The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Strategic Partnership

  • India–U.S. Ties Beyond the Trump Show

    India–U.S. Ties Beyond the Trump Show

    With its deep institutional roots and strategic clarity, the India–U.S. relationship is well-positioned to advance further, driven not by transient rhetoric but by enduring common purpose

    U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated assertions about mediating a ceasefire between India and Pakistan have reignited long-standing apprehensions surrounding external involvement in the Kashmir issue. His remarks, including those referenced during a U.S. court hearing in May 2025—where U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick testified that the Trump administration’s trade policies helped avert a potential nuclear confrontation in South Asia—were met with widespread criticism from strategic experts and policymakers alike. New Delhi has remained steadfast in its position: the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is strictly bilateral and not subject to international mediation.

    Diaspora Influence and Institutional Depth

    Despite Trump’s controversial rhetoric, the India–U.S. relationship has matured well beyond the influence of individual leaders. It now stands as a robust, multi-dimensional partnership, underpinned by shared strategic interests, deepening economic ties, and strong people-to-people linkages. This is evident through the formalization of the relationship via key agreements and strategic initiatives. Today, it is regarded as a promising and one of the most consequential partnerships of the 21st century, given its potential to reshape the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Moreover, this strength is particularly reflected in the vibrant Indian diaspora in the United States—numbering over four million—one of the most educated and affluent immigrant communities in the country, playing an increasingly influential role in shaping policy.

     

    The diaspora’s clout in U.S. policymaking has grown remarkably. A striking example of this influence was witnessed during the COVID-19 crisis in 2021. At a critical juncture, when the Biden administration had imposed export restrictions on essential medical supplies, Indian-Americans mounted an organized lobbying campaign. Their efforts succeeded in convincing the administration to reverse the ban and dispatch critical medical equipment and raw materials for vaccines to India. This intervention demonstrated the community’s capacity to influence key policy decisions at the highest levels. Their role is not limited to crisis management. The Indian-American community has been instrumental in advancing landmark initiatives such as the U.S.–India civil nuclear agreement, and today, many Indian-Americans serve in influential roles within the U.S. government. This diaspora acts as a cultural and strategic bridge, enhancing bilateral understanding and reinforcing long-term cooperation.

    The evolving India–U.S. partnership is bolstered by a diverse and committed set of stakeholders,including government institutions, private enterprises, think tanks, academic bodies, and civil society in both nations. Crucially, U.S. institutions such as the State Department and Congress continue to regard India as a vital strategic partner, particularly in the context of the Indo-Pacific strategy and broader efforts to counterbalance China’s growing regional influence. These institutions take a long-term, bipartisan approach to India–U.S. relations, one that is grounded in continuity and strategic alignment rather than reactive or transactional impulses, such as those reflected in Trump’s pronouncements.

    Strategic Continuity

    Trump’s leadership style has often been described as transactional, business-oriented, and self-promoting. He frequently projects himself as a master negotiator and dealmaker, but many of his actions suggest otherwise. His tendency to prematurely claim success and take credit has often weakened his own negotiating position, whether in the context of Ukraine, North Korea, Iran, or South Asia. For instance, Trump repeatedly announced breakthroughs in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that never materialized, thereby weakening his credibility and diminishing his effectiveness as a serious diplomatic actor.

    While Trump’s erratic rhetoric may generate headlines, it is critical not to exaggerate its impact on this deeply rooted relationship. His habitual tendency to seek the spotlight and amplify his personal role in global diplomacy often lacked substantive backing or long-term vision.

    In the case of India and Pakistan, Trump’s attempt to “hyphenate” the relationship—suggesting he could broker a deal between both nations—ignored the decades-long efforts by previous U.S. administrations to de-hyphenate the ties and treat each relationship on its own strategic merits. His statement that “they’ve been fighting for 1,500 years” reveals a superficial understanding of South Asian geopolitics and history. Such remarks reflect a lack of diplomatic nuance and strategic depth.

    In contrast, previous U.S. presidents devoted sustained efforts toward cultivating strategic trust with India—especially in light of their fraught Cold War history and the lingering presence of anti-American sentiment within Indian political and intellectual circles. During this era, American foreign policy toward India embodied a form of strategic altruism, emphasizing long-term engagement grounded in mutual respect rather than immediate concessions or gains. Successive administrations—Republican and Democratic alike, including Trump’s own during his first term—recognized the importance of winning India’s trust, acknowledging its historic skepticism of U.S. intentions and its adherence to a non-aligned foreign policy stance.

    These efforts bore fruit in the form of landmark agreements and growing strategic alignment across a broad spectrum of areas, including defense cooperation, civil nuclear energy, high technology, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism. Recent developments—including the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), the U.S.–India Major Defense Partnership Framework (2025–2035), the COMPACT Initiative, and collaborations through platforms like INDUS-X and the Artemis Accords—have deepened cooperation. These engagements signify that the India–U.S. partnership is now an essential component of the 21st-century global security and economic architecture.

    the India–U.S. partnership rests on far more stable and enduring foundations: bipartisan consensus within the U.S. strategic establishment, shared democratic values, converging geopolitical interests, and institutional mechanisms that safeguard continuity and progress.

    While Trump’s erratic rhetoric may generate headlines, it is critical not to exaggerate its impact on this deeply rooted relationship. His habitual tendency to seek the spotlight and amplify his personal role in global diplomacy often lacked substantive backing or long-term vision.  Even his relationship with Elon Musk—once a vocal ally who contributed nearly $300 million to pro-Trump political efforts during the 2024 campaign—has deteriorated into public conflict, highlighting the unpredictability of Trump’s leadership style. In stark contrast, the India–U.S. partnership rests on far more stable and enduring foundations: bipartisan consensus within the U.S. strategic establishment, shared democratic values, converging geopolitical interests, and institutional mechanisms that safeguard continuity and progress.

    West Asia dynamics: No Indian shift

    Moreover, recent U.S. gestures toward Pakistan—including inviting Pakistan’s Army Chief to U.S. Army Day celebrations, public praise for its leadership, the release of funds for upgrading the F-16 fleet—and support in securing IMF bailout packages—should be analysed through the lens of broader strategic imperatives, particularly concerning Iran. Amid escalating tensions with Tehran and recent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets by its close ally Israel, Washington may be positioning itself for potential regional contingencies and wider escalation. In this context, logistical access to Pakistani military bases—notably Noor Khan Airbase, and other facilities which, according to senior analyst Imtiaz Gul, is already under partial U.S. operational control—could become critical. Pakistan has a history of facilitating U.S. military operations, such as during the War on Terror. Given its proximity to Iran, Pakistan is strategically well-placed to support U.S. initiatives in the region.

    The U.S. may also seek to ensure that Pakistan remains aligned with Western objectives should Israel act unilaterally against Iran. Therefore, recent goodwill gestures by the U.S. toward Pakistan should be interpreted not as a shift away from India, as some within the Indian strategic establishment might fear, but as part of a calculated strategy to secure regional flexibility amid evolving geopolitical uncertainties in West Asia.

    Ultimately, the strength and resilience of the India–U.S. relationship derive from its firm institutional foundation and shared strategic vision. It is largely insulated from the whims of transient political figures. Despite periodic turbulence, the partnership has demonstrated remarkable continuity and adaptability. Key U.S. national security documents—including the Indo‑Pacific Strategy and the National Security Strategy—consistently describe India as a “major defense partner” and an indispensable actor in the effort to balance China’s regional ambitions. These structural commitments ensure that the bilateral relationship remains on a trajectory of deepening cooperation. As articulated in the 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, India is seen as a “like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia,” and a “driving force of the Quad and a net security provider in the region.”

    Conclusion

    Today, the India–U.S. relationship stands as a beacon of mutual trust, strategic alignment, and forward-looking engagement. Decades of deliberate diplomacy, institutional investment, and cultural linkage have given rise to one of the most promising partnerships of the 21st century. While figures like President Trump may generate momentary uncertainty, they lack the capacity to derail the deep-rooted and multidimensional nature of this partnership. The future of India–U.S. relations remains bright, anchored in shared democratic ideals, strategic complementarity, and a common vision for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

    Feature Image credit: news18.com

    Image of  President Bush and PM Manmohan Singh: wikipedia India-United States Civil Nuclear Deal.

  • Evaluating the Make in India Policy for Defence Manufacturing and Technology Acquisition

    Evaluating the Make in India Policy for Defence Manufacturing and Technology Acquisition

    Led by the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Ministry of Commerce, the Make in India policy (“MII”) extends to 25 focused sectors. Among these is the defence sector, where the nature of the sector renders MII extremely important and relevant. This is outlined by India’s status as the second-largest standing army and third-largest military spender in the world.[1] Yet, it remains the second-largest arms importer and its exports merely amount to 0.2% of the global pie.[2] China is the fifth-largest arms exporter at 5.5% of the global share.[3] However, this is likely to fall in the post-pandemic world, where China’s credibility has been severely tainted.[4] This represents an opportunity for Indian defence manufacturers to attract present and future foreign investment.

    Against this background, MII was enacted with two objectives: (1) to increase domestic manufacturing of defence equipment; and (2) address the national security interest of self-sufficiency over key technologi. There are two ways in which technology up-gradation can happen: (1) indigenous efforts; and (2) transfer of technology, through international agreements. In this article, I flag the main challenges to argue that India has significantly underperformed in both. Subsequently, I propose macro-policy changes to address identified challenges.

    Evaluating technological upgradation in the Defence sector in india

    1. Evaluating ‘Indigenous Efforts’

    Indigenous efforts are confronted with three main challenges:

    • Inadequate Investment for Research & Development (R&D)

    Only 5.7% of the defence budget is allocated to R&D,[5] despite successive parliamentary committees recommending at least 10% to meet minimum requirements.[6] The average allocation among global rivals like USA, UK, France, and China is well above 15%.[7] Even private-sector players in India, like Tata, L&T, and Mahindra and Mahindra, invest less than 1% of their turnover in R&D, as against the average of 10% in the aforementioned countries.[8] The producer lacks the basic R&D required even for making marginal improvements in performance to the product, or altering it based on user-specifications.[9] The effect of this is that the resulting product is obsolete in an already disruptive market. Thus, a buyer, even if domestic, is unwilling to accept such an obsolete product at higher prices merely for the sake of indigenous production.

    • Shortage of Skilled Workforce

    A skilled workforce is the key to achieving self-sufficiency in defence manufacturing because of the highly specialized nature of this sector and the workforces’ vision and skills determine the efficacy of the produced/procured domestic technology. This shortage exists at both the research and procurement level.

    At the research level, there is a severe shortage of skilled human resources, in terms of quantity and quality, at R&D organizations like DRDO.[10] With more than 3,500 engineering colleges producing about 1.5 million engineering graduates annually, India has an unparalleled talent availability.[11] However, only 17.5% of these graduates are employable because colleges lack proper infrastructure and faculty,[12] along with current curriculum ignoring industry skills, defined career paths, and evolving technologies.[13] Thus, organizations are compelled to spend significantly in making fresh talent “employable”.

    While India has a decent pool of highly qualified low-cost engineers and scientists,[14] they are unwilling to work in the public sector due to limited opportunities and low growth potential,[15] where most defence R&D is undertaken. As the departure of 132 scientists in the last five years from DRDO shows,[16] even those employed mostly do not continue long-term due to better opportunities elsewhere.[17] The contribution of most of these scientists has been limited to the production of academic articles,[18] which hasn’t seen any significant and meaningful absorption in the policy. Therefore, the policy has been unable to capture the huge latent employment potential in this sector.[19]

    This position must be contrasted against global competitors like the US and China, where the highly skilled and employable workforce is significantly and routinely absorbed into the most impactful R&D organization, whether private or public.[20] Moreover, unlike other leading countries, India lacks any training and education infrastructure specialized for R&D personnel in the defence sector. These countries have developed specialist defence schools that have managed to produce large pools of exclusive talent. France itself has managed to produce 134,000 specialist employees.[21]

    At the procurement level, the asset acquisition process is not tasked to a dedicated cadre of the workforce.[22] Further, there are no educational or training programs for employees involved in this process.[23] Thus, there is the loss in terms of the benefits of specialization, especially in a sector where progress is characterized by specialization.

    • Limited Involvement of the Private Sector

    There is a significant lack of incentive for greater private sector involvement. The private sector is commercially motivated to establish its manufacturing base only when it has a good chance, or preferably guarantee, of getting frequent and sizeable orders.[24] However, the current manufacturing and procurement process has ignored this motivation but is also completely converse to it.

    As the BJP government’s Rafale fiasco indicates, the procurement processes lack transparency, and frequently fraught with allegations and counter-allegations.[25] This disincentivizes both domestic and global private sector players from conducting business.

    Despite unprecedented inclusion of the private sector, it is widely believed in the private sector that the government is biased towards public sector undertakings, denying a level-playing field for the private sector and even denying opportunities to bid.[26]

    The government’s Strategic Partnership Model, aimed at inviting world-class defence giants to collaborate with Indian entities, has unduly restricted autonomy. Under this program, the government chooses the Indian partner for the foreign OEM, without consulting them.[27] Global defence giants, like Airbus, Lockheed Martin, ThyssenKrupp, and Dassault, have shown interest in contracting with the Indian private sector.[28] However, it is a combination of these factors that this interest has largely failed to materialise into successfully concluded deals.

    Even where, despite these disincentives, the private sector has been involved, this has been in non-critical and less required areas. Most of India’s defence imports are in the category of major platforms such as fighter aircraft, helicopters, naval guns, and anti-submarine missiles.[29] However, the private sector initiatives are predominantly in the category of ammunitions (including rockets and bombs), and surveillance and tracking systems.[30]

    1. Evaluating ‘Transfer of Technology’

    There has been no transfer of technology (“ToT”) in the critical defence procurement process. All major contracts under MII have been “off the shelf”, and without any crucial ToT.[31] As per the CAG Report, between 2007 and 2018, the government concluded 46 offset contracts but failed to implement the ToT agreements in any of them.[32]

    The failure here can be attributed to successive governments unduly hoping that India’s status as a large arms importer would necessarily make international players compliant as regards sharing their intellectual property (“IP”). While foreign companies have shown interest in contracting with Indian players, the large purchase orders have been inadequate to incentivize foreign players to share their IP.[33]

    The government has also been overly ambitious of ToT as a means of technology upgradation. Even implementing the negotiated ToT is not the end because the more challenging issues of absorption of this technology and ownership of IP remain.[34] Moreover, the ToT route provides India only with the ‘know-how’, without any insight into the ‘know-why’.[35] As India’s acquisition of the Sukhoi Su-30 has shown, the public sector is critically dependent on the OEMs, here the Russians, for even minor systemic upgradations.

    Way Forward

    The government must increase allocation to defence R&D to at least 10% and must incentivize greater contributions from the private sector. Existing capabilities and services at training and diploma centres must be upgraded through public-private partnerships. There must be a separate and devoted institutional structure for all procurement-related functions. The procurement policy must also aim at buying talent, besides technology, to bridge technology gaps. The education curriculum at engineering universities needs to be modernized, with a focus on employability. Specialist defence schools must also be established. However, it is most important that the public sector aims at retaining its talent through unique and lucrative incentive structures.

    To incentivize the private sector through minimum order guarantees, the government must utilize ‘public procurement of innovation’. Under this policy tool, the government uses its exchequer to artificially generate demand for an emerging innovative solution, unavailable on a commercial scale.[36] The private sector can further be incentivized by streaming the procurement and dispute resolution process. As for procurement, a fast-track procedure with single-window clearances can be adopted.[37] As for dispute resolution a permanent arbitration tribunal must be established to expeditiously settle disputes with finality.[38]

    Conclusion

    Firstly, the indigenous efforts at technology up-gradation have failed due to limited R&D output, shortage of skilled workforce, and limited private sector involvement. The R&D budgetary allocation is way below the recommended and global standard. The shortage of skilled workforce is both at the research and procurement due to a lack of education and training infrastructure specific to the defence sector, low employability among most graduates, and unwillingness to work in the public sector among highly qualified graduates. The private sector has been disincentivized due to a lack of order guarantees, the unrealistic and retroactive manner of the procurement process, the constant allegations and counter-allegations, and the continued bias towards the public sector. Moreover, the private sector has been involved in non-critical and less required areas.

    Secondly, while the government has concluded ToT agreements, it has been inefficient in enforcing them. Moreover, even if this were to succeed, it has not established any action plan for absorbing this technology and addressing ownership of IP. It has also been overly ambitious of the utility of ToT.

     

     

    References

    [1] Kuldip Singh, ‘Yes, Indian Military Can Go the ‘Make in India’ Way – Just Not Yet’ (The Quint, 25 May 2020) <https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-armed-forces-defence-sector-military-expenditure-budget-technology-upgrade-make-in-india> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [2] Arjun Srinivas, ‘Private defence business gets one more nudge’ (LiveMint, 1 October 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/private-defence-business-gets-one-more-nudge-11601460654397.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [3] Snehesh Alex Philip, ‘China has become a major exporter of armed drones, Pakistan is among its 11 customers’ (The Print, 23 November 2020) <https://theprint.in/defence/china-has-become-a-major-exporter-of-armed-drones-pakistan-is-among-its-11-customers/549841/> accessed 4 January 2021.

    [4] Rajan Kochhar, ‘Preparing defence sector for post COVID-19 world: Time to treat private sector as equal partner’ (Economic Times, 5 May 2020) <https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/governance/opinion-make-in-india-a-dream-or-reality-for-the-armed-forces/75552970> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [5] Jayant Singh, ‘Industry Scenario’ (Invest India) <https://www.investindia.gov.in/sector/defence-manufacturing> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [6] Prof (Dr) SN Misra, ‘Make in India: Challenges Before Defence Manufacturing’ (2015) 30(1) Indian Defence Rev <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/make-in-india-challenges-before-defence-manufacturing/2/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [7] ‘Government Expenditures on Defence Research and Development by the United States and Other OECD Countries: Fact Sheet’ (2020) Congressional Research Service R45441 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R45441.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020; A Sivathanu Pillai, ‘Defence R&D’ in Vinod Misra (ed), Core Concerns in Indian Defence and the Imperatives for Reforms (Pentagon Press & IDSA 2015) 132-133.

    [8] Misra (n 6).

    [9] Amitabha Pande, ‘Defence, Make in India and the Illusive Goal of Self Reliance’ (The Hindu Centre for Public Policy, 11 April 2019) <https://www.thehinducentre.com/the-arena/current-issues/article26641241.ece> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [10] Azhar Shaikh, Dr. Uttam Kinange, & Arthur Fernandes, ‘Make in India: Opportunities and Challenges in the Defence Sector’ (2016) 7(1) Intl J Research in Commerce & Management 13, 14-15.

    [11] Kishore Jayaraman, ‘How Can India Bridge The Skill Gap in Aerospace & Defence Sector?’ (All Things Talent, 24 September 2018) <https://allthingstalent.org/2018/09/24/how-can-india-bridge-skill-gap-in-aerospace-defence-sector/> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [12] Dr. JP Dash & BB Sharma, ‘Skilling Gaps in Defence Sector for ‘Make in India’’ (2017) 32(2) Indian Defence Rev <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/skilling-gaps-in-defence-sector-for-make-in-india/> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [13] Jayaraman (n 10); Dhiraj Mathur, ‘Unlocking defence R&D in India – Do we have the skill?’ (Firstpost, 6 April 2016)<https://www.firstpost.com/business/unlocking-defence-rd-in-india-do-we-have-the-skill-2715650.html> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [14] Mathur (n 13).

    [15] PR Sanjai, ‘Indian aerospace sector needs one million skilled workforce in next 10 years’ (Livemint, 20 February 2015) <https://www.livemint.com/Politics/hRJQjq7ZKVXQ5RFkzWbmAJ/Indian-aerospace-sector-needs-one-million-skilled-workforce.html> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [16] PTI, ‘132 scientists left DRDO on personal grounds in last 5 years: Govt’ (Economic Times, 12 March 2020) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/132-scientists-left-drdo-on-personal-grounds-in-last-5-years-govt/articleshow/74579857.cms?from=mdr> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [17] Dash (n 12).

    [18] PTI, ‘India is world’s third largest producer of scientific articles: Report’ (Economic Times, 18 December 2019) <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/science/india-is-worlds-third-largest-producer-of-scientific-articles-report/articleshow/72868640.cms?from=mdr> accessed 30 December 2020.

    [19] ‘Make in India: An Overview of Defence Manufacturing in India’ (2015) Singhania & Partners LLP Report <https://www.gita.org.in/Attachments/Reports/Make-in-India-Defence-Manufacturing-in-India.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [20] Ranjit Ghosh, ‘Defence Research and Development: International Approaches for Analysing the Indian Programme’ (2015) IDSA Occasional Paper 41, 11-34 <https://idsa.in/system/files/opaper/OP41__RanjitGhosh_140815.pdf> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [21] Dash (n 12).

    [22] Shaikh (n 10) 15.

    [23] Ibid.

    [24] Rohit Srivastava, ‘New measures for self-sufficiency in defence – industry perspective’ (Indian Defence Industries, 19 May 2020) <https://indiandefenceindustries.in/defence-reforms-industry-perspective> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [25] Pradip R Sagar, ‘How ‘Make in India’ in defence sector is still an unfulfilled dream’ (The Week, 25 May 2019) <https://www.theweek.in/theweek/current/2019/05/25/how-make-in-india-in-defence-sector-is-still-an-unfulfilled-dream.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [26] Ibid; Lt. Gen. (Retd.) (Dr). Subrata Saha, ‘Execution key for defence manufacturing in India’ (LiveMint, 2 April 2020) <https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Gx9NVPGvIsVbVzLTJ0VouK/Execution-key-for-defence-manufacturing-in-India.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [27] Prasanna Karthik, ‘India’s strategic partnership policy is counter-productive in its current form’ (Observer Research Foundation, 8 June 2020) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/indias-strategic-partnership-policy-is-counter-productive-in-its-current-form-67511/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [28] Sagar (n 25).

    [29] Srinivas (n 3).

    [30] Ibid.

    [31] Singh (n 1); Sagar (n 25).

    [32] Joe C Mathew, ‘Defence offset policy performance dismal: CAG’ (Business Today, 24 September 2020) <https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/defence-offset-policy-performance-dismal-cag/story/416872.html> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [33] Lieutenant Commander L Shivaram (Retd), ‘Understanding ‘Make in India’ in the Defence Sector’ (2015) 145(601) J United Service Institution of India <https://usiofindia.org/publication/usi-journal/understandingmake-in-india-in-the-defence-sector/> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [34] Lt Gen A B Shivane, ‘India needs outcome oriented defence reforms’ (Indian Defence Industries, 22 May 2020) <https://indiandefenceindustries.in/india-outcome-oriented-reforms> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [35] Misra (n 6).

    [36] E. Uyarra & J. Edler, ‘Barriers to Innovation through Public Procurement: A Supplier Perspective’ (2014) 34(10) Science Direct <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166497214000388> accessed 19 December 2020.

    [37] Kochhar (n 4).

    [38] Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Dalip Bharadwaj, ‘‘Make in India’ in defence sector: A distant dream’ (Observer Research Foundation, 7 May 2018) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/make-in-india-defence-sector-distant-dream/> accessed 19 December 2020.