The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: UNCLOS

  • Vietnam Successfully Delivers at the UNSC

    Vietnam Successfully Delivers at the UNSC

    Vietnamese leaders and people have every reason to celebrate the successful completion of their country’s role as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for the years 2020 and 2021. Before assuming the responsibilities at the UNSC it had announced that it will “make the most of its two years to contribute to improving the effectiveness of the Council, to foster dialogue to help find peaceful solutions to conflicts and to bring the voice of small countries to the work of the council” with particular focus on “conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy, peaceful settlement of disputes, and strengthened implementation of Chapter VI of the UN Charter,” By all accounts, the country achieved all set goals notwithstanding the “complicated and unpredictable socio-economic, political, and security developments as well as unprecedented challenges, including the widespread impact of the COVID-19 pandemic”.

    Vietnam has accrued international prestige not only as an important regional actor but also responsible international actor whose focus is on Chapter VI and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter

    During the above period, Vietnam served twice as President of UNSC in January 2020 and April 2021. It led to several events and initiatives, and these were acknowledged by other members of the UNSC; above all, these received an active response. Some of the important proposals led by Vietnam were (a) two resolutions on reappointing the prosecutor and reviewing the two-year operation of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT)  and on the protection of essential infrastructure; (b) three President’s statements on respecting the UN Charter, strengthening the relationship between the UN and regional organisations in promoting trust-building and resolving the consequences of mines; (c) one press statement on the terrorist attack in Indonesia; and (d) the Hanoi declaration on women, peace and security. It also promoted issues concerning UN peacekeeping and called on the international community to “respond to and reduce climate change impacts on international peace and security”.

    Vietnam also supported issues raised by other non-permanent members of the UNSC. For instance, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh supported Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Five Principles and assured that Vietnam is “committed to working with India and other Council members in promoting dialogue, cooperation and mutual respect, for global peace and prosperity”. He too made three proposals i.e. (a) sustainably utilizing the oceans and seas; (b) comprehensive and holistic maritime security through “cooperation, dialogue and international law” and led by the UN; and (c) uphold legal obligations in line with international law, especially the United Nations Charter and UNCLOS 1982.

    In the context of the latter, Prime Minister Chinh made known that his country was “determined” to engage with ASEAN and China to “seriously, fully and effectively implement the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and negotiate an effective and substantive Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (COC) consistent with international law, in particular, UNCLOS 1982”.

    The country can be credited for raising the issue of the South China Sea at the United Nations 

    During its tenure-ship as a non-permanent member of the UNSC, Vietnam concurrently held the Chairship of the ASEAN in 2020.  The country can be credited for raising the issue of the South China Sea at the United Nations. In his message to the High-level General Debate of the UN General Assembly, President Nguyen Phu Trong conveyed that while Vietnam is committed to the “maintenance and promotion of peace, stability, maritime security and safety and freedom of navigation in the East Sea (South China Sea)” and upholding international law, particularly the 1982 UNCLOS, emphasised and called on “all concerned parties to exercise restraint, avoid unilateral acts that would complicate the situation, and settle disputes and differences through peaceful means with due respect for diplomatic and legal processes.” It is not surprising that there was a reaction from Beijing and the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that the “Security Council is not a suitable place to discuss the South China Sea issue,”

    In essence, Vietnam not only addressed international-transnational-global issues at the UNSC, but it also raised regional issues such as the South China Sea which is the collective voice of the ASEAN as well as the claimant States. This is a big politico-diplomatic advantage for the ASEAN and Vietnam has accrued international prestige not only as an important regional actor but also responsible international actor whose focus is on Chapter VI and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

     

    Feature Image Credit: VnExpress International

  • China’s New Coast Guard Act: Vietnam could lead Response

    China’s New Coast Guard Act: Vietnam could lead Response

    China’s new Coast Guard Act has put the ‘cat among the pigeons’ and the South China Sea claimants Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan are visibly worried. The Act has also attracted international attention; for some, it is an act of war and for others, it violates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    The Act came into effect last month on 01 February. In its administrative content, the Act is the culmination of at least two reorganizations of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) that began in 2013 involving administrative and operational control of five closely associated national maritime law enforcement agencies, also referred to as the Five Dragons , that were brought under one umbrella. In 2018, CCG became part of the People’s Armed Police Force.

    Under the new Act, it is feared, the CCG would conduct operations just like the PLA Navy and would be directly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. The CCG is empowered with powerful ‘security and control measures’ and has the rights to take necessary actions to “restrain foreign military vessels and foreign vessels used for non-commercial purposes in waters under China’s jurisdiction from violating the laws or regulations of China” which is potentially in contravention to the 1982 UNCLOS.

    The Act has also attracted international attention; for some, it is an act of war and for others, it violates the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    Under Article 20, the CCG may demolish “buildings, structures, and various fixed or floating devices” built by foreigners “in the sea areas and islands under our jurisdiction”, and Article 47 authorizes the agency to “directly use weapons if there is no time for warning or if there is a risk of serious harm after giving a warning.”

    It is the latter that prompted Japan to label the Act as “blatantly threatening” and “aimed directly at the Senkakus” raisingspeculation that the Japanese Coast Guard, which hitherto could “fire weapons directly at foreign vessels in cases of self-defence and emergency escape” may now “ fire on foreign official vessels under laws by regarding vessels aiming to land on the Senkaku Islands as committing violent crimes”.

    However, it is fair to say that some of the provisions contained in the Chinese Coast Guard Act are not extraordinary. Navies, Coast Guards and law enforcement agencies of many countries are administratively controlled by the ministries of national defence and routinely operate with the national navies albeit pursue different rules of engagements. Many maritime law enforcement agencies are also known to intercept and even sink foreign fishing vessels especially when these engage in IUU fishing. These naturally attract diplomatic protests from the affected countries including China.

    Be that as it may, the ASEAN and China signed the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the South China Sea in 2016 under which both sides are committed to “maintaining regional peace and stability, maximum safety at sea, promoting good neighbourliness and reducing risks during mutual unplanned encounters in air and at sea, and strengthening cooperation among navies”. This agreement is for the navies and draws upon the CUES (voluntary and non-binding) adopted by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

    The new Chinese Coast Guard Act may have created an opportunity for ASEAN and China to conceptualize CUES that is tailored to the mandate of the Coast Guards i.e. law enforcement. The issue can also be on the agenda of the Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agency Meeting (HACGAM), a grouping of 22 Member States and multilateral organisations, which aims at cooperative and proactive efforts to address maritime issues confronting the region.

    Among the ASEAN member countries, Vietnam is well placed to lead the initiative for at least three reasons.  First, it is a claimant and some of the features in the South China Sea are under its control; second, it has a larger Coast Guard when compared to the capabilities of the other ASEAN claimants; and third, the Vietnamese Communist Party maintains close contacts with their counterparts in China and this could be a useful channel to facilitate a dialogue.

    However, it remains to be seen if Beijing would allow debate and discussion on the Coast Guard Act particularly when it also involves contested areas such as the South China Sea. For that deft diplomacy by Vietnam could be a good idea.

    Feature Image: www.japantimes.co.jp