The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Nationalism

  • The Dark Side of Sindhi Nationalism in Pakistan

    The Dark Side of Sindhi Nationalism in Pakistan

    “If Sindhudesh is created, the feudal lords will kill us”1.

    These were the words of the late veteran Sindhi leader Rasool Baksh Palijo. As a Marxist, he had fully dedicated himself to the popular causes, fighting for the constitutional and legal rights of Bengalis, Balochs, Sindhis and minorities. His almost life-long antagonism to Sindhi Secessionism underlines the structural problems plaguing the province of Sindh, caste being at the centre of it. The problems have manifested themselves politically in numerous instances, beginning with the separation of Sindh from Bombay Province in 1936, and the Pakistan Movement itself. After the Partition, the Ashrafiya-Savarna alliance2 –which views the Sindhi society in terms of non-antagonistic Hindu-Muslim binary, while comfortably brushing casteism under the carpet– has been at the forefront of this. In fact, the alliance is a recent (re)construction, which happened as a result of the marginalisation of Ashraf Sindhis at the hands of Mohajir and Punjabi elites that began immediately after independence. Similarly, Sindh’s turn to Sufism, which mostly took place in the colonial era3, and was later adopted by Sindhi Secessionists as one of the most defining identities of the Sindhi nation, itself has its underpinnings in the caste system. It is then no surprise that a section of Sindhis –mostly of the lower castes– has opposed the idea of Sindhudesh.

    For the last few years, Indians have been at the receiving end of the BJP-sponsored narrative of Pakistan being on the brink of breaking up into four or five states, one of them being Sindhudesh. Indian Sindhis (like myself) are thrilled with such conceptions. Little is known about the sociological background of the Sindhi National Movement. A look into that might answer why the movement has not succeeded politically. In this article, I discuss the cases of two communities that have largely stayed out of the nationalist movement: the Haris and Dalits.

    Are Sindhis Casteless people?

    The vehement assertion, especially by the Sindhi diaspora, of Sindhis being casteless is remotely the truth. Sindhis, both Hindus and Muslims, practise the caste system as religiously as the rest of the Indian society.

    The vehement assertion, especially by the Sindhi diaspora, of Sindhis being casteless is remotely the truth. Sindhis, both Hindus and Muslims, practise the caste system as religiously as the rest of the Indian society. In Muslims, the Syeds –who claim to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad– occupy the top-most strata, followed by other Ashrafis belonging to Central Asian, Iranian and Arab descent, as well as the Balochs and Pathans communities. The Pirs or spiritual leaders, who have wielded considerable political power during the colonial period, also largely fall into the upper castes. They are followed by Waderas and Sammats who constitute the landowning class, that has traditionally wielded the socio-economic power in rural Sindh. Then there is the Hari community, composed of landless labourers. Among Hindus, there are, among others, the Brahmins, Rajputs, Amils – the civil servant caste, Bhaibands – the caste of businessmen, and Dalits. While most Amils and Bhaibands migrated to India after the partition, some Brahmins, Rajputs and Dalit pockets remain intact. Some districts –Tharparkar, Tando Allahyar and Mirpurkhas– have a huge population of Dalits.

    Around 59 upper castes –both Muslim and Hindu– and 22 feudal families make up the ruling class in rural Sindh.4 Since Pakistan has no custom of caste census, we do not know how much they are over-represented in its political institutions. However, an analysis by Ghulam Hussein in his paper Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism in Sindh, Pakistan states that the Dalit community is highly underrepresented in Sindh Provincial Assembly –with only one out of nine reserved seats for minorities going to a Dalit; though the number is higher in local bodies. After the partition, as analysed by Hussein, the Syeds were the beneficiaries of the Hindu Migration to India as far as representation in the assemblies is concerned, since they occupied most of the seats vacated by Caste Hindus. The number of Scheduled Castes representatives, however, remained the same as that before the partition, despite them becoming the majority within the minority. Similarly, Pasmanda Muslims, that are unacknowledged by Pakistan to be existent, are also under-represented. Furthermore, more than a quarter of Sindh’s Members of Provincial Assembly (MPAs) in the 12th Assembly were professional landlords5.

    Casteism makes no appearance in Sindhi nationalist debates. One argument given by the Sindhi nationalists is that being a predominantly Islamic society, caste is non-existent among Sindhis.

    Casteism makes no appearance in Sindhi nationalist debates. One argument given by the Sindhi nationalists is that being a predominantly Islamic society, caste is non-existent among Sindhis. Instead, many ‘progressive’ Sindhi writers have displayed sympathy for the working classes instead of the lower castes. For Hindu communities, though they acknowledge the presence of caste, they quickly turn towards the benefits of reservation. Hussein writes, “In the Sindhi nationalist historical imaginary, casteism does not seem as problematic as sectarianism, religious bigotry and ethnolinguistic discord”6. In some instances, the Sindhi community as a whole is presented as Untouchables within Pakistan, thereby drawing a parallel between oppression of the Dalits and state oppression of Sindhi Secessionists/Nationalists7.

    The Rural Setting of Sindh: The oppression of the Hari Community

    Mohammed Ibrahim Joyo, another Marxist leader of Sindh during the colonial era, in his short book, Save Sind, Save the Continent (From Feudal Lords, Capitalists and their Communalisms), wrote about the exploitative nature of the rural setting dominated by Pirs, Waderas and Syeds. He, much like Palijo, identifies the local Syeds, Pirs, Hindu moneylenders, Zamindars etc., and not the Europeans, as the real enemies of the people of Sindh. For him, the Zamindars and Jagirdars, present themselves as “semi-gods to their peasant slaves”. Their only mission in life is to “vitiate the entire social fabric of life around”. “Periodically, they bestir themselves and make themselves available for snatching votes and forcing consent from the people, so that they could rule over them ‘democratically’”. For the Haris, he writes, ‘‘the only duty they know is to work like bullocks for their landlords and money-lenders, to touch the feet of their Zamindar-Masters and Pirs, and worship them literally as living gods, and lastly to instruct their children to do likewise’’8

    Ghulam Murtaza Syed (hereafter referred to as Syed), the Father of Sindhi Nationalism and a product of the ruling class in Sindh, attributes the setting to the administrative measures of the colonisers, which led to coming into “existence [of] a limited new hierarchy of fat landlords, absentee, indifferent, unenlightened and in some cases oppressive and tyrannical”9. “The great community of peasants became a crowd of ‘tenants at will’ without any permanent or substantial stake in its own occupation.” Syed, in his speeches and writings, is heavily critical of the established elite and seems to favour the upliftment of the conditions of the Haris. He places a ‘potentiality for evil’10 upon the Zamindars, who are involved in most of the crimes, some of which include kidnapping the women of the Haris.

    Despite the concern shown by Syed in his disquisitions, many Sindhi leaders remained suspicious and mistrustful of him. Though Palijo, Joyo and a few other leftist Sindhi leaders were once his companions, and despite them having some ideological affinities with him, they were largely opposed to his goals. They viewed Islam and the notion of Social Justice it emanates as a panacea of all social ills, as opposed to Syed who detested, at least after 1973, the role of religion in a modern state. They, nonetheless, remained on good personal terms with Syed. Their antipathy to Syed’s ideas stemmed, among others, from his personal conduct. Despite all the sympathetic speeches and writings, Syed continued to behave as an Ashrafiya, wearing white clothes to display his purity and detachment from worldly matters. The peasants who worked for the leader regularly touched his feet to ask for favours11.

    Hamida Khuhro, another associate of Syed to later part ways, describes it as ‘Syedism’, which, according to her, was his first and most constant ideology12. It is similar to the politics of patronage that characterises the entire subcontinent, but with some Sindhi blend of reverence of Syeds and Pirs. As per Oskar Vekaaik, author of Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan, Syed was brought up with the idea of Syed as a spiritual hero to the Hari working for him. “Rather than the people of flesh and blood working on his fields, however, he soon took the Hari as an abstract or imagined category including all landless Muslim peasants in Sindh. He saw the Haris as an exploited and backward people, who needed to be freed and uplifted. To him, this was the main task of the Syed”13.

    The province of Sindh is (in)famous for being one of the last strongholds of feudalism. During the British conquest of Sindh in 1843, the province had one of the most repressive feudal systems in the entire subcontinent. The British, having no coherent and consistent agrarian policy –they first introduced the ryotwari system only to abandon it later– didn’t endeavour to undo the socio-economic control of Waderas. These Waderas performed, and still do, many functions in rural Sindh, including quasi-judicial and tax collection. The system served the limited purpose of the British to collect taxes and transportation of raw materials. Charles Napier even regarded them as Sindh’s natural aristocracy. Thus, the dovetailed interests of Waderas and the British led the landlord class to flourish14. The power of Waderas grew so much during British rule that at the time of partition, around 80% of the province’s arable land was owned by them.15

    To be fair, the concerns of the Hari community did occupy, though didn’t dominate, some mainstream Sindhi political debates. Syed, as one of the proponents of their upliftment, has been a vocal critic of their oppression. Other leaders, such as Hyder Baksh Jatoi, M.A. Khuhro, etc. had built their careers on issues of Haris. However, the social background of Sindhi Nationalist leaders, and their daily actions that go against their words, have prevented the landless labourers from supporting their cause. This is corroborated by what Imdad Qazi, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Pakistan, told Hussein in an interview, “Marxists, both Leninists and Maoists, parted ways with the nationalists in the 1970s. When the barrage-lands were allotted to peasants, Nationalists stood with Marxists, but when Marxists spoke about land reforms, Nationalists left us”16

    It is, thus, the rural setting of Sindh which makes leaders like Palijo suspicious of, and even antagonistic to, the intentions of Sindhi secessionists. The Syed-Pir-Wadera alliance which has continuously exploited the Haris for centuries has made them committed, though dissenting, citizens of Pakistan.

    Manifestation of Nationalism

    The predilection of Sindhi nationalists towards Ashrafiya-Savarna symbolism is conspicuous. For instance, in his book, and otherwise as well, Paigham-e-Latif, G.M. Syed not only declared Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, a Syed, as the national poet of Sindh but went as far as to justify his own genealogical superiority by tracing his lineage to the late mediaeval poet17. Furthermore, in his book A Nation in Chains- Sindhudesh, he first propounded the idea of Raja Dahir, the Brahmin king during the invasion led by Muhammad bin Qasim in 711 AD, as a national hero (which was a response to the state-sponsored narrative of tracing the history of Pakistan to the invasion).18

    The issues were taken up by Sindhi nationalists who also represent the Ashrafiya-Savarna bias. Take for instance the issue of religious conversion of Sindhi Hindus. By confining their opposition to conversion under the bracket of religious freedom, they conveniently bypass their Dalit identity –since most of the converted people are Dalits– thereby serving Savarna Hindu causes. Another example is the incursion of Punjabis and Army personnel (Pakistan has a policy of allocating land to retired army men) which is, perhaps, most detested by Sindhi nationalists. Punjabis, who have been migrating and settling in Sindh for more than a century, and have developed agricultural practices that yield more than those employed by Sindhi feudal lords, are seen as a major threat to Ashrafiya domination. Thus, the issue of Punjabis settling in rural Upper Sindh becomes one of the most potent rallying points.

    Sufism is perhaps the most defining feature of Sindhi Nationalism. Nationalists project Sindh as a land of Sufi saints, with some figures, such as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, being identified with the Sindhi nation itself. Sufism, however, is used as a soft power by the Syeds to perpetuate their domination.

    Sufism is perhaps the most defining feature of Sindhi Nationalism. Nationalists project Sindh as a land of Sufi saints, with some figures, such as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, being identified with the Sindhi nation itself. Sufism, however, is used as a soft power by the Syeds to perpetuate their domination. The Pirs, most of whom are Syeds and local agents of Sufism, have traditionally had more power than the local Mulla. Their huge following has given them enormous influence over the lives of ordinary people. In fact, to be a be-Pir, or without a Pir, was traditionally seen as tantamount to being a non-believer. With such hegemonic power of Sufism of the local Pirs –described as Political Sufism– renders irrelevant caste one of the most important factors in micropolitics. Sufism, furthermore, augments the power of the Syeds, who already have huge amounts of land gifted to them by successive rulers, including the British.19

    Conclusion

    Since the death of G.M. Syed in 1995, the Sindhudesh Movement has been dying out. Since then, the movement has suffered blows from the Pakistani Army that, among others, led to the poisoning (most probably by ISI) of Bashir Ahmad Qureshi in 2012. Moreover, it stands divided, with numerous factions of Syed’s Jeay Sindh Mahaz propping up since the 1980s. However, the core support bank of the movement –the rural Syed, Pirs and Waderas remain, more or less, supportive of the movement. Though electorally, they desert the nationalists and vote for Bhutto’s People’s Party of Pakistan. The movement, however, still remains less popular amongst the Haris and Dalits. The latter has been deemed politically absent by the nationalists. The former, though appearing in nationalist discourses, have been disenchanted with their conduct, which contradicts their words. The writers and leaders of the movement have carefully projected their struggle narrowly against the actions of, what they deem as, Punjabi-dominated Pakistan. Their concerns regarding the injustices being done by the state far outweigh the concerns for the injustices they themselves have been unleashing upon their fellow Sindhis for centuries.

    References

    1. “Biggest problem is structural: Palijo” The Dawn, August 19, 2003

    https://www.dawn.com/news/135713/biggest-problem-is-structural-palijo

    2. The term is borrowed from Hussain, Ghulam. “Appropriation of Caste Spaces in Pakistan: The Theo-Politics of Short Stories in Sindhi Progressive Literature” Religions 10, no. 11: 627. 2019 https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10110627

    3. Boivin, Michel. The Sufi Paradigm and the Makings of a Vernacular Knowledge in Colonial India: The Case of Sindh (1851–1929). Palgrave Macmillan. 2020

    4. Hussain, Ghulam. “Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism in Sindh, Pakistan”. Journal of Asian and African Studies Vol 1 Issue 30. 2019

    5. Kronstadt K. A. “Pakistan’s Sindh province”. Congressional Research Service. 2015. October 29 https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/sindh.pdf

    6. Hussain, Ghulam.. “Appropriation of Caste Spaces in Pakistan: The Theo-Politics of Short Stories in Sindhi Progressive Literature” Religions 10, no. 11: 627. 2019 https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10110627

    7. Ibid.

    8. Joyo, Ibrahim M. Save Sind, Save the Continent (From Feudal Lords, Capitalists and their Communalisms). Karachi. 1946.

    9. Ibid

    10. Ibid.

    11. Verkaaik, Oskar. “Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan.” International Review of Social History, vol. 49, 2004, pp. 65–86. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26405524. Accessed 6 Jun. 2022.

    12. Ibid.

    13. Ibid

    14. “Sind and Its Pirs up to 1843.” Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947, by Sarah F. D. Ansari, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 9–35.

    15. Kronstadt K. A. “Pakistan’s Sindh province”. Congressional Research Service. Washington D.C. 2015. October 29. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/sindh.pdf

    16. Hussain, Ghulam. “Ethno-Nationality of Caste in Pakistan: Privileged Caste Morality in Sindhi Progressive Literature and Politics”. Critical Sociology. 2021. 48(1):127-149

    17. Ibid

    18. Syed, Ghulam M. A Nation in Chains- Sindhudesh. 1974.

    19. Ansari, Sarah F.D. Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.

  • Nationalism Today: A Threat to Democracy and Multilateralism?

    Nationalism Today: A Threat to Democracy and Multilateralism?

    The idea of ‘nationalism’ and a sense of cohesive national identity has existed perhaps longer than the system of modern nation-states came to be. Except for a few, every empire, kingdom, and the territorial state tried to legitimise and conceptualise its authority in the minds of its citizens through ideology. A phenomenon that recurs throughout history, nationalism has only recently taken on the connotations it holds today: a malignant force that separates and divides rather than unites and deteriorates rather than improves.

    A phenomenon that recurs throughout history, nationalism has only recently taken on the connotations it holds today: a malignant force that separates and divides rather than unites and deteriorates rather than improves.

    In the contemporary context, this phenomenon presents across the world and appears to be accelerated by the current global pandemic. If one begins their survey at the Westernmost end, it is easy to witness this wave all over: in the United States, ahead of the elections, with Trump’s white supremacist, protectionist agenda underlined by anti-immigration measures; further in Europe, the rise of nationalist parties in Italy and Spain; Russia’s stifling of dissent and opposition under the mandate of national security, Viktor Orban’s rule by decree-law in Hungary to take over complete control in the Covid-19 backdrop- and further east, India’s and China’s majoritarian movements reflecting minority suppression and territorial aggression respectively.

    Considering these developments, the looming health crisis appears to be the catalyst for the rise of this aggressive, exclusionary brand of nationalism, or as observers have called it, hyper-nationalism. But looking beyond the surface one can discern the vast backdrop of a competitive international system that allowed these movements to become the popular political tool of the time.

    The past decades were characterised by some major changes in the international order; most importantly, the transition from a unipolar world under American hegemony to an emerging multipolar polar one with the rise of Asian powers and a Russia hoping to regain its superpower status. Economic ebbs and falls, the climate crisis, and a shift from multilateralism and globalism was the backdrop against which China grew as a rule-maker in the international system. China’s rapid rise as a global power gives the spectre of a possible bipolar world.

    Akin to the Cold War, wherein ideological systems competed, this decade in the post-COVID-19 world is also marked by alliances, power clusters, challenges to the globalised economy, and the visible fragility of the liberal democracy. While nations like the US prompt the liberal world to identify China as the face of the abstract systemic threat to the framework of democracy, liberalism and multilateral cooperation, the real danger may lie elsewhere. Besides coronavirus and the human tragedy, it evoked, the endemic threat to the norms and values of the democratic order is most likely internal and to be found in the political weaponry of modern democracy.

    What does nationalism mean as a value? To a nation-state, creating a sense of allegiance to the nation-state is extremely important and vital to its survival. Nationalism may be a force of resistance against oppressive authorities, or toward self-determination. The Irish and Indian national movements against colonisation, for instance, were nationalistic struggles that established self-governance in these countries and were spearheaded by the people themselves. However, nationalism may also manifest as state-led, systemic, and top-down approach under the authority of a populist leader who commands the support of many. An example is Mussolini’s fascist movement in Italy, prompted by the poverty and economic downfall of the interwar period.

    Triggered (although not caused) by extreme crises like the pandemic, this kind of nationalism uses a nationwide problem to appropriate control and stir political unrest.

    What we see in the world today is ostensibly the latter: aggressive, top-down nationalism where individuals and groups have little organic agency or innovation. Triggered (although not caused) by extreme crises like the pandemic, this kind of nationalism uses a nationwide problem to appropriate control and stir political unrest. These forms of control may involve excessive use of the police apparatus to restrict movement, a suspension of electoral or democratic processes and accountability mechanisms, or the use of the pandemic to enforce identity politics against minorities. In India, the police crackdown on the Shaheen Bagh riots in January 2020, a series of protests against the discriminatory Citizenship Amendment Act, is an example along with the United States’ successive episodes of racially motivated police brutality against African Americans. In Hungary, Orban has been pushing towards a regionalist, Christian, Central European community at the expense of minorities and immigrants (while heavily militarising Budapest in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic).

    This causality, somewhere in the 21st century, seems to have weathered down and given way to   monolithic ideas of territoriality, authority, centralisation, and capitalism, propelled especially by the role of contemporary social media.

    Nationalism has historically been espoused with democratic revolution and civil rights movements. In the French Revolution, the Irish Independence movements, and the colonial liberation movements of many other colonies, nationalist movements allowed a people to unite for a secular, democratic cause: self-determination. Even as of the late 20th century, nationalism served to demolish imperialism, colonialism, and dictatorships giving rise to civil rights, suffrage, labour rights, and even the welfare states. This causality, somewhere in the 21st century, seems to have weathered down and given way to   monolithic ideas of territoriality, authority, centralisation, and capitalism, propelled especially by the role of contemporary social media. The question that we must ask is this: Is the current flavour of nationalism serving any advantage to strengthening the democratic apparatus? Does it help make our leaders accountable, our parties representative, and our economies more resilient to face unexpected crises?

     
    Image credit: vocal.media

  • PDC 6: Concept and relevance of Nationalism in the 21st century

    PDC 6: Concept and relevance of Nationalism in the 21st century

    PDC Past Event :  25th Jan 2020

    The concept of nationalism and its influence in shaping the modern world system is undeniable. According to Anderson, humans consider themselves as part of imagined communities based on some common features and derive collective responsibility to that idea. This feeling over time results in identifying a language, shared heritage, and so on to develop uniqueness and distinctness of their community from others. Across history, there are various instances of multiple nations existing under a common kingdom like the Roman Empire, Austria-Hungary, etc. However, post the thirty year war and the Treaty of Westphalia, modern nation states evolved and nationalism became a primary force in shaping these entities. This found its final expression in John Locke’s philosophy that rejected the divine rights of the king and stressed that all persons are endowed with natural rights, and rulers failing to protect them should be removed, with force if necessary. These rising concepts drove the masses towards liberty, equality and fraternity resulting in the French revolution and the American war of independence. The race between powerful states and the spread of colonialism ensured that a national identity could be forged only with a population within a defined territory, ruled by a legitimate government. This Western notion of modern nation states was applied to all regions of the world, altering the natural course of evolution of the nationalism process in these regions. From Africa to Asia, territorial claims and the forging multiple nations to form nation states resulted in various challenges that still remain. For instance, Iraq was formed based on its oil reserves and not in its civilizational bonds. It brought forged the Shia, Sunni and Kurd communities with differing histories and no common bond into a single nation state, resulting in a fragile state with implications even felt today.

    Interestingly, globalisation and its standardising imperatives have stimulated nationalism rather than dissolving its validity. It is argued that self- determination in the 21st century, especially when the global culture is increasingly unified, intensifies due to revival of nationalism. As communication and movement is eased, often the unique identity is weakened. These disruptors to national identities are seen as threats, which is used by politicians and world leaders to strengthen the existing uniqueness of their states. However, these nationalistic drives disregard the diversity that exists in each nation state, creating domestic challenges, particularly for minorities. Electoral politics further divides the people by creating a nation of us vs them, often painting others as potential threats. This has manifested into modern challenges of immigration, terrorism and so on. The rise of hypernationalism in modern day politics can be traced along these lines. By imposing a common national identity, it affects the subnational sentiments of the people since nationalism is more local than national. Singapore, for instance, thrives by creating an equal space for the various sections of its people. While nationalism is a requirement for the functioning of any nation, hypernationalism is a threat to its very existence.