This essay is based on a lecture given by the author at the German Jordanian University in Amman on the 18th of November 2021.
Abstract
We are witnessing the birth pains of a new global order. The previous order based on the hegemony of the Western states is in tatters and the newly industrialized nations are no longer seeking to imitate Western modernity but to rely on their own civilizational achievements. They are trying to combine a kind of modernity with an identity of their own. Nevertheless, opposing the declining West is not enough to initiate a global order, which is surpassing the previous one. The most successful challengers of Western modernity are relying on authoritarian or even totalitarian (IS, Taliban) conceptions of identity. But the alternative to the (neo-)liberal world order should not be an illiberal order. In order to design such an alternative, we need to conduct a discourse of the civilizational foundations of our different approaches by further developing intercultural philosophy. Intercultural philosophy has had already its height after the demise of the USSR but remained mainly a theoretical enterprise; it is of paramount importance in the conflicts about the new world order. Assuming that we are witnessing a new phase of globalization, which can be characterized by the simultaneous processes of the rise (Zakaria) as well as the demise of the other (Herberg-Rothe), intercultural philosophy is becoming a practical philosophy designated to mitigate conflicts about interests.
Intercultural Philosophy as a Practical Approach
The Western model of society is viewed to be in crisis and for many people, nations and civilizations it is no longer an attractive role model.
Intercultural philosophy has had already its height after the end of the Cold War but was mainly a theoretical enterprise. Assuming that we are witnessing a new phase of globalization, which can be characterized by the simultaneous processes of the rise (Zakaria, 2008) as well as the demise of the other (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020), intercultural philosophy is becoming a practical philosophy designated to mitigate conflicts about interests and culture to cope with this process. The current phase of globalization, which in the footsteps of Zygmunt Bauman could be labelled hybrid globalization (Bauman, 2000), is accompanied by emotions (Moisi, 2010) like insecurity, uncertainty and dissolution of identities. Hybrid globalization is characterized by the ongoing process of globalization and local resistance against it. The Western model of society is viewed to be in crisis and for many people, nations and civilizations it is no longer an attractive role model. But all nations and civilizations need to find a balance between their civilizational traditions and coping with hybrid globalization. Mutual recognition of the civilizational foundations of the Western and Non-Western world may be a possible means to cope with this process. I’m assuming that the alternative to Western modernity and the global order which is based on it should not be illiberalism or even authoritarian rule but a new balance of the normative foundations of all civilizations (Katzenstein, 2009).
What we need, therefore, is to initiate a virtuous circle as follows:
- Research on the subject of how conflicts are articulated in terms of culture and religion.
- Relating these concepts to different understandings of civilization.
- Mutual recognition of the civilizational foundations of Islam and Western thinking.
- Self-recognition is not only as religion or culture but as a civilization.
- Self-binding to civilizational norms in order to be recognized as equally valued civilization.
Based on our interpretation of Clausewitz (Herberg-Rothe, 2007) we think that mutual recognition among the great civilizations of the earth is the prerequisite of settling disputes over diverging interests.
What we need, therefore, is the initiative of a discourse of mutual recognition of the great civilizations on earth and even a discourse, where the diverse understandings of central concepts like order, self-determination, emancipation, identity, dignity and so forth differ. At the same time, a closer look at the civilizations’ common grounds is essential, to eventually provide a basis for a meaningful dialogue. We think that we must find a balance between the Western model of the billiard game and the Eastern model of the concentric circles (Qin, 2016 and Yan, 2011).
Additionally, most countries of the Non-Western world are no longer seeing the Western world as a role model they must follow but are seeking to find their own identity as a balance of their traditions and civilizational achievements – be it the Chinese dream of Xi Jinping, Hindu nationalism in India, and the revival of Confucianism in East Asia.
We assume that there is a close linkage of struggles for recognition, the question of identity and increasing radicalization (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020). The fundamental problem existed in the assumption that the uprooted, redundant, and excluded members of society would come to terms with their destiny on an individual level. We assume that these excluded are forming violent groups, in which they find a kind of stable identity through recognition by exercising violence. Only by recognizing the contributions of the civilizations of the world to the heritage of mankind, it is possible to enable a stable identity contrary to violent actions (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). Additionally, most countries of the Non-Western world are no longer seeing the Western world as a role model they must follow but are seeking to find their own identity as a balance of their traditions and civilizational achievements – be it the Chinese dream of Xi Jinping, Hindu nationalism in India, and the revival of Confucianism in East Asia. Especially in China, the concept of harmony in Confucianism serves the purpose of balancing the other two C’s, communism and capitalism (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018).
The denial of recognition versus mutual recognition
The denial of recognition and the struggle for recognition play an ever-increasing role in intra-state conflicts in a globalized world as well as the international sphere, which is characterized by the “Rise of the Other” (Zakaria, 2008). We live in an increasingly globalized world, in which we assume that difficulties concerning recognition (between individuals, groups, ethnos, religious communities, nations or even civilizations) are a major source for radicalization. If mutual recognition is non-existent or cannot be built, conflicting interests are much more likely to escalate. There is a broad consensus (in the field of socialization research and increasingly also within social sciences in general) that the urge for recognition is the important factor for forming and stabilizing identity (personal, group, national, and civilizational) (Daase, 2015)
Samuel P. Huntington was widely criticized for his assumption that we are facing a clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1996). What the liberal critics of Huntington were highlighting was that there should not be a clash of civilizations, but even more important that there could not be a clash of civilizations because in their view there was only one civilization, the Western one. The others were in their view religions or cultures, but no civilizations, because they did not undergo the process of secularization, which is in the Western discourse a dogma (Katzenstein, 2009).
So, my first proposition for the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth is that most are based on religion, not in opposition to or separation from their related religions. For example, the Han dynasty created Confucianism as a civilization three centuries after Confucius, similarly Buddhist culture and civilization was constructed and expanded on a worldwide scale by Emperor Ashoka in India, nearly three centuries after Buddha.
Through the achievement of mutual recognition, the rapidly growing radicalization tendencies are supposed to be reduced and in the long run, peaceful coexistence is more likely. However, recognition requires awareness for differences and communalities (ontological perspective) or is otherwise produced within a process (epistemological approach). The outlook is thus the development of a third way in between universalization of only one culture or civilization (in the form of “We against the Rest”; Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018), be it eurocentrism or any other kind of ethnocentrism and cultural relativism to stimulate peaceful cooperation and to limit the dramatic tendencies of radicalization throughout the world (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020).
Given the absence or non-maturity of Chinese, Russian, African, Islamic, or Indian IRTs, the mainstream IRT originated almost exclusively from the Anglo-Saxon world, for example, realism, neo-realism, neo-conservatism, liberal institutionalism, and theories of democratic peace (although in connection to Kant).
In the wake of globalization, many pundits articulated whether the theoretical concepts developed from the era of nation-states (Beck, 1992) are still tenable for the portrayal of twenty-first century international relations. Furthermore, many concepts regarded as central in the IRT came to be perceived as a mere form of American political science (Acharya, 2000 and 2014). Given the absence or non-maturity of Chinese, Russian, African, Islamic, or Indian IRTs, the mainstream IRT originated almost exclusively from the Anglo-Saxon world, for example, realism, neo-realism, neo-conservatism, liberal institutionalism, and theories of democratic peace (although in connection to Kant). The reason is that in most Non-Western countries’ societies, cultures and civilizations are more important than the state, whereas in the Western understanding the state is the most important institution.
My second proposition for the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth is, therefore, to be aware that in the Western world the state has the dominant role – international relations are relations between states – whereas in the Non-Western world the state is a variable of society, culture. In the process of globalization this separation between the Western World and all other civilizations is dissolving (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018)
The problem of identity in a globalized world
One’s identity is shaped through a difficult and open-ended interplay and mutual interdependency of personal performance and societal consideration. Recognition is thus the result of an exchange, during which the failure of a human being is feasible. No given script through societal framing is existent anymore, whereby risk and insecurity increase significantly. It is not necessarily the need for recognition that is “new” and for this reason just generated through modernity, rather the conditions are new in this context. An unsatisfactory identity-building leads to rage and an imminent loss of identity leads to fear – both hold enormously destructive potentials. The paradox of all rebellious attempts to create an identity is thereby that a conspicuous or provocative behaviour of young persons is often, citing Erik Erikson, just a “request for brotherly recognition” (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). Although I share the critique of identity politics put forward by Francis Fukuyama in general, in which identity is related to a fixed core, my consequence is to conceptualize identity as a balance of conflicting tendencies within individuals, societies and communities (Herberg-Rothe, 2007; Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018 and Fukuyama, 2018)
Through the social change in rendering globalization, the individual, as well as collectives, face increasing societal pressure. Zygmunt Bauman speaks of the transition from a “solid” into a “fluid” modernity (Bauman, 2000). Former stable identities (determined through solid social and spatial borders which offer, despite quite critical aspects of these borders, still a secured room for identity shaping) become insecure, if not destructed (Beck, 1992). The outcome of this is a high demand on individuals as well as collectives to cope with the obstacles of identity building in constant active work. The continually transforming social, cultural and political spaces and contexts hinder this process additionally. If the obstacles appear to be insuperable or if no realistic options for action exist, societies with a multiplicity of fragmented identities develop.
To sum up, the big identity question has such importance because radicalization drifts are an increasing phenomenon in heterogeneous societies.
To sum up, the big identity question has such importance because radicalization drifts are an increasing phenomenon in heterogeneous societies. Globalization represents profound structural changes that are accompanied by momentous crises (Moisi, 2010). Anyway, existing social inequalities become more and more intensified and find expression in intra-societal tensions. Adjustment processes appear almost impossible, as the promises based on modernity are broadly seen as unrealistic or not reasonable. According to this, an alternative to cope with the rapidly changing transformation must be discovered (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018)
The developments and assumptions regarding identity, recognition and radicalization serve as the basis for our research project. To enable unstable individuals or collectives to recover their identity, it is necessary, by focusing on the macro level, to foster mutual recognition between the world’s civilizations. Dialogue and with it an associated discourse of mutual recognition is supposed to contribute as a crucial component of avoidance of radicalization. The aim is to establish dialogues and to find practical approaches for inter-civilizational agreement. Under the overall scheme of mutual recognition versus radicalization, it is, for now, the purpose to elaborate differences and similarities of the world’s civilizations. The focus lies on the understanding of societal and international relations in order to initiate a dialogue in which the denial of recognition does not transform conflicts about interests into struggles for recognition, which are again the main source for radicalization processes (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020).
One can view this kind of balancing and harmonizing as a form of limited plurality or as articulated by Hannah Arendt, unity of multiplicity and multiplicity within unity.
According to this, the focus lies on mutual understanding and recognition as powerful tools to prevent vanished and unstable identities in the globalized world, to see the last resort in radical thinking and acting. Yet the question arises, how much plurality and variety in thinking and acting is really desirable, respectively rated as positive in principle. It is therefore also an important element of our research, to find a way in between the fundamental contrast, on the one side of the universalism of values of just one civilization and cultural relativism on the other. Amitav Acharya’s concept of “universal pluralism” is in this respect ground-breaking, but still insufficient in our eyes (Acharya 2000 and 2014). We advocate the development of a process, in which the concepts of Clausewitz’s “floating balance” (Clausewitz, 1976), Confucian’s “harmony”, and Hegel’s “mutual recognition” are examined closely (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). One can view this kind of balancing and harmonizing as a form of limited plurality or as articulated by Hannah Arendt, unity of multiplicity and multiplicity within unity. In this way, we aim to devise ways to effectively cope with or govern differences and contrasts facing the international society of the twenty-first century. All in all, we seek to adopt a harmonious mutual recognition of Western and East Asian thoughts and devise a better set of theories and methodologies to analyse the contemporary world. It is our deepest conviction that the Western and like-minded states could only hold on to such values as freedom, equality, emancipation, and human rights if these could be harmoniously balanced with the contributions of other civilizations (Zhang, 2012) and cultures.
Intercultural philosophy as a foundational approach for mutual recognition
Intercultural philosophy can play an important role in this process of the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth. Since Karl Jaspers, the godfather of intercultural philosophy acknowledged the existence of four different civilizations, immense progress has been made concerning understanding of the different approaches (Katzenstein, 2009). Nevertheless, I strongly believe that all civilizations have posed the same question but did find different answers. So, intercultural philosophy is in my view possible beyond the acknowledgement of a mere multiplicity of philosophies, because we as humans are posing the same questions. For example, concerning being born, living and dying, between immanence and transcendence, between the individual and community, between our limited abilities and the desire for eternity, the relation of us as being to some degree animals and ethics which constitutes us as humans – our ethical convictions may be different, but all civilizations have an ethical foundation. I would even argue that it is ethics, which distinguishes us from animals, not our intellect. We might get aware of the full realization of this proposition when relating it to the development of artificial intelligence.
Although I’m advocating the development of intercultural philosophy as a part of transnational governance and the mutual recognition of the civilizations of the earth, I would like to highlight the main problem, at least in my view.
Aristotle already posed the decisive question, whether the whole is more than the sum of its parts? If I understand with my very limited knowledge of Islamic philosophy rightly it is based on the assumption that the whole is more than the sum of its parts – we might label this position a holistic approach. On the contrary Western thinking is characterized by the approach of exchanging the whole exactly through the sum of its parts. We might label this an atomistic approach – atoms are just differentiated by the number of electrons, neutrons and so on. Concerning holism, I would argue that the task might be how to distinguish the whole from mere hierarchies – concerning the concept of harmony in Confucianism I would argue that true harmony is related to a balance of hierarchical and symmetrical societal and international relations. Instead of the false assumption in Western approaches that we could transform all hierarchical relations into symmetrical ones, I think that we need to construct a balance between both (Herberg-Rothe and Foerstle, 2020). If I’m not misguided there is also a concept in Islam that might be comparable to that of balance and harmony. Harmony is not sameness but implies a lot of tensions: to be clear: harmony can be characterized by “unity with difference and difference with unity” (Herberg-Rothe and Son, 2018). I compare this perspective sometimes with a water wave in a sea: If there are no waves at all, the sea is dying, if the waves are Tsunamis, they are destructive for society.
My colleague Peng Lu from Fujian university made the following proposition: In the 19th century, the Europeans conquered the whole world, in the twentieth century the defeated nations and civilizations needed to live with the victorious West, in the twenty-first century the civilizations of the earth finally need to learn to live with one another. This is the task of the century.
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Feature Image Credit: Harvard Business Review
