The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Russia

  • Ukraine War: India’s Stature in the Emerging World Order

    Ukraine War: India’s Stature in the Emerging World Order

    The war between Russia and Ukraine has caused a major disruption not only in that region, but the entire world. Power centres are shifting; a new world order is emerging out of this global churn. The world anxiously waits for India to take a more active role in a bid to end hostilities. What will India do?

    India’s firm stand of neutrality about the conflict in Ukraine has attracted considerable attention from the world’s strategic thinkers and governments. In this regard, many see the rise of India as a future pole power of the 21st century, as the current world order has entered a phase of instability, conflict, and competition. The Ukraine war may be the tipping point for the Euro-American dominance in the last three centuries, as a multi-polar world order is emerging, albeit slowly. India’s stature in this world order transformation is critical, as the non-western countries that constitute two-thirds of the world will meticulously observe and monitor it. A careful analysis of the ongoing transformation of the world order amidst the massive cacophony of propaganda and a plethora of biased reports (masquerading as research and academic outputs) is a huge challenge for serious researchers and policymakers.

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  • The New World and the Ukraine-Russia Breadbasket – Book review of “Oceans of Grain”

    The New World and the Ukraine-Russia Breadbasket – Book review of “Oceans of Grain”

    To understand the rise and fall of empires, we must follow the paths travelled by grain—along rivers, between ports, and across seas. In Oceans of Grain, historian Scott Reynolds Nelson reveals how the struggle to dominate these routes transformed the balance of world power. Early in the nineteenth century, imperial Russia fed much of Europe through the booming port of Odessa, on the Black Sea in Ukraine. But following the US Civil War, tons of American wheat began to flood across the Atlantic, and food prices plummeted. This cheap foreign grain spurred the rise of Germany and Italy, the decline of the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, and the European scramble for empire. It was a crucial factor in the outbreak of the First World War and the Russian Revolution.
    A powerful new interpretation, Oceans of Grain shows that amid the great powers’ rivalries, there was no greater power than control of grain.

    Thomas Grennes reviews the book ‘Oceans of Grain’ by Scott Reynolds Nelson. The book is very timely, given the emerging food crisis as a result of the blockade of the Black Sea ports that hampers the export of grain from the major exporters,  Ukraine and Russia.

     

     

     

    Book Title – Oceans of Grain: How American Wheat Remade the World

    Author – Scott Reynolds Nelson

    Publisher – Basic Books

    Page Count – 368 pages

    Date Published – Feb 22, 2022

     

     

     

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine has reminded the world that war in Europe isn’t just the stuff of history books. It also demonstrates how war can affect the world’s food supply, as both Ukraine and Russia have long been major global suppliers of wheat and other grains.

    This makes the new book Oceans of Grain, by University of Georgia history professor and Guggenheim fellow Scott Reynolds Nelson, especially timely. Nelson has written five other history-oriented books, including the award-winning Steel Drivin’ Man: John Henry, the Untold Story of an American Legend and A Nation of Deadbeats: An Uncommon History of American Financial Disasters.

    Oceans of Grain covers some 14,000 years of human history, beginning with the origin of bread, with an emphasis on the era in which the modern wheat market developed, from the 18th century to the end of World War I.

    New World food / The book focuses on the breadbaskets of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, though it also gives a little attention to Canada, Argentina, and Australia, and passing mention of South and East Asia. Nelson often writes as if Russia and Ukraine are one land, in part because the border between them has shifted many times throughout history. His use of the word “grain” is nearly synonymous with “wheat,” though he does offer limited discussions of corn (maize), oats, barley, and rice.

    Grain has been crucial to human life for millennia. Expressions such as “Bread is the staff of life” and prayers such as “Give us this day our daily bread” illustrate the historical importance of bread and wheat. Technical change that has raised productivity in grain production has increased the standard of living for hundreds of millions of people, and negative shocks to the grain sector have caused crises and wars.

    Expansion of grain production in the 19th century to the then-newly settled regions of the United States, Canada, Argentina, and Australia greatly benefited grain consumers around the world, but it harmed traditional producers in Russia and elsewhere. The benefits for Europe were previously described in a 1997 Journal of Economic History article by Kevin H. O’Rourke as the “distributional effects of Christopher Columbus.” According to O’Rouke, transport innovations such as steamships and railroads “exported New World land to Europe, embodied in New World food.”

    Geography and transport / Geography has been crucial to the location of grain production and the pattern of world grain trade. The fertile chernozem (Russian for “black soil”) of Ukraine, parts of Russia, and neighboring lands were conducive to early grain production. Ancient “black paths” used by oxcart drivers led from the interior of Ukraine to Black Sea ports. Centuries ago, grain was shipped through the Turkish Straits on both ends of the Sea of Marmara to the Aegean Sea and then onto the ancient Greek and Roman civilizations along the Mediterranean. Control of those straits, the Bosporus and Dardanelles, has long been crucial and has led to many wars involving Russia and Turkey. Even today, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, access to the Turkish Straits by Russian ships is a crucial military issue.

    Transport innovations have had a major effect on the pattern of world trade. Improvements in navigation and sailing ships were followed by the transition to steamships. The development of Odessa on the Black Sea was a major contributor to Ukrainian grain exports. Grain ports have been described as the children of empires, and Nelson points out the Greek term emporion — “marketplace” — is the etymological root of both “emporium” and “empire.”

    Other innovations also played important roles. Improvements in communication, such as the telegraph and undersea cables, aided long-distance trade. Improvements in explosives (nitroglycerin) contributed to the construction of deep-water harbors that can handle bigger ships. Better explosives also helped build the Suez Canal. Completed in 1869, it reduced travel time from London to Calcutta from six months to 30 days. The shortcut from the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean permitted the bypassing of the southern tip of Africa.

    Grain policy / Government policies have had an important effect on the pattern of world grain trade.

    Russian Tsarina Catherine II (1762–1796), better known as Catherine the Great, sought to develop a more grandiose Russian empire by making the country a major grain exporter. Russia’s partitioning of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth added territory from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south that included fertile wheat-growing land.

    According to Nelson, Catherine was influenced by the French Physiocrats, led by François Quesnay, who thought that agriculture was the main source of wealth. Catherine believed that Russia’s becoming a large grain producer would free its citizens from having to rely on other countries for their basic food. She also admired the benefits received by Poles from transporting grain down the Vistula River to Gdańsk. By increasing Russian production and exports of grain from Black Sea ports through the Turkish Straits, Catherine expected to convert Constantinople to “Tsargrad.”

    She promoted Russian wheat production in various ways, including increasing the power of landlords over serfs that made the serfs more like slaves. She also followed the anti-Semitism of earlier tsars who restricted Jews from living in old Russia. Jews were underrepresented as grain growers and overrepresented as middlemen in the grain sector. According to Nelson, this made it easy for Catherine to believe they were “leeches” who profited off the work of others. She limited the area where Jews could live to an area called the Pale of Settlement, which mostly came from land recently acquired from the partition of Poland–Lithuania. The Pale included Ukraine, with its rich black soil for growing grain, and Odessa was founded during her reign. Adding the Jewish population of the Pale made Catherine the ruler of the largest Jewish population in the world.

    A grain “invasion” / At the time of Catherine, the United States had not become an important grain exporter. But after 1865, the American Great Plains were settled, the U.S. rail network expanded, and ships and communication improved. Those innovations contributed to the United States becoming a major producer and exporter of grain.

    O’Rourke’s 1997 article described the expansion of U.S. exports as a “grain invasion” of Europe. Train tracks substituted for the ancient black paths, carrying the Plains’ bounty to U.S. ports and then onto Europe. Development of multinational grain companies like Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus (known collectively as ABCD) also contributed to a major change in the pattern of trade. The migration of labor from Europe to the United States and other emerging exporters aided the production of the newly settled farmland.

    This grain invasion increased the world supply of land devoted to wheat. That harmed European landowners, and they sought protection from their governments. German landowners successfully lobbied Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who responded with protectionism in the form of tariffs. He was supported in this by ultranationalist politician and history professor Heinrich von Treitschke, who blamed cheap imports for the fall of the Greek and Roman empires.

    This grain invasion increased the world supply of land devoted to wheat. Russian leaders, including Prime Minister Sergei Witte and Finance Minister Ivan Vyshnegradsky, sought to regain Russia’s export prominence. They promoted a long and costly railroad expansion through Siberia to Port Arthur in Manchuria, believing it would become a major port for Russian grain exports to the Pacific. Japan resented the Russian encroachment in their neighborhood and defeated Russia in the Russo–Japanese War of 1905. The defeat was an embarrassment to the government of Witte and Vyshnegradsky, and the Marxists used it in their calls for revolution. Frequently stated goals of the Bolshevik revolutionaries were “Peace, Land, and Bread.” Nelson suggests that the humiliating military defeat may have contributed to Russia’s participation in World War I and drove Russia into revolution.

    The United Kingdom was a prominent exception to grain protectionism. Parliament did impose the protectionist Corn Laws (“corn” in British English encompasses all grains) in 1815, but the beginning of the Irish Potato Famine (1845–1852) led to the laws’ repeal in 1846. British grain production fell as a result, but the broader economy prospered. Land devoted to grain production decreased and real wages rose. Many British cities, including London and Liverpool, doubled in size between 1845 and 1860. European workers gained from greater access to grain, and European socialist parties generally supported free grain imports.

    Parvus / Nelson illustrates the connection between developments in the grain sector and politics by following the colorful life of Israel Lazarevich Helphand (sometimes spelled “Gelfand”; 1867–1924), who used the pseudonym “Alexander Lvovich Parvus” or just “Parvus.” He was the odd combination of a widely-read journalist with a doctoral degree in political economy from the University of Basel, a Marxist theorist and practitioner, and a wealthy grain trader. According to Nelson, Parvus was the thinker whom Vladimir Lenin, Leon Trotsky, and Rosa Luxemburg most admired. Parvus was born in a shtetl in Belarus and his family moved to Odessa, where his father became a grain trader. Odessa was also the home of David Leontyevich Bronstein, who raised and traded grain. His son, Lev Davidovich Bronstein, would later take the pseudonym “Leon Trotsky.”

    Parvus has been rediscovered recently, and he was the subject of recent television series in both Russia (“Demon of the Revolution,” 2017) and Turkey (“The Last Emperor,” 2017–2020). Nelson claims that both series distorted and glorified Parvus’s true role in the Russian Revolution.

    Conclusion / Oceans of Grain is a good read. It is imaginative and bold in suggesting that shocks to the grain sector may have contributed to wars and revolutions. Relevant data are usually presented to support the hypotheses. Even though they are not always convincing, they do stimulate thought.

    There are inevitable omissions, but all good stories must leave out some details. Nelson’s extensive focus on the emergence of U.S. grain production and exports is appropriate given the resulting negative effects on European grain producers and positive effects on European grain consumers. However, his limited attention to Canada, Argentina, and Australia is disappointing because they contributed to those effects on Europe. Failing to examine the competing producers in some detail could exaggerate the effects of American grain exports to Europe.

    The current Russian invasion of Ukraine certainly gives this book special relevance. Putin aspires to control the territory of the old Russian Empire, and he considers Russia and Ukraine inseparable. Nelson tells the story of how the combined Russia/Ukraine once dominated grain trade with Europe, and how the United States and other newly settled grain exporters successfully challenged that dominance. Russia and Ukraine remain among the world’s largest wheat exporters today. The fertile black soil north of the Black Sea continues to be a major source of wheat and daily bread for millions of people.

     

    This review was published earlier by Cato Institute.

    Feature Image Credit: www.gtreview.com

  • Ukraine Crisis and India’s Rejection of Western Binary Construct

    Ukraine Crisis and India’s Rejection of Western Binary Construct

    “India has already chosen a side, its own, where it is happy, willing and most importantly capable of staying put”

    The current crisis in Ukraine has, or at least threatened to, shift the focus away from two equally urgent geopolitical conundrums – the Taliban usurping power in Afghanistan and China increasing its assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. One almost gets the feeling that the timings of these events couldn’t have been better scripted. Needless to say, all three of them are intertwined in a complex web of events where the major world players are looking to outmanoeuvre each other. These events hold serious ramifications for India, a country which under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has looked to continuously raise its international profile as a major and responsible power in the region. Out of the three, India is a serious stakeholder in the Afghan equation and the Indo-Pacific construct, with even the Ukraine crisis putting the world’s focus on India.

    Derek Grossman, writing for the Foreign Policy magazine, observes that due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing crisis, “Modi’s multipolar Moment Has Arrived”. He even sees India as ‘the clear beneficiary of Russia’s war’. Grossman says that by not condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and refusing to toe the Western line in sanctioning Moscow, India has in fact elevated its global stature. He suggests each of the major powers from the US to China to Russia has been vying to have India on its ‘side’. This assumption is not limited to just Grossman alone but many Western analysts assume that India is vying for a side. But this is exactly where Grossman fails to understand the basic objective of India’s foreign policy. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s remarks at the recent GLOBESEC 2022 Bratislava Forum throw light on this ‘misunderstanding’ on the part of Grossman and analysts of his ilk. Jaishankar, to a question regarding the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict that in case India must pick a side, who India will side with – the US or China, quipped “I don’t accept that India has to join either the US axis or the China axis. We are one-fifth of the world’s population, the fifth or sixth-largest economy in the world, and India is entitled to have its own side and make her own choices devoid of cynical transactions but based on India’s values and interests.” In the same forum, he also remarked that India is not “sitting on the fence” on the Ukraine issue (a reference to Biden’s remark of India being ‘shaky’) and is in fact merely “sitting on its ground”. Jaishankar’s remarks emphasize India’s policy of strategic autonomy and of India not being a lackey of any power or axis. Meaning India has already chosen a side, its own, where it is happy, willing and most importantly capable of staying put.

    “Somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.”

    But what Grossman does get right is in his usage of the term ‘Multipolar’. India indeed views the world as multipolar today. Instead of clinging to either pole of the binary world order, India desires to be one of the poles itself. So, then what explains the West’s adamancy or incapability to understand India? Even this has been partly answered by Jaishankar himself as he says, “Somewhere Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.” And this is exactly why I mentioned Afghanistan and the Indo-Pacific at the very outset. It is not to say that an India desiring to be a globally recognised power shouldn’t be concerned about Ukraine, but to understand the fact that, for India, a “messy” US withdrawal from Afghanistan and an ever-aggressive China lurking large on its borders are far greater challenges that cannot be met by choosing sides, rather India has to meet those challenges on its own strength. India simply doesn’t have the luxury of joining Axis A against Axis B or vice versa. Among many other things, India needs Russia to balance out China and for its strategic interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia; India needs the US to cement its role in the Indo-Pacific and create a strong deterrence against China; while India also needs to partner with China and Russia in climate change politics as well as limit Western dominance over the global financial system.

    But it is also true that today, India’s strategic interests find greater convergence with that of the US, ranging from countering extremism in the Af-Pak region to checking China’s rise and securing a free and open Indo-Pacific with the help of “like-minded” nations in the region like Japan and Australia in the QUAD grouping. With regards to Russia, relations between the two traditional partners have cooled down a little especially because of Russia’s hobnobbing with Pakistan to secure its interests in Afghanistan and India’s growing ties to the US. Given the fact that Russia is speculated to become increasingly dependent on China as the war in Ukraine wages on, India’s manoeuvrability stands even more limited. Ever since the start of the war, India has tirelessly tried to explain to its Western counterparts the need to re-focus on the Indo-Pacific. Perhaps the bigger challenge for the democratic world is China’s unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the region. Russia’s threat is largely military in nature and is a headache majorly for its European neighbours. But the Chinese threat is global and all-encompassing ranging from economic to military to security to cultural. Additionally, for India, the Taliban in power next door doesn’t evoke any pleasant memories as anti-India forces might be on the loose given the Taliban’s proximity to Pakistan and its ties with anti-India forces.

    India must solidly guard against being labelled in any camp and should steadfastly pursue its own path. India’s recent actions of abstentions in the UN against Russian aggression at the same time as Prime Minister Modi making a whirlwind tour of Europe to calm Western nerves augur well for its strategic objectives. The signing of the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in the recently held QUAD summit in Tokyo also serves India well vis-à-vis China. A recent visit of an Indian delegation to Afghanistan, ostensibly to oversee aid distribution, suggests that New Delhi may be willing to work with the Taliban regime, thus providing the latter with some legitimacy and the former some flexibility. To be recognised as a major global power, India should de-link from all geopolitical binaries and work towards becoming the Third Pole, maybe taking a cue from the Himalayas.

    Feature Image Credits: Economic Times

  • The Geopolitical Consolidation of Artificial Intelligence

    The Geopolitical Consolidation of Artificial Intelligence

    Key Points

    • IT hardware and Semiconductor manufacturing has become strategically important and critical geopolitical tools of dominant powers. Ukraine war related sanctions and Wassenaar Arrangement regulations invoked to ban Russia from importing or acquiring electronic components over 25 Mhz.
    • Semi conductors present a key choke point to constrain or catalyse the development of AI-specific computing machinery.
    • Taiwan, USA, South Korea, and Netherlands dominate the global semiconductor manufacturing and supply chain. Taiwan dominates the global market and had 60% of the global share in 2021. Taiwan’s one single company – TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co), the world’s largest foundry, alone accounted for 54% of total global revenue.
    • China controls two-thirds of all silicon production in the world.
    • Monopolisation of semiconductor supply by a singular geopolitical bloc poses critical challenges for the future of Artificial Intelligence (AI), exacerbating the strategic and innovation bottlenecks for developing countries like India.
    • Developing a competitive advantage over existing leaders would require not just technical breakthroughs but also some radical policy choices and long-term persistence.
    • India should double down over research programs on non-silicon based computing with a national urgency instead of pursuing a catch-up strategy.

    Russia was recently restricted, under category 3 to category 9 of the Wassenaar Arrangement, from purchasing any electronic components over 25MHz from Taiwanese companies. That covers pretty much all modern electronics. Yet, the tangibles of these sanctions must not deceive us into overlooking the wider impact that hardware access and its control have on AI policies and software-based workflows the world over. As Artificial Intelligence technologies reach a more advanced stage, the capacity to fabricate high-performance computing resources i.e. semiconductor production becomes key strategic leverage in international affairs.

    Semiconductors present a key chokepoint to constrain or catalyse the development of AI-specific computing machinery. In fact, most of the supply of semiconductors relies on a single country – Taiwan. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) manufactures Google’s Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), Cerebras’s Wafer Scale Engine (WSE), as well as Nvidia’s A100 processor. The following table provides a more detailed1 assessment:

    Hardware Type

    AI Accelerator/Product Name

    Manufacturing Country

    Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs)

    Huawei Ascend 910

    Taiwan

    Cerebras WSE

    Taiwan

    Google TPUs

    Taiwan

    Intel Habana

    Taiwan

    Tesla FSD

    USA

    Qualcomm Cloud AI 100

    Taiwan

    IBM TrueNorth

    South Korea

    AWS Inferentia

    Taiwan

    AWS Trainium

    Taiwan

    Apple A14 Bionic

    Taiwan

    Graphic Processing Units (GPUs)

    AMD Radeon

    Taiwan

    Nvidia A100

    Taiwan

    Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)

    Intel Agilex

    USA

    Xilinx Virtex

    Taiwan

    Xilinx Alveo

    Taiwan

    AWS EC2 FI

    Taiwan

    As can be seen above, the cake of computing hardware is largely divided in such a way that the largest pie holders also happen to form a singular geopolitical bloc vis-a-vis China. This further shapes the evolution of territorial contests in the South China Sea. This monopolisation of semiconductor supply by a singular geopolitical bloc poses critical challenges for the future of Artificial Intelligence, especially exacerbating the strategic and innovation bottlenecks for developing countries like India. Since the invention of the transistor in 1947, and her independence, India has found herself in an unenviable position where there stands zero commercial semiconductor manufacturing capacity after all these years while her office-bearers continually promise of leading in the fourth industrial revolution.

    Bottlenecking Global AI Research

    There are two aspects of developing these AI accelerators – designing the specifications and their fabrication. AI research firms first design chips which optimise hardware performance to execute specific machine learning calculations. Then, semiconductor firms, operating in a range of specialities and specific aspects of fabrication, make those chips and increase the performance of computing hardware by adding more and more transistors to pieces of silicon. This combination of specific design choices and advanced hardware fabrication capability forms the bedrock that will decide the future of AI, not the amount of data a population is generating and localising.

    However, owing to the very high fixed costs of semiconductor manufacturing, AI research has to be focused on data and algorithms. Therefore, innovations in AI’s algorithmic efficiency and model scaling have to compensate for a lack of equivalent situations in the AI’s hardware. The aggressive consolidation and costs of hardware fabrication mean that firms in AI research are forced to outsource their hardware fabrication requirements. In fact, as per DARPA2, because of the high costs of getting their designs fabricated, AI hardware startups do not even receive much private capital and merely 3% of all venture funding between 2017-21 in AI/ML has gone to startups working on AI hardware.

    But TSMC’s resources are limited and not everyone can afford them. To get TSMC’s services, companies globally have to compete with the likes of Google and Nvidia, therefore prices go further high because of the demand side competition. Consequently, only the best and the biggest work with TSMC, and the rest have to settle for its competitors. This has allowed this single company to turn into a gatekeeper in AI hardware R&D. And as the recent sanctions over Russia demonstrate, it is now effectively playing the pawn which has turned the wazir in a tense geopolitical endgame.

    Taiwan’s AI policy also reflects this dominance in ICT and semiconductors – aiming to develop “world-leading AI-on-Device solutions that create a niche market and… (make Taiwan) an important partner in the value chain of global intelligent systems”.3 The foundation of strong control over the supply of AI hardware and also being #1 in the Global Open Data Index, not just gives Taiwan negotiating leverage in geopolitical competition, but also allows it to focus on hardware and software collaboration based on seminal AI policy unlike most countries where the AI policy and discourse revolve around managing the adoption and effects of AI, and not around shaping the trajectory of its engineering and conceptual development like the countries with hardware advantage.

    Now to be fair, R&D is a time-consuming, long-term activity which has a high chance of failure. Thus, research focus naturally shifts towards low-hanging fruits, projects that can be achieved in the short-term before the commissioning bureaucrats are rotated. That’s why we cannot have a nationalised AGI research group, as nobody will be interested in a 15-20 year-long enterprise when you have promotions and election cycles to worry about. This applies to all high-end bleeding-edge technology research funding everywhere – so, quantum communications will be prioritised over quantum computing, building larger and larger datasets over more intelligent algorithms, and silicon-based electronics over researching newer computing substrates and storage – because those things are more friendly to short-term outcome pressures and bureaucracies aren’t exactly known to be a risk-taking institution.

    Options for India

    While China controls 2/3 of all the silicon production in the world and wants to control the whole of Taiwan too (and TSMC along with its 54% share in logic foundries), the wider semiconductor supply chain is a little spreadout too for any one actor’s comfort. The leaders mostly control a specialised niche of the supply chain, for example, the US maintains a total monopoly on Electronic Design Automation (EDA) software solutions, the Netherlands has monopolised Extreme UltraViolet and Argon Flouride scanners, and Japan has been dishing out 300 mm wafers used to manufacture more than 99 percent of the chips today.4 The end-to-end delivery of one chip could have it crossing international borders over 70 times.5 Since this is a matured ecosystem, developing a competitive advantage over existing leaders would require not just proprietary technical breakthroughs but also some radical policy choices and long term persistence.

    It is also needless to say that the leaders are also able to attract and retain the highest quality talent from across the world. On the other hand, we have a situation where regional politicians continue cribbing about incoming talent even from other Indian states. This is therefore the first task for India, to become a technology powerhouse, she has to, at a bare minimum, be able to retain all her top talent and attract more. Perhaps, for companies in certain sectors or of certain size, India must make it mandatory to spend at least X per cent of revenue on R&D and offer incentives to increase this share – it’ll revamp things from recruitment and retention to business processes and industry-academia collaboration – and in the long-run prove to be a lot more socioeconomically useful instrument than the CSR regulation.

    It should also not escape anyone that the human civilisation, with all its genius and promises of man-machine symbiosis, has managed to put all its eggs in a single basket that is also under the constant threat of Chinese invasion. It is thus in the interest of the entire computing industry to build geographical resiliency, diversity and redundancy in the present-day semiconductor manufacturing capacity. We don’t yet have the navy we need, but perhaps in a diplomatic-naval recognition of Taiwan’s independence from China, the Quad could manage to persuade arrangements for an uninterrupted semiconductor supply in case of an invasion.

    Since R&D in AI hardware is essential for future breakthroughs in machine intelligence – but its production happens to be extremely concentrated, mostly by just one small island country, it behoves countries like India to look for ways to undercut the existing paradigm of developing computing hardware (i.e. pivot R&D towards DNA Computing etc) instead of only trying to pursue a catch-up strategy. The current developments are unlikely to solve India’s blues in integrated circuits anytime soon. India could parallelly, and I’d emphatically recommend that she should, take a step back from all the madness and double down on research programs on non-silicon-based computing with a national urgency. A hybrid approach toward computing machinery could also resolve some of the bottlenecks that AI research is facing due to dependencies and limitations of present-day hardware.

    As our neighbouring adversary Mr Xi says, core technologies cannot be acquired by asking, buying, or begging. In the same spirit, even if it might ruffle some feathers, a very discerning reexamination of the present intellectual property regime could also be very useful for the development of such foundational technologies and related infrastructure in India as well as for carving out an Indian niche for future technology leadership.

    References:

    1. The Other AI Hardware Problem: What TSMC means for AI Compute. Available at https://semiliterate.substack.com/p/the-other-ai-hardware-problem

    2. Leef, S. (2019). Automatic Implementation of Secure Silicon. In ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI (Vol. 3)

    3. AI Taiwan. Available at https://ai.taiwan.gov.tw/

    4. Khan et al. (2021). The Semiconductor Supply Chain: Assessing National Competitiveness. Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
    5. Alam et al. (2020). Globality and Complexity of the Semiconductor Ecosystem. Accenture.

  • America’s Two Cold Wars: Hegemony to Decline?

    America’s Two Cold Wars: Hegemony to Decline?

    Book Name: America’s Two Cold Wars: Hegemony to Decline?

    Author: Alfredo Toro Hardy

    Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan

    Year of Publication: March, 2022

    Pages: 305 

     

    The war in Ukraine has necessitated a recalibration of US foreign policy as tensions intensify between America, its allies and Russia. The US’s ‘pivot to Asia’ policy has taken a hit in the face of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. As global attention, once again, shifts to the former Cold War superpower, China appears to be reaping all the benefits in the ensuing power vacuum.

    Alfredo Toro Hardy’s America’s Two Cold Wars: From Hegemony to Decline? is a timely addition, both in terms of what is unfolding presently and the literature that is emerging on the shortfalls of American foreign policy in its dealings with Russia and China. The former Venezuelan diplomat joins the intensifying debate on the emerging reality of a Cold War between the US and China and the broader debate surrounding America’s decline from being a global hegemonic power and its implications for the country’s international engagement with the rest of the world.

    The book offers a comprehensive diagnosis of American foreign policy by way of a comparative analysis of the US’s Cold War with the Soviet Union with the emerging one with China from the American perspective and seeks to answer two questions: one, how different a strategic competitor is China to the erstwhile Soviet Union and two, how different is the US of today compared to its former self when it confronted and won the Cold War with the Soviets.

    Hardy identifies five fundamental issues afflicting US foreign policy in its engagement with China – ideology (or lack thereof), squandered alliances, foreign policy-related inconsistencies, the country’s economic downturn and the containment strategy trap. The author’s key argument recurs throughout the book – that the US is confronting China in the emerging Cold War on a “wrong configuration of factors” (p. 168) and needs to “responsibly explore and analyse the options on the table” (p. 171).

    In acknowledgement of the deficiencies facing America’s foreign policy regarding China, the author sets the context and provides readers with a succinct account of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the period of US hegemony and the rise of China in the first two chapters. Hardy rightly emphasises that America is threatened by China’s ascendence – citing research done by the Pew Research Center that showed that 73 per cent of Americans viewed China negatively. In the author’s words, “Washington is aggrievedly and forcefully reacting against what it perceives as an existential contention” (p. 7).

    Hardy also outlines the Chinese perspective and correctly concludes that Beijing is driven by its experience under imperialist powers during the ‘century of humiliation’ and economic mismanagement under Mao Zedong. Indeed, this coupled with the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, controversy over Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi between 1989-1990, the Taiwan strait crisis in 1996, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (p. 23) by American forces and more recently, the independence movements in Hong Kong are insightful examples in understanding why the Party and now, Xi Jinping, are in pursuit of relentless centralisation of power and authority. Despite China’s adroitness in foreign affairs under Xi Jinping, the country’s great power ambitions are driven by domestic considerations and how the international community perceives these ambitions. The US’s belief in China’s disregard for a rules-based order is what the latter takes offence with – believing the former to be constraining it from taking its “rightful place in the world” (p.7). China eschews the American mindset of reverting to the Cold War mentality and instead argues for a more inclusive world where both states are mindful of their responsibilities.

    The author offers a penetrating account of US-China relations – moving from cautious partners with mutual strategic interests to strategic competitors. A pragmatic agreement was drawn up that was mindful of the other’s national interests – the US would recognize the Communist government in China and give it legitimacy and in exchange, China would not seek to limit or challenge the “US’s power projection in Asia” (p.22). China’s gains from this arrangement were enormous and translated into divestment from Mao’s model of productivity and economic self-sufficiency, a foothold in Western markets and a WTO membership. However, 2008 marked the inflexion point in their relations. The diplomat’s insightful analysis of the changing currents in China’s foreign policy and engagement with the US – the global financial crisis and China’s ability in tiding over it, the success of the Beijing Olympics, the US’s failures in the Middle East and disregard for its allies, China’s military build-up, the South China Sea and Xi Jinping’s leadership – is unparalleled and serves as an excellent prelude to why he thinks the two countries are in an “unavoidable collision course” (p. 35). China’s desire to forge a new status quo and challenge the US’s rules and the US’s and China’s “perceived sense of mission and superiority” based on their history and national myths as they look into the future, makes the prospect of a major conflict with spill over effects plausible. Here Hardy goes a step further and claims, based on the plausibility of a war between the two, that they are already in the midst of a Cold War (p. 36). In announcing its ambitions to the world, China may have lost the advantage of its hitherto low profile strategy and believes that American hegemony is on the decline.

    To be sure, the author’s analysis of the five deficiencies in American foreign policy forms the most important section of the book. His commentary on America’s notion of its exceptionalism and “crusader foreign policy” (p. 42) is particularly relevant when we look at its response to the war in Ukraine – the US’s network of financial institutions and media conglomerates have been “able to impose international patterns of credibility or ostracism depending on the acceptance or not of the prevailing liberal ideology” (p. 18).

    Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America described American democracy as a form of Christianity and there is more than a grain of truth to this when they believe they were ordained by God to undertake the responsibility of exporting democracy to the rest of the world, not unlike the colonial powers; as Hardy keenly points out – “the United States never stopped being what its puritan colonists wanted it to become” (p. 42). The ideological calculus worked in America’s favour during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. In confronting China, a country uninterested in exporting communism, in relentless pursuit of efficiency and economic development, the US falls considerably short. This section is a succinct account of the erosion of democracy domestically, the political establishment, poor performance in development indicators (specifically, education and infrastructure) and the labour market. As Hardy puts it – “efficiency is the catchword” (p. 53) and the name of the game in the Cold War between America and China.

    In building alliances to counter China, US foreign policy has a long road ahead as it recovers from the wars in the Middle East, the Trump presidency, its recent misstep in leaving Afghanistan to the Taliban and now, its conflict escalations with Russia. America’s inconsistencies in maintaining its alliances have put them on the back foot in confronting China and only served to better the latter’s position in the international community through cooperative multilateralism (p. 82). The author concludes that the worst-case scenario for the US would be a Russia-China alignment. Indeed, in the fourth iteration of the India-US 2+2 dialogue, the Russia-Ukraine war was the elephant in the room as joint statements from the US and India reflected a sentiment of ‘agree to disagree’. These joint remarks were widely acknowledged to be ‘tame’ in comparison to the statements several White House officials made of India’s position on the matter, most notably that of President Biden’s comment of India being “somewhat shaky” on the Quad and that of Deputy NSA Daleep Singh who warned of “consequences” should India continue to increase its imports from Russia.

    The author is critical of the growing divide between the Democrats and Republicans in the foreign policy establishment – referring to them as “inhabiting different foreign policy planets” (p. 105). Even the consensus on the containment strategy for China is shaky as Progressive Democrats call for restraint. China, on the other hand, is a different story. According to Hardy, China has its eggs in order – a sound national objective, well-rounded foreign policy, cooperative multilateral mechanisms and localised geopolitical ambitions for the moment. China exhibits unwavering focus as it marches towards what it believes is its destiny – to become a world power by 2049. The only downside that the author warns of in China’s strategy is Xi’s presence at the helm. The longer Xi stays at the top, the more the country’s policies will mould around his personality. In the event of his absence “China may find itself in big trouble” (p. 109).

    In comparing the Soviet Union and China’s economies, here too the US falls short. During the first Cold War, America had both economic and military advantages and possessed a technological edge that was unmatched. Today, the US might go toe to toe with China and still not emerge victorious. According to Hardy, China will surpass the US’s GDP in absolute terms and has already achieved the same in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). It is very likely that China’s military expenditure will far exceed the US’s down the line. It has militarily caught up to the US through asymmetric “armament development” (p. 121) and other strategies. Its advantage also lies in the fact that its military deployment is closer to home compared to the US’s strategy of maintaining a standing presence around the world. However, the analysis in this section falls short of elaborating upon America’s weaponization of its financial power. A major factor in the US being a superpower has been the dollar hegemony it has enjoyed since the 1970s. This aspect is intrinsic to understanding US foreign policy, especially when global FOREX reserves in dollars have declined to 59 per cent from 72 per cent in the last two decades. Analysts argue that this reflects the decline of the dollar’s dominance in the face of other currencies. Indeed, China, Russia, India and Brazil are working to reduce their dependency on the dollar and shield themselves from Washington’s vagaries.

    Washington is playing catch-up with Beijing; inheriting the Cold War mentality and deploying used strategies against a competitor that almost evenly matches the US in all aspects. From Hardy’s commentary on the containment strategy that the US pursued against the Soviets, it is immediately evident that the same cannot be replicated in its confrontation with China. While appreciative of the consistency that the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations have shown in dealing with China, the author claims the lack of an overarching strategy and general cohesiveness will not deter China’s ambitions. Considerations of “economic preponderance and geopolitical feasibility” (p. 146) appear to be missing in devising a strategy to counter China. But the author astutely points to the viability of containing China in a region that is of significant geostrategic importance and has historically been its sphere of influence and rightly questions the US’s capability to respond when China has “firm control of the operational theatre” (p. 148) in the region.

    Hardy’s sections that delve into the US’s economy, while useful in the context of its military expenditure, do not adequately explain the sheer influence and entitlement that the country enjoys in international organizations like the IMF, World Bank, OECD, WHO etc. and its impacts in its engagement with China. Similarly, the US has historically turned to sanctions as punitive measures against their enemies – indicative of confidence borne out of the dollar hegemony. Insights into how effective sanctions are and why and how the US weaponizes this power would more forcefully drive home the well-rounded strategy that America has pursued as a hegemon. The Ukraine war is just one example in a long line wherein the US has exercised its power and unilaterally imposed severe sanctions on Russia – encouraging even its allies and partners to take the same measures against Russia. Increasingly, it is becoming evident that the US’s unilateral sanctions are having a negative impact on its credibility as a responsible superpower. Nevertheless, the book offers the general reader a comprehensive assessment of the US in the world order presently and more specifically, a comparison of its foreign policy strategies with the erstwhile Soviet Union and China.

    Overall, America’s Two Cold Wars: From Hegemony to Decline? is a thorough exposition of US foreign policy and draws from experts like Kishore Mahbubani, Mathew Kroenig, Francis Fukuyama, Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer and, unlike most literature on the topic, Hardy does not assume a fatalistic narrative that supports the US’s decline of power. Simply put, with the first Cold War, America had all the right configuration of factors in place. This seems to have changed in the second; if the US is facing China on the wrong configuration of factors (p. 168), then the results are only a product of successive administrations lacking coherency in putting together a sound strategy. The author, in a reflection of his experience and expertise, incisively concludes that the US must pursue alternatives to a Cold War with China for three important reasons: first, sharing global governance responsibilities would aid in building US credibility as a responsible superpower as well provide cooperative solutions to global problems like climate change; second, US strategy towards China needs to be a choice between adopting a China-centred policy or alliance centred policy geared towards building multilateral cooperation (p. 169) and third, the interconnectedness of the global economic system will ensure that everyone pays the price for an expensive war between the US and China. The US’s only recourse is to focus on building back its credibility, alliances and partnerships. At the same time, it must be realistic and reflect a deeper understanding of China’s national interests and strategic objectives. These two intentions must work in tandem if the US hopes to successfully counter China.

    About the Author:

    ALFREDO TORO HARDY is a Venezuelan retired diplomat, scholar and author. He has a PhD in International Relations from the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Affairs, two master’s degrees in international law and international economics from the University of Pennsylvania and the Central University of Venezuela, a post-graduate diploma in diplomatic studies by the Ecole Nationale D’Administration (ENA) and a Bachelor of Law degree by the Central University of Venezuela. Before resigning from the Venezuelan Foreign Service in protest of events taking place in his country, he was one of its most senior career diplomats. As such, he served as Ambassador to the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Brazil, Singapore, Chile and Ireland.

    Hardy directed the Diplomatic Academy of the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as other Venezuelan academic institutions in the field of international affairs. He is an Honorary Research Fellow of the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations and has been a Visiting Professor at the universities of Princeton and Brasilia and an online Professor at the University of Barcelona. He has also been a Fulbright Scholar, a two-time Rockefeller Foundation Bellagio Center Resident Scholar and an academic advisor on diplomatic studies at the University of Westminster. He has authored twenty-one books and co-authored fifteen more on international affairs and history while publishing thirty peer-reviewed papers on the same subjects.

  • IAF’s Force Structure: Strategy for Overcoming the Crisis

    IAF’s Force Structure: Strategy for Overcoming the Crisis

    Aligned with its national security interests, India’s strong geostrategic role-play, amidst the changing world order as a rising military power, aerospace power in particular must be rooted in the Indian industry.

    The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has many cautions for India. War at anytime and anywhere is a human catastrophe and therefore, all efforts to prevent or stop war should not be spared. While the American-led side wants India to take a stand in favour of their position, the Russian side is appreciative of India’s neutral stand. Recent visits by leaders from the USA, UK, EU, and Japan have emphasised the need for India to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

    What is of concern, however, is the fact that the USA and others stressing their view that India’s excessive dependence on Russia for its military equipment is the reason for its refusal to support their sanctions on Russia. Various officials from the US State Department and the DOD have openly advocated their objective of weaning India’s defence imports from Russia. There lies the real issue.

    India’s defence market is too huge and attractive for Western defence industries, and hence, it is the focus of strategic dialogues of many of these countries with India.

    India’s defence market is too huge and attractive for Western defence industries, and hence, it is the focus of strategic dialogues of many of these countries with India. India has diversified its military procurements in the last three decades to ensure it does not become vulnerable to a single source supply. As a result, India’s defence supplies from Russia, which was as high as 70-75% in the early 2000s came down to a current level of 50-55%. The US has been the biggest gainer in this diversification, garnering nearly $ 22 billion in sales to India in the last 15 years to emerge as its number 1 supplier. The Ukraine conflict and the resultant sanctions are being used by the USA to pressurise India to reduce its imports from Russia. The real objective is to ensure the US and its European allies replace Russia as India’s major if not exclusive supplier of defence equipment. The threat of CAATSA on India’s S-400 air defence missile deal with Russia is a prime example. The crux of the India-USA strategic partnership is really about capturing India’s defence market for the Military-Industrial Complex of the USA.

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    Read More
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  • TPF Analysis Series on Russia – Ukraine Conflict #2

    TPF Analysis Series on Russia – Ukraine Conflict #2

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    The First Paper of the Series – TPF Analysis Series on Russia – Ukraine Conflict #1
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    What’s in Ukraine for Russia? 

    In a press conference marking his first year in office, President Biden, on the question of Russia invading Ukraine, remarked that such an event would, “be the most consequential thing that’s happened in the world, in terms of war and peace, since World War Two”. [1] It has now been two months since Russia officially launched its “special military operation” in Ukraine, which the US and its allies consider an unjustified invasion of a sovereign state. The conflict in the Eurasian continent has drawn global attention to Europe and US-Russia tensions have ratcheted to levels that were prevalent during the Cold War. The conflict has also raised pertinent questions on understanding what exactly are Russian stakes in Ukraine and the latter’s role in the evolving security architecture of Europe. The second paper in this series will delve into these questions.

    The current Russian position stems from the experience that Russia, and Putin, gained while dealing with the West on a host of issues, not least of which was NATO expansion.

    The Ties that Bind

    An examination of post-Soviet history reveals that Russian preoccupation with security threats from NATO is not embedded in Russian geopolitics; instead, it has been reported that, early on, Russia was even agreeable to joining the military alliance. The current Russian position stems from the experience that Russia, and Putin, gained while dealing with the West on a host of issues, not least of which was NATO expansion. A line of argument sympathetic to Russia is President Putin’s contention that terms dictated to Russia during the post-Cold War settlements were unfair. The claim is a reference to Secretary of State James Baker’s statement on the expansion of NATO, “not an inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction”, in 1990 in a candid conversation with Mikhael Gorbachev on the matter of reunification of Germany. [2] It could be argued that it is this commitment and subsequent violation through expansions of NATO is one of the main causes of the current conflict. 

    At the root of the problem was Russia’s security concerns – regarding both traditional and hybrid security – that ultimately led to the centralisation of power after a democratic stint under Yeltsin. Accordingly, Putin had put it in late 1999, “A strong state for Russia is not an anomaly, or something that should be combated, but, on the contrary, the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and the main driving force of any changes”. [3]

    Historically being a land power, Russia has viewed Ukraine as a strategically critical region in its security matrix. However, as the central control of Moscow weakened in the former USSR, the nationalist aspirations of the Ukrainian people began to materialise and Ukraine played a crucial role, along with the Russian Federation and Belarus, in dissolving the former Soviet Union. The two countries found themselves on opposite sides on extremely fundamental issues, such as security, economic partnership, post-Soviet order, and, not least, sovereignty. In Belovezh, in early December of 1991, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Belarusian leader Stanislav Shushkevich met to dissolve the USSR, major disagreements regarding the transitional phase and future of the republics erupted. Yeltsin expressed his desire for some sort of central control of the republics, whereas Kravchuk was vehemently opposed to any arrangement that might compromise his country’s sovereignty. Later, at the foundational ceremony of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), he stressed a common military, the most potent rejection of which came from Kravchuk. [4]

    Source: Wikimedia Commons

    The elephant in the room, however, was the status of Sevastopol, which housed the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet. Yeltsin was quoted saying that “The Black Sea Fleet was, is and will be Russia’s. No one, not even Kravchuk will take it away from Russia”. [5] Though the issue was soon temporarily resolved –with the two countries dividing the fleet equally amongst themselves, it continued to dominate and sour their relationship. Russia, as the successor state of the USSR, wanted the base and the entire fleet in its navy. Yeltsin even offered gas at concessional rates to Ukraine if it handed over the city and nuclear weapons to Russia. The issue remained unresolved until the 1997 Friendship Treaty under which Ukraine granted Moscow the entire fleet and leased Sevastopol to Russia until 2017 (later extended).

    Ukraine, under Kravchuk and, later, Leonid Kuchma, struggled to tread a tightrope between Russia and the European Union. On one hand, it was economically knit with former Soviet Republics, and on the other, it was actively looking to get economic benefits from the EU. However, soon a slide towards the west was conspicuous. In 1994, it preferred a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU over CIS Customs Union, which was a Russian initiative. Later, in 1996, it declined to join a new group consisting of former Soviet Republics ‘On Deepening Integration’, scuttling the initiative, since its purpose was to bring Ukraine back into the Russian fold. [6] By 1998, the Kuchma government had formulated a ‘Strategy of Integration into the European Union’. [7]

    Nuclear weapons were another point of contention between the two. Ukraine was extremely reluctant to give up its arsenal, citing security threats from Russia. Kravchuk received a verbal ‘security guarantee’ from the US which forced Russia to “respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each nation” [8] in exchange for surrendering Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. 

    Notwithstanding the disputes, there was a great deal of cooperation between the two, especially after Kuchma’s re-election in 1999. Kuchma’s hook-up with authoritarianism distanced Kyiv from Brussels and brought it closer to Moscow. Ukraine agreed to join Russian initiatives of the Eurasian Economic Community as an observer and Common Economic Space as a full member. At home as well, his support in the eastern parts of the country, where ethnic Russians dwelled, increased dramatically, as evident in the 2002 Parliamentary Elections. [9] However, the bonhomie was soon disrupted by a single event.

    The Orange Revolution was Russia’s 9/11. [10] It dramatically altered Russian thinking on democracy and its ties with the West. It raised the prospect in Russia that Ukraine might be lost completely. It further made them believe the colour revolutions in former Soviet republics were CIA toolkits for regime change. More importantly, it made the Russians apprehensive of a similar revolution within their borders. As a result, the distrust between Russia and the West, and Russia and Ukraine grew considerably. As a nationalist, Victor Yushchenko formulated policies that directly hurt Russian interests. The two countries fought ‘Gas Wars’ in 2006 and 2009, which made both the EU and Russia uncomfortable with Ukraine as a gas transit country. Furthermore, Yushchenko bestowed the title of ‘Hero of Ukraine’ upon Stepan Bandera, a Nazi collaborator and perpetrator of the Holocaust, a decision that surely did not go well with Moscow.

    Geoeconomics: Ukraine as a Gas Transit Country

    The current war is the worst in Europe since the Second World War. Still, Ukraine continues to transit Russian gas through its land, Russia continues to pay for it, and Western Europe continues to receive the crucial resource. The war has shattered all the big bets on Russian dependence on Ukraine for delivering gas to Western Europe and has renewed the discourse on reducing European energy dependence on Russia. Since the EU imports 40% of its gas from Russia, almost a quarter of which flows through Ukraine, Kyiv has had leverage in dealing with Russians in the past. It has been able to extract favourable terms by either stopping or diverting gas for its own domestic use at a time of heightened tensions between Ukraine and Russia. As a result, the EU was directly drawn into the conflict between them, infructuating Moscow’s pressure tactics for a long.

    Moscow has made numerous attempts in the past to bypass Ukraine by constructing alternate pipelines. Nord Stream, the most popular of them, was conceived in 1997, as an attempt to decrease the leverage of the transit states. The pipeline was described as the “Molotov-Ribbentrop Pipeline” by Polish Defence Minister Radoslaw Sirkosi for the geoeconomic influence it gave to Russia. [11] Another project – the South Stream – was aimed at providing gas to the Balkans, and through it to Austria and Italy. The pipeline was conceived in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution and its construction was motivated by geoeconomics, rather than economic viability. It would have led to Russia bypassing Ukraine in delivering gas to the Balkans and Central Europe, thus seizing its significant leverage, and relegating it to vulnerable positions in which Moscow could have eliminated the gas subsidies Ukraine was being provided. [12]As a result of economic unviability, the project was abandoned in 2014.

    To a certain extent, the European Union has been complicit in making matters worse for Russia. For instance, during the 2009 ‘Gas War’ – that began due to Ukraine’s non-payment of gas debt to Russia – instead of holding Ukraine accountable, the EU countries blamed Russia for the gas crisis in Europe and asked Russia to resume gas supply to Ukraine. Later, realising the importance of Ukraine as a transit country, it reached an agreement with Kyiv that “recognized the importance of the further expansion and modernization of Ukraine’s gas transit system as an indispensable pillar of the common European energy infrastructure, and the fact that Ukraine is a strategic partner for the EU gas sector”. The agreement excluded Russia as a party, which saw it as undermining the collaboration between itself and Ukraine, and injuring its influence on the country. [13] The Russian grievance becomes even more palpable when we view the significant gas subsidies it has provided to Ukraine for more than two decades. 

    Similarly, the EU countries viewed Nord Stream 2 from a geostrategic and geo-economic perspective. In December last year, German Economic Affairs Minister Robert Habeck warned Russia of halting Nord Stream 2 if it attacks Ukraine. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was quoted saying that he would do ‘anything’ to ensure that Ukraine remains a transit country for Russian gas. [14] In fact, the pipeline – that is set to double the capacity of gas delivered to the EU – has faced opposition from almost all Western European countries, the US, the EU as well as Ukraine, which has described it as ‘A dangerous Geopolitical Weapon’. [15] The pipeline had raised concerns amongst Ukrainians of losing a restraining factor on Moscow’s behaviour. [16] However, with the pipeline still inoperable, the Kremlin has already made the restraining factor ineffective.

    The Security Objective

    The Russian Federation is a country which spreads from the European Continent to Asia. In this giant nation, the hospitable region where people live is mainly on the European side, which also comprises main cities like St. Petersburg, Volgograd and the Capital City Moscow. Throughout history, Russia has seen invasions by Napoleon as well as Hitler, and the main area through which these invasions and wars happened was through Ukrainian land which gave them direct access to Russia – due to the lack of any geographical barriers. It was certainly a contributing factor towards the initial success of these invasions. Today, we might understand these events as Russia’s sense of vulnerability and insecurity if history is any indicator. 

    The Russian Federation also follows a similar approach to ensuring its security, survival and territorial integrity. Russia’s interest in Ukraine is as much geopolitical as cultural. Since Russians and Ukrainians were intrinsically linked through their culture and language, Ukraine quickly came to be seen as Russian land, with Ukrainians being recognized as ‘Little Russians’ (Kubicek, 2008), as compared to the “Great Russians”. They were consequently denied the formation of a distinct Ukrainian identity. Putin gave substance to this sentiment as, according to a US diplomatic cable leak, he had “implicitly challenged the territorial integrity of Ukraine, suggesting that Ukraine was an artificial creation sewn together from the territory of Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, and especially Russia in the aftermath of the Second World War” during a Russia-NATO Council meeting. [17]

    Crimea and much of eastern Ukraine are ethnically Russian and desire closer ties with Russia. But moving further west, the people become increasingly cosmopolitan and it is mostly this population that seeks greater linkage with the Western European countries and membership into the EU and NATO. This in addition to the Euro Maidan protests is what Putin has used to justify the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The other security consideration was the threat it faced from the likelihood of NATO establishing a base in Crimea given its own presence in Sevastopol in the Black Sea. 

    In the current scenario, the second phase of Russian Military operation in the East and South has shown us the larger vulnerabilities Moscow has which are being countered through control of certain points in the region. By liberating the Donbass region in the east, Russia plans to create a buffer zone between itself and the west to stop future aggression and keep enemies at bay. But the extension of this buffer zone all the way to Odessa is indicative of other strategic considerations. Mariupol in the south of Ukraine is one of the many extended strategic points Russia now controls leading us to ask just why Mariupol is a game-changer in this conflict?

    The port city of Mariupol is a small area geographically, but it provides the land bridge for the Russian forces in the Crimean Peninsula to join the Military operation in the Donbas region. Moreover, it gives Russia a land bridge to Crimea from the Russian Mainland. According to General Sir Richard Barrons, former Commander of UK Joint Forces Command, Mariupol is crucial to Russia’s offensive movement, – “When the Russians feel they have successfully concluded that battle, they will have completed a land bridge from Russia to Crimea and they will see this a major strategic success.” [18]

    Source: ISW (Assessment on 09 May, 2022)

    If the port city of Mariupol is important for the creation of a land corridor, then the Sea of Azov which is adjacent to it is even more important due to its strategic position. [19] The three geopolitical reasons why this sea is important are as follows:

    1. The Sea of Azov is a major point for the economic and military well-being of Ukraine. Proximity to the frontlines of the Donbass region where the fighting between Ukrainian forces and Pro-Russian separatists is taking place makes the control of this sea vital to the Russian military as it helps weaken Ukrainian defence in the region via control of the Kerch Strait.
    2. Controlling the Sea of Azov is strategically important for Russia, to maintain its control in the Crimean Peninsula, which allows Moscow to resupply its forces through the Strait of Kerch.
    3. Finally, it also involves Eurasian politics into why Russia needs to control this region and here the discussion of the Volga-Don canal which links the Caspian Sea with the Sea of Azov comes to the fore. Russia has always used this canal to move warships between the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea and project its power in both regions. Moreover, Russia sees this connection as a significant strategic advantage in any future crisis.

    If Mariupol and the Sea of Azov are considered the most important strategically valuable features by Russia, there also exists the crucial points of Kherson and Odessa which will give Russia complete dominance of the Ukrainian coast line, thus giving larger access and control in the Black Sea region that has the potential to be militarised in the future in conflicts with the West. Moreover, it gives Russia a land corridor to Transnistria which is a Pro-Russian separatist area in Moldova and an opening into the Romanian border through Odessa, thus balancing the build-up of NATO forces in the region. 

    Conclusion

    The Ukrainian crisis is as much the West’s doing as Russia’s and an ear sympathetic to the Russian narrative might even say that the West took advantage of Russia when it was vulnerable immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in negotiations regarding the German state reunification and NATO enlargement.

    The bottom line is that, presently, Putin views NATO as an existential security threat to the Russian state and sees the US and its allies’ support of Ukraine as a challenge. Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO is a non-starter for Russia and pitting a Ukraine, that has a symbiotic relationship with Russia at all levels, against a slightly diminished but still formidable great power will have consequences for the security architecture and geopolitics of the region.  The Ukrainian crisis is as much the West’s doing as Russia’s and an ear sympathetic to the Russian narrative might even say that the West took advantage of Russia when it was vulnerable immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in negotiations regarding the German state reunification and NATO enlargement. On some level, NATO countries recognize the fact that Ukraine and Georgia can never be allowed membership into the North Atlantic alliance because the alternative of wilfully ignoring Russia’s security and national interests is just a recipe for disaster and might just launch the region into the single biggest armed conflict since World War 2. 

    References:

    [1] The White House. (2022, January 20). Remarks by president Biden in the press conference. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/01/19/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference-6/

    [2] Savranskaya, S., Blanton, T. S., & Zubok, V. (2010). Masterpieces of history: The peaceful end of the Cold War in Europe, 1989. Central European University Press.

    [3] Putin, Vladimir. “Rossiya na Rubezhe Tysyacheletii,” Nesavisimaya Gazeta, December 30, 1999, quoted in D’Anieri, Paul (2019). Ukraine and Russia: From Civilized Divorce to Uncivil War. Cambridge University Press.

    [4] Ibid

    [5] Rettie, J. and James Meek, “Battle for Soviet Navy,” The Guardian, January 10, 1992

    [6] Ibid, no. iii

    [7] Solchanyk, R., Ukraine and Russia: The Post-Soviet Transition. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. 2000.

    [8] Goldgeier, J. and Michael McFaul. “Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia after the Cold War”, Brookings Institution Press, 2003

    [9] Ibid, no. iii

    [10]  The comment was made by Gleb Pavlovskii, a Russian Political Scientist. quoted in Ben Judah (2013), Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, p. 85.

    [11] Ibid, no. iii

    [12] Wigell, M. and  A. Vihma, Geopolitics versus geoeconomics: the case of Russia’s geostrategy and its effects on the EU. International Affairs, 92: 605-627. May 6, 2016

    [13] Ibid, no. iii

    [14] Harper, J. (2021, December 23). Nord stream 2: Who wins, who loses? Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/en/nord-stream-2-who-wins-who-loses/a-60223801

    [15] Ukraine: Nord stream 2 a ‘dangerous geopolitical weapon’. (2021, August 22). DW.COM. https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-nord-stream-2-a-dangerous-geopolitical-weapon/a-58950076

    [16] Pifer, S. “Nord Stream 2: Background, Objectives and Possible Outcomes”, Brookings, April 2021 https://www.brookings.edu/research/nord-stream-2-background-objections-and-possible-outcomes/

    [17] WikiLeaks. (2008, August 14). UKRAINE, MAP, AND THE GEORGIA-RUSSIA CONFLICT, Canonical ID:08USNATO290_a. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08USNATO290_a.html

    [18] Gardner, F. (2022, March 21). Mariupol: Why Mariupol is so important to Russia’s plan. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60825226

    [19] Blank, S. (2018, November 6). Why is the Sea of Azov so important? Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/why-is-the-sea-of-azov-so-important/

    Featured Image Credits: Financial Times

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  • Does Facial Recognition Tech in Ukraine’s War Bring Killer Robots Nearer?

    Does Facial Recognition Tech in Ukraine’s War Bring Killer Robots Nearer?

    Clearview AI is offering its controversial tech to Ukraine for identifying enemy soldiers – while autonomous killing machines are on the rise

    Technology that can recognise the faces of enemy fighters is the latest thing to be deployed to the war theatre of Ukraine. This military use of artificial intelligence has all the markings of a further dystopian turn to what is already a brutal conflict.

    The US company Clearview AI has offered the Ukrainian government free use of its controversial facial recognition technology. It offered to uncover infiltrators – including Russian military personnel – combat misinformation, identify the dead and reunite refugees with their families.

    To date, media reports and statements from Ukrainian government officials have claimed that the use of Clearview’s tools has been limited to identifying dead Russian soldiers in order to inform their families as a courtesy. The Ukrainian military is also reportedly using Clearview to identify its own casualties.

    This contribution to the Ukrainian war effort should also afford the company a baptism of fire for its most important product. Battlefield deployment will offer the company the ultimate stress test and yield valuable data, instantly turning Clearview AI into a defence contractor – potentially a major one – and the tool into military technology.

    If the technology can be used to identify live as well as dead enemy soldiers, it could also be incorporated into systems that use automated decision-making to direct lethal force. This is not a remote possibility. Last year, the UN reported that an autonomous drone had killed people in Libya in 2020, and there are unconfirmed reports of autonomous weapons already being used in the Ukrainian theatre.

    Our concern is that hope that Ukraine will emerge victorious from what is a murderous war of aggression may cloud vision and judgement concerning the dangerous precedent set by the battlefield testing and refinement of facial-recognition technology, which could in the near future be integrated into autonomous killing machines.

    To be clear, this use is outside the remit of Clearview’s current support for the Ukrainian military; and to our knowledge Clearview has never expressed any intention for its technology to be used in such a manner. Nonetheless, we think there is real reason for concern when it comes to military and civilian use of privately owned facial-recognition technologies.

    Clearview insists that its tool should complement and not replace human decision-making. A good sentiment but a quaint one

    The promise of facial recognition in law enforcement and on the battlefield is to increase precision, lifting the proverbial fog of war with automated precise targeting, improving the efficiency of lethal force while sparing the lives of the ‘innocent’.

    But these systems bring their own problems. Misrecognition is an obvious one, and it remains a serious concern, including when identifying dead or wounded soldiers. Just as serious, though, is that lifting one fog makes another roll in. We worry that for the sake of efficiency, battlefield decisions with lethal consequences are likely to be increasingly ‘blackboxed’ – taken by a machine whose working and decisions are opaque even to its operator. If autonomous weapons systems incorporated privately owned technologies and databases, these decisions would inevitably be made, in part, by proprietary algorithms owned by the company.

    Clearview rightly insists that its tool should complement and not replace human decision-making. The company’s CEO also said in a statement shared with openDemocracy that everyone who has access to its technology “is trained on how to use it safely and responsibly”. A good sentiment but a quaint one. Prudence and safeguards such as this are bound to be quickly abandoned in the heat of battle.

    Clearview’s systems are already used by police and private security operations – they are common in US police departments, for instance. Criticism of such use has largely focused on bias and possible misidentification of targets, as well as over-reliance on the algorithm to make identifications – but the risk also runs the other way.

    The more precise the tool actually is, the more likely it will be incorporated into autonomous weapons systems that can be turned not only on invading armies but also on political opponents, members of specific ethnic groups, and so on. If anything, improving the reliability of the technology makes it all the more sinister and dangerous. This doesn’t just apply to privately owned technology, but also to efforts by states such as China to develop facial recognition tools for security use.

    Outside combat, too, the use of facial recognition AI in the Ukrainian war carries significant risks. When facial recognition is used in the EU for border control and migration purposes – and it is, widely – it is public authorities that are collecting the sensitive biomarker data essential to facial recognition, the data subject knows that it is happening and EU law strictly regulates the process. Clearview, by contrast, has already repeatedly fallen foul of the EU’s GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) and has been heavily sanctioned by data security agencies in Italy and France.

    If privately owned facial recognition technologies are used to identify Ukrainian citizens within the EU, or in border zones, to offer them some form of protective status, a grey area would be established between military and civilian use within the EU itself. Any such facial recognition system would have to be used on civilian populations within the EU. A company like Clearview could promise to keep its civil and military databases separate, but this would need further regulation – and even then would pose the question as to how a single company can be entrusted with civil data which it can easily repurpose for military use. That is in fact what Clearview is already offering the Ukrainian government: it is building its military frontline recognition operation on civil data harvested from Russian social media records.

    Then there is the question of state power. Once out of the box, facial recognition may prove simply too tempting for European security agencies to put back. This has already been reported in the US where the members of the New York Police Department are reported to have used Clearview’s tool to circumvent data protection and privacy rules within the department and to have installed Clearview’s app on private devices in violation of NYPD policy.

    This is a particular risk with relation to the roll-out and testing in Ukraine. If Ukrainian accession to the European Union is fast-tracked, as many are arguing it should be, it will carry into the EU the use of Clearview’s AI as an established practice for military and potentially civilian use, both initially conceived without malice or intention of misuse, but setting what we think is a worrying precedent.

    The Russian invasion of Ukraine is extraordinary in its magnitude and brutality. But throwing caution to the wind is not a legitimate doctrine for the laws of war or the rules of engagement; this is particularly so when it comes to potent new technology. The defence of Ukraine may well involve tools and methods that, if normalised, will ultimately undermine the peace and security of European citizens at home and on future fronts. EU politicians should be wary of this. The EU must use whatever tools are at its disposal to bring an end to the conflict in Ukraine and to Russian aggression, but it must do so ensuring the rule of law and the protection of citizens.

    This article was published earlier in openDemocracy, and is republished under Creative Commons Licence. 

    Feature Image Credit: www.businessinsider.in

  • Sanctions on Russia Are a Tool That Must Be Calibrated Like Any Other

    Sanctions on Russia Are a Tool That Must Be Calibrated Like Any Other

    If de-dollarisation occurs, the impact will be felt wide and far. Severe sanctions are a double-edged sword which will impact every nation.

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been condemned by the majority of countries in the United Nations. NATO has not intervened militarily since that runs the danger of a wider conflagration with the possible use of nuclear weapons. So, instead, the NATO powers have supplied Ukrainian forces with weapons and imposed severe sanctions on Russia. Evermore sanctions are announced every week.

    It was said that this would degrade Russia’s capacity to wage war by freezing its assets held in Western banks. Also, its earnings through trade would decline and impoverish it. It was also argued that the Russians would be hurt through multiple channels – higher inflation, the inability of its citizens to get dollars, a collapse in prices of financial assets, like, shares and so on.

    Thus, while Russia is attacking militarily, the West is hitting back through economic means. Further, there is also a cyber and media component to the war. It is perhaps the first war on multiple fronts. Will the Russians be hurt enough to stop the war? Can one draw lessons from the sanctions against Iran?

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  • Towards a New Movement of Non-Alignment: Politics of John Mearsheimer and Alexander Dugin

    Towards a New Movement of Non-Alignment: Politics of John Mearsheimer and Alexander Dugin

    Only last August, the U.S. had to leave Afghanistan in disgrace, leaving behind a destroyed country – and now they suddenly appear as the guardians of freedom, human rights and as the leading power of the West?

    Without equating Russia and the USA, they are very similar in their foreign policy behaviour. Despite all the problems under Trump, the U.S. is and remains a democracy in which human rights can be litigated. Russia is only formally an (electoral) democracy, as Putin himself once put it, a managed democracy in which human rights can hardly be claimed. Despite this fundamental difference, it is quite astonishing how the past 20 years have been forgotten in the West. Were the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya always and in every respect legitimate? Weren’t hundreds of thousands of people killed in them and by no means always only the soldiers? Only last August, the U.S. had to leave Afghanistan in disgrace, leaving behind a destroyed country – and now they suddenly appear as the guardians of freedom, human rights and as the leading power of the West? Conversely, we need to realize that while the U.S. would advocate regime change in Russia as well, does this legitimize all the actions of the Russian leadership and the Russian army?

    It is not only questionable whether Mearsheimer had the ear of the U.S. government – much more decisive is that he not only presents an analysis but in a sense naturalizes the struggle for spheres of influence and large areas. 

    And in essence, Mearsheimer can hardly hide the fact that neo-realism has models in the large-area policy of the Nazis and at least that of Carl Schmitt.

    To find an explanation for the conflict over Ukraine, two theorists are very often referred to, John Mearsheimer from the U.S. and Alexander Dugin from Russia. The defenders of Russia resort to the line of thought of the neo-realists, which was significantly influenced by Mearsheimer. And Mearsheimer argues that Ukraine is not the issue at all, but rather a global political showdown between the United States and Russia over spheres of influence. He attests that the Russian side under Putin is only reacting to a covert war of the USA – with the means at their disposal. And with countries like Sweden, Finland and even Switzerland soon to join NATO, the U.S. strategy – if the government in Washington had stuck to Mearsheimer’s indirect script – would have been extremely successful. The unity of the West under U.S. leadership has also been restored overnight. Mearsheimer is always used in this context as evidence of the true intentions of the U.S. and the real culprit in this war. However, it is not only questionable whether Mearsheimer had the ear of the U.S. government – much more decisive is that he not only presents an analysis but in a sense naturalizes the struggle for spheres of influence and large areas. For the next step, if one were to share his views, one would have to concede such a policy to the US as well? And in essence, Mearsheimer can hardly hide the fact that neo-realism has models in the large-area policy of the Nazis and at least that of Carl Schmitt.

    Dugin’s vision of Eurasia, on the other hand, is ideologically determined. But from his writings can be read the will to reconquer the Baltic states and large parts of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty after Ukraine and to achieve at least Russian hegemony in Europe.

    The same applies to the dreams of Alexander Dugin, a neo-fascist ideologue who has at times been said to be particularly close to Vladimir Putin. Just as with Mearsheimer, the government action of Russia cannot be traced to his ideologue, but there are similarities here as well. Dugin, too, starts from large spaces and, like Putin, includes in his considerations the great Eurasian project, the political-ideological linking of Asia and Europe under Russian leadership. And indeed, this perspective already exists in the Chinese New Silk Road and is being built up economically by President Xi and the Chinese leadership with billions of Yuan. Dugin’s vision of Eurasia, on the other hand, is ideologically determined. But from his writings can be read the will to reconquer the Baltic states and large parts of the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty after Ukraine and to achieve at least Russian hegemony in Europe.

    What seems progressive here at first glance is the rejection of human equality – at its core, Dugin is concerned with a strictly hierarchical, estates-based society in which “white, male Europeans” are at the top.

    In this way, Dugin positioned himself as an outstanding representative of geopolitical thought as well as a mastermind of a “Eurasian” – as opposed to “Atlantic” – cultural space. This corresponds to the “fourth political theory” he postulates, which, after liberalism, fascism and communism, is most likely to ensure the survival of mankind in the age of globalization in his view. Dugin’s theoretical advisers, besides Heidegger, is the French founder of the “Nouvelle Droite,” Alain de Benoist.  All political systems of modernity are accordingly the results of three ideologies: The first and oldest, he says, is liberal democracy, the second is Marxism, and the third is fascism. The latter has long since failed, banished from history; the first no longer functions as an ideology, but as something taken for granted. The world today is on the brink of a post-political reality in which the values of liberalism are so deeply ingrained that the average person is not even aware of the effect of an ideology in his environment. Thus, liberalism threatens to monopolize political discourse, to flood the world with a universalistic sameness, and to destroy everything that makes different cultures and peoples unique. What seems progressive here at first glance is the rejection of human equality – at its core, Dugin is concerned with a strictly hierarchical, estates-based society in which “white, male Europeans” are at the top.

    a new policy of the Non-Aligned Movement is necessary, because as understandable as partisanship may be due to the suffering in Ukraine, we should not allow ourselves to be instrumentalized by either side.

    At their core, Mearsheimer and equally Dugin are representatives of a neo-colonial policy, in that they want to divide the whole world into their spheres of influence. This is what the U.S. has been trying to do since 2001 and now Russia as well. Still unclear is the role of China, which has not yet made a final decision and sees itself equally threatened by both visions. Instead of taking sides for one of the two positions, a new policy of the Non-Aligned Movement is necessary, because as understandable as partisanship may be due to the suffering in Ukraine, we should not allow ourselves to be instrumentalized by either side. Foreign Minister Lavrov had spoken of the need for a balanced world order during his visit to New Delhi. It would be of fundamental importance if Russia were to adhere to this itself. The real actors in such a balanced world order, however, would be the middle powers in a new movement of non-aligned states.

    Feature Image Credit: ipis.ir