The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Pakistan

  • The Pakistan Paradox: Courted by Rivals, Valued Only Against India

    The Pakistan Paradox: Courted by Rivals, Valued Only Against India

    Pakistan’s presence at China’s Victory Day parade exposed a more profound truth: its value lies not in strategic brilliance but in being a pawn for both Washington and Beijing. Far from balancing, Islamabad survives as a tool in the great power game against India.

    China’s recent Victory Day parade on September 3, 2025, was more than a ceremonial display; it was a calculated act of strategic signalling to the West. By showcasing its formidable military hardware and hosting close allies such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, Beijing sought to project its emergence as a great power, much as it did during the 2008 Olympics. By bringing these leaders together, China signalled not only unity but also the contours of an emerging alternative world order that challenges Western dominance.

    The parade sent “chill waves” across Western capitals, with even Donald Trump admitting that he closely followed the event. On social media, he sardonically addressed China: “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America.” On September 5, 2025, he further voiced his frustration, declaring that the U.S. had “lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China,” a remark that reflected Washington’s growing unease over Beijing’s expanding influence.

    India, notably absent from China’s Victory Day parade on September 3, 2025, made its own strategic moves. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan on August 29–30, ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin on August 31–September 1. By going to Tokyo first and then to Tianjin, Modi signalled to the West that India continues to prioritise its commitments in the Indo-Pacific, while also reminding Beijing that New Delhi remains open to engagement. During the SCO summit, Modi’s remark that India’s engagement with China “should not be seen through third-country lenses” was intended to reassure the West of India’s balancing strategy.

    Yet, amid this choreography of great powers, one country’s presence at the Victory Day parade raised eyebrows: Pakistan. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stood alongside leaders who openly challenge the Western-led order—figures the West often labels as part of an “axis of evil”—despite Pakistan being nominally allied with the United States. What was even more surprising was the silence of Washington and its partners. Had it been India’s leader at the parade, the Western outcry would have been deafening. But when Pakistan did it, no questions were asked. Why this extraordinary tolerance?

    The explanation lies not in Pakistan’s own strategic brilliance. Unlike India, Pakistan lacks genuine strategic agency or independent decision-making capacity. It has long been dependent on external patrons and remains heavily constrained by domestic crises. The narrative advanced by some strategic experts that Islamabad is engaged in a masterful balancing act between Washington and Beijing is misleading. Instead, both the U.S. and China tolerate Pakistan’s duplicity because of its enduring strategic utility against India.

    Washington knows Pakistan’s record all too well. During the War on Terror, Islamabad received over $33 billion in U.S. aid while simultaneously providing sanctuary to Taliban leaders. U.S. officials, including President Trump, repeatedly acknowledged this duplicity. In a tweet on January 1, 2018, Trump stated: ‘The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!”

    Similarly, Congressman Ted Poe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, introduced a bill in 2016 calling for Pakistan to be declared a “state sponsor of terrorism,” stating that Pakistan was “not only an untrustworthy ally but has also aided and abetted the enemies of the United States”. Counterterrorism cooperation is, therefore, not the real reason Washington continues to indulge Pakistan. Nor are West Asia’s dynamics or connectivity goals the central factor, though they play a role.

    The real reason is India. Pakistan serves as a pressure valve for Washington to use whenever New Delhi strays from American strategic priorities. Similarly, for Beijing, Pakistan is an indispensable grey-zone tool against India — a reliable proxy that complicates India’s security calculus without requiring direct Chinese involvement. This explains why China continues to describe its relationship with Pakistan as ‘higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel,’ even though Beijing is fully aware that the “honey” and other lofty adjectives in this partnership are largely rhetorical, given Pakistan’s military establishment has historically maintained close ties with the Pentagon and U.S. defense agencies.

    Recent developments illustrate this pattern. Despite Islamabad striking a minerals deal in Balochistan with the U.S.—an area where China has invested heavily through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and even frequently loses its workers to terrorist attacks—Beijing has not retaliated.

    China has invested nearly $60 billion in CPEC projects, including Gwadar Port and associated infrastructure, yet continues to tolerate Pakistan’s parallel engagement with the U.S. Even though just days ago, China exited funding for certain sections of CPEC, such as the Karachi–Rohri stretch of the Main Line-1 railway, the broader corridor remains intact and firmly under Beijing’s control.

    Similarly, Washington has been remarkably quiet about the expansion of CPEC and its recent announcement to extend it into Afghanistan, despite this development directly strengthening Chinese influence in South and Central Asia, which contradicts U.S. national security strategies, including the Indo-Pacific strategy designed to counterbalance China. Imagine if India were to engage China in a similar manner; the Western backlash would be immediate and fierce.

    The silence over Pakistan reveals the underlying logic: both Washington and Beijing find it useful to maintain Islamabad as a strategic lever against India. For China, Pakistan provides military intelligence, operational support, and a constant security distraction for New Delhi, keeping India tied down on its western front. For the U.S., Pakistan is less a partner in counterterrorism than a tool to remind India of the costs of drifting too far from American preferences.

    Thus, Pakistan’s position is not the result of deft balancing or sophisticated statecraft. It is tolerated, even courted, by two rival great powers because of its instrumental value in their respective strategies against India. Far from being an Independent balancer, Pakistan remains a dependent actor whose importance derives almost entirely from the leverage it provides to others.

    For India, the lesson is clear. The tolerance extended to Pakistan by both Washington and Beijing is not about Islamabad’s capabilities or credibility — both powers know well its history of duplicity. Instead, it reflects the centrality of India in global strategy and the willingness of other powers to use Pakistan as a pawn in their broader geopolitical contest. Recognising this reality is essential for shaping New Delhi’s responses, ensuring that India continues to strengthen its autonomy and strategic weight in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

    Feature Image Credit: India Today

    Pictures in Text: www.arabnews.com, www.nationalheraldindia.com, www.deccanherald.com

  • Kashmir at a Crossroads: Pahalgam Terror Attack Amid Democratic Gains

    Kashmir at a Crossroads: Pahalgam Terror Attack Amid Democratic Gains

    The recent deadly terror attack on April 22 in Phalgham, near the Baisaran Valley, in which 26 innocent people were killed and more than a dozen others injured, has served as a stark reminder that external threats—particularly Pakistan-backed terrorism—remain a grave challenge to the region’s hard-won stability.

    Jammu and Kashmir is witnessing a remarkable and unprecedented political shift. In a development that would have seemed unimaginable a few years ago, many separatist groups, historically associated with anti-India activities, have abandoned their secessionist stance and re-entered the democratic mainstream. This transformation is not sudden—it reflects years of sustained government outreach, targeted policy reforms, and a persistent invitation to dialogue. Together, these efforts have fostered an environment of relative peace, reshaping public sentiment and political engagement across the valley. However, the recent deadly terror attack on April 22 in Phalgham, near the Baisaran Valley, in which 26 innocent people were killed and more than a dozen others injured, has served as a stark reminder that external threats—particularly Pakistan-backed terrorism—remain a grave challenge to the region’s hard-won stability.

    In a significant turn of events in April 2024, key factions of the Hurriyat Conference, such as the J&K Tahreeqi Isteqlal and J&K Tahreek-l-Istiqamat, publicly renounced separatism and embraced the democratic process. Their decision marks a critical shift in the political discourse of the region, challenging long-standing narratives of alienation and conflict. Union Home Minister Amit Shah hailed this move, declaring, “Under the Modi government, separatism is breathing its last, and the triumph of unity is echoing across Kashmir.” The reintegration of these groups into the democratic fold indicates the success of New Delhi’s long-term outreach and governance initiatives, as well as the strengthening of its position on the global stage regarding Jammu & Kashmir.

    the candidacy of individuals such as Sayar Ahmad Reshi (Kulgam), Aijaz Ahmad Mir (Zainapora), Talat Majeed (Pulwama), Mohammad Sikandar Malik (Bandipora), and Farooq Ahmad Genie (Beerwah) sent a powerful message—both domestically and internationally—of a growing trust in democratic processes and a shift away from violence.

    The 2024 Assembly elections further illustrated this transformation. Over 25 former militants, separatists, and members of the banned Jamaat-e-Islami contested as independent candidates. Although none of them secured a win, the candidacy of individuals such as Sayar Ahmad Reshi (Kulgam), Aijaz Ahmad Mir (Zainapora), Talat Majeed (Pulwama), Mohammad Sikandar Malik (Bandipora), and Farooq Ahmad Genie (Beerwah) sent a powerful message—both domestically and internationally—of a growing trust in democratic processes and a shift away from violence.

    Central to this transformation is the 2019 abrogation of Article 370. While Article 370 did not cause terrorism, it fostered a psychological and political sense of separateness. Its existence reinforced a feeling of isolation, suggesting that Jammu and Kashmir was distinct from the rest of India and that its political destiny remained unsettled, thereby encouraging subnational identity and sentiments of exclusion. Local political elites often exploited this narrative of exclusivity and exceptionalism for their political objectives, constantly telling people that Jammu and Kashmir had a “special relationship” with the Union of India, having its own constitution, flag, and national anthem. This exacerbated the sense of alienation and fueled anti-India sentiment.

    Article 370 served as a protective shield for corrupt politicians and bureaucrats from central investigation agencies, as it limited the powers of these agencies, allowing corruption to flourish unabatedly. On the global stage, Article 370 was utilised as a geostrategic tool against India.

    Moreover, domestically, the real benefits of Article 370 never reached the common people. Instead, it supported the interests of a few influential political families, such as the likes of the Muftis and the Abdullahs, etc., while the ordinary citizen continued to face hardship and underdevelopment. Additionally, Article 370 served as a protective shield for corrupt politicians and bureaucrats from central investigation agencies, as it limited the powers of these agencies, allowing corruption to flourish unabatedly. On the global stage, Article 370 was utilised as a geostrategic tool against India. References to Jammu & Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status and its separate flag and constitution created a misleading impression internationally—that it was some foreign territory under Indian occupation. Many significant powers often utilised this narrative to exert pressure on India and further their geopolitical objectives.

    Since its removal, the region has witnessed measurable progress. Terrorist incidents have plummeted by 81%—from 228 in 2018 to just 43 in 2023. Civilian and security force casualties have similarly declined. Stone pelting, once a near-daily occurrence, has disappeared entirely, with 2,654 such incidents in 2010 dropping to zero by 2023. Hartals and forced shutdowns have become a thing of the past. Educational outcomes have also improved. The number of colleges has risen from 94 to 147. Prestigious institutions such as IIT, IIM, and AIIMS have been established. Medical colleges increased from four to eleven, and the region now boasts 15 nursing colleges. Medical seat availability has grown from 500 to over 1,300.

    The region’s Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) has more than doubled—from ₹1 lakh crore in 2014–15 to ₹2.27 lakh crore in 2022–23. In tourism, a record 2.36 crore visitors arrived in 2024, including over 65,000 foreign tourists.

    Economically, Jammu and Kashmir is undergoing a boom. Investments surged from ₹297 crore in 2019–20 to ₹2,153 crore in 2022–23, with another ₹6,000 crore in the pipeline. The region’s Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP) has more than doubled—from ₹1 lakh crore in 2014–15 to ₹2.27 lakh crore in 2022–23. In tourism, a record 2.36 crore visitors arrived in 2024, including over 65,000 foreign tourists. Global events like the G20 Tourism Working Group meeting and the Legends League Cricket (LLC) have put Jammu and Kashmir on the international map. Infrastructure development is progressing rapidly. Mega projects such as the USBRL Tunnel 50, Z-Morh Tunnel, and the iconic Chenab Rail Bridge—the highest in the world—are transforming connectivity. The Vande Bharat train now connects Katra with Srinagar. Symbolising civic normalcy, the Muharram procession returned to Srinagar in 2024 after a 34-year ban.

    However, the recent Pahalgam terror attack is a stark reminder that Pakistan continues to act as the primary external disruptor of peace and progress in Jammu & Kashmir. Despite the undeniable local yearning for peace and development, Pakistan’s strategic objective to “bleed India with a thousand cuts” remains unchanged. Its support for terrorism and infiltration undermines the region’s stability.

    Pakistan’s proxy war not only attempts to destabilise India but also hampers the development trajectory of Jammu & Kashmir, which had been flourishing in education, infrastructure, and economic growth.

    The attack, which targeted civilians and spread fear among tourists, has had immediate consequences: many tourists have cancelled bookings, impacting the Valley’s booming tourism sector. It reflects how Pakistan’s proxy war not only attempts to destabilise India but also hampers the development trajectory of Jammu & Kashmir, which had been flourishing in education, infrastructure, and economic growth.

    While local recruitment into militancy has declined and radicalisation has significantly reduced, Pakistan’s designs persist. Security agencies have reported the presence of 35–40 foreign terrorists operating in small groups in the Jammu division, with recent attacks in Reasi, Kathua, and Kishtwar proving that infiltration is now affecting eight out of ten districts. New Delhi must now recalibrate its approach. While the ecosystem-based strategy addressing governance, development, and security has yielded positive outcomes, the Pakistan problem requires a distinct strategic lens. Counterterrorism efforts must be intensified, international diplomacy must expose Pakistan’s continued support for terror, and internal resilience must be strengthened to protect gains made post-Article 370.

    In conclusion, nearly six years after the abrogation of Article 370, Jammu & Kashmir has indeed embarked on a transformative journey. But the road ahead must account for persistent external threats. The people of the region overwhelmingly desire peace, progress, and integration—but Pakistan’s continued interference demands a more robust, strategic, and multidimensional response.

  • Indus Water Treaty: A Model for International Water Governance

    Indus Water Treaty: A Model for International Water Governance

    Introduction

    Water is the basis of biological sustenance, without which no civilisation can sustain. Access to clean and safely managed water is therefore a human right, not a privilege.

    According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) —

    One in four people still lives without safely managed water services or clean drinking water. Approximately 4 billion people live with severe water scarcity for at least one month of the year, and about half a billion people face water scarcity year-round.

    The water crisis is not an isolated issue but a global challenge. It calls for effective governance not just within the local governments and authorities of a country but transnationally as well.

    International Water Governance refers to this process of decision-making, formulation, and implementation of policies pertaining to the use, management, and distribution of transboundary water resources.

    Peace and cooperation on matters of conflict over water are hard to reach and much harder to maintain. Treaties, multilateral agreements and conventions often govern transboundary waters; one such example of a successful bilateral water-distribution treaty is the Indus Water Treaty (the IWT) of 1960 between India and Pakistan over the regulation and use of the Indus River Basin and its tributaries.

    Indus Water Treaty

    The Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960 in Karachi between India and Pakistan as facilitated by the World Bank (erstwhile International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or IBRD). It demarcates the sharing and usage of the Indus River and its major tributaries, categorised into “eastern” and “western” rivers for Indian and Pakistani use, respectively.

    The Indus River flows mainly from Tibet and the Himalayan regions of India’s Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and across Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh before emptying into the Arabian Sea through Karachi.

    Of the six major tributaries of the Indus River— the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej are the “eastern rivers” and the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum are the “western rivers”. The former is for India’s exclusive use after Pakistan’s permitted water use, and the latter is for Pakistan’s exclusive use after the criteria of India’s permitted use are met.

    As a result, the split was made in the ratio of about 20:80 of the total water flow from the Indus system in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan has unrestricted access to the waters of the western rivers for agricultural, domestic, and industrial purposes.

    India too is permitted to use a limited amount of water from these rivers, apart from the eastern rivers, for specified purposes, such as irrigation and power generation. It also lays down detailed regulations for India in building projects over the western rivers.

    Historical context and Security concerns

    As the partition of British India took place on religious lines instead of geographic factors, the division of the historically integrated water system in a manner satisfactory to both countries was a challenging feat. Although most of the river naturally flows through the regions of Pakistan, it primarily originates from India before it enters the former. Hence, Pakistan is the downstream nation of the Indus River. This places Pakistan in a vulnerable position, exposed to the risks of India causing artificial droughts or flooding of its arable lands, which may be used as leverage to control water and food security in times of hostilities.

    According to Pakistan, it was entitled to all the waters of the Indus and its tributaries due to its historical right before or until the partition, also highlighting the threat of severe water scarcity without the continuous flow of the rivers. Whereas India insisted that the waters be equitably distributed on a new post-partition basis by proposing for the first time the separate rationing of the western and eastern rivers between the two nations. Ergo, paving the way for arguably one of the most successful, long-standing bilateral agreements struck between any two agnostic states.

    Provisions and Objectives of IWT

    In 1952, with the World Bank as the mediator, a Working Party consisting of Indian, Pakistani, and World Bank engineers was formed to draw up a cooperative plan for the use, allocation and distribution of the disputed waters. After almost eight long years of negotiations, the Indus Water Treaty was finally ratified in 1960.

    The main provisions of the IWT are as follows:

    • Water distribution:

    India and Pakistan received approximately 30% and 70% of the total waters of the Indus rivers located in India. India’s eastern rivers have a mean annual flow of 40b/m3 while the western of Pakistan have an MAF of 100b/m3.

    • Regulation of water use:

    Use of waters of the eastern and western rivers are explicitly demarcated between India and Pakistan while limited usage of the other country’s rivers is also permitted for specific purposes that are of non-consumptive nature, like hydropower generation, fishing, etc.

    • Water rights:

    According to IWT, although the liberty to use unutilized water of the other country exists, the right over the water is not forfeited over time, even in case of repeated underutilization.

    • Conflict resolution:

    A Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) comprising commissioners from both India and Pakistan is provided for by the Treaty. The PIC serves as a forum for the exchange of hydrological data, information, and views on the implementation of the treaty and the resolution of disputes.

    Aftermath

    The treaty has survived several border skirmishes, terror attacks including the 26/11, and even two full-fledged wars in 1965 and 1971. The terms of water sharing as agreed upon have been adhered to despite such hostilities.

    After the 2016 Uri Attack on an Indian Army base in Jammu and Kashmir and the 2019 Pulwama Attack, threats of revoking the Treaty have been made by India but never materialised, as the Treaty continues to remain intact. However, according to the IWT, the bombing or destroying of dams, barrages, power stations, etc. located in the Indian part of the Indus basin by Pakistan violates the Treaty which can lead to its abrogation.

    Despite Pakistan’s repeated violation of the Treaty by using groundwater of Ravi and Sutlej areas of India for various uses before they cross into its area, and by constructing river training works to reduce river flooding in Pakistan and enhance flooding in India’s Great Rann of Kutch area; no concerns have been raised by the latter hereto.

    With the Treaty in place, several projects have been undertaken on the allotted rivers, India has constructed the Bhakra-Nangal and Salal dams for hydroelectric power generation. Pakistan constructed the Tarbela and Mangla Dams for water storage, irrigation, and hydropower generation.

    Shahpur Kandi and Ratle Projects:

    The Shahpur Kandi project of India over the Ujh river has been objected to by Pakistan for diverting waters of Ujh, a tributary of Ravi, an eastern river exclusive for India’s use. The dam was officially completed in February 2024.

    India’s ongoing Ratle Hydroelectric Project on the Chenab also made headlines, for Pakistan’s objection to its construction in the Indian area after its funding was finally approved in 2021. The dam would have an 850 MW generative capacity, for which a limited reserve of water is required to be reserved. This alarmed Pakistan as it claimed it would pose a risk of possible weaponization of water supply by India in wartime situations. Disagreement over the summoning of a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration as authorised by the Treaty for dispute resolution was settled in 2016 by the World Bank’s decision to let both motions proceed simultaneously. Later, India was allowed to construct the dam by the World Bank despite objections by Pakistan. The project is scheduled to commence operations in 2026.

    A Blueprint for Transboundary Water Cooperation

    The success of the IWT sets an example of how countries can overcome their political differences and contribute to an efficient system of shared resource governance. It successfully helped the Indian subcontinent evade a potential war between the two nuclear-armed states over the river basin, a model for other regions struggling with water scarcity and competition to follow.

    Climate change coupled with the construction of dams and barrages for water storage and regulation carries heavy ecological repercussions like the disruption of river ecosystems, aquatic habitats, and biodiversity of the concerned region. Consequently, endangering the livelihood of the nearby occupants, even forcing them to relocate.  Hence, such a cooperative regulatory mechanism must be in place to facilitate constructive dialogue towards incorporating environmental considerations into water management strategies to tackle and mitigate any negative repercussions.

    The Indus Water Treaty has demonstrated its efficacy as a significant diplomatic agreement between the two neighbouring states, consistently withstanding various challenges over time. The treaty primarily emphasises the importance of cooperation and diplomacy in resolving transboundary water disputes while also establishing a foundation and providing scope for potential future collaboration in numerous domains of shared governance.

    Proposals for its abrogation have been deemed impractical for both parties, as the treaty has endured for six decades. Nevertheless, there is a recognised need to re-examine, renegotiate, revise, and amend the long-standing Treaty to better address contemporary issues, including new ecological and climate change concerns, as well as evolving terms of negotiation.

     

     

    References:

    ET Online, (2024, February 26). India completely stops Ravi River water flow to Pakistan. Historical context and significance. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-completely-stops-ravi-river-water-flow-to-pakistan-historical-context-and-significance/articleshow/107980936.cms

    Gupta, M.S. (2024, February 25). Shahpurkandi dam complete after 3 decades, will help check unutilised Ravi water flowing to Pakistan. The Print. https://theprint.in/india/governance/shahpurkandi-dam-complete-after-3-decades-will-help-check-unutilised-ravi-water-flowing-to-pakistan/1978380/

    Gupta, S [The Print]. (2023, January 31). Understanding the Indus Waters Treaty & why India is pushing Pakistan for changes [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/pVp93u2IgSg

    MEA Media Centre, (1960, September 19). Bilateral/Multilateral Documents: Indus Waters Treaty. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (MEA, GOI). https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6439/Indus

    Samantha, P.D. (2023, January 31). The Indus Question: India, Pakistan and rivers of concern. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/analysis-india-pakistan-looking-to-exploit-resources-for-more-electricity/articleshow/97462196.cms

    Times Now Digital, (2018, November 7). Pak ‘diplomatic sabotage’ busted: India to go ahead with Ratle hydroelectric project, govt to send team to J&K. Times Now. https://web.archive.org/web/20190225224015/https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/pakistan-india-ratle-hydroelectric-project-indus-water-treaty-agreement-chenab-shahpur-kandi-dam-project-ujh-multipurpose-project-jammu-and-kashmir/310636

  • “And Now to some serious Governance”

    “And Now to some serious Governance”

    A time comes for each leader and government to rise above pettiness, discarding ill will and hatred towards all. For the BJP, now uniquely in its third term, this is the time to show the nation that it is a party with a difference. For the opposition equally, this is the time to cooperate with the government on critical issues impacting the country.  

     

    Since my retirement from active service, I have avoided politics and political writings like the plague, but the avoidable happenings of the past few months have caused me, like am sanguine would have to millions of our countrymen, pain and a sense of despair.

    India has conducted over 18   general elections to its Parliament since 1952 with a lot of fury and vibrancy, but the Lok Sabha 2024 general elections were indeed an example of abysmally low-level politics transcending our better senses.

            How the world’s largest democracy indulged in its Lok Sabha 2024 elections was hardly complimenting to it considering the unquestionable fact that among the emerging nations in the world, call it from the Global South, the conduct of our elections showed some among those participating in poor light. Between competing political parties, enlightened debates and mutual civility were sadly lacking.   India has conducted over 18   general elections to its Parliament since 1952 with a lot of fury and vibrancy, but the Lok Sabha 2024 general elections were indeed an example of abysmally low-level politics transcending our better senses. India, which carries a fair amount of moral authority and is considered an example of a true and vibrant democracy, cannot let its hallowed image be sullied attributable to the selfish electoral games of some of its political leaders. The party in power at the Centre, the principal Opposition party and all those regional parties at the helm in the states have to display adequate maturity and a modicum of propriety and civility towards each other and not politicize each and every aspect of governance or national issues impacting India. The opposition, as it shows the mirror to the government on critical issues of governance, must not criticise each and every act of the government as a matter of routine.

             With the outcome of the general elections now done and dusted and the previous BJP government back in power, albeit with a clear reduction in its seats tally from 303 down to 240, it must get down to the exacting business of good governance from the Centre. That the same government, with its experience of the last ten continuous years in power, fielding more or less the same faces in the Cabinet in critical ministries and importantly serviced by the same bureaucrats should have, relatively speaking, not such an arduous task in governance. However, the thrust for fair, equitable, and sensitive handling of all critical matters across the nation has to come from the top political leadership. All our states must never feel discrimination by the Centre, especially in financial allocations urgently required for developmental works and disaster management. Additionally, the new government must take stern measures to keep rising inflation and unnecessary governmental expenditure under check before the economy takes a severe nose-dive.

             The Modi government, with the continuous experience of the last ten years, will have more than a good idea of the systemic improvements required and about areas needing additional financial resources and effort. It is unnecessary to worry too much about criticisms from the opposition but to carry on regardless in developmental works, without fear or favour, and with impartiality towards all the states in the true spirit of federalism. A time comes for each leader and government to rise above pettiness, discarding ill will and hatred towards all. For the BJP, now uniquely in its third term, this is the time to show the nation that it is a party with a difference. For the opposition equally, this is the time to cooperate with the government on critical issues impacting the country.

             New Delhi’s hands will be full of the nation’s diverse and formidable challenges, requiring attention and effectiveness. On the foreign policy front, India will have to walk the tightrope of maintaining strategic autonomy and sustaining its good relations with both the US and Russia. However, as it determinedly confronts an overly assertive China, India needs to use its economic clout and sophisticated diplomacy to get its South Asian neighbourhood closer to it and each other, avoiding the debt trap diplomacy and financial machinations of China.

    The number of terror-related incidents in J&K has gone up substantially in the last three months, and Pakistan will have to be kinetically chastened.

          India must, at the appropriate level, convey to China that their confrontationist attitude towards us will be harmful to the Chinese, too and may propel India to rethink its existing Tibet policy. Nevertheless, India must maintain the utmost vigil along the 3485 km Line of Actual Control/ IB, which it shares with  China. Meanwhile, Pakistan once again needs to be cautioned against stepping up terror activities in J&K  or elsewhere in the Indian hinterland. India is in full knowledge of Pakistan’s many fault lines. Still, it has refrained from exploiting these, and Pakistan must also cooperate in ensuring a peaceful and prosperous South Asian neighbourhood independent of China’s wily stratagems. The number of terror-related incidents in J&K has gone up substantially in the last three months, and Pakistan will have to be kinetically chastened.

    Meanwhile, India’s preparations to successfully improve its security capabilities to confront a two-front war must go ahead with realism and an unfailing determination. Measures to augment capital expenditure for major defence acquisitions must be identified. Transformative defence reforms like the introduction of integrated theatre commands will need the attention of the Centre. In addition, India must take all steps to restore peace in our restive NE states.

             The Modi government has come in for some criticism abroad on its human rights record and dealings with its Muslim population. This unjust criticism must be dealt with judiciously and with maturity. India’s overall inclusiveness and celebration of its diversity are unique examples for the entire world, especially the nations of the Global South. We must never deviate or be even seen to shift from this noble orientation.

    Reduction of the yawning gap between the countless ultra-rich and those millions in abject poverty is essential as we boast of becoming the 5th largest economy in the world. The many human indices where we are faltering also need to be addressed.

             As economic strength is the pillar that propels and sustains progress, the Modi government must take measures to improve our economic health. Reduction of the yawning gap between the countless ultra-rich and those millions in abject poverty is essential as we boast of becoming the 5th largest economy in the world. The many human indices where we are faltering also need to be addressed.

             By all yardsticks, India is deservingly on the cusp of acquiring a seat on the global high table. Let us not squander away this golden opportunity by internal squabbling but instead work together in addressing crucial issues that affect our nation; we must seize this opportunity.

    Feature Image Credit:  vskbharat.com    

    Cartoon Credit: Times of India

  • Five Years without an Elected Administration: Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir

    Five Years without an Elected Administration: Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir

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    The Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir comprises an informal group of concerned citizens who believe that, in the prevailing situation in the former state, an independent initiative is required so that continuing human rights violations do not go unnoticed.

    This is the fourth annual report issued by the Forum, which has also issued two midterm and/or thematic reports). It has largely been compiled from government sources, media accounts (carried in well-established and reputed newspapers or television), NGO fact-finding reports, interviews, and information garnered through legal petitions. The various sources listed have been fact-checked against each other to ensure the information is as accurate as possible, and only that information has been carried that appears to be well-founded. Where there is any doubt regarding a piece of information, queries have been footnoted.

    Executive Summary

    In an additional counter-affidavit filed before the Supreme Court in July 2023 against petitions challenging the constitutionality of the Presidential Orders of August 5, 2019 (reading down Article 370 of the Indian Constitution), as well as the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act of August 9, 2019, the union Ministry of Home Affairs claimed that that the changes wrought by the two actions had ‘brought unprecedented development, progress, security and stability to the region.’

    The facts, however, suggest otherwise. In its three annual and two thematic reports, the Forum has documented over three dozen economic, political and social rights that have been violated between August 2019 and July 2022, including economic losses of over Rs. 50,000 crores at a conservative estimate, vitiation of land and domicile rights, marginalisation and even purges of local personnel in the civil and police services, questionable arrests under draconian legislation, communication bans, media intimidation, and routinised curbs on the freedom of expression and movement. Equally glaring, the right to representation has been denied for five years, as of June 2023.

    This report on the state of human rights in Jammu and Kashmir between August 2022- July 2023 finds that while there has been improvement on some parameters, human rights violations continue on most. Its findings are as follows:

    1. Civilian insecurity persists. Targeted attacks on Pandits and migrant workers – both Hindu and Muslim – continue. While the number of lives lost due to armed attacks and counter-insurgency operations was lower than in the previous year, the number of police personnel who died, including Central Reserve Police Forces (CRPF), continues to be unacceptably high. 71 CRPF troops were killed in the four years between 2019-2022, twice as many as in the previous four years, 2014-2018, when 35 died. By comparison, in the four years between 2012-2015, which can be categorised as an uneasy interregnum between the post-peace process years and the rise of conflict in the BJP-PDP coalition, 27 CRPF troops were killed.

    2. A high volume of small arms. In 2023, it was found that Jammu and Kashmir had the largest number of licensed gun holders amongst union territories and the highest per capita amongst states as well as union territories, at 500,105 in June 2023, or four per hundred people.

    3. Resurgence of militancy in Jammu. After decades of peace, the bordering areas of Poonch and Rajouri districts in Jammu division are re-emerging as a locus for militancy with cross-border support from Pakistani-held territories of the former state. The 2022 delimitation of fresh legislative constituencies, adding Poonch and Rajouri to Kashmir’s Anantnag, may have added to the alienation that these Muslim-majority areas face with the sharpening of communal divides in Jammu. Increasing weaponisation through Jammu’s village defence guards, a problematic policy that the Forum highlighted in its 2022 report, has added further insecurity in the region. As has the 2023 Jammu and Kashmir Scheduled Tribes (Amendment) bill, which has pitted Paharis against Gujjars and other listed scheduled tribes of the region.

    4. Continuing civil rights abuses. There has been no improvement in gross violations of the freedom of expression and movement, especially the rights of the media to a safe working environment. Arrests under draconian legislation such as the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) and the Public Safety Act (PSA) continue, despite judicial attempts to limit their application. Along with Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir has the highest rate of undertrials as a proportion of its prisons population, at 91 percent, considerably higher than the national average of 76 percent.

    5. Custodial deaths and overcrowded prisons. The Jammu and Kashmir courts have flagged overcrowding and negligence as causes of custodial deaths. The region’s prisons can house a total of 3,629 inmates, but they lodged 5,300 as of June 2023.

    6. Denial of political rights. Two issues of political rights dominate this year’s report. The demand for an assembly election in Jammu and Kashmir; and the demand for a legislative assembly in Ladakh, along with rights under the sixth schedule of the constitution of India.

    Elections. It has been nine years since the last legislative election in Jammu and Kashmir. The union administration accepted the delimitation commission’s report a year ago and it is eight months since fresh electoral rolls were prepared. All the preparations for an election have thus been completed, but the election commission has yet to announce dates for it. Despite their valid criticisms of the delimitation commission’s report, Jammu and Kashmir’s political parties have demanded that the election be held this year (2023). Fresh reservations to woo new constituencies through four bills scheduled to be introduced in the monsoon session of parliament will, if enacted, entrench caste-based voter mobilisation. One of them was debated on July 26.

    Ladakh Kargil and Leh, the two districts of Ladakh, have united around the demand for an elected administration with substantive powers over economic and social development such as those provided under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian constitution, or, alternatively and it seems preferably, the grant of statehood. The union administration has repeatedly promised to discuss the inclusion of Ladakhis in the sixth schedule, but little has resulted. Given Ladakh’s geo-strategic location, bordering both Pakistan and China, the union administration might prefer to govern the union territory directly. However, direct administration has resulted in alienating Ladakh’s elected councillors as well as its people, both of which impact negatively on Indian democracy as well as national security.

    7. A record year of tourism in 2022 boosted the economy, but it still lagged behind the national average on per capita income and rates of growth. The multidimensional poverty index for 2023 showed an impressive reduction in the proportion of its population living in poverty from an estimated figure of 12.56 percent in 2015-2016 to 4.8 percent between 2019-2021, but it ranked sixth out of eight union territories on the sustainable development goals (SDG), with Ladakh at seventh. Its forest cover decreased from 39.66 percent to 39.15 between 2020- 2021.

    8. Unemployment and drug abuse. At 23.1 percent in March 2023, unemployment was almost three times the national average of 7.8 percent. According to the union ministry of health, Jammu and Kashmir are among the top two states and union territories for drug abuse, with an estimated 900,000 habitual drug users, roughly 1 in 130.

    9. Data scarcity. There is a paucity of readily available figures for the former state. Though the 2023 budget presentation for parliament forecast a NSDP growth rate of 14.9 percent for Jammu and Kashmir in 2022-2023, the economic survey of 2023 said that figures for its per capita NSDP were not available from 2019 to date, as did the 2022 Reserve Bank of India statistics on states.

    Air Vice Marshal Kapil Kak (Retd) is a Distinguished Fellow and a member of the Governing Council of The Peninsula Foundation (TPF). He is a member of the Forum for Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir.

    Disclaimer: The views represented herein are those of the Forum and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Peninsula Foundation, its staff, or its trustees.

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  • The South Asia Nuclear Zero

    The South Asia Nuclear Zero

    The nuclear tests, of May 1998, by India and Pakistan, marked an epochal juncture for South Asia. The Doomsday Clock maintained by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, jumped from 11:43 to 11:51, or just “9 minutes to midnight.”

    While, in India, the “Shakti” tests, do find celebratory mention, Pakistan observes the Chagai series of nuclear tests, as a national day, termed “Yom-e-Taqbir.” On the 25th anniversary of this event, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai (Retd), currently, advisor, to Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA), delivered an address at the Arms Control and Disarmament Centre of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.

    Kidwai, who served, for 14 years, as the Director-General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division (SPD), was at the heart of Pakistan’s NCA, and oversaw the operationalisation of its nuclear deterrent. Although his talk was for public consumption, given the historic absence of an Indo-Pak nuclear dialogue, some of Kidwai’s statements – if taken at face value – contain worrisome undertones, which need analysis.

    After mentioning the rationale for Pakistan embarking on nuclear weaponization (“humiliation of the 1971 War followed by India’s nuclear test of May 1974”) Kidwai proceeded to enlighten the audience about the implications of Pakistan’s new policy of Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) and how it kept, “India’s aggressive designs, including the Indian military’s Cold Start Doctrine, in check.”

    While retaining the fig leaf of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), Kidwai went on to mention the “horizontal dimension” of Pakistan’s nuclear inventory, held by the individual Strategic Force Commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force. The “vertical dimension,” of the Pak deterrent, he said, encapsulated “adequate range coverage from zero meters to 2750 km, as well as nuclear weapons of destructive yields at three tiers: strategic, operational and tactical.”

    While the missile range of 2750 km, corresponds, roughly, to the distance from a launch-point in south-east Sindh, to the Andaman Islands, and indicates the “India-specificity” of the Shaheen III missile, it is the mention of “zero metres” that is intriguing. Pakistan already has the 60 km range, “Nasr” missile, projected as a response to India’s Cold Start doctrine. Therefore, unless used as a colloquialism, Kidwai’s mention of “zero metres” range could only imply a pursuit of ultra short-range, tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), like artillery shells, land mines, and short-range missiles, armed with small warheads, of yields between 0.1 to 1 kiloton (equivalent of 100 to 1000 tons of TNT).

    By shifting from CMD to FSD, with the threat of nuclear first use, to defend against an Indian conventional military thrust, Pakistan is aping the, discredited, US-NATO Cold War concept of Flexible Response. Fearing their inability to withstand a massive Warsaw Pact armoured offensive, this 1967 doctrine saw the US and NATO allies deploy a large number of TNW to units in the field.

    However, the dangers of escalation arising from the use of TNW were soon highlighted, by US Secretary Defence, Robert McNamara’s, public confession: “It is not clear how theater nuclear war could actually be exe­cuted without incurring a very serious risk of escalating to general nuclear war.” This marked a turning point in US-NATO nuclear strategy.

    Kidwai’s speech contains three statements of note. Firstly, he attempts to dilute India’s declared policy of “massive retaliation” (MR), in response to a nuclear strike, by claiming that Pakistan possesses an entire range of survivable nuclear warheads of desired yield, in adequate numbers, to respond to India’s MR. He adds, “Pakistan’s counter-massive retaliation can therefore be as severe (as India’s) if not more.”

    Far more significant is Kidwai’s declaration that, since Pakistan’s missiles can threaten the full extent of the Indian landmass and island territories, “…there is no place for India’s strategic weapons to hide” (emphasis added).

    Secondly, in an attempt to downplay India’s (inchoate) ballistic missile defence (BMD), he declares that in a “target-rich India”, Pakistan is at liberty to expand the envelope and choose from counter-value, counterforce and battlefield targets, “notwithstanding the indigenous Indian BMD or the Russian S-400” (air-defence systems).

    Far more significant is Kidwai’s declaration that, since Pakistan’s missiles can threaten the full extent of the Indian landmass and island territories, “…there is no place for India’s strategic weapons to hide” (emphasis added). The assumption, so far, was that, given its limitations in terms of missile accuracy, real-time surveillance and targeting information, Pakistan would follow a “counter-value” or “counter-city” targeting strategy. The specific targeting of India’s nuclear arsenal, especially, if undertaken by conventional (non-nuclear) missiles, would add a new dimension to the India-Pakistan nuclear conundrum.

    Delivered in the midst of Pakistan’s acute financial crisis, as well as the ongoing political turmoil and civil-military tensions, one may be tempted to dismiss Lt Gen Kidwai’s recent discourse. However, as the longest-serving, former head of the SPD and architect of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent, his views are widely heard and deserve our attention.

    Having voluntarily pledged “no first use” (NFU), India’s 2003 Nuclear Doctrine, espoused a “credible minimum deterrent” and promised “massive retaliation,” in response to a nuclear first strike. Since then, our two adversaries, China and Pakistan, have expanded and upgraded their nuclear arsenals, presumably, with corresponding updating of doctrines. India’s strategic enclave has, however, not only maintained a stoic silence and doctrinal status quo but also defended the latter.

    BJP’s 2014 Election Manifesto, had undertaken to “revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine and to “make it relevant to current times,” but this promise has not been kept. Thus, India, currently, faces a moral dilemma as well as a question of “proportionality”: will the loss of a few tanks or soldiers to a Pakistani nuclear artillery salvo, on its own soil, prompt India to destroy a Pakistani city of a few million souls? Since India, too, has developed a family of tactical missiles, capable of counterforce strikes, does it indicate a shift away from CMD and NFU, calling for a response from our adversaries?

    These are just some of the manifold reasons why there is a most urgent need for the initiation of a sustained nuclear dialogue between India and Pakistan, insulated from the vagaries of politics. Such an interaction, by reducing mutual suspicion and enhancing transparency, might slow down the nuclear arms race and mindless build-up of arsenals.

    This article was published earlier in Indian Express.

  • Squaring the Circle

    Squaring the Circle

    John Paul Rathbone, writing in the Financial Times, on the United Kingdom’s efforts to transform its military amid public spending constraints and growing strategic challenges, puts it extremely well when he wonders as to how its military will “square the circle of being everything, everywhere, all at once.” 

    This, however, is not just a problem that afflicts the UK or its European and NATO Allies, but the rest of the international community as well. The impact of the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict, in what increasingly appears to be an unwinnable war, is restricted not only to the geo-political or and national security spheres but also calls for a clear understanding of how future conflicts will play out and what kind of a military capability is essential if that country is to remain relevant in the changing global order.

    In our context, the challenges are far more complex and greater as we face two hostile neighbours, both nuclear armed, and unwilling to give any quarter. Indeed, it is quite ironic that while China poses the greater threat to our aspirations, ambitions and future prosperity, it is the dysfunctional and dystopian Pakistan, that threatens us with Armageddon, looking to take us down with it, as it seems intent on committing hara-kiri. 

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  • The Implications of Pakistan’s Implosions

    The Implications of Pakistan’s Implosions

    “Much like in Pakistan, religion and ethnicity are increasingly seen as tools to spread divisiveness aimed at fulfilling political agendas”.

    As we watch Pakistan crash and burn on live television, it is too early to say if we are witnessing the beginning of the end or just the end of the beginning. Even in this age of misinformation and deep fakes what can be said with certainty is that, much in the manner of Humpty Dumpty, Pakistan has had a great fall and all the Imrans, Shariefs, Bhutto’s and Asims put together, can never make Pakistan whole again.

    Of course, none of this was unexpected. We have seen Pakistan slowly go bankrupt, with inflation soaring and its currency collapsing as the impact of climate change, the pandemic, endemic corruption and sheer mismanagement have taken their toll, leaving its economy in tatters. While always known for its rather rumbustious politics, with opposition parties at each other’s throats and the military always looming over their shoulders, this time things seem a bit different.

    For one, the Army’s image has been badly scorched with public accusations of corruption against the top brass, which has lost much of its public support and created cracks within its ranks. Now, as per unconfirmed reports, dissensions at the very top, have adversely impacted its cohesion. Add to that increasing terror attacks by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), radicalisation within and troubles in the provinces, especially Balochistan. All in all, it has been lashed by a perfect storm for some time now, and something had to give. So, it did, with Imran Khan’s arrest becoming the hair that broke the proverbial Camel’s back.

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  • Punjab: On The Boil Again

    Punjab: On The Boil Again

    Punjab—the land of saints and seers, the granary of India, nursery of the nation’s exceptionally gallant soldiers and outstanding sportspersons— appears to be once again, sliding to the brink of militancy largely attributed to religion-based secessionist motivations of a few extremists. That it is also fuelled by Pakistan’s sinister Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and its well-funded stooges abroad brooks no elaboration.

    It will be prudent to recall that in the late 70s, Pakistan’s military dictator President Gen Zia-ul-Haq had conceived his infamous K-2 strategy (Kashmir and Khalistan) to foment trouble in two of India’s strategic border states of Kashmir and Punjab. Since then, till date, Pakistan has relentlessly strived to plant the seeds of terrorism, religious strife and lawlessness in these border regions. That turmoil and militancy did affect Punjab also in the 80s cannot be denied. Ultimately, the patriotism of the sturdy Sikhs coupled with firm handling by the Centre and state governments and embellished by strong and effective state police leadership under officers like Julio Ribeiro and KPS Gill had curbed the insurgency in Punjab. Those dark days did throw up vital lessons for all stakeholders to imbibe and implement to prevent such recurrences. But as usually happens with most establishments, a sense of déjà vu takes over till the next crisis occurs! The current state in Punjab is no exception.

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  • Indus Waters: Yawning Gap Between Threat and Reality

    Indus Waters: Yawning Gap Between Threat and Reality

    World Bank brokered the IWT between India and Pak after many years of intense negotiations to allocate the waters of the Indus river basin

    The Narendra Modi government has decided to start talks with Pakistan on the Indus Waters Treaty, and rightly so. After the Uri incident, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had said that “blood and water cannot flow together”. The reality, however, is that while flow of blood can be stopped, the water will continue to flow. The geography makes it next to impossible for the waters from the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum. Yet there is reason to revisit this treaty, because of Pakistan’s persistent misuse of the provisions of the IWT that enable it to adopt a dog in the manger attitude to prevent or delay any development of hydel projects on the three rivers that is permitted by the treaty. This must stop.

    The Indus rivers system has a total drainage area exceeding 11,165,000 sq. km. Its estimated annual flow stands at around 207 km3, making it the twenty-first largest river in the world in terms of annual flow. It is also Pakistan’s sole means of sustenance. The British had constructed a complex canal system to irrigate the Punjab region of Pakistan. Partition had left a large part of this infrastructure within Pakistan.

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