to the Ukrainian forces. In short, before European allies that had doubted Washington’s commitments to its continent, and of the viability of NATO itself, America proved to be the indispensable superpower.

                Meanwhile, American alliances in the Indo-Pacific have also been strengthened and expanded, with multiple initiatives emerging as a result. As the invasion of Ukraine made evident the return of geopolitics by the big door, increasing the fears of China’s threat to regional order, Washington has become for many the essential partner. America’s security umbrella has proved to be for them a fundamental tool in containing China’s increasing arrogance and disregard for international law and jurisprudence. Among the security mechanisms or initiatives created or reinforced under its stewardship are an energized Quad; the emergence of AUKUS; NATO’s approach to the Indo-Pacific region; the tripartite Camp David’s security agreement between Japan, South Korea and the U.S.; a revamped defence treaty with The Philippines; an increased military cooperation with Australia; and Hanoi’s growing strategic alignment with Washington. On the economic side, we find the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and the freshly emerged Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment & India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.

    Enough would be enough

                Although the Global South has proved to be particularly reluctant to fall back under the security leadership of the superpowers, Washington has undoubtedly become the indispensable partner for many in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Thanks to Biden, the United States has repositioned itself on the cusp of a potent alliance system, regaining credibility and vitality. What would happen, thus, if he is defeated in the 2024 elections and Trump regains the White House? In 2007, Brzezinski believed, as mentioned, that although America had deeply eroded its international standing, a second chance was still possible. Actually, with Biden (and thanks in no small part to the Russian invasion and China’s pugnacity), the U.S. got an unexpected third chance. But definitively, enough would be enough. Moreover, during Trump’s first term in office, a professional civil service and an institutional contention wall (boosted by the so-called “adults in the room”), may have been able to keep at bay Trump’s worst excesses. According to The Economist, though, that wouldn’t be the case during a second term, where thousands of career public servants would be fired and substituted by MAGA followers. The deconstruction of the so-called “deep State” would be the aim to be attained, which would translate into getting rid of anyone who knows how to get the job done within the Federal Government. Hence, for America’s allies, Trump’s nightmarish first period would pale in relation to a second one. Trump followed four years later by Trump, no doubt about it, would shatter America’s trustiness, credibility, international standing, and its system of alliances. [9]

    Notes:

    [1] “Bracing for Trump 2.0”, Foreign Affairs, September 5, 2023

    [2] The Economist, 19th February, 2005; Walt, Stephen M, Taming American Power, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005, p.72.

    [3] Second Chance, New York: Basic Books, 2007, p. 191, 192, 206.

    [4] Hass, Richard, “America and the Great Abdication”, The Atlantic, December 28, 2017.

    [5] Campbell, Kurt, The Pivot, New York: Twelve, 2016, pp. 11-28.

    [6] Steltzer, Irwin, Neoconservatism, London: Atlantic Books, 2004, pp. 3-28; Fukuyama, Francis, “After the Neoconservatives”, London: Profile Books, 2006, p. 41; Zakaria, Farid, “The Self-Destruction of American Power”, Foreign Affairs, July-August 2019.

    [7] World Politics Review, “Trump works overtime to shake down alliances in Asia and appease North Korea”, October 14, 2019.

    [8] White, Hugh, “Canberra voices fears”, The Strait Time, 25 November, 2017; Breuninger, Kevin, “Canada announces retaliatory tariffs”, CNBC, May 31, 2018; The Economist, “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe”, November 7th, 2019; Kishore Mahbubani, Has China Won? New York: Public Affairs, 2020, p. 56; Cooley, Alexander and Nexon, Daniel, Exit from Hegemony , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 70.

    [9]  The Economist, “Preparing the way: The alarming plans for Trump’s second term”, July 15th, 2023.

     

    Feature Image Credit: livemint.com

    Cartoon Credit: seltzercreativegroup.com

  • Why India risks a quantum tech brain drain

    Why India risks a quantum tech brain drain

    Clear career progression would help India’s quantum workforce and avoid a brain drain overseas

    India could lose its best quantum tech talent if the industry doesn’t get its act together.

    Quantum technology has the potential to revolutionise our lives through speeds which once seemed like science fiction.

    India is one of a few nations with national quantum initiatives and it stands on the threshold of potentially enormous technological and social benefits.

    The National Quantum Mission, approved by the national cabinet in April, is a timely government initiative that has the potential to catapult India to a global leader leading in quantum research and technologies if leveraged correctly.

    Its main areas of research are quantum computing, secure quantum communications, quantum sensing and metrology and quantum materials.

    The challenge for India is how it ensures it gets the best out of the mission.

    The benefits of the technology can benefit many aspects of society through processing power, accuracy and speed and can positively impact health, drug research, finance and economics.

    Similarly, quantum security can revolutionise security in strategic communication sectors including defence, banking, health records and personal data.

    Quantum sensors can enable better GPS services through atomic clocks and high-precision imaging while quantum materials research can act as an enabler for more quantum technologies.

    But the Indian quantum ecosystem is still academia-centric.

    India’s Department of Science and Technology had set up a pilot programme on Quantum Enabled Science and Technologies — a precursor to the National Quantum Mission.

    As a result, India has a large number of young and energetic researchers, working at places such as RRI Bangalore, TIFR and IIT Delhi who have put an infrastructure in place for the next generation quantum experiments with capabilities in different quantum technology platforms. These include quantum security through free space, fibres as well-integrated photonics, quantum sensing and metrology.

    The prospects and impact of quantum technologies will be hugely strategic. Predictions suggest quantum computing will have a profound impact on financial services, logistics, transportation, aerospace and automotive, materials science, energy, agriculture, pharmaceuticals and healthcare, and cybersecurity. All of these areas are strategic on macroeconomic and national security scales.

    Even as it has taken significant policy initiative to kickstart research into quantum technologies, India will need to craft a national strategy with a long-term perspective and nurture and develop its research work force.

    Clear career progression would help India’s quantum workforce. The risk of brain drain, where local talent moves overseas for better opportunities, could be a real possibility if different industries which can benefit from the technology fail to recognise its transformative capabilities and how it can help create jobs and opportunities.

    While there are multiple labs working in different quantum sectors, the career path of students and post-doctoral researchers remains unclear as there are not enough positions in the academic sector.

    One problem is industry and academia are competing with each other for quantum research funding which is why equal emphasis on quantum technology development in the industrial sector could help.

    While India does have some quantum start-ups, more lab-to-market innovations which would make the technology practically useful could give the field momentum. Currently, the big industrial firms in India are not yet committed to quantum technology.

    The lack of homegrown technologies like optical, optomechanical and electronic components for precision research is another impediment. Most of these are imported, resulting in financial drain and long delays in research.

    The National Quantum Mission could help fix a number of these problems.

    Hurdles could be turned into opportunities if more start-ups and established industries were to manufacture high-end quantum technology enabling products in India.

    Another major deterrent is the lack of coordination. Multiple efforts to develop and research the technology, across government and start-ups, do not seem to have coherence and still lack maturity. People involved in quantum research are hopeful the mission will help address this.

    Like most other countries, India has witnessed plenty of hype about quantum research. While this may help provide a short-term boost to the field, excessive hype can lead to unrealistic expectations.

    Continuing to build a skilled workforce and a clear career progression plan for those involved in research and development of quantum technologies can help secure India’s future in this space.

    There is a distinction between magic and miracles and while believing in one, one should not start expecting the latter as that can only lead to disappointment in the long run.

     

    This article was originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.

     

  • The Atomic Executioner’s Lament

    The Atomic Executioner’s Lament

    While the world focuses on the trials and travails of the scientists who invented the atomic bomb, little attention is paid to the hard positions taken by the nuclear executioners, the men called upon to drop these bombs in time of war.

     

    Crew of the Enola Gay, returning from their atomic bombing mission over Hiroshima, Japan. At center is navigator Capt. Theodore Van Kirk; to the right, in foreground, is flight commander Col. Paul Tibbetts. (Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

     

    There is an interesting scene in Chris Nolan’s film Oppenheimer, one which could easily get lost in the complexity of telling the story of the man considered to be the father of the American atomic bomb, J. Robert Oppenheimer.

    The Trinity test of the first nuclear device has been successfully completed, and Oppenheimer is watching as two men in military uniform are packing up one of Oppenheimer’s “gadgets” for shipment out of Los Alamos to an undisclosed destination.

    Oppenheimer talks to them about the optimum height for the detonation of the weapon above ground, but is cut off by one of the soldiers, who, smiling, declares “We’ve got it from here.”

    Such men existed, although the scene in the movie — and the dialogue — was almost certainly the product of a scriptwriter’s imagination. The U.S. military went to great lengths to keep the method of delivery of the atomic bomb a secret, not to be shared with either Oppenheimer or his scientists.

    Formed on March 6, 1945, the 1st Ordnance Squadron, Special (Aviation) was part of the 509th Composite Group, commanded by then-Lieutenant Colonel Paul Tibbets. Prior to being organized into the 1st Ordnance Squadron, the men of the unit were assigned to a U.S. Army ordnance squadron stationed a Wendover, Utah, where Tibbets and the rest of the 509th Composite Group were based.

    Mission map for the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Aug. 6 and Aug. 9, 1945. Scale is not consistent due to the curvature of the Earth. Angles and locations are approximate. Kokura was included as the original target for Aug. 9 but weather obscured visibility; Nagasaki was chosen instead. (Mr.98, Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

    While Oppenheimer and his scientists designed the nuclear device, the mechanism of delivery — the bomb itself — was designed by specialists assigned to the 509th. It was the job of the men of the 1st Ordnance Squadron to build these bombs from scratch.

    The bomb dropped on Hiroshima by Paul Tibbets, flying a B-29 named the Enola Gay, was assembled on the Pacific Island of Tinian by the 1st Ordnance Squadron.

    Concerned about the possibility of the B-29 crashing on takeoff, thereby triggering the explosive charge that would send the uranium slug into the uranium core (the so-called gun device), the decision was made that the final assembly of the bomb would be done only after the Enola Gay took off.

    One of the 1st Ordnance Squadron technicians placed the uranium slug into the bomb at 7,000 feet over the Pacific Ocean.

    The bomb worked as designed, killing more than 80,000 Japanese in an instant; hundreds of thousands more died afterwards from the radiation released by the weapon.

    For the pilot and crew of the Enola Gay, there was no remorse over killing so many people. “I knew we did the right thing because when I knew we’d be doing that I thought, yes, we’re going to kill a lot of people, but by God we’re going to save a lot of lives,’ Tibbets recounted to Studs Terkel in 2002. He added:

    “We won’t have to invade [Japan]. You’re gonna kill innocent people at the same time, but we’ve never fought a damn war anywhere in the world where they didn’t kill innocent people,” Tibbets told Terkel. “If the newspapers would just cut out the shit: ‘You’ve killed so many civilians.’ That’s their tough luck for being there.

    An atomic bomb victim with burns, Ninoshima Quarantine Office, Aug. 7, 1945. (Onuka Masami, Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

    Major Charles Sweeney, the pilot of Bockscar, the B-29 that dropped the second American atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki on Aug. 9, 1945, held similar convictions about his role in killing 35,000 Japanese instantly.

    “I saw these beautiful young men who were being slaughtered by an evil, evil military force,” Sweeney recounted in 1995. “There’s no question in my mind that President Truman made the right decision.” However, Sweeney noted, “As the man who commanded the last atomic mission, I pray that I retain that singular distinction.”

    History records the remorse felt by Oppenheimer and his Soviet counterpart, Andrei Sakharov, and the punishment they both suffered at the hands of their respective governments. They suffered from designer’s remorse, a regret — stated after the fact — that what they had built should not be used, but somehow locked away from the world, as if the Pandora’s Box of nuclear weaponization had never been opened.

    Having designed their respective weapons, however, both Oppenheimer and Sakharov lost control of their creations, turning them over to military establishments which did not participate in the intellectual and moral machinations of bringing such a weapon into existence, but rather the cold, hard reality of using these weapons to achieve a purpose and goal which, as had been the case for Tibbets and Sweeney, seemed justified.

    Ignoring the Executioner

    Brigadier General Charles W. Sweeney, pilot of the aircraft that dropped the atomic bomb on Nagasaki. (Public domain, Wikimedia Commons)

    This is the executioners’ lament, a contradiction of emotions where the perceived need for justice outweighs the costs associated.

    While the world focuses on the trials and travails of Oppenheimer and Sakharov, they remain silent about the hard positions taken by the nuclear executioners, the men called upon to drop these bombs in time of war.  There have only been two such men, and they remained resolute in their judgement that it was the right thing to do.

    The executioner’s lament is overlooked by most people involved in supporting nuclear disarmament. This is a mistake, because the executioner, as was pointed out to Oppenheimer by the men of the 1stOrdnance Squadron, is in control.

    They possess the weapons, and they are the ones who will be called upon to deliver the weapons. Their loyalty and dedication to the task are constantly tested in order to ensure that, when the time comes to execute orders, they will do so without question.

    Image of a younger Petrov from a family album.
    (Stanislav Petrov’s Personal Library, Wikimedia Commons, CC0)

     

     

    Those opposed to nuclear weapons often point to the example of Stanislav Petrov, a former lieutenant colonel of the Soviet Air Defense Forces who, in 1983, twice made a decision to delay reporting the suspected launch of U.S. missiles towards the Soviet Union, believing (rightly) that the launch detection was a result of malfunctioning equipment.

    But the fact is that Petrov was an outlier who himself admitted that had another officer been on duty that fateful day, they would have reported the American missile launches per protocol.

    Those who will execute the orders to use nuclear weapons in any future nuclear conflict will, in fact, execute those orders. They are trained, like Tibbets and Sweeney, to believe in the righteousness of their cause.

    Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian prime minister and president who currently serves as the deputy chairman of the Russian National Security Council, has publicly warned the Western supporters of Ukraine that Russia would “have to” use nuclear weapons if Ukrainian forces were to succeed in their goal of recapturing the former territories of Ukraine that have been claimed by Russia in the aftermath of referenda held in September 2022.

    “Imagine,” Medvedev said, “if the offensive, which is backed by NATO, was a success and they tore off a part of our land, then we would be forced to use a nuclear weapon according to the rules of a decree from the president of Russia. There would simply be no other option.”

    Some in the West view Medvedev’s statement to be an empty threat; U.S. President Joe Biden said last month that there is no real prospect of Russian President Vladimir Putin ordering the use of nuclear weapons against either Ukraine or the West.

    “Not only the West, but China and the rest of the world have said: ‘don’t go there,’ ” Biden said following the NATO Summit in Vilnius.

    Ignoring Russian Doctrine

    But Biden, like other doubters, emphasizes substance over process, denying the role played by the executioner in implementing justice defined on their terms, not that of those being subjected to execution.

    Russia has a nuclear doctrine that mandates that nuclear weapons are to be used “when the very existence of the state is put under threat.” According to Medvedev, “there would simply be no other option,” ironically noting that “our enemies should pray” for a Russian victory, as the only way to make sure “that a global nuclear fire is not ignited.”

    The Russians who would execute the orders to launch nuclear weapons against the West would be operating with the same moral clarity as had Paul Tibbets and Charles Sweeney some 88 years ago. The executioner’s lament holds that they will be saddened by their decision but convinced that they had no other choice.

    Proving them wrong will be impossible because, unlike the war with Japan, where the survivors were given the luxury of reflection and accountability, there will be no survivors in any future nuclear conflict.

    The onus, therefore, is on the average citizen to get involved in processes that separate the tools of our collective demise — nuclear weapons — from those who will be called upon to use them.

    Meaningful nuclear disarmament is the only hope humankind has for its continued survival.

    The time to begin pushing for this is now, and there is no better place to start than on Aug. 6, 2023 — the 78th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, when like-minded persons will gather outside the United Nations to begin a dialogue about disarmament that will hopefully resonate enough to have an impact of the 2024 elections.

     

    This article was published earlier in consortiumnews.com

    The views expressed are the author’s own.

    Feature Image: The devastated city of Hiroshima after the atomic bomb blast – bbc.com

  • The South Asia Nuclear Zero

    The South Asia Nuclear Zero

    The nuclear tests, of May 1998, by India and Pakistan, marked an epochal juncture for South Asia. The Doomsday Clock maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, jumped from 11:43 to 11:51, or just “9 minutes to midnight.”

    While, in India, the “Shakti” tests, do find celebratory mention, Pakistan observes the Chagai series of nuclear tests, as a national day, termed “Yom-e-Taqbir.” On the 25th anniversary of this event, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai (Retd), currently, advisor, to Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA), delivered an address at the Arms Control and Disarmament Centre of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

    Kidwai, who served, for 14 years, as the Director-General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), was at the heart of Pakistan’s NCA, and oversaw the operationalisation of its nuclear deterrent. Although his talk was for public consumption, given the historic absence of an Indo-Pak nuclear dialogue, some of Kidwai’s statements – if taken at face value – contain worrisome undertones, which need analysis.

    After mentioning the rationale for Pakistan embarking on nuclear weaponization (“humiliation of the 1971 War followed by India’s nuclear test of May 1974”) Kidwai proceeded to enlighten the audience about the implications of Pakistan’s new policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) and how it kept, “India’s aggressive designs, including the Indian military’s Cold Start Doctrine, in check.”

    While retaining the fig leaf of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), Kidwai went on to mention the “horizontal dimension” of Pakistan’s nuclear inventory, held by the individual Strategic Force Commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The “vertical dimension,” of the Pak deterrent, he said, encapsulated “adequate range coverage from zero meters to 2750 km, as well as nuclear weapons of destructive yields at three tiers: strategic, operational and tactical.”

    While the missile range of 2750 km, corresponds, roughly, to the distance from a launch-point in south-east Sindh, to the Andaman Islands, and indicates the “India-specificity” of the Shaheen III missile, it is the mention of “zero metres” that is intriguing. Pakistan already has the 60 km range, “Nasr” missile, projected as a response to India’s Cold Start doctrine. Therefore, unless used as a colloquialism, Kidwai’s mention of “zero metres” range could only imply a pursuit of ultra short-range, tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), like artillery shells, land mines, and short-range missiles, armed with small warheads, of yields between 0.1 to 1 kiloton (equivalent of 100 to 1000 tons of TNT).

    By shifting from CMD to FSD, with the threat of nuclear first use, to defend against an Indian conventional military thrust, Pakistan is aping the, discredited, US-NATO Cold War concept of Flexible Response. Fearing their inability to withstand a massive Warsaw Pact armoured offensive, this 1967 doctrine saw the US and NATO allies deploy a large number of TNW to units in the field.

    However, the dangers of escalation arising from the use of TNW were soon highlighted, by US Secretary Defence, Robert McNamara’s, public confession: “It is not clear how theater nuclear war could actually be exe­cuted without incurring a very serious risk of escalating to general nuclear war.” This marked a turning point in US-NATO nuclear strategy.

    Kidwai’s speech contains three statements of note. Firstly, he attempts to dilute India’s declared policy of “massive retaliation” (MR), in response to a nuclear strike, by claiming that Pakistan possesses an entire range of survivable nuclear warheads of desired yield, in adequate numbers, to respond to India’s MR. He adds, “Pakistan’s counter-massive retaliation can therefore be as severe (as India’s) if not more.”

    Far more significant is Kidwai’s declaration that, since Pakistan’s missiles can threaten the full extent of the Indian landmass and island territories, “…there is no place for India’s strategic weapons to hide” (emphasis added).

    Secondly, in an attempt to downplay India’s (inchoate) ballistic missile defence (BMD), he declares that in a “target-rich India”, Pakistan is at liberty to expand the envelope and choose from counter-value, counterforce and battlefield targets, “notwithstanding the indigenous Indian BMD or the Russian S-400” (air-defence systems).

    Far more significant is Kidwai’s declaration that, since Pakistan’s missiles can threaten the full extent of the Indian landmass and island territories, “…there is no place for India’s strategic weapons to hide” (emphasis added). The assumption, so far, was that, given its limitations in terms of missile accuracy, real-time surveillance and targeting information, Pakistan would follow a “counter-value” or “counter-city” targeting strategy. The specific targeting of India’s nuclear arsenal, especially, if undertaken by conventional (non-nuclear) missiles, would add a new dimension to the India-Pakistan nuclear conundrum.

    Delivered in the midst of Pakistan’s acute financial crisis, as well as the ongoing political turmoil and civil-military tensions, one may be tempted to dismiss Lt Gen Kidwai’s recent discourse. However, as the longest-serving, former head of the SPD and architect of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, his views are widely heard and deserve our attention.

    Having voluntarily pledged “no first use” (NFU), India’s 2003 Nuclear Doctrine, espoused a “credible minimum deterrent” and promised “massive retaliation,” in response to a nuclear first strike. Since then, our two adversaries, China and Pakistan, have expanded and upgraded their nuclear arsenals, presumably, with corresponding updating of doctrines. India’s strategic enclave has, however, not only maintained a stoic silence and doctrinal status quo but also defended the latter.

    BJP’s 2014 Election Manifesto, had undertaken to “revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine and to “make it relevant to current times,” but this promise has not been kept. Thus, India, currently, faces a moral dilemma as well as a question of “proportionality”: will the loss of a few tanks or soldiers to a Pakistani nuclear artillery salvo, on its own soil, prompt India to destroy a Pakistani city of a few million souls? Since India, too, has developed a family of tactical missiles, capable of counterforce strikes, does it indicate a shift away from CMD and NFU, calling for a response from our adversaries?

    These are just some of the manifold reasons why there is a most urgent need for the initiation of a sustained nuclear dialogue between India and Pakistan, insulated from the vagaries of politics. Such an interaction, by reducing mutual suspicion and enhancing transparency, might slow down the nuclear arms race and mindless build-up of arsenals.

    This article was published earlier in Indian Express.

  • The Asymmetric Indo-US Technology Agreement Points to India’s Weak R&D Culture

    The Asymmetric Indo-US Technology Agreement Points to India’s Weak R&D Culture

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to the USA resulted in four significant agreements and the visit is hailed as one of very important gains for India and Indo-US strategic partnership. The focus has been on defence industrial and technology partnership. Media and many strategic experts are seeing the agreements as major breakthroughs for technology transfers to India, reflecting a very superficial analysis and a lack of understanding of what really entails technology transfer. Professor Arun Kumar sees these agreements as a sign of India’s technological weakness and USA’s smart manoeuvring to leverage India for long-term defence and technology client. The visit has yielded major business gains for USA’s military industrial complex and the silicon valley. Post the euphoria of the visit, Arun Kumar says its time for India to carefully evaluate the relevant technology and strategic policy angles.

     

    The Indo-US joint statement issued a few days back says that the two governments will “facilitate greater technology sharing, co-development and co-production opportunities between the US and the Indian industry, government and academic institutions.” This has been hailed as the creation of a new technology bridge that will reshape relations between the two countries

    General Electric (GE) is offering to give 80% of the technology required for the F414 jet engine, which will be co-produced with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). In 2012, when the negotiations had started, GE had offered India 58%. India needs this engine for the Light Combat Aircraft Mark 2 (LCA Mk2) jets.

    The Indian Air Force has been using LCA Mk1A but is not particularly happy with it. It asked for improvements in it. Kaveri, the indigenous engine for the LCA under development since 1986, has not been successful. The engine development has failed to reach the first flight.

    So, India has been using the F404 engine in the LCA Mk1, which is 40 years old. The F414 is also a 30-year-old vintage engine. GE is said to be offering 12 key technologies required in modern jet engine manufacturing which India has not been able to master over the last 40 years. The US has moved on to more powerful fighter jet engines with newer technologies, like the Pratt & Whitney F135 and GE XA100.

    India is being allowed into the US-led critical mineral club. It will acquire the highly rated MQ-9B high-altitude long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles. Micron Technologies will set up a semiconductor assembly and test facility in Gujarat by 2024, where it is hoped that the chips will eventually be manufactured. The investment deal of $2.75 billion is sweetened with the Union government giving 50% and Gujarat contributing 20%. India is also being allowed into the US-led critical mineral club.

    There will be cooperation in space exploration and India will join the US-led Artemis Accords. ISRO and NASA will collaborate and an Indian astronaut will be sent to the International Space Station. INDUS-X will be launched for joint innovation in defence technologies. Global universities will be enabled to set up campuses in each other’s countries, whatever it may imply for atmanirbharta.

    What does it amount to?

    The list is impressive. But, is it not one-sided, with India getting technologies it has not been able to develop by itself.

    Though the latest technology is not being given by the US, what is offered is superior to what India currently has. So, it is not just optics. But the real test will be how much India’s technological capability will get upgraded.

    Discussing the New Economic Policies launched in 1991, the diplomat got riled at my complaining that the US was offering us potato chips and fizz drinks but not high technology, and shouted, “Technology is a house we have built and we will never let you enter it.”

    What is being offered is a far cry from what one senior US diplomat had told me at a dinner in 1992. Discussing the New Economic Policies launched in 1991, the diplomat got riled at my complaining that the US was offering us potato chips and fizz drinks but not high technology, and shouted, “Technology is a house we have built and we will never let you enter it.”

    Everyone present there was stunned, but that was the reality.

    The issue is, does making a product in India mean a transfer of technology to Indians? Will it enable India to develop the next level of technology?

    India has assembled and produced MiG-21 jets since the 1960s and Su-30MKI jets since the 1990s. But most critical parts of the Su-30 come from Russia. India set up the Mishra Dhatu Nigam in 1973 to produce the critical alloys needed and production started in 1982, but self-sufficiency in critical alloys has not been achieved.

    So, production using borrowed technology does not mean absorption and development of the technology. Technology development requires ‘know-how’ and ‘know-why’.

    When an item is produced, we can see how it is produced and then copy that. But we also need to know how it is being done and importantly, why something is being done in a certain way. Advanced technology owners don’t share this knowledge with others.

    Technology is a moving frontier

    There are three levels of technology at any given point in time – high, intermediate, and low.

    The high technology of yesterday becomes the intermediate technology of today and the low technology of tomorrow. So, if India now produces what the advanced countries produced in the 1950s, it produces the low-technology products of today (say, coal and bicycles).

    If India produces what was produced in the advanced countries in the 1980s (say, cars and colour TV), it produces the intermediate technology products of today. It is not to say that some high technology is not used in low and intermediate-technology production.

    The high technologies of today are aerospace, nanotechnology, AI, microchips and so on. India is lagging behind in these technologies, like in producing passenger aircraft, sending people into space, making microchips, quantum computing, and so on.

    The advanced countries do not part with these technologies. The World Trade Organisation, with its provisions for TRIPS and TRIMS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Trade-Related Investment Measures), consolidated the hold of advanced countries on intermediate and low technologies that can be acquired by paying royalties. But high technology is closely held and not shared.

    Advancements in technology

    So, how can nations that lag behind in technology catch up with advanced nations? The Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow pointed to ‘learning by doing’ – the idea that in the process of production, one learns.

    So, the use of a product does not automatically lead to the capacity to produce it, unless the technology is absorbed and developed. That requires R&D.

    Schumpeter suggested that technology moves through stages of invention, innovation and adaptation. So, the use of a product does not automatically lead to the capacity to produce it, unless the technology is absorbed and developed. That requires R&D.

    Flying the latest Airbus A321neo does not mean we can produce it. Hundreds of MiG-21 and Su-30 have been produced in India. But we have not been able to produce fighter jet engines, and India’s Kaveri engine is not yet successful. We routinely use laptops and mobile phones, and they are also assembled in India, but it does not mean that we can produce microchips or hard disks.

    Enormous resources are required to do R&D for advanced technologies and to produce them at an industrial scale. It requires a whole environment which is often missing in developing countries and certainly in India.

    Enormous resources are required to do R&D for advanced technologies and to produce them at an industrial scale. It requires a whole environment which is often missing in developing countries and certainly in India.

    Production at an experimental level can take place. In 1973, I produced epitaxial thin films for my graduate work. But producing them at an industrial scale is a different ballgame. Experts have been brought from the US, but that has not helped since high technology is now largely a collective endeavour.

    For more complex technologies, say, aerospace or complex software, there is ‘learning by using’. When an aircraft crashes or malware infects software, it is the producer who learns from the failure, not the user. Again, the R&D environment is important.

    In brief, using a product does not mean we can produce it. Further, producing some items does not mean that we can develop them further. Both require R&D capabilities, which thrive in a culture of research. That is why developing countries suffer from the ‘disadvantage of a late start’.

    A need for a focus on research and development

    R&D culture thrives when innovation is encouraged. Government policies are crucial since they determine whether the free flow of ideas is enabled or not. Also of crucial importance is whether thought leaders or sycophants are appointed to lead institutions, whether criticism is welcomed or suppressed, and whether the government changes its policies often under pressure from vested interests.

    Unstable policies increase the risk of doing research, thereby undermining it and dissuading the industry. The result is the repeated import of technology.

    The software policy of 1987, by opening the sector up to international firms, undermined whatever little research was being carried out then and turned most companies in the field into importers of foreign products, and later into manpower suppliers. Some of these companies became highly profitable, but have they produced any world-class software that is used in daily life?

    Expenditure on R&D is an indication of the priority accorded to it. India spends a lowly 0.75% of its GDP on R&D. Neither the government nor the private sector prioritises it. Businesses find it easier to manipulate policies using cronyism. Those who are close to the rulers do not need to innovate, while others know that they will lose out. So, neither focus on R&D.

    Innovation also depends on the availability of associated technologies – it creates an environment. An example is Silicon Valley, which has been at the forefront of innovation. It has also happened around universities where a lot of research capabilities have developed and synergy between business and academia becomes possible.

    This requires both parties to be attuned to research. In India, around some of the best-known universities like Delhi University, Allahabad University and Jawaharlal Nehru University, coaching institutions have mushroomed and not innovative businesses. None of these institutions are producing any great research, nor do businesses require research if they can import technology.

    A feudal setup

    Technology is an idea. In India, most authority figures don’t like being questioned. For instance, bright students asking questions are seen as troublemakers in most schools. The emphasis is largely on completing coursework for examinations. Learning is by rote, with most students unable to absorb the material taught.

    So, most examinations have standard questions requiring reproduction of what is taught in the class, rather than application of what is learned. My students at JNU pleaded against open-book exams. Our class of physics in 1967 had toppers from various higher secondary boards. We chose physics over IIT. We rebelled against such teaching and initiated reform, but ultimately most of us left physics – a huge loss to the subject.

    Advances in knowledge require critiquing its existing state – that is, by challenging the orthodoxy and status quo. So, the creative independent thinkers who generate socially relevant knowledge also challenge the authorities at their institutions and get characterised as troublemakers. The authorities largely curb autonomy within the institution and that curtails innovativeness.

    In brief, dissent – which is the essence of knowledge generation – is treated as a malaise to be eliminated. These are the manifestations of a feudal and hierarchical society which limits the advancement of ideas. Another crucial aspect of generating ideas is learning to accept failure. The Michelson–Morley experiment was successful in proving that there is no aether only after hundreds of failed experiments.

    Conclusion

    The willingness of the US to provide India with some technology without expecting reciprocity is gratifying. Such magnanimity has not been shown earlier and it is obviously for political (strategic) reasons. The asymmetry underlines our inability to develop technology on our own. The US is not giving India cutting-edge technologies that could make us a Vishwaguru.

    India needs to address its weakness in R&D. As in the past, co-producing a jet engine, flying drones or packaging and testing chips will not get us to the next level of technology, and we will remain dependent on imports later on.

    This can be corrected only through a fundamental change in our R&D culture that would enable technology absorption and development. That would require granting autonomy to academia and getting out of the feudal mindset that presently undermines scientific temper and hobbles our system of education.

     

    This article was published earlier in thewire.in

    Feature Image Credit: thestatesman.com

     

  • India and Myanmar: Two Years after the Coup

    India and Myanmar: Two Years after the Coup

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    Relegated to the sidelines with the ongoing Ukraine war and other crises like Taiwan, Myanmar has resurfaced in world headlines. In a recent dispatch, Associated Press (AP) reported that on 11 April 2023 ‘a fighter jet dropped bombs directly onto a crowd of people who were gathering at 8 am for the opening of a local office of the country’s opposition movement outside Pazigyi village in Sagaing region’s Kanbalu township….’ 1 . Subsequent information indicates that the number of dead including women and children is over 170. If so, this is the deadliest aerial attack carried out by the Myanmar military on its own people in the bloody aftermath of the military coup two years ago.

    With various Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) and Peoples’ Defence Forces (PDFs) battling the Tatmadaw, martial law has been declared in 47 townships in Myanmar, cutting across states and regions. 2 More than 154,000 people have been displaced in the first two months of 2023, with total numbers of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) since the military takeover now at 1.3 million. Heavy fighting rages in Kachin State, the South East and North West of the country, 3 and overall 3000 civilian deaths since February 2021 are estimated 4 . Targeted assassination of military appointed government officials continues, the latest victim being the deputy director-general of the Union Election Commission who was shot dead on 22 April this year 5 . In 2022, up to 30,000 civilian infrastructures, including schools are reported to have been destroyed during military operations 6 . This situation has compelled the Tatmadaw to again postpone elections earlier scheduled for August 2023. The state of emergency has been extended.

    Important Developments Post February 2021

    The above statistics provide a telling perspective of the current violence in Myanmar. Yet there are other noteworthy developments in the country post the February 2021 coup. First of these is the increasing relevance of the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) around which civilian support appears to have coalesced.

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    Featured Image Credits: CNBC Indonesia