Tag: Inflation

  • Macrovariable Projections in Uncertain Times

    Macrovariable Projections in Uncertain Times

    International factors and faulty data will impact India’s projections of GDP, inflation and balance of payments

    The Fed has raised its benchmark interest rate again by a whopping 0.75%. The Reserve Bank of India has also been forced to raise interest rates further but also take other steps. These decisions in the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting are based on what the members of the MPC see as the likely course of…

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  • India is not the Fastest Growing Big Economy

    India is not the Fastest Growing Big Economy

    A closer look at recent data on GDP shows that the numbers are flawed and recovery is incomplete

    The Provisional Estimates of Annual National Income in 2021-22 just released show that GDP grew 8.7% in real terms and 19.5% in nominal terms (including inflation). It makes India the fastest-growing major economy in the world. Further, the real economy is 1.51% larger than it was in 2019-20, just before the…

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  • Will Government Steps Tame Runaway Inflation?

    Will Government Steps Tame Runaway Inflation?

    “The steps announced by the government are only a first step. Prices of essentials have to be brought down (not just rate of inflation) and wages indexed to inflation”

    WPI rising at 15.08% in April 2022 has set alarm bells ringing in the government. Not only has the WPI been rising at above 10% per annum for over 13 months, but it has also been rising faster since February 2022. In other words, it has accelerated. Of course, the war in Ukraine has impacted it but it had been rising rapidly prior to that. In November 2021 it had risen by 14.87%. It moderated a little till January 2022 and then again rose.

    In November 2021 the government had cut taxes on petro goods to bring down their prices. Now the government has again cut these taxes in the hope of moderating inflation. By restricting the exports of wheat and sugar it seeks to lower their prices. Additionally, it has acted to lower the prices of basics like steel, cement and plastics. These steps should help moderate inflation. The issue is how much and whether it will benefit the citizens, especially the marginalized ones?

    Acceleration and Generalization to all Commodities.

    When indirect taxes are levied on basic items of production, they feed into the price of all other products. For instance, if the price of energy rises, since it is used in all production, the price of all products rises – there is a generalized price rise. If the tax on diesel is raised, transport costs, cost of running pumps in the fields and electricity generated using diesel rise. Similar is the case with coal, cement, steel and plastics. So, one way of lowering the rate of inflation is to reduce taxes on these basics.

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  • Examining the Policy Effectiveness of Negative Interest Rates: A Case Study on Japan

    Examining the Policy Effectiveness of Negative Interest Rates: A Case Study on Japan

    As a global health crisis ravages across the world, central bankers have rushed to lower rates to historic levels in an attempt to soften the economic blow of the pandemic. Since the crisis hit in early 2020, interest rates have been slashed across the globe on 37 separate occasions. Almost all major economies have cut their policy rates and many are at near-zero levels. In light of this economic climate, the debate on whether negative interest rates could prove effective in adverse conditions has come to the forefront again.

    As of today, 5 economies in the world follow a negative interest rate policy (NIRP).  In 2012, Denmark was the first country to announce negative rates, subsequently followed by the Eurozone, Switzerland, Sweden and Japan.

    The decrease in interest rates is not a new phenomenon, rates have been sliding globally for the last 30 years [1]. This trend has been more pronounced since the financial crisis of 2008. While many economies have reached the theoretical zero lower-bound of rates, some have even dared to venture below the surface into negative territory. As of today, 5 economies in the world follow a negative interest rate policy (NIRP).  In 2012, Denmark was the first country to announce negative rates, subsequently followed by the Eurozone, Switzerland, Sweden and Japan. While the very concept of negative rates may seem baffling, it’s even more shocking to note that over $15 trillion’ worth of bonds is traded at negative yields globally [2]. This means that over 30% of the world’s investment-grade securities are traded in a manner such that lenders pay borrowers to use their funds.

    Negative Interest Rates in Theory

    Interest rates have widely been regarded as the most powerful weapon in a central banker’s arsenal. Until very recently, their only limitation seemed to be the zero-lower bound beyond which bankers have had their hands tied. However, with Denmark’s policy rates going negative in 2012, this limit seems to have been breached. In theory, the NIRP is put in effect by central banks making the policy rate or repo rate (rate at which banks park their funds with the central bank) negative. While the negative rates directly apply only to banks, its effects are transmitted to the entire system by effectively lowering overall real interest rates. Central banks envisage that negative policy rates would induce increased spending and stimulate the economy in two ways – firstly, by forcing banks to hold lesser deposits with the central bank and channelling these funds into increased lending to households and businesses. Secondly, a cut in the policy rate would also lead to lower rates in the overall lending market, thus encouraging borrowing and spending.

    This policy, however, is riddled with several loopholes and works only under certain conditions. There has also been evidence of unwanted externalities associated with negative rates. The experience of the 5 economies which implemented the NIRP has been mixed and there is no consensus so far among economists and policymakers on the merits/demerits of the policy.

    Japan’s Tryst with Negative Rates: A Case Study

    In 2016 the Bank of Japan (BOJ), facing a relentless battle against deflation and a depreciating Yen, decided to venture into negative territory and has stayed there ever since.  The Japanese economy’s long downward spiral began with the real-estate asset bubble bursting in 1989-90. While Japan’s ‘lost decade’ is a widely known concept, many academics argue that Japan has lost more than a decade and has not fully recovered yet. The economy has been in first-gear ever since the crash – today, almost 30 years hence, the Nikkei 225 is still languishing at about 40% of its 1989 peak [3].

    Over the years, the BOJ has tried almost every trick in the trade – low rates, printing more money, rounds of quantitative easing, you name it and it has been done already. But much like a car stuck in the mud, the Japanese economy just seems to be spinning its wheels in one place. It is in this backdrop that the BOJ pulled out one last trick up its sleeve, announcing a negative interest rate regime.

    What Did Japan Hope to Achieve Through the NIRP?

    To combat deflation, the BOJ has long been involved in multiple rounds of aggressive bond-buying, hoping to inject more cash in the economy. According to data from the BOJ statistics portal, the central bank has been purchasing bonds worth 8-12 trillion Yen per month consistently. This has led to a mammoth increase in the bond holdings of the BOJ and also the monetary base of the Japanese economy. This has had two direct implications –

    • Japanese banks were now flush with money but this did not translate into increased lending activity. Rather banks were now parking this excess cashback with the central bank as reserves, thus defeating the purpose. It has been estimated that over 90% of the new money created by the BOJ since 2013 has ended up back with the central bank
    • The downside of this aggressive bond-buying policy was that Japan had now accumulated a mountain of debt. As of 2020, Japan was the most indebted nation in the world, with its debt accounting for over 234% of its GDP [4]

    The BOJ hoped that the NIRP would help address both these concerns. By announcing a 0.1% negative interest rate on excess reserves, it hoped to force banks to hold lesser reserves with the BOJ and use the money for lending purposes. On the other hand, negative rates would also help ease the burden of interest payments on the national debt.

    Reasons for Failure of NIRP in Japan

    While the NIRP did succeed in its immediate goal of reducing banks holdings with the BOJ, it has failed to stimulate bank lending. Instead, Japanese banks are now looking to park their funds elsewhere, to beat the low returns at home. With rates at historic lows in Japan and lacklustre borrowing sentiment from households and businesses, banks have turned to foreign investments to rake up profits. The NIRP, rather than stimulate the economy through increasing lending has instead spurred a massive outflow of funds in favour of overseas assets. As a result, Japanese banks hold nearly 20% of the world’s CLO’s (collateralized loan obligations) [5]. The foreign investments of the Japan Post Office Bank (owned by the government) alone stood at $630 billion as of 2020, showing glimpses into the outflow of reserves from the domestic economy.

    The NIRP, rather than stimulate the economy through increasing lending has instead spurred a massive outflow of funds in favour of overseas assets. As a result, Japanese banks hold nearly 20% of the world’s CLO’s (collateralized loan obligations).

    The failure of the NIRP to stimulate domestic spending and investments has shown that the Japanese economy faces several structural challenges that need to be addressed first. Given Japan’s ageing workforce, it will not be easy to discourage households from saving, especially in the current economic climate. Unless businesses and households are willing to spend or invest, the availability of cheap loans is redundant. No matter how low the BOJ pushes interest rates, the economy cannot be revived unless the structural bottlenecks subduing growth are addressed.

    Policy Shortcomings of the NIRP

    Japan’s case and the experiences of the other four economies have highlighted several loopholes in the NIRP. While it has been successful in reducing commercial bank holdings with central banks, it has not managed to translate this into lending activity. As in the case of Japan, banks can always find other ways to make use of excess funds. Even if banks manage to pass on the negative rates to the general public, households would continue to hoard cash in the form of mattress money, thus defeating the purpose of the policy. Take Sweden’s case for example – despite having negative rates, Sweden still has the 3rd highest household savings rate in the world.

    The NIRP has also been associated with several unwanted externalities –

    • Decreasing Bank Profitability

    Negative rates can destabilize the entire banking system by adversely affecting bank profits. In the Euro-zone alone, banks have transferred $24.2 billion to the European Central Bank (ECB) as negative fees in the five years since negative interest rates were introduced

    • Create asset bubbles

    A negative rate regime could also lead to the creation of property and other asset bubbles. Since rates are low (or negative) for cash holdings, people tend to invest in real estate or other tangible assets, thus driving up prices.

    • Erode Pension Funds

    Many academics believe that negative rates would hurt economies in the long run by eroding pension funds. This could potentially be a major cause for concern for countries like Japan which have an ageing population

    Is the NIRP here to stay?

    Despite its long list of flaws and potential side-effects, nations still seem to be sticking with the NIRP, with trends showing that even more may follow suit soon. Given the current economic climate, central bankers are left with no choice but to continue with low rates – that they do so despite its shortcomings speaks volumes of the precarious global economic conditions. The NIRP however, cannot be written off as a completely failed policy as it has shown that it can be successful under certain conditions. In Switzerland for example, the NIRP has been largely successful in helping depreciate the Franc (to keep exports competitive) and maintaining exchange rate parity in the face of large foreign inflows into the country. Switzerland’s experience is replicated in Sweden, with negative rates helping boost exports, although not substantially.

    Different nations have had different motives for venturing into negative territory – while countries like Japan wanted to stimulate inflation, others like Switzerland and Sweden were more interested in maintaining their exchange rates. Success or failure of the NIRP depends on the prevailing conditions of the economy and the desired end-goals that countries are after. Since it has been a relatively new policy, countries are still in the phase of experimenting with negative rates and it is too early to draw conclusions on their successes and failures.  On whether the NIRP is an effective policy tool, the jury is still out.

     

    References

    [1] Neufeld, D. (2020, February 4). Visualizing the 700-Year Fall of Interest Rates. Visual Capitalist. https://www.visualcapitalist.com/700-year-decline-of-interest-rates/

    [2] Mullen, C & Ainger, J. (2020, November 6). World’s Negative-Yield Debt Pile Has Just Hit a New Record. Bloomberg Quint. https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/negative-yielding-debt-hits-record-17-trillion-on-bond-rally#:~:text=The%20market%20value%20of%20the,it%20reached%20in%20August%202019.

    [3] Tamura, M. (2019, December 29). 30 years since Japan’s stock market peaked, climb back continues. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/30-years-since-Japan-s-stock-market-peaked-climb-back-continues

    [4] World Population Review. (2020). Debt to GDP Ratio by Country 2020. Retrieved from https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-national-debt

    [5] Japanese banks own 20% of collateralized loans market – survey. (2020, June 2). Reuters. https://in.reuters.com/article/japan-economy-boj-loans/japanese-banks-own-20-of-collateralised-loans-market-survey-idUSL4N2DF1LP

     

    Image Credit: www.gulftoday.ae

  • India’s Farm Distress: Priority and a Challenge for the New Government

    India’s Farm Distress: Priority and a Challenge for the New Government

    Manjari Balu                                                                                                         May 30, 2019/Analysis

    A deliberate campaigning strategy of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has yielded an expected victory in the 2019 Lok Sabha election. The election season had sparked off many appealing promises; one of them pertains to, agriculture, the most critical sector of the Indian economy. The agriculture sector contributes to 12.2 % of the GDP (it has fallen from 17.6% in 2004-05 to 12.2% in 2016-17) for the year 2017-2018 and roughly employs 50 % of the total workforce. The agrarian structure continues to suffer while political parties competed on the delusory promises during the campaigns. NDA government with a special focus on agrarian society has branded its promise to double each marginal farmer’s income by 2022. A pedestrian cash transferscheme has been propelled during the interim budget to provide INR 6000 (per year) to all the marginal farmers who hold less than 2 hectares of land. A valid scepticism about the promise stems out of the fact that there exist an unavailability of data about the farmers’ income and all the political parties refuse to talk about the farmers’ current income. Cash transfer scheme being an attempt to mollify the accumulated antipathy among the public especially farming community has to be scrutinized and put under the radar for substantial discussion.

    Agriculture Distress and the Marginal Farmer

    According to last published NSSO figures for the years 2012-13, farmers’ income averaged out to INR 6,424. Extrapolating the past data to arrive at the 2018-19 income using Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) to the nominal gross value added components of agriculture, cash transfer of 6000 would account for merely 6 % of the total farmers’ income. The Chief Economic Advisor claimed that the annual transfer to marginal farmers would be 17 %, an assertion backed with no clarification. The nebulous methodology to estimate income seems to question the effectiveness of such a policy instrument to address the perennial agricultural distress.

     The agrarian economy has been volatile over the past few years and the well-being of the farmers have always been the litmus test to review the performance of the sector. Around 87 % of the farmers are small and marginal farmers with less than 2 hectares of land holding, this figure seems to be swelling- indicating an objective failure of the land consolidation reforms in the past few years.

     There is a steady decline in the population engaged in agriculture to the total percentage of employment since the beginning of the independence. Displacement of agriculture labours to other sectors is inevitable if there is a gradual policy shift to mechanization of agriculture and capital formation, the eventual effect of the investment is ought to be reflected in the productivity. But between the years 2011 and 2015, agriculture workforce declined by 12.6 million, and the labour force increased by 14 million but total employmentin the economy increased only by 12 million. The incongruity in the figures proves the inability of the nonfarm sector to absorb residual workers out of work. Further, it is erroneous to premise the out of work farm labourers as an ultimate result of only innovation in agriculture. Status of unemployment has to be confessed and measures to provide employment has to be prioritized. It is apparent that the incumbent administration is resorting to the same banal and anodyne prescriptions that preceded it in its attempt to curry favour with the agricultural voter base, which had been promised employment during the 2014 election.

    The incessant crisis is evident from the past records of famers’ suicide data published by National Crime Records Bureau; however, the report faces severe criticisms for underreporting deaths. Though there are various socio psychological reasons for suicides, indebtedness has been considered the primary cause of death. A mere addition of cash transfer might marginally ameliorate farmers’ debts but heavy dependence on informal credit system requires the government to resolve the gaps in current credit system.

    Policy Challenge – Dealing with the Debt Problem

     The Debt Asset Ratio (DAR) indicates the quantum of indebtedness among farmers, since 1990 the ratio has increased at an astounding rate of 630 % in 2013. One commonly posited explanation for the skyrocketing DAR is the excessive informal borrowings by the farmers while the asset value remains stagnant. The perpetual ignorance by the government to address the structural issues over decades pushed the farmers to demonstrate a protest and subsequently resulted in the electoral setbacks of BJP post the protest.

    The apprehension is beyond agricultural and institutional policies, food inflation rates have fallen from 12.9 percent from 2013-14 to 0.13 percent in 2018. Even though the low inflation rates benefit the consumers in general- it would also imply the low food prices would be way below the input costs and return on private investment would be less if not non-existent. Government’s efforts have had little effect on keeping the inflation at a steady rate; the extreme movements of the inflation rates exacerbated the condition of the agrarian economy. The Government has announced to fix Minimum Support Price (MSP) at 50 % above the cost of production as per the recommendation of agricultural scientist Dr.Swaminathan. However, the recent protest placed a demand to change the method of arriving at the MSP figure. Pseudo free market behaviour from the government side has altered the market structure and mostly worked against the welfare of the marginal farmers. While the APMC (Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee) controls the MSP, the small farmers are expected to reach out to the market with a higher transaction cost and end up with much lower revenue. The state has failed to acknowledge the governance failure and continues to place MSP in an equivocal position in every budget. Cash transfers schemes have been placed in the budget with a similar ambiguity in terms of its impact on agricultural productivity and growth. There is a paucity of literature that provides a lucid explanation for execution of cash transfer. A recent study conducted in the rural parts of poor Indian states with 3,800 samples concluded that only 13% of the respondents preferred cash transfer over public health care facilities. Though it is not as same as providing cash transfer to farmers, similar schemes in the past have failed to create a sanguine impression and has made the beneficiaries dubious about such ambitious policies. The sample is also not a true representation of the agrarian community, sector which has been victimized for decades and would vote for short term benefits that risks stagnant productivity and falling workforce.

    The Paradox of Indian Agriculture

    Indian agriculture faces many challenges and is a paradox. India has the second largest area of 159 million hectares in the world as arable land, next only to the United States.  India is the second largest producer of Rice, Wheat, fruits and vegetables. India is the largest producer of bananas and mangoes. Export of agricultural products have ben growing at over 4% year on year. Despite all this there has been great volatility in agricultural economy over the last decade. Growth has been uneven, marginal farmers find farming becoming very uneconomical, and there has been significant decline in marginal farm holdings from 2.27 hectares in 2002 to 1.07 hectares in 2015. While big farmers have sustained themselves well, it is the marginal farmers who have continued to face increasing stress. While many encouraging policies and financial support schemes have been announced, in reality the implementation has been ineffective if not shoddy. Most planned investments and financial assistance have not reached the desired target populace.

     Investment in agriculture GDP has declined from 3.3 % in 1980-81 to 2.9 % in 2013-2014 while the subsidies on fertilizers has increased by 15 times in the same time frame after adjusting to inflation. Fertilizers subsidy accounts to 47 % of the total subsidy in the budget for the year 2017-2018 and amounts to almost Rs.70,000 crore.  Shenggen Fan and Ashok Gulati in their landmark studyto compare relative benefits of investments versus subsidies used a well-established statistical method ‘multi-equation system’. For every 10 lakh invested in agriculture pulled 328 people out of poverty and every one rupee spent on Research & Development increased the agriculture GDP by Rs11.20. The study also suggests that the inefficient input subsidies have actually been more counterproductive by hindering new investments and choking agriculture growth. Member of NITI Aayog and a renowned agronomist, Ramesh Chand had commented that research and development spend in India is not far behind China, a statement that calls for a reality check. For two decades India’s R&D spending as a percentage of GDP has been around 0.6 % while China spends around 2.1 % and Israel with the highest percentage if 4.2%. In absolute terms India invests 5 times lower than China and Israel. An effort on research & development is rather ostensible given less attention in the budget allocation.

    Conclusion : Need for Effective Policy Actions

     There is a conspicuous need for the government to assess the impact of cash transfer to farmers as a policy with various dimensions. The extent to which it can reconcile the distress in farming sector has to be scientifically proved to justify the quantum of investment for execution.  Heavily subsidized agriculture and loan waiver always helped with political victory but the fundamental crisis has been unceasing. Even an elementary study on trends in agriculture seems to highlight that it requires prompt moves and strong long term goals. Policies’ pertaining to agriculture has to be a parcel of broader strategies. Tactics of transferring cash with minimal sanction from experts reserves its place only as a political expediency.

    Marginal farmers and fragmented landholdings are the bottlenecks that prevent effective modernisation of Indian agriculture. The government will need to play a major role in evolving policies that create inclusive solutions to overcome the problems of marginal farmers. Agriculture in India continues to be in the grips of manual and subsistence farming without farm mechanisation or technological inputs. Average landholdings have shrunk from 2.28 hectares in 1970 to 1.08 hectare in 2015 (NABARD). Promoting cooperative farming will allow small and marginal farmers to take advantage of their family labour. Corporate farming, meanwhile, could allow economies of scale to kick in at lower thresholds.

    Yet again, hollow electioneering masquerades as policy with the advent of the great festival of democracy.  Now that the new government is in power, it is time that agriculture is given the due attention it deserves with a long-term strategy to resolve the problems of marginal farmers, fragmented land holdings, and the urgent need for rapid modernisation of agriculture and a national policy on water resources management.

    Manjari Balu is a Research Analyst at ‘The Peninsula Foundation”. She holds a degree in economics. Opinions expressed are the author’s own.

    Photo by Nandhu Kumar on Unsplash