The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Modi

  • India-Australia Strategic Partnership: Leveraging Aerospace Capacity

    India-Australia Strategic Partnership: Leveraging Aerospace Capacity

    Category : India India’s, Military, India-Australia Relations
    Title : India-Australia strategic partnership: Leveraging aerospace capacity
    Author : M Matheswaran 02-06-2020

    The forthcoming virtual summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison assumes considerable significance for an India-Australia strategic partnership, particularly as it comes against the backdrop of heightened friction with China for both countries. Enhanced defence cooperation between the two countries could be an important signal to Beijing of the costs of overly assertive strategic behaviour – whether in the Himalaya or in trade. For some years, defence cooperation has largely focused on the naval relationship. Now is the time for enhanced air-power cooperation.

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  • President Trump’s India Visit : Balancing Optics with Substance

    President Trump’s India Visit : Balancing Optics with Substance

    As President Donald Trump arrives in India today, 24 February 2020,on his maiden official visit to India,  there is significant level of discussions amongst the academics, strategists, and foreign policy experts about whether this visit is more about optics than substantive discussions on strategies and agreements to strengthen the US-India strategic partnership. On arrival the president’s first public engagement is a super spectacle, ‘Namaste Trump’ at the new Motera Stadium in Ahmedabad that will have more than 100,000 people, which is Prime Minister Modi’s way of reciprocating for ‘Howdy, Modi’ at Houston last year. Most opine that while Mr Trump’s visit will be packed with pageantry, it will be light on policy and therefore, unlike previous presidential visits this one may not yield many break-through agreements. There are, however, some important developments that are very unique to the Trump-Modi era when compared to the previous visits of American presidents. Both leaders excel in showmanship and also in projecting strong nationalistic orientation to each one’s domestic constituency. Trump, with his transactional and disruptive approach comes off as more unpredictable when it comes to foreign policy and strategic issues.

    Politics and Showmanship

    It has taken Mr Trump, more than three years since he assumed office to visit India. This could mean that India was not a high priority for the Trump regime in the initial years, or as it turned out India was not the target of Trump’s disruptive strategy that he employed against USA’s traditional allies, China, Russia, and others. The final year of a POTUS term is generally termed as the ‘lame duck year’, where very few presidents have had a good last year and many were hampered by major controversies. It is important to note that India is the first country that President Trump is traveling to after his impeachment trial. There is more to Mr Trump’s India relationship than just this visit. One must remember that he is a shrewd businessman, and even before he became the president, India was already home to the most Trump ventures outside of North-America.  While India’s strategic importance is well recognised by all presidents since Bill Clinton, President Trump’s approach is considerably different than the others. His daughter Ivanka Trump made headlines when she visited Hyderabad, as White House Advisor, for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit in Nov 2017 and the prime minister broke protocol to host a dinner in her honour.

    That the Trump administration has followed a calibrated strategy of recognising and enhancing PM Modi’s image for significant gains to the American defence industry in particular is evident. The current visit, therefore, focuses primarily on strengthening strategic partnership issues in areas such as defence trade, intelligence sharing, counter terrorism, and visa issues. American side may make a token mention about Trump’s offer to facilitate improvement of India-Pakistan talks, China and issues of religious freedom.  However, these will get swamped by the more visible spectacle that will be on display at Ahmedabad and Agra.

    Defence Relationship – the most substantive progress

    India – US defence partnership has progressed significantly over the last decade and a half. The two militaries are exercising together more frequently than ever, and the strategic interactions are moving more towards equitable approach to various aspects. The Trump administration has covered significant ground in nudging India, despite its reluctance, towards partnerships such as the ‘Quad’ and moving towards interoperability by concluding various agreements including the foundational agreements through Defence-Trade-Technology relationship mechanisms.

    Defence trade between the two countries has grown exponentially since 2007. Two major procurements are likely to be signed by the Indian government during this visit: acquisition of 24 Sea-Hawk naval multi-role helicopters (NMRH) from Lockheed Martin worth $ 2.6 billion for the Indian Navy and six AH-64E Apache attack helicopters from Boeing worth $ 930 million for the Indian Army. Both procurements will be through the FMS (Foreign Military Sales) route. Trump administration cleared the decks for enhanced defence cooperation with India by approving India as a major Non-NATO defence partner in 2019, thus smoothening the process for exporting or selling hi-tech weapon systems to India. This is often confused with India becoming a major Non-NATO ally, which is clearly not the case.

    What is clear is that the US has secured major business deals with India to its great advantage, without India gaining much in terms of technology access or industrial production of hi-tech weaponry. The US objective is clearly to wean India away from its heavy dependence on Russian weaponry and secure much broader business relationship with American arms industry. The MIC (military industrial complex) of the USA is clearly focused on India now as its major avenue of business in the 21st century. The Americans were clearly unhappy that India went ahead with S-400 purchase from Russia despite the threat of CAATSA. That India has decided to buy an air defence missile system from the US, again through FMS route, worth $ 1.9 billion seems to be a compensation for such a decision.

    The US-India defence deal will scale $ 20 billion this year after the Trump visit. Many of these weapon system procurements, in terms of numbers, are not of a scale sufficient to create major industrial partnerships for manufacturing. India, however, will need to look at ways and means of acquiring significant technologies from the US through joint ventures, co-design and co-development. Otherwise, there lurks the danger of India being trapped in an all too familiar pattern of buyer-seller relationship rather than as strategic partners.

    Strategic gains?

    The visit’s focus is in areas of trade, defence, counter-terrorism, energy, and co-ordination on regional and global issues. These are areas in which considerable ground has been covered and is a continuing process. The agreement on trade deal, which was keenly expected, has been deferred. With President Trump accusing India of high tariffs and dashing all hopes of a deal before the visit, it is clear that the USA intends to push hard for favourable access to Indian markets for American companies. There are some positives that are emerging. The prospects for increased collaboration in space between ISRO and NASA looks bright.

    The focus of the American side is primarily on Defence trade.  Increase in investments in defence production may become a possibility with major projects in the pipeline. Both Boeing and Lockheed Martin are pushing hard for IAF’s 114 aircraft order, which will be processed under the strategic partnership model of ‘Make in India’ program. This could expand the production run to over 200 aircraft. Similarly, the naval  helicopter (NMRH) procurement has a possibility  of expanding into ‘Make in India’ project for over 100 helicopters. Boeing’s S-76D is a contender for Navy’s utility helicopter procurement under ‘make in India’ program.

    The spectacle of this visit will certainly contribute to both leaders’ constituencies, for President Trump’s re-election campaign and for PM Modi it may divert people’s attention from current issues of flagging economy, Delhi electoral reverses, the Kashmir issue and ongoing protests on CAA and NRC. India however, will need to negotiate hard and leverage the expanding defence business to address technology access and  strengthen Indian industry by enabling them into global supply chain. For this the Indian establishment will need to see well beyond the optics to assess real gains.

    Air Marshal M Matheswaran AVSM VM PhD (retd) is the President of TPF and a former Deputy Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff.

     

  • A step closer to N-triad deterrent

    A step closer to N-triad deterrent

    PM Modi announced with justifiable national pride on November 6 that India’s first nuclear-propelled submarine, INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, was now operational as an integral part of its nuclear deterrent. India earlier had the capabilities to launch nuclear weapons from the air, mounted largely on its Mirage 2000 and Jaguar, and by land-based missiles, ranging from Agni 1 (700-900 km) to Agni 5 missiles (5,500 km). Its aim has been to develop a ‘credible nuclear deterrent’, with capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons from multiple locations to strategic areas in its nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Pakistan.

    Arihant provides India with a capability to hit either neighbour from 300 m under the sea. The sea-based missiles envisaged for this purpose are Sagarika (750 km range) and K-4 (3,500 km). While land-based missile sites can be destroyed, a submarine-based deterrent is virtually impregnable against a missile attack. India is the only country with a sea-based N-deterrent, which is not a Permanent Member of the UNSC. India will soon operationalise a second nuclear submarine (Arighat), and is expected to have a fleet of four by 2022.

    According to US Federation of Nuclear Scientists, India currently possesses 130-140 nuclear weapons, while Pakistan has 140-150 and China 280. While India tested its first nuclear weapons in 1998, Pakistan’s first test was in 1990, on Chinese soil.

    In a recent book, Thomas Reed, a US nuclear weapons designer and former Secretary of the US air force, stated that China’s ‘Pakistan nuclear connection’ can be explained in the following words: ‘India was China’s enemy and Pakistan was India’s enemy. The Chinese did a massive training of Pakistani scientists, brought them to China for lectures, even gave them the design of the CHIC-4 device, which was a weapon that was easy to build — a model for export.’ Gary Milhollin, another expert, remarked: ‘Without China’s help, Pakistan’s bomb would not exist.’ China has also provided Pakistan the designs of its nuclear weapons, upgraded its ‘inverters’ for producing enriched uranium in Kahuta and provided it with plutonium reactors to build tactical nuclear weapons in Khushab and Fatehjang. Pakistan’s ballistic and cruise missiles are replicas of Chinese missiles.

    India’s N-doctrine stated that its weapons would only be used in retaliation against a major attack on Indian territory, or on its forces anywhere, in which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are used. But Pakistan does not have a formal doctrine. The long time head of its Nuclear Command Authority, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, however, said over a decade ago that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were ‘aimed solely at India’ and Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquered a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroyed a large part of its land and air forces. He also held out the possibility of the use of weapons if India tried to ‘economically strangle’ it, or pushed it to political destabilisation. Pakistan’s statements in recent years have, however, indicated that it would not be averse to using tactical nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict with India.

    China, like India, also had proclaimed that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. But it has been ambiguous if this applied to India. China has maintained a measure of ambiguity on its ‘no-first-use’ pledge. This became evident when China’s foreign ministry spokesman (in 2004) rejected a suggestion from External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh that both countries should adopt a ‘common’ nuclear doctrine. Subsequent discussions between Indian and Chinese experts have suggested that China maintains deliberate ambiguity on its doctrine when it comes to dealing with India. Many ask if this is meant to signal to Pakistan that China will come to its aid in any nuclear exchange Pakistan may have with India, even if initiated by Pakistan. This ambiguity adds to India’s determination to strengthen its ‘triad’ of land, air and sea-based nuclear weapons. Agni 5 missiles can target China’s populous east coast. Within the next four years, we would have an adequate sea-based deterrent to deter China from holding out credible nuclear assurances to Pakistan that it would intervene should India choose to respond to use, or threats of use, of tactical weapons by Pakistan.

    While India has a streamlined nuclear command structure headed by the PM and Cabinet Committee on Security, it needs to revamp the archaic structure of its Ministry of Defence (MoD). The key military figure in the command structure is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who generally holds office for less than a year; hardly enough time for him to become familiar with the complexities of the command. Repeated proposals, including from defence committees and task forces, recommending the appointment of a full-time Chief or Defence Staff, or Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, who will hold charge of the command and report to the political authority, have gathered dust in the offices of the MoD bureaucracy.

    The MoD needs to be reorganised. Recommendations for such change, even from the Parliament Standing Committee of Defence, lie unimplemented. We recently acquired our desperately needed first batch of artillery guns after the ’80s’ Bofors controversy. This happened even as detailed designs for 155 mm Howitzers provided by Sweden were gathering dust for two decades. There is also surely something wrong if it takes over a decade to acquire fighter aircraft, even as the IAF is facing a shortage of around 30 per cent in the sanctioned strength.

    Ambassador G Parthasarathy  IFS (Retd) is the former High Commissioner to Pakistan and is a trustee of TPF. 

    This Op-Ed was published earlier in ‘The Tribune’ on November 15th.