Tag: PLA

  • Between Two Rocks and a Very Hard Place

    Between Two Rocks and a Very Hard Place

    Leave aside political affiliations and the flag-waving, slogan shouting, adrenaline pumped personas we adopt while watching cricket and ask ourselves a simple question. To what extent are we invested in our country, and what are we willing to sacrifice for its well-being and progress?

    Ukraine, for example, has a population of about 43 million. More than a fourth of this, mainly women, children and the aged, have been either internally or externally displaced by the ongoing war. By most estimates, over a hundred and fifty thousand are dead or wounded, which includes over 30,000 civilians, and counting. The country’s infrastructure is in ruins and despite this, their leadership, wholly supported by the people, fights on resolutely, with no quarter given or asked for. Determined to fight till they succeed in driving the Russians out of their territory, regardless of the time or toll it takes.

    In sharp contrast, we have lost over a 1000 square kilometres, of what we claim as our sovereign territory in Ladakh, without even putting up a semblance of a fight. What is even more shocking is that our government, for whatever reasons, has yet to publicly acknowledge this loss. Instead, we have had to face the ignominy of the External Affairs Minister, publicly stating that China is far too powerful for us to confront. What does that say about us?

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    Featured Image: Council of Foreign Relations

  • The Fallacy of Handling China with Kid Gloves

    The Fallacy of Handling China with Kid Gloves

    It is apparent that the Modi Government has shown great reluctance to enhance defence expenditure, and instead has been looking for ways and means to curtail spending, as any government should. This is reflected in the manner it has gone about slashing manpower and rehashing recruitment and manpower policies.

    By introducing, what the vast majority consider, a flawed Agnipath Scheme, whose efficacy or otherwise only time will tell. In addition, it has also undertaken a concerted drive towards indigenization of defence procurement. The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has clearly demonstrated rightsizing, reorganisation and reorientation of our military is unavoidable.

    The proposed reduction in strength of the Rashtriya Rifles is indeed a welcome step that requires to be hastened. In fact, following abrogation of Article 370 and reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir, while many may disagree, the logical follow-up should have been de-notification of AFSPA and withdrawal of the Army from the hinterland.

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  • China’s Growing Space Power Significant for India

    China’s Growing Space Power Significant for India

    Space has become an arena of competition for power and influence. Big powers have invested heavily in their military space capabilities. Amid an accelerated militarisation of space, China’s space capabilities have grown by leaps and bounds. China has identified Space as a critical domain in the perspective of its global ambitions. The rapid growth in China’s Space capabilities and its articulated ambitions are of significant importance to India’s Space security and national interests.

    Space has become an enormously important facet of our daily life. The increasing utility and critical need for space-based services have made it a rapidly-growing economic and technological arena. Space capabilities now symbolise a nation-state’s growing economic power. Innovation and disruptive technologies are now characterising the growth of the space industry, both in the private and public sectors. In all this, play the most important role as space has become an arena of competition for power and influence.

    Traditionally, military uses of space technologies have revolved around advanced communication, precise navigation, improved Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and meteorology. Further developments have enabled these technologies to be used in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), advanced sensors, early warning systems, and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems.

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  • India’s Indian Ocean and the Imperative for a Strong Indian Navy

    India’s Indian Ocean and the Imperative for a Strong Indian Navy

    “A good navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guarantee of peace!”
    The Indian Ocean has been at the centre of world history ever since we know it. Man originated in Africa, probably somewhere in the Olduvai Gorge in present-day Tanzania – where Homo Erectus lived 1.2 million years ago and where the first traces of Homo Sapiens, our more recent ancestors having evolved only about 200,000 years ago. First phonetic languages evolved around 100, 000 years ago. The migration of mankind out of Africa began almost 60000 years ago. But we don’t call the Indian Ocean the African Ocean because the first recorded activity over it began only about 3000 years ago.
    Three great early recorded activities of this period come to mind. The first is the Indus Valley Civilization. It was a Bronze Age civilization (3300–1300 BCE; mature period 2600–1900 BCE) in the northwestern region of the Indian subcontinent. Along with Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, it was one of three early civilizations of the Old World, and of the three the most widespread.
    The Indus civilization’s economy appears to have depended significantly on trade, which was facilitated by major advances in transport technology. It may have been the first civilization to use wheeled transport. These advances may have included bullock carts that are identical to those seen throughout South Asia today, as well as boats. Most of these boats were probably small, flat-bottomed craft, perhaps driven by sail, similar to those one can see on the Indus River today; however, there is secondary evidence of sea-going craft.
    Archaeologists have discovered a massive, dredged canal and what they regard as a docking facility at the coastal city of Lothal now in Gujarat. Judging from the dispersal of Indus civilization artifacts, the trade networks, economically, integrated a huge area, including portions of Afghanistan, the coastal regions of Persia, northern and western India, and Mesopotamia. There is some evidence that trade contacts extended to Crete and possibly to Egypt.
    There was an extensive maritime trade network operating between the Harappan and Mesopotamian civilizations as early as the middle Harappan Phase, with much commerce being handled by “middlemen merchants from Dilmun” (modern Bahrain and Failaka located in the Persian Gulf). Such long-distance sea trade became feasible with the innovative development of plank-built watercraft, equipped with a single central mast supporting a sail of woven rushes or cloth.
    The second great economic activity was Slavery. Slavery can be traced back to the earliest records, such as the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1760 BC), which refers to it as an established institution. Slavery is rare among hunter-gatherer populations, as it is developed as a system of social stratification. Slavery typically also requires a shortage of labour and a surplus of land to be viable. Bits and pieces from history indicate that Arabs enslaved over 150 million African people and at least 50 million from other parts of the world.  Later they also converted Africans into Islam, causing a complete social and financial collapse of the entire African continent apart from wealth attributed to a few regional African kings who became wealthy in the trade and encouraged it.
    The third great economic activity was seafaring evidenced by migration. The island of Madagascar, the largest in the Indian Ocean, lies some 250 miles (400 km) from Africa and 4000 miles (6400 km) from Indonesia. New findings, published in the American Journal of Human Genetics, show that the human inhabitants of Madagascar are unique – amazingly, half of their genetic lineages derive from settlers from the region of Borneo, with the other half from East Africa. It is believed that the migration from the Sunda Islands began around 200 BC.
    Linguists have established that the origins of the language spoken in Madagascar, Malagasy, suggested Indonesian connections, because its closest relative is the Maanyan language, spoken in southern Borneo. The Gods were also kind and gave the IOR the weather conditions that helped in evolving seaborne trade and intercourse. The sea surface current and prevailing wind structure in and over the Indian Ocean favoured seafarers in their endeavour and sailings in the Indian Ocean from the southern tip of Africa (Cape of Good Hope) during the month of May. After the entry into the Indian Ocean, the seafarers continued to sail in the northerly direction along the coastline of Africa (aided by the strong Somali Current and the East Arabian Current) towards the Arabian Sea.
    The physical environmental conditions over the sea and the external prevailing weather helped the seafarers reach places up to the west coast of India. As this sea surface current extend towards the east coast of India, the sailors were greatly assisted by the surface current as they sailed along. During November, when the East Indian Winter wind reverses in its direction and begins to blow from the northeast, the sailors prepare for their return journey. The winds that generate the waves contribute to the reduction in the otherwise required travel time for the sailings between any given two points of departure and arrival. The natural and external forces help the sailors make their journey/expedition more economical and energy-efficient.
    Clearly, the region was a hub of all kinds of economic activity. Then came the Petroleum Age. And things changed as never before. The Spice trade, the Silk trade, and the China trade all paled into insignificance. The use of Coal as a ship fuel enlarged distances and volumes of cargo. Oil made even longer journeys and greater volumes possible.
    Petroleum is the lifeblood of modern society. It’s a relatively new activity, but its advent has transformed our world as few things have. Petroleum, in one form or another, has been used since ancient times. According to Herodotus more than 4000 years ago, asphalt was used in the construction of the walls and towers of Babylon; there were oil pits near Babylon, and a pitch spring on Zacynthus.
    Great quantities of it were found on the banks of the river Issus, one of the tributaries of the Euphrates. Ancient Persian tablets indicate the medicinal and lighting uses of petroleum in the upper levels of their society. By 347 AD, oil was produced from bamboo-drilled wells in China. Early British explorers to Myanmar documented a flourishing oil extraction industry based in Yenangyaung, that in 1795 had hundreds of hand-dug wells under production.
    Oil is now the single most important driver of world economics, politics and technology.  The rise in importance was due to the invention of the internal combustion engine, the rise in commercial aviation, and the importance of petroleum to industrial organic chemistry, particularly the synthesis of plastics, fertilizers, solvents, adhesives and pesticides. Today, oil contributes 3% of the global GDP.
    In 1847, the process to distill kerosene from petroleum was invented by James Young. He noticed natural petroleum seepage in the Riddings colliery at Alfreton, Derbyshire from which he distilled a light thin oil suitable for use as lamp oil, at the same time obtaining a thicker oil suitable for lubricating machinery. In 1848 Young set up a small business refining the crude oil.
    Today the world’s biggest stand-alone refinery is the Reliance refinery at Jamnagar with a refining capacity of about 1.5 million barrels a day. The Essar refinery at Jamnagar refines a further 0.5 million barrels a day. Together they make Jamnagar one of the world’s great refining centers. India’s number one export item is Petroleum products, mostly Petrol and Diesel. India now exports the equivalent of about 615,000 barrels a day. In 2020, petroleum exports accounted for $25.3 billion of our total exports of $291.8 billion in the same year.
    India imported $77 billion worth of oil in the year 2020-21 and more than half of this comes from countries in the IOR. Iraq’s share is 22.4%, Saudi Arabia’s share is 18.8%, UAE’s share is 10.8%, and Kuwait’s 5%. The IOR is India’s lifeline and lifeblood. If the line is blocked we will suffer hugely, if the blood gets anaemic we will suffer hugely. India just cannot afford anything to go wrong here.
    The sea lanes in the Indian Ocean are considered among the most strategically important in the world—according to the Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, more than 80 percent of the world’s seaborne trade in oil transits through the Indian Ocean choke points, with 40 percent passing through the Strait of Hormuz, 35 percent through the Strait of Malacca and 8 percent through the Bab el-Mandab Strait.
    But it’s not just about sea-lanes and trade. More than half the world’s armed conflicts are presently located in the Indian Ocean region, while the waters are also home to continually evolving strategic developments including the competing rises of China and India, the potential nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan, the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamist terrorism, incidents of piracy in and around the Horn of Africa, and management of diminishing fishery resources.
    As a result of all this, almost all the world’s major powers have deployed substantial military forces in the Indian Ocean region. For example, in addition to maintaining expeditionary forces in Iraq, the US 5th Fleet is headquartered in Bahrain, and uses the island of Diego Garcia as a major air-naval base and logistics hub for its Indian Ocean operations. In addition, the United States has deployed several major naval task forces there, including Combined Task Force 152 (currently operated by the Kuwait Navy), which is focusing on illicit non-state actors in the Arabian Gulf, and Combined Task Force 150 (currently commanded by the Pakistan Navy), which is tasked with Maritime Security Operations (MSO) outside the Arabian Gulf with an Area of Responsibility (AOR) covering the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman. France, meanwhile, is perhaps the last of the major European powers to maintain a significant presence in the north and southwest Indian Ocean quadrants, with naval bases in Djibouti, Reunion, and Abu Dhabi.
    And, of course, China and India both also have genuine aspirations of developing blue water naval capabilities through the development and acquisition of aircraft carriers and an aggressive modernization and expansion programme.
    China’s aggressive soft power diplomacy has widely been seen as arguably the most important element in shaping the Indian Ocean strategic environment, transforming the entire region’s dynamics. By providing large loans on generous repayment terms, investing in major infrastructure projects such as the building of roads, dams, ports, power plants, and railways, and offering military assistance and political support in the UN Security Council through its veto powers, China has secured considerable goodwill and influence among countries in the Indian Ocean region.
    And the list of countries that are coming within China’s strategic orbit appears to be growing. Sri Lanka, which has seen China replace Japan as its largest donor, is a case in point—China was no doubt instrumental in ensuring that Sri Lanka was granted dialogue partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
    To the west, Kenya offers another example of how China has been bolstering its influence in the Indian Ocean. The shift was underscored in a leaked US diplomatic cable from February 2010 that was recently published by WikiLeaks. In it, US Ambassador to Kenya Michael Ranneberger highlighted the decline of US influence in East Africa’s economic hub, saying: ‘We expect China’s engagement in Kenya to continue growing given Kenya’s strategic location…If oil or gas is found in Kenya, this engagement will likely grow even faster. Kenya’s leadership may be tempted to move close to China in an effort to shield itself from Western, and principally US pressure to reform.’
    The rise of China as the world’s greatest exporter, its largest manufacturing nation and its great economic appetite poses a new set of challenges. At a meeting of South-East Asian nations in 2010, China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi, facing a barrage of complaints about his country’s behaviour in the region, blurted out the sort of thing polite leaders usually prefer to leave unsaid. “China is a big country,” he pointed out, “and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact.”
    Indeed it is, and China is big not merely in terms of territory and population, but also in military might. Its Communist Party is presiding over the world’s largest military build-up. And that is just a fact, too—one that the rest of the world has to come to terms with.
    China’s defence budget has almost certainly experienced double-digit growth for two decades. According to SIPRI, a research institute, annual defence spending rose from over $30 billion in 2000, $120 billion in 2010 to almost $229.4 billion in 2021. SIPRI usually adds about 50% to the official figure that China gives for its defence spending, because even basic military items such as research and development are kept off budget. Including those items would imply total military spending in 2021, based on the latest announcement from Beijing, would be around $287.8 billion.
    This is not a sum India can match and the last thing we need to get caught in is a numbers game. A one-party dictatorship will always be able to outspend us, even if our GDPs get closer.
    But history tells us again and again that victory is not assured by superiority in numbers and even technology. If that were to be so, Alexander should have been defeated at Gaugamela, Babur at Panipat, Wellington at Waterloo, Russia at Leningrad, Britain in the Falklands, and above all Vietnam who defeated three of the world’s leading powers – France, the USA and China – in succession. I don’t have to tell you that victory is more a result of strategy and tactics. Numbers do matter, but numbers are not all. Technology does matter, but technology alone cannot assure you of victory. It’s always mind over matter. You know these things better than most of us. You also know what to do. As the old saying goes: “When the going gets tough, the tough get going!”
    That said, the threat from China should not be exaggerated. There are three limiting factors. First, unlike the former Soviet Union, China has a vital national interest in the stability of the global economic system. Its military leaders constantly stress that the development of what is still only a middle-income country with a lot of very poor people takes precedence over military ambition. The increase in its military spending reflects the growth of the economy, rather than an expanding share of national income. For many years China has steadily spent the same proportion of GDP on defence (a bit over 1.7%, whereas America spend about 3.7% in the year 2020-21).
    The real test of China’s willingness to keep military spending constant will come when China’s headlong economic growth starts to slow further. But in the past form, China’s leaders will continue to worry more about internal threats to their control than external ones. In 2020, the Chinese spending on internal security was $212 billion. With a rapidly ageing population, it is also a good bet that meeting the demand for better health care will become a higher priority than maintaining military spending.
    Like all the other great powers, China faces a choice of guns and butter or more appropriately walking sticks. But till then it is: Nervi belli pecunia infinita or unlimited money is the muscle of war.
    India on the other hand will keep growing long after China has stopped growing. Its youthful population and present growth trends indicate the accumulation of the world’s largest middle class in India. India’s growth is projected to continue well past 2050. In fact so big will this become, that India during this period will increasingly power world economic growth, and not China. In 2050, India is projected to have a population of 1.64 billion and of these 1.3 billion will belong to the middle and upper classes. The lower classes will be constant at around 300 million, as it is now.
    India already has the world’s third-largest GDP. Many economists prophesize that in 2050 it will be India that will be the world’s biggest economy, not China. In per capita terms, we might still be poorer, but in over GDP terms, we will be bigger.
    According to a study by IHS Markit, a subsidiary of S&P Global, India will be the world’s third-largest economy by 2030. Indian GDP in 2030 is projected to be $8.4 trillion. China, in second place, will have a GDP of $ 33.7 trillion and the US $ 30.4 trillion. As we say in India, aap key muh mein ghee aur shakhar.  Both incidentally now deemed bad for health.
    Now comes the dilemma for India. Robert Kaplan writes: “As the United States and China become great power rivals, the direction in which India tilts could determine the course of geo-politics in Eurasia in the 21st century. India, in other words, looms at the ultimate pivot state.” At another time Mahan noted that India, located in the centre of the Indian Ocean littoral, is critical for the seaward penetration of both the Middle-east and China.
    Now if one were an Indian planner, he or she would be looking at the China Pakistan axis with askance. India has had conflicts and still perceives threats from both, jointly and severally. The Tibetan desert, once intended to be India’s buffer against the north now has become China’s buffer against India. The planner will not be looking at all if he or she were not looking at the Indian Ocean as a theatre. After all, it is also China’s lifeline and its lifeblood flows here.
    Now if one were a Chinese planner, he or she would be looking with concern over India’s growth and increasing ability to project power in the IOR. The planner will also note what experts are saying about India’s growth trajectory. That it will be growing long after China gets walking sticks. That it is the ultimate pivot state in the grand struggle for primacy between the West led by the USA and Japan, and China.
    What will this planner be thinking particularly given the huge economic and military asymmetry between China and India now? Tacitus tells it most pithily. That peace can come through strength or Si vis pacem para bellum. While China has ratcheted up its show of assertiveness in recent years, India has been quietly preparing for a parity to prevent war. Often parity does not have to be equality in numbers. The fear of pain disproportionate to the possible gains, and the ability of the smaller in numbers side to do so in itself confer parity.
    There is a certain equilibrium in Sino-Indian affairs that make recourse to force extremely improbable. Both modern states are inheritors of age-old traditions and the wisdom of the ages. Both now read their semaphores well and know how much of the sword must be unsheathed to send a message. This ability will ensure the swords remain recessed and for the plowshares to be out at work.
    Finally, I would be remiss if I did not say something about the centrality of the Indian Navy to our future. Nothing says it better than what Theodore Roosevelt said a century ago: “A good Navy is not a provocation to war. It is the surest guarantee of peace!”
    Featured Image Credit: Indian Navy
  • Chinese Roulette: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?

    Chinese Roulette: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?

    The 2022 campaigning season along the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC) opens up in just a matter of months. By all reckoning, the situation is likely to continue remaining extremely volatile, uncertain and tense. While some believe that it may have been this Government’s abrogation of Article 370 and the Home Minister’s statement in Parliament that invited a strong response from the Chinese, the truth is that we are yet to fully comprehend the Chinese leadership’s motivation for damaging, if not jettisoning, over three decades of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and growing economic ties, though the latter seems not to have been impacted in the short term, by resorting to unprovoked aggressive action in Eastern Ladakh and elsewhere.

    In addition, we continue to see a steady build-up of forces and infrastructure, as well as cartographic aggression in the form of renaming of villages in Arunachal Pradesh and the passage of the Land Border Law, effective from 1st January 2022. All of this strongly suggests that the situation will get much worse before it gets better, and we are more likely to see increased Chinese assertiveness and determination to settle territorial disputes on its own terms. Moreover, by its actions in Eastern Ladakh, it has already occupied territory up to its Claim Line of 1959. This begs the question, obviously difficult to answer with any degree of certainty, as to whether there is a likelihood of further Chinese escalation leading to a limited conflict?

    Clearly, the Government is also seized of the problem, as is obvious from the Defence Minister’s statement, while inaugurating border infrastructure, that “We faced our adversary in the northern Sector recently with grit and determination. It could not have been done without proper infrastructural development. In today’s uncertain environment, the possibility of any kind of conflict cannot be ruled out.”i It must be emphasised that conflict is not something that we either desire or is in our interest, especially given the Omicron tsunami that appears to be gathering momentum and the adverse impact that the pandemic has already had on our economy.

    It is therefore quite apparent from the Modi Government’s actions that it has been extremely circumspect and cautious in its response following China’s occupation of our territory, by some estimates extending over a 1600 Sq. Km. Clearly, it has no intention of either attempting to push back the PLA from the intrusion sites, or for that matter, occupying territory elsewhere, as a quid pro quo and bargaining chip for later. However, there is a view that occupying Indian claimed territory in Aksai Chin as a quid pro quo is not a bargain but an acknowledgement that Aksai Chin is alien territory. Therefore this Government has attempted to engage China in talks, both at the diplomatic and military level, though with little success to show for its efforts. Given the mismatch in force levels, this level of military and diplomatic engagement is understandable, though Mr. Modi’s unwillingness to personally call out the Chinese for their provocative behaviour may well give, them and the world at large, an impression of an eagerness to crawl, when just asked to bend.

    However, a deeper examination of events does suggest that the Government has not taken Chinese bullying lightly, and has, in fact, responded in an extremely measured manner, militarily. Following the Galwan incident, it has mirrored Chinese troop accretions by deploying additional forces in Eastern Ladakh, along with armour and other supporting elements. Its pro-active occupation of the Kailash Heights, though these troops were subsequently withdrawn as a part of reciprocal action by the PLA in the Pangong Tso Sector, hinted at the possibility of similar, but more offensive actions, being replicated elsewhere. The reorientation of the Army with the earmarking of a second Mountain Strike Corps for offensive operations has substantially added to the Army’s capabilities and would adversely impact the PLA’s force ratio dynamics. Most importantly, the upgrade of communication infrastructure, not just in Ladakh but elsewhere along the LAC as well, has been greatly speeded up and is coming to fruition, thereby significantly enhancing our defensive capabilities.

    To help us understand if China is likely to resort to force in the ongoing stand-off, an examination of historical precedent may give us some vital clues. As Prof M Taylor Pravel of MIT notes, two characteristics have defined China’s use of force. Firstly, “along its continental border, China has employed force in frontier disputes where it has faced militarily powerful opponents (i.e., states that could possibly challenge its otherwise strong claims). Although the local military balance is difficult to measure with precision, China has on average been vastly stronger in the overall military balance…. India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam in the early 1980s. At the same time, China has refrained from employing force against its weaker continental neighbours. Second, China has used force in disputes where the strength of its claims have been weak, especially when it has occupied little or none of the contested territory. In these disputes, China has been sensitive to any further decline in its bargaining power.”ii

    This suggests that even with neighbours that de facto accept Chinese interpretations of its territorial claims, China is still extremely wary of actions that they may undertake to change the existing relative balance of power along with its disturbed periphery, and prefers to use force against them to delay/stop their progress. For example, there is evidence to suggest Nehru’s Forward Policy and the refuge given to the Dalai Lama were a serious cause of concern to the Chinese leadership. This is borne out by declassified United States documents pertaining to the capture of Longju in August 1959, which reveal that “the late August clashes point of a mode of thought which has remained an ingredient in the Chinese leaders’ calculations on the border dispute: ‘When the Indians show a temperament to advance on the ground, we must alter their frame of mind by letting military action take over political caution. Besides, military risk itself is negligible, because we are the stronger side’.”iii A perception within the Chinese leadership that appears to have remained unchanged in the intervening years, and is especially pertinent at the present time, given President Xi Jinping’s penchant for following in the footsteps of late Chairman Mao Zedong.

    In addition, there are some other factors that have a bearing on this issue of force escalation. For one, it is fairly common for autocratic governments to attempt to conjure up external threats to unify the people against a common enemy, and divert their attention from serious domestic challenges that may lead to unrest or hurt their own leadership position. In this context, as Kalpit Mankikar, a Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation who focuses on China points out, prior to the 1962 Conflict Chairman Mao faced serious internal dissension against his leadership and it had more to do with the intra-CCP power struggle. Mao’s Great Leap Forward (GLP) had been criticised, and for the first time, he had to demit office as State President, forced to hand over to his heir apparent Liu Shaoqi, which came as a huge jolt to him.

    President Xi now finds himself in rather similar circumstances as the economy stutters, in no small measure due to his government’s crackdown on multiple Chinese sectors and companies that have been mascots of growth over the years. His emphasis has been on the idea of “common prosperity” or “reasonable adjustment of excessive incomes and encouraging high-income groups and businesses to return more to society”iv, a blatantly populist measure, that was initially very well received by the average Chinese citizen. However, the enforcement of new regulations in this regard, the so-called “Three Red Lines”, has had a devastating impact on real estate companies such as Evergrande, which hold approximately 75% of all retail investments, bringing them to the verge of bankruptcy, and creating internal turmoil, uncertainty and dissent as the average citizen sees his savings completely wiped out. The likelihood of a domino effect on other facets of the economy cannot be wished away and is bound to adversely impact President Xi’s efforts to stay in power after the end 2022, when his term officially ends.

    In these circumstances creating and tackling an external threat along its borders, as the prevailing situation along the LAC is made out to be, will certainly divert attention and may very well pay great dividends. For example, while President Xi would have preferred to undertake actions to integrate Taiwan, he is hampered by the very real likelihood of The United States and its allies coming to the aid of Taiwan. Taking on India at the LAC is a relatively easier option, as interference by the United States and its allies is likely to be restricted to providing moral and material support at best. Furthermore, it could be viewed as a dress-rehearsal that would allow the PLA to gain vital operational experience, something it has been bereft of since the Sino- Vietnam Conflict of 1979, apart from ensuring a protected flank. Moreover, a successful termination of such a campaign would setback Indian aspirations by decades and severely dent Mr. Modi’s reputation and popularity, much as 1962 did in the case of Pandit Nehru. Not only would such action have a sobering impact on Taiwan’s dealings with the Chinese, but also in the manner other South East and Central Asian neighbours respond to Chinese hegemonistic designs as well.

    It is in this context that the new Land Border Law, now in effect, is likely to be extremely problematic for two reasons, and may well act as the trigger for any future conflict. Firstly, it attempts to give Chinese acts of cartographic aggression, such as differing perceptions on the exact alignment of the LAC, renaming of towns and villages in Arunachal Pradesh, and its acts of ‘salami- slicing’ over the years, a veneer of legality. Secondly, there is a clause in the Law that can be interpreted to suggest that it prohibits the construction of permanent facilities in the vicinity of the LAC without sanction from Chinese authorities, which would obviously be unacceptable to any sovereign state, especially given the manner in which it is rapidly developing communication infrastructure and settlements bordering the LAC.

    Increasing troop concentrations, especially in terms of armour and ballistic/air-defence missiles, in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) along with the external and internal difficulties confronting President Xi suggests a high possibility of a conflict breaking out within the year. There are analysts, including some in this country, who believe that the PLA will be able to achieve a decisive victory given the over-all force disparity, especially in cyber, space and missile capabilities, as was the case in the 1962 Conflict. However, they have tended to disregard the adverse impact of climate and altitude, both on personnel and equipment, that gives a distinct advantage to a military fighting internal lines.

    The PLA can hardly afford to ignore its extended and extremely vulnerable lines of communication, however well developed, and the uncertain internal security environment within TAR and Xingjian. Most importantly, the PLAAF will be operating with greatly reduced capabilities from bases within TAR because of the altitudes involved, while being adversely impacted while operating from bases outside the Region given the extended ranges involved. Finally, the Indian Military does have a sizeable force, reasonably well-equipped with two Mountain Strike Corps and a Division plus of Special Operations Forces in place for offensive operations that will act as a deterrent to Chinese misadventure.

    It understands, however contrarian its public pronouncements may be, that the Indian Armed Forces are a very different force from what they encountered in 1962. Not only is the Indian Army far more experienced and battle-hardened in high altitude and mountain warfare than the PLA, but it will be the Indian Air Force, not utilised in 1962, that will be the battle-winning factor in any conflict. In addition, the employment of the Tibetan manned Special Frontier Force (SFF) in the Kailash Ranges, which received worldwide accolades, would have certainly caused immense disquiet within the Chinese leadership. The SFFs actions and rise of the Taliban have surely given an immense boost to the Independence Movements in both TAR and Xinjiang. Most importantly President Xi and his acolytes must be fully aware that anything other than a decisive victory, will for all intents and purposes, be perceived as a defeat and be the final nail in his coffin.

    Will all of this be sufficient to deter the Chinese from escalating the stand-off? The truth is that while we are inherently placed in an advantageous position, primarily due to location and circumstance, neither deterrence nor success is guaranteed. The fact of the matter is that over the past two decades the military has not just been neglected, but has also been deliberately discriminated against by the political and bureaucratic establishment. The damage that has been done, both to its organisational culture, morale and capabilities will need focus, effort and time to reverse. Most importantly, threats of this nature are best tackled by a nation that is united and willing to place its complete trust in its political leadership. Does our political establishment have the maturity, foresight, integrity and vision to provide the leadership we deserve and need? To quote the poet, philosopher and singer, Bob Dylan, “the answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind”…

    i The Times of India, New Delhi 29 December 2021, p 19.

    ii M Taylor Fravel, Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes, International Security, Winter 2007/2008, Vol 32 No 3, p 56

    https://www.jstor.org/stable/30130518?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

    iii The Sino-Indian Dispute, Section 1:1950-59, DD/I Staff Study, CIA/RSS March 02, 1963, Approved for Release May 2007, p 33.

    iv Bloomberg News, China Eyes Wealth Redistribution in Push for ‘Common Prosperity’, 18 August 2021

    The article was originally published in Indian Defence Review, Jan – Mar 2022, Vol 37 (1) Pg 50.

    Featured Image Credits: CNBC

  • Military leadership: In the eye of storm

    Military leadership: In the eye of storm

    Politicians are trying hard to keep behind curtains the true state of affairs along the Line of Actual Control but it’s only adding to credibility deficit

    The acrimonious exchanges between both sides on the heels of the 13th Corps Commander-level talks in Ladakh, an exercise in futility and procrastination, have drawn adverse attention to the manner in which the Union Government has kept its own citizens in the dark as to the true state of affairs along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh and elsewhere. Equivocation has its costs, and the recently released videos and photographs of our personnel taken prisoners at Galwan have left us embarrassed and angered, mainly at the folly and shortsightedness of our leadership for not coming clean on the issue in the first place. All that its rather inept attempts to keep the genie in the bottle have achieved is to play into the hands of the excellent Information Warfare capabilities the Chinese possess, allowing them to shape the narrative to their advantage.


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  • The Modernisaton of the PLA during a Time of Crises and Plague

    The Modernisaton of the PLA during a Time of Crises and Plague

    Since the days of Sun-Tzu, China’s military leaders have always been aware that to defeat an enemy at the nation’s gates, you have to maintain a communal armed force: that is, a military force that is an integral part of ordinary peoples’ lives.   However, since the time of the Han dynasty, the military power of the Chinese people has always been intimately associated with the idea of living harmoniously within the realm of Heaven (t’iem). The people have also needed to be willing to accept the authority of the “Son of Heaven” (t’iem-tzu), which means ultimately a supreme personality that will guide the Chinese masses in times of peace and war. In the early twenty-first century, the concept of “Heaven” in the People’s Republic of China is the embodied in the Communist Party of China (CPC) and its current economic power and military influence is well beyond the shores of mainland China and even of east Asia; it can be felt, for example, in South America and in Africa.  Its polar star, Xi Jinping, has emerged as an undisputed, authoritative leader, just as Mao Zedong was – who pioneered China’s modern military theory.  What Xi has done is to take Mao’s theory of warfare and transformed it into a modern conception of a military machine that is both Chinese in concept and Westernized in its pragmatism, military readiness and its deployment.

    From my perspective as a military historian, I would state that the Communist Party of China with its Central Military Commission is a sophisticated parallel to the command and control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is under the operational control of the Central Military Commission of the CCP Central Committee—the Party’s CMC. The overall Chinese leadership have been aware since the Persian Gulf War of the prowess of the American armed forces against the Iraqi army. It understood then, during that momentous time in history, the urgent need to modernize the Chinese armed forces – much as the Stalin-era Soviet military and political leadership were both impressed with and fearful of the modernization of the emergent Nazi armed forces, which included the army, air force and navy echelons. It can be said unequivocally that Stalin saw the need to prepare for a major regional war with fascist Germany, just as the Chinese leadership is aware that eventually, it will have to wage war against the United States. Unless their American adversary implodes from within, leaving disparate fiefdoms across its landscape, or a new military leadership develops within the United States due to a sophisticated insurrection or military coup and a Second American Civil War ensues, there remains a danger of war between the two nation-states. An America with a fascist government and military hierarchy whose ultimate political desire is to destroy socialist China, despite the possibility of a thermo-nuclear war, is still a possibility.

    The Chinese leadership were undoubtedly grim in their early analysis of what awaited them: if they were not prepared to solidify their armed forces with the capability to withstand violent dissent within their borders as well as to fight a war beyond the Great Wall of China, then their demise or ruin was inevitable. The Chinese leadership, I am sure, has looked closely at the decisions made prior to World War II by Stalin and the Soviet political leadership.  Although eager to strike first against the armies of Hitler, Stalin found himself unable to undertake a “first strike” as Lenin had advocated, and tragedy ensued with the loss of 29 to 30 million Soviet military and civilian lives during the Great Patriotic War. The Chinese leadership is more than aware of what almost mortally wounded the USSR: namely the failure of the Soviet military leadership to prepare quickly enough by modernizing the armed forces in time and by creating a defensive border force that could have blunted more quickly the Nazi tanks and the thousands of German fascist troops that crossed the Minsk or Pripet Marshes through Poland and which tore through the heart of Soviet Russia. The Communist leadership of China know that if it is not ready to confront the United States, let alone its secondary adversary, India, then it is gambling with its very existence. Xi and his military council members are not gamblers when it comes to war; they are strategists who know that to keep Heaven you have to fight for it.

    In my analysis of the contemporary military prowess of the People’s Republic of China, I will address the issues not through a dogmatic application of military theory but instead by looking at recent essays or articles that have arrived at certain conclusions or made particular observations regarding the Chinese military infrastructure, while nevertheless understanding that even the observations in these journals or periodicals that I cite are not facts set in stone. I remember in my youth that Mao Zedong would quote authors, philosophers and poets in his military theory and allude to them in his poetry when writing about military periods in his own life, without losing the inner core of his final analysis of the art of war as it he perceived it during and after the Chinese Revolution.

    In terms of the substance of the Chinese army, it is undergoing a creative build-up, meaning that its military commanders are more focused on quality troops than on simple numbers of servicemen and servicewomen on the battlefield. An essay, written for the Council on Foreign Relations, titled “China’s Modernizing Military”, states:

    “The army is the largest service and was long considered the most important, but its prominence has waned as Beijing seeks to develop an integrated fighting force with first-rate naval and air capabilities. As the other services expanded, the army shrunk to around 975,000 troops, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Reforms have focused on streamlining its top-heavy command structure; creating smaller, more agile units; and empowering lower-level commanders. The army is also upgrading its weapons. Its lightweight Type 15 tank, for example, came into service in 2018 and allows for engagement in high-altitude areas, such as Tibet.” [1]

    The author of the essay implies that the Chinese military command is more concerned with smaller infantry units and creating lighter tanks (bringing to mind the light French tanks that could outrun the heavier German tanks during the invasion of 1940, but which lacked their firepower). But such light tanks will not necessarily be a powerful weapon against the more powerful American, technologically advanced tanks.  These light tanks are not on par with the modern Russian T-14 Armata, which is “based on a modular combat platform, which can also serve as a basis for other armoured variants such as heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and armoured personnel carrier (APC)”.[2]  However, the PLA has a powerful heavy tank that is equal in fighting power to the T-72 or the American M1A2 SEP Abrams tank, in that “In comparison to older Chinese-made tanks, the MBT has improved capabilities in terms of protection, power and mobility. It has a crew of three. ZTZ 99 was made to compete with western tanks, while its technology is used to improvise the more economical ZTZ 96. Regiments in China’s Shenyang and Beijing military areas currently deploy the MBT Z”.[3]What is factual in terms of actual combat experience is that the T-72 has seen major combat just as the American Abrams tank has, while the Russian T-14 Armata and the Chinese ZTZ 96 have not been properly put to the test yet on the world’s battlefields. I, therefore, observe that the decisive factor will be the readiness of the PLA, with its modernized air force and navy giving support both in retreat and offensive attacks, depending on what the context requires at a given moment.

    Just over a year ago, the American Department of Defense was quoted by the Brookings Institute recalling its report of twenty years earlier:

    “DoD’s 2000 report assessed that the PLA was slowly and unevenly adapting to the trends in modern warfare. The PLA’s force structure and capabilities focused largely on waging large-scale land warfare along China’s borders. The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Its conventional missiles were generally of short-range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cyber capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its nominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day.”[4]

    In this description of the capabilities of the PLA, there was almost a complete dismissal of the fighting ability of the Chinese infantrymen, which should have included an evaluation of its Marine Special Forces. The report had implied that the PLA was basically a mainland Chinese army whose mission was to defend or wage war along its borders and went on to belittle the PLA further by stating with a certain arrogance that:

    “Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The report assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressed they would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force[5].”

    However, Brookings notes, the latest DoD report acknowledges that:

    “The PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect[6].”

    Benjamin Brimelow likewise acknowledges the reforms and writes, with less bellicose language and more precision:

    “China’s 11 military regions were restructured into five, the ballistic-missile force became its own branch of the armed forces, and the PLA marine corps, which had been disbanded in 1957, was reestablished.

    “Xi also created the PLA’s Strategic Support Force to support the PLA’s cyber warfare, space warfare, and electronic warfare operations, and the Joint Staff Department, which acts as a commanding organ between all branches of the PLA and the Central Military Commission.

    “Xi has increased the PLA’s budget in an effort to create a world-class military by the year 2050. China is now the second-biggest spender on defence in the world, behind the US, and the largest in Asia.”[7]

    What the author implies in the above quote is that China’s Communist Party leadership and its military leadership is not standing by idly waiting to be destroyed by outside or indeed enemies from within. It is instead advancing – slowly but steadily – in creating an army, air force and navy that will equal and eventually exceed the present United States armed forces in their sophistication and in their deadliness.  While the American army, air force and navy comprise volunteers, the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are conscripted and are doctrinally trained so that they have a serious commitment to the health and sovereignty of the Chinese motherland. The history of the Chinese Armed Forces is still imbued with the aspirations of the military virtues of the era of Mao although the principles have been changed in accordance with the context of the present period of world history. It would be naïve to think that Chinese troops have the same divisions, disunity and deep racism that exist in the modern United States Army, even though there are thousands of American military servicemen men and women who are sincerely dedicated to the preservation of the United States, despite dissent within the ranks as revealed by the attempted insurrection on January 6th. There were active and former military men and women involved in the violent acts at the Capitol, a clear signal of disunity within the American army as well, although the National Guard seemed committed to preventing the Trump regime from gaining the initiative in creating a populist fascist government.

    It is with caution that I make an observation about China’s navy, which although it has now assumed ascendancy as the world’s largest navy is not necessarily totally capable of defending mainland China or defeating its adversaries on the high seas. However, the American newspaper, The New York Times, has been calm in its assessment of Chinese naval power, explaining it in a balanced way:

    “A modernization program focused on naval and missile forces has shifted the balance of power in the Pacific in ways the United States and its allies are only beginning to digest. While China lags in projecting firepower on a global scale, it can now challenge American military supremacy in the places that matter most to it: the waters around Taiwan and in the disputed South China Sea. That means a growing section of the Pacific Ocean — where the United States has operated unchallenged since the naval battles of World War II — is once again contested territory, with Chinese warships and aircraft regularly bumping up against those of the United States and its allies.”[8]

    I would say that although the Chinese navy has carried out great improvements in the bolstering of its anti-missile ships and nuclear submarines, it still lags seriously behind the United States Navy in terms of quality naval ships, partly because it has yet to achieve strike capabilities comparable to the Seawolf and Virginia class submarines that the United States has not only in the Pacific region but in other far-off oceans and seas as well.  I would suggest that perhaps the strategic goal of the Chinese navy high command is to create large quantities of submarines so as to defeat a potential adversary with more advanced submarine technology. I am reminded in this instance of how Soviet tank designers were able to create and mass-produce T-34 tanks which moved faster on the battlefield and were able to withstand enemy shell hits because of their unique cup-turret design. Although the T-34 was not as sophisticated as the Panzerkampfwagen V or Panther and Tiger tanks created by the German military engineers during World War II, Soviet engineers – like modern China’s military engineers – were pragmatic in their weapon designs.  In any case, the two nations, the United States and the People’s Republic of China, may engage as naval powers in a battle of wills over the disputed islands in the Paracels, and a major naval battle there in the future will decide who not only controls the South China Sea but all the Pacific Ocean territories as well.

    I have attempted in this essay to cover the probabilities or capabilities of the People’s Republic of China’s emerging military strength, which I would more modestly call military maturity rather than “world-class”. It is her modern missile capabilities that I think will be the major deciding factor should a Third World War break out. The American journalist that I mentioned earlier in this essay, Brimelow, said this about Chinese missile capabilities:

    “The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) has become one of the most intimidating missile forces in the world. China never signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and was never subject to its limits, so it has been free to invest heavily in ballistic missiles.”[9]

    It is the powerful and continual growth of high-velocity and long-range ballistic missiles within the Chinese arsenal, including the in-depth deployment of intercontinental missiles across mainland China, that the United States, as well as her allies, should actually fear because it is missile firepower with nuclear warheads that will be the deciding factor should a Third World War emerge on the world’s stage.

    The contest for military ascendancy or military parity is not simply a competition between the United States and China, as there are multiple other rivalries across the world’s continents. As China, Russia and other nation-states in the Middle East and South America continue to resist the United States’ hegemonic project for economic and military superiority, political and military tensions will increase between these two multi-polar major competing forces.  Also, because of various other international social factors, including the breakdown of cultural and economic structures that the pandemic in 2020 destroyed on a worldwide basis, there will be a desire to assert the hitherto hidden agenda for emerging nation-states’ independence rather than submitting to the status quo of the self-destructive imperialist powers.  A boldness will emerge in which these nation-states will no longer want to be second-best to Western Europe or to North America.

    Since the Long March, in which the nucleus of the People’s Liberation Army emerged under the guidance of Chairman, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China, there have been at times both steps forward and reversals in terms of the qualitative and quantitative achievements that China’s military strength represents. China showed its resilience and determination in fighting American military forces during the Korean War, revealing that its troops were not intimidated by American troops; during the Vietnam War, Chinese military advisers played a major role in strategy and tactics in helping General Giap and his field commanders to fight a sophisticated war of independence against the United States military armies, particularly at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.  In 2014, a retired Vietnamese professor, Dao Nguyen Cat, was interviewed by the Xinhua news agency, and “on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Vietnam’s victory in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, Cat said that with the rare support of Chinese forces, the Vietnamese troops were able to successfully drive away the French colonial forces from the province of Dien Bien Phu, 300 km northwest of the capital Hanoi”.[10]  Professor Cat, who served as an official of Vietnam’s Central Propaganda Committee at Dien Bien Phu Campaign, Cat was quoted as saying: “Definitely without China’s support, we would have failed to defeat the French colonial masters… They not only gave training courses from the command posts but also went directly to the battlefield to talk with our soldiers. They supplied Vietnam not only weapons but also with food…”[11]  The military advisers and military supplies given by the leadership of the PLA at that time in history, regarding the Vietnam War, known by the Vietnamese people as The American War, reveal that Chinese leadership were moving forward in honing their military skills beyond their borders.

    The reversal of military progress came during the nineteen sixties and late seventies in the form of territorial disputes. First, in March 1969, there was a military clash between the Soviet Union and China: a seven-month undeclared military conflict that occurred near Zhenbao (Damansky) Island on the Ussuri (Wusuli) River, near Manchuria. The conflict between the two Communist nation-states would eventually result in a ceasefire, which led to a return to the status quo; however, a balanced history is yet to be written on how the two parties view each other as ideological threats, all this taking place during the period of the Culture Revolution.  Secondly, the Sino-Vietnamese War was a border war fought between China and Vietnam in early 1979. Rightly or wrongly, China created an offensive attack in response to Vietnam’s actions against the Khmer Rouge in 1978, ending the dominance of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge. What is regrettable but not surprising is that two socialist nation-states were unable through diplomacy to decide how to end their dispute regarding the Khmer Rouge’s various mistakes in its destruction of thousands of lives that could have contributed to the Communist cause in Southeast Asia.  However, China then began to gain influence, sending economic aid and military advisors to Africa, including Cuba and Venezuela – which reveals the wise and ancient observation by Sun Tzu who said “To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”  The Chinese Communist Party know how to achieve a military strategy without going to war.

    In May 2020 there was an actual hand-to-hand struggle between Chinese and Indian troops at locations along the Sino-Indian border, including near the disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and near the border between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region. During the last days of May 2020, Chinese forces objected to Indian road construction in the Galwan river valley, and there then ensued violent verbal exchanges between the two military camps, resulting in deaths and taking of prisoners on both sides. Although I will not attempt to describe in any detail how each side viewed the territorial dispute, I will say that the complexities between China and India, only reinforce why China is so protective of its borders and why India has chosen the United States as its major ally.  We have read similar accounts in ancient historical texts: Thucydides wrote about it in The War of The Peloponnesians And The Athenians, therefore we should not be surprised that in our own day, these small conflicts can lead to greater military build-up and to territorial jealousies which ensnare two parties or various parties into an eventual war that cannot be quelled, but which rather leads to disaster.

    In closing, I would like to quote the eminent Marxist historian, Domenico Losurdo, who wrote about the People’s Republic of China that “The foundations of the People’s Republic of China, following an epic national liberation struggle, certainly did not result in an immediate end to the situation of danger. To the end… the Korean War… challenged US hegemony in Asia, a memorable lesson…”[12].  This makes clear to me that the epic struggle of the modern Chinese people and the People’s Liberation Army has not yet reached its zenith in world history.

     

    References:

     

    [1]  https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-modernizing-military

    [2] https://www.army-technology.com/projects/t-14-armata-main-battle-tank/

    [3] https://www.army-technology.com/projects/type99chinese-main/

    [4] https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/09/04/what-the-pentagons-new-report-on-china-means-for-u-s-strategy-including-on-taiwan/

    [5] Ibid.

    [6] Ibid.

    [7] https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-military-is-improving-but-us-has-more-combat-experience-2020-7

    [8] https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html

    [9]  https://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-military-is-improving-but-us-has-more-combat-experience-2020-7

    [10] http://www.china.org.cn/world/2014-05/07/content_32317279.htm

    [11]  Ibid.

    [12] Domenico Losurdo, War and Revolution, trans. By Gregory Elliott. New York & London: Verso Books,2015, 257.

     

    Image Credit: ecns.cn

  • What After The Galwan Incident?

    What After The Galwan Incident?

    As one writes, a phase of the events in the Galwan valley near the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has come to an end. Inputs from government, media and private commentators, have provided a perspective of the events preceding the incidents of 15/16 June and thereafter till the current day. For the world, the occasion has provided the opportunity yet again to witness the fighting spirit and junior leadership of all ranks of the Indian Army, who despite being outnumbered, were able to inflict far greater casualties on their adversaries, in inhospitable terrain under fading light conditions. The sacrifices of the men of 16 BIHAR, 3 PUNJAB, 3 Medium Regiment, and individual personnel from 81 Field Regiment, Corps of Signals and the Army Medical Corps have added lustre to the reputation of the Indian military. Their deeds shall remain enshrined in the memory of a grateful nation. At this watershed moment, we salute them.
    China is contesting control over settled areas (Galwan), exploiting laid down rules and norms of border management by resorting to use of primitive weapons instead of firearms, and pushing the envelope on the ground in attempting to increase areas under control such as at Hot Springs and Pangong Tso – all actions just short of war.
    One theory gaining currency in attempting to understand China’s recent behaviour, pertains to its unhappiness over what it perceives as alteration of the status quo on the LAC by designating Ladakh as a Union Territory – resulting in active collusion with Pakistan which shares Beijing’s sentiments on this issue, amongst others. However, there is no doubt that the strategy applied by China in East Ladakh comes straight out of its manual on Grey Zone Warfare. It is contesting control over settled areas (Galwan), exploiting laid down rules and norms of border management by resorting to use of primitive weapons instead of firearms, and pushing the envelope on the ground in attempting to increase areas under control such as at Hot Springs and Pangong Tso – all actions just short of war.

    While the situation on the Pangong Tso awaits resolution, what is amply clear is that the era of explaining away patrol clashes on the LAC to the Indian public, in terms of ‘varying perceptions held by both sides’, is past. By its perfidious actions in East Ladakh this year, China has shredded in letter and spirit the border agreements built up over the last three decades. The recent incidents have brought greater clarity to the public mind, with a consensus that China’s salami slicing tactics cannot be tolerated any further. Indian soldiers see the LAC as a line marked on the map. Commanders are clear that the areas up to that line are to be either physically occupied or patrolled at will from bases in the vicinity, supplemented by other forms of surveillance. As per media reports, the Government has over the weekend ‘revised the Rules of Engagement’, giving ‘a free hand to the Army’ to deal with occurrences of this nature. By implication, in future if patrols cannot resolve their face offs peacefully, there will be no resorting to hand to hand scuffles with primitive weapons – unsuccessful efforts at border management will give way to border defence, through resort to tactical military operations.
    As per media reports, the Government has over the weekend ‘revised the Rules of Engagement’, giving ‘a free hand to the Army’ to deal with occurrences of this nature. By implication, in future if patrols cannot resolve their face offs peacefully, there will be no resorting to hand to hand scuffles with primitive weapons – unsuccessful efforts at border management will give way to border defence, through resort to tactical military operations.
    Response to this new paradigm places another set of challenges before the Indian Army. Prior to May 2020, Galwan was not in the category of disputed areas, as understood in LAC parlance. Neither had any Chinese activity been sensed in the preceding years. While construction of the DSDBO road could be the trigger, the fact that an area where the LAC had lain undisturbed since 1962 could become the scene of such a violent action, warrants scrutiny of PLA intent across the board. Previous assumptions with respect to the PLAs likely areas of interest across the entire Northern border, therefore, certainly warrants a relook. Conclusions drawn would mandate contingency planning and consequent tasking at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Such plans doubtless exist. However, it is obvious that their scope, timelines, and imperatives for successful implementation will need review in conjunction with the other services.
    Outcomes of such reviews would inevitably renew the focus on capability building and in the middle term, might even alter priorities for the same. Substantial enhancements in the areas of surveillance, tactical and strategic air mobility and real time communication links continue to retain their importance. Induction of greater varieties of kinetic non-contact weapon systems, complemented by force multipliers such as cyber warriors and special forces too remain on top of the list. Also, the continued ceasefire violations on the Line of Control to the West, and the relentless tempo of counter terrorist operations in the Valley during this period smack of collusion and tell a tale which defence planners must take note of. Developing the desired capability will be predicated on guaranteed funding and fast track procedures. It is heartening to peruse reports in the Economic Times of 22 June that the Government has granted emergency financial powers up to Rs 500 crore per procurement project to each service for buying weapons and ammunition. Even if new projects cannot be initiated immediately because of fund constraints imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic and otherwise, it is time for stalled ones like the Mountain Strike Corps to be quickly completed. The example of the PLA which has almost completed its reorganisation for fighting wars of the future and tested the response of its field force during the Covid-19 pandemic, must be taken note of.
    Thanks to the Galwan episode, the vital aspect of border infrastructure has gained nationwide attention. There is perceptive increase in the pace of development over the last few years. The sequence and methodology however are dictated essentially by two factors – availability of resources (funds and specialist equipment) and the need for calibrating messages implicit in such actions to China. Despite Covid-19 constraints, the current crisis mandates that funds currently earmarked for infrastructure development continue to flow so that development progresses, albeit at a slower pace. As regards messaging to China, we have reached a watershed moment. As high level military talks continue and spell out the Indian position on the ground to the Chinese, creating an ‘all of nation approach’ for tackling China becomes necessary.
    Galwan incident has ensured that the negative perception of China worldwide is now shared by almost all sections of Indian society. This bitterness is fuelled by the sheer brutality of the Chinese military and duplicity of the Chinese government, bringing back memories of 1962 for many who have only heard of that era. It is driven further by a realisation of the scale of India’s dependence on China, be it in the import of manufactured goods of all hues, or technology, and the consequent harm to Indian interests and livelihoods. Awareness has spread amongst Indians that China’s constant working against India’s interests in world fora, be it in vetoing expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council for ‘technical reasons’, blocking its membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group or introducing discussions on Kashmir are all part of its plan to obstruct India’s progress to its rightful place in the comity of nations. In attempting to correct an unequal economic relationship, ensuring that India retains its position in the region and preventing erosion of its influence in South Asia and beyond, all elements of the Indian state have their tasks cut out. It becomes imperative now to prepare a different toolkit with a wider range of options (including those not envisaged earlier) to manage India-China relations. Such options now require to be coordinated at all levels of the government and intimated to stakeholders including industry and other influencers for implementation. This coordination is long overdue. Resetting the economic relationship will not be easy. However, announcement of a practical time bound and holistic road map which has been thought through with all stakeholders would be a beginning.
    Galwan incident has ensured that the negative perception of China worldwide is now shared by almost all sections of Indian society.
    To supplement the proposed policy outlined above, articulation of a holistic Strategic Narrative vis-a-vis China becomes necessary. Such a narrative would pertain to as many aspects as possible – bilateral issues (including border management), local and regional matters, so that consistent, coherent and long term views are voiced, keeping in mind the national interest. information operations would be a subset of such a narrative, and briefings organised as frequently as possible would be useful force multipliers. It might be necessary for the concerned sections in the newly formed Department of Military Affairs and the Department of Defence to coordinate these aspects. India must also actively consider the possibilities that other forms of conflict, including hybrid warfare, are necessary to exploit and invest in the same. Here too, employment of such methodologies by China is an example. China has been refining its doctrine of ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ since the early 90s. The effects are there to see in South China Sea and elsewhere. It is executing certain aspects of this strategy against India on the Northern borders.
    Managing relations with China is destined to remain the major preoccupation for Indian strategic thinkers in coming years. Tensions along the LAC are but one manifestation of this problem. Both nations are hostage to geography. China’s behaviour over the last decade has influenced Indian foreign and military policies like no other, causing India to take decisions that were not in the realms of possibility earlier. Articulating a holistic China strategy through an all of government approach within the overall ambit of a National Security Strategy to ensure that India achieves its rightful place, has never been so important.
    Image Credit: ASPI:The Strategist – Nathan Ruser

  • Daulet Beg Oldi: Operating from the World’s Highest Airfield

    Daulet Beg Oldi: Operating from the World’s Highest Airfield

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    Daulet Beg Oldi (DBO) is a historic campsite in Ladakh on an ancient trade route connecting Ladakh to the Tarim Basin. It is named after Sultan Said Khan (Daulet Beg), who died here on his return journey after the invasion of Ladakh and Kashmir. DBO is strategically significant as it is close to the Siachen Glacier, the Karakoram Pass, and China’s Xinjiang-Karakoram highway. The Chip Chap river flows just to the south of DBO from east to west. It has an airstrip at an altitude of 5064 meters (16,614 ft), the world’s highest airstrip. India activated DBO as a military base and Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) following the border dispute with the PRC in the late 1950s. The IAF activated DBO airfield in 1962 and it became a crucial ALG since then. DBO continued to be in use till 1966. The airfield was damaged following an earthquake in 1966, which put a stop to its further use. The IAF maintains many of the forward posts and villages in the himalayan regions through airdrops using a string of ALGs. Following increased belligerence from China, DBO was reactivated in 2008. The completion of the Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road added immense logistical strength to the Indian military in the region. Since 2013, China has intensified its probing incursions in this region. The recent clash in the Galwan valley is a high point of increasing tensions along the borders.

    Operations from the DBO have been a huge challenge, given its high altitude, mountainous terrain, and loose soil conditions. Group Captain A G Bewoor VM (Retd), an air force veteran with immense transport flying experience, describes the challenges overcome by the IAF in activating the DBO through first landings spaced out by 46 years.

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