Tag: India

  • Navigating Geopolitical Turbulence in a Fragmented International System

    Navigating Geopolitical Turbulence in a Fragmented International System

    The old world order is not returning; the international system is structurally transforming into a fragmented multipolar reality. In this age of disorder, flexible institutions and reformist leadership—exemplified by India—are essential to sustain global governance.

    The 56th World Economic Forum Annual Meeting took place in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, from January 19 to 23, 2026, under the theme “A Spirit of Dialogue.” The forum brought together global political, business, and intellectual leaders at a moment when the international order is not merely under strain but undergoing a deeper structural transformation. Discussions at Davos underscored a shared recognition that dialogue in today’s fractured global environment is not a sentimental ideal but a strategic necessity—particularly amid intensifying geopolitical competition, accelerating technological disruption, economic fragmentation, and the growing limitations of established institutional frameworks. Significantly, the conversations reflected a broader shift in global thinking, moving away from nostalgia for a stable post–Cold War order toward an urgent search for more flexible and adaptive forms of global governance capable of managing uncertainty, fragmentation, and persistent conflict.

    The contemporary international system is undergoing an unprecedented degree of geopolitical turbulence. Institutions such as the United Nations and other global governance mechanisms—established in the aftermath of the Second World War—were designed to manage conflict and promote cooperation within the structural realities of that era. Today, however, the assumptions underpinning these institutions no longer align with prevailing geopolitical conditions, rendering many of them increasingly ineffective and disconnected from contemporary realities. This growing institutional disconnect is inseparable from deeper structural changes in the global system itself. As Zack Cooper, a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, notes in his Stimson Center essay “An American Strategy for a Multipolar World”, “a multipolar world is now unavoidable, with legacy powers increasingly accompanied by a number of rising powers… this is a much more complex system than the multipolar dynamic that existed in Europe after the Congress of Vienna… today’s multipolar system is highly fragmented along regional and functional lines.” This observation captures the core challenge of the present international system: it is not merely shifting in power distribution, but fundamentally transforming in structure and complexity.

    From Bipolarity to Fragmentation

    The post–Second World War order was shaped initially by Cold War bipolarity and later by a brief unipolar moment following the end of the Cold War. In contrast, the current system is marked by fragmentation, instability, and a gradual transition toward multipolarity. Historically, periods of power transition—particularly multipolar configurations—have been associated with heightened uncertainty, miscalculation, and conflict. The present environment reflects this pattern, as competing power centres and overlapping crises push the international system toward persistent volatility.

    In this volatile context, states are increasingly adopting hedging strategies to manage risks and vulnerabilities. From Europe to Asia and beyond, countries are diversifying partnerships, avoiding rigid alignments, and seeking strategic flexibility. This behaviour is neither anomalous nor irrational; rather, it is a structural response to systemic uncertainty. Such adaptive behaviour, however, is itself a symptom of deeper structural instability in the international system.

    As many scholars, most notably Kenneth Waltz, have long argued, an emerging multipolar order tends to be among the most unstable configurations in international politics, marked by heightened risks of conflict, miscalculation, and escalation. With multiple powers competing simultaneously and no clear hegemon capable of stabilising the system, the international order becomes increasingly fragile and prone to error. The contemporary system appears to be operating on this edge, shaped by overlapping crises and rival power centres.

    Compounding this instability is the rapid emergence of critical and disruptive technologies, advanced weapons platforms, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence. These developments further intensify volatility by lowering barriers to conflict, accelerating escalation dynamics, and complicating traditional deterrence frameworks. International experts at a 2025 conference warned that such technologies are “eroding present deterrence frameworks” and could destabilise the global security order without a global regulatory consensus. Similarly, the World Economic Forum’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025 notes that “cybersecurity is entering an era of unprecedented complexity,” as the rapid adoption of AI without adequate safeguards creates far-reaching security risks requiring multilateral cooperation.

    While some observers attribute current turbulence primarily to political leaders such as Donald Trump, this interpretation is overly simplistic. Trump’s policies may have accelerated existing trends, but they are not the root cause. The deeper drivers lie in structural shifts within the international system and in long-term transformations within American domestic politics that have altered the foundations of US global engagement.

    Davos and the Recognition of a New World Order

    These concerns have been openly acknowledged by global leaders at the World Economic Forum. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, speaking at Davos, argued that “the old world order is not coming back,” cautioning against nostalgia-driven policymaking and warning that the global system is undergoing a rupture rather than a smooth transition. He further observed that economic interdependence has increasingly been weaponised and warned middle powers that “if you are not at the table, you are on the menu.” Such remarks reflect a growing recognition that disorder, competition, and power asymmetries are now embedded features of the international system.

    Similarly, World Economic Forum President Børge Brende highlighted the depth of uncertainty confronting the global order, noting that “the political, geopolitical, and macroeconomic landscape is shifting under our feet.” Emphasising the limits of unilateralism and rigid frameworks, Brende stressed that “dialogue is a necessity, not a luxury,” reinforcing the idea that cooperation must persist even in an era of fragmentation. These statements underline a critical point: the challenge today is not the absence of institutions, but their inability to adapt to changing geopolitical realities.

    French President Emmanuel Macron further reinforced this diagnosis at Davos by warning of a “shift towards a world without rules, where international law is trampled underfoot and where the law of the strongest prevails.” His remarks underscore the erosion of the post–Second World War multilateral framework under the pressure of returning imperial ambitions, coercive diplomacy, and unilateral action. Macron’s warning reflects a broader concern that global politics is increasingly shaped by power rather than norms. At the same time, he rejected intimidation as an organising principle of international relations, stating that “we prefer respect to bullies,” and called for effective multilateralism—one that is reformed and updated rather than dismantled.

    Reforming Global Governance for an Age of Disorder

    Against this backdrop, the central question is how states can navigate such geopolitical turbulence. A rigid, blueprint-based institutional approach—reminiscent of Cold War–era frameworks—is no longer viable. What is required instead are flexible, adaptive institutions capable of absorbing shocks, accommodating diverse interests, and operating under conditions of persistent uncertainty. Since traditional multilateralism is increasingly strained, it is essential to recognise that disorder itself is likely to remain a defining feature of the contemporary international system.

    Any effort to design or reform institutions must therefore begin with this recognition. Fragmentation and regionalisation—particularly through minilateral and issue-based coalitions—are inevitable outcomes of a multipolar environment. However, this does not eliminate the need for global cooperation. Rather, it demands cooperation frameworks that are flexible, inclusive, and responsive to evolving geopolitical realities. Institutions must be capable of adapting to shifting power balances rather than attempting to impose outdated structures on a transformed system. In these tough times, the world requires greater cooperation and coordinated action, because the challenges we face—such as climate change, cyber threats, economic instability, and regional conflicts—are global in nature and cannot be solved through isolated national approaches.

    Another limitation in current thinking is the tendency to interpret global politics solely through the lens of US–China rivalry. While great power competition undeniably shapes the international environment, such a narrow focus underestimates the agency of middle and regional powers. Many states actively shape outcomes, norms, and institutions rather than merely reacting to great power pressures. Effective institutional design must therefore reflect this distributed agency and avoid reducing global politics to a binary rivalry.

    Equally important is the need to move beyond linear and deterministic thinking. The contemporary world is characterised by non-linear dynamics, uncertainty, and complex interactions. Predicting the future exclusively through the lens of past patterns—particularly those rooted in liberal or Cold War assumptions—is increasingly misleading. Institutional responses must be grounded in realism, flexibility, and adaptability rather than static or idealised models of order.

    Recent initiatives such as Donald Trump’s proposal for a “Board of Peace,” driven largely by personal leadership and transactional logic, illustrate the limitations of personality-centric approaches to global governance. Given their temporary nature and the likelihood of reversal under future administrations, such initiatives lack durability. Moreover, such proposals are often unrepresentative and do not reflect the realities of the international system; they are based on authoritarian-style solutions rather than broad-based legitimacy, consensus, and institutional resilience. In contrast, reforming existing institutions—particularly the United Nations—offers a more sustainable path forward. Reforms that reflect contemporary geopolitical realities would enhance the UN’s relevance without undermining its foundational principles.

    India’s Reformist Approach to Global Governance

    India’s approach to global governance is particularly instructive in this context. When India criticises the United Nations or other global institutions, its objective is not to dismantle them but to reform them. This distinguishes India from countries such as China and Russia, which often seek to replace existing structures with alternative, and frequently anti-Western, institutional arrangements. India positions itself not as an anti-Western power, but as a non-Western one—committed to liberal democracy, pluralism, and engagement with existing global frameworks. As India’s Ministry of External Affairs has emphasised, “the architecture of global governance in 2025 for the future cannot be written in ink from 1945,” highlighting the need to update institutions rather than replace them.

    This distinction is crucial. India has significantly benefited from the existing international order, and its economic transformation since the post-1991 reforms has been largely enabled by the stability, access to global markets, and investment flows that the post-World War II system provided. Consequently, India has little incentive to support a China-centric alternative. Reforming the current system, rather than replacing it, aligns with India’s long-term strategic interests. Moreover, India’s leadership and participation in forums such as the SCO and BRICS have played a stabilising role. Without India’s presence, these platforms could easily evolve into explicitly anti-Western blocs. India’s foreign policy is best understood as reformist rather than revisionist, acting as a bridge between the West and the Global South; as Chatham House notes, India seeks to “change the international order from within rather than overthrow it.” Yet many Western policymakers fail to understand India’s global vision and often categorise it alongside other revisionist powers, viewing India narrowly through a bilateral prism or primarily as a counterweight to China. This misreading overlooks India’s broader role as an independent norm-shaping power.

    In light of these dynamics, the most effective strategy for navigating contemporary geopolitical turbulence lies in reforming and revitalising existing institutions rather than constructing entirely new ones based on rigid, blueprint-style thinking. A blueprint approach assumes that we can predict the future and design institutions accordingly—an assumption that is inherently flawed because the future is always uncertain and unknowable. Institutions must therefore be designed to capture the reality of moving from the known to the unknown and to adapt continuously as new challenges emerge. They must be made flexible, resilient, and responsive to disorder rather than designed to eliminate it. Accepting instability as a structural condition—and designing mechanisms of cooperation accordingly—offers the best chance of sustaining global governance in an increasingly fragmented world.

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.byarcadia.org

  • Positioning Sri Lanka in an Emerging Multipolar World Order

    Positioning Sri Lanka in an Emerging Multipolar World Order

     Summary 

    Sri Lanka sits at a strategic crossroads, with geography that positions it at the heart of global trade and regional security. Yet economic vulnerability, political inconsistency, and limited strategic clarity have constrained its influence. As global power fragments and the Global South rises, the island faces a choice: remain reactive and peripheral or leverage its location, strengthen its economy, and build stable institutions to become a neutral logistics hub, a trusted diplomatic partner, and an active contributor to the emerging multipolar order. Acting decisively now will transform strategic opportunity into lasting national influence. 

    Over the past four years, geopolitical, economic, and technological shifts have progressed at a pace unmatched in the previous three decades. The world we face today is fundamentally different from the one we knew before. War has returned to Europe, shattering the assumption that major interstate conflict on the continent was a thing of the past. The Middle East is once again engulfed in overlapping crises that draw in both regional actors and global powers. Across Africa—from the Sahel to the Horn—coups, insurgencies, and persistent violence are eroding state institutions and deepening humanitarian emergencies. The impact of Trump’s tariffs threatened many sectors globally.

    At the same time, trust in multilateral institutions, long the guardians of global order, is fading. The UN struggles to act decisively, the WTO is weakened, and even climate negotiations are increasingly shaped by national interests rather than collective responsibility. The consensus that once underpinned global cooperation is fragmenting. 

    Meanwhile, technological disruption is accelerating competition. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and strategic supply chains have become the new battlegrounds for influence. Nations no longer compete only for territory or ideology; they compete for data, minerals, energy, and technological dominance. 

    The post–Cold War optimism that once promised a borderless world of global democracy and free markets has evaporated. In its place has emerged an era defined by political fragmentation, economic rivalry, and strategic competition. Great-power tensions are rising, regional blocs are hardening, and smaller states are being compelled to navigate an increasingly complex and divided international landscape. 

    The rules-based order that emerged after World War II is weakening, and neither the United States nor China can dictate the future alone. Instead, a triangular contest among the global West, global East, and the global South is shaping a new geopolitical reality. 

    In addition, the Indo-Pacific has become the central arena of strategic competition between the United States and China. As China expands its economic reach, military power, and political influence, the U.S. seeks to uphold a free, open, and rules-based regional order. This rivalry now shapes security, diplomacy, trade, and technology across the entire region, with flashpoints such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea posing the greatest risks of confrontation and global economic disruption. 

    Where does Sri Lanka stand 

    Sri Lanka is a small island nation, but one with a singular and powerful advantage: its geography. Positioned at the center of the world’s busiest East–West maritime corridor, the island lies along sea lanes that carry nearly two-thirds of global oil shipments and almost half of all container traffic. In an era when supply chains, shipping routes, and energy pathways are becoming strategic assets in their own right, Sri Lanka’s location is not merely convenient—it is consequential.

    This makes the island strategically valuable to every major power. For India, Sri Lanka’s stability is essential to security in its immediate neighbourhood and to its ambitions in the wider Indian Ocean. For China, the island is a vital node in the Belt and Road Initiative, linking the maritime silk route to broader trade and energy networks. For the United States, Sri Lanka is central to its Indo-Pacific strategy, where freedom of navigation, open sea lanes, and counter-balancing rival influences are paramount. 

    Beyond the great powers, there is a range of middle powers, which includes Japan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and even Turkey. These countries are deepening economic, maritime, and diplomatic engagement across the Indian Ocean. Their interests converge on Sri Lanka not merely because of geography, but because of the island’s potential as a stable partner, a logistical hub, and a platform for regional connectivity. Collectively, these factors position Sri Lanka as not just a nation-state but a geopolitical crossroads, where the interests of global and regional actors meet, overlap, and at times compete. 

    Yet, despite this inherent strategic value, Sri Lanka continues to struggle in transforming geography into meaningful geopolitical influence. The island’s location offers an extraordinary opportunity, but opportunity alone does not translate into power. 

    Policy inconsistency—driven by frequent political turnover, short-term decision-making, and competing domestic priorities—has created persistent uncertainty that discourages long-term investment and undermines Sri Lanka’s international credibility. At the same time, an overly cautious geopolitical posture, often bordering on indecision, has prevented the country from defining a clear strategic identity in the Indian Ocean. 

    As a result, Sri Lanka has too often been a reactor rather than an actor: responding to external pressures instead of anticipating them, accommodating the interests of major powers instead of assertively advancing its own. Although global actors are drawn to the island because of its strategic location, Sri Lanka has not consistently leveraged that interest to secure lasting economic, diplomatic, or security advantages. 

    The task ahead is to break this cycle. Sri Lanka must transition from being merely a geographical point of convergence to becoming a strategic participant capable of shaping outcomes that affect its future. This requires strengthening the domestic economic base, setting coherent long-term foreign policy priorities, and building the institutional stability needed to negotiate with confidence. Only then can Sri Lanka convert its location into lasting influence—anchoring its long-term security, enhancing its prosperity, and securing a respected place within a rapidly reordering world. 

    For countries like Sri Lanka, the challenge is to navigate this environment with careful diplomatic balance—leveraging economic opportunities from both the U.S. and China while preserving strategic autonomy and avoiding undue dependency. At the same time, Sri Lanka’s trade-driven economy relies heavily on stable, rules-based maritime routes across the Indian Ocean and the wider Indo-Pacific, making regional peace and open sea lanes essential for national economic stability. 

    The Weak Link in Sri Lanka’s Strategy. 

    The 2022 economic crisis significantly weakened Sri Lanka’s geopolitical standing. A nation’s foreign policy is only as strong as the economic foundation beneath it. When an economy collapses, sovereignty is not formally lost, but it is quietly constrained. Sri Lanka’s reliance on external lenders, bilateral creditors, and major-power investments has narrowed its strategic flexibility and limited its ability to negotiate from a position of strength. 

    Instead of shaping regional agendas, we increasingly find ourselves adjusting to those set by others. Unless Sri Lanka restores economic resilience and rebuilds fiscal credibility, the country risks becoming a pawn in a larger great power contest rather than a strategic actor capable of advancing its own interests. 

    Real impact on Sri Lanka 

    The Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs on Sri Lankan exports functioned as a form of trade restriction rather than a targeted sanction or financial embargo. Nevertheless, the measures had material implications for the country’s economy. The garment sector, which constitutes the backbone of Sri Lanka’s foreign-exchange earnings and employment, was particularly exposed. Given that the United States represents a significant share of Sri Lanka’s export market, the tariffs threatened to impede post-2022 economic recovery and constrain critical foreign-exchange inflows. Beyond immediate economic effects, the episode highlights Sri Lanka’s structural vulnerability to shifts in global trade policy, revealing a broader strategic challenge: without enhanced economic resilience and proactive engagement in international trade frameworks, Sri Lanka risks being perpetually reactive rather than an influential actor in the global economic system. 

    The Global South Is Rising 

    One of the most consequential geopolitical shifts of our time is the emergence of middle powers within the Global South as influential actors in global affairs. Countries such as India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Mexico are no longer peripheral participants in a system dominated by the West. They possess the economic weight, demographic scale, technological ambition, and diplomatic confidence to reshape global institutions, from trade and finance to climate governance and security frameworks. 

    This rise is visible everywhere. India is now the world’s fastest-growing major economy and a central player in the G20 and Indo-Pacific. Brazil shapes global environmental and agricultural policy. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are redefining energy geopolitics and investing heavily across Asia and Africa. South Africa and Nigeria influence continental politics, peacekeeping, and resource diplomacy. Turkey has become a pivotal actor in West Asia, Central Asia, and global mediation efforts. Together, these countries are forming new coalitions, from BRICS+ to the G20’s expanded role, challenging the old North–South divide and demanding a more equitable international order. 

    And yet, amid this global transformation, Sri Lanka remains largely absent from the strategic conversation. We participate in international forums, but seldom shape their agendas. We attend summits, but rarely articulate a coherent long-term national strategy. The country possesses clear potential, but lacks the strategic clarity and diplomatic consistency required to convert that potential into influence. 

    Sri Lanka belongs to the Global South by geography, history, and shared developmental challenges—but not yet by strategic weight or leadership. At a time when emerging powers across Asia, Africa, and Latin America are redefining global governance, Sri Lanka risks remaining on the sidelines. Unless we strengthen our capacity to articulate priorities, build alliances, and engage proactively, we may become spectators in a moment when others are reshaping the international order. 

    If the Global South continues its ascent as current economic, demographic, and diplomatic trends indicate, it will become a decisive force in global negotiations on climate, trade, energy, technology, and security. The question then becomes: Where will Sri Lanka stand? We must choose whether to meaningfully align with this emerging bloc, articulate our own national priorities, and build partnerships that reflect our strengths or risk being left behind, irrelevant in a world that is rapidly reorganising itself. 

    Opportunities in the New Disorder 

    Disorder brings danger, but it also brings opportunity. History shows that moments of global turbulence create openings for small, agile states to elevate their influence. Finland, Singapore, Qatar, and the UAE are prime examples—nations that turned geography, diplomacy, and strategic clarity into disproportionate global relevance. They became connectors, mediators, hubs, and conveners at a time when great powers were distracted by rivalry. Sri Lanka, too, possesses the attributes to rise in this emerging landscape, if we choose to act with purpose. 

    As a Maritime and Logistics Hub, Sri Lanka sits along the world’s most important East–West maritime highway, yet has not fully realised the potential of this position. With the right investment climate, regulatory consistency, and diplomatic balance, the island can become an efficient, neutral logistics hub serving all blocs: West, East, and South. This includes strengthening ports, aviation links, and digital infrastructure to support regional supply chains and trans-shipment networks. 

    As a Diplomatic Bridge in the Indian Ocean Geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly defined by competition, mistrust, and strategic ambiguity. Amid this environment, Sri Lanka can offer what few others can: a neutral, trusted venue for dialogue, confidence-building, and conflict prevention. By convening maritime security forums, climate adaptation roundtables, and regional economic dialogues, Sri Lanka can redefine itself as a facilitator rather than a battleground for competing interests. This diplomatic role, rooted in neutrality and credibility, can become a cornerstone of the island’s long-term relevance. 

    The global transition to clean energy is rewriting economic and political priorities across continents. Sri Lanka’s hydropower, solar, and wind capacity create an opportunity to position the country as a renewable energy partner for the region. Expanding grid connectivity, attracting green financing, and partnering on technology transfers can anchor national energy security while forging deeper alliances with both great powers and rising middle powers as a Renewable Energy Partner. 

    As the Global South demands a fairer international order, Sri Lanka has the opportunity to join voices calling to democratise global governance, from the UN Security Council to the IMF and World Bank. Smaller nations deserve equitable representation and greater institutional responsiveness. By aligning with reform-oriented coalitions, Sri Lanka can gain diplomatic visibility and credibility that far exceeds its size, as a Voice for Reform in Global Institutions. 

    But seizing these opportunities requires qualities we have not consistently demonstrated: political stability, coherent foreign policy, and economic credibility. These are the foundations upon which successful small states build influence, and they are the areas where Sri Lanka has repeatedly stumbled. If Sri Lanka can correct this trajectory, through disciplined governance, strategic clarity, and long-term national planning, then the disorder of today’s world need not be a threat. Instead, it can become the opening through which the island finally realises its potential as a regional connector, a diplomatic actor, and a resilient nation in a rapidly changing global order. 

    The Path Forward 

    Choosing Influence Over Vulnerability Sri Lanka must urgently embrace a new strategic mindset built on five pillars: Balanced Foreign Policy, Avoiding entanglement in rival blocs. Economic Transformation, Strengthening the economy to regain autonomous decision-making. Indian Ocean Strategy, Leveraging geography as a national asset, not a bargaining chip. Institutional Reform, building trustworthy governance that inspires investor and diplomatic confidence. Most importantly engagement with the Global South, positioning Sri Lanka as an active contributor to the emerging world order. The next decade will determine the shape of global power for a generation. If Sri Lanka hesitates, the world will move forward without us. 

    A Moment of Choice 

    Sri Lanka stands at a historic juncture. We possess strategic advantages that many nations envy, yet economic vulnerabilities limit our choices. The world is being reordered, messily, rapidly, irreversibly. The question is not simply Where does Sri Lanka stand today? The real question is: Where will Sri Lanka choose to stand tomorrow? In a world drifting toward rivalry and fragmentation, Sri Lanka must choose to be not a pawn, but a purposeful small power—neutral, stable, connected, and confident. This is our moment to reclaim agency. If we fail, the new world order will be written around us, not with us. The choice before us is stark, to remain a spectator in a world that is rapidly changing—or to step forward, with clarity and purpose, as a nation that shapes its own destiny. 

    References: 

    Alexander Stubb, The West’s Last Chance How to Build a New Global Order Before It’s Too Late January/February 2026 Published on December 2, 2025 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ 

    Rizwie, Rukshana; Athas, Iqbal; Hollingsworth, Julia “Rolling power cuts, violent protests, long lines for basics: Inside Sri Lanka’s unfolding economic crisis” (3 April 2022). 

    Wignaraja, Ganeshan (16 February 2025). “Sri Lanka struggles to deliver a new era of post-crisis growth | East Asia Forum”. East Asia Forum. Retrieved 29 July 2025. 

    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-03-17/shock-waves-from-the-war-in-ukraine-threaten-to-swamp-sri-lanka 

    https://www.reuters.com/markets/rates-bonds/sri-lankas-ambitious-governance-macro-linked-bonds-2024-12-17/#:~:text=LONDON%2C%20Dec%2017%20(Reuters),ever%20arranged%20in%20a%20restructuring. 

    https://www.voanews.com/a/india-feels-the-squeeze-in-indian-ocean-with-chinese-projects-in-neighborhood-/6230845.html 

    Reuters+2isas.nus.edu.sg+2 

    https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/tracking-impact-of-us-tariffs-on-apparel-footwear-supply-chains-wpftc/ 

    Author:

    Air Chief Marshal Gagan Bulathsinghala RWP RSP VSV USP MPhil MSc FIM  ndc psc.

    Formerly Commander Sri Lanka Air Force & Ambassador to Afghanistan

    Director, Charisma Energy
    Director, Strategic Development, WKV Group 
    President, Association of Retired Flag Rank Officers
    Senior Fellow South Asia Foresight Network
     

    Feature Image Credit: ndtv.com

     

  • INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN: PRAGMATISM IS KEY

    INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN: PRAGMATISM IS KEY

    Given that the Taliban appear sincere in their determination to secure peace and improve their citizens’ standard of living, it is prudent for India to remain cooperative and avoid overinvolvement in such matters at this time. It is also likely that, over time, Indian influence on Afghanistan—whether through development, trade, security, health, or education—will have a positive impact on Afghan society, mainly through the younger generation of Afghans studying in India

     

    Introduction

    During his week-long visit to India in October 2025, Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, the foreign minister of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, became the first high-ranking Afghan official to travel to the country since the fall of the Ashraf Ghani regime in August 2021. The minister who faced a travel ban was permitted to enter India after the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee approved a waiver application on his behalf [1]. His visit and its portents have sparked numerous commentaries across South Asia. India-Afghanistan relations, which had receded from the limelight post the 2021 Taliban takeover in Kabul, are now being viewed with renewed interest.

    ‘Afghanistan Map: courtesy Nations Online Project’

    Afghanistan’s Enduring Importance

    A glance at the map above shows why Afghanistan is called the ‘Heart of Asia’. A country for the most part rugged and mountainous, it borders seven nations – Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China (Tibet at the tip of the Wakhan Corridor), India, and Pakistan- and sits at the crossroads of South, Central, and West Asia. The sheer geostrategic importance of this location, the multitude of tribal ethnicities and loyalties that transcend borders, and a fierce sense of independence have resulted in a turbulent history and the awarding of a less flattering designation: ‘Graveyard of Empires’. The most recent example is the defeat of the mighty Soviet Union by the Afghan Mujahedin, who were armed and aided by the West and trained by its proxy, Pakistan.

    Another reason for interest in Afghanistan is its vast untapped mineral reserves, valued at over $1 trillion, located in 24 specific ‘areas of interest’ across the country’s 34 provinces[2]. With nations eager to diversify sources of critical minerals and rare earths, this represents a hugely attractive opportunity. Landlocked Afghanistan’s access to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf passes through Pakistan and Iran, respectively. This has implications for the West’s relations with both countries. Russia, seeking to consolidate influence in its neighbourhood, became the first country to recognise the Taliban regime in July this year. However, it is China that has arguably taken the lead in rehabilitating the Taliban regime globally. It has resumed full diplomatic relations by posting an ambassador in Kabul. To quote Shivam Shekhawat in his paper of July 2025, ‘…At the international level, Beijing has argued for Afghanistan’s reintegration and urged the international community not to interfere in its internal affairs. It has called for the removal of sanctions imposed on the Taliban leaders, the release of the country’s foreign reserves, and keeping aid independent from any political preconditions[3]. Also, it steadily expands its influence through trade. During the period August 2024 to August 2025, its exports to Afghanistan increased by 41.7% from $114 million to $161 million[4].

    With its unbroken history of conflict since 1979 and the geopolitical, social, and economic consequences on its neighbours, Afghanistan remains crucial to regional stability. Zobair Solahi discusses this in his April 2022 paper, where he states, ‘..A stable and peaceful Afghanistan could be an integral actor in trade, transit, and political stability across the Eurasian continent, but continued unrest will undermine regional peace and stability…’[5] This perspective needs to be appreciated by those who hold reservations about India-Afghanistan relations and who attribute hidden motives to our development efforts aimed at improving the lives of the Afghan people.

    The Situation Today

    The reasons for the failure of Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (the US mission focused on counterterrorism and strengthening Afghan security forces) and NATO’s Operation Resolute Support are widely debated. What is not debated is the outcome – a Taliban regime that holds sway over the entire country. The new government (Taliban 2.0) now includes various factions of the Taliban militia, integrated into a new Afghan Army (AA). This AA has kept the structures of the old Afghan National Army (ANA) intact, replacing key commanders with Taliban loyalists. The AA has successfully sidelined a splintered opposition. While certain officials of previous regimes are eking out a quiet existence in Kabul under Taliban watch, warlords of past eras like Gen Rashid Dostum, now largely ineffective, live in exile. Younger men such as Ahmed Masood, son of the renowned ‘Lion of Panjsher’, Ahmed Shah Masood, lack both experience and influence. The few leaders of significance who still hold credibility, like former Vice President Amrullah Saleh, do not possess the resources to challenge the Taliban on a large scale needed to effect regime change. Although an armed opposition will continue mounting guerrilla actions against the Islamic Emirate, these are unlikely to lead to a change of government, at least in the medium term, and that too with extensive outside support, which is currently not forthcoming.

    After its voluntary exit in 2021, the recent shift of the US towards Afghanistan has sparked much speculation. The US desire to retake the Bagram air base outside Kabul is being linked to a host of reasons, including the official one of monitoring Chinese nuclear assets across the Wakhan corridor. There may be other motives—such as using a strategic asset like Bagram to effectively oversee activities in Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, and even the possibility that the threat of retaking the base could be used to extract unspoken concessions from the Taliban. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that the US would forcibly enter Afghanistan without the Taliban’s approval. More critically, even if a small American military presence is allowed by the Taliban, the implications of a superpower’s re-entry into the Heart of Asia will be significant, considering China’s and Russia’s footprints, and the situations in Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan will once again be a key factor, with potential consequences for India.

    India and Afghanistan

    The Indian Embassy in Kabul. Original photo courtesy India Today, posted on KabulNow 22 October 2025

    Although India downgraded its diplomatic presence in Kabul following the Taliban takeover, it maintained a ‘technical mission’ with minimal staff. After a four-year period of ‘wait and watch’, it became evident that the Taliban is now the sole governing force in Afghanistan. The longstanding history of friendly economic, developmental, and people-to-people ties, the shared strategic understanding with previous regimes dating back to 1947, and the current regional security concerns highlight the need to restore the relationship for the benefit of both nations. On its part, the Taliban is eager to once again secure Indian developmental assistance, especially amid the reduction of Western aid following criticism of the human rights situation in the country.

    The outcome of this understanding is the visit of Mawlawi Muttaqi, an event of seminal importance. This was followed by the elevation of the technical mission in Kabul to the status of the Embassy of India on 21 October 2025[6]. Even a brief review of India’s assistance to Afghanistan over the years would reveal the substantial stakes India has in that country and the benefits it has gained in terms of goodwill. Areas of cooperation and assistance (including security collaboration) are well-known and numerous. It is to the credit of successive Indian governments that policy towards Afghanistan has remained consistent (except for a brief cooling period during the first Taliban regime and the current situation).

    Understandably, India at this juncture does not want to be crowded out of Afghanistan, ceding all the space to others. To their credit, the Taliban have recognised the advantages of cooperation. Mawlawi Muttaqi struck the right chords in his media interactions in Delhi by answering all questions (including those about women’s rights from Indian women journalists). He has welcomed the return of Sikh and Hindu refugees (an unlikely event, considering that most have either obtained Indian citizenship or secured asylum in the West) and has echoed India’s stance on terrorism. Importantly, he has criticised Pakistan, blaming its policies for the unrest along the Durand Line. India, on its part, has announced six new development projects in Afghanistan, along with several other measures outlined by External Affairs Minister Mr Jaishankar during his meeting with Mawlawi Muttaqi[7]. Muttaqi has also requested increased trade, including via Wagah-Attari, for which Pakistan’s cooperation is vital. Given that countries with hostile relations continue to trade (Bangladesh and Myanmar being examples, with Bangladesh approving the import of 50,000 tonnes of rice from Myanmar under government-to-government agreements)[8], this is a proposal worth pursuing, especially with Chabahar under US sanctions and the economic unviability of a sustained air corridor for trade and commerce.

    Importantly, on security issues, India and non-Taliban Afghan regimes have traditionally shared a similar outlook. With Taliban 2.0 promising to end the influence of terror organisations, including Al Qaeda and Islamic State, a stable Afghanistan could become a reality, benefiting regional stability. This would support Indian plans for trade corridors to Central Asia and beyond. It is clear that Afghanistan no longer considers Pakistan its benefactor, as shown by the changes in Afghan-Pakistani relations following the rise of Taliban 2.0. Actions such as Pakistan’s unilateral fencing of the Durand Line (allegedly even encroaching on Afghan territory in certain instances)[9], forcibly returning Afghan refugees, and border skirmishes culminating in Pakistani air strikes on Kabul, followed by the Doha ceasefire, are indicators. Currently, Pakistan’s prized ‘strategic depth’ through Afghanistan stands denied. This benefits India, as Pakistan must maintain heightened vigilance on two borders. If the Pakistani government recognises its constraints, a less hostile relationship with India might also be possible.

    Conclusion

    Optimists might argue that India-Afghanistan relations have come full circle over four years. However, there are vital differences in how the two nations approach ideology and governance. Despite claims to the contrary, gender and ethnic disparities in Afghanistan are too evident to overlook. Additionally, India must bear in mind that the opposition’s return to power could always be a possibility in the long run. Therefore, fully endorsing Taliban policies in the face of visible social instability in Afghanistan is neither wise nor desirable, as it conflicts with India’s longstanding views on such issues.

    That said, the mere fact that such problems have been acknowledged by Taliban 2.0, even if somewhat vaguely, is a step forward. Also, given that the Taliban appear sincere in their determination to secure peace and improve their citizens’ standard of living, it is prudent for India to remain cooperative and avoid overinvolvement in such matters at this time. It is also likely that, over time, Indian influence on Afghanistan—whether through development, trade, security, health, or education—will have a positive impact on Afghan society, mainly through the younger generation of Afghans studying in India. With a combination of pragmatism and goodwill, this relationship is destined to benefit both nations.

     

    End Notes:

    [1]‘UNSC Panel Clears Muttaqi’s Travel, Paving Way for Taliban’s First Ministerial Trip to India’ The Wire 03 October 2025.

    [2]  ‘Mapping Afghanistan’s Untapped Natural Resources’ Mohammed Hussein and Mohammed Haddad  Al Jazeera, 24 September 2021.

    [3] ‘Understanding China’s Engagement with Afghanistan Under Taliban 2.0’  Shivam Shekhawat  Issue Brief Issue No 816 July 2025 Observer Research Foundation.

    [4] ‘  Website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) China and Afghanistan trade figures’.

    [5] ‘Afghanistan: A Junction of Asia’s Connectivity’  Zobair Salahi  The National Bureau of Asian Research May 28, 2022

    [6] Upgradation of the Technical Mission of India in Kabul to Embassy of India, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs  , media centre press release dated 21 October 2025 on website mea.gov.in

    [7] EAM’s opening remarks during meeting with Foreign Minister of Afghanistan (October 10, 2025)’ Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs media centre speeches and statements on website mea.gov.in

    [8] 100,000 tons of rice to be imported from Myanmar, Dubai, Dhaka Tribune, 22 October 2025,   Tribune Desk.[4] ‘  Website of the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) China and Afghanistan trade figures’.

    [9] ‘The Durand Line and the Fence: How are communities managing with cross-border lives?’ Sabawoon Samim,  Afghanistan Analysts Network  , Regional Relations  , April 2024.

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.arabnews.com

     

  • Bridging Civilisations: Nalanda, India’s Connection with the East, and the Spirit of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam

    Bridging Civilisations: Nalanda, India’s Connection with the East, and the Spirit of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam

    By invoking ‘Om Shanti, Shanti Om’ and recalling his ‘Indian DNA,’ President Prabowo Subianto reminded the world of India’s timeless civilisational values. These gestures reflect centuries-old cultural and philosophical bonds between India and East Asia, rooted in peace, harmony, and shared heritage.

    When Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto recently concluded his speech at the 80th UN General Assembly with the Sanskrit mantra “Om Shanti, Shanti Om,” it was more than a ceremonial gesture. He called for global peace, justice, and equal opportunity, warning that “human folly, fuelled by fear, racism, hatred, oppression, and apartheid, threatens our common future.” The invocation of Sanskrit highlighted a message of harmony amid global uncertainties and reminded the world of India’s enduring civilisational values.

    Earlier, during his visit to India as the chief guest for the Republic Day celebrations, he remarked that he carried “Indian DNA” and pointed to the Sanskrit origins of many Indonesian names, underscoring centuries-old cultural and civilisational connections between India and Southeast Asia.

    A Forgotten Dimension of Indian History

    India’s historical interactions, however, have often been narrated through the prism of invasions from the Northwest. Colonial historiography deliberately emphasised repeated waves of conquest and plunder—ranging from the Aryan migrations, Persian invasions, Alexander the Great, the Indo-Greeks, Shakas, Kushans, and Hunas, to the Turkic invasions, the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, the Mughal conquest under Babur, and Ahmad Shah Abdali’s incursions—painting India’s past as one of perpetual defeat and humiliation.

    This selective focus on invasions was deliberately designed to keep Indian confidence low, ensuring that generations grew up seeing themselves primarily as victims of history rather than inheritors of a rich and diverse civilisation. Meanwhile, India’s long-standing engagement with East Asia, including trade networks, cultural diffusion, and philosophical exchange, was largely sidelined in colonial and post-colonial narratives. Monumental structures such as Angkor Wat in Cambodia or Borobudur in Indonesia bear testimony to this enduring civilisational conversation, yet these were rarely taught as part of mainstream Indian history.

    Another challenge lies in the application of Western theoretical frameworks—such as realism, neorealism, and similar models—to understanding India’s global outlook. These frameworks often assume that every state behaves aggressively, seeking domination and power, and paint all nations with the same brush. China’s “Middle Kingdom” worldview or its quest to reverse its “century of humiliation” may fit this logic, but India’s history and philosophy reflect a markedly different trajectory. With the exception of the Chola naval expeditions, India has rarely sought to invade foreign lands.

    India’s worldview is often likened to a lotus, with its various petals—culture, philosophy, ethics, and diplomacy—contributing to harmony, coexistence, and the principle of “live and let live.” Central to this vision is the concept of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam: the world is one family.

    This perspective underpins India’s approach to global engagement, blending ethical statecraft with strategic autonomy. Building on this philosophical foundation, India translates its vision into action through cultural diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and initiatives that promote global cooperation and inclusive development.

    During its G20 presidency in 2023, India played a pivotal role in reshaping the summit’s focus toward the challenges faced by the Global South, highlighting issues such as debt restructuring, food security, climate financing, and reforms in multilateral development banks. A landmark achievement was the inclusion of the African Union as a permanent member of the G20, reflecting India’s diplomatic leadership and commitment to amplifying the voices of developing countries.

    Alongside this, initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance (ISA), the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), Project Mausam, the India-UN Development Partnership Fund, and India’s COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy underscore its dedication to global solidarity, humanitarian support, and sustainable development.

    India’s strategic thought is deeply informed by its philosophical heritage. The Arthashastra emphasises practical statecraft and realpolitik, while the Dharmashastra provides the ethical and moral framework guiding those actions.Classical thinkers like Chanakya (Kautilya) emphasised practical governance while aligning with the ethical principles of dharma, balancing power with moral responsibility. As he famously noted, “The duty of a ruler is for the welfare of his people,” highlighting that ethical considerations were central even in matters of statecraft. India’s strategic worldview thus seeks to harmonise national interests with global responsibilities, recognising that ethical governance and long-term security require attention not only to domestic welfare but also to the broader international order.

    Religious reformers and spiritual leaders—such as the Buddha, Mahavira, Ramanuja, and Madhva—championed ethics, nonviolence, and universal harmony. Modern visionaries such as Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore, and Sri Aurobindo extended these ideas to the global stage, advocating moral leadership, cultural diplomacy, and internationalism. Later thinkers, such as Mahatma Gandhi, Vinoba Bhave, and Jiddu Krishnamurti, emphasised ethical governance, humanistic values, and personal transformation as the foundation for societal and global peace.

    This holistic approach—blending practical insights of Arthashastra with ethical guidance of Dharmashastra, informed by centuries of philosophical thought—distinguishes India’s worldview from Western, power-centric models.

    Despite these long-standing ties, independent India largely overlooked Southeast Asia for much of its early decades, focusing instead on its immediate security concerns and the dynamics of the Cold War. ASEAN countries leaned toward the United States, while India charted a non-aligned course. While Cold War pressures existed, India largely neglected this crucial region and its maritime dimension. Only in the 1990s, with the introduction of the Look East Policy, did New Delhi consciously reconnect with its eastern neighbourhood. By then, decades of neglect had to be addressed to restore historical relationships, a point noted by scholars who observe that India had “historically left Southeast Asia largely unattended, despite long-standing civilisational links.”

    Reviving the Civilisational Link

    One of the most potent symbols of India’s engagement with East Asia is Nalanda University. Established in the 5th century CE by Emperor Kumaragupta I, it was the world’s first great residential university, drawing scholars from China, Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia, and beyond. Nalanda offered an interdisciplinary curriculum spanning Buddhist scriptures, logic, grammar, medicine, astronomy, and philosophy, fostering holistic learning long before modern academic disciplines were compartmentalised. Over the centuries, it suffered repeated attacks, culminating in the 1193 CE assault by Bakhtiyar Khilji, which destroyed its nine-story library, Dharmagañja, along with countless manuscripts covering philosophy, medicine, astronomy, and other fields.

    Smoke from the burning texts lingered for months, erasing invaluable works across multiple disciplines and causing an irreparable loss to India’s and Asia’s intellectual heritage.

    During the inauguration of the new campus in Rajgir, Bihar, on June 19, 2024, Prime Minister Narendra Modi underscored Nalanda’s enduring civilisational legacy. He remarked that while “fire can destroy books, [it] cannot destroy knowledge,” affirming that “Nalanda is not just a name; it is an identity, an honour, a value, a mantra, a pride, and a saga.” Highlighting the significance of the revival, he noted that the new Nalanda “will demonstrate that nations built on strong human values know how to revive history and lay the foundation for a better future.”

    External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar also emphasised Nalanda’s diplomatic and academic importance, noting during the 2024 campus inauguration that the university is actively fostering regional integration through initiatives like the “ASEAN-India University Network” and highlighting that its destruction “marked a downturn in our history”

    The modern revival of Nalanda University rekindles its historic spirit of cross-cultural exchange and global engagement. Its contemporary philosophy emphasises integrating traditional wisdom with modern academic disciplines, promoting an interdisciplinary approach that blends Buddhist Studies, Philosophy, Comparative Religion, Ecology, Environmental Studies, and Management Studies. Programs encourage students to engage with original texts, critical interpretations, and contemporary applications, reflecting a holistic understanding of knowledge.

    In September 2025, Nalanda University hosted the inaugural three-day East Asia Summit Conclave of Heads of Higher Education Institutions, bringing together over 35 academic leaders from India and ASEAN/EAS countries. The conclave included thematic deliberations, cultural programs, and the signing of MoUs with institutions such as Vietnam National University, the Indian Maritime University, and MAKAIS. A parallel workshop on Energy Efficiency and Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE) further highlighted India’s sustainability agenda. This landmark event reinforced Nalanda’s role as a hub for academic diplomacy, cross-cultural dialogue, and regional integration.

    Today, Nalanda’s student body includes participants from ASEAN countries, Africa, and beyond, embodying diversity, dialogue, and shared learning. The university is a living reflection of what India stands for: tolerance, pluralism, and coexistence. Unlike the distorted Western narratives that often portray India as illiberal or intolerant, Nalanda demonstrates that India’s civilisational ethos embraces diversity and intercultural engagement. Its holistic and inclusive approach reinforces India’s soft power and projects a message of peace, coexistence, and intellectual openness.

    Nalanda continues to uphold its interdisciplinary ethos, emphasising the interconnectedness of knowledge and fostering collaboration to address contemporary global challenges. In doing so, it revives historical connections with East Asia and exemplifies India’s vision of a world united through learning, dialogue, and mutual respect.

    When leaders like the Indonesian president invoke Sanskrit terms or highlight cultural kinship, it is a reminder that India’s story is far richer than the invasion-centric histories emphasised under colonial education. To decolonise our historical imagination, we must foreground India’s ancient engagement with the East, its traditions of non-aggression, and its civilisational ethos of peace and fraternity.

    India and its East Asian partners, particularly ASEAN countries, share centuries-old cultural, philosophical, and civilisational bonds that manifest in religion, art, architecture, literature, cuisine, trade, education, and people-to-people exchanges. These living streams of cultural ties continue to enrich both India and Southeast Asia, reflecting a legacy of adaptation, creativity, and mutual influence.

    As Michel Foucault argued, power and knowledge are inseparable—knowledge is both shaped by power and a tool through which power operates. History functions in this dynamic, shaping identity, self-perception, and the trajectory of nations. Institutions like Nalanda University, both in its ancient and modern forms, exemplify India’s civilisational vision: fostering interdisciplinary learning, cross-cultural dialogue, and a holistic understanding of knowledge, while promoting a mutual exchange of ideas and practices that enriches both India and its partners.

    Reclaiming India’s forgotten ties with the East and recognising the enduring legacy of centres like Nalanda is not only a matter of historical accuracy but also a foundation for building a future grounded in shared heritage, mutual respect, and the vision of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam—the world as one family.

    By nurturing these connections through education, cultural exchange, and inclusive engagement, India and its partners can ensure that history, knowledge, and creativity continue to serve as instruments of peace, cooperation, and shared prosperity across the region.

    Feature Image Credit: Modern Nalanda University Campus at Night (photo by M Matheswaran)
    Indonesian President’s Address at UNGA photo credit: media.un.org
    Ancient Nalanda ruins, the Mahabodhi temple, Nalanda campus, and a spectrum of students – Photos Credit: M Matheswaran

  • The Pakistan Paradox: Courted by Rivals, Valued Only Against India

    The Pakistan Paradox: Courted by Rivals, Valued Only Against India

    Pakistan’s presence at China’s Victory Day parade exposed a more profound truth: its value lies not in strategic brilliance but in being a pawn for both Washington and Beijing. Far from balancing, Islamabad survives as a tool in the great power game against India.

    China’s recent Victory Day parade on September 3, 2025, was more than a ceremonial display; it was a calculated act of strategic signalling to the West. By showcasing its formidable military hardware and hosting close allies such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un, Beijing sought to project its emergence as a great power, much as it did during the 2008 Olympics. By bringing these leaders together, China signalled not only unity but also the contours of an emerging alternative world order that challenges Western dominance.

    The parade sent “chill waves” across Western capitals, with even Donald Trump admitting that he closely followed the event. On social media, he sardonically addressed China: “Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America.” On September 5, 2025, he further voiced his frustration, declaring that the U.S. had “lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China,” a remark that reflected Washington’s growing unease over Beijing’s expanding influence.

    India, notably absent from China’s Victory Day parade on September 3, 2025, made its own strategic moves. Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Japan on August 29–30, ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin on August 31–September 1. By going to Tokyo first and then to Tianjin, Modi signalled to the West that India continues to prioritise its commitments in the Indo-Pacific, while also reminding Beijing that New Delhi remains open to engagement. During the SCO summit, Modi’s remark that India’s engagement with China “should not be seen through third-country lenses” was intended to reassure the West of India’s balancing strategy.

    Yet, amid this choreography of great powers, one country’s presence at the Victory Day parade raised eyebrows: Pakistan. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stood alongside leaders who openly challenge the Western-led order—figures the West often labels as part of an “axis of evil”—despite Pakistan being nominally allied with the United States. What was even more surprising was the silence of Washington and its partners. Had it been India’s leader at the parade, the Western outcry would have been deafening. But when Pakistan did it, no questions were asked. Why this extraordinary tolerance?

    The explanation lies not in Pakistan’s own strategic brilliance. Unlike India, Pakistan lacks genuine strategic agency or independent decision-making capacity. It has long been dependent on external patrons and remains heavily constrained by domestic crises. The narrative advanced by some strategic experts that Islamabad is engaged in a masterful balancing act between Washington and Beijing is misleading. Instead, both the U.S. and China tolerate Pakistan’s duplicity because of its enduring strategic utility against India.

    Washington knows Pakistan’s record all too well. During the War on Terror, Islamabad received over $33 billion in U.S. aid while simultaneously providing sanctuary to Taliban leaders. U.S. officials, including President Trump, repeatedly acknowledged this duplicity. In a tweet on January 1, 2018, Trump stated: ‘The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!”

    Similarly, Congressman Ted Poe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, introduced a bill in 2016 calling for Pakistan to be declared a “state sponsor of terrorism,” stating that Pakistan was “not only an untrustworthy ally but has also aided and abetted the enemies of the United States”. Counterterrorism cooperation is, therefore, not the real reason Washington continues to indulge Pakistan. Nor are West Asia’s dynamics or connectivity goals the central factor, though they play a role.

    The real reason is India. Pakistan serves as a pressure valve for Washington to use whenever New Delhi strays from American strategic priorities. Similarly, for Beijing, Pakistan is an indispensable grey-zone tool against India — a reliable proxy that complicates India’s security calculus without requiring direct Chinese involvement. This explains why China continues to describe its relationship with Pakistan as ‘higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel,’ even though Beijing is fully aware that the “honey” and other lofty adjectives in this partnership are largely rhetorical, given Pakistan’s military establishment has historically maintained close ties with the Pentagon and U.S. defense agencies.

    Recent developments illustrate this pattern. Despite Islamabad striking a minerals deal in Balochistan with the U.S.—an area where China has invested heavily through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and even frequently loses its workers to terrorist attacks—Beijing has not retaliated.

    China has invested nearly $60 billion in CPEC projects, including Gwadar Port and associated infrastructure, yet continues to tolerate Pakistan’s parallel engagement with the U.S. Even though just days ago, China exited funding for certain sections of CPEC, such as the Karachi–Rohri stretch of the Main Line-1 railway, the broader corridor remains intact and firmly under Beijing’s control.

    Similarly, Washington has been remarkably quiet about the expansion of CPEC and its recent announcement to extend it into Afghanistan, despite this development directly strengthening Chinese influence in South and Central Asia, which contradicts U.S. national security strategies, including the Indo-Pacific strategy designed to counterbalance China. Imagine if India were to engage China in a similar manner; the Western backlash would be immediate and fierce.

    The silence over Pakistan reveals the underlying logic: both Washington and Beijing find it useful to maintain Islamabad as a strategic lever against India. For China, Pakistan provides military intelligence, operational support, and a constant security distraction for New Delhi, keeping India tied down on its western front. For the U.S., Pakistan is less a partner in counterterrorism than a tool to remind India of the costs of drifting too far from American preferences.

    Thus, Pakistan’s position is not the result of deft balancing or sophisticated statecraft. It is tolerated, even courted, by two rival great powers because of its instrumental value in their respective strategies against India. Far from being an Independent balancer, Pakistan remains a dependent actor whose importance derives almost entirely from the leverage it provides to others.

    For India, the lesson is clear. The tolerance extended to Pakistan by both Washington and Beijing is not about Islamabad’s capabilities or credibility — both powers know well its history of duplicity. Instead, it reflects the centrality of India in global strategy and the willingness of other powers to use Pakistan as a pawn in their broader geopolitical contest. Recognising this reality is essential for shaping New Delhi’s responses, ensuring that India continues to strengthen its autonomy and strategic weight in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

    Feature Image Credit: India Today

    Pictures in Text: www.arabnews.com, www.nationalheraldindia.com, www.deccanherald.com

  • India’s war on the Mughal Empire

    India’s war on the Mughal Empire

    The profound legacies of the Mughal Empire, forged through a remarkable fusion of Persian and Sanskrit worlds, are now under siege from a mythical vision of India’s past.

    On every 15 August since 1947, India’s Independence Day, the country’s prime minister unintentionally acknowledges the Mughals’ political legacy by delivering a nationwide address from the parapets of the mightiest symbol of Mughal power – Delhi’s massive Red Fort, built in 1648.

    ‘As is true of autocracies everywhere’, wrote David Remnick last April, ‘this Administration demands a mystical view of an imagined past.’  Although Remnick was referring to Trump’s America, something of the same sort could be said of India today. Informed by Hindutva (Hindu-centric) ideals, the country’s governing BJP party imagines a Hindu ‘golden age’ abruptly cut short when Muslim outsiders invaded and occupied an imagined sacred realm, opening a long and dreary ‘dark age’ of anti-Hindu violence and tyranny. In 2014, India’s prime minister declared that India had experienced 1,200 years of ‘slavery’ (ghulami), referring to ten centuries of Muslim rule and two of the British Raj. But whereas the British, in this view, had the good sense to go home, Muslims never left the land they had presumably violated and plundered. To say the least, India’s history has become a political minefield.

    Today’s India would be unrecognisable without the imprint the Mughals had made, and continue to make, on its society and culture. It was they who, for the first time, unified most of South Asia politically.

    Between the early 16th and the mid-18th century, towards the end of those 12 centuries of alleged ‘slavery’, most of South Asia was dominated by the Mughal Empire, a dazzling polity that, governed by a dynasty of Muslims, was for a while the world’s richest and most powerful state. Although it declined precipitously during the century before its liquidation by Queen Victoria in 1858, today’s India would be unrecognisable without the imprint the Mughals had made, and continue to make, on its society and culture. It was they who, for the first time, unified most of South Asia politically. On every 15 August since 1947, India’s Independence Day, the country’s prime minister unintentionally acknowledges the Mughals’ political legacy by delivering a nationwide address from the parapets of the mightiest symbol of Mughal power – Delhi’s massive Red Fort, built in 1648. Much of modern India’s administrative and legal infrastructure was inherited from Mughal practices and procedures. The basis of India’s currency system today, the rupee, was standardised by the Mughals. Indian dress, architecture, languages, art, and speech are all permeated by Mughal practices and sensibilities. It’s hard to imagine Indian music without the sitar, the tabla, or the sarod. Almost any Indian restaurant, whether in India or beyond, will have its tandoori chicken, kebab, biryani, or shahi paneer. One can hardly utter a sentence in a north Indian language without using words borrowed from Persian, the Mughals’ official language. India’s most popular entertainment medium – Bollywood cinema – is saturated with dialogue and songs delivered in Urdu, a language that, rooted in the vernacular tongue of the Mughal court, diffused throughout India thanks to its association with imperial patronage and the prestige of the dynasty’s principal capital, Delhi.

    Yet, despite all this, and notwithstanding the prime minister’s national address at Delhi’s Red Fort, India’s government is engaged in a determined drive to erase the Mughals from public consciousness, to the extent possible. In recent years, it has severely curtailed or even abolished the teaching of Mughal history in all schools that follow the national curriculum. Coverage of the Mughals has been entirely eliminated in Class Seven (for students about 12 years old), a little of it appears in Class Eight, none at all in Classes Nine to 11, and a shortened version survives in Class 12. In 2017, a government tourism brochure omitted any mention of the Taj Mahal, the acme of Mughal architecture and one of the world’s most glorious treasures, completed in 1653. Lawyers in Agra, the monument’s site, have even petitioned the courts to have it declared a Hindu temple.

    Although such radical measures have failed to gain traction, the national government has made more subtle efforts to dissociate the monument from the Mughals and identify it with Hindu sensibilities. For example, authorities have eliminated the initial ‘a’ from the name of one of its surrounding gardens, so that what had been Aram Bagh, the ‘Garden of Tranquility’, is now Ram Bagh, the ‘Garden of Ram’, the popular Hindu deity. This is the same deity to which India’s current government recently dedicated an extravagant temple complex on the site of the Babri Masjid, the mosque in eastern India that the Mughal Empire’s founder had built in 1528, but which a mob of Hindu activists tore down brick by brick in 1992.

    All of this prompts two related questions: how did a rich, Persian-inflected Mughal culture sink such deep roots in today’s India in the first place? And why in recent years has the memory of that culture come under siege?

    Ever since the early 13th century, a series of dynastic houses, known collectively as the Delhi sultanate, had dominated the north Indian plain. The last of these houses, the ethnically Afghan Lodis, was dislodged by one of the most vivid figures in early modern history, Zahir al-Din Babur(1483-1530). In 1526, Babur led an army of mostly free-born Turkish retainers from his base in Kabul, down through the Khyber Pass and onto the wide Indo-Gangetic plain, thereby launching what would become the Mughal Empire.

    As was true for the Delhi sultans, the new polity’s success lay in controlling access to ancient trade routes connecting Delhi and Lahore with Kabul, Balkh, and Central Asian markets, such as Samarkand and Bukhara. For centuries, cotton and other Indian goods moved northwards along this route, while horses – more than a hundred thousand annually, by Babur’s day – moved southwards to markets across South Asia. War horses had long formed the basis of power for Indian states, together with native war elephants. But the larger and stronger horses preferred by Indian rulers had to be continually imported from abroad, especially from Central Asia’s vast, long-feathered grasslands where native herds roamed freely.

    Having established a fledgling kingdom centred on Delhi, Agra and Lahore, Babur bequeathed to his descendants a durable connection to the cosmopolitan world of Timurid Central Asia, a refined aesthetic sensibility, a love of the natural world reflected in his delightful memoir, the Baburnama, and a passion for gardens. Aiming to recreate in India the refreshing paradisiac spaces that he knew from his Central Asian homeland, Babur built gardens across his realm, a practice his descendants would continue, culminating in the Taj Mahal.

    Since he died only four years after reaching India, Babur’s new kingdom merely continued many institutions of the defeated Lodis, such as giving his most trusted retainers land assignments, from which they collected taxes and maintained specified numbers of cavalry for state use. It was Babur’s son Humayun (r. 1530-40, 1555-56) who took the first steps to deepen the roots of Mughal legitimacy in Indian soil, as when he married the daughter of an Indian Muslim landholder rather than a Central Asian Turk, a practice he encouraged his nobles to follow. More importantly, while seated in a raised pavilion (jharokha) that projected from his palace’s outer walls, he would greet the morning’s rising sun and show his face to the public, just as the sun showed itself to him. This followed an ancient practice of Indian rajas that subtly conflated the image of a seated monarch with the icon of a Brahmanical deity, before whom one pays respectful devotion through mutual eye contact (darshan).

    The Mughals became further Indianised during the long reign of Humayun’s son Akbar (r. 1556-1605). Whereas for three centuries the Delhi sultans had struggled to defeat the Rajput warrior clans that dominated north India’s politics, Akbar adopted the opposite policy of absorbing them into his empire as subordinate kings. Nearly all Rajput kings accepted this arrangement, for by doing so they could retain rulership over their ancestral lands while simultaneously receiving high-ranking positions in Akbar’s newly created ruling class – the imperial mansabdars. Their new status also allowed them to operate on an all-India political stage instead of remaining provincial notables. Moreover, they were granted religious freedom, including the right to build and patronise Hindu temples. Over time, there emerged a warrior ethos common to both Mughals and Rajputs that superseded religious identities, allowing the latter to understand Muslim warriors as fellow Rajputs, and even to equate Akbar himself with the deity Rama. For their part, Akbar and his successors, as the Rajputs’ sovereign overlords, acquired regular tribute payments from subordinate dynastic houses, the service of north India’s finest cavalry, access to the sea through Rajasthani trade routes leading to Gujarat’s lucrative markets, and the incorporation of Rajput princesses in the imperial harem.

    Moreover, since Rajput women could become legal wives of the emperor, from Akbar’s time onwards, an emperor’s child by a Rajput mother was eligible for the throne. As a result, Akbar’s son Jahangir (r. 1605-23) was half Rajput, as his mother was a Rajput princess. Jahangir, in turn, married seven daughters of Rajput rulers, one of whom was the mother of his imperial successor Shah Jahan, making the latter biologically three-quarters Rajput.

    This last point proved especially consequential. As more Rajput states submitted to Mughal overlordship, the imperial court swelled into a huge, multi-ethnic and women-centred world in which the Rajput element steadily gained influence over other ethnicities. Moreover, since Rajput women could become legal wives of the emperor, from Akbar’s time onwards, an emperor’s child by a Rajput mother was eligible for the throne. As a result, Akbar’s son Jahangir (r. 1605-23) was half Rajput, as his mother was a Rajput princess. Jahangir, in turn, married seven daughters of Rajput rulers, one of whom was the mother of his imperial successor Shah Jahan, making the latter biologically three-quarters Rajput.

    Inevitably, Rajput mothers in the imperial harem imparted their culture to their offspring, who were raised in the harem world. This allowed Indian sensibilities and values to seep deeply into Mughal imperial culture, reflected in imperial art, architecture, language, and cuisine. At the same time, the absorption of Rajput cavalry in the imperial system allowed native military practices to diffuse throughout the empire’s military culture.

    The Mughals engaged with Sanskrit literary traditions and welcomed Brahmin and Jain scholars to their courts. From the 1580s on, Akbar sponsored Persian translations of the great Sanskrit epics Mahabharata and Ramayana, effectively accommodating Indian thought to Mughal notions of statecraft.

    Like all authentically Indian emperors, moreover, the Mughals engaged with Sanskrit literary traditions and welcomed Brahmin and Jain scholars to their courts. From the 1580s on, Akbar sponsored Persian translations of the great Sanskrit epics Mahabharata and Ramayana, effectively accommodating Indian thought to Mughal notions of statecraft. Whereas the Sanskrit Mahabharata stressed cosmic and social order (dharma), its Persian translation stressed the proper virtues of the king. Similarly, the Sanskrit Ramayana was subtly refashioned into a meditation on Mughal sovereignty, while the epic’s hero, Rama, was associated with Akbar himself, as though the emperor were an avatar of Vishnu.

    Beginning with Akbar, the Mughals also fostered cultural fusions in the domains of medicine and astronomy.  By the mid-17th century, the Mughals’ Greco-Arab (Yunani) medical tradition had become thoroughly Indianised, as Indo-Persian scholars engaged with Indian (Ayurvedic) works on pharmacology and the use of native Indian plants.

    Similarly, from the late 16th century on, Persian-Sanskrit dictionaries allowed Sanskrit scholars to absorb Arabo-Persian ideas that had derived from ancient Greek understandings of the uniformity of nature and laws of motion. That knowledge, together with astronomical tables patronised by Shah Jahan that enabled the prediction of planetary movements, then spread among the Mughal-Rajput ruling class at large.

    The most telling indication of the public’s acceptance of the Mughals as authentically Indian is that in both the 18th and 19th centuries, when the empire faced existential threats from outside, native forces rallied around the Mughal emperor as the country’s sole legitimate sovereign. In 1739, the Persian warlord Nadir Shah invaded India, routed a much larger Mughal army, sacked Delhi, and marched back to Iran with enormous loot, including the symbolically charged Peacock Throne. At this moment, the Marathas, who for decades had fiercely resisted the imposition of Mughal hegemony over the Indian peninsula, realised that the Mughals represented the ultimate symbol of Indian sovereignty and must be preserved at all costs. The Marathas’ chief minister Baji Rao (1700-40) even proposed that all of north India’s political stakeholders form a confederation to support and defend the weakened Mughal dynasty from foreign invaders.

    Similarly, by the mid-19th century, the English East India Company had acquired de facto control over much of the subcontinent, while the reigning Mughal ruler, Bahadur II (r. 1837-57), had been reduced to a virtual prisoner in Delhi’s Red Fort, an emperor in name only. But in 1857, a rebellion broke out when a disaffected detachment of the Company’s own Indian troops massacred their English officers in the north Indian cantonment of Meerut. Seeking support for what they hoped would become an India-wide rebellion, the mutineers then galloped down to Delhi and enthusiastically rallied around a rather bewildered Bahadur II.  Notwithstanding his own and his empire’s decrepit condition, to the rebels, this feeble remnant of the house of Babur still represented India’s legitimate sovereign.

    Through the Mughals’ twilight years, spanning the two incidents mentioned above, one emperor was especially revered in public memory – ‘Alamgir (r. 1658-1707), widely known today by his princely name, Aurangzeb. Upon his death, large and reverential crowds watched his coffin move 75 miles across the Deccan plateau to Khuldabad, a saintly cemetery in present-day Maharashtra. There, the emperor’s body was placed, at his own request, in a humble gravesite open to the sky, quite unlike the imposing monuments built to glorify the memory of his dynastic predecessors (excepting Babur). That simple tomb soon became an object of intense popular devotion. For years, crowds thronged his gravesite, beseeching ‘Alamgir’s intercession with the unseen world, for his saintly charisma (baraka) was believed to cling to his gravesite, just as in life it had clung to his person. For, during his lifetime, the emperor was popularly known as ‘Alamgir zinda-pir, or ‘Alamgir, the living saint’, one whose invisible powers could work magic.

    ‘Alamgir’s status as a saintly monarch continued to grow after his death in 1707. Already in 1709, Bhimsen Saksena, a former imperial official, praised ‘Alamgir for his pious character and his ability to mobilise supernatural power in the empire’s cause. In 1730, another retired noble, Ishwar Das Nagar, credited ‘Alamgir for the exceptional peace, security, and justice that had characterised his long reign. Nagar’s account followed a spate of histories that praised the emperor as a dedicated, even heroic administrator, and his half-century reign as a ‘golden age’ of governmental efficiency.

    Further contributing to ‘Alamgir’s cult was the appearance of hundreds of images depicting the emperor engaged in administration, military activity, or religious devotion. Reflecting the extent of the ‘Alamgir cult, many of these post-1707 paintings were produced not at the imperial court but in north India’s Hindu courts, including those of the Mughals’ former enemies. No other Mughal emperor was so venerated, and for so long a period, as ‘Alamgir.

    Over time, however, Indians gradually came to see the Mughal period – and especially ‘Alamgir’s reign – in an increasingly negative light. As the East India Company attained control over South Asia in the late 18th century, British administrators, being unable as foreigners to deploy a nativist rationale to justify their rule, cited the efficiency, justice, peace and stability that they had brought to their Indian colony. And because the Mughals had immediately preceded the advent of Company rule, those rulers were necessarily construed as having been inefficient and unjust despots in a war-torn and unstable land. The colonial understanding of Muslims and Hindus as homogeneous and mutually antagonistic communities also facilitated aligning colonial policies with the old Roman strategy of divide et impera. More perniciously, the colonial view of the Mughals as alien ‘Mahomedans’ who had oppressed a mainly non-Muslim population reinforced the notion of a native Hindu ‘self’ and a non-native Muslim ‘other’ – constructions that would bear bitter fruit.

    Although originating from within the colonial regime, such ideas gradually percolated into the public domain as the 19th century progressed and Indians became increasingly absorbed in the Raj’s educational and administrative institutions. It was not until the 1880s, with the first stirrings of Indian nationalist sentiment, however, that such colonial tropes became widely politicised. As the possibility of an independent nation took root, Indian nationalists began to look to their own past for models that might inspire and mobilise mass support for their cause. The writing of history soon became a political endeavour, ultimately degenerating into a black-and-white morality play that clearly distinguished heroes from villains. In short, India’s precolonial past became a screen onto which many – though not all – Hindu nationalists projected the tropes of the Hindu self and the Muslim other.

    Between 1912 and 1924, one of India’s most esteemed historians, Jadunath Sarkar, published his five-volume History of Aurangzib, the princely name of ‘Alamgir, who would soon become the most controversial – and ultimately the most hated – ruler of the Mughal dynasty. Sarkar’s study was so detailed, so thoroughly researched, and so authoritative that, in the century following its publication, no other historian even attempted a thorough survey of ‘Alamgir’s reign.

    Importantly, Sarkar wrote against the backdrop of the Great War and a nationalist movement that was just then reaching a fever pitch. In 1905, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy for India, had partitioned Sarkar’s native province of Bengal in half, a cynical divide-and-rule measure that ‘awarded’ Bengali Muslims with their own Muslim-majority province of eastern Bengal. The very next year, there appeared the All-India Muslim League, a political party committed to protecting the interests of India’s Muslims. Meanwhile, the partition of Bengal had provoked a furious protest by Bengali Hindus, leading to India-wide boycotts against British-made goods. Ultimately, the government gave in to Hindu demands and, in 1911, annulled the partition, which only intensified fear and anxiety within India’s Muslim minority community.

    It was in this highly charged political atmosphere that Sarkar worked on his biography of ‘Alamgir. With each successive volume of his study, the emperor was portrayed in darker colours, as were Muslims generally. In the end, Sarkar blamed ‘Alamgir for destroying Hindu schools and temples, thereby depriving Hindus of the ‘light of knowledge’ and the ‘consolations of religion’, and for exposing Hindus to ‘constant public humiliation and political disabilities’. Writing amid the gathering agitation for an independent Indian nation, Sarkar maintained that ‘no fusion between the two classes [Hindus and Muslims] was possible’, adding that while a Muslim might feel that he was in India, he could not feel of India, and that ‘Alamgir ‘deliberately undid the beginnings of a national and rational policy which Akbar [had] set on foot.’

    Perhaps more than any other factor, Sarkar’s negative assessment of ‘Alamgir has shaped how millions have thought about that emperor’s place in Indian history. Since the publication of History of Aurangzib, professional historians have generally shied away from writing about the emperor, as though he were politically radioactive. This, in turn, opened up space in India’s popular culture for demagogues to demonise the Mughal emperor. For millions today, ‘Alamgir is the principal villain in a rogues’ gallery of premodern Indo-Muslim rulers, a bigoted fanatic who allegedly ruined the communal harmony established by Akbar and set India on a headlong course that, many believe, in 1947, culminated in the creation of a separate Muslim state, Pakistan. In today’s vast, anything-goes blogosphere, in social media posts, and in movie theatres, he has been reduced to a cardboard cutout, a grotesque caricature serving as a historical punching bag. A recent example is the film Chhaava, a Bollywood blockbuster that was released on February 14, 2025 and has since rocketed to superstar status. Among films in only their sixth week since release, already by late March, it had grossed the second-largest earnings in Indian cinema history.

    Loosely based on a Marathi novel of the same title, Chhaava purports to tell the story of a pivotal moment in ‘Alamgir’s 25-year campaign to conquer the undefeated states of the Deccan plateau. These included two venerable sultanates, Bijapur and Golkonda, and the newly formed Maratha kingdom, launched in 1674 by an intrepid chieftain and the Mughals’ arch-enemy, Shivaji (r. 1674-80). The film concerns the reign of Shivaji’s elder son and ruling successor, Sambhaji (r. 1680-89), his struggles with Mughal armies, and finally his capture, torture, and execution at ‘Alamgir’s order in 1689.

    The film is not subtle. With its non-stop violence, gratuitous blood and gore, overwrought plot, and black-and-white worldview, the movie turns the contest between Sambhaji and ‘Alamgir into a cartoonish spectacle, like a Marvel Comics struggle between Spiderman and Doctor Doom. Whereas Sambhaji single-handedly vanquishes an entire Mughal army, ‘Alamgir is pure, menacing evil. Mughal armies display over-the-top brutality toward civilians: innocent Indians are hanged from trees, women are sexually assaulted, a shepherdess is burned to death, and so forth.

    In reality, ‘Alamgir is not known to have plundered Indian villages or attacked civilians (unlike the Marathas themselves, whose raids in Bengal alone caused the deaths of some 400,000 civilians in the 1740s). On the other hand, contemporary sources record Sambhaji’s administrative mismanagement, his abandonment by leading Maratha officers inherited from his father reign, his weakness for alcohol and merry-making, and how, instead of resisting Mughal forces sent to capture him, he hid in a hole in his minister’s house, from which he was dragged by his long hair before being taken to ‘Alamgir.

    Historical accuracy is not Chhaava’s strength, nor its purpose. More important are its consequences. Within weeks of its release, the film whipped up public fury against ‘Alamgir and the Mughals. In one venue where the movie was showing, a viewer wearing medieval warrior attire rode into the theatre on horseback; in another, a viewer became so frenzied during the film’s protracted scene of Sambhaji’s torture that he leapt to the stage and began tearing the screen apart.

    Politicians swiftly joined the fray. In early March, a member of India’s ruling BJP party demanded that ‘Alamgir’s grave be removed from Maharashtra, the heartland of the Maratha kingdom. On 16 March, another party member went further, demanding that the emperor’s tomb be bulldozed. The next day, a riot broke out in Nagpur, headquarters for the far-right Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, India’s paramilitary Hindu supremacist organisation. It began when around 100 activists who supported bulldozing ‘Alamgir’s grave burned an effigy of the emperor. In response, a group of the city’s Muslims staged a counter-protest, culminating in violence, personal injuries, the destruction of property, and many arrests. The fevered demand for bulldozing ‘Alamgir’s final resting place, however, is deeply ironic. In 1707, Sambhaji’s son and eventual successor to the Maratha throne, Shahu, travelled 75 miles on foot to pay his pious respects to ‘Alamgir’s tomb.

    In the end, the furore over ‘Alamgir’s gravesite illustrates the temptation to adjust the historical past to conform to present-day political priorities. Indicating the Indian government’s support for Chhaava’s version of history, in late March, India’s governing party scheduled a special screening of the film in New Delhi’s Parliament building for the prime minister, Cabinet ministers, and members of parliament.

    Nor is it only the historical past that is being adjusted to accord with present-day imagination. So is territory. In 2015, the Indian government officially renamed New Delhi’s Aurangzeb Road – so-named when the British had established the city – after a former Indian president. Eight years later, the city of Aurangabad, which Prince Aurangzeb named for himself while governor of the Deccan in 1653, was renamed Sambhaji Nagar, honouring the man the emperor had executed in 1689.

    Such measures align with the government’s broader agenda to scrub from Indian maps place names associated with the Mughals or Islam and replace them with names bearing Hindu associations, or simply to Sanskritise place-names containing Arabic or Persian lexical elements. Examples include: Mustafabad to Saraswati Nagar (2016), Allahabad to Prayagraj (2018), Hoshangabad to Narmadapuram (2021), Ahmednagar to Ahilyanagar (2023), and Karimgunj to Sribhumi (2024). Many more such changes have been proposed – at least 14 in the state of Uttar Pradesh alone – but not yet officially authorised.

    It is said that the past is a foreign country. Truly, one can never fully enter the mindset of earlier generations. But if history is not carefully reconstructed using contemporary evidence and logical reasoning, and if it is not responsibly presented to the public, we risk forever living with a ‘mystical view of an imagined past’ with all its attendant dangers, as Remnick warns.

     

    This essay was published earlier on www.engelsbergideas.com

    Feature Image Credit: www.engelsbergideas.com

     

  • India–U.S. Ties Beyond the Trump Show

    India–U.S. Ties Beyond the Trump Show

    With its deep institutional roots and strategic clarity, the India–U.S. relationship is well-positioned to advance further, driven not by transient rhetoric but by enduring common purpose

    U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated assertions about mediating a ceasefire between India and Pakistan have reignited long-standing apprehensions surrounding external involvement in the Kashmir issue. His remarks, including those referenced during a U.S. court hearing in May 2025—where U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick testified that the Trump administration’s trade policies helped avert a potential nuclear confrontation in South Asia—were met with widespread criticism from strategic experts and policymakers alike. New Delhi has remained steadfast in its position: the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is strictly bilateral and not subject to international mediation.

    Diaspora Influence and Institutional Depth

    Despite Trump’s controversial rhetoric, the India–U.S. relationship has matured well beyond the influence of individual leaders. It now stands as a robust, multi-dimensional partnership, underpinned by shared strategic interests, deepening economic ties, and strong people-to-people linkages. This is evident through the formalization of the relationship via key agreements and strategic initiatives. Today, it is regarded as a promising and one of the most consequential partnerships of the 21st century, given its potential to reshape the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. Moreover, this strength is particularly reflected in the vibrant Indian diaspora in the United States—numbering over four million—one of the most educated and affluent immigrant communities in the country, playing an increasingly influential role in shaping policy.

     

    The diaspora’s clout in U.S. policymaking has grown remarkably. A striking example of this influence was witnessed during the COVID-19 crisis in 2021. At a critical juncture, when the Biden administration had imposed export restrictions on essential medical supplies, Indian-Americans mounted an organized lobbying campaign. Their efforts succeeded in convincing the administration to reverse the ban and dispatch critical medical equipment and raw materials for vaccines to India. This intervention demonstrated the community’s capacity to influence key policy decisions at the highest levels. Their role is not limited to crisis management. The Indian-American community has been instrumental in advancing landmark initiatives such as the U.S.–India civil nuclear agreement, and today, many Indian-Americans serve in influential roles within the U.S. government. This diaspora acts as a cultural and strategic bridge, enhancing bilateral understanding and reinforcing long-term cooperation.

    The evolving India–U.S. partnership is bolstered by a diverse and committed set of stakeholders,including government institutions, private enterprises, think tanks, academic bodies, and civil society in both nations. Crucially, U.S. institutions such as the State Department and Congress continue to regard India as a vital strategic partner, particularly in the context of the Indo-Pacific strategy and broader efforts to counterbalance China’s growing regional influence. These institutions take a long-term, bipartisan approach to India–U.S. relations, one that is grounded in continuity and strategic alignment rather than reactive or transactional impulses, such as those reflected in Trump’s pronouncements.

    Strategic Continuity

    Trump’s leadership style has often been described as transactional, business-oriented, and self-promoting. He frequently projects himself as a master negotiator and dealmaker, but many of his actions suggest otherwise. His tendency to prematurely claim success and take credit has often weakened his own negotiating position, whether in the context of Ukraine, North Korea, Iran, or South Asia. For instance, Trump repeatedly announced breakthroughs in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that never materialized, thereby weakening his credibility and diminishing his effectiveness as a serious diplomatic actor.

    While Trump’s erratic rhetoric may generate headlines, it is critical not to exaggerate its impact on this deeply rooted relationship. His habitual tendency to seek the spotlight and amplify his personal role in global diplomacy often lacked substantive backing or long-term vision.

    In the case of India and Pakistan, Trump’s attempt to “hyphenate” the relationship—suggesting he could broker a deal between both nations—ignored the decades-long efforts by previous U.S. administrations to de-hyphenate the ties and treat each relationship on its own strategic merits. His statement that “they’ve been fighting for 1,500 years” reveals a superficial understanding of South Asian geopolitics and history. Such remarks reflect a lack of diplomatic nuance and strategic depth.

    In contrast, previous U.S. presidents devoted sustained efforts toward cultivating strategic trust with India—especially in light of their fraught Cold War history and the lingering presence of anti-American sentiment within Indian political and intellectual circles. During this era, American foreign policy toward India embodied a form of strategic altruism, emphasizing long-term engagement grounded in mutual respect rather than immediate concessions or gains. Successive administrations—Republican and Democratic alike, including Trump’s own during his first term—recognized the importance of winning India’s trust, acknowledging its historic skepticism of U.S. intentions and its adherence to a non-aligned foreign policy stance.

    These efforts bore fruit in the form of landmark agreements and growing strategic alignment across a broad spectrum of areas, including defense cooperation, civil nuclear energy, high technology, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism. Recent developments—including the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), the U.S.–India Major Defense Partnership Framework (2025–2035), the COMPACT Initiative, and collaborations through platforms like INDUS-X and the Artemis Accords—have deepened cooperation. These engagements signify that the India–U.S. partnership is now an essential component of the 21st-century global security and economic architecture.

    the India–U.S. partnership rests on far more stable and enduring foundations: bipartisan consensus within the U.S. strategic establishment, shared democratic values, converging geopolitical interests, and institutional mechanisms that safeguard continuity and progress.

    While Trump’s erratic rhetoric may generate headlines, it is critical not to exaggerate its impact on this deeply rooted relationship. His habitual tendency to seek the spotlight and amplify his personal role in global diplomacy often lacked substantive backing or long-term vision.  Even his relationship with Elon Musk—once a vocal ally who contributed nearly $300 million to pro-Trump political efforts during the 2024 campaign—has deteriorated into public conflict, highlighting the unpredictability of Trump’s leadership style. In stark contrast, the India–U.S. partnership rests on far more stable and enduring foundations: bipartisan consensus within the U.S. strategic establishment, shared democratic values, converging geopolitical interests, and institutional mechanisms that safeguard continuity and progress.

    West Asia dynamics: No Indian shift

    Moreover, recent U.S. gestures toward Pakistan—including inviting Pakistan’s Army Chief to U.S. Army Day celebrations, public praise for its leadership, the release of funds for upgrading the F-16 fleet—and support in securing IMF bailout packages—should be analysed through the lens of broader strategic imperatives, particularly concerning Iran. Amid escalating tensions with Tehran and recent Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets by its close ally Israel, Washington may be positioning itself for potential regional contingencies and wider escalation. In this context, logistical access to Pakistani military bases—notably Noor Khan Airbase, and other facilities which, according to senior analyst Imtiaz Gul, is already under partial U.S. operational control—could become critical. Pakistan has a history of facilitating U.S. military operations, such as during the War on Terror. Given its proximity to Iran, Pakistan is strategically well-placed to support U.S. initiatives in the region.

    The U.S. may also seek to ensure that Pakistan remains aligned with Western objectives should Israel act unilaterally against Iran. Therefore, recent goodwill gestures by the U.S. toward Pakistan should be interpreted not as a shift away from India, as some within the Indian strategic establishment might fear, but as part of a calculated strategy to secure regional flexibility amid evolving geopolitical uncertainties in West Asia.

    Ultimately, the strength and resilience of the India–U.S. relationship derive from its firm institutional foundation and shared strategic vision. It is largely insulated from the whims of transient political figures. Despite periodic turbulence, the partnership has demonstrated remarkable continuity and adaptability. Key U.S. national security documents—including the Indo‑Pacific Strategy and the National Security Strategy—consistently describe India as a “major defense partner” and an indispensable actor in the effort to balance China’s regional ambitions. These structural commitments ensure that the bilateral relationship remains on a trajectory of deepening cooperation. As articulated in the 2022 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, India is seen as a “like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia,” and a “driving force of the Quad and a net security provider in the region.”

    Conclusion

    Today, the India–U.S. relationship stands as a beacon of mutual trust, strategic alignment, and forward-looking engagement. Decades of deliberate diplomacy, institutional investment, and cultural linkage have given rise to one of the most promising partnerships of the 21st century. While figures like President Trump may generate momentary uncertainty, they lack the capacity to derail the deep-rooted and multidimensional nature of this partnership. The future of India–U.S. relations remains bright, anchored in shared democratic ideals, strategic complementarity, and a common vision for a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

    Feature Image credit: news18.com

    Image of  President Bush and PM Manmohan Singh: wikipedia India-United States Civil Nuclear Deal.

  • China and the Sunset of the International Liberal Order

    China and the Sunset of the International Liberal Order

         

    Rise of Multipolar World Order – www.newsvoyagernet.com

           The irrational amounts that the Soviet Union allocated to its defense budget not only represented a huge burden on its economy, but imposed a tremendous sacrifice on the standard of living of its citizens. Subsidies to the rest of the members of the Soviet bloc had to be added to this bill.

             Such amounts were barely sustainable for a country that, as from the first half of the 1960s, was subjected to a continuous economic stagnation. This situation became aggravated by the strong decline of oil prices, USSR’s main export, since the mid 1980s. The reescalation of the Cold War undertaken by Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, particularly the latter, put in motion an American military buildup, that could not be matched by Moscow.

             With the intention of avoiding the implosion of its system, Moscow triggered a reform process that attained none other than accelerating such outcome. Indeed, Mikhail Gorbachev opened the pressure cooker hoping to liberate, in a controlled manner, the force contained in its interior. Once liberated, however, this force swept away with everything on its path. Initially came its European satellites, subsequently Gorbachev’s power base, and, finally, the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet system had reached the point where it could not survive without changes, but neither could assimilate them. In other words, it had exhausted its survival capacity.

              Without a shot being fired, Washington had won the Cold War. The exuberant sentiment of triumph therein derived translated into the “end of history” thesis. Having defeated its ideological rival, liberalism had become the final point in the ideological evolution of humanity. If anything, tough, the years that followed to the Soviet implosion were marred by trauma and conflict. In the essential, however, the idea that the world was homogenizing under the liberal credo was correct.

             On the one hand, indeed, the multilateral institutions, systems of alliances and rules of the game created by the United States shortly after World War II, or in subsequent years, allowed for a global governance architecture. A rules based liberal international order imposed itself over the world. On the other hand, the so-called Washington Consensus became a market economy’s recipe of universal application. This homogenization process was helped by two additional factors. First, the seven largest economies that followed the U.S., were industrialized democracies firmly supportive of its leadership. Second, globalization in its initial stage acted as a sort of planetary transmission belt that spread the symbols, uses, and values of the leading power.

             The new millennium thus arrived with an all-powerful America, whose liberal imprint was homogenizing the planet. The United States had indeed attained global hegemony, and Fukuyama’s end of history thesis seemed to reflect the emerging reality.

    But things turned out to be more complex than this, and the history of the end of history proved out to be a brief one. In a few years’ time, global “Pax Americana” began to be challenged by the presence of a powerful rival that seemed to have emerged out of the blue: China. How had this happened?

             Beginning the 1970s, Beijing and Washington had reached a simple but transformative agreement. Henceforward, the United States would recognize the Chinese Communist regime as China’s legitimate government. Meanwhile, China would no longer seek to constrain America’s leadership in Asia. By extension, this provided China with an economic opening to the West. Although it would be only after Deng Xiaoping’s arrival to power, that the real meaning of the latter became evident.

             In spite of the multiple challenges encountered along the way, both the United States and China made a deliberate effort to remain within the road opened in 1972. Their agreement showed to be not only highly resilient, but able to evolve amid changing circumstances. The year 2008, however, became an inflexion point within their relationship. From then onwards, everything began to unravel. Why was it so?

             The answer may be found in a notion familiar to the Chinese mentality, but alien to the Western one – the shi. This concept can be synthesized as an alignment of forces able to shape a new situation. More generally, it encompasses ideas such as momentum, strategic advantage, or propensity for things to happen. Which were, hence, the alignment of forces that materialized in that particular year? There were straightforward answers to that question: The U.S.’ financial excesses that produced the world’s worst financial crisis since 1929; Beijing’s sweeping efficiency in overcoming the risk of contagion from this crisis; China’s capability to maintain its economic growth, which helped preventing a major global economic downturn; and concomitantly, the highly successful Beijing Olympic games of that year, which provided the country with a tremendous self-esteem boost.

             The United States, indeed, had proven not to be the colossus that the Chinese had presumed, while China itself turned out to be much stronger than assumed. This implied that the U.S. was passing its peak as a superpower, and that the curves of the Chinese ascension and the American decline, were about to cross each other. Deng Xiaoping’s advice for future leadership generations, had emphasized the need of preserving a low profile, while waiting for the attainment of a position of strength. In Chinese eyes, 2008 seemed to show that China was muscular enough to act more boldly. Moreover, with the shi in motion, momentum had to be exploited.

             Beijing’s post-2008 assertiveness became much bolder after Xi Jinping’s arrival to power in 2012-2013. China, in his mind, was ready to contend for global leadership. More to the point within its own region, China’s centrality and the perception of the U.S. as an alien power, had to translate into pushing out America’s presence.

    Challenged by China, Washington reacted forcefully. Chinese perceptions run counter to the fact that the U.S.’ had been a major power in East Asia since 1854, which translated into countless loss of American lives in four wars. Moreover, safeguarding the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, a key principle within the rules based liberal international order, provided a strong sense of staying power. This was reinforced by the fact that America’s global leadership was also at stake, thus requiring not to yield presence in that area for reputational reasons. The containment of Beijing’s ascendancy, became thus a priority for Washington.

             However, accommodating two behemoths that feel entitled to pre-eminence is a daunting task. Specially so, when one of them feels under threat of exclusion from the region, and the other feels that its emergence is being constrained. On top, both remain prisoners of their history and of their national myths. This makes them incapable of looking at the facts, without distorting them with the subjective lenses of their perceived sense of mission and superiority.

             War ensuing, under those circumstances, is an ongoing risk. But if war is a possibility, Cold War is already a fact. This implies a multifaceted wrestle in which geopolitics, technology, trade, finances, alliances, and warfare capabilities are all involved. And even if important convergent interest between them still remains in place, ties are being cut by the day. As a matter of fact, if in the past economic interdependence helped to shield from geopolitical dissonances, the opposite is the case today. Indeed, a whole array of zero-sum geopolitical controversies are rapidly curtailing economic links.

             The U.S., particularly during the Biden administration, chose to contain China through a regional architecture of alliances and by way of linking NATO with Indo-Pacific problems and selective regional allies. The common denominator that gathers them together is the preservation of the rules based liberal international order. An order, threatened by China’s geostrategic regional expansionism.

     

     

     

    However, China itself is not short of allies. A revisionist axis, that aims at ending the rules based liberal international order, has taken shape. The same tries to throw back American power and to create its own spheres of influence. This axis represents a competing center of gravity, where countries dissatisfied with the prevailing international order can turn to. Together with China two additional Asia-Pacific powers, Russia and North Korea, are part of this bloc.

    Trump’s return to the White House might change the prevailing regional configuration of factors. Although becoming more challenging to Beijing from a trade perspective, he could substantially weaken not only the rules based liberal international order, but the architecture of alliances that contains China. The former, because the illiberal populism that he represents is at odds with the liberal order. The latter, not only because he could take the U.S. out of NATO, but because his transactional approach to foreign policy, which favors trade and money over geopolitics, could turn alliances upside down.

    The rules based liberal international order, which became universal over the ashes of the Soviet Union, could now be facing its sunset. This, not only because its main challenger, China, may strengthen its geopolitical position in the face of its rival alliances’ disruption, but, more significantly, because the U.S. itself may cease to champion it.

    Feature Image Credit: www.brookings.edu

     

  • Indus Water Treaty: A Model for International Water Governance

    Indus Water Treaty: A Model for International Water Governance

    Introduction

    Water is the basis of biological sustenance, without which no civilisation can sustain. Access to clean and safely managed water is therefore a human right, not a privilege.

    According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) —

    One in four people still lives without safely managed water services or clean drinking water. Approximately 4 billion people live with severe water scarcity for at least one month of the year, and about half a billion people face water scarcity year-round.

    The water crisis is not an isolated issue but a global challenge. It calls for effective governance not just within the local governments and authorities of a country but transnationally as well.

    International Water Governance refers to this process of decision-making, formulation, and implementation of policies pertaining to the use, management, and distribution of transboundary water resources.

    Peace and cooperation on matters of conflict over water are hard to reach and much harder to maintain. Treaties, multilateral agreements and conventions often govern transboundary waters; one such example of a successful bilateral water-distribution treaty is the Indus Water Treaty (the IWT) of 1960 between India and Pakistan over the regulation and use of the Indus River Basin and its tributaries.

    Indus Water Treaty

    The Indus Water Treaty was signed in 1960 in Karachi between India and Pakistan as facilitated by the World Bank (erstwhile International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or IBRD). It demarcates the sharing and usage of the Indus River and its major tributaries, categorised into “eastern” and “western” rivers for Indian and Pakistani use, respectively.

    The Indus River flows mainly from Tibet and the Himalayan regions of India’s Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir and across Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh before emptying into the Arabian Sea through Karachi.

    Of the six major tributaries of the Indus River— the Beas, Ravi and Sutlej are the “eastern rivers” and the Indus, Chenab and Jhelum are the “western rivers”. The former is for India’s exclusive use after Pakistan’s permitted water use, and the latter is for Pakistan’s exclusive use after the criteria of India’s permitted use are met.

    As a result, the split was made in the ratio of about 20:80 of the total water flow from the Indus system in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan has unrestricted access to the waters of the western rivers for agricultural, domestic, and industrial purposes.

    India too is permitted to use a limited amount of water from these rivers, apart from the eastern rivers, for specified purposes, such as irrigation and power generation. It also lays down detailed regulations for India in building projects over the western rivers.

    Historical context and Security concerns

    As the partition of British India took place on religious lines instead of geographic factors, the division of the historically integrated water system in a manner satisfactory to both countries was a challenging feat. Although most of the river naturally flows through the regions of Pakistan, it primarily originates from India before it enters the former. Hence, Pakistan is the downstream nation of the Indus River. This places Pakistan in a vulnerable position, exposed to the risks of India causing artificial droughts or flooding of its arable lands, which may be used as leverage to control water and food security in times of hostilities.

    According to Pakistan, it was entitled to all the waters of the Indus and its tributaries due to its historical right before or until the partition, also highlighting the threat of severe water scarcity without the continuous flow of the rivers. Whereas India insisted that the waters be equitably distributed on a new post-partition basis by proposing for the first time the separate rationing of the western and eastern rivers between the two nations. Ergo, paving the way for arguably one of the most successful, long-standing bilateral agreements struck between any two agnostic states.

    Provisions and Objectives of IWT

    In 1952, with the World Bank as the mediator, a Working Party consisting of Indian, Pakistani, and World Bank engineers was formed to draw up a cooperative plan for the use, allocation and distribution of the disputed waters. After almost eight long years of negotiations, the Indus Water Treaty was finally ratified in 1960.

    The main provisions of the IWT are as follows:

    • Water distribution:

    India and Pakistan received approximately 30% and 70% of the total waters of the Indus rivers located in India. India’s eastern rivers have a mean annual flow of 40b/m3 while the western of Pakistan have an MAF of 100b/m3.

    • Regulation of water use:

    Use of waters of the eastern and western rivers are explicitly demarcated between India and Pakistan while limited usage of the other country’s rivers is also permitted for specific purposes that are of non-consumptive nature, like hydropower generation, fishing, etc.

    • Water rights:

    According to IWT, although the liberty to use unutilized water of the other country exists, the right over the water is not forfeited over time, even in case of repeated underutilization.

    • Conflict resolution:

    A Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) comprising commissioners from both India and Pakistan is provided for by the Treaty. The PIC serves as a forum for the exchange of hydrological data, information, and views on the implementation of the treaty and the resolution of disputes.

    Aftermath

    The treaty has survived several border skirmishes, terror attacks including the 26/11, and even two full-fledged wars in 1965 and 1971. The terms of water sharing as agreed upon have been adhered to despite such hostilities.

    After the 2016 Uri Attack on an Indian Army base in Jammu and Kashmir and the 2019 Pulwama Attack, threats of revoking the Treaty have been made by India but never materialised, as the Treaty continues to remain intact. However, according to the IWT, the bombing or destroying of dams, barrages, power stations, etc. located in the Indian part of the Indus basin by Pakistan violates the Treaty which can lead to its abrogation.

    Despite Pakistan’s repeated violation of the Treaty by using groundwater of Ravi and Sutlej areas of India for various uses before they cross into its area, and by constructing river training works to reduce river flooding in Pakistan and enhance flooding in India’s Great Rann of Kutch area; no concerns have been raised by the latter hereto.

    With the Treaty in place, several projects have been undertaken on the allotted rivers, India has constructed the Bhakra-Nangal and Salal dams for hydroelectric power generation. Pakistan constructed the Tarbela and Mangla Dams for water storage, irrigation, and hydropower generation.

    Shahpur Kandi and Ratle Projects:

    The Shahpur Kandi project of India over the Ujh river has been objected to by Pakistan for diverting waters of Ujh, a tributary of Ravi, an eastern river exclusive for India’s use. The dam was officially completed in February 2024.

    India’s ongoing Ratle Hydroelectric Project on the Chenab also made headlines, for Pakistan’s objection to its construction in the Indian area after its funding was finally approved in 2021. The dam would have an 850 MW generative capacity, for which a limited reserve of water is required to be reserved. This alarmed Pakistan as it claimed it would pose a risk of possible weaponization of water supply by India in wartime situations. Disagreement over the summoning of a Neutral Expert or a Court of Arbitration as authorised by the Treaty for dispute resolution was settled in 2016 by the World Bank’s decision to let both motions proceed simultaneously. Later, India was allowed to construct the dam by the World Bank despite objections by Pakistan. The project is scheduled to commence operations in 2026.

    A Blueprint for Transboundary Water Cooperation

    The success of the IWT sets an example of how countries can overcome their political differences and contribute to an efficient system of shared resource governance. It successfully helped the Indian subcontinent evade a potential war between the two nuclear-armed states over the river basin, a model for other regions struggling with water scarcity and competition to follow.

    Climate change coupled with the construction of dams and barrages for water storage and regulation carries heavy ecological repercussions like the disruption of river ecosystems, aquatic habitats, and biodiversity of the concerned region. Consequently, endangering the livelihood of the nearby occupants, even forcing them to relocate.  Hence, such a cooperative regulatory mechanism must be in place to facilitate constructive dialogue towards incorporating environmental considerations into water management strategies to tackle and mitigate any negative repercussions.

    The Indus Water Treaty has demonstrated its efficacy as a significant diplomatic agreement between the two neighbouring states, consistently withstanding various challenges over time. The treaty primarily emphasises the importance of cooperation and diplomacy in resolving transboundary water disputes while also establishing a foundation and providing scope for potential future collaboration in numerous domains of shared governance.

    Proposals for its abrogation have been deemed impractical for both parties, as the treaty has endured for six decades. Nevertheless, there is a recognised need to re-examine, renegotiate, revise, and amend the long-standing Treaty to better address contemporary issues, including new ecological and climate change concerns, as well as evolving terms of negotiation.

     

     

    References:

    ET Online, (2024, February 26). India completely stops Ravi River water flow to Pakistan. Historical context and significance. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/india-completely-stops-ravi-river-water-flow-to-pakistan-historical-context-and-significance/articleshow/107980936.cms

    Gupta, M.S. (2024, February 25). Shahpurkandi dam complete after 3 decades, will help check unutilised Ravi water flowing to Pakistan. The Print. https://theprint.in/india/governance/shahpurkandi-dam-complete-after-3-decades-will-help-check-unutilised-ravi-water-flowing-to-pakistan/1978380/

    Gupta, S [The Print]. (2023, January 31). Understanding the Indus Waters Treaty & why India is pushing Pakistan for changes [Video]. YouTube. https://youtu.be/pVp93u2IgSg

    MEA Media Centre, (1960, September 19). Bilateral/Multilateral Documents: Indus Waters Treaty. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (MEA, GOI). https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6439/Indus

    Samantha, P.D. (2023, January 31). The Indus Question: India, Pakistan and rivers of concern. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/analysis-india-pakistan-looking-to-exploit-resources-for-more-electricity/articleshow/97462196.cms

    Times Now Digital, (2018, November 7). Pak ‘diplomatic sabotage’ busted: India to go ahead with Ratle hydroelectric project, govt to send team to J&K. Times Now. https://web.archive.org/web/20190225224015/https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/pakistan-india-ratle-hydroelectric-project-indus-water-treaty-agreement-chenab-shahpur-kandi-dam-project-ujh-multipurpose-project-jammu-and-kashmir/310636

  • Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

     

    TPF Occasional Paper: 10/2024

    Recalibrating India’s Act East Policy: New Realities in Myanmar and Bangladesh

    Maj Gen Alok Deb (Retd)

    On 23 September 2024, Reuters published a news item quoting unnamed sources that said that India had ‘ invited political and military opponents of Myanmar’s ruling junta to attend a seminar in New Delhi’[i]. The item went on to specify that the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic minority rebels from the states of Chin, Rakhine and Kachin bordering India had been invited to a seminar in mid-November, to be hosted by the Delhi-based Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), a foreign policy think tank funded by the Government of India. The piece was also carried by some major Indian newspapers with its origin attributed to Reuters. At the time of writing, there has been no acknowledgement or rebuttal of this report by any government agency. Neither has the ICWA posted this on its website as a forthcoming event. Even as the lack of corroboration of such a report puts it in the realm of conjecture, it is worthwhile mulling over the motivations or otherwise for such a seminal event to be even contemplated, especially in the light of implications for India’s Act East Policy.

    A Summary of India’s Act East Policy

    India’s ‘Act East’ policy of 2014 is an initiative that takes off from its earlier ‘Look East’ policy. ‘Act East’ envisages initiatives at multiple levels with the nations of ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific region. These initiatives are to be taken forward through a process of continuous engagement at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, thereby providing enhanced connectivity in its broadest sense, including political, economic, cultural and people-to-people relations.[ii]

    To successfully implement the ‘Act East’ policy, the Indian government is working to make the North East its strategic gateway to ASEAN. Accordingly, it has increased the allocation for the region’s development by more than four times over the last 10 years.[iii]  The North East is also poised to benefit from initiatives from countries like Japan which earlier this year had proposed developing an industrial hub in Bangladesh with supply chains to the North East, Nepal and Bhutan.[iv]

    As the North East becomes India’s gateway to ASEAN,  the centrality of Myanmar to our Act East becomes apparent. It is the key link in the road connectivity between India’s North East and other ASEAN nations whereby the free flow of inland goods, services and other initiatives to and from these nations to India can be ensured. The success or otherwise of Act East is thus directly affected by the security environment in Myanmar. Instability here will negatively impact our North Eastern states sharing borders with that country. The internal situation in Myanmar therefore becomes an area of prime concern for India, warranting close attention.

    For similar reasons, another neighbour, Bangladesh, is equally important for the success of India’s Act East Policy. India’s North East has benefitted from good ties with Bangladesh, both security-wise and economically. Militancy in the North East has reduced over the last decade and a half. With Bangladesh agreeing to provide access to its ports in the Bay of Bengal for the movement of Indian goods, the North Eastern states have a shorter route to the sea. Additionally, states bordering Bangladesh such as Assam and Meghalaya have developed trade links with that country for mutual benefit. The  BBIN (Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic was signed in 2015 to ‘ promote safe, economically efficient and environmentally sound road transport in the sub-region andfurther help each country in creating an institutional mechanism for regional integration’  is another mechanism for implementing our Act East and Neighbourhood First policies[v]. The role of Bangladesh here is pivotal.

    State of the Civil War in Myanmar

    Fighting in Myanmar is now in its fourth year. The military junta continues to suffer reverses on the battlefield. Large portions of Rakhine State and certain portions of Chin State are now under the control of the Arakan Army (AA). International Crisis Group has recently averred that ‘..in just a few months, the Arakan Army has created the largest area in Myanmar under the control of a non-state armed group – in terms of both size and population – and is now on the verge of securing almost all of Rakhine[vi].

    In Shan state to the North, the Three Brotherhood Alliance (TBA) of three Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) had by December 2023, captured over 20,000 square kilometres of territory, including key border crossings and trade routes between China and Myanmar in Operation 1027[vii].  On 07 March 2024, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) launched Operation 0307 and successfully captured certain military posts across  Kachin State close to the Chinese border. This forced the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) to redeploy, further thinning out forces[viii]. Fighting also continues in other states and regions across the country, notably Sagaing and Kayah.

    Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..’.The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. 

    Notwithstanding these losses, there is no let-up in the Tatmadaw’s efforts to combat the rebels. The Junta has resorted to conscription to stem rising attrition, activating an old law in this regard. Associated Press deduces that ‘.. the announcement of the measure on state television amounts to a major, though tacit, admission that the army is struggling to contain the nationwide armed resistance against its rule..[ix] To further contextualise, the same article stated the rebel National Unity Government’s (NUG) claim that more than 14,000 troops have defected from the military since the 2021 seizure of power. The Junta has since conscripted Rohingya youth and deployed them against the Rakhines. The Chins fear that they too will be acted upon similarly.[x]

    To overcome the asymmetry of force especially in artillery and airpower, the rebels have acquired large numbers of drones. These are being used to bomb military positions, contributing significantly towards the successes of the CNA’s operations[xi].  To summarise, Myanmar’s civil war continues to see-saw with no signs of ebbing. The Junta continues to make periodic peace overtures to the NUG with conditionalities that the latter is unwilling to accept[xii]. With the multiplicity of actors and issues involved, there are no clear indications of how and when the conflict will be resolved.

    Impact of the  Myanmar Conflict on India’s North-East

    The impact of Myanmar’s internal situation on India’s border states has progressively worsened. Initially, after the Junta takeover, it was Mizoram which bore the brunt. The state government citing common ethnicity and humanitarian concerns accepted the influx of Chins from Myanmar as a moral responsibility and initiated rehabilitation measures. These refugees along with earlier refugees from Bangladesh recently joined Kukis from Manipur, number around 44000 and continue to remain in refugee camps.[xiii] The Central government has had to reconcile its policy of preventing infiltration across borders with the societal realities of Mizoram. A positive outcome of this approach is that there has been no violence in Mizoram.

    In Manipur, by September 2024, the 18-month-long ethnic conflict had resulted in over 225 deaths and some 60,000 people displaced.[xiv] The administration has been derided by both sides, more so with recent warnings about impending threats to law and order[xv] followed by retractions[xvi]. People of either community have been uprooted from their homes and moved to safe areas separated by buffer zones guarded by security forces.  So great is the mutual suspicion that on the clamour of the Meiteis to replace the Assam Rifles, two battalions of this central force have been withdrawn and replaced by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), against the wishes of the Kukis[xvii].

    Voices for an independent ‘Kukiland’ for the Kuki Zo peoples are being raised,[xviii] which are variously interpreted as a demand for greater autonomy within Manipur or for a separate union territory. The current happenings also dredge up the old ghost of ‘Zale’n-gam’ or Kuki nation, comprising the Chin Kuki Zomi peoples (including Mizos) residing across India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Zale’n- gam has few takers and appears restricted to a YouTube channel[xix]. Today both sides fight each other with a variety of weapons including improvised rockets and drones. Hostage-taking is the latest tactic that has been adopted.[xx]

    Tension between the Nagas of Manipur and other communities is discernible with some reports of violence against the former.[xxi] As of now Nagas have kept out of the Kuki-Meitei dispute; also, other than the insurgent National Socialist Council of Nagaland ( Isak Muviah) faction (NSCN-IM) that is observing a ceasefire with the Centre, no other party has demanded integration of all Naga inhabited areas in India ( Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur) and Myanmar – the idea of  Greater Nagalim.

    At the state level, the responses of Mizoram and Manipur to the Myanmar crisis vary. This can be best seen in their reactions to the Centre’s recent notification to fence the entire 1643 Km Myanmar border and its earlier decision to end the Free Movement Regime that permits movement on both sides of the border for up to a distance of 16 km.[xxii]  While the Mizoram government and tribes living in both states oppose the decisions, the Manipur government clamours for its implementation. Currently, only around 30 Km of the border has been fenced.

    Since the Tatmadaw now has limited control over its border areas, it has become imperative for India to commence a structured dialogue with other warring parties in Myanmar’s border regions. This, with a view to restoring the situation in Manipur (and on the border) through mutually acceptable solutions at least for the short to medium term, is necessary. Only then can a modicum of security on the border be guaranteed. This involves navigating a maze of ethnic, religious, historical and societal issues with great sensitivity. The importance of such a dialogue cannot be overemphasised, more so because of recent developments in Bangladesh.

    The Impact of Bangladesh’s ‘Second Liberation’

    The events of 5 August 2024  that witnessed the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina’s government have proved to be yet another watershed in India-Bangladesh relations. India has invested more in the India-Bangladesh relationship than with any other neighbour in South Asia. A glance at the website of our Ministry of External Affairs[xxiii], where details of various agreements and summaries from the last Prime Ministerial meeting in Delhi in June 2024 are provided, will suffice to show just how strong and all-encompassing this relationship has become.

    Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen. Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners.

    At the time of writing, it is two months since the interim government headed by Chief Advisor Mohammed Yunus assumed charge.  The country continues to make efforts to reestablish the rule of law. All wings of the armed forces have been given magisterial powers[xxiv]. The functioning of the judiciary, higher civil services, local administration, police, security agencies, banking, economy, and higher education, is under review. Persons or organisations associated with the previous regime have either fled the country or been placed under arrest and assets confiscated. A few have been killed by mobs. Bank accounts of others have been frozen.[xxv] The Jamaat e Islami which collaborated with the Pakistan Army in 1971 has been resurrected. Extremists with proven murder charges against them have been freed from prison, as have political prisoners. Commissions have been set up to suggest reforms in the constitution, electoral system, police, judiciary, public administration and in tackling corruption.  Elections do not seem to be on the horizon yet. The advisers ( as the ministers are currently known) are new faces, not well known in India.

    While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here.

    With the removal of Sheikh Hasina, the India-Bangladesh relationship is undergoing a major reset. Statements of certain public figures and sentiments of a section of the population in that country suggest that a different perspective on the evolution of Bangladesh as a nation from 1971 onwards is emerging. While this paper does not attempt to be a study of India-Bangladesh relations, the polarised politics in that country coupled with a perception that the misdeeds of Sheikh Hasina’s government were conducted with impunity because of Indian backing, is sure to impact India’s portrayal here. This will make it an arduous task for both countries to go back to the trusted, cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship that existed. As mentioned, the list of achievements for both countries is far too numerous –  settlement of land and oceanic borders,  road, rail and riverine connectivity (including use of ports), economy and business ( both government and private), education including educational scholarships, technology, disaster management, border management, maritime security, military to military cooperation, improved people to people contacts, culture and health. As per records, of the 16 lakh visas issued by India for Bangladesh nationals in 2023, 4.5 lakhs were for medical treatment alone[xxvi]. Economies are so embedded that everyday necessities like onions are exported regularly to Bangladesh ( approximately 6 to 7 lakh tonnes annually).

    Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

    A parallel reality, however, is that negative perceptions about India have historically found space in sections of Bangladesh’s polity. These have received a huge fillip after the change of regime with even settled agreements prone to misunderstanding. A recent example pertains to a tripartite agreement dating back to the Hasina period whereby electricity is to be imported from Nepal via India to Bangladesh. The agreement was signed in Kathmandu in the first week of  October 2024. Newspaper reports from Bangladesh indicate that there is palpable resentment over the condition that Indian transmission systems inside Indian territory be utilised for this purpose since it increases costs per unit of electricity in Bangladesh.[xxvii] Another issue currently bedevilling relations is the state of minorities in Bangladesh who have faced attacks on their homes, businesses and religious places with some loss of life, since the protests in July. India’s concerns in this regard have been conveyed at the highest level. Even as the new regime provides assurances on the security of minorities and acknowledges India as an important neighbour, the enthusiasm with which it has interacted with official interlocutors from a host of nations worldwide especially China, Pakistan and the US is noteworthy and indicates where its newfound priorities might lie.

    Larger Implications for India

    Bangladesh and Myanmar are pivotal for India’s Act East policy from the security, economic and connectivity angles. The issues pertaining to Myanmar and Manipur have been brought out earlier. A common concern affecting both nations and  India is the Rohingya crisis. Despite international pressure and requests from Bangladesh for China to intercede with Myanmar on its behalf, there has been no positive response from Myanmar. Bangladesh, which currently hosts close to one million refugees,[xxviii] has publicly expressed its inability to accommodate any more Rohingyas and asked for a speedy ‘third country settlement’ [xxix]. A detailed report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) in October 2023[xxx]provides details of activities of militant organisations like the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) which are involved in drug running from Myanmar along with Bangladeshi syndicates for sale of the product in that country. Their participation in violent crime and other illegal activity has become a pressing concern within Bangladesh. Rohingyas have infiltrated into India as well, and have been identified as far North as Jammu. The security implications of such migration for both Bangladesh and India are apparent. The insensitivity of the Myanmar Junta on this account is heightening security risks for India and Bangladesh and merits diplomatic intervention.

    With the situation in Bangladesh evolving by the day, it is prudent for India to take a strategic pause as it weighs its options for pursuing its Act East policy. While giving the new regime in Bangladesh its due, India has to consider the impact of resurgent forces aided by inimical powers that aim to derail the India-Bangladesh relationship beyond repair. Even as both countries attempt to reestablish strong ties, the old adage preached by educated Bangladeshis in the context of support to Sheikh Hasina’s regime that ‘India should not put all its eggs in one basket’ resonates. While Myanmar geographically cannot provide the singular advantages that Bangladesh can, it is time for India to press for securing Myanmar’s cooperation to complete pending projects in that country, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Port Project (KMMPP) via Sittwe and Paletwa, that provides an alternate route to our North East, as well as the Trans Asian Highway (TAH) that provides connectivity with the rest of ASEAN, amongst others.

    To summarise, two possible reasons for inviting rebel Myanmar groups to Delhi could be: first, the relative viability of either Bangladesh or Myanmar to help implement the Act East policy in light of the emerging situation in Bangladesh and the state of the civil war in Myanmar. The second, ensuring security on the India-Myanmar border, to prevent aggravating the situation in India’s border states.

     

    Notes:

    [i] ‘Exclusive: India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar’s anti-junta forces, sources say’ Wa Lone and Devjyot Ghoshal Reuters September 23, 2024

    [ii] ‘Govt aims to make Northeast gateway of ‘Act East Policy’: President Murmu’ Press Trust of India 27 June 2024.

    [iii] Ibid.

    [iv] ‘Japan to tie landlocked Northeast India with Bangladesh’  Saleem Samad  The Daily Messenger 05 March 2024.

    [v] Press Information Bureau Government of India Ministry of Shipping note dated  10 June 2015

    ‘Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicle Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic amongst BBIN’

    [vi]   ‘Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State Asia Report N°339 | 27 August 2024’ International Crisis Group (Executive Summary).

    [vii]   ‘As Myanmar’s Junta Loses Control in the North, China’s Influence Grows’  Jason Tower, United States Institute for Peace, August 1, 2024.

    [viii] Ibid.

    [ix]   ‘Facing setbacks against resistance forces, Myanmar’s military government activates conscription law ‘ Associated Press, February 12, 2024.

    [x] ‘India’s ‘Forgotten Partition’ and the Myanmar Refugee Crisis’  Swapnarka Arnan The Diplomat  11 May 2024.

    [xi] ‘We killed many … drones are our air force’: Myanmar’s rebels take on the junta from above. Aakash Hassan and Hannah Ellis-Petersen  The Observer 20 January 2024.

    [xii] ‘Armed Groups Snub Myanmar Junta ‘Peace’ Offer’  The Irrawaddy 28 September 2024

    [xiii] ‘Centre provides 1,379 MT rice to Mizoram for Manipur, Myanmar, B’desh refugees’ Morung Express 25 September 2024.

    [xiv] ‘Ethnic violence in India’s Manipur escalates, six killed’  Tora Agarwala Reuters  September 7, 2024

    [xv] ‘900 Kuki militants infiltrated Manipur from Myanmar, says Security Advisor’ India Today NE September 20 2024.

    [xvi] ‘Input on infiltration by 900 Kuki militants could not be substantiated on the ground, says Manipur security advisor’ Vijaita Singh The Hindu 26 September 2024.

    [xvii] ‘Kukis call removal of Assam Rifles from 2 Manipur areas ‘biased, appeasement’, Meiteis call it ‘victory’  Ananya Bhardwaj  The Print 04 August 2024.

    [xviii]‘ Manipur: Kuki-Zo organizations hold rallies, demand separate ‘Kukiland’ for peace  by Northeast News

    August 31, 2024.

    [xix] YouTube channel titled ‘Zalengam Media’.

    [xx] ‘Kuki militants seek release of ‘secessionist’ in Manipur’ Prawesh Lama and Thomas Ngangom Hindustan Times Sep 30, 2024.

    [xxi] ‘Keep us out of your war, Manipur Naga body warns two warring communities’  The Hindu Bureau 06 February 2024

    [xxii] ‘Government sanctions ₹31,000 crore to fence Myanmar border’   The Hindu

    Published – September 18, 2024

    [xxiii] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India website mea.gov.in.

    [xxiv] ‘Navy, the air force also granted magistracy powers’  The Daily Star September 30 2024

    [xxv] ‘Bank accounts of Joy Putul Bobby frozen’ Dhaka Tribune 30 Sep 2024.

    [xxvi] ‘Indian High Commission in Dhaka, facing protests & threats, returns 20,000 visa applicants’ passports ‘ Ananya Bhardwaj  The Print   29 September 2024.

    [xxvii] ‘Bangladesh delegation in Nepal to sign the contract to import 40 MW electricity’ Dhaka Tribune 30 September 2024.

    [xxviii] Operational Data Portal of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, for Bangladesh.

    [xxix] ‘Bangladesh calls for faster resettlement process for Rohingya’ Ruma Paul  Reuters  September 8, 2024

    [xxx] ‘Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: Limiting the Damage of a Protracted Crisis’ International Crisis Group Autumn Update 04 October 20223.

     

    Feature Image Credit: What does Sheikh Hasina’s resignation mean for India-Bangladesh relations? – aljazeera.com 

    Map Credit: National Online Project

    Bangladesh Parliament Image: The Shattered Identity of a Nation: From Liberation to Chaos – borderlens.com

    Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Statue: Bangabandhu to Toppled Statue: Mujibur Rahman’s contested legacy post Bangladesh upheaval – Economic Times