The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Indian Air Force

  • Indian Air Force at 91: Challenges and Opportunities

    Indian Air Force at 91: Challenges and Opportunities

    The Indian Air Force, created on October 8, 1932, completes 91 years of glorious service as it celebrates the Air Force Day today, October 8, 2023. As the IAF celebrates its annual day with customary elan, it is a time to reflect and assess the future in terms of challenges and opportunities. On the operational front, the die is already cast with two nuclear-powered neighbours, one in political and economic turmoil and the other continuing an aggressive posture. A three-yearlong standoff on the northern border with no signs of reconciliation makes the environment precarious.

    China, with its goal of becoming the leading military power with global reach by 2049, has moved fast to replace and transform its antiquated equipment, systems, and organizations, especially after observing the 1991 Gulf War. Reorganization of the PLA in the last decade, consolidation of forces under one command to oversee military operations against India and creation a Special Support Group (SSG) has enhanced its force application capabilities. Specifically, the upgradation of military infrastructure, airfields, and helipads just north of India is a matter of concern. Robust military hardware production for modern systems and investment in R&D in new-era fields like quantum computing, quantum radars, artificial intelligence, and aircraft and weapon systems development have facilitated significant growth in PLA’s capabilities. Qualitatively and quantitatively, India cannot match the Chinese economy, military hardware, military industry, or infrastructure in the foreseeable future. The only way forward for India is to use its resources in a focused manner to achieve its well-defined strategic goals commensurate with available resources. Lessons from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, a contest between unequal forces, are relevant in our context.

    Force Structure Challenges to Overcome

    Besides the operational challenges the Indian Air Force faces on the borders, there are issues related to equipment and organization.

     

    The salience of combat aircraft in battlespace is well known. However, combat aircraft numbers are declining worldwide, with older systems paving the way for modern and more capable platforms. In India, the decline has been rather steep, and replacements are not potent enough to offset the quantity quality. Against an authorization of over 1000 combat aircraft, the Indian armed forces are now in the region of 600. This decline will continue, and by 2030, IAF combat aircraft strength will be down to 450 with the phase-out of MiG-21, MiG-29, Jaguar, and Mirage-2000 fleets. The induction of 36 Rafales, the prolonged induction of LCA, and the planned acquisition of more Su30MKIs will not be able to reverse the declining trend. The ambitious plans for India’s fifth-generation aircraft, AMCA, are still far away. Given this reality, the IAF must make do with, at best, 34-36 fighter squadrons in the 2035 timeframe. It must work on operational strategies based on superior tactics and a local favourable balance of power in case a war is inevitable during this period.

    In the critical area of force multipliers, the numbers have been nearly static since their initial induction in 2003 concerning IL-78 In-Flight Refuellers and in 2010 concerning AWACS. The number of long-range weapons is somewhat limited. And in the surveillance and space domains, the resources are meagre. The situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future.

    There are positive changes regarding airlift capability, and single-wave airlift capability is gradually increasing with the commencement of induction of the first of the 56 new C-295 transport aircraft replacing vintage Avro. Despite the gradual phase-out of heavy lift Il-76 and light transport aircraft An-32, the fleet of C-17 and C-130 will sustain the requisite airlift capability that enabled the rapid deployment of Indian Army units in Ladakh against PLA build-up. Similarly, the enhanced number of more versatile and potent indigenous helicopters, ALH and LCH, will increase local mobility and firepower.

    The area that is yet to take centre stage is the Unmanned systems. Although the numbers and types increase due to imports, recent conflicts have demonstrated their hugely versatile utility. This aspect needs more attention to offset the capability deficit owing to the reduced number of combat aircraft. Tasks like intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and ground and maritime attack can be effectively performed by unmanned aerial systems, resulting in the release of aircraft for other roles.

    New and more capable radars and integrated networks are replacing the older systems, giving a robust defensive capability. These need to be backed by long-range and quick-reaction surface-to-air weapon systems. Currently, the numbers are limited, and the area to be covered is extensive. Agility in planning, deployment and redeployment is the key to effective defence with limited resources.

    Evolving Battlespace and the Imperative of Jointness

    The battle space is evolving. Conflict hybridization has accelerated the expansion of battlespace, leading to enhanced significance of battlespace transparency. Induction of hypersonic systems, fast relocation of combat elements, and reduced times for systems operationalization have compressed the reaction time. This time-compression for action has tilted the offence-defence balance in favour of the offence. The concept of operations needs to factor in these realities, especially when dealing with a potent and stronger adversary with significant reverse capability.

    Organisationally, the integration of three wings of the Indian armed forces will likely pick up pace in the coming year(s). Integration is now an operational necessity and needs to be fast-tracked. Once theatre commands come into being, the most critical factor will be the allocation and plan of utilization of various combat assets that are limited in numbers but can operate seamlessly between multiple sectors. Will the integration model follow the complex assignment of such resources? That will be suboptimal and possibly counterproductive to enhancing combat capability through integration. IAF will have to make a holistic plan to exploit the full combat potential of its assets, irrespective of how the integration model pans out. Organisationally, this will be the most significant challenge for the men and women in blue in the coming year(s).

    Conclusion

    In the last five decades, India has taken the pole position in money spent on military hardware imports. Saudi Arabia is a distant second, spending less than half of Indian expenditure in this sector. How did India reach here? Public sector monopoly in defence has not yielded the desired results for the last seven decades. Inadequate focus and investment in R&D, captive customers, the Indian armed forces not hand-holding the industry, restrictive policies, monopoly of the public sector, dependency on imported military hardware and inability to leverage large imports for technology access are the factors contributing to this state. Atamnirbhar, from being a rhetoric, is gradually taking shape with orders being placed on Indian enterprises. The policy of earmarking part of the capital budget for Indian manufacturers will undoubtedly encourage the Indian defence industry. Although production efficiency and quality control have been a concern regarding the public sector, things are likely to improve as they face competition from the private sector. The lack of control over critical technologies in areas of aero engines, air-launched weapons, and electronic warfare systems remains a severe vulnerability. Opening the defence sector for private entities, allowing DRDO to share available testing facilities and technology, and creating defence manufacturing corridors are steps in the right direction.

    Capability differential and information differential between the competing sides form the basis of military operations. A classical information matrix about the opposing force includes intent, strategy, military doctrine, and military objectives; besides the overall direction that military strategy gives, an operational plan and its execution are based on an information matrix to achieve defined goals with the least cost or in the minimum possible timeframe. IAF, with its new doctrine IAP2000-22, endeavours to capture the essence of these changes. Indian Air Force needs to be ready with its limited assets and deter war. IAF must augment its limited resources with courage, ingenuity and clever resource employment to outwit the adversary. Given the limited resources and challenges ahead, the IAF will need to be a smart force for efficient management of resources and clever exploitation of force application.

    Photo Credits: Sunil Jain

    The views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the TPF or the IAF.

  • What IAF Needs to Transform into to Develop as an Aerospace Power

    What IAF Needs to Transform into to Develop as an Aerospace Power

    Pakistan has also enunciated a “first-use” nuclear option against India, that cannot be taken lightly.

    For the Indian Air Force to truly live up to its motto of “Touching the Skies with Glory”, some critical transformational imperatives are needed. While the IAF is sincerely trying to move from air power to being an aerospace power, these imperatives have to be implemented with vision and alacrity. Faced with China’s rapidly growing military assertiveness and its unbridled ambitions, supplanted by a traditionally hostile Pakistan, the challenge to the IAF by both nations, individually and collusively, in the aerospace domain are indeed formidable. Aerospace is unquestionably the domain of the future.

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  • Indian Armed Forces @75: The Challenges Ahead

    Indian Armed Forces @75: The Challenges Ahead

    India overall, since 1947, has done reasonably well in keeping at bay the many diverse security challenges which came its way. However, the strategic and military lessons from our confrontations, since 1947, must never be forgotten.

    As India completes 75 years of its independence from 200 years of British yoke, there is much to celebrate about and equally much to introspect. Revisiting the functioning with stark honesty of all its institutions and governance structures will produce realistic mid-course corrections and suggest better paths for the nation to traverse. The Indian Armed Forces, unquestionably, one of the few institutions of the nation, which has lived up to its assigned responsibilities with elan and the desired results has much to be proud of. Nevertheless, many emerging aspects, nuances of the nation’s security and well-being have to be factored in and pursued earnestly with vision and resolve. For the nation’s honour, its Armed Forces can never be found wanting.

    By any standards, India is located in one of the most geo-politically troubled regions of the world. That it is surrounded by two consistently anti-India neighbours, China and Pakistan, both individually and collusively posing threats, only aggravates the formidable challenges it has to confront for its security. Both these nations being nuclear powers, synergistically anti-India, also adept at asymmetric warfare makes India’s strategic challenges mind-boggling.

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  • India’s Fighter Aircraft Needs: Strategies in the face of Geopolitical and Economic Crisis

    India’s Fighter Aircraft Needs: Strategies in the face of Geopolitical and Economic Crisis

    Having lost out big time due to short-sighted piecemeal procurements, India’s acquisition process needs an overhaul and improve its track-record. With correct lessons derived and applied diligently, India can truly emerge as a globally competitive defence manufacturer and achieve control over critical technologies

    The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, now in its fifth month, has major lessons for India and the rest of the world, not only in terms of the future of war and military operations but more importantly on the importance of military capability and technological sovereignty. The war will be studied for its various aspects: the role and effectiveness of air dominance and air defence, Ukrainian use of anti-tank missiles and shoulder-fired missiles, anti-shipping missiles, heavy use of artillery, urban warfare, Russia’s use of long-range and hypersonic precision missiles, it’s artillery dominated grinding nature of the land campaign, use of drones by both sides, communications and the use of satellite networks, and the overbearing influence of ISR. The geopolitical fall-out of the war on India needs to be considered carefully. The comprehensive and large-scale sanctions imposed on Russia are already resulting in a multi-dimensional impact on the rest of the world.

    The USA and its allies have pressurised India to not only denounce Russia’s military action against Ukraine but to go along with their sanctions by severing India’s military armament and energy relationship with Russia. When analysed carefully, we can see that the real objective of their strategy is to severe economic and military-industrial relations of the former Soviet republics with Russia and incorporate them into the western economic system. This has been done successfully in countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, Baltic states, Romania, and now is being attempted in Ukraine. A sanction is an important tool for this strategy. While the war is on in Europe, India’s lucrative defence market has been the primary objective of this strategy ever since 2014 and later when CAATSA was introduced. India has been careful to safeguard its strategic relations with not only Russia but the US and Western Europe as well. The US has gone on record to say that its objective is to wean India away from its reliance on military imports from Russia. The Ukrainian crisis has given a sense of urgency to the USA about its India strategy.

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  • IAF’s Force Structure: Strategy for Overcoming the Crisis

    IAF’s Force Structure: Strategy for Overcoming the Crisis

    Aligned with its national security interests, India’s strong geostrategic role-play, amidst the changing world order as a rising military power, aerospace power in particular must be rooted in the Indian industry.

    The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has many cautions for India. War at anytime and anywhere is a human catastrophe and therefore, all efforts to prevent or stop war should not be spared. While the American-led side wants India to take a stand in favour of their position, the Russian side is appreciative of India’s neutral stand. Recent visits by leaders from the USA, UK, EU, and Japan have emphasised the need for India to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

    What is of concern, however, is the fact that the USA and others stressing their view that India’s excessive dependence on Russia for its military equipment is the reason for its refusal to support their sanctions on Russia. Various officials from the US State Department and the DOD have openly advocated their objective of weaning India’s defence imports from Russia. There lies the real issue.

    India’s defence market is too huge and attractive for Western defence industries, and hence, it is the focus of strategic dialogues of many of these countries with India.

    India’s defence market is too huge and attractive for Western defence industries, and hence, it is the focus of strategic dialogues of many of these countries with India. India has diversified its military procurements in the last three decades to ensure it does not become vulnerable to a single source supply. As a result, India’s defence supplies from Russia, which was as high as 70-75% in the early 2000s came down to a current level of 50-55%. The US has been the biggest gainer in this diversification, garnering nearly $ 22 billion in sales to India in the last 15 years to emerge as its number 1 supplier. The Ukraine conflict and the resultant sanctions are being used by the USA to pressurise India to reduce its imports from Russia. The real objective is to ensure the US and its European allies replace Russia as India’s major if not exclusive supplier of defence equipment. The threat of CAATSA on India’s S-400 air defence missile deal with Russia is a prime example. The crux of the India-USA strategic partnership is really about capturing India’s defence market for the Military-Industrial Complex of the USA.

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  • Chinese Roulette: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?

    Chinese Roulette: Which Way Will the Wind Blow?

    The 2022 campaigning season along the Sino-Indian Line of Actual Control (LAC) opens up in just a matter of months. By all reckoning, the situation is likely to continue remaining extremely volatile, uncertain and tense. While some believe that it may have been this Government’s abrogation of Article 370 and the Home Minister’s statement in Parliament that invited a strong response from the Chinese, the truth is that we are yet to fully comprehend the Chinese leadership’s motivation for damaging, if not jettisoning, over three decades of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and growing economic ties, though the latter seems not to have been impacted in the short term, by resorting to unprovoked aggressive action in Eastern Ladakh and elsewhere.

    In addition, we continue to see a steady build-up of forces and infrastructure, as well as cartographic aggression in the form of renaming of villages in Arunachal Pradesh and the passage of the Land Border Law, effective from 1st January 2022. All of this strongly suggests that the situation will get much worse before it gets better, and we are more likely to see increased Chinese assertiveness and determination to settle territorial disputes on its own terms. Moreover, by its actions in Eastern Ladakh, it has already occupied territory up to its Claim Line of 1959. This begs the question, obviously difficult to answer with any degree of certainty, as to whether there is a likelihood of further Chinese escalation leading to a limited conflict?

    Clearly, the Government is also seized of the problem, as is obvious from the Defence Minister’s statement, while inaugurating border infrastructure, that “We faced our adversary in the northern Sector recently with grit and determination. It could not have been done without proper infrastructural development. In today’s uncertain environment, the possibility of any kind of conflict cannot be ruled out.”i It must be emphasised that conflict is not something that we either desire or is in our interest, especially given the Omicron tsunami that appears to be gathering momentum and the adverse impact that the pandemic has already had on our economy.

    It is therefore quite apparent from the Modi Government’s actions that it has been extremely circumspect and cautious in its response following China’s occupation of our territory, by some estimates extending over a 1600 Sq. Km. Clearly, it has no intention of either attempting to push back the PLA from the intrusion sites, or for that matter, occupying territory elsewhere, as a quid pro quo and bargaining chip for later. However, there is a view that occupying Indian claimed territory in Aksai Chin as a quid pro quo is not a bargain but an acknowledgement that Aksai Chin is alien territory. Therefore this Government has attempted to engage China in talks, both at the diplomatic and military level, though with little success to show for its efforts. Given the mismatch in force levels, this level of military and diplomatic engagement is understandable, though Mr. Modi’s unwillingness to personally call out the Chinese for their provocative behaviour may well give, them and the world at large, an impression of an eagerness to crawl, when just asked to bend.

    However, a deeper examination of events does suggest that the Government has not taken Chinese bullying lightly, and has, in fact, responded in an extremely measured manner, militarily. Following the Galwan incident, it has mirrored Chinese troop accretions by deploying additional forces in Eastern Ladakh, along with armour and other supporting elements. Its pro-active occupation of the Kailash Heights, though these troops were subsequently withdrawn as a part of reciprocal action by the PLA in the Pangong Tso Sector, hinted at the possibility of similar, but more offensive actions, being replicated elsewhere. The reorientation of the Army with the earmarking of a second Mountain Strike Corps for offensive operations has substantially added to the Army’s capabilities and would adversely impact the PLA’s force ratio dynamics. Most importantly, the upgrade of communication infrastructure, not just in Ladakh but elsewhere along the LAC as well, has been greatly speeded up and is coming to fruition, thereby significantly enhancing our defensive capabilities.

    To help us understand if China is likely to resort to force in the ongoing stand-off, an examination of historical precedent may give us some vital clues. As Prof M Taylor Pravel of MIT notes, two characteristics have defined China’s use of force. Firstly, “along its continental border, China has employed force in frontier disputes where it has faced militarily powerful opponents (i.e., states that could possibly challenge its otherwise strong claims). Although the local military balance is difficult to measure with precision, China has on average been vastly stronger in the overall military balance…. India in 1962, the Soviet Union in 1969, and Vietnam in the early 1980s. At the same time, China has refrained from employing force against its weaker continental neighbours. Second, China has used force in disputes where the strength of its claims have been weak, especially when it has occupied little or none of the contested territory. In these disputes, China has been sensitive to any further decline in its bargaining power.”ii

    This suggests that even with neighbours that de facto accept Chinese interpretations of its territorial claims, China is still extremely wary of actions that they may undertake to change the existing relative balance of power along with its disturbed periphery, and prefers to use force against them to delay/stop their progress. For example, there is evidence to suggest Nehru’s Forward Policy and the refuge given to the Dalai Lama were a serious cause of concern to the Chinese leadership. This is borne out by declassified United States documents pertaining to the capture of Longju in August 1959, which reveal that “the late August clashes point of a mode of thought which has remained an ingredient in the Chinese leaders’ calculations on the border dispute: ‘When the Indians show a temperament to advance on the ground, we must alter their frame of mind by letting military action take over political caution. Besides, military risk itself is negligible, because we are the stronger side’.”iii A perception within the Chinese leadership that appears to have remained unchanged in the intervening years, and is especially pertinent at the present time, given President Xi Jinping’s penchant for following in the footsteps of late Chairman Mao Zedong.

    In addition, there are some other factors that have a bearing on this issue of force escalation. For one, it is fairly common for autocratic governments to attempt to conjure up external threats to unify the people against a common enemy, and divert their attention from serious domestic challenges that may lead to unrest or hurt their own leadership position. In this context, as Kalpit Mankikar, a Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation who focuses on China points out, prior to the 1962 Conflict Chairman Mao faced serious internal dissension against his leadership and it had more to do with the intra-CCP power struggle. Mao’s Great Leap Forward (GLP) had been criticised, and for the first time, he had to demit office as State President, forced to hand over to his heir apparent Liu Shaoqi, which came as a huge jolt to him.

    President Xi now finds himself in rather similar circumstances as the economy stutters, in no small measure due to his government’s crackdown on multiple Chinese sectors and companies that have been mascots of growth over the years. His emphasis has been on the idea of “common prosperity” or “reasonable adjustment of excessive incomes and encouraging high-income groups and businesses to return more to society”iv, a blatantly populist measure, that was initially very well received by the average Chinese citizen. However, the enforcement of new regulations in this regard, the so-called “Three Red Lines”, has had a devastating impact on real estate companies such as Evergrande, which hold approximately 75% of all retail investments, bringing them to the verge of bankruptcy, and creating internal turmoil, uncertainty and dissent as the average citizen sees his savings completely wiped out. The likelihood of a domino effect on other facets of the economy cannot be wished away and is bound to adversely impact President Xi’s efforts to stay in power after the end 2022, when his term officially ends.

    In these circumstances creating and tackling an external threat along its borders, as the prevailing situation along the LAC is made out to be, will certainly divert attention and may very well pay great dividends. For example, while President Xi would have preferred to undertake actions to integrate Taiwan, he is hampered by the very real likelihood of The United States and its allies coming to the aid of Taiwan. Taking on India at the LAC is a relatively easier option, as interference by the United States and its allies is likely to be restricted to providing moral and material support at best. Furthermore, it could be viewed as a dress-rehearsal that would allow the PLA to gain vital operational experience, something it has been bereft of since the Sino- Vietnam Conflict of 1979, apart from ensuring a protected flank. Moreover, a successful termination of such a campaign would setback Indian aspirations by decades and severely dent Mr. Modi’s reputation and popularity, much as 1962 did in the case of Pandit Nehru. Not only would such action have a sobering impact on Taiwan’s dealings with the Chinese, but also in the manner other South East and Central Asian neighbours respond to Chinese hegemonistic designs as well.

    It is in this context that the new Land Border Law, now in effect, is likely to be extremely problematic for two reasons, and may well act as the trigger for any future conflict. Firstly, it attempts to give Chinese acts of cartographic aggression, such as differing perceptions on the exact alignment of the LAC, renaming of towns and villages in Arunachal Pradesh, and its acts of ‘salami- slicing’ over the years, a veneer of legality. Secondly, there is a clause in the Law that can be interpreted to suggest that it prohibits the construction of permanent facilities in the vicinity of the LAC without sanction from Chinese authorities, which would obviously be unacceptable to any sovereign state, especially given the manner in which it is rapidly developing communication infrastructure and settlements bordering the LAC.

    Increasing troop concentrations, especially in terms of armour and ballistic/air-defence missiles, in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) along with the external and internal difficulties confronting President Xi suggests a high possibility of a conflict breaking out within the year. There are analysts, including some in this country, who believe that the PLA will be able to achieve a decisive victory given the over-all force disparity, especially in cyber, space and missile capabilities, as was the case in the 1962 Conflict. However, they have tended to disregard the adverse impact of climate and altitude, both on personnel and equipment, that gives a distinct advantage to a military fighting internal lines.

    The PLA can hardly afford to ignore its extended and extremely vulnerable lines of communication, however well developed, and the uncertain internal security environment within TAR and Xingjian. Most importantly, the PLAAF will be operating with greatly reduced capabilities from bases within TAR because of the altitudes involved, while being adversely impacted while operating from bases outside the Region given the extended ranges involved. Finally, the Indian Military does have a sizeable force, reasonably well-equipped with two Mountain Strike Corps and a Division plus of Special Operations Forces in place for offensive operations that will act as a deterrent to Chinese misadventure.

    It understands, however contrarian its public pronouncements may be, that the Indian Armed Forces are a very different force from what they encountered in 1962. Not only is the Indian Army far more experienced and battle-hardened in high altitude and mountain warfare than the PLA, but it will be the Indian Air Force, not utilised in 1962, that will be the battle-winning factor in any conflict. In addition, the employment of the Tibetan manned Special Frontier Force (SFF) in the Kailash Ranges, which received worldwide accolades, would have certainly caused immense disquiet within the Chinese leadership. The SFFs actions and rise of the Taliban have surely given an immense boost to the Independence Movements in both TAR and Xinjiang. Most importantly President Xi and his acolytes must be fully aware that anything other than a decisive victory, will for all intents and purposes, be perceived as a defeat and be the final nail in his coffin.

    Will all of this be sufficient to deter the Chinese from escalating the stand-off? The truth is that while we are inherently placed in an advantageous position, primarily due to location and circumstance, neither deterrence nor success is guaranteed. The fact of the matter is that over the past two decades the military has not just been neglected, but has also been deliberately discriminated against by the political and bureaucratic establishment. The damage that has been done, both to its organisational culture, morale and capabilities will need focus, effort and time to reverse. Most importantly, threats of this nature are best tackled by a nation that is united and willing to place its complete trust in its political leadership. Does our political establishment have the maturity, foresight, integrity and vision to provide the leadership we deserve and need? To quote the poet, philosopher and singer, Bob Dylan, “the answer, my friend, is blowing in the wind”…

    i The Times of India, New Delhi 29 December 2021, p 19.

    ii M Taylor Fravel, Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes, International Security, Winter 2007/2008, Vol 32 No 3, p 56

    https://www.jstor.org/stable/30130518?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents

    iii The Sino-Indian Dispute, Section 1:1950-59, DD/I Staff Study, CIA/RSS March 02, 1963, Approved for Release May 2007, p 33.

    iv Bloomberg News, China Eyes Wealth Redistribution in Push for ‘Common Prosperity’, 18 August 2021

    The article was originally published in Indian Defence Review, Jan – Mar 2022, Vol 37 (1) Pg 50.

    Featured Image Credits: CNBC