Tag: Trump

  • The End of War in Ukraine: A Tough Road Ahead

    The End of War in Ukraine: A Tough Road Ahead

    The war, which began when NATO leaders dismissed Russia’s demand for security guarantees from the West, was intended as a way for Russia to reclaim its power and prestige on the global stage while strengthening its security in the region. Neither of these objectives has been achieved, nor will they be with Ukraine’s defeat. The war quickly escalated into a proxy conflict between Moscow and the collective West, with significant losses on both sides.

    Given that President Putin has recently signed an order to draft 160,000 additional soldiers with the goal of “finishing off” the Ukrainian resistance, the Russia-Ukraine war is far from a definitive resolution. Nonetheless, it is never too early to begin considering the options for a successful post-war settlement and the potential to transform the US-advocated ceasefire (if it ever materializes) into a lasting peace.

     

    Unfortunately, neither side of the conflict has presented anything even remotely resembling a plan for a sustainable, acceptable post-war settlement. The war, which began when NATO leaders dismissed Russia’s demand for security guarantees from the West, was intended as a way for Russia to reclaim its power and prestige on the global stage while strengthening its security in the region. Neither of these objectives has been achieved, nor will they be with Ukraine’s defeat. The war quickly escalated into a proxy conflict between Moscow and the collective West, with significant losses on both sides. Russia’s international security situation is now worse than it was before the war began, and this will remain the case for some time, regardless of what happens in Ukraine.

    Ukraine, in fact, is fighting a losing battle. Its leaders are sacrificing the country in the midst of a geopolitical rivalry involving Russia, Europe, and the USA. If Ukraine accepts a Trump-mediated deal with Russia, it will lose four regions occupied by Russian forces since 2022, agree to the annexation of Crimea, and abandon any hopes of NATO membership in the future. If Ukraine is defeated on the battlefield, it will lose its independence and be forced to submit to what Russian leaders refer to as demilitarization and denazification—essentially, a regime change and the reconstitution of Ukrainian governance.

    With no realistic prospect of pushing Russian forces out of the country and with the increasing likelihood of an exploitative “resources plus infrastructure” deal imposed by Washington, Ukraine risks losing not only its state sovereignty but any semblance of international agency. If Ukraine’s role in a post-war settlement, as envisioned in the Saudi negotiations, is reduced to either a Russian-occupied territory or a de facto resource colony of the United States, such a “settlement” would merely serve as an interlude between two wars, offering no lasting resolution to the conflict.

    As the Kremlin proposes placing Ukraine under external governance and the White House demands control over all of Ukraine’s natural resource income for several years—along with a perpetual share of that revenue—the process of transforming Ukraine into a non-self-governing territory accelerates. However, Russia also faces setbacks. Despite Putin’s efforts to halt NATO’s expansion and push the alliance back to its 1997 military posture, NATO has grown closer to Russia’s borders, with formerly neutral Sweden and Finland joining the alliance in direct response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Trump’s previous alignment with Putin prompted EU leaders to agree to a substantial €800 billion increase in defence spending, while French President Macron proposed extending France’s nuclear deterrent to protect all of Europe from potential Russian threats. This may lead to France positioning its nuclear-capable jets in Poland or Estonia, and its ballistic-missile submarines in the Baltic Sea. The British nuclear deterrent is already committed to NATO policy, and it is not unimaginable that some or all of the UK’s nuclear submarines could be deployed closer to Russia’s borders. A UK contribution to a European nuclear umbrella, along with the creation of a low-yield variant of existing nuclear capabilities, would further erode Russia’s already fragile security.

    Putin’s proposal for the external governance of Ukraine reveals Russia’s deep vulnerabilities, which the full occupation of Ukraine would soon expose. A collapse of Ukrainian statehood and the need to occupy the entire country would require Russia to maintain an occupation force of several hundred thousand troops, while also assuming responsibility for law enforcement, security, state administration, essential services, and more. Rebuilding Ukraine’s devastated southeast would cost billions of dollars, and efforts to restore the entire former Ukrainian nation are simply beyond Russia’s capacity. Meanwhile, the guerrilla warfare that the Ukrainians will inevitably intensify in response to Russia’s territorial expansion will further drain the occupiers’ resources.

    The end of the war would mark a slowdown in the military-industrial complex that has driven Russia’s economic growth in recent years. Additionally, the ongoing militarization of society, the rise of nationalist totalitarianism, and the enormous costs of occupying the “new territories” highlight the Pyrrhic nature of Russia’s supposed “victory.”

    Despite the Kremlin’s bravado, Russia’s economy and society have been significantly weakened by the war. With the key interest rate at 21 percent, annual inflation at 10 percent, dwindling welfare fund reserves, and an estimated 0.5 to 0.8 million casualties (killed and wounded) on the battlefield, it’s unclear how much longer Putin can stave off economic decline and maintain reluctant public support for his administration. The end of the war would mark a slowdown in the military-industrial complex that has driven Russia’s economic growth in recent years. Additionally, the ongoing militarization of society, the rise of nationalist totalitarianism, and the enormous costs of occupying the “new territories” highlight the Pyrrhic nature of Russia’s supposed “victory.” The best possible settlement from Russia’s perspective—leaving a rump Ukraine that is independent, self-sufficient, and friendly—is simply out of reach. The remaining options will only delay the inevitable second round of hostilities.

    Finally, the Western proposals for post-war settlements are either unsustainable or outright counterproductive. This is perplexing, given that the war has cost Europe dearly, and it should be in the EU’s interest to see it end as soon as possible. While predictions of seeing the Russian economy in tatters have not materialized, Europe now faces an imminent financial crisis. With the EU economy growing by less than 1 percent in 2024, while Russia’s economy grows 4.5 times faster, it’s time for those like President Macron of France—who advocate continuing the war with extensive European military and financial support—to reconsider their stance.

    However, this is not happening. Instead, EU leaders are urging Russia to agree to an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire on equal terms, with full implementation,” under the threat of new sanctions and the redoubling of Europe’s support for Ukraine.

    This approach is counterproductive and likely to strengthen Russia’s resolve. Beyond the fact that continued support for Ukraine’s war effort will further strain the already fragile budgets of the supporting states, insisting that Ukraine fight to the bitter end is both practically and morally indefensible. At the same time, abandoning Ukraine to face Russia alone could lead to the collapse of Ukrainian statehood. In either case, the collective West loses.

    A negotiated settlement, as proposed by President Trump, is a lesser evil under the current circumstances. Yes, it’s a suboptimal solution that could embolden Putin, harm Ukraine, deepen the divide between Russia and Europe, and create new challenges for international security.

    Yet, the preservation of Ukrainian statehood would be ensured. Death and destruction would cease. Europe’s economy would recover, and the global economy would see a boost. The risk of nuclear war in Europe would fade away. The need for European citizens to stockpile 72 hours’ worth of supplies, as per the European Commission’s recent guidance, might become less of a priority for the already-intimidated European citizens.

    European leaders should consider working alongside Trump, Putin, and Zelensky to craft a balanced, negotiated solution that accounts for the interests of all sides. Even if everyone must make sacrifices, it is better than losing everything. 

    While any path out of this war will be difficult, the strategy of threatening Russia with harsher sanctions, forming “coalitions of the willing,” and creating EU nuclear-armed forces will not make it any easier. Instead, European leaders should consider working alongside Trump, Putin, and Zelensky to craft a balanced, negotiated solution that accounts for the interests of all sides. Even if everyone must make sacrifices, it is better than losing everything.

    Feature Image Credit: www.pbs.org

  • President Trump’s India Visit : Balancing Optics with Substance

    President Trump’s India Visit : Balancing Optics with Substance

    As President Donald Trump arrives in India today, 24 February 2020,on his maiden official visit to India,  there is significant level of discussions amongst the academics, strategists, and foreign policy experts about whether this visit is more about optics than substantive discussions on strategies and agreements to strengthen the US-India strategic partnership. On arrival the president’s first public engagement is a super spectacle, ‘Namaste Trump’ at the new Motera Stadium in Ahmedabad that will have more than 100,000 people, which is Prime Minister Modi’s way of reciprocating for ‘Howdy, Modi’ at Houston last year. Most opine that while Mr Trump’s visit will be packed with pageantry, it will be light on policy and therefore, unlike previous presidential visits this one may not yield many break-through agreements. There are, however, some important developments that are very unique to the Trump-Modi era when compared to the previous visits of American presidents. Both leaders excel in showmanship and also in projecting strong nationalistic orientation to each one’s domestic constituency. Trump, with his transactional and disruptive approach comes off as more unpredictable when it comes to foreign policy and strategic issues.

    Politics and Showmanship

    It has taken Mr Trump, more than three years since he assumed office to visit India. This could mean that India was not a high priority for the Trump regime in the initial years, or as it turned out India was not the target of Trump’s disruptive strategy that he employed against USA’s traditional allies, China, Russia, and others. The final year of a POTUS term is generally termed as the ‘lame duck year’, where very few presidents have had a good last year and many were hampered by major controversies. It is important to note that India is the first country that President Trump is traveling to after his impeachment trial. There is more to Mr Trump’s India relationship than just this visit. One must remember that he is a shrewd businessman, and even before he became the president, India was already home to the most Trump ventures outside of North-America.  While India’s strategic importance is well recognised by all presidents since Bill Clinton, President Trump’s approach is considerably different than the others. His daughter Ivanka Trump made headlines when she visited Hyderabad, as White House Advisor, for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Nov 2017 and the prime minister broke protocol to host a dinner in her honour.

    That the Trump administration has followed a calibrated strategy of recognising and enhancing PM Modi’s image for significant gains to the American defence industry in particular is evident. The current visit, therefore, focuses primarily on strengthening strategic partnership issues in areas such as defence trade, intelligence sharing, counter terrorism, and visa issues. American side may make a token mention about Trump’s offer to facilitate improvement of India-Pakistan talks, China and issues of religious freedom.  However, these will get swamped by the more visible spectacle that will be on display at Ahmedabad and Agra.

    Defence Relationship – the most substantive progress

    India – US defence partnership has progressed significantly over the last decade and a half. The two militaries are exercising together more frequently than ever, and the strategic interactions are moving more towards equitable approach to various aspects. The Trump administration has covered significant ground in nudging India, despite its reluctance, towards partnerships such as the ‘Quad’ and moving towards interoperability by concluding various agreements including the foundational agreements through Defence-Trade-Technology relationship mechanisms.

    Defence trade between the two countries has grown exponentially since 2007. Two major procurements are likely to be signed by the Indian government during this visit: acquisition of 24 Sea-Hawk naval multi-role helicopters (NMRH) from Lockheed Martin worth $ 2.6 billion for the Indian Navy and six AH-64E Apache attack helicopters from Boeing worth $ 930 million for the Indian Army. Both procurements will be through the FMS (Foreign Military Sales) route. Trump administration cleared the decks for enhanced defence cooperation with India by approving India as a major Non-NATO defence partner in 2019, thus smoothening the process for exporting or selling hi-tech weapon systems to India. This is often confused with India becoming a major Non-NATO ally, which is clearly not the case.

    What is clear is that the US has secured major business deals with India to its great advantage, without India gaining much in terms of technology access or industrial production of hi-tech weaponry. The US objective is clearly to wean India away from its heavy dependence on Russian weaponry and secure much broader business relationship with American arms industry. The MIC (military industrial complex) of the USA is clearly focused on India now as its major avenue of business in the 21st century. The Americans were clearly unhappy that India went ahead with S-400 purchase from Russia despite the threat of CAATSA. That India has decided to buy an air defence missile system from the US, again through FMS route, worth $ 1.9 billion seems to be a compensation for such a decision.

    The US-India defence deal will scale $ 20 billion this year after the Trump visit. Many of these weapon system procurements, in terms of numbers, are not of a scale sufficient to create major industrial partnerships for manufacturing. India, however, will need to look at ways and means of acquiring significant technologies from the US through joint ventures, co-design and co-development. Otherwise, there lurks the danger of India being trapped in an all too familiar pattern of buyer-seller relationship rather than as strategic partners.

    Strategic gains?

    The visit’s focus is in areas of trade, defence, counter-terrorism, energy, and co-ordination on regional and global issues. These are areas in which considerable ground has been covered and is a continuing process. The agreement on trade deal, which was keenly expected, has been deferred. With President Trump accusing India of high tariffs and dashing all hopes of a deal before the visit, it is clear that the USA intends to push hard for favourable access to Indian markets for American companies. There are some positives that are emerging. The prospects for increased collaboration in space between ISRO and NASA looks bright.

    The focus of the American side is primarily on Defence trade.  Increase in investments in defence production may become a possibility with major projects in the pipeline. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin are pushing hard for IAF’s 114 aircraft order, which will be processed under the strategic partnership model of ‘Make in India’ program. This could expand the production run to over 200 aircraft. Similarly, the naval  helicopter (NMRH) procurement has a possibility  of expanding into ‘Make in India’ project for over 100 helicopters. Boeing’s S-76D is a contender for Navy’s utility helicopter procurement under ‘make in India’ program.

    The spectacle of this visit will certainly contribute to both leaders’ constituencies, for President Trump’s re-election campaign and for PM Modi it may divert people’s attention from current issues of flagging economy, Delhi electoral reverses, the Kashmir issue and ongoing protests on CAA and NRC. India however, will need to negotiate hard and leverage the expanding defence business to address technology access and  strengthen Indian industry by enabling them into global supply chain. For this the Indian establishment will need to see well beyond the optics to assess real gains.

    Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (retd) is the President of TPF and a former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff.