The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: Geopolitics

  • From the Illusion of Linearity to the Simultaneity of the Non-Simultaneous: Rise of the Major Middle Powers

    From the Illusion of Linearity to the Simultaneity of the Non-Simultaneous: Rise of the Major Middle Powers

    Introduction: The Crisis of Mapping

    The epochal shift of the years 1989/91 marked not only the physical collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the bipolar world order, but it also unleashed a fundamental crisis of historico-philosophical and geopolitical orientation. With the disappearance of the rigidly frozen fronts of the Cold War, political science was confronted with the monumental challenge of conceptually remapping a rapidly changing global reality. Looking back at the central theoretical frameworks that emerged in the decades following this systemic rupture, it becomes apparent that they are often discussed in isolation from one another.

    However, if we move beyond a purely additive comparison and look deeper, a profound logical structure reveals itself: these approaches can be understood as sequential stages on a dialectical ladder of insight. Each stage reacts to the blind spots of the previous one, until the system reaches a threshold where the linear sequence itself collapses, giving way to a completely new phase – the era of hybrid globalisation.

    The Dialectical Ladder of Post-Cold War Theory

    Stage 1: The Liberal Illusion and the Confusion of Phase with Telos

    At the beginning of this movement stands the West’s absolute euphoria, paradigmatically formulated in Francis Fukuyama’s highly influential thesis of “The End of History”. Fukuyama conceived the triumph of the Western model not as a temporary historical victory, but as the final teleological endpoint of humanity’s ideological evolution. His core thesis postulated an unstoppable, universal wave of worldwide democratisation, flanked and stabilised by global regulation through the free market.

    From the perspective of historical movement, Fukuyama reactivated the figure of linear ascent: he assumed that the achievements of liberal democracy could be globalised irreversibly, independent of local contexts. What Fukuyama overlooked, however, was the confusion of a purely local, Western snapshot with a global constant. The disappearance of the grand ideological adversary did not mean the disappearance of politics itself; it merely laid bare deeper structural fractures that market forces could not regulate away.

    Stage 2: The Counter-Strike of Material and Social Reality

    As a direct antithesis to Fukuyama’s hyper-optimistic linearity, a radical disillusionment quickly materialised. In his dystopian essay “The Coming Anarchy,” Robert Kaplan drew the exact counter-image. Instead of worldwide democratisation, Kaplan witnessed the unstoppable decay of state structures, driven by overpopulation, resource scarcity, rampant crime, and the collapse of post-colonial orders.

    Kaplan’s historico-philosophical consequence was the figure of linear decline, coupled with a global imperial imperative: to prevent the global periphery from sliding into total chaos, the remaining Western empire must enforce order worldwide through strategic and military hardness. Kaplan correctly understood that global space contained structural cracks and profound imbalances, yet he remained trapped in the mechanical assumption that a single hegemonic centre could immanently coerce order.

    Stage 3: The Culturalization of Conflict

    Once it became obvious that neither the market nor the American empire disguised as global democracy could guarantee universal pacification, a radical shift in perspective took place at the third stage—away from ideology and geopolitics, and toward culture. Samuel P. Huntington confronted the world with his paradigm of the “Clash of Civilisations”. Huntington rightly recognised that the fault lines of global politics after the Cold War were no longer primarily ideological or economic, but ran along cultural and civilizational identities.

    Huntington’s framework draws heavily on cyclical patterns and the assumption of incommensurable cultural blocs. He argued that the West’s attempt to impose its values as universal would inevitably provoke violent resistance from other civilisations. Although Huntington was justly criticised for his holistic and essentialist understanding of culture, his lasting merit remains the insight that identity politics and the retreat into seemingly unshakeable cultural cores had become the driving forces of modern conflict.

    Stage 4: The De-statization and Privatisation of Violence

    While Huntington still conceptualised the actors as large civilizational collectives, the fourth stage shifted the focus to the micro-political and economic decomposition of warfare itself. Formulated by scholars such as Mary Kaldor and Herfried Münkler, the phenomenon of “New Wars” and the privatisation of warfare moved to the centre of analysis.

    Here, the classic Clausewitzian triad of state, people, and army dissolved completely. In place of state-centric confrontations stepped warlords, private military companies and transnational criminal networks, violent gangs and terrorist cells. These actors no longer utilise violence as a means to achieve a political purpose, but rather as a business model or a permanent form of existence. This stage marks the total loss of an ordering global axis; it describes the oscillation of violence in a state of pure decentralisation, where war feeds upon itself.

    Stages 5 & 6: The Pluralisation of Power and the Return of Great Power Politics

    The subsequent stages of this development describe the geopolitical transformation of the international system in the early twenty-first century. Fareed Zakaria captured this shift with his phrase “The Rise of the Rest” (The Post-American World). This approach definitively breaks with Eurocentric and Western hegemony. The rise of China, India, and other emerging powers is not a mere copycatting of Western modernisation, but an economic and technological shift of epic proportions.

    Closely coupled with “The Rise of the Rest” is the simultaneous phenomenon of the resurgence of Great Powers—the return of classic Great Power Competition between the US, China, and Russia. Zakaria and contemporary realists demonstrate that the world has become multipolar – instead of non-alignment, multi-alignment has become the centre of the major middle powers. The West has lost its monopoly on defining the terms of modernity and globalisation.

    The Culminating Point: Hybrid Globalisation

    When looking back at these six points, the political science debate has mostly treated them as chronological phases: euphoria was followed by shock, then cultural division, asymmetric threats, and finally multipolarity. My central thesis, however, is that these phases are no longer chained together sequentially. They have collapsed into each other and occur simultaneously within the exact same historical moment.

    Traditional linear or purely cyclical thinking fails when facing the complexity of our present. We are not experiencing a succession of eras, but a radical simultaneity of the non-simultaneous. This is precisely the phenomenon I conceptualise as Hybrid Globalisation, a framework I have unfolded in detail in the journal India Quarterly.

    By hybrid globalisation, I mean the highly tense, profoundly paradoxical process in which technological, economic, and digital globalisation advances unstoppably, while at the same time radical local, regional, and cultural fragmentation and rejection take place. It is the simultaneity of total interconnectedness and total isolation. In this process, identities do not simply become fluid; they fragment, creating existential vacuums often filled by reactive violence and the radical construction of friend-enemy binaries.

    The Technology of Re-Feudalisation: Algorithmic Fragmentation and Digital Legalism

    To fully grasp the current mutation of this process, we must expand our diagnostic matrix to include the technological driver of this condition: the “Cultural Revolution from the Right.” Driven by libertarian tech-milliardaires and the ideological vanguard of the “Dark Enlightenment” (such as Peter Thiel), this movement represents a toxic, modern synthesis of radical fragmentation and one-dimensional control. It uses technological acceleration to exploit the structural tensions of hybrid globalisation.

    This dynamic operates through a dual pathology that fundamentally threatens civilizational order:

    1. Engineered Tribalism and Structural Fragmentation

    Modern digital capitalism no longer fosters a unified global village. Instead, by leveraging hyper-targeted algorithms, digital platforms intentionally partition global consciousness into distinct, mutually hostile tribal enclaves. This represents the ultimate radicalisation of neoliberal and post-structuralist dynamics: the total atomization of the social fabric into competing marketplace agents, stripped of any shared meta-narrative or common ethical framework (dharma, li, or asabiyya).

    The algorithmic logic feeds on existential insecurity, transforming the “other” into an absolute enemy. In this hyper-fragmented condition, the capacity for democratic consensus and intercultural recognition implodes under the weight of artificial polarisation.

    1. The Rise of Digital Legalism

    The profound danger of this project lies in its dialectical twist. The systematic induction of chaos and cognitive fragmentation within the planetarian storm is not designed to liberate the individual. Rather, it serves as the necessary precondition and ultimate justification for a new, one-dimensional architecture of total control. Just as the structural breakdown of the Warring States period in ancient China paved the way for the ruthless absolutism of the Qin Dynasty, the engineered chaos of contemporary digital tribalism is utilised to legitimise an algorithmic re-feudalisation.

    This emerging order represents the modern equivalent of an unmitigated, one-dimensional Legalism (Fa). In the Silicon Valley oligarchy’s vision, society is treated as a deterministic machine to be optimised through code. When law is converted into pure, automated algorithms, it loses its human interiority; it becomes an external, unyielding framework of absolute coercion. The tech-ideologists position themselves as sovereign, non-state lawgivers who remain entirely above the very systems they program.

    Historical experience across civilisations demonstrates a universal law: one-dimensional, absolute control structures possess a fatal brittleness. They achieve spectacular short-term mobilisation, but because they eradicate the vital counter-poles of human agency, adaptive moral restraint (Li), and flexible self-regulation, they lack internal resilience. A system that attempts to navigate the planetary storm by compressing society into a rigid, algorithmic straightjacket accumulates massive, invisible structural tensions. Lacking the elasticity of a generative polar complementarity, it becomes fragile like glass. When external shocks hit its unyielding surface, it cannot bend; it can only explode in catastrophic violence or implode through systemic exhaustion.

    The Illusion of Monolithic Success: Why One-Dimensionality Fails Long-Term

    This structural brittleness highlights a broader historical law that directly challenges the contemporary resurgence of strongman politics and neo-authoritarian governance. Across political history, one-dimensional forms of rule often achieve spectacular, highly visible short-term success. By centralising executive authority, dismantling institutional counterweights, and enforcing ideological or nationalistic uniformity, such regimes can rapidly mobilise societies, execute massive infrastructure projects, and project hard power with formidable efficiency. In an era of global volatility, this monolithic decisiveness creates a powerful illusion of stability and progress, making one-dimensional authority appear superior to the messiness of pluralistic negotiation.

    However, this initial triumph is a developmental trap. Long-term civilisational survival demands systemic elasticity—the capacity to absorb internal contradictions and adapt to shifting environments without fracturing. One-dimensional governance achieves short-term momentum precisely by suffocating this adaptability. By substituting the fluid, generative friction of opposite social forces with rigid top-down compliance, these systems systematically blind themselves to their own errors. Corruption goes unchecked, local grievances are suppressed rather than mediated, and the state’s survival becomes precariously tied to the absolute infallibility of a centralised leadership or a singular cultural narrative.

    As a consequence, when the inevitable complex crises of hybrid globalisation hit—be they economic stagnation, demographic pressure, or technological disruptions—the monolithic structure cannot flex. Because it lacks the internal architecture of a floating balance, it accumulates structural fatigue until the tension becomes unbearable. History shows that such systems do not gently evolve; when internal strains peak, they face sudden, catastrophic failure. Short-term hyper-efficiency is thus bought at the expense of terminal, long-term fragility.

    Our Present: The Toxic Synthesis of 3, 5, and 6

    If we want to precisely diagnose today’s world-political situation, we must recognise that we are currently facing a highly dangerous, dynamic combination of stages 3, 5, and 6:

    • The Clash of Civilisations (Stage 3): Global conflicts are increasingly charged with religious, existential, and cultural significance. They are no longer about negotiable material interests, but about incompatible identity claims.
    • The Rise of the Rest (Stage 5): The post-Western world order is a reality. The Global South demands independent, emancipated agency and refuses the West’s moral and political paternalism.
    • The Resurgence of Great Powers (Stage 6): We are witnessing the return of hard, imperial geopolitics, territorial wars, and nuclear deterrence scenarios that echo the darkest times of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

    The unique feature of hybrid globalisation is that classic great-power conflict (Stage 6) is fought across the fault lines of cultural identities (Stage 3), while taking on a completely altered, multipolar dynamic through the rise of new global actors (Stage 5).

    To not only describe this highly volatile condition but to politically and philosophically navigate it, neither the reliance on market forces nor the flight into a universal metanarrative will suffice. We require a return to a methodologically reframed Clausewitzian perspective: the concept of a floating balance of opposites.

    In the era of hybrid globalisation, the goal is not to violently resolve these contradictions through a dialectical finality (Hegel’s mistake), but to structurally balance the permanent tensions between self-assertion and self-transcendence, between global interconnectedness and local identity. Only through such an acknowledgement of unresolvable polarities can we prevent the hybrid world order from sliding into total global anarchy.

    Outlook: The Strategic Mandate of the Major Middle Powers

    It is precisely within this tense matrix of hybrid globalisation—where the dual threats of Great Power collision and algorithmic fragmentation loom large—that a critical, yet frequently underestimated category of actors moves to the centre of world politics: the Major Middle Powers.

    The contemporary international system can no longer be understood solely through the lens of a binary superpower rivalry (the US-China axis) or a fragmented mass of minor states. Instead, Major Middle Powers—such as South Korea, India (acting as a civilizational bridge), Australia, the EU with the UK, France and Germany, or Indonesia—hold the structural key to preventing the polarisation of the global order from turning fatal.

    1. Beyond the Binary: Middle Powers as Buffers against Polarisation

    The defining pathology of both Great Power Competition (Stage 6) and digital tribalism is the eradication of the middle ground. Both systems thrive on binary friend-enemy exclusions. In this volatile environment, Major Middle Powers function as vital systemic shock absorbers. They possess sufficient economic weight, technological sophistication, and diplomatic autonomy to resist being completely swallowed by either the American or the Chinese orbit.

    By refusing to submit to an absolute, one-dimensional alignment, these powers create strategic breathing space in international relations. They establish minilateral coalitions and issue-based partnerships that cut across civilizational and geopolitical divides, diluting the rigid binary blocs that have historically preceded global conflagrations.

    1. Safeguarding Global Interconnectedness against Fragmented Isolation

    Major Middle Powers have the most to lose from both extremes of hybrid globalisation—they are highly vulnerable to the disruption of global supply chains (the threat of total fragmentation) and equally threatened by the extraterritorial coercion of superpowers (the threat of one-dimensional dominance). Consequently, their strategic interest is inherently tied to maintaining a rules-based, yet flexible, international framework.

    They are uniquely positioned to defend global interconnectedness while respecting local and regional sovereignty. Unlike superpowers, which tend to weaponise interdependence to achieve absolute dominance, Major Middle Powers utilise integration to build resilient, multilateral safety nets. They act as the primary custodians of the global commons, ensuring that the planetarian storm does not lead to a total breakdown of international law and commerce.

    1. Institutionalising the Floating Balance

    In the philosophical framework of a generative polar complementarity, the Major Middle Powers can be understood as the concrete, institutional embodiment of the floating balance of opposites. They are mediators by structural necessity. They navigate between the pole of global systemic integration and the pole of local, sovereign self-assertion. They possess the unique civilizational capacity to translate between different cultural frameworks, bridging the gap between the Global South’s demand for emancipated agency (Stage 5) and the necessary preservation of functional global institutions.

    The future of global civilisation in the twenty-first century will not be decided by the absolute victory of Western liberalism, nor by the dystopian triumph of an algorithmic tech-feudalism, nor by the total destruction of Great Power war or a new ethnic—civilisational centrism, which would just supplant Eurocentrism. It will be decided by whether we can build an international architecture capable of holding opposite forces in a creative, non-violent tension.

    The Major Middle Powers are the natural architects of this upcoming order. By anchoring the international system in a dense, flexible network of multilateral counterweights, they provide the pragmatic and philosophical navigation system required to steer humanity through the planetarian storm, transforming a fractured, volatile world into a sustainably balanced, multipolar coexistence.

  • The World Order we Inherited — and Why it must Change

    The World Order we Inherited — and Why it must Change

    This is the first in a series on India’s strategic choices, civilisational responsibilities, and the contest for the emerging world order.

    The Material Foundations of Western Power

     

    The world of strategists is familiar with the quote of Lord Palmerston, Britain’s nineteenth-century Prime Minister. He famously declared: “There are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.”

    Lord Palmerston

    As a description of statecraft, this is not wrong. Every civilisation that has endured has pursued its interests — including the ones this series will spend considerable space defending. Kautilya’s Rajamandala is, at its core, a theory of interest-based alignment. The Cholas sailed across the Bay of Bengal to protect Tamil trading interests. No serious tradition of statecraft has ever pretended that interest does not matter, and none should.

    The question worth asking is not whether interests are permanent. It is whether anything else is.

    Palmerston’s formulation, taken as a complete theory of how a state should conduct itself — not as one true observation among several, but as the only thing that needs ever to be consulted — becomes something different. It becomes a licence. If interest is permanent and nothing else is, then ethical limits on how interest is pursued are, by definition, temporary: honoured when convenient, discarded when not. That is not realism. That is realism with the safety catch removed.

    This is the civilisational fork in the road, and four hundred years of history show which branch the dominant powers took — and still take.

    The Islamic Golden Age — spanning roughly the 8th to the 14th century — was one of the greatest intellectual achievements in human history. Scholars at Baghdad’s House of Wisdom undertook a systematic, state-sponsored project of translation and synthesis: gathering the accumulated knowledge of Greece, Persia, India, and China, translating it into Arabic, and building upon it with original contributions in mathematics, astronomy, medicine, philosophy, optics, and chemistry. Avicenna’s Canon of Medicine became a foundational text in European universities. Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle shaped medieval European philosophy.

    Exhibit in Gulbenkian Museum, Lisbon – Photo by Author

    Europe in the early medieval period was not the centre of the world. It was its periphery — impoverished, fragmented, and in the grip of what its own historians call the Dark Ages. While Europe’s literacy rates collapsed and theological conformity suppressed inquiry, something extraordinary was unfolding in Baghdad, Cordoba, and Cairo. The Islamic Golden Age — spanning roughly the 8th to the 14th century — was one of the greatest intellectual achievements in human history. Scholars at Baghdad’s House of Wisdom undertook a systematic, state-sponsored project of translation and synthesis: gathering the accumulated knowledge of Greece, Persia, India, and China, translating it into Arabic, and building upon it with original contributions in mathematics, astronomy, medicine, philosophy, optics, and chemistry. Avicenna’s Canon of Medicine became a foundational text in European universities. Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle shaped medieval European philosophy. The numeral system through which all modern mathematics operates — including the zero — came to Europe through the Arabic transmission of Indian mathematics. This was not borrowing. It was the rescue and synthesis of civilisational knowledge — and without it, the European Renaissance would have had no foundation on which to build.

    The numeral system through which all modern mathematics operates — including the zero — came to Europe through the Arabic transmission of Indian mathematics. This was not borrowing. It was the rescue and synthesis of civilisational knowledge — and without it, the European Renaissance would have had no foundation on which to build.

    Europe’s intellectual reawakening in the 14th and 15th centuries drew directly on this Islamic transmission. The Renaissance, together with the gunpowder revolution and the state system formalised at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, gave European civilisation (viewing it as a single civilisation may not be truly appropriate – disparate kingdoms, fused by the race for maritime trade dominance and military conquest – Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, British, Russian, etc.) something it had never possessed before: military-technological superiority, organised state power, and the bureaucratic capacity to project both across the world.

    This wealth — extracted through conquest, forced indigenous labour, and the systematic destruction of existing civilisations — capitalised the European empires that would go on to colonise two-thirds of the world

    Columbus – Truth vs Myth

    The rise of the West that followed the maritime route discoveries of Columbus and Vasco da Gama needs to be understood correctly, devoid of the myths built around them. The West celebrates them, but the truth is they were plunderers who unleashed the genocidal expansion of the West. This truth is now being brought out by brilliant and unbiased historians such as Howard Zinn and Utsa Patnaik. Howard Zinn writes – ” what Columbus did to the Arawaks of the Bahamas, Cortés did to the Aztecs of Mexico, Pizarro to the Incas of Peru, and the English settlers of Virginia and Massachusetts to the Powhatans and the Pequots. They used the same tactics, and for the same reasons – the frenzy in the early capitalist states of Europe for gold, for slaves, for products of the soil, to pay for the bondholders and stockholders of the expeditions, to finance the monarchical bureaucracies rising in Western Europe, to spur the growth of the new money economy rising out of feudalism…These were the violent beginnings of an intricate system of technology, business, politics, and culture that would dominate the world for the next five centuries.”

    What followed was not a story of civilisational achievement. It was a story of extraction on a scale without precedent in human history — extraction conducted on the understanding that, once interest was engaged, nothing else needed to be weighed. From the Americas alone, Spanish colonial mining operations extracted approximately 150,000 metric tonnes of silver between 1500 and 1800 — representing 80 to 90 per cent of global silver production over three centuries. By 1600, 25,000 tonnes of silver had crossed the Atlantic. This wealth — extracted through conquest, forced indigenous labour, and the systematic destruction of existing civilisations — capitalised the European empires that would go on to colonise two-thirds of the world. The Atlantic slave trade transported an estimated twelve to fifteen million Africans into forced labour over three centuries.

    The British were ruthless in pursuing their interests at the expense of the people and the geography of their colonial empire, particularly in India. The economy under the British Raj was not a system of governance or development – it was a system of systematic wealth extraction unprecedented in scale and duration. From 1765 (when Robert Clive obtained the Diwani Rights, that is, the right to collect taxes and revenue, from the Mughal emperor as a result of the Battle of Buxar) to 1947 – 182 years – Britain drained India’s wealth through every possible mechanism. The scale of this drain was staggering. Britain extracted the equivalent of about $45 trillion (in current dollar terms) from India during its colonial rule. This wasn’t accidental impoverishment or the natural result of economic evolution. This was deliberate policy, implemented systematically through revenue extraction, deindustrialisation, trade manipulation, and infrastructural control.

     

    500-year Commemoration of Vasco-da-Gama’s voyage to India -Lisbon – defining moments of colonialism. Photo by Author
    The Russian empire was equally consumed by Western Europe’s passion for colonies. Catherine the Great, Russian Empress and originally a German princess, was a ruthless expansionist of the Russian Empire. However, Russia differed significantly from Western colonialism. Catherine the Great’s Statue in St. Petersburg. Photo by Author.

    None of this was an aberration from Western values. It was the expression of them. Palmerston’s formulation was not a description of how all states behave. It was a justification for a specific civilisational approach: that power exists to be exercised without ethical constraint, that the strong may do what they will, and that the legitimating language of civilisation, Christianity, and later human rights, are instruments of justification rather than a genuine limits on conduct.

    Slavery was the most crucial contributor to the West’s development. This was a critical element of the transatlantic world. exhibit in the African American Museum, Washington, D.C. Photo by Author.

    The Berlin Conference of 1884–85 is its most clinical illustration. Otto von Bismarck convened the European powers to divide Africa between them. Not a single African leader was present. A request by the Sultan of Zanzibar to attend was dismissed. The Congo basin — a territory larger than Western Europe, home to millions of people with ancient civilisations, cultures, and governance systems — was assigned as the personal property of Belgian King Leopold II, one of the vilest European monarchs in human history. In the years that followed, hundreds of thousands of Congolese were worked to death on rubber plantations. Those who failed their quotas had their hands amputated. Leopold accumulated one of the largest personal fortunes in history from the proceeds.

    This was not an exceptional act of cruelty. It was Palmerston’s formulation taken to its logical and undiluted conclusion.

    Whatever the merits claimed for each individually, taken together they represent the same formula: interest declared permanent, leading to the ruthless pursuit of national interests; ethical limits declared situational, that is, practically irrelevant.

    The pattern did not end with empire. It changed vocabulary. The wars launched and led by the United States since 2001 — in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and beyond — were conducted in the language of security, liberation, and the defence of human rights. By the most careful independent estimates, their costs have run into the hundreds of thousands of civilian lives, and their stated justifications have repeatedly diverged from their actual outcomes. Whatever the merits claimed for each individually, taken together they represent the same formula: interest declared permanent, leading to the ruthless pursuit of national interests; ethical limits declared situational, that is, practically irrelevant. The vocabulary had changed since 1884. The structure of the choice had not.

    The economic register tells the same story. The formal end of colonialism did not end the system. It adapted it. The International Monetary Fund and World Bank, established at Bretton Woods in 1944, became the institutional mechanisms through which the global south’s economic policies were directed from Washington. Structural adjustment programmes imposed fiscal austerity, market liberalisation, and debt dependency on nations that had barely emerged from colonial rule.

    Francophone West Africa became perhaps the most striking contemporary illustration of this persistence. Fourteen countries continued to use the CFA franc — a currency whose reserves were held in the French Treasury, whose exchange rate was set in Paris, and whose monetary sovereignty had never been genuinely transferred since formal independence. Long-term analysis tells the structural story: The Ivory Coast reached its peak in income per capita in 1978, in less than two decades after independence. It then stagnated over the next fifty years. Niger reached its highest level in 1965 — the year of independence. Seven decades of formal sovereignty. Not a single decade of genuine economic progress. France’s control was not only monetary. It was political and military. French intelligence maintained deep ties with governing elites. French military bases ensured that no elected government that moved too far from French interests would survive. The system corrupted the democratic process itself.

    When Thomas Sankara became President of Burkina Faso in 1983 and attempted to secure genuine sovereignty — nationalising land, refusing IMF debt, building schools and healthcare, and articulating a vision of African self-reliance — he was assassinated in 1987. French agents were present in the capital the following day. Blaise Compaoré, who replaced him, immediately reversed every policy of sovereignty and ruled for 27 years. When a popular uprising removed him in 2014, French troops exfiltrated him to the Ivory Coast. He was later convicted in absentia by a Burkinabe court and sentenced to life imprisonment for Sankara’s murder. The system did not merely extract wealth. It murdered the leaders who sought to end the extraction.

    “Anything that maintains us in slavery, we will break those bonds” – Captain Ibrahim Traore

    Then, between 2021 and 2023, something changed. A new generation of young, educated, patriotic military officers — shaped by Sankara’s tradition — moved. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States, expelled French and American military forces, and announced their intention to abandon the CFA franc entirely. Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traore declared: “Anything that maintains us in slavery, we will break those bonds.” These are not coups in the traditional sense. They are the consequence of a system that used democratic institutions as a mechanism of foreign control for seven decades. As I write this essay, Burkina Faso officially severed all diplomatic relations with France on June 26, 2026. The African nation’s Communications Minister announced the decision on national television, stating that the essential conditions for mutual respect, trust, and non-interference were absent. President Ibrahim Traore accused Paris of harbouring “neo-colonial ambitions,” backing terrorist groups, and acting against Burkinabe interests. African countries are rising against the strangulating control of the West and its neo-colonialism of the last seven decades.

    This is the order that India inhabits. This is the order India is being asked to join as a rising power. The contest for a new world order is not simply a geopolitical competition between states. It is a civilisational question —not the one Palmerston’s critics often imagine. The question is not whether a rising power will have permanent interests. Of course it will, and should. The question is whether it will articulate, with equal permanence and equal seriousness, the ethical limits within which those interests are pursued — limits that hold even when honouring them is costly.

    India has the history, the philosophy, and the standing to make that commitment. The question is whether it has the will.

    —

    Further Reading:

    On Palmerston’s statement and interest-based statecraft

    Lord Palmerston, Speech to the House of Commons, 1 March 1848. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, vol. 97, cols. 66–123.

    Kautilya, Arthashastra, Books VI–VII (Mandala theory of interstate relations). Trans. R.P. Kangle, The Kautiliya Arthashastra, 3 vols. (University of Bombay, 1960–65).

    On the Islamic Golden Age and knowledge transmission to Europe

    George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (MIT Press, 2007).

    Jonathan Lyons, The House of Wisdom: How the Arabs Transformed Western Civilisation (Bloomsbury, 2009).

    Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ‘Abbasid Society (Routledge, 1998).

    Georges Ifrah, The Universal History of Numbers (Wiley, 2000). On the transmission of Hindu-Arabic numerals, including the zero.

    On colonial extraction — the Americas

    Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, ‘Cycles of Silver: Global Economic Unity through the Mid-18th Century,’ Journal of World History, 13(2), 2002.

    Source for the 150,000-tonne / 80–90% global silver production estimates, 1500–1800.

    Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501–1650 (Harvard University Press, 1934).

    Foundational source for the c. 25,000-tonne figure by 1600.

    On the Atlantic slave trade

    David Eltis and David Richardson, Atlas of the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Yale University Press, 2010).

    The Slave Voyages Database, Emory University. slavevoyages.org.

    Basis for the 12–15 million estimate.

    On the Berlin Conference and the Congo Free State

    Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Houghton Mifflin, 1998).

    S.E. Crowe, The Berlin West African Conference, 1884–1885 (Longmans, 1942).

    Matthew Craven, ‘Between Law and History: The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 and the Logic of Free Trade,’ London Review of International Law, 3(1), 2015.

    On the Sultan of Zanzibar’s exclusion.

    On post-2001 conflicts and civilian costs

    Costs of War Project, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University. costsofwar.org.

    Cumulative estimates of direct and indirect deaths in post-9/11 wars (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Yemen).

    Iraq Body Count project. iraqbodycount.org.

    Independent database of documented civilian deaths in Iraq since 2003.

    Gilbert Burnham et al., ‘Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster sample survey,’ The Lancet, 368(9545), 2006.

    One of several widely-cited epidemiological estimates; cited to indicate the range of credible estimates rather than to adjudicate between methodologies.

    On Bretton Woods, the IMF/World Bank, and structural adjustment

    Eric Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order (Cornell University Press, 2014).

    Ngaire Woods, The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers (Cornell University Press, 2006).

    On the CFA franc and Francophone West Africa

    Fanny Pigeaud and Ndongo Samba Sylla, Africa’s Last Colonial Currency: The CFA Franc Story (Pluto Press, 2021).

    World Bank, World Development Indicators (databank.worldbank.org).

    Basis for the Ivory Coast (1978 peak) and Niger (1965 peak) GDP per capita figures.

    On Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaoré

    Ernest Harsch, Thomas Sankara: An African Revolutionary (Ohio University Press, 2014).

    On the French intelligence presence following the 1987 coup: reporting by Jeune Afrique and Radio France Internationale (RFI), 1987.

    On Compaoré’s 2014 exfiltration: Reuters and Agence France-Presse, October 2014.

    On Compaoré’s conviction: ‘Burkina Faso: Blaise Compaoré sentenced to life in prison over Thomas Sankara’s assassination.’ Reuters, 6 April 2022.

    On the Alliance of Sahel States (2021–2024)

    Formation of the Alliance of Sahel States, September 2023, and withdrawal from ECOWAS, January 2024: Reuters, Al Jazeera, and AfricaNews coverage, 2023–2024.

    Captain Ibrahim Traoré, ‘Anything that maintains us in slavery, we will break those bonds.’ Public addresses, widely reported across pan-African and international media, 2023–2024.

    On the closure of the US drone facility at Agadez, Niger: ‘Niger orders US military to leave the country.’ BBC News, 17 March 2024.

    —

    Air Marshal M Matheswaran (Retd) is the Founder-President of The Peninsula Foundation (@TPF_Chennai), an independent policy research think tank in Chennai, rooted in the conviction that governance must serve conscience and that the world order India helps shape must be grounded in ethics, not merely in interests.

  • Navigating Geopolitical Turbulence in a Fragmented International System

    Navigating Geopolitical Turbulence in a Fragmented International System

    The old world order is not returning; the international system is structurally transforming into a fragmented multipolar reality. In this age of disorder, flexible institutions and reformist leadership—exemplified by India—are essential to sustain global governance.

    The 56th World Economic Forum Annual Meeting took place in Davos-Klosters, Switzerland, from January 19 to 23, 2026, under the theme “A Spirit of Dialogue.” The forum brought together global political, business, and intellectual leaders at a moment when the international order is not merely under strain but undergoing a deeper structural transformation. Discussions at Davos underscored a shared recognition that dialogue in today’s fractured global environment is not a sentimental ideal but a strategic necessity—particularly amid intensifying geopolitical competition, accelerating technological disruption, economic fragmentation, and the growing limitations of established institutional frameworks. Significantly, the conversations reflected a broader shift in global thinking, moving away from nostalgia for a stable post–Cold War order toward an urgent search for more flexible and adaptive forms of global governance capable of managing uncertainty, fragmentation, and persistent conflict.

    The contemporary international system is undergoing an unprecedented degree of geopolitical turbulence. Institutions such as the United Nations and other global governance mechanisms—established in the aftermath of the Second World War—were designed to manage conflict and promote cooperation within the structural realities of that era. Today, however, the assumptions underpinning these institutions no longer align with prevailing geopolitical conditions, rendering many of them increasingly ineffective and disconnected from contemporary realities. This growing institutional disconnect is inseparable from deeper structural changes in the global system itself. As Zack Cooper, a Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, notes in his Stimson Center essay “An American Strategy for a Multipolar World”, “a multipolar world is now unavoidable, with legacy powers increasingly accompanied by a number of rising powers… this is a much more complex system than the multipolar dynamic that existed in Europe after the Congress of Vienna… today’s multipolar system is highly fragmented along regional and functional lines.” This observation captures the core challenge of the present international system: it is not merely shifting in power distribution, but fundamentally transforming in structure and complexity.

    From Bipolarity to Fragmentation

    The post–Second World War order was shaped initially by Cold War bipolarity and later by a brief unipolar moment following the end of the Cold War. In contrast, the current system is marked by fragmentation, instability, and a gradual transition toward multipolarity. Historically, periods of power transition—particularly multipolar configurations—have been associated with heightened uncertainty, miscalculation, and conflict. The present environment reflects this pattern, as competing power centres and overlapping crises push the international system toward persistent volatility.

    In this volatile context, states are increasingly adopting hedging strategies to manage risks and vulnerabilities. From Europe to Asia and beyond, countries are diversifying partnerships, avoiding rigid alignments, and seeking strategic flexibility. This behaviour is neither anomalous nor irrational; rather, it is a structural response to systemic uncertainty. Such adaptive behaviour, however, is itself a symptom of deeper structural instability in the international system.

    As many scholars, most notably Kenneth Waltz, have long argued, an emerging multipolar order tends to be among the most unstable configurations in international politics, marked by heightened risks of conflict, miscalculation, and escalation. With multiple powers competing simultaneously and no clear hegemon capable of stabilising the system, the international order becomes increasingly fragile and prone to error. The contemporary system appears to be operating on this edge, shaped by overlapping crises and rival power centres.

    Compounding this instability is the rapid emergence of critical and disruptive technologies, advanced weapons platforms, cyber capabilities, and artificial intelligence. These developments further intensify volatility by lowering barriers to conflict, accelerating escalation dynamics, and complicating traditional deterrence frameworks. International experts at a 2025 conference warned that such technologies are “eroding present deterrence frameworks” and could destabilise the global security order without a global regulatory consensus. Similarly, the World Economic Forum’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025 notes that “cybersecurity is entering an era of unprecedented complexity,” as the rapid adoption of AI without adequate safeguards creates far-reaching security risks requiring multilateral cooperation.

    While some observers attribute current turbulence primarily to political leaders such as Donald Trump, this interpretation is overly simplistic. Trump’s policies may have accelerated existing trends, but they are not the root cause. The deeper drivers lie in structural shifts within the international system and in long-term transformations within American domestic politics that have altered the foundations of US global engagement.

    Davos and the Recognition of a New World Order

    These concerns have been openly acknowledged by global leaders at the World Economic Forum. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, speaking at Davos, argued that “the old world order is not coming back,” cautioning against nostalgia-driven policymaking and warning that the global system is undergoing a rupture rather than a smooth transition. He further observed that economic interdependence has increasingly been weaponised and warned middle powers that “if you are not at the table, you are on the menu.” Such remarks reflect a growing recognition that disorder, competition, and power asymmetries are now embedded features of the international system.

    Similarly, World Economic Forum President Børge Brende highlighted the depth of uncertainty confronting the global order, noting that “the political, geopolitical, and macroeconomic landscape is shifting under our feet.” Emphasising the limits of unilateralism and rigid frameworks, Brende stressed that “dialogue is a necessity, not a luxury,” reinforcing the idea that cooperation must persist even in an era of fragmentation. These statements underline a critical point: the challenge today is not the absence of institutions, but their inability to adapt to changing geopolitical realities.

    French President Emmanuel Macron further reinforced this diagnosis at Davos by warning of a “shift towards a world without rules, where international law is trampled underfoot and where the law of the strongest prevails.” His remarks underscore the erosion of the post–Second World War multilateral framework under the pressure of returning imperial ambitions, coercive diplomacy, and unilateral action. Macron’s warning reflects a broader concern that global politics is increasingly shaped by power rather than norms. At the same time, he rejected intimidation as an organising principle of international relations, stating that “we prefer respect to bullies,” and called for effective multilateralism—one that is reformed and updated rather than dismantled.

    Reforming Global Governance for an Age of Disorder

    Against this backdrop, the central question is how states can navigate such geopolitical turbulence. A rigid, blueprint-based institutional approach—reminiscent of Cold War–era frameworks—is no longer viable. What is required instead are flexible, adaptive institutions capable of absorbing shocks, accommodating diverse interests, and operating under conditions of persistent uncertainty. Since traditional multilateralism is increasingly strained, it is essential to recognise that disorder itself is likely to remain a defining feature of the contemporary international system.

    Any effort to design or reform institutions must therefore begin with this recognition. Fragmentation and regionalisation—particularly through minilateral and issue-based coalitions—are inevitable outcomes of a multipolar environment. However, this does not eliminate the need for global cooperation. Rather, it demands cooperation frameworks that are flexible, inclusive, and responsive to evolving geopolitical realities. Institutions must be capable of adapting to shifting power balances rather than attempting to impose outdated structures on a transformed system. In these tough times, the world requires greater cooperation and coordinated action, because the challenges we face—such as climate change, cyber threats, economic instability, and regional conflicts—are global in nature and cannot be solved through isolated national approaches.

    Another limitation in current thinking is the tendency to interpret global politics solely through the lens of US–China rivalry. While great power competition undeniably shapes the international environment, such a narrow focus underestimates the agency of middle and regional powers. Many states actively shape outcomes, norms, and institutions rather than merely reacting to great power pressures. Effective institutional design must therefore reflect this distributed agency and avoid reducing global politics to a binary rivalry.

    Equally important is the need to move beyond linear and deterministic thinking. The contemporary world is characterised by non-linear dynamics, uncertainty, and complex interactions. Predicting the future exclusively through the lens of past patterns—particularly those rooted in liberal or Cold War assumptions—is increasingly misleading. Institutional responses must be grounded in realism, flexibility, and adaptability rather than static or idealised models of order.

    Recent initiatives such as Donald Trump’s proposal for a “Board of Peace,” driven largely by personal leadership and transactional logic, illustrate the limitations of personality-centric approaches to global governance. Given their temporary nature and the likelihood of reversal under future administrations, such initiatives lack durability. Moreover, such proposals are often unrepresentative and do not reflect the realities of the international system; they are based on authoritarian-style solutions rather than broad-based legitimacy, consensus, and institutional resilience. In contrast, reforming existing institutions—particularly the United Nations—offers a more sustainable path forward. Reforms that reflect contemporary geopolitical realities would enhance the UN’s relevance without undermining its foundational principles.

    India’s Reformist Approach to Global Governance

    India’s approach to global governance is particularly instructive in this context. When India criticises the United Nations or other global institutions, its objective is not to dismantle them but to reform them. This distinguishes India from countries such as China and Russia, which often seek to replace existing structures with alternative, and frequently anti-Western, institutional arrangements. India positions itself not as an anti-Western power, but as a non-Western one—committed to liberal democracy, pluralism, and engagement with existing global frameworks. As India’s Ministry of External Affairs has emphasised, “the architecture of global governance in 2025 for the future cannot be written in ink from 1945,” highlighting the need to update institutions rather than replace them.

    This distinction is crucial. India has significantly benefited from the existing international order, and its economic transformation since the post-1991 reforms has been largely enabled by the stability, access to global markets, and investment flows that the post-World War II system provided. Consequently, India has little incentive to support a China-centric alternative. Reforming the current system, rather than replacing it, aligns with India’s long-term strategic interests. Moreover, India’s leadership and participation in forums such as the SCO and BRICS have played a stabilising role. Without India’s presence, these platforms could easily evolve into explicitly anti-Western blocs. India’s foreign policy is best understood as reformist rather than revisionist, acting as a bridge between the West and the Global South; as Chatham House notes, India seeks to “change the international order from within rather than overthrow it.” Yet many Western policymakers fail to understand India’s global vision and often categorise it alongside other revisionist powers, viewing India narrowly through a bilateral prism or primarily as a counterweight to China. This misreading overlooks India’s broader role as an independent norm-shaping power.

    In light of these dynamics, the most effective strategy for navigating contemporary geopolitical turbulence lies in reforming and revitalising existing institutions rather than constructing entirely new ones based on rigid, blueprint-style thinking. A blueprint approach assumes that we can predict the future and design institutions accordingly—an assumption that is inherently flawed because the future is always uncertain and unknowable. Institutions must therefore be designed to capture the reality of moving from the known to the unknown and to adapt continuously as new challenges emerge. They must be made flexible, resilient, and responsive to disorder rather than designed to eliminate it. Accepting instability as a structural condition—and designing mechanisms of cooperation accordingly—offers the best chance of sustaining global governance in an increasingly fragmented world.

     

    Feature Image Credit: www.byarcadia.org

  • Cinema as a tool of National narratives and Geopolitics

    Cinema as a tool of National narratives and Geopolitics

    ABSTRACT

    This paper aims to understand how world politics, the geopolitical environment in the international arena, and economic relationships between countries are portrayed in films and entertainment media. This paper attempts to understand the portrayal of the themes through varied parameters, namely, the geopolitical timeline of when the film was released, the theme or the event that the film is trying to address, the region the movie was produced in and the audience it would cater to. As films are pretty nuanced and very interpretative, these themes might overlap. Nevertheless, it will attempt to identify and understand the themes as best possible. This paper also aims to understand the active relationship between films and the various global interactions among nation-states. It will also examine the impact of these films on the foreign policy decisions made by the State and how the narratives change with changing leadership. This paper will understand films through the lens of international politics and not just as a medium of entertainment.

     

    INTRODUCTION

    Beyond the fiction of reality, there is the reality of the fiction.

    – Slavoj Žižek

    Let’s ask a simple question. How much of the reality that we live in do we see in fiction? This question seems to have a complex answer. The main reason for the existence of films is their ability to transport viewers to a world of imagination or fiction where anything can happen, unlike the rigid realities we live in. However, upon closer examination, one might find that fiction interacts with present, everyday realities and fosters an ideology within itself. Films and ideology have a deep-rooted connection, and it is impossible to analyse films without encountering the ideology they inevitably promote. This is particularly evident in films that fall under the genre of politics or political commentary. Politics is often described as a struggle for power, where ideology plays a crucial role. Films have the power to influence the masses, making them a potent tool for those in power to wield. This is why ideology is embedded in films. According to Slavoj Žižek’s documentary ‘The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology’, ideology is a socio-economic and political apparatus that is created and propagated by humans. He argues that ideology is a social reality, and attempting to escape it is also an ideology.

    Ideology has a significant impact on the superstructure, shaping our perception of political reality. Unfortunately, this often results in a distorted or biased portrayal of events that goes unchallenged due to the disclaimer that it is a work of fiction. This allows ideologies to spread without being acknowledged. Films with political themes are particularly susceptible to this, as they are shaped by the prevailing ideology of the time and place in which they are created and discussed. These films serve as a means of propagating state-sponsored ideologies, which can then be used to legitimise state propaganda. They are essentially used as a trial run to measure the public’s reaction to certain ideas before implementing them. These films function as a symbolic order, swaying public opinion in line with the desired political narrative. The depictions in these movies, being fictional, are often exaggerated and used to evoke feelings of patriotism and nationalism, making it easier for political leaders to shape the status quo in their favour.

    Films are generally regarded as a source of entertainment, but they also have a profound impact on the realities of our lives. Even movies with superhero themes, which are purely fictional, have the power to shape political realities. For instance, the Marvel Cinematic Universe, a franchise that features individuals with exceptional abilities, highlights the inability of governments to address significant issues or credible threats. These governments tend to view those who can effect change as a greater threat than the aliens themselves. This commentary reflects on the governments’ and leadership’s propensity to prioritize personal insecurities and power politics over the greater good. This, in turn, questions the relevance of democratic institutions and government, which is ironic given that the films originate from a country that has historically promoted democracy. This paper aims to explore how these films portray global politics and economic relations, and the rationale behind these depictions.

    RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICS AND THE FILM INDUSTRY

    Before examining the portrayal of political institutions in films, it is important to consider the extent to which these institutions influence the film industry, as this relationship will greatly determine the narrative or nature of the films. It is crucial to understand the independence of the film industry when it comes to politics. During the Cold War era, also known as the era of ideological conflict, films played a significant role in fostering a sense of nationalism among the population. They served as an effective means of disseminating an ideology that would advantage the host country. Films became a tool of soft power, and both sides utilized them to the fullest.

    Independence Day, a motion picture released in 1996 and starring Will Smith, exemplifies the interconnection between politics and cinema. The film centres around an alien assault on Earth and the United States of America’s leadership and military’s endeavour to exact retribution and obliterate the extraterrestrial ships, thereby preventing further attacks. This reflects the ‘saviour of the world’ narrative that the United States of America champions and takes pride in. The movie’s portrayal of the United States as the epicentre of the world is strikingly evident. The Cold War period in Hollywood was greatly influenced by the United States’ aspiration for global dominance. It sought to establish US supremacy across the globe. The Cold War was a critical juncture in US political history, and it was essential to emerge victorious in ideological warfare. Consequently, the United States utilised film as a medium to rally the masses and legitimise its actions through an exalted portrayal of patriotism and nationalism. Depicting the US as the only state capable of addressing global threats was a recurring theme in these films. Although the movie is more than a decade old, it accurately portrays the nature of the international arena. It depicts the US at the centre, emphasising that the US is a superpower today and an economically advanced nation with immense financial resources and the ability to carry out military operations. However, compared to the present reality, this portrayal might not be entirely accurate, as the US is currently grappling with enormous debt and bearing significant costs for its interventions around the world.

    Nonetheless, it maintains a significant influence and directs economic ties in some manner or form. Hence, one can argue that the depiction is a fictionalized exaggeration of reality, despite the presence of some factual elements. How autonomous is the film industry -from any location or time frame- in creating or presenting narratives that challenge the established order? This study will delve into specific films as case studies and scrutinize them meticulously to glean a clearer understanding of the portrayal and to what extent it reflects the true picture of the global arena.

    Analysis

    Part 1 of the paper examined films as tools of ideological expression and explored the relationship between the film industry and the State. Moving forward, the paper will delve into regional cinema to investigate its narratives and discourses. Entertainment media has emerged as a powerful socio-political institution that wields influence over the state and individuals through the stories and ideologies it presents. Media has the capacity to depict social realities in accordance with the norms, values, and laws of society at a particular time (Zelizer and Allan, 2011). By comparing and contrasting films from different eras with the social realities of their respective times, it becomes possible to uncover the interconnections between reality and representation. During the Cold War era, films were utilized to foster domestic patriotism, thereby granting the State the legitimacy to pursue its ambitions and achieve greatness. Independence Day is an illustration of this phenomenon.

    The way in which the domestic audience receives information about foreign policy through portrayals of interstate relations is complex, and these portrayals are often influenced by state-centred bias and ideology, which can result in the transmission of biased information (Baum, 2007; Cohen, 1963; Entman, 2004; Chomsky, 1989; McChesney, 2008; McQuail, 2005). The role of the media as a discourse-producing entity and as an entity that defines the complex but symbiotic relationship between the government and the media is central. However, while the media should work independently, it is often commercially motivated and, therefore, promotes the ideas and beliefs of the status quo due to the intertwining of vested interests with the corridors of power (Bagdikian, 2004; Bettig and Hall, 2003; Norris, 1990; Vivian, 2006). This results in the media and government submitting to the interests of a small section of the community being propagated, rather than serving the socio-cultural aspect of the institution.

    In the 21st century, propaganda and ideology have become increasingly pervasive. This is due to the rise in content production that aligns with state agendas and the status quo. In India, the movie “The Kashmir Files” has sparked debates regarding whether it is a right-wing propaganda. The movie recounts the exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in Kashmir and the bloodshed that occurred during the 1990s. In today’s context, where right-wing ideologies are gaining momentum, it is evident that ideology and statecraft are interconnected. The portrayal of world and domestic politics is not devoid of an underlying ideological intent. For instance, Bollywood movies like “Raazi” and “LOC Kargil” play a crucial role in propagating India’s foreign policy stance within the domestic political arena. These movies depict India as a progressive global entity, while also propagating the Indian “Big Brother Syndrome” towards its neighbours.

    In the movie “Raazi,” released in 2018 and starring Alia Bhatt and Vicky Kaushal, an undercover RAW agent is married to a Pakistani army official to retrieve crucial information regarding Pakistani moves in Bangladesh and India in 1971. The movie portrays India as a superior state trying to liberate Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) from the “Enemy.” This theme of Indian superiority among its neighbours is prevalent in most films that deal with world and domestic politics. Similarly, the developed West promotes capitalism through films and other visual media.

    Hollywood emerged as a centre for state-sponsored and ideology-driven content during the Cold War. Movies like Wall Street, released in 1987 during an ideological conflict between the United States and the USSR, reflected capitalist ideologies and demonized the USSR and its communist system. The film depicted the ruthless and often exploitative nature of capitalism that prevailed during the 1980s. One of the lead characters, Gordon Gekko, portrayed by Michael Douglas, advocated for the greed and highly capitalistic nature of businessmen. In the context of the Cold War, this promoted a specific type of capitalist ideology to counter the Soviet or communist threat. The glorification of the businessman and the discontentment of the businessman played a significant role in the domestic economic output. The 1980s glorified greed, and this movie accurately represented it. Wall Street explicitly conveyed the notion that morality should not be prioritized over money. The film also featured a speech by Gordon Gekko, in which he declared, “Greed is good.” Movies like this projected a sense of American exceptionalism in the political and economic sense.

    “Don’t Look Up” is a satirical film released in 2022 that critiques the global response to the impending climate crisis. Although the movie aimed to address the issue on a worldwide scale, it primarily focused on Western perspectives. A film that seeks to tackle an international issue should address it on a more comprehensive level. The film, produced in the United States and released on an Over-The-Top (OTT) platform, failed to address the problem it intended to address due to the country’s state-centred ideology and propaganda, which portrays the United States as the saviour of the world. Even though countries like Russia and India were mentioned, the film’s Western bias was evident in the portrayal of these countries as technologically inadequate in stopping the comet from colliding with Earth. This bias is also reflected in movies produced globally, where the notion that national interest takes precedence over all else is a recurring theme.

    Therefore, it can be asserted with confidence that when motion pictures address world politics and economic relationships either currently or historically, the narrative is not unconnected to the state’s agenda. It is permeated with ideology that continually resurfaces. The only solution is the establishment of an autonomous media institution. It is crucial to distinguish between art and the state, as art has proven to be revolutionary in the past. The art produced in India during its quest for independence embodies that essence of truth and authenticity which appears to be lacking in today’s profit-driven, capitalistic world. It is vital to view things objectively, removing the tint of ideology, and acknowledge reality for what it is. This is where the political economy comes into play, exposing the exploitative, biased, and dismissive workings of the industry and institution. Numerous academic studies have examined and concluded that films have significantly influenced the public’s perspective on the State and its actions, making a thorough analysis of contemporary films even more necessary. In a world where false information spreads rapidly, independent media is indispensable.

     

    Feature Image Credit:  Wikimedia Commons
    Scene from Dr Zhivago depicting the Cossacks attacking peaceful demonstrators, a prelude to the Russian Revolution.  Dr Zhivago was a book written by Boris Pasternack, with the plot set in the last days of the Second World War and the break out of the Russian revolution. The book was banned in the USSR, was smuggle out into Europe and translated into English and other European languages. It was made into a classic movie by David Lean during the peak of the Cold War. The movie became a weapon in the cultural component of the Cold War, for its depiction of a totalitarian tendency inherent in the Russian revolution from the start. Boris Pasternack was awarded the Nobel prize (for his book ‘And Quite flows the Don’) but refused to receive it due to the pressure of the ideological  contest between the communist USSR and the capitalist West.    

    Kashmir Files poster Image: koimoi.com

    Raazi poster Image: Mumbai Mirror  

     

    Bibliography

    Bagdikian, Ben H. 2004. The New Media Monopoly. Boston: Beacon. https://library.uniteddiversity.coop/Media_and_Free_Culture/The_New_Media_Monopoly-Ben_H_Bagdikian.pdf.

    BAUM, MATTHEW A. 2007. “Soft News and Foreign Policy: How Expanding the Audience Changes the Policies.” Japanese Journal of Political Science 8 (1): 115–45. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1468109907002502.

    Bettig, Ronald V., and Jeanne Lynn Hall. (2003) . Big Media, Big Money : Cultural Texts and Political Economics. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

    Chomsky, Noah. 1991. “Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies, Noam Chomsky. 1989. Sough End Press, Boston, MA. 432 Pages. ISBN: 0-89608-366-7. $16.00.” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 11 (3): 183–83. https://doi.org/10.1177/027046769101100328.

    Cohen, Bernard C. 1963. The Press and Foreign Policy. The American Historical Review. https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/69.3.805.

    Entman, Robert. 2005. “Robert M. Entman. Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2003. .Public Opinion Quarterly 69 (2): 324–26. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfi017.

    Mcchesney, Robert Waterman . 2008. The Political Economy of Media : Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas. New York: Monthly Review Press.

    McQuail, Denis . 2005. McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory. Sage Publications Ltd., London. https://www.scirp.org/reference/referencespapers?referenceid=1839060.

    Norris, Pippa. 2002. “Studying the Media and Politics in Britain: A Tale of Two Literatures?” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 4 (2): 359–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856x.t01-1-00009.

    Vivian, John. 2006. The Media of Mass Communication. Allyn & Bacon.

    Zelizer, Barbie, and Stuart Allan. 2011. Journalism after September 11. Taylor & Francis.

     

  • What the Global Economy and Security Require

    What the Global Economy and Security Require

    With the new year 2024 well underway, the world is afflicted with wars, economic challenges, and the larger issues of climate change impact that threaten the very survival of the planet. It is paradoxical to see that great powers are still focused on competition and conflict. The year ahead portends continued conflicts, wars, and the weaponisation of economic infrastructures, demonstrated by Israel’s genocidal war against the Palestinians. Carla Norrlof highlights the increase in geopolitical conflicts and the complex relationship between economics and security. The article, like most Western academics, looks from the American perspective. and may miss the larger worldview.

    – Team TPF

    This article was published earlier in Project Syndicate.

     

    If America and its allies are to maximize both security and prosperity in the coming years, policymakers and strategists will have to understand the complex interplay of forces that is making the world more adversarial and fraught with risk. The global environment demands a comprehensive new economic-security agenda. The global order is undergoing significant changes that demand a new economic-security agenda.

    From hot wars and localized insurgencies to great-power standoffs, geopolitical conflict has made the complex relationship between economics and security a daily concern for ordinary people everywhere. Complicating matters even more is the fact that emerging markets are gaining economic clout and directly challenging traditional powers’ longstanding dominance through new networks and strategic alliances.

    These developments alone would have made this a tumultuous period marked by economic instability, inflation, and supply-chain disruptions. But one also must account for rapid technological advances – which have introduced new security risks (such as arms races and cyber threats) – as well as natural risks such as pandemics and climate change.

    To navigate this dangerous new world, we must reckon with three interrelated dimensions: the effects of geopolitics on the global economy; the influence of global economic relations on national security; and the relationship between global economic competition and overall prosperity.

    Each pathway sheds light on the multifaceted interplay between economics and security. We will need to understand all of them if we are to tackle the varied and complex challenges presented by our highly interconnected global system.

    As recent years have shown, geopolitics can profoundly affect the global economy, reshaping trade, investment flows, and policies sometimes almost overnight. Aside from their devastating human toll, wars like the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s campaign in Gaza often reverberate far beyond the immediate theater of conflict.

    For example, Western-led sanctions on Russia, and the disruption of Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea, caused energy and food prices to soar, resulting in supply insecurity and inflation on a global scale. Moreover, China has deepened its economic relationship with Russia following the mass exodus of Western firms in 2022 and 2023.

    Similarly, Israel’s bombing of Gaza has destabilized the entire Middle East, especially tourism-dependent neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Meanwhile, Yemeni Houthi rebels, long supplied by Iran, have been attacking cargo ships in the Red Sea, leading international shipping firms to suspend or adjust their routes and directly impeding trade through the Suez Canal – a major artery of global commerce.

    We are witnessing the destabilizing effects of natural threats as well. The COVID-19 pandemic drove a massive shift away from cost-effective “just-in-time” supply chains to a “just-in-case” model aimed at strengthening resilience during disruptions. And, more recently, an El Niño-induced drought has diminished the capacity of the Panama Canal – another major artery of global commerce. Whether for geopolitical or ecological reasons, rerouting around these new bottlenecks inevitably increases shipping costs, causes delivery delays, disrupts global supply chains, and creates inflationary pressure.

    Turning to the second dimension – the implications of global economic relations for national security – it is clear that countries will be more likely to adopt bold or aggressive security policies if they already have a web of economic ties that can either attract support or dampen opposition. China, for example, is counting on economically dependent countries within its Belt and Road Initiative to accept its political influence and longer-term bid for hegemony. Many countries also now rely on China for critical defence-related supply-chain components, which leaves them vulnerable diplomatically and militarily.

    More broadly, global connectivity, in the form of economic networks and infrastructure, is increasingly being weaponized for geopolitical ends. As Russia’s war on Ukraine shows, economic ties can create dependencies that raise the cost of opposing assertive security policies (or even outright aggression). The implicit threat of supply disruptions has a coercive – sometimes quite subtle and insidious – effect on a country’s national security objectives. Owing to the network effects of the dollar system, the United States retains significant leverage to enforce international order through coercive sanctions against states that violate international norms.

    Trading with the enemy can be lucrative, or simply practical, but it also alters the distribution of power. As Western governments learned over the past two decades, the advantages conferred by technological superiority can be substantially offset by forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft, and reverse engineering.

    The third dimension – the relationship between global economic competition and prosperity – has been complicated by these first two dynamics, because the pursuit of material well-being now must be weighed against security considerations. Discussions in this area thus centre around the concept of economic security, meaning stable incomes and a reliable supply of the resources needed to support a given standard of living. Both Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan and President Joe Biden’s “Build Back Better” plan reflect concerns that economic relations with China harm US prosperity.

    The challenge for the US and its allies is to manage the tensions between these varying economic and security objectives. There is a potential conflict between adapting to market- and geopolitically-driven shifts in economic power and sustaining the economic strength to finance a military force capable of protecting the global economy. The US, as the dominant power, must remain both willing and capable of preserving an open, rules-based global economy and a peaceful international order. That will require additional investments in military capabilities and alliances to counteract territorial aggression and safeguard sea lanes, as well as stronger environmental policies and frameworks to distribute global economic gains according to market principles.

    By attempting to mitigate security risks through deglobalization (reshoring, onshoring, and “friend-shoring”), we risk adding to the economic and security threats presented by a more fragmented world. Though economic ties with rivals can create dangerous dependencies, they also can act as a safeguard against hostility.

    All governments will need to grapple with these tensions as they develop a new economic-security agenda. The world is quickly becoming more adversarial and fraught with risk. To maximize both security and prosperity, we will have to understand the complex interplay of forces that are creating it.

    Feature Image Credit: India Today

  • Mercenaries in Libyan Conflict: Need for a Strong International Law Against Mercenary Activities

    Mercenaries in Libyan Conflict: Need for a Strong International Law Against Mercenary Activities

    The presence of mercenary groups and foreign fighters in Libya potentially had an impact in intensifying and prolonging the Libyan conflict, further complicating the search for a peaceful solution to the crisis. Foreign fighters and mercenaries have grossly violated domestic and international human rights and contributed to enormous human suffering. Mohamad Aujjar, Chair of the independent international fact-finding mission on Libya, told the UN Human Rights Council that the “mission’s investigations had found that all parties to the conflict in Libya since 2016, including third states, foreign fighters, and mercenaries, have violated international humanitarian law, particularly the principles of proportionality and distinction, and that some had committed war crimes”. Twelve years after violent conflicts and political crises, Libya is turning to a crucial election this year, one that was originally scheduled in December 2021 but could not be held due to disagreement between various political groups. It is considered that the presence of mercenaries and foreign fighters in the conflicting territories will be an obstacle to peaceful elections. African Union chairman stated that “the departure of foreign mercenaries could help Libya to achieve greater stability which was in a constant tussle since 2011”. As mentioned previously, mercenary involvement is one of the primary causes for the prolongation of the Libyan conflict, caused by the absence of firm international law concerning mercenary activities.

    The growing presence of mercenaries in armed conflicts across the world, and the threat that mercenaries are posing towards international peace and human security is a signal of the need for a strong legal framework for regulating mercenary activities.

    The conflict in Libya started when NATO-backed Western powers toppled the former authoritarian leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 and failed in placing a stable central authority in the country. In 2014 this political vacuum and crisis turned into a civil war between two rival groups, the Government of National Accord (GNA) in the western parts of the country that is recognised by the United Nations, and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in the eastern parts of the country, headed by Khalifa Haftar. Foreign powers had strategically aligned with the conflicting parties to protect their own parochial geopolitical and economic interests in the region. GNA had the support of Turkey and Western countries like Italy. In December 2020, the Turkish parliament authorised the deployment of troops to Libya in support of the GNA. It is estimated that Turkey sent between 2000 and 4000 mercenaries from Syria to Libya, all of whom were under the direct control of the Turkish military. The Sadat, a Turkish private military firm, was also directly involved in the Libyan conflict. On the other hand, the LNA enjoyed the support of Russia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Since 2014, UAE has supported the LNA by supplying arms while Russia sent mercenaries to boost LNA. In February 2021, the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) formed a new government called the Government of National Unity (GNU) with Abdulhamid AlDabaiba as Prime Minister with the approval of the Libyan House of Representatives. GNU failed to hold the national election which was the main purpose for the formation of the GNU. Thus, the country was again divided into two camps. On the one side, Egypt, Russia, France, and Qatar supported Bashaga and his eastern supporters. On the other side were Italy, Turkey (with some exceptions), the United Nations, and the United States. The UAE, surprisingly, supported Dbeibah. Once again, the situation on the ground demonstrates that a plethora of foreign actors are interfering in Libyan domestic affairs, each pursuing its interests rather than those of Libya and the entire region. Libya has become another battleground for proxy wars between Russia and Western powers. For Russian oil companies, Libya is attractive due to its vast oil reserves and vital from a military standpoint due to its strategic location. By constructing naval facilities in the Mediterranean, Russia would be able to expand its military presence further west. Regional and global powers are struggling to reshape the region according to their interests in the Sahel region. Russia and Turkey are leaders in this trend by using several mercenary groups. Thus, the complete elimination of mercenaries from Libya is one of the preconditions for peace and stability in Libya.

    The growing presence of mercenaries in armed conflicts across the world, and the threat that mercenaries are posing towards international peace and human security is a signal of the need for a strong legal framework for regulating mercenary activities. There are a few reasons why mercenaries need to be legally regulated. First, mercenaries are beyond state control and may pose a practical threat to state sovereignty and security, as well as challenge the traditional realist idea of the state monopoly to use coercion or force, though realists agree that the nation-states no longer hold a monopoly over coercive instruments*. Second, mercenaries are profit-oriented firms, where financial gain is the goal. This raises both a political and moral dilemma that an individual who does not have any political or ideological affiliation towards the conflict is direct participant in the conflict. Above all, mercenary involvements in conflicts across the world are significantly changing the nature of conflicts by intensifying and complicating the pre-existing dynamics, especially considering they openly defy human rights and avoid related responsibilities.

    The major treatise and conventions that regulate mercenary activities include Additional Protocol I and II to Article 47 of the Geneva Convention (1949), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa (1972), and the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (1989). However, these treatises are far from perfect as Sarah Percy says, “International law dealing with mercenaries is notoriously flawed”. According to her, the primary reason why international is weak is that states, back in the 1970s and 1980s, did not care enough to create effective regulations as they were not considered enough of a “practical difficulty” or warranted enough “moral attention” to necessitate legal attention. Another reason is that notably, weaker African states are vulnerable to mercenary activities as even Western states were willing to use mercenaries in the African continent for their strategic gains, and as well these African states have intentionally created loopholes within the law to use mercenaries themselves for their advantage. Immediately following World War II, Western states suppressed the African people’s struggle for self-determination and sovereignty by using mercenaries. Dusoulier says that “the private security industry has a long history on the African continent whether in the Sahel, Mali, or the Central African Republics”. He further points out that this state of affairs is a consequence of two factors: the weakness of government institutions in some countries and the continent’s wealth of mineral resources. Hence, it is evident that the laws concerning mercenaries are not strong enough to contain the spread of mercenary activities across the globe.

    Recent conflicts in Libya, Yemen, Ukraine, and Syria are showing the paucity of international law concerning mercenary activities. Without an effective international framework to regulate mercenary activities, conflicts in this world will be turning more violent and intensified. Bilateral cooperation, information sharing, and the efforts of international organisations are important in this regard. The withdrawal of mercenaries from Libya will contribute to peaceful elections in the country and further lead to peace and stability in the country. Peace and stability in Libya will create a larger scope for peace in the entire Sahel region. 

    REFERENCES

    1. OHCHR. (n.d.). All Parties to the Conflict in Libya, including Third States, Foreign Fighters and Mercenaries, Have Violated International Humanitarian Law, and Some Have Also Committed War Crimes, Chair of Fact-finding Mission on Libya Tells Human Rights Council. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/10/all-parties-conflict-libya-including-third-states-foreign-fighters-and
    2. Cascais, A., & Koubakin, R. (2023b, January 17). Mercenary armies in Africa. Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/the-rise-of-mercenary-armies-in-africa/a-61485270
    3. Beaumont, P. (2020, January 3). Turkish MPs pass bill to send troops to support Libyan government. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/02/turkish-parliament-to-vote-on-sending-troops-to-libya
    4. Libya: Help make 2023 the year of ‘free and fair elections’, Security Council urged. (2022b, December 16). Retrieved from https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/12/1131817
    5. El-Assasy, A. (2023, February 20). AU Voices Commitment to Reconciliation in Libya. Retrieved from https://libyareview.com/32092/african-union-voices-commitment-to-reconciliation-initiative-in-libya/
    6. Powers, M. (2021, October 8). Making Sense of SADAT, Turkey’s Private Military Company – War on the Rocks. Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2021/10/making-sense-of-sadat-turkeys-private-military-company/
    7. Percy, S. V. (2007). Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law. International Organization, 61(02). https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818307070130
    8. On the Approval of the Government of Libyan National Unity. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.embassyoflibyadc.org/news/on-the-approval-of-the-government-of-libyan-national-unity

    Featured Image Credits: Council on Foreign Relations

  • India and the New Geopolitical Churnings

    India and the New Geopolitical Churnings

    In an interdependent world, India must manage both its internal pressures and external challenges with vision, a sense of balance and determination. The coming years project immense promise for India in diverse fields of human endeavour. Let’s capitalize on our innate strengths and an inclusive vision for all in our great nation and be a beacon for humanity.

    “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”

    — Japanese PM Fumio Kishida at the 2022 Shangri La Dialogue

    Historically speaking, there usually remains an uneasy consistency in the geopolitical world order as the strategic interests of nations are not given easy alterability. Nevertheless, the traumatic geopolitical churning witnessed by the world in the last three years has no parallels since the end of World War II in 1945. Even by conservative standards, the overall impact on the world—political, economic, social and diplomatic— has been unmistakably tectonic.

    As all nations, including the major powers, endeavour to absorb the cataclysmic effects of the events of the last three years, the early months of 2023 also display a susceptibility for this adverse impact continuing in relations between nations and severe economic and health challenges remaining to the fore threatening the overall worsening of the established global order. It brooks no elaboration to state that the current and likely continuing geopolitical differences in the world community will drive geo-economic warfare and vastly augment the risk of multi-domain conflicts. By any standards, the future in geopolitical churns across the globe remains steeped in uncertainty!

    Recent Traumatic Events And Geopolitical Churnings

    The end of 2019 witnessed a global catastrophe with the outbreak of Covid19 pandemic also known as the coronavirus pandemic. Originating from the Chinese city of Wuhan, it could not be contained there and quickly spread to other Asian nations and in a few months from early 2020, virtually engulfed the entire globe. Reportedly, till date, this virus has affected 676 million cases causing over 6.88 million deaths. According to the WHO, this virus still exists in many parts of the globe in some form or the other. This Black Swan event affected the global economy, politics, health, ecology and environment besides adversely affecting many other aspects of life as never before. The globe is still reeling under the adverse impact of this virus.

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  • The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The Geopolitical Significance of Chabahar Port to India 

    The port of Chabahar is a seaport in south-eastern Iran, located on the Gulf of Oman, at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. It is situated in Sistan-va-Baluchestan, one of Iran’s least developed provinces. Contrary to Bandar Abbas, the busiest port in Iran, Chabahar is a deep-water port with direct access to the Indian Ocean that is outside the Hormuz Strait. It is Iran’s only seaport and consists of two separate ports called Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari. The last Shah of Iran proposed the port’s development in 1973. Work in Chabahar began when the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, was in power. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 hindered the development of this port. Following the 1979 Islamic revolution, US firms involved in various infrastructure investments fled the country. The new government took on these projects. The port of Chabahar grew in importance during the Iran-Iraq war of 1983 when ships were hesitant to enter the Strait of Hormuz. The port’s first phase opened during the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran began shifting maritime trade up the east coast toward the Pakistani border to reduce the reliance on Persian Gulf ports which were susceptible to attack by the Iraq Air Force. Chabahar is substantial for its fishing industry and will serve as a major trade hub designed to connect South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Chabahar can emerge as a potential global trading hub – and an arena for geopolitical competition. Chabahar is vital for both India and Iran to reduce their dependence on the Suez Canal for transporting cargo to Europe. Chabahar is a strategic port from an Indian perspective. Apart from being easily accessible from India’s western coasts, it serves several important functions. For starters, by having access to the port, India can reduce its commute time to Central Asia by one-third. Second, a link between Afghanistan and India could be built without going through Pakistan and this could help the already established diplomatic, security and economic relationship between New Delhi and Kabul. Third, India gains road access to four cities in Afghanistan via Chabahar: Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif. This will help India strengthen its trade with Afghanistan (“Chabahar and Beyond” 2016). However, the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 gives rise to a certain level of uncertainty. The current geopolitical environment, both regional and global, creates opportunities for India to overcome possible uncertainties.

    New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets.

    Being one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, expansion of trade relations and access to new markets is a necessity for India. As an investor, New Delhi views Chabahar port as a means of bypassing Pakistan’s land routes to gain access to the Afghan and Central Asian markets. Pakistan’s Gwadar port is one possible route for India to access Central Asian markets, India has long aimed for alternative routes due to its adversarial relationship with Pakistan (“Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan,” n.d.). Additionally, the port will strengthen relations between India and Iran, which may help counterbalance strong Sino-Pakistani cooperation. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MEA), India and Iran share close historical and civilizational ties, “Our bilateral relations are marked by strong linkages across institutions, cultures and people-to-people ties,” the MEA said in a statement. Afghanistan also seeks to explore new trade routes to reach international markets. It aims to reduce its dependence on Pakistan, which handles most of the Afghan trade due to the country’s landlocked status. 

    Afghanistan is crucial for India’s ‘neighbourhood first’ strategy. India assisted Afghanistan in becoming a full member state of SAARC in 2007. It signed a Preferential Trade Agreement with Kabul in 2003 following the establishment of the interim government post the US’s intervention in 2001. Under the North-South Transport Corridor framework, India, Afghanistan, and Iran signed the Chabahar port agreement in 2003, allowing all three countries to use the Chabahar port as a trade hub. India is working on constructing the Chabahar port primarily to compete with the Gwadar port project and to connect it to Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). India has already built a 218-km-long road from Delaram to Zaranj (“India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan” 2008) and now plans to connect this road to Chabahar port and deliver goods through this route. India is also keen on using the Chabahar port to connect the oil-rich Central Asian countries by road connectivity via the Milak (Iran) and Zaranj-Dilaram (Afghanistan) roads. For India, the port, which is only 940 kilometers from Mundra in Gujarat, is about more than just facilitating the flow of trade with Afghanistan. Rather, the development of Chabahar is a crucial component of the country’s grand strategy to connect with Central Asia. India’s justification for wanting to develop the Chabahar Port goes beyond its interest in Afghanistan. Enhancing regional trade and connectivity as well as thwarting China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean are other top priorities for Indian foreign policy (“What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses,” n.d.).

    Geopolitical Challenges

    The port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    The competition for regional dominance between India and China can be seen in the development of ports in the regions. Indian involvement in the Chabahar port is important in securing India’s interest in the region. A calculative China will seize any opportunity that India might present in the port facility. If China moves in, Indian investments in the Chabahar port may be unfavorably affected (Pant and Mehta, 2018). A significant barrier is the complex nature of India-Iran relations, in which the former does not hold a privileged position. Given India’s priorities in the Middle East, it is unlikely that the relationship with Iran could compete with the comprehensive partnership that China and Pakistan share, which includes a strong defence and security arrangement. Iran may find it challenging to ignore or exclude China, its largest foreign investor, from the Chabahar project. Additionally, China has successfully completed several infrastructure projects in Iran, including the Tehran Metro, and has allocated US$ 1.5 billion through its EXIM Bank for the electrification of the Tehran-Mashhad railway line (“$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project” 2017).

    Peace and stability in Afghanistan will also impact the performance of the Chabahar Port. The tumultuous security situation in Afghanistan could jeopardise trilateral efforts between India, Iran, and Afghanistan to operate the Chabahar Port facility. And finally, the port of Chabahar will be of little use if Afghanistan is not stable. Indian interest in the Chabahar Port, therefore, continues to be closely linked to the geopolitical changes the region is currently experiencing.

    References

    “$1.5b China Loan for Iranian Rail Project.” 2017. Financial Tribune. July 25, 2017. https://financialtribune.com/articles/economy-domestic-economy/68986/update-15b-china-loan-for-iranian-rail-project.

    Amirthan, Shawn. 2016. “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement?” Strategic Analysis 41 (1): 87–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2016.1249184.

    “Chabahar and Beyond.” 2016. Www.thehindubusinessline.com. May 25, 2016. https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/chabahar-and-beyond/article8646239.ece.

    “Chabahar Port: A Step toward Connectivity for India and Afghanistan.” n.d. Thediplomat.com. https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/chabahar-port-a-step-toward-connectivity-for-india-and-afghanistan/.

    “India Completes Zaranj-Delaram Highway in Afghanistan.” 2008. Development News from Afghanistan, August 24, 2008. https://afghandevnews.wordpress.com/2008/08/24/india-completes-zaranj-delaram-highway-in-afghanistan/.

    Pant, Harsh V., and Ketan Mehta. 2018. “India in Chabahar.” Asian Survey 58 (4): 660–78. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.4.660.

    “What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement? Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.” n.d. Idsa.in. https://idsa.in/strategicanalysis/40_1/india-iran-and-afghanistans-benefits-from-the-chabahar-port-agreement.

    Featured Image Credit: Lowy Institute

  • The Great Chips War

    The Great Chips War

    The supply chain disruptions for semiconductor chips and the increasing sanctions imposed by the US on high-tech chips access to China and Russia has signalled the critical relevance of control over this technology and process for national security. Chip design and manufacture involve heavy capital investments and access to special machinery that is monopolised by very few American-controlled/influenced companies in Europe and East Asia. India, having missed the boat earlier due to poor investment decisions, has recognised chip manufacturing as a critical strategic industry and is investing efforts to establish significant capabilities. This could take years as challenges still remain.  – TPF Editorial Team

    Following the US Commerce Department’s announcement of severe new restrictions on sales of advanced semiconductors and other US high-tech goods to China, the Sino-American rivalry has entered an important new phase. Even under the best circumstances, China will have a difficult time adapting to its new reality.

    In addition to dealing with the fallout from open warfare in eastern Europe, the world is witnessing the start of a full-scale economic war between the United States and China over technology. This conflict will be highly consequential, and it is escalating rapidly. Earlier this month, the US Commerce Department introduced severe new restrictions on the sale of advanced semiconductors and other US high-tech goods to China. While Russia has used missiles to try to cripple Ukraine’s energy and heating infrastructure, the US is now using export restrictions to curtail China’s military, intelligence, and security services.

    The new chip war is a war for control of the future.

    Moreover, in late August, US President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS Act, which includes subsidies and other measures to bolster America’s domestic semiconductor industry. Semiconductors are and will remain, at the heart of the twenty-first-century economy. Without microchips, our smartphones would be dumb phones, our cars wouldn’t move, our communications networks wouldn’t function, any form of automation would be unthinkable, and the new era of artificial intelligence that we are entering would remain the stuff of sci-fi novels. Controlling the design, fabrication, and value chains that produce these increasingly important components of our lives is thus of the utmost importance. The new chip war is a war for control of the future.

    The semiconductor value chain is hyper-globalized, but the US and its closest allies control all the key nodes. Chip design is heavily concentrated in America, and production would not be possible without advanced equipment from Europe, and fabrication of the most advanced chips – including those that are critical for AI – is located exclusively in East Asia. The most important player by far is Taiwan, but South Korea is also in the picture.

    In its own pursuit of technological supremacy, China has become increasingly reliant on these chips, and its government has been at pains to boost domestic production and achieve “self-sufficiency.” In recent years, China has invested massively to build up its own semiconductor design and manufacturing capabilities. But while there has been some progress, it remains years behind the US; and, crucially, the most advanced chips are still beyond China’s reach.

    It has now been two years since the US banned all sales of advanced chips to the Chinese telecom giant Huawei, which was China’s global technology flagship at the time. The results have been dramatic. After losing 80% of its global market share for smartphones, Huawei was left with no choice but to sell off its smartphone unit, Honor, and reorient its corporate mission. With its latest move, the US is now aiming to do to all of China what it did to Huawei.

    This dramatic escalation of the technology war is bound to have equally dramatic economic and political consequences, some of which will be evident immediately, and some of which will take some time to materialize. China most likely has stocked up on chips and is already working to create sophisticated new networks to circumvent the sanctions. (After Huawei spun it off in late 2020, Honor quickly staged a comeback, selling phones that use chips from the US multinational Qualcomm.)

    Still, the new sanctions are so broad that, over time, they will almost certainly strike a heavy blow not only to China’s high-tech sector but also to many other parts of its economy. A European company that exports to China now must be doubly sure that its products contain no US-connected chips. And, owing to the global nature of the value chain, many chips from Taiwan or South Korea also will be off-limits.

    The official aim of the US policy is to keep advanced chips out of the Chinese military’s hands. But the real effect will be to curtail China’s development in the sectors that will be critical to national power in the decades ahead.

    The official aim of the US policy is to keep advanced chips out of the Chinese military’s hands. But the real effect will be to curtail China’s development in the sectors that will be critical to national power in the decades ahead. China will certainly respond with even stronger efforts to develop its own capabilities. But even under the best circumstances, and despite all the resources it will throw at the problem, any additional efforts will take time to bear fruit, especially now that US restrictions are depriving China of the inputs that it needs to achieve self-sufficiency.

    The new chips war eliminates any remaining doubt that we are witnessing a broader Sino-American decoupling. That development will have far-reaching implications – only some of them foreseeable – for the rest of the global economy.

    Ukraine is already repairing and restarting the power stations that have been hit by Russian missile barrages since the invasion began in February. But it will be much more difficult for China to overcome the loss of key technologies. As frightening as Russia’s twentieth-century-style war is, the real sources of power in the twenty-first century do not lie in territorial conquest. The most powerful countries will be those that master the economic, technological, and diplomatic domains.

    This article was published earlier in Project Syndicate.

    Images Credit: Globaltimes.cn

  • The Geopolitical Consolidation of Artificial Intelligence

    The Geopolitical Consolidation of Artificial Intelligence

    Key Points

    • IT hardware and Semiconductor manufacturing has become strategically important and critical geopolitical tools of dominant powers. Ukraine war related sanctions and Wassenaar Arrangement regulations invoked to ban Russia from importing or acquiring electronic components over 25 Mhz.
    • Semi conductors present a key choke point to constrain or catalyse the development of AI-specific computing machinery.
    • Taiwan, USA, South Korea, and Netherlands dominate the global semiconductor manufacturing and supply chain. Taiwan dominates the global market and had 60% of the global share in 2021. Taiwan’s one single company – TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co), the world’s largest foundry, alone accounted for 54% of total global revenue.
    • China controls two-thirds of all silicon production in the world.
    • Monopolisation of semiconductor supply by a singular geopolitical bloc poses critical challenges for the future of Artificial Intelligence (AI), exacerbating the strategic and innovation bottlenecks for developing countries like India.
    • Developing a competitive advantage over existing leaders would require not just technical breakthroughs but also some radical policy choices and long-term persistence.
    • India should double down over research programs on non-silicon based computing with a national urgency instead of pursuing a catch-up strategy.

    Russia was recently restricted, under category 3 to category 9 of the Wassenaar Arrangement, from purchasing any electronic components over 25MHz from Taiwanese companies. That covers pretty much all modern electronics. Yet, the tangibles of these sanctions must not deceive us into overlooking the wider impact that hardware access and its control have on AI policies and software-based workflows the world over. As Artificial Intelligence technologies reach a more advanced stage, the capacity to fabricate high-performance computing resources i.e. semiconductor production becomes key strategic leverage in international affairs.

    Semiconductors present a key chokepoint to constrain or catalyse the development of AI-specific computing machinery. In fact, most of the supply of semiconductors relies on a single country – Taiwan. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) manufactures Google’s Tensor Processing Unit (TPU), Cerebras’s Wafer Scale Engine (WSE), as well as Nvidia’s A100 processor. The following table provides a more detailed1 assessment:

    Hardware Type

    AI Accelerator/Product Name

    Manufacturing Country

    Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs)

    Huawei Ascend 910

    Taiwan

    Cerebras WSE

    Taiwan

    Google TPUs

    Taiwan

    Intel Habana

    Taiwan

    Tesla FSD

    USA

    Qualcomm Cloud AI 100

    Taiwan

    IBM TrueNorth

    South Korea

    AWS Inferentia

    Taiwan

    AWS Trainium

    Taiwan

    Apple A14 Bionic

    Taiwan

    Graphic Processing Units (GPUs)

    AMD Radeon

    Taiwan

    Nvidia A100

    Taiwan

    Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs)

    Intel Agilex

    USA

    Xilinx Virtex

    Taiwan

    Xilinx Alveo

    Taiwan

    AWS EC2 FI

    Taiwan

    As can be seen above, the cake of computing hardware is largely divided in such a way that the largest pie holders also happen to form a singular geopolitical bloc vis-a-vis China. This further shapes the evolution of territorial contests in the South China Sea. This monopolisation of semiconductor supply by a singular geopolitical bloc poses critical challenges for the future of Artificial Intelligence, especially exacerbating the strategic and innovation bottlenecks for developing countries like India. Since the invention of the transistor in 1947, and her independence, India has found herself in an unenviable position where there stands zero commercial semiconductor manufacturing capacity after all these years while her office-bearers continually promise of leading in the fourth industrial revolution.

    Bottlenecking Global AI Research

    There are two aspects of developing these AI accelerators – designing the specifications and their fabrication. AI research firms first design chips which optimise hardware performance to execute specific machine learning calculations. Then, semiconductor firms, operating in a range of specialities and specific aspects of fabrication, make those chips and increase the performance of computing hardware by adding more and more transistors to pieces of silicon. This combination of specific design choices and advanced hardware fabrication capability forms the bedrock that will decide the future of AI, not the amount of data a population is generating and localising.

    However, owing to the very high fixed costs of semiconductor manufacturing, AI research has to be focused on data and algorithms. Therefore, innovations in AI’s algorithmic efficiency and model scaling have to compensate for a lack of equivalent situations in the AI’s hardware. The aggressive consolidation and costs of hardware fabrication mean that firms in AI research are forced to outsource their hardware fabrication requirements. In fact, as per DARPA2, because of the high costs of getting their designs fabricated, AI hardware startups do not even receive much private capital and merely 3% of all venture funding between 2017-21 in AI/ML has gone to startups working on AI hardware.

    But TSMC’s resources are limited and not everyone can afford them. To get TSMC’s services, companies globally have to compete with the likes of Google and Nvidia, therefore prices go further high because of the demand side competition. Consequently, only the best and the biggest work with TSMC, and the rest have to settle for its competitors. This has allowed this single company to turn into a gatekeeper in AI hardware R&D. And as the recent sanctions over Russia demonstrate, it is now effectively playing the pawn which has turned the wazir in a tense geopolitical endgame.

    Taiwan’s AI policy also reflects this dominance in ICT and semiconductors – aiming to develop “world-leading AI-on-Device solutions that create a niche market and… (make Taiwan) an important partner in the value chain of global intelligent systems”.3 The foundation of strong control over the supply of AI hardware and also being #1 in the Global Open Data Index, not just gives Taiwan negotiating leverage in geopolitical competition, but also allows it to focus on hardware and software collaboration based on seminal AI policy unlike most countries where the AI policy and discourse revolve around managing the adoption and effects of AI, and not around shaping the trajectory of its engineering and conceptual development like the countries with hardware advantage.

    Now to be fair, R&D is a time-consuming, long-term activity which has a high chance of failure. Thus, research focus naturally shifts towards low-hanging fruits, projects that can be achieved in the short-term before the commissioning bureaucrats are rotated. That’s why we cannot have a nationalised AGI research group, as nobody will be interested in a 15-20 year-long enterprise when you have promotions and election cycles to worry about. This applies to all high-end bleeding-edge technology research funding everywhere – so, quantum communications will be prioritised over quantum computing, building larger and larger datasets over more intelligent algorithms, and silicon-based electronics over researching newer computing substrates and storage – because those things are more friendly to short-term outcome pressures and bureaucracies aren’t exactly known to be a risk-taking institution.

    Options for India

    While China controls 2/3 of all the silicon production in the world and wants to control the whole of Taiwan too (and TSMC along with its 54% share in logic foundries), the wider semiconductor supply chain is a little spreadout too for any one actor’s comfort. The leaders mostly control a specialised niche of the supply chain, for example, the US maintains a total monopoly on Electronic Design Automation (EDA) software solutions, the Netherlands has monopolised Extreme UltraViolet and Argon Flouride scanners, and Japan has been dishing out 300 mm wafers used to manufacture more than 99 percent of the chips today.4 The end-to-end delivery of one chip could have it crossing international borders over 70 times.5 Since this is a matured ecosystem, developing a competitive advantage over existing leaders would require not just proprietary technical breakthroughs but also some radical policy choices and long term persistence.

    It is also needless to say that the leaders are also able to attract and retain the highest quality talent from across the world. On the other hand, we have a situation where regional politicians continue cribbing about incoming talent even from other Indian states. This is therefore the first task for India, to become a technology powerhouse, she has to, at a bare minimum, be able to retain all her top talent and attract more. Perhaps, for companies in certain sectors or of certain size, India must make it mandatory to spend at least X per cent of revenue on R&D and offer incentives to increase this share – it’ll revamp things from recruitment and retention to business processes and industry-academia collaboration – and in the long-run prove to be a lot more socioeconomically useful instrument than the CSR regulation.

    It should also not escape anyone that the human civilisation, with all its genius and promises of man-machine symbiosis, has managed to put all its eggs in a single basket that is also under the constant threat of Chinese invasion. It is thus in the interest of the entire computing industry to build geographical resiliency, diversity and redundancy in the present-day semiconductor manufacturing capacity. We don’t yet have the navy we need, but perhaps in a diplomatic-naval recognition of Taiwan’s independence from China, the Quad could manage to persuade arrangements for an uninterrupted semiconductor supply in case of an invasion.

    Since R&D in AI hardware is essential for future breakthroughs in machine intelligence – but its production happens to be extremely concentrated, mostly by just one small island country, it behoves countries like India to look for ways to undercut the existing paradigm of developing computing hardware (i.e. pivot R&D towards DNA Computing etc) instead of only trying to pursue a catch-up strategy. The current developments are unlikely to solve India’s blues in integrated circuits anytime soon. India could parallelly, and I’d emphatically recommend that she should, take a step back from all the madness and double down on research programs on non-silicon-based computing with a national urgency. A hybrid approach toward computing machinery could also resolve some of the bottlenecks that AI research is facing due to dependencies and limitations of present-day hardware.

    As our neighbouring adversary Mr Xi says, core technologies cannot be acquired by asking, buying, or begging. In the same spirit, even if it might ruffle some feathers, a very discerning reexamination of the present intellectual property regime could also be very useful for the development of such foundational technologies and related infrastructure in India as well as for carving out an Indian niche for future technology leadership.

    References:

    1. The Other AI Hardware Problem: What TSMC means for AI Compute. Available at https://semiliterate.substack.com/p/the-other-ai-hardware-problem

    2. Leef, S. (2019). Automatic Implementation of Secure Silicon. In ACM Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI (Vol. 3)

    3. AI Taiwan. Available at https://ai.taiwan.gov.tw/

    4. Khan et al. (2021). The Semiconductor Supply Chain: Assessing National Competitiveness. Center for Security and Emerging Technology.
    5. Alam et al. (2020). Globality and Complexity of the Semiconductor Ecosystem. Accenture.