The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Pakistan

  • Don’t Put Troops in Harm’s Way

    Don’t Put Troops in Harm’s Way

    Every military campaign is fraught with dangers. The Russian army finds it in a mess it cannot jiggle out of. We should think twice before any adventurism in POK.

    Nine months on into the conflict in Ukraine, with its reputation and capabilities in tatters, the Russian Armed Forces are just hanging on by the skin of their teeth, hoping that the winter will allow them a badly needed reprieve to reorganise. One cannot help but wonder as to how they found themselves in such dire circumstances, despite a decade of reforms and modernisation.

    Clearly, much of the responsibility for the utter disaster that has ensued and the difficult predicament Russia finds itself in, must rest with Putin. However, it is utterly inconceivable that he acted without the advice, support and acquiescence of the military hierarchy. Though many of the missteps may be attributable to faulty intelligence assessments, the responsibility for the military’s non-performance rests squarely on the senior hierarchy of the Russian Armed Forces. Their obvious incompetence, lack of leadership skills and professional acumen, and the corruption that has been laid bare are without parallel. Yet, they are the lucky ones, given that Stalin executed Generals for much less.

    It is standard practice in all countries that selection of the military’s top leadership is overseen and approved at the highest political level, as it should be. Where autocracies and totalitarian regimes differ from democracies is in the necessity for them to give primacy to ideology or loyalty to the Supreme Leader even at the cost of professionalism. This lack is bound to percolate to lower levels over time and while it ensures the leadership remains unchallenged in the normal course of events, its consequences in a conflict can be devastating as has been the case with the Russians.

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  • The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The port of Chabahar is a seaport in south-eastern Iran, located on the Gulf of Oman, at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is situated in Sistan-va-Baluchestan, one of Iran’s least developed provinces. Contrary to Bandar Abbas, the busiest port in Iran, Chabahar is a deep-water port with direct access to the Indian Ocean that is outside the Hormuz Strait. It is Iran’s only seaport and consists of two separate ports called Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari. The last Shah of Iran proposed the port’s development in 1973. Work in Chabahar began when the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, was in power. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 hindered the development of this port. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, US firms involved in various infrastructure investments fled the country. The new government took on these projects. The port of Chabahar grew in importance during the Iran-Iraq war of 1983 when ships were hesitant to enter the Strait of Hormuz. The port’s first phase opened during the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran began shifting maritime trade up the east coast toward the Pakistani border to reduce the reliance on Persian Gulf ports which were susceptible to attack by the Iraq Air Force. Chabahar is substantial for its fishing industry and will serve as a major trade hub designed to connect South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Chabahar can emerge as a potential global trading hub – and an arena for geopolitical competition. Chabahar is vital for both India and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Suez Canal for transporting cargo to Europe. Chabahar is a strategic port from an Indian perspective. Apart from being easily accessible from India’s western coasts, it serves several important functions. For starters, by having access to the port, India can reduce its commute time to Central Asia by one-third. Second, a link between Afghanistan and India could be built without going through Pakistan and this could help the already established diplomatic, security and economic relationship between New Delhi and Kabul. Third, India gains road access to four cities in Afghanistan via Chabahar: Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif. This will help India strengthen its trade with Afghanistan (“Chabahar and Beyond” 2016). However, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 gives rise to a certain level of uncertainty. The current geopolitical environment, both regional and global, creates opportunities for India to overcome possible uncertainties.

    New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets.

    Being one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, expansion of trade relations and access to new markets is a necessity for India. As an investor, New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets. Pakistan’s Gwadar port is one possible route for India to access Central Asian markets, India has long aimed for alternative routes due to its adversarial relationship with Pakistan (“Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan,” n.d.). Additionally, the port will strengthen relations between India and Iran, which may help counterbalance strong Sino-Pakistani cooperation. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MEA), India and Iran share close historical and civilizational ties, “Our bilateral relations are marked by strong linkages across institutions, cultures and people-to-people ties,” the MEA said in a statement. Afghanistan also seeks to explore new trade routes to reach international markets. It aims to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, which handles most of the Afghan trade due to the country’s landlocked status. 

    Afghanistan is crucial for India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ strategy. India assisted Afghanistan in becoming a full member state of SAARC in 2007. It signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with Kabul in 2003 following the establishment of the interim government post the US’s intervention in 2001. Under the North-South Transport Corridor framework, India, Afghanistan, and Iran signed the Chabahar port agreement in 2003, allowing all three countries to use the Chabahar port as a trade hub. India is working on constructing the Chabahar port primarily to compete with the Gwadar port project and to connect it to Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). India has already built a 218-km-long road from Delaram to Zaranj (“India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan” 2008) and now plans to connect this road to Chabahar port and deliver goods through this route. India is also keen on using the Chabahar port to connect the oil-rich Central Asian countries by road connectivity via the Milak (Iran) and Zaranj-Dilaram (Afghanistan) roads. For India, the port, which is only 940 kilometers from Mundra in Gujarat, is about more than just facilitating the flow of trade with Afghanistan. Rather, the development of Chabahar is a crucial component of the country’s grand strategy to connect with Central Asia. India’s justification for wanting to develop the Chabahar Port goes beyond its interest in Afghanistan. Enhancing regional trade and connectivity as well as thwarting China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean are other top priorities for Indian foreign policy (“What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses,” n.d.).

    Geopolitical Challenges

    The port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    The competition for regional dominance between India and China can be seen in the development of ports in the regions. Indian involvement in the Chabahar port is important in securing India’s interest in the region. A calculative China will seize any opportunity that India might present in the port facility. If China moves in, Indian investments in the Chabahar port may be unfavorably affected (Pant and Mehta, 2018). A significant barrier is the complex nature of India-Iran relations, in which the former does not hold a privileged position. Given India’s priorities in the Middle East, it is unlikely that the relationship with Iran could compete with the comprehensive partnership that China and Pakistan share, which includes a strong defence and security arrangement. Iran may find it challenging to ignore or exclude China, its largest foreign investor, from the Chabahar project. Additionally, China has successfully completed several infrastructure projects in Iran, including the Tehran Metro, and has allocated US$ 1.5 billion through its EXIM Bank for the electrification of the Tehran-Mashhad railway line (“$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project” 2017).

    Peace and stability in Afghanistan will also impact the performance of the Chabahar Port. The tumultuous security situation in Afghanistan could jeopardise trilateral efforts between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to operate the Chabahar Port facility. And finally, the port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    References

    “$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project.” 2017. Financial Tribune. July 25, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/68986/update-15b-china-loan-for-iranian-rail-project.

    Amirthan, Shawn. 2016. “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement?” Strategic Analysis 41 (1): 87–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1249184.

    “Chabahar and Beyond.” 2016. Www.thehindubusinessline.com. May 25, 2016. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/chabahar-and-beyond/article8646239.ece.

    “Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan.” n.d. Thediplomat.com. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/chabahar-port-a-step-toward-connectivity-for-india-and-afghanistan/.

    “India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan.” 2008. Development News from Afghanistan, August 24, 2008. https://afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2008/08/24/india-completes-zaranj-delaram-highway-in-afghanistan/.

    Pant, Harsh V., and Ketan Mehta. 2018. “India in Chabahar.” Asian Survey 58 (4): 660–78. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.4.660.

    “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.” n.d. Idsa.in. https://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/40_1/india-iran-and-afghanistans-benefits-from-the-chabahar-port-agreement.

    Featured Image Credit: Lowy Institute

  • Indian Armed Forces @75: The Challenges Ahead

    Indian Armed Forces @75: The Challenges Ahead

    India overall, since 1947, has done reasonably well in keeping at bay the many diverse security challenges which came its way. However, the strategic and military lessons from our confrontations, since 1947, must never be forgotten.

    As India completes 75 years of its independence from 200 years of British yoke, there is much to celebrate about and equally much to introspect. Revisiting the functioning with stark honesty of all its institutions and governance structures will produce realistic mid-course corrections and suggest better paths for the nation to traverse. The Indian Armed Forces, unquestionably, one of the few institutions of the nation, which has lived up to its assigned responsibilities with elan and the desired results has much to be proud of. Nevertheless, many emerging aspects, nuances of the nation’s security and well-being have to be factored in and pursued earnestly with vision and resolve. For the nation’s honour, its Armed Forces can never be found wanting.

    By any standards, India is located in one of the most geo-politically troubled regions of the world. That it is surrounded by two consistently anti-India neighbours, China and Pakistan, both individually and collusively posing threats, only aggravates the formidable challenges it has to confront for its security. Both these nations being nuclear powers, synergistically anti-India, also adept at asymmetric warfare makes India’s strategic challenges mind-boggling.

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  • Three Years as a Union Territory: Human Rights in J&K

    Three Years as a Union Territory: Human Rights in J&K

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    The Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir comprises an informal group of concerned citizens who believe that, in the prevailing situation in the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, an independent initiative is required so that continuing human rights violation do not go unnoticed.

    The aim of the Forum is to highlight, report and seek action. It will primarily focus on human rights protected by the constitutions of India and Jammu and Kashmir, as well as those identified in international treaties/instruments which India has ratified. It will research evident violations, and may take suo moto notice of any violation, irrespective of whether or not a formal complaint is received.

    The Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir will receive information/materials on human rights violation to its email hrforumjk@gmail.com and through other means, and it may report/forward complaints to relevant authorities with recommendations for action. Please note that this is not an anticipatory body.

    This is the fourth report issued by the Forum. It has largely been compiled local first-hand accounts, governments sources, media accounts (carried in well-established and reputed newspaper or television), and NGO fact-finding reports. The various sources listed above have been fact-checked against each other to ensure the information is as accurate as possible, and only that information has been carried that appears to be well-founded.

    The members of the Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir take allegations of inaccuracy, bias, or any other criticism founded in fact, very seriously. Criticism of this nature will be considered and responded in real-time.

    Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak (Retd) is a Distinguished Fellow and a member of the Governing Council of The Peninsula Foundation (TPF). He is a member of the Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir.

    Disclaimer: The views represented herein are those of the Forum and not necessarily reflect the views of The Peninsula Foundation, its staff, or its trustees.

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  • The Dark Side of Sindhi Nationalism in Pakistan

    The Dark Side of Sindhi Nationalism in Pakistan

    “If Sindhudesh is created, the feudal lords will kill us”1.

    These were the words of the late veteran Sindhi leader Rasool Baksh Palijo. As a Marxist, he had fully dedicated himself to the popular causes, fighting for the constitutional and legal rights of Bengalis, Balochs, Sindhis and minorities. His almost life-long antagonism to Sindhi Secessionism underlines the structural problems plaguing the province of Sindh, caste being at the centre of it. The problems have manifested themselves politically in numerous instances, beginning with the separation of Sindh from Bombay Province in 1936, and the Pakistan Movement itself. After the Partition, the Ashrafiya-Savarna alliance2 –which views the Sindhi society in terms of non-antagonistic Hindu-Muslim binary, while comfortably brushing casteism under the carpet– has been at the forefront of this. In fact, the alliance is a recent (re)construction, which happened as a result of the marginalisation of Ashraf Sindhis at the hands of Mohajir and Punjabi elites that began immediately after independence. Similarly, Sindh’s turn to Sufism, which mostly took place in the colonial era3, and was later adopted by Sindhi Secessionists as one of the most defining identities of the Sindhi nation, itself has its underpinnings in the caste system. It is then no surprise that a section of Sindhis –mostly of the lower castes– has opposed the idea of Sindhudesh.

    For the last few years, Indians have been at the receiving end of the BJP-sponsored narrative of Pakistan being on the brink of breaking up into four or five states, one of them being Sindhudesh. Indian Sindhis (like myself) are thrilled with such conceptions. Little is known about the sociological background of the Sindhi National Movement. A look into that might answer why the movement has not succeeded politically. In this article, I discuss the cases of two communities that have largely stayed out of the nationalist movement: the Haris and Dalits.

    Are Sindhis Casteless people?

    The vehement assertion, especially by the Sindhi diaspora, of Sindhis being casteless is remotely the truth. Sindhis, both Hindus and Muslims, practise the caste system as religiously as the rest of the Indian society.

    The vehement assertion, especially by the Sindhi diaspora, of Sindhis being casteless is remotely the truth. Sindhis, both Hindus and Muslims, practise the caste system as religiously as the rest of the Indian society. In Muslims, the Syeds –who claim to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad– occupy the top-most strata, followed by other Ashrafis belonging to Central Asian, Iranian and Arab descent, as well as the Balochs and Pathans communities. The Pirs or spiritual leaders, who have wielded considerable political power during the colonial period, also largely fall into the upper castes. They are followed by Waderas and Sammats who constitute the landowning class, that has traditionally wielded the socio-economic power in rural Sindh. Then there is the Hari community, composed of landless labourers. Among Hindus, there are, among others, the Brahmins, Rajputs, Amils – the civil servant caste, Bhaibands – the caste of businessmen, and Dalits. While most Amils and Bhaibands migrated to India after the partition, some Brahmins, Rajputs and Dalit pockets remain intact. Some districts –Tharparkar, Tando Allahyar and Mirpurkhas– have a huge population of Dalits.

    Around 59 upper castes –both Muslim and Hindu– and 22 feudal families make up the ruling class in rural Sindh.4 Since Pakistan has no custom of caste census, we do not know how much they are over-represented in its political institutions. However, an analysis by Ghulam Hussein in his paper Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism in Sindh, Pakistan states that the Dalit community is highly underrepresented in Sindh Provincial Assembly –with only one out of nine reserved seats for minorities going to a Dalit; though the number is higher in local bodies. After the partition, as analysed by Hussein, the Syeds were the beneficiaries of the Hindu Migration to India as far as representation in the assemblies is concerned, since they occupied most of the seats vacated by Caste Hindus. The number of Scheduled Castes representatives, however, remained the same as that before the partition, despite them becoming the majority within the minority. Similarly, Pasmanda Muslims, that are unacknowledged by Pakistan to be existent, are also under-represented. Furthermore, more than a quarter of Sindh’s Members of Provincial Assembly (MPAs) in the 12th Assembly were professional landlords5.

    Casteism makes no appearance in Sindhi nationalist debates. One argument given by the Sindhi nationalists is that being a predominantly Islamic society, caste is non-existent among Sindhis.

    Casteism makes no appearance in Sindhi nationalist debates. One argument given by the Sindhi nationalists is that being a predominantly Islamic society, caste is non-existent among Sindhis. Instead, many ‘progressive’ Sindhi writers have displayed sympathy for the working classes instead of the lower castes. For Hindu communities, though they acknowledge the presence of caste, they quickly turn towards the benefits of reservation. Hussein writes, “In the Sindhi nationalist historical imaginary, casteism does not seem as problematic as sectarianism, religious bigotry and ethnolinguistic discord”6. In some instances, the Sindhi community as a whole is presented as Untouchables within Pakistan, thereby drawing a parallel between oppression of the Dalits and state oppression of Sindhi Secessionists/Nationalists7.

    The Rural Setting of Sindh: The oppression of the Hari Community

    Mohammed Ibrahim Joyo, another Marxist leader of Sindh during the colonial era, in his short book, Save Sind, Save the Continent (From Feudal Lords, Capitalists and their Communalisms), wrote about the exploitative nature of the rural setting dominated by Pirs, Waderas and Syeds. He, much like Palijo, identifies the local Syeds, Pirs, Hindu moneylenders, Zamindars etc., and not the Europeans, as the real enemies of the people of Sindh. For him, the Zamindars and Jagirdars, present themselves as “semi-gods to their peasant slaves”. Their only mission in life is to “vitiate the entire social fabric of life around”. “Periodically, they bestir themselves and make themselves available for snatching votes and forcing consent from the people, so that they could rule over them ‘democratically’”. For the Haris, he writes, ‘‘the only duty they know is to work like bullocks for their landlords and money-lenders, to touch the feet of their Zamindar-Masters and Pirs, and worship them literally as living gods, and lastly to instruct their children to do likewise’’8

    Ghulam Murtaza Syed (hereafter referred to as Syed), the Father of Sindhi Nationalism and a product of the ruling class in Sindh, attributes the setting to the administrative measures of the colonisers, which led to coming into “existence [of] a limited new hierarchy of fat landlords, absentee, indifferent, unenlightened and in some cases oppressive and tyrannical”9. “The great community of peasants became a crowd of ‘tenants at will’ without any permanent or substantial stake in its own occupation.” Syed, in his speeches and writings, is heavily critical of the established elite and seems to favour the upliftment of the conditions of the Haris. He places a ‘potentiality for evil’10 upon the Zamindars, who are involved in most of the crimes, some of which include kidnapping the women of the Haris.

    Despite the concern shown by Syed in his disquisitions, many Sindhi leaders remained suspicious and mistrustful of him. Though Palijo, Joyo and a few other leftist Sindhi leaders were once his companions, and despite them having some ideological affinities with him, they were largely opposed to his goals. They viewed Islam and the notion of Social Justice it emanates as a panacea of all social ills, as opposed to Syed who detested, at least after 1973, the role of religion in a modern state. They, nonetheless, remained on good personal terms with Syed. Their antipathy to Syed’s ideas stemmed, among others, from his personal conduct. Despite all the sympathetic speeches and writings, Syed continued to behave as an Ashrafiya, wearing white clothes to display his purity and detachment from worldly matters. The peasants who worked for the leader regularly touched his feet to ask for favours11.

    Hamida Khuhro, another associate of Syed to later part ways, describes it as ‘Syedism’, which, according to her, was his first and most constant ideology12. It is similar to the politics of patronage that characterises the entire subcontinent, but with some Sindhi blend of reverence of Syeds and Pirs. As per Oskar Vekaaik, author of Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan, Syed was brought up with the idea of Syed as a spiritual hero to the Hari working for him. “Rather than the people of flesh and blood working on his fields, however, he soon took the Hari as an abstract or imagined category including all landless Muslim peasants in Sindh. He saw the Haris as an exploited and backward people, who needed to be freed and uplifted. To him, this was the main task of the Syed”13.

    The province of Sindh is (in)famous for being one of the last strongholds of feudalism. During the British conquest of Sindh in 1843, the province had one of the most repressive feudal systems in the entire subcontinent. The British, having no coherent and consistent agrarian policy –they first introduced the ryotwari system only to abandon it later– didn’t endeavour to undo the socio-economic control of Waderas. These Waderas performed, and still do, many functions in rural Sindh, including quasi-judicial and tax collection. The system served the limited purpose of the British to collect taxes and transportation of raw materials. Charles Napier even regarded them as Sindh’s natural aristocracy. Thus, the dovetailed interests of Waderas and the British led the landlord class to flourish14. The power of Waderas grew so much during British rule that at the time of partition, around 80% of the province’s arable land was owned by them.15

    To be fair, the concerns of the Hari community did occupy, though didn’t dominate, some mainstream Sindhi political debates. Syed, as one of the proponents of their upliftment, has been a vocal critic of their oppression. Other leaders, such as Hyder Baksh Jatoi, M.A. Khuhro, etc. had built their careers on issues of Haris. However, the social background of Sindhi Nationalist leaders, and their daily actions that go against their words, have prevented the landless labourers from supporting their cause. This is corroborated by what Imdad Qazi, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Pakistan, told Hussein in an interview, “Marxists, both Leninists and Maoists, parted ways with the nationalists in the 1970s. When the barrage-lands were allotted to peasants, Nationalists stood with Marxists, but when Marxists spoke about land reforms, Nationalists left us”16

    It is, thus, the rural setting of Sindh which makes leaders like Palijo suspicious of, and even antagonistic to, the intentions of Sindhi secessionists. The Syed-Pir-Wadera alliance which has continuously exploited the Haris for centuries has made them committed, though dissenting, citizens of Pakistan.

    Manifestation of Nationalism

    The predilection of Sindhi nationalists towards Ashrafiya-Savarna symbolism is conspicuous. For instance, in his book, and otherwise as well, Paigham-e-Latif, G.M. Syed not only declared Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, a Syed, as the national poet of Sindh but went as far as to justify his own genealogical superiority by tracing his lineage to the late mediaeval poet17. Furthermore, in his book A Nation in Chains- Sindhudesh, he first propounded the idea of Raja Dahir, the Brahmin king during the invasion led by Muhammad bin Qasim in 711 AD, as a national hero (which was a response to the state-sponsored narrative of tracing the history of Pakistan to the invasion).18

    The issues were taken up by Sindhi nationalists who also represent the Ashrafiya-Savarna bias. Take for instance the issue of religious conversion of Sindhi Hindus. By confining their opposition to conversion under the bracket of religious freedom, they conveniently bypass their Dalit identity –since most of the converted people are Dalits– thereby serving Savarna Hindu causes. Another example is the incursion of Punjabis and Army personnel (Pakistan has a policy of allocating land to retired army men) which is, perhaps, most detested by Sindhi nationalists. Punjabis, who have been migrating and settling in Sindh for more than a century, and have developed agricultural practices that yield more than those employed by Sindhi feudal lords, are seen as a major threat to Ashrafiya domination. Thus, the issue of Punjabis settling in rural Upper Sindh becomes one of the most potent rallying points.

    Sufism is perhaps the most defining feature of Sindhi Nationalism. Nationalists project Sindh as a land of Sufi saints, with some figures, such as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, being identified with the Sindhi nation itself. Sufism, however, is used as a soft power by the Syeds to perpetuate their domination.

    Sufism is perhaps the most defining feature of Sindhi Nationalism. Nationalists project Sindh as a land of Sufi saints, with some figures, such as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, being identified with the Sindhi nation itself. Sufism, however, is used as a soft power by the Syeds to perpetuate their domination. The Pirs, most of whom are Syeds and local agents of Sufism, have traditionally had more power than the local Mulla. Their huge following has given them enormous influence over the lives of ordinary people. In fact, to be a be-Pir, or without a Pir, was traditionally seen as tantamount to being a non-believer. With such hegemonic power of Sufism of the local Pirs –described as Political Sufism– renders irrelevant caste one of the most important factors in micropolitics. Sufism, furthermore, augments the power of the Syeds, who already have huge amounts of land gifted to them by successive rulers, including the British.19

    Conclusion

    Since the death of G.M. Syed in 1995, the Sindhudesh Movement has been dying out. Since then, the movement has suffered blows from the Pakistani Army that, among others, led to the poisoning (most probably by ISI) of Bashir Ahmad Qureshi in 2012. Moreover, it stands divided, with numerous factions of Syed’s Jeay Sindh Mahaz propping up since the 1980s. However, the core support bank of the movement –the rural Syed, Pirs and Waderas remain, more or less, supportive of the movement. Though electorally, they desert the nationalists and vote for Bhutto’s People’s Party of Pakistan. The movement, however, still remains less popular amongst the Haris and Dalits. The latter has been deemed politically absent by the nationalists. The former, though appearing in nationalist discourses, have been disenchanted with their conduct, which contradicts their words. The writers and leaders of the movement have carefully projected their struggle narrowly against the actions of, what they deem as, Punjabi-dominated Pakistan. Their concerns regarding the injustices being done by the state far outweigh the concerns for the injustices they themselves have been unleashing upon their fellow Sindhis for centuries.

    References

    1. “Biggest problem is structural: Palijo” The Dawn, August 19, 2003

    https://www.dawn.com/news/135713/biggest-problem-is-structural-palijo

    2. The term is borrowed from Hussain, Ghulam. “Appropriation of Caste Spaces in Pakistan: The Theo-Politics of Short Stories in Sindhi Progressive Literature” Religions 10, no. 11: 627. 2019 https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10110627

    3. Boivin, Michel. The Sufi Paradigm and the Makings of a Vernacular Knowledge in Colonial India: The Case of Sindh (1851–1929). Palgrave Macmillan. 2020

    4. Hussain, Ghulam. “Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism in Sindh, Pakistan”. Journal of Asian and African Studies Vol 1 Issue 30. 2019

    5. Kronstadt K. A. “Pakistan’s Sindh province”. Congressional Research Service. 2015. October 29 https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/sindh.pdf

    6. Hussain, Ghulam.. “Appropriation of Caste Spaces in Pakistan: The Theo-Politics of Short Stories in Sindhi Progressive Literature” Religions 10, no. 11: 627. 2019 https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10110627

    7. Ibid.

    8. Joyo, Ibrahim M. Save Sind, Save the Continent (From Feudal Lords, Capitalists and their Communalisms). Karachi. 1946.

    9. Ibid

    10. Ibid.

    11. Verkaaik, Oskar. “Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan.” International Review of Social History, vol. 49, 2004, pp. 65–86. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26405524. Accessed 6 Jun. 2022.

    12. Ibid.

    13. Ibid

    14. “Sind and Its Pirs up to 1843.” Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947, by Sarah F. D. Ansari, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 9–35.

    15. Kronstadt K. A. “Pakistan’s Sindh province”. Congressional Research Service. Washington D.C. 2015. October 29. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/sindh.pdf

    16. Hussain, Ghulam. “Ethno-Nationality of Caste in Pakistan: Privileged Caste Morality in Sindhi Progressive Literature and Politics”. Critical Sociology. 2021. 48(1):127-149

    17. Ibid

    18. Syed, Ghulam M. A Nation in Chains- Sindhudesh. 1974.

    19. Ansari, Sarah F.D. Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

  • The Fall of Kabul and dealing with the Taliban 2.0

    The Fall of Kabul and dealing with the Taliban 2.0

    The debacle of the democratic apparatus in Afghanistan was inevitable. After pumping billions in aid and significant bloodshed, the US government ended its longest war in defeat, the war in Afghanistan under the euphemism of ‘Global War on Terror’. Right after occupying the White House, the Biden administration has followed the path of its predecessors and commanded the complete withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. The 2020 – Doha peace agreement between the US government and the Taliban brought a scant number of outcomes. Even during the presence of international forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban leaders disrespected the peace agreement and violated significant features of the agreement – that is a ceasefire. Following the agreement, over 5000 prisoners belonging to the separatist groups- were released by the Afghan government, under pressure from the US. Quite naturally, these prisoners were back with their militant outfits, thus strengthening the Taliban’s fighting capability.

    As of now, India has not taken any part in the peace negotiations with the Taliban. One of the major reasons is in the past the Indian government has never recognised the Taliban as a legitimate actor and vouched for a peace negotiation that should be Afghan-led, Afghan controlled and Afghan-owned. Currently, there are speculations about the likely power structure and composition of the government in Afghanistan, but it is quite clear the Taliban will govern the country by Sharia law. At this time of fast transition, the countries in South Asia are seeking to gain diplomatic leverage in the situation.

    India has a huge stake in Afghanistan’s reconstruction. In 2016 Indian Prime Minister and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani inaugurated the Salma dam project in Afghanistan. This 200 million dollar project is part of the larger developmental approach of the Indian government to Afghanistan. But recently, the equipment of the Salma dam was captured by the Taliban. In this scenario, it is unlikely that the Dam project will receive further Indian logistical support in future. Similarly, uncertainty beleaguers the Chabahar Project. India was one of the largest bilateral donors to Afghanistan during the war on terror. It ranges from infrastructure building to the promotion of democracy and small development projects. Almost $3 billion has been invested in and on Afghanistan in capacity building, education, infrastructure and security counts. This developmental commitment has made India the most dependable country and strategic partner for Afghanistan so far. However, now that the Taliban is in full control, the Indian government needs to find a diplomatic solution on how to go ahead with the various projects and commitments in Afghanistan.

    Except for Panjshir province, the entire country is under Taliban control. The president, head of the state, has left the country. Led by interim President Amrullah Saleh and Ahamad Masoud, the Resistance Force from Panjshir Valley is fiercely fighting against the Taliban. Under such circumstances, the conservative approach of the Indian government, as it has begun to talk to the Taliban, could ruin the decades’ long reputation and developmental efforts in Afghanistan. India has legitimate concerns in Afghanistan and should protect its interests carefully. The absence of the US forces and elected Afghan government makes the task very difficult for the government of India. In the past, the Indian government cooperated with the elected Afghan government based on their shared interests and values of democracy, freedom, rule of law and respect for human rights. But the past approach may not work anymore under the Taliban leadership. In the past, the Ministry of External Affairs stated that it is in touch with ‘various stakeholders’ in Afghanistan and other regional countries. Indian officials believe that a ‘double’ peace’ i.e. one within Afghanistan and around the country is necessary for the region. To ensure safety for the Indians living in Afghanistan, the government has already evacuated all Indians employed by the Indian embassy. India has also started emergency E-visa facilities for Afghan citizens. With regard to the diplomatic relationship with the Taliban, the government is following a ‘wait and watch policy with its extended neighbour. The Taliban leadership has announced that they would like to have good relations with the Indian government and access to the Indian market through Pakistan. The Taliban also wants these two countries to resolve their issues as its interests are linked to the two countries. The government of India is yet to respond. The Afghan media personnel, translators, performance artists, civilians are being hunted down by the Taliban soldiers. In this scenario, India will carefully assess the situation and the reliability of the Taliban to make its further move.

    While India is still on the horns of a dilemma over the direct dialogue with the Taliban, India’s arch-rival Pakistan is busy re-establishing its hold and is trying to isolate India diplomatically from the region. Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognise the Taliban as a legitimate actor in the 90s. Last year, the government of Pakistan welcomed an Afghan Taliban delegation led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar. In the meeting, Pakistan showed their support for peace and blamed India as a spoiler of peace in the war-torn country. But reports suggest otherwise. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Pakistan harbours Taliban leaders along with other insurgent groups such as the Haqqani network, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Laskar-e-Taiba. Such groups have the potential to disrupt the security and stability in South Asia. The report also says that the strategic objective of the Pakistan government is to counter the Indian influence in Afghanistan. In a recent interview, Pakistan foreign affairs minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said that the violence in Afghanistan led to a refugee exodus to Pakistan but they cannot take more refugees. Last year, the High Council for National Reconciliation leader Abdullah Abdullah said that Pakistan holds the key role in the Afghan peace process and India should keep their profile low in the Afghan situation.

    As the Taliban emerges in its second avatar while reframing its extremist Islamic ideology, China is poised to become the critical player in the region.  Under a slew of conditions negotiated with the Taliban, China will enhance its role through rapid investments and enabling Afghanistan to integrate into its Belt and Road Initiative. An unstable, dry and war-torn Afghanistan doesn’t offer any attractive economic proposition at the moment. As the economic challenges loom on the Taliban government, it can’t simply sustain on drugs. The Taliban have to rely on China, Pakistan and some Central Asian republics to rebuild its economy. Afghanistan’s unexploited mineral wealth, worth a trillion or more, is a great opportunity for the Taliban to leverage economic gains by engaging China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey. An alliance of China, Pakistan, Iran or Turkey may lead to the marginalisation of India’s role and effectiveness in Afghanistan.

    Whether India will recognize the Taliban is not clear yet but India can’t simply meditate either. Under India’s presidency, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2593 on Afghanistan. Chairing a session India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh V Shringla has clarified that India won’t tolerate if Afghan territory turns into a sanctuary of terrorists and threat for the neighbouring states. Apart from human rights, Shringla emphasized Women’s participation in society.

    India along with its all partners should advocate for strict observation of the Taliban led governance. Having invested over $3 billion over the last two decades in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, India’s considerable contribution cannot be ignored. The recent meeting between India’s envoy Deepak Mittal and the Taliban’s foreign minister-designate Stanekzai at the Taliban’s request signals a possibility for a changed approach and environment from that of the Taliban 1.0. India’s immediate priority should be the safe evacuation of the Indian origin people and stranded Afghans.

     

    Image Credit: www.dawn.com

  • Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

    Dealing with China in 2021 and Beyond

                                                                                                                         TPF Occasional Paper
                                                                                                                                                                            February 2021

    The Current Situation

    As Eastern Ladakh grapples with a severe winter in the aftermath of a violent and tension-filled 2020, much analysis concerning happenings on the India-Tibet border during the previous year has become available internationally and within India. Despite variance in individual perspectives and prognoses, the one issue starkly highlighted is that 2020 marks a turning point in the India-China relationship, which, shorn of diplomatese, has taken a clear adversarial turn.

    Enough debate has taken place over the rationale and timing behind the Chinese action. It suffices to say that given the expansionist mindset of the Xi regime and its aspiration for primacy in Asia and across the world, it was a matter of time before China again employed leverages against India. In 2020 it was calibrated military pressure in an area largely uncontested after 1962, combined with other elements of hard power – heightened activity amongst India’s neighbours and in the Indian Ocean plus visibly enhanced collusivity with Pakistan This, despite platitudes to the contrary aired by certain China watchers inside India, who continued to articulate that existing confidence-building mechanisms (CBMs) would ensure peace on the border and good relations overall. Multiple incidents on the border over the last few years culminating in the loss of 20 Indian lives at Galwan have dispelled such notions.

    Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    As an immediate consequence, the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the arena of conflict in East Ladakh is seeing the heaviest concentration of troops in history, supplemented by fighter jets, utility and attack helicopters, the latest artillery acquisitions, armoured formations, road building teams and an inventory of drones, backed by matching logistics. Currently, in terms of militarization, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh can vie with the Line of Control (LOC) on the Western border.

    Within the country, the perception of China as the principal foe has crystallised. At no other time since 1962 has China come in for such intense scrutiny. Indian public discourse is focused on China, towards interpreting its policies and implications for India and the world – all against the backdrop of international geopolitics churned further by the Covid pandemic.

    China and the World in 2021

    In 2017, President Xi Jinping had given a foretaste of things to come when spelling out his vision during the 19th Party Congress – that China has entered a “new era” where it should take the “centre stage in the world’[1]. In an insightful essay, Jake Sullivan (now National Security Adviser in the Biden administration) and Hal Brands have observed that ‘China has two distinct paths towards achieving this aim’ [2]. The first ‘focuses on building regional primacy as a springboard to global power’ while the second ‘focuses less on building a position of unassailable strength in the Western Pacific than on outflanking the U.S. alliance system and force presence in that region by developing China’s economic, diplomatic, and political influence on a global scale’. In the same piece, the authors sombrely conclude that the US ‘could still lose the competition with China even if it manages to preserve a strong military position in the Western Pacific….softer tools of competition—from providing alternative sources of 5G technology and infrastructure investment to showing competent leadership in tackling global problems—will be just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese challenge…’ [3] These observations are prescient.

    China and the Pandemic. A look at China’s conduct in this context and those of other nations over the last 12 months is instructive. The first aspect is its reaction to worldwide opprobrium for initially mishandling the Corona crisis – reprehensible wolf warrior diplomacy, crude attempts to divert the narrative about the origin of the Virus, unsuccessful mask diplomacy[4] and successfully delaying a WHO sponsored independent investigation into the matter for a full year without any guarantee of transparency. Secondly, it has exploited the covid crisis to strengthen its hold on the South China Sea commencing from March 2020 itself. Some examples are the renaming of 80 islands and geographical features in the Paracel and Spratly islands, commissioning research stations on Fiery Cross Reef and continued encroachment on fishing rights of Indonesia and Vietnam[5], in addition to a host of aggressive actions too numerous to mention, including ramming of vessels. Retaliatory actions from the US have continued, with the Trump administration in its final days sanctioning Chinese firms, officials, and even families for violation of international standards regarding freedom of navigation in January 2021[6]. The outgoing administration delivered the last blow on 19 January, by announcing that the US has determined that China has committed “genocide and crimes against humanity” in its repression of Uighur Muslims in its Xinjiang region[7]. As regards Taiwan, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute had recently forecast that China Taiwan relations will be heading for a crisis in a few weeks’ time,[8] (as borne out by serious muscle-flexing currently underway). If so, it would put the American system of alliances in the region since 1945 squarely to the test.

    Pushback in the Indo Pacific. With China constantly pushing the envelope in its adjoining seas, the Quadrilateral Dialogue, whose existence over the last decade was marked only by a meeting of mid-level officials in Manila in November 2017, has acquired impetus. Initially dismissed as ‘sea foam’ by China, the individual interpretations of roles by each constituent have moved towards congruence, with Australia openly voicing disenchantment with China. Though an alliance is not on the cards, it can be concluded that increased interoperability between militaries of India, Australia, Japan and the US is both as an outcome and driver of this Dialogue, deriving from respective Indo Pacific strategies of member nations. Further expansion of its membership and tie-ups with other regional groupings is the practical route towards an egalitarian, long-lasting and open partnership for providing stability in this contested region. Japan’s expression of interest in joining the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing network of the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand[9], is a step in this direction. European nations like Germany, the Netherlands and France have recently declared their Indo Pacific strategies. France has provided the clearest articulation, with the French Ambassador in Delhi spelling out the prevailing sentiment in Europe about China, as ‘ a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival’[10], while further stating that  “when China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and very clear”[11] . A blunt message befitting an Indo Pacific power, reflecting the sentiments of many who are yet to take a position.

    BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Slowing of a Behemoth. China’s other driver the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has considerably slowed in 2020. Lee YingHui, a researcher with Nanyang Technological Institute Singapore wrote last September  ‘..in June this year, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that about 20 per cent of the projects under its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) had been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same press briefing, Wang Xiaolong, director-general at the Foreign Ministry’s International Economic Affairs Department, also revealed that a survey by the ministry estimated that some 30 to 40 per cent of projects had been somewhat affected, while approximately 40 per cent of projects were deemed to have seen little adverse impact[12]. Given the parlous condition of economies of client states post Covid-19 with many including Pakistan requesting a renegotiation of loans[13], BRI will see major reprioritisation – though its flagship program, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is unlikely to suffer despite disagreements on certain issues between the two countries.

    Resilient Economy. China’s economy has rebounded fastest in the world, growing at 6.5 % in the final three months of 2020[14]. Despite the rate of annual growth being lowest in 40 years[15], its prominence in global supply chains has ensured some successes, such as the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU in December 2020. The deal, which awaits ratification by the European Parliament is more a diplomatic than an economic win for China, being perceived as detrimental to President Biden’s efforts to rejuvenate the Trans-Atlantic Alliance. China has notched up another win with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), where it along with 14 Asian countries from ASEAN and others (including Quad members like Australia and Japan)  have agreed on an ‘ integrated market’. Given India’s position on the RCEP, how this agreement pans out and implications for its members will be watched with interest.

    America in the New Year. The Biden Administration’s initial actions reaffirm the bipartisan consensus achieved last year on dealing with China. Comments of  Secretary of State Anthony Blinken that  ‘China presents the “most significant challenge” to the US while India has been a “bipartisan success story” and the new US government may further deepen ties with New Delhi,’[16] were indicative, as were those of Gen Lloyd Austin the Secretary of Defence during his confirmatory hearing[17].  President Biden’s first foreign policy speech on 04 February that ‘America is Back’ have provided further clarity. Earlier, Blinken and Austin had dialled Indian counterparts NSA Doval and Defence minister Rajnath Singh to discuss terrorism, maritime security, cybersecurity and peace and stability in the Indo Pacific.[18]Economically, American interest in joining or providing alternatives to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, with an 11 nation membership, born out of President Trump’s withdrawal from its previous format, the TPP), will be another determinant in matters of trade with China. Harsh national security challenges will test the new administration’s resolve, as has already happened in the South China Sea over Taiwan where at the time of writing, the USS Theodore Roosevelt is conducting Freedom of Navigation operations[19]. Similar tests will occur over North Korea and Tibet, where the Senate’s passage of the Tibet Policy and Support Act 2020 mandates that decisions regarding the Dalai Lama’s succession be taken exclusively by the Tibetan people and the incumbent. Overall, a sense of how the world including the US will deal with China in 2021 is well captured by Commodore Lalit Kapur of the Delhi Policy Group when he states that ‘ …China has become too unreliable to trust, too powerful and aggressive to ignore and too prosperous, influential and connected to easily decouple from………[20] Going back to the views essayed by Sullivan and Brands, it appears that China is following both paths to achieve its objective, ie Great Power status.

    India and China

    The Early Years  India’s attempt, soon after independence to develop a relationship with China, its ‘civilisational neighbour’ was overshadowed by the new threat to its security as the PLA invaded Tibet in 1950 – effectively removing the buffer between the two large neighbours. Dalai Lama’s flight to India in March 1959, the border clash at Hot Springs in Ladakh six months later and the subsequent 1962 war shattered our illusions of fraternity.  Documents published recently pertaining to the period from 1947 to the War and beyond[21], reveal differences in perception within the Indian government in the run-up to 1962 despite the availability of sufficient facts. This combined with Chinese duplicity and disinformation, Indian domestic and international compulsions resulted in disjointed decision making, leading to the disastrous decision to implement the ‘Forward Policy’ with an unprepared military. A brief period of security cooperation with the US ensued including the signing of a Mutual Defence Agreement.[22] However, the US-China rapprochement of the early 70s and India’s professed non-alignment ensured its diminished status in the great power calculus.

    Reaching Out to China. India’s outreach to China commenced with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 in the aftermath of the Chinese intrusion at Somdorung Chu in 1986 in Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a full-fledged standoff which lasted till mid-1987. The consequent push towards normalisation of relations resulted in the September 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas,  the November 1996 Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, followed thereafter by the Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China, of June 2003 and finally the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question of April 2005, signed during the visit of Chinese premier Wen Jiabao, which also saw the India China relationship elevated to a ‘Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’.

    Despite partially successful attempts to broad base the engagement, territorial sovereignty continued to dominate the India China agenda, as can be observed by the number of agreements signed on border management – with minimal outcomes. It appears now that what can only be construed as diffidence in dealing with China on the border (and other issues) arose not because of misplaced optimism over such agreements, but for several other reasons. Some were structural weaknesses, such as lack of development of the border areas and poor logistics. Others arose because of want of a full-throated consensus on how strong a line to take with a  visibly stronger neighbour  – aggravated by growing economic disparity and the limitations imposed by self-professed non-alignment, especially so in the absence of a powerful ally like the Soviet Union, which had disintegrated by 1991. Also, American support could not be taken for granted, as was the case in the 60s.  Overall, the approach was one of caution. This, coupled with lack of long term border management specialists induced wishful myopia on the matter, which was dispelled periodically by border skirmishes or other impasses, before returning to ‘business as usual’.  

    The extent of Engagement Today. To objectively analyse the relationship, it is important to comprehend the extent of the India China engagement on matters other than security. In the context of trade and industry, a perusal of the website of the Indian embassy in Beijing provides some answers. There is a list of 24 agreements/ MoUs /protocols between the two countries on Science and Technology alone, covering fields as diverse as aeronautics, space technology, health and medicine, meteorology, agricultural sciences, renewable energy, ocean development, water resources, genomics, geology, and others. The Embassy brings out India’s concerns regarding trade including impediments to market access, noting that trade imbalances have been steadily rising, to reach $58.4 billion in 2018, reducing marginally to $56.95 in 2019, a first since 2005. The poor penetration of Indian banks in China, India’s second-largest shareholding (8%) in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and being the largest borrower from the New Investment Bank or NIB, a BRICS bank of which all members have equal shareholding provide an understanding of linkages between the countries in the banking sector[23]. Other areas of cooperation are in petroleum and railways.

    Economic Fallout Post April 2020. After the Galwan incident, India has taken strong measures on the economic front against China, from banning over 250 software applications to a partial ban on various categories of white goods,and the imposition of anti-dumping duties on many others. The Consolidated FDI Policy of the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade dated 15 October 2020, mandates Government scrutiny of every Chinese investment proposal before approval. However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner. India reduced imports from China but exports to China grew by a robust 26.2 per cent at $10.16 billion[24]. Also, conditionalities for borrowing from the AIIB and NIB have resulted in India having to permit Chinese firms to bid for works connected with projects funded by these institutions. Consequently in January this year, the contract for construction of a 5.6 km long underground stretch of the Rapid Rail Transit System in the National Capital Region has been awarded to a Chinese company, Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company Limited.[25] As noted earlier, decoupling is not easy. Incentives for companies to relocate to India have been announced, with some investment flowing in from Google and Facebook, and plans for Samsung to relocate a factory to NOIDA[26]. Finally, India’s exclusion from the RCEP will also have to be factored in when negotiating a long term trade policy with China.

    However, the paradox in the India China relationship is well illustrated by trade figures for the first half of the Financial Year 20-21, where China surpassed the USA to become India’s largest trading partner.

    Soft Power and Academia. Indian soft power in China remains subservient to harsh security concerns despite oft-quoted historical antecedents. Some elements like Indian cinema continue to be extremely popular. Student exchange programs have taken shape, especially under the aegis of Confucius Institutes which have secured a toehold in some Indian campuses. Following the trend worldwide, their programs are also under scrutiny[27].  The few Indian students in China (less than 25000)[28] have been hit hard by the coronavirus. Overall, given the current state of engagement, employing soft power as an effective tool has limited potential. Exchange of scholars from policy and security think tanks has been a good way of imbibing a sense of the other, resulting in greater awareness. While the trust deficit and reasons for the same have always been highlighted by the Indian side, it has been the general experience that China has been less forthcoming in its responses.

    Building Blocks for a China Policy

    In the middle term, unless there is a concerted and verifiable effort by China, trade with that country will be overshadowed by security issues  (the huge trade imbalance also becoming one of these !). The Indian economy has commenced its post-Covid recovery in the new year. The budget for FY 21-22, trade policies of others like the EU and the US, will impact economic policy, as will national security concerns.

    Immediate security priorities vis a vis China are a mix of the geopolitical and purely military. These can broadly be outlined – safeguarding Indian interests in the Indian Ocean region and the littorals, holding the line in the high Himalayas and ensuring sanctity over Indian skies. The first being both a geopolitical and security matter would leverage all elements of statecraft including the military. The balance two are a direct outcome of India’s military power. These, intertwined with India’s multilateral approach towards cooperation in world fora would form the basis of dealing with China.

    Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps.

    Managing the Neighbourhood. In South Asia, India is primus inter pares due to size, geographical location, resources, capability and potential. Its soft power, economic reach ( while not comparable to China’s) and associated linkages with other countries are huge, at times even considered overwhelming. Countries in the neighbourhood other than Pakistan when in distress, look first towards India for relief – natural calamities, food shortages[29], and now the corona vaccine, where Indian generosity remains unsurpassed worldwide. India does not indulge in cheque book diplomacy, nor entice weaker neighbours into debt traps. Despite ethnic linkages and security concerns resulting sometimes in what is perceived by others as ‘interventionist politics’, India’s respect for its neighbours’ sovereignty is absolute. This is in contrast to China, whose recent interventions in Nepal have led to rallies in front of the Chinese embassy[30]. Its pressure on the NLD government in Myanmar over BRI projects had again not been viewed favourably in that country,[31] though the trajectory that the China-Myanmar relationship now follows remains to be seen, with China attempting to support Myanmar’s military in international fora after the coup[32]. Within South Asia, strengthening delivery mechanisms, sticking to timelines in infrastructure projects, improving connectivity and resolving the myriad issues between neighbours without attempting a zero-sum game with China is the way forward for India, which should play by its considerable strengths. Simultaneously, it must look at growing challenges such as management of Brahmaputra waters and climate change, and leverage these concerns with affected neighbours.

    Strengthening Military Capability. A more direct challenge lies more in the military field,  and in measures necessary to overcome these.  The justifiable rise in military expenditure during the current year would continue or even accelerate. The armed forces are inching towards a mutually agreed road map before implementing large scale organisational reforms. Conceptual clarity on integrated warfighting across the spectrum in multiple domains (including the informational ) is a sine qua non, more so when cyberspace and space domains are concerned. This mandates breaking up silos between the military and other specialist government agencies for optimisation and seamless cooperation. Also, while classical notions of victory have mutated, swift savage border wars as witnessed in Nagorno Karabakh remain live possibilities for India, with open collusion now established between China and Pakistan. As always, the study of the inventory, military capability of the adversary and his likely pattern of operations will yield valuable lessons. The armed forces have to prepare multiple options, to deal with a range of threats from full scale two front wars down to the hybrid, including responses to terrorist acts while ensuring sovereignty across the seas. Network-centric warfare will take centre stage, with information operations being vital for overall success, possibly even defining what constitutes victory.

    Progress has been achieved in these directions. As an example, the first Indian weaponised drone swarm made its debut on Army Day 2021, and visuals of a ‘wingman drone’ underdevelopment have been shown during the Aero India 2021 at Bangalore. The military would be planning for operationalisation, induction, deployment, staffing and human resource aspects of this weapon platform with the nominated service. An estimate of the time required to resolve these issues as also for full-scale production of such systems and larger variants will dictate procurement decisions with respect to other land and air platforms providing similar standoff kinetic effects, and surveillance capability. A concurrent requirement to develop sufficient capability to counter such systems would doubtless be under scrutiny. In this regard, the outcome of the PLA merging its cyber and electronic warfare functions for multiple reasons merits attention.[33] While the Navy’s requirements to dominate the Indian Ocean are well appreciated, a consensus on its future role and the need (or otherwise) for a third aircraft carrier would decide the nature, type and numbers of future naval platforms – unmanned underwater vehicles, submarines, shore/ carrier-based aircraft and others.  With decisions over the Tejas LCA induction finalised, induction of a state of the art platforms from the USA and France over the last few years and hope for the acquisition of new generation indigenous air defence systems[34] on the anvil, the IAF is set to gradually regain its edge. Overall, India’s military has to leverage the latest technology and develop the capability to fight in multiple domains, which its hard-earned experience in third-generation warfighting would complement. With restructuring planned concurrently, each decision will have to be fully informed and thought through – more so when mini faceoffs as has happened at Naku La in Sikkim this month continue to occur.

    A Way Forward

    Traditional Chinese thinking has simultaneously been dismissive and wary of India. In his seminal publication at the turn of the century, Stephen Cohen noted that ‘…from Beijing’s perspective India is a second rank but sometimes threatening state. It poses little threat to China by itself and it can be easily countered but Beijing must be wary of any dramatic increase in Indian power or an alliance between New Delhi and some hostile major state..’[35]  As brought out in this paper, outlines of a grounded long term China policy based on previous experiences and new realities are visible. Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains. As pointed out by the Minister for External Affairs in his talk to the 13th All India Conference for China Studies this month [36] the India-China relationship has to be based on ‘mutuality…  mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interests ..’. The EAM further noted that ‘expectations…. that life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation at the border, that is simply not realistic. There are discussions underway through various mechanisms on disengagement at the border areas. But if ties are to steady and progress, policies must take into account the learnings of the last three decades’[37].

    Rooted primarily in the security dimension followed thereafter by the economic, its success will be predicated on peace and tranquillity on the border, without entering into the trap of competition in either of the two domains.

    In the same talk, the EAM has laid down eight broad and eminently practical propositions as guidelines for future India-China relations. Most prominent of these is that peace and tranquillity on the border are a must if relations in other spheres are to develop. Also, the need to accept that a multipolar world can have a multipolar Asia as its subset. He stressed that reciprocity is the bedrock of a relationship, and sensitivities to each other’s aspirations, interests and priorities must be respected. Concurrently, management of divergences and differences between two civilizational states should be considered over the long term.

    A China policy crafted on these principles would ensure that India’s concerns vis a vis its neighbour is addressed, within the larger National goal of all-round growth and development of India and its citizens in the 21st Century.

     

    Notes:

    [1] ‘Xi JinPing Heralds New Era of Chinese Power’ Dipanjan Ray Chaudhury, Economic Times 18 October 2017

    [2] ‘China Has Two Paths To Global Domination’ Jake Sullivan,  Hal Brands, Foreign Policy, 22 May 2020

    [3] ibid

    [4] ‘China’s Mask Diplomacy is Faltering.But the US isn’t Doing any better’ Charlie Campbell Time Magazine 03 April 2020

    [5] ‘China’s Renewed Aggression in the South China Sea’ Gateway House Infographic 22 April 2020

    [6] ‘US imposes new sanction on Beijing over South China Sea’  Mint 15 January 2021

    [7] In parting shot, Trump administration declares China’s repression of Uighurs ‘genocide’ Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters 19 January 2021

    [8] ‘Pacific Panic: China-Taiwan relations to reach breaking point in ‘next few weeks’ skynews.com.au 18 January 2021

    [9] ‘Japan wants de facto ‘Six Eyes’ intelligence status: defence chief’ Daishi Abe and Rieko Miki Nikkei Asia 14 August 2020

    [10] ‘Emmanuel Bonne’s interview to the Times of India’ 10 January 2021  Website of the French Embassy in New Delhi

    [11] ‘When China breaks rules, we have to be very robust and clear: French diplomat’ Dinakar Peri, The Hindu 08 January 2021

    [12] ‘COVID-19: The Nail in the Coffin of China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ Lee YingHui, The Diplomat 28 September 2020

    [13] ibid

    [14] ‘Covid-19: China’s economy picks up, bucking global trend’ BBC.com  18 January 2021

    [15] ibid

    [16] ‘New US govt may look to further deepen ties with India: Blinken’ Elizabeth Roche, The Mint 21 Jan 2021

    [17] ‘What Biden’s Defence Secretary Said About Future Relations With India, Pakistan’ Lalit K Jha, The Wire 20 January 2021

    [18] ‘US NSA speaks to Doval, Def Secretary dials Rajnath’ Krishn Kaushik and Shubhajit Roy Indian Express 27 January 2021

    [19] ‘As China Taiwan tension rises, US warships sail into region’ The Indian Express 25 January 2021

    [20] ‘India and Australia: Partners for Indo Pacific Security and Stability’  Lalit Kapur, Delhi Policy Group Policy Brief Vol. V, Issue 42 December 15, 2020

    [21] ‘India China Relations 1947-2000 A Documentary Study’ (Vol 1 to 5)  Avtar Singh Bhasin   Geetika Publishers New Delhi 2018

    [22] ‘The Tibet Factor in India China Relations’  Rajiv Sikri  Journal of International Affairs , SPRING/SUMMER 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2, pp 60

    [23] Website of the Embassy of India at Beijing   www.eoibeijing.gov.in

    [24] ‘What an irony! Mainland China beats US to be India’s biggest trade partner in H1FY21’  Sumanth Banerji        Business Today 04 December 2020

    [25] ‘Chinese company bags vital contract for first rapid rail project’  Sandeep Dikshit   The Tribune   03 January 2021

    [26] ‘Samsung to invest Rs 4,825 cr to shift China mobile display factory to India’ Danish Khan  Economic Times 11 December 2020

    [27]  ‘The Hindu Explains | What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?’

    Ananth Krishnan The Hindu August 09 2020

    [28] ‘23,000 Indian students stare at long wait to return to Chinese campuses’  Sutirtho Patranobis  Hindustan Times  08  September 2020

    [29] ‘Offering non-commercial, humanitarian food assistance to its neighbours: India at WTO’ Press Trust of India 19 December 2020

    [30] ‘Torch rally held in Kathmandu to protest against Chinese interference’ ANI News  30 December 2020

    [31] ‘Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visits Myanmar with aim to speed up BRI projects’  Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury  Economic Times  09 January 2021

    [32] ‘China blocks UNSC condemnation of Myanmar coup’ India Today Web Desk 03 February 2021

    [33] ‘Electronic and Cyber Warfare: A Comparative Analysis of the PLA and the Indian Army’ Kartik Bommankanti ORF Occasional Paper July 2019

    [34] ‘India successfully test fires new generation Akash NG missile’ Ch Sushil Rao  Times of India  25 January 2021

    [35] ‘ India  Emerging Power’  Stephen Philip Cohen   Brookings Institution Press 2001   pp 259

    [36] Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies January 28, 2021

    [37] ibid

     

    Image Credit: Wion  and Trak.in

  • As the US exits Afghanistan, who is there to tame Taliban?

    As the US exits Afghanistan, who is there to tame Taliban?

    Sometimes, the best way to triumph over an enemy is to quit the game. In an attempt to honour his election campaign promise of bringing the American soldiers back home, President Trump announced the complete withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. About eight thousand six hundred remaining boys in boots will return from Afghanistan by Christmas this year. The Taliban, whom American forces have been fighting for the last two decades, is now a closed-door dialogue partner of the White House. The arch-rivals in the eerie battleground are now facing off each other in opulent hotels.

    In Doha, the Afghan government caught up with the Taliban at the much-awaited intra-Afghan peace talk, held in September. 

    In the two-decade-long war, America has paid enormously in currency, diplomacy, and defence. It has cost the US exchequer almost $2 trillion. Several efforts to bring peace have gone in vain. Ultimately, Washington has successfully brought the Taliban and the Afghan government to talk to each other. The two belligerent parties are now engaged in the tete-a-tete. In Doha, the Afghan government caught up with the Taliban at the much-awaited intra-Afghan peace talk, held in September. Despite several attempts, an agreement between the Taliban and the Afghan government could not take place earlier as the bellicose force never recognized the legitimacy of the elected government in Afghanistan. In the eyes of the Taliban, the incumbent in Kabul remains a puppet government of the Western powers. What contrasts the most between the present administration and the earlier Talibani rule is their diametrically opposite ideologies. Whereas the present system in Afghanistan runs democratically, the Taliban believes in the Islamic Sharia law. The battle is now between democracy and theocracy.

    The ongoing peace process is a continuum of American mediation between the Taliban and the Afghan government since February 2020.  White House is nearing an imminent peace deal with the Taliban as they are no longer deeply interested in Afghanistan. Washington’s priority is now countering China’s growing influence.

    In the previous peace talks, the western states sat with the Taliban, disdaining the Afghan government. Even Russia’s attempts failed to produce any fruitful results in favour of Afghanistan. One of the major reasons for the failure is about diluting the Afghan government authority. The Afghan government never endorsed the efforts of foreign nations in the Afghan peace negotiations, in which the Afghan government itself is side-lined. Afghan government affirmed that any kind of peace deal would not be entertained as the legitimate government was not a part of it as it was a clear violation of Afghan sovereignty.  Afghan government took the issue to the United Nations and accused Pakistan of bypassing it in peace talks with the Taliban.

    a large area of Afghanistan and its people are under the Taliban’s control. The Taliban is collecting taxes from the citizens to exercise their undisputed rule.

    Unlike the previous attempts, the intra-Afghan dialogue has raised much hope among the Afghans, the Government, and the international community. But both parties are likely to face many tough challenges to achieve the desired outcome.  The Taliban has already violated the agreement with the United States that resulted in the death of Afghan civilians and army personnel but stresses that it is continuing with the ceasefire. It is possible that by claiming to maintain the ceasefire the Taliban is trying to put pressure on the Afghan government. Despite this hostile situation, the Afghan government has agreed to negotiate with the Taliban mainly for two reasons. First, most of the International Security Assistance Forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces have left Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces have neither the training nor the institutional mechanism to provide security to its people. Second, a large area of Afghanistan and its people are under the Taliban’s control. The Taliban is collecting taxes from the citizens to exercise their undisputed rule.

    Unlike the previous peace processes, the current one does not rely much on foreign countries. But the peace deal is likely to affect Afghanistan’s external relations adversely. If the Taliban reverts to its Islamic radicalism, Afghanistan may lose billions of foreign aid it has been receiving since the last decade for the reconstruction of the country. The Afghan government worries that the premature departure of American troops may have a negative impact on international assistance.

    Although both parties agreed to negotiate on the peace deal, there is dissatisfaction within the cadres of the parties. In the recent elections, the two Presidential contestants each claimed electoral victory. A power-sharing arrangement was concluded where Ashraf Ghani is the President and Abdullah Abdullah exercises power as the chairperson of the High Council for National Reconciliation. On the Taliban side, many leaders do not support the peace process as they believe that they could win the Afghan war by military means. They consider  Pentagon’s departure from Afghanistan as a sign of their victory.

    The Taliban continues to maintain its contact with the Al-Qaeda, according to a UN security council report. The US -Taliban agreement of February demands a complete divorce between the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda.  UN reports and the violation of ceasefire show that the Taliban is not adhering to the agreement. Once the peace deal is completed, the Taliban could take advantage of the absence of US troops in Afghanistan and renege on their commitments by maintaining close ties with the Al Qaeda, Haqqani Network, and the other extremist groups. The training camps of these Islamist terrorist groups are being used by Pakistan based terror outfits like Lashkar and Jaish-e-Mohammed. When Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, insurgency and terrorism increased in Kashmir. It saw a drastic fall when Washington waged war on Taliban and other Islamist extremist groups.

    If the Sharia law returns to Afghanistan, all the democratic rights and the freedom that the Afghan people have seen since the last decade, are likely to be lost.

    The consequences would be grave if the peace deal doesn’t fetch the desired results. The peace deal is necessary for the Afghan government in maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan. If the Sharia law returns to Afghanistan, all the democratic rights and the freedom that the Afghan people have seen since the last decade, are likely to be lost. Even if a peace deal fructifies, it may not ensure peace for every section of society. During the previous Taliban rule, the fundamental rights of women- ranging from education to employment, were denied. Women had to live a sub-human life. At present, women hold 28 percent of the total seats in the parliament. So, if the Sharia law is enacted again, it will deny the basic rights of Afghan women. Millions of Afghan refugees in neighbouring Iran, Pakistan, and elsewhere in European countries cannot hope to return home. The host countries, however, have started sending back the Afghan refugees forcefully amid instability.

    Afghanistan is a country of over a hundred ethnic groups, tribes, non-Muslims, and other communities. Most ethnic groups have a conflict with each other. In recent times, the Taliban attacked the non-Muslim communities, especially Hindus and Sikhs. The Ministry of External Affairs of India facilitated the travels of a few Hindu families to India. Even after the Afghan government concludes a peace deal with the Taliban, conflicts may continue and peace may still be elusive. The effectiveness of the peace deal will depend on the commitments of each party.

    European countries do not have the military or economic strength to prosecute overseas conflicts. The internal mechanism of NATO is weaker than before. And after the Brexit deal, the fragmented European union lacks the political will to intervene in the war-torn state. China’s interests in Afghanistan are mostly commercial. Infrastructures or projects under Belt and Road Initiative can’t be built amid the carnage. China has the political, financial, and military strength to fill the void, after the complete withdrawal of the US forces. The Chinese financial contribution in Afghanistan is a clear sign that the country has a long-term strategy in the region. This apart, China has security concerns as well in Afghanistan. The rise of extremist movements in Afghanistan is likely to impact security in China, especially in Xinjiang province. In recent years, China has increased its military ties with Afghanistan. In the absence of the American troops, Afghanistan may consider China as possible support.

    Once the US exits, Kabul will have an option to raise the peace issue in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO can be the main military and economic block in Asia. Except for Turkmenistan, all the bordering countries of Afghanistan and other major players in South Asia have either members-status or observer status at the SCO. It can certainly play a very effective role as the peacemaker providing its members, each with considerably different stakes in Afghanistan can get their act together.

    The Taliban in the Afghan government would provide political leverage to Pakistan over India.

    If the Taliban assumes power, India-Afghanistan bonhomie will turn frosty. Unlike other countries, the Indian government never supported the Taliban. India has been a staunch supporter of Afghan-led, Afghan controlled and Afghan-owned peace deal. Pakistan has always been supportive of the Taliban as it serves its strategic interests. The Taliban in the Afghan government would provide political leverage to Pakistan over India. Seeing that it has been left out of the Afghan peace talks, it appears that India is coming around to talk to the Taliban.

    Afghans are exhausted from bloodshed in the last few decades. The region has turned into a breeding ground for Islamic State in Khorasan, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups. A stable and democratic Afghan government is necessary for maintaining peace in the South Asian region. As the effectiveness of SAARC continues to be hampered by India-Pakistan animosity, other South Asian states, Organization of Islamic Cooperation member states, and other Islamic states like Saudi Arabia or Turkey should act to restrain the Taliban and pave the way for peace in Afghanistan.

     

    Image: US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo meets with Taliban’s Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and members of his negotiating team. Credit: www.voanews.com