Tag: Insurgency

Depending on the context, these uprooted and redundant young people can become terrorists, child soldiers, members of youth gangs that dominate the suburbs from Paris to Rio, drug cartels, mafia gangs, or human traffickers.

With the end of the Cold War in 1991, interstate war seemed to have said goodbye. But even then, there was no end of history, as Francis Fukuyama had assumed. Instead, interstate war was largely replaced by wars of intervention in weak states and civil wars. At the latest since the war in Ukraine, however, interstate war is back on the agenda and a new arms race has begun – the wars of the present have been nationalized. What is often overlooked, however, is that civil wars have not completely ceased to exist but have been replaced by gang wars. This will be analyzed here using the example of South American gangs, but it applies equally to large parts of Africa, Iraq, or Southeast Asia.

A Brief Review

In order to analyze this, a brief review is necessary. After the fall of the USSR, a return to the Middle Ages was diagnosed in security policy, and a return to pre-modern weapon carriers such as child soldiers, warlords, and private security companies. After the attacks of September 11, the fight against a new totalitarianism, this time Islamist, seemed imminent, and the “war on terror” was proclaimed. Meanwhile, China and Russia have re-emerged as serious rivals to the U.S., at least militarily, and a new arms race is on the horizon. The U.S. has been weakened by its lost wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which even the much-vaunted and overestimated military-technological revolution could not stop.

While in the 19th century the Western states conquered the whole world, in the 20th century the defeated empires and civilizations had to learn to live with the victorious West, and now the resurgent empires and the West have to learn to live with each other.

Are there long-term trends in this rapid succession of different experiences and analyses of violent events? Two immediately come to mind: the “rise of the others,” as the influential US columnist Fareed Zakaria has called it, that is, the resurgence of the great empires and civilizations submerged by European colonization and US hegemony. These are primarily China and India, but also Russia and the littoral states of the North Pacific. In short, world affairs are shifting from the North Atlantic to the North Pacific. Whereas the entire 20th century was dominated by the North Atlantic littoral states (with the exception of Japan), in the 21st century there are at least two such centers: the North Atlantic littoral states and the North Pacific littoral states.  Here, the United States has the unbeatable geostrategic advantage of being located on both oceans. These former great empires and civilizations have almost one goal: to no longer be considered underdeveloped or backward by the states of the West, but as equals. While in the 19th century the Western states conquered the whole world, in the 20th century the defeated empires and civilizations had to learn to live with the victorious West, and now the resurgent empires and the West have to learn to live with each other.

more and more people are becoming aware that Western modernity has a Janus face.   What is the hallmark of Western modernity: human rights, democracy and the emancipation of women, or colonialism, racism, two world wars?

While until well into the 20th century many assumptions were that the values of Western modernity would spread throughout the world, more and more people are becoming aware that Western modernity has a Janus face.   What is the hallmark of Western modernity: human rights, democracy and the emancipation of women, or colonialism, racism, two world wars? And even Auschwitz was not carried out by “barbarians” but by the Germans, of all people, who are often associated abroad with Goethe, Schiller, Bach, Beethoven, and Mozart.  The opposing interpretations either argue that this is regrettable but has nothing to do with the nature of the West. And conversely, critics of the West argue just as one-sidedly that Western values are just empty words, and that the reality of Western politics is characterized by colonialism and racism. And Donald Trump’s current polemic against female Democratic Party politicians with immigrant backgrounds is racist, colonialist, and hostile to women. And the fact that there has been no outcry from the liberal West against this polemic may even indicate a concealed complicity because we Europeans also come to terms with racist and colonialist stereotypes. Donald Trump’s racism can be summed up in the simple formula: Make America white again. People of a different skin color or origin are only tolerated as long as they fit into the new hierarchy.

Racist polemics like those of the new right in Europe, of White Power in the U.S., or even of Bolsonaro’s movement in Brazil can really only be understood against a backdrop of fundamental insecurity and grievance. The West feels deeply offended that the “others” who were always seen as less developed no longer want to copy it, and full of fear that they could even overtake the West. Fear rules the politics of the West, fear of the end of its feeling of superiority and of the fact that nothing could then be left if one no longer feels superior to the others.  Freely according to the motto: I am nothing, I can do nothing, but I am German – and this shows its ugly grimace in hate speech and violent outbursts. But we are not alone in this respect. For alongside the resurgence of the Others, which is significant in terms of world politics, civil wars around the world are turning into gang wars – the political community is disintegrating into ever new gangs. This has not been adequately perceived in the West until today because we have not been able to describe this process adequately with our conceptual system. In Western thought, the paradigm of Thomas Hobbes from the 17th century is still valid. It states that in a theoretically constructed state of nature, which always occurs when there is no longer a functioning state, the “state of nature” of the “war of all against all” occurs. In this conception, everyone is absolutely free and has a right to everything he can take, provided he has the power to do so. This life, however, according to Hobbes, is full of violence and fear eats the soul. To overcome this self-destructive “state of nature,” all individuals transfer all violence to a single sovereign, who in return provides them with protection and security. In this simple construction the modern state was born, secured by the state monopoly of violence. Here, only the state has a right to legitimately exercise violence, and non-state violence is criminalized.

Gang Wars

What is not included in this construction are gangs – groups of mostly young men left over from the civil wars since the end of the Cold War, uprooted in the refugee movements, or who have lost their identity in the dramatic transformation process we trivialize as globalization. Depending on the context, these uprooted and redundant young people can become terrorists, child soldiers, members of youth gangs that dominate the suburbs from Paris to Rio, drug cartels, mafia gangs, or human traffickers. The context varies, but the cause is the same everywhere: these young people feel marginalized, superfluous, and uprooted. Approaches that have analyzed related global violence have almost always emphasized individual violence or violent enrichment. Of course, there are civil war economies, markets of violence, and state collapse, including “new wars” (Kaldor and Münkler) characterized by the privatization and economization of violence and asymmetric warfare against the weakest in societies. In such markets of violence, people are traded first and foremost, and about 79% of them are women and children, but also weapons, drugs, rare earths, and the well-known blood diamonds as a synonym for precious stones. In many countries, however, violent gangs play at least as large a role.

A characteristic feature of these gangs is that they are not exclusively concerned with private enrichment through violence, but paradoxically give their members a sense of identity and even home through their violence. This paradox is not provided for in our conceptual system for understanding violence.  Islamist terrorism can in no way be attributed to the pursuit of material interests. It is true that the Islamic State also used oil and that the Taliban dominate the opium trade in the Golden Crescent between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. This only proves that there is a link between political and economic struggles, not that the struggles for recognition and identity in these organizations are economically determined. This means that there is still a link between violence and the market, perhaps it has just become more “invisible”, more visible at the micro level. Macro-violence, on the other hand, is increasingly characterized by struggles for identity and recognition.

If we say there is a transition to a global war of all against all, I think there is a global transition to gang wars. These may or may not be youth gangs. Drug cartels and mafia organizations can also be based on gang structures. Of course, economic interests play an important role here, but I doubt that cohesion is guaranteed by economic interests alone. One example is the Japanese Yakuza. What are gangs?  A gang is a group that originally formed spontaneously and socializes and integrates its members through fighting and conflict. Typical behaviors include meeting in person, hanging out and occupying public space, traveling in a group, and having a high propensity for conflict – such as rocker groups.

Many children, adolescents, and young adults in Central and South America are active members of youth gangs called “maras” or “pandillas”.

The result of this behavior is the development of a distinct tradition, an unreflective internal structure, an esprit de corps, paradoxically solidarity and morality within the group, and a sense of belonging to a unified territory.  The leader must constantly maintain a threatening gesture against his own and also constantly rekindle the waning enthusiasm of his followers; in other words, respect for him must be constantly maintained. Many children, adolescents, and young adults in Central and South America are active members of youth gangs called “maras” or “pandillas”.

After the end of the civil wars in Nicaragua in 1990, El Salvador in 1992, and Guatemala in 1996, there was a forced migration of illegal immigrants from the U.S. to their home countries, including the deportation of Central American-born members of street gangs formed in the U.S. to their parents’ home countries.  These young people had fled poverty and civil war, formed criminal gangs (maras) primarily on the West Coast of the U.S., and were now forced to return to their home countries, which they may never have seen. Back in Latin America, the mareros regrouped and received a large influx of both young people looking for direction and demobilized security forces and guerrillas (there were about 40,000 of them at the time).

The most important aspects of a Latin American gang member’s life are honor, drugs, and violence. This is what a pandillero’s entire daily life revolves around, and in most cases, it also determines the when, how, and why of his death. In the gangs, there is a certain code of honor that states that gang solidarity and reputation are more important than anything else.  In a sense, the honor of the gang becomes the transcendence of the members, as the collective as such is religiously exalted and the individual counts for less and less. The individual is obligated to kill unconditionally for the honor of the group or die himself. There is also a paradoxical construction in another point: on the one hand, there is an absolute hierarchy, on the other hand, there is a feeling of being a gang: “We rule the barrio so that no one tells us what to do. If someone does, we silence them. You submit because we are many. We young people rule.  The response of the pandillero in a world where he is nothing is to attack, to dominate the barrio, to submit because he is submitted, to define a territory because he lives in uprootedness, to join an institution that gives identity because he lacks it. The pandillero strives to dominate in an environment that excludes him.

Whoever belongs to a pandilla must not only master the exercise of violence, but must also be able to accept the suffering of violence. The initiation rituals for men and women are different: men must allow themselves to be beaten by existing members of the gang for a certain period of time, which varies from gang to gang, while women must allow themselves to be raped by any member of the gang. The unimaginable extent of violence in Central American youth gangs is an indication that gangs cannot be attributed to interests alone, for although these interests may be predominant in the exercise of violence, they are unlikely to play a role in voluntary submission to the group, self-sacrifice for it, and endurance of violence. Rather, the recognition by group members of having endured violence is the central aspect of one’s identity and loyalty to the gang. This is the too often overlooked connection between the wars of states and parastatal organizations (IS, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards) and the violence that takes place on a mass but individual level (Hobbes, war of all against all). They cannot be attributed to either level, but are the intermediate realm, the hybrid between the two.

Feature Image: Salvadoran left wing revolutionary group Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front