The Peninsula Foundation

Tag: CDS

  • Indian Armed Forces @75: The Challenges Ahead

    Indian Armed Forces @75: The Challenges Ahead

    India overall, since 1947, has done reasonably well in keeping at bay the many diverse security challenges which came its way. However, the strategic and military lessons from our confrontations, since 1947, must never be forgotten.

    As India completes 75 years of its independence from 200 years of British yoke, there is much to celebrate about and equally much to introspect. Revisiting the functioning with stark honesty of all its institutions and governance structures will produce realistic mid-course corrections and suggest better paths for the nation to traverse. The Indian Armed Forces, unquestionably, one of the few institutions of the nation, which has lived up to its assigned responsibilities with elan and the desired results has much to be proud of. Nevertheless, many emerging aspects, nuances of the nation’s security and well-being have to be factored in and pursued earnestly with vision and resolve. For the nation’s honour, its Armed Forces can never be found wanting.

    By any standards, India is located in one of the most geo-politically troubled regions of the world. That it is surrounded by two consistently anti-India neighbours, China and Pakistan, both individually and collusively posing threats, only aggravates the formidable challenges it has to confront for its security. Both these nations being nuclear powers, synergistically anti-India, also adept at asymmetric warfare makes India’s strategic challenges mind-boggling.

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  • Civil-Military Relations: Differing Perspectives

    Civil-Military Relations: Differing Perspectives

    There are a number of theoretical constructs that have been propounded to explain Civil-Military Relations. However, these concepts, be it Huntington’s “Objective Civilian Control”, or Morris Janowitz views on “Subjective Control”, and there are others as well, basically interpret and differentiate the interplay between the degree of civilian dominance and military autonomy.

    Introduction

    At the present time, there is an ongoing controversy in the public domain with regard to our Higher Defence Management as the Services are unable to agree on how to proceed forward with the Government’s stated aim of establishing Theatre Commands. We are told that Raksha Mantri has asked the CDS to convene a meeting of the three services to thrash out the matter so that a consensus can be reached on how to proceed forward. This direction by the RM is a clear pointer to the distressing state of civil-military relations prevailing within our country.

    In any democracy civilian control over the military, which implies the control exercised by our elected representatives through the government, is the very foundation on which civil-military relations are based. Therefore, one would expect when the Services have divergent views, the politicians would step in and give concise directions on how the Services are to proceed. In roughly similar circumstances in the United States, for example, the US Congress broke the logjam through the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. This brought about sweeping changes to the  Department of Defense by reworking the command structure of the United States Military. More recently, in China, on President Xi Jinping’s directions, transformational changes to the PLA’s organizational structure were undertaken. So, to clearly understand why our Ministry of Defence (MOD) is unable to push through such reforms, we perforce must examine its functioning and set up.

    In essence, however, Civil-Military Relations are a messy affair, not just here, but worldwide. The Goldwater Nichols Act, for example, took a year to be passed and nearly another four to five years to be implemented. There are a number of theoretical constructs that have been propounded to explain Civil-Military Relations. However, these concepts, be it Huntington’s “Objective Civilian Control”, or Morris Janowitz views on “Subjective Control”, and there are others as well, basically interpret and differentiate the interplay between the degree of civilian dominance and military autonomy.

    Leaving aside the theoretical aspects, the one thing on which there can be no disagreement is the fact that success or otherwise at tackling vital national security issues depends on, what Raj Shukla in his paper “Civil-Military Relations in India” (CLAWS, 2012), calls “the pattern of institutional interaction between the civil and military components of a nation’s polity.” Most importantly, in our context, this is essential not just because the military is responsible for protecting our national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and must, therefore, deliver the maximum bang for the buck, but more so, because defence spending, while at its’ lowest in the past seven years,  is still  13.73% of all government expenditure at Rs 4.78 Lakh Crores. Not an insubstantial amount in any way.

    In the opinion of Steven Wilkinson, author of  Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence, our military has been defanged and “coup proofed” by a series of measures put in place by the bureaucracy and its political masters.

    Historical Precedent

    It is important to remember the Spanish philosopher, George Santayana’s, words of wisdom that “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”, we would also do well to recall the maxim that “there’s a reason why your windshield is bigger than your rear-view mirror. Where you’re headed is much more important than what you left behind”. Therefore, seventy plus years on, historical precedent means little, because we have had enough time to have absorbed lessons from the wars we have fought since and adapted our HDO accordingly. Suffice it to say that Prime Minister Nehru had an inherent dislike for the military and was apprehensive of what it could do, especially after seeing what was happening in our neighbourhood.

    In the opinion of Steven Wilkinson, author of  Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy Since Independence, our military has been defanged and “coup proofed” by a series of measures put in place by the bureaucracy and its political masters. These include a steep decline in its precedence and perks, diversifying its ethnic composition and giving overriding powers to the civilian bureaucracy within the Ministry of Defence in every aspect of military functioning, including the selection of senior ranks.

    In addition, large paramilitary forces under the Union Home Ministry have also been formed to “ring-fence” the military and for use as countervailing forces against it, if required. Finally, the lure of post-retirement crumbs, such as an ambassadorship, governorship or membership of the Armed Forces Tribunal has ensured that the senior hierarchy remains quiet and continues to toe the Government line. All of this has weakened the military to a large extent making it a less attractive career, which is why it has been attempting to cope with large deficiencies over an extended period of time.

    The Kargil Conflict of 1999 caught us by surprise, and in its aftermath, there were calls for drastic changes to the existing system. It was obvious that the existing defence paradigm of the Indian state was obsolete while we were in the 21st century, our command and control structures were still in the 20th century. The Government established the Kargil Review Committee headed by K Subrahmanyam to go into the issue of reforms and its subsequent recommendations were handed over to a group of ministers for examination and implementation.

    Amongst the recommendations made, the three that were of most importance pertained to the necessity for integration of the services both with each other and with the MOD; the creation of a chief of defence staff (CDS); and joint operational commands. Like nothing else, the Kargil Conflict showed up the serious lack of synergy amongst the three Services of Armed Forces as well as a lack of coordination between the Armed Forces and Civil authorities. It must be pointed out that while some of the lesser recommendations were implemented, including facetiously attempting to fool the political establishment by renaming the Service Headquarters, it has only been after nearly two decades that any serious movement towards reforms has been undertaken with the appointment of the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA). It is still too early to comment on their efficacy.

    Characteristics of Civil-Military Relations in India

    It may come as a surprise to some that the Raksha Mantri and the civilian bureaucrats in the MOD, apart from handling the three Services and the Coast Guard, also deal with a number of civilian manned and run agencies such as DRDO, OFB and Veterans Welfare etc. The total number of civilians paid from defence estimates exceeds 500,000. To put it in perspective it is larger than the active strength of the Pakistan Armed Forces.

    Anit Mukherjee in a paper titled The Absent Dialogue (Seminar 599-2009)  suggests that there are three main characteristics that our Civil-Military Relations present, which explains to a large extent the ongoing interaction between the two. These are:

    • Strong administrative, procedural and bureaucratic controls over the armed forces. Where this differs from other democracies in this respect is the complete lack of expertise on defence matters among the civilian bureaucrats. As a result dialogue between both sides is constrained and, as is to be expected, they are more focused on the process than the outcome. This lack of knowledge also ensures that they are unable to “arbitrate between competing parochial interests”, and are also unwilling to take responsibility or be held accountable for controversial decisions.
    • While consulted, the military is excluded from the crucial decision-making forums, thereby denying them a role in the policy-making process. The CDS has only been granted the position of a member of the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) as well as in the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), both headed by the NSA, which is the “principal mechanism for inter-ministerial coordination and integration of relevant inputs in the formulation of national security policies.” Thus, the NSA de facto performs the duties of the CDS—a peculiar situation since the former completely lacks the requisite experience.
    • The military has been granted a great deal of autonomy concerning its own affairs. is allowed to do much of what it wants in what it considers its own sphere of activity: training and education, threat assessments, force structure, doctrine, innovations, appointments (up to a certain rank) and miscellaneous welfare activities. This makes for personality-driven interactions.
    • In addition to the above three characteristics as propounded by Anit Mukherjee, there is also the issue of disjointed and uncoordinated interaction between the MOD with the Ministry of Finance (MoF). For example, Amit Cowshish in his paper, Distortions in the Discourse on Modernization of Armed Forces, in the Journal of Defence Studies (Vol 8, No3, Jul-Sept 2014) writes that “in the run-up to the formulation of the 12th Defence Five-Year Plan (FYP) (2012–17), all the Services Headquarters confirmed to the MoD that the Op Directives were a good enough basis for formulating the plan. However, “the difference of opinion between the MoD and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) over the size of the 11th Defence FYP (2007–12) was one of the reasons why it could not be brought before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)”.

    Impact on Functioning

    The impact on the functioning of our Higher Defence Management of all of this is that we live in a divided house in which the atmosphere reeks of distrust and hostility, the currency for interaction is power, and the aim of all stakeholders is to protect one’s own turf at all costs, at the very least. It is indeed unfortunate that the most important lesson we seemed to have picked up from the British and perfected, is the fine art of divide and rule.

    The second issue of import is the fact that over all these years we have not been able to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy document. This goes far beyond just the functioning of the MOD or Civil-Military interactions and can be blamed on our inability to adopt a ‘whole of government approach. Nonetheless, its absence has not only caused ambiguity in our strategic aims but also has had a debilitating effect on our military. As I have written elsewhere in my paper Rebooting the India Army: A Doctrinal Approach to Force Restructuring (ORF Issue Brief No439, Feb 2021) that “The NSS is also the foundation for a comprehensive military doctrine by the Armed Forces. This military doctrine acts as a formalised guideline that broadly visualises the nature of potential conflicts, the preparations required for them, and the methods to be adopted. In its formulation, it flows from the military-strategic goals enumerated, which dictate how the military must be organised, trained and equipped to carry out its assigned missions”.

    It implies, that instead of transforming our organizational architecture or processes to deal with future conflict scenarios we adopt the lowest common denominator that allows for compromise. 

    If perceptions, within the Services and at the MOD, vary about what our strategic aims are and how we plan to accomplish them, then substantive dialogue on the issue of integration and joint manship are extremely difficult. It implies, that instead of transforming our organizational architecture or processes to deal with future conflict scenarios we adopt the lowest common denominator that allows for compromise.  Basically, that allows us to adopt a bureaucratic bean-counting mode, to ensure harmony among all stakeholders, which translates to proportional representation in all aspects of functioning, entailing only superficial changes in the status quo. The Armed Forces Special Operations Division (AFSOD) is the perfect example of such an approach. Instead of consolidating all of our Special Operations Forces (SOF) resources, we have adopted a flawed approach, not unlike what the United States adopted.  after the disaster of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980, the abortive bid to free US diplomats held hostage by the Iranians. They formed the Joint Special Operations Agency which was flawed as it had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF. By providing minimal resources that have little operational impact, we have managed to pay lip service to jointness while each Service continues to control and employ its SOF assets as it chooses.

    Conclusion

    The only way forward for us is a change in mindsets and attitudes. We can no longer afford a system wherein, according to K. Subrahmanyam, “politicians enjoy power without any responsibility, bureaucrats wield power without any accountability, and the military assumes responsibility without any direction”. We need a more informed and enlightened polity that is aware of our security environment and is willing to demand answers from our political and security establishment as to how our tax Rupees are being spent on defence. There is no doubt that accountability is the key to a more secure future.

    It is time our political establishment got real, set aside bureaucratic infighting and apathy and took control as the Constitution requires them to do. This requires a better understanding of security issues along with political will, determination and a more assertive leadership that is focused on strengthening our institutions. Otherwise, as Anit Mukherjee so aptly asserts, “It might not make a pretty picture to say that we are weak because we choose to be weak, but sometimes it is necessary to look in the mirror”.

    Feature Image Credit: www.ipdutexas.org

    Article Image Credit: patimes.org

     

  • Theatre Commands in India: Have We got it Backwards?

    Theatre Commands in India: Have We got it Backwards?

    As per a recent report by Nitin Gokhale, published on the Bharatshakti website, higher defence reforms are on track in India with the likely formation of two integrated commands by August 2021. Nitin also reiterates the reforms mandate to the CDS, General Bipin Rawat, to bring about jointness in communications, training, logistics & maintenance and support services, apart from operations, within three years while rationalizing the existing infrastructure to augment combat capabilities of the armed forces and reducing wasteful expenditure.

    The very fact of air defence being thought of as bringing just the SAMs and AD guns under one commander indicates a lack of such study and of military history as in Bekaa Valley in 1982.

    From the questions raised in this report itself on the conceptual framework of the Air Defence Command still requiring resolution, it becomes apparent that we are putting the cart before the horse in our haste to meet the given deadline. Surely, the senior leadership must have considered this issue of integration in all previous appointments and studied the experience of other nations, particularly the US being the largest in this field as a democracy, and formulated a plan to adapt their structure and best practices to our institutional and cultural environment instead of reinventing the wheel. The very fact of air defence being thought of as bringing just the SAMs and AD guns under one commander indicates a lack of such study and of military history as in Bekaa Valley in 1982.

    Even a cursory study would indicate that the essential initial steps for joint operations are training backed by the requisite secure communications integrating literally every fighting unit in the command loop to execute joint plans with the requisite flexibility in the fog of war, or in other words integrating sensors with shooters to minimize the OODA cycle in this era of informatized warfare. With all three services reportedly still using their individual communication networks which do not easily talk to each other, much less to the systems of other friendly nations that we regularly exercise with, the desired integration would remain a mirage. Just one example from the US would illustrate the importance of this issue. It may be recalled that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 created seven regional (theatre) combatant commands bringing all five US military services under unified, geographically organized command structures. Today, there are 11 including the recent Space Command. Even after five years, in Desert Storm, the Joint Air Component Commander, General Horner, could not electronically pass the Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) to the Carrier Groups of the US Navy and these had to be flown in manually every day. It took the air wings of the US Navy and the USAF almost another decade of cross-training till Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom to come together on a common platform and largely operate as one team, with some issues still to be resolved. In the case of the USAF and US Army, such a model was still being considered till 2007.

    35 years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act mandating unified commands, the USAF still operates eight separate commands, namely Air Combat Command, Air Education and Training Command, Material Command, Global Strike Command, Air Mobility Command, Space Command, AF Reserve Command and even an AF Special Operations Command. In addition, it has separate command organizations for Pacific Air Forces and USAF in Europe. When required to support operational missions, the Secretary of Defense directs the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) to execute a Change in Operational Control (CHOP) of these units to a Regional Combatant Commander. With over 5300 aircraft currently, surely the USAF could have been parcelled out to various theatre commands if that was the most operationally effective integrated approach. However, it was not, based on the principles of unity of command and concentration of firepower. In the case of a much smaller IAF, with just about 30 combat squadrons, against a sanction of 45, and a handful of combat support elements, how is the reported division in the name of reforms even being thought of?

    Similarly, the US Navy operates nine major commands like Navy Expeditionary Combat, Military Sealift, Sea Systems, Air Systems, Naval Facilities Engineering Systems, Supply Systems, IW Systems, Strategic Systems Program and Naval Education & Training apart from Fleet Forces commands for each region. Despite operating more than 3700 operational aircraft, the US Navy also does not divide its aircraft or carrier groups but allocates these based on the situation while continuing to train for all contingencies. Even the US Army runs many major commands and five major surface component commands like Pacific, Europe and Africa, North, South and Central all headed by 3 or 4-Star Generals. As recently as 2018, necessity resulted in the formation of an additional Army Futures Command (AFC).

    Co-location has been cited by many in India as a pre-requisite for integration, jointness and economizing by shutting down some existing commands. Against this, even in the case of the US Army where it is possible to pre-position most forces in the area of envisaged operations due to their relative immobility and reaction time, three unified commands and their army components have headquarters outside their area of operations. CENTCOM’s is located at MacDill  AFB in Tampa, Florida with a forward headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar while the army component, ARCENT, is headquartered at Shaw AFB in South Carolina. Functioning is through efficient communications with the span of control of the commanders still a major consideration. Have we carried out a study on the actual savings versus operational effectiveness after the proposed closure and relocation of some commands?

    The Army also seems to work on its limited field of view by seeing the air force more as flying artillery for close air support, apart from air mobility, without the broader strategic vision of the Air Force.

    Unfortunately, in our case, the approach appears to be driven more by the numbers and vacancies for each service with the fixation of having the forces under command. The Army also seems to work on its limited field of view by seeing the air force more as flying artillery for close air support, apart from air mobility, without the broader strategic vision of the Air Force. Undeniably, the Air Force is the most technology-intensive service and a single platform today is capable of role switching and reacting in near real-time to emergent situations. Due to the roles and rapid strategic reach, it is also likely to be the first responder in most contingencies in our current geopolitical environment under a nuclear overhang. Based on this, it could be argued that the Air Force should lead most theatre commands duly assisted by component commanders from each service. In Desert Storm, General Norman Shwarzkopf wisely handed over the operations to the air component commander, General Charles Horner, to run a 1000-hour air campaign before a 100-hour ground campaign. Such maturity is unlikely in India without jointly educated and trained commanders and staff.

    It is also easier for an airman to understand surface operations than it is for a soldier to understand air operations. An example of a Corps Commander in 1989-91 later criticizing the non-use of Mi-25/35 attack helicopters in Kargil despite having had these helicopters under him in his Corps shows how limited their understanding of airpower is. The same General also talked of a certain number of fighter squadrons being authorized for close air support, once again displaying his ignorance on the use of multi-role fighters in particular and air power in general. The example of the Pakistani Army sending out a brigade, which was decimated by air at Longewala in 1971, without first achieving air superiority in that area further illustrates the thinking of soldiers in the sub-continent and strengthens the case for the air force.

    Training and communications issues, therefore, should have been first addressed and resolved before haste makes waste of our efforts at integration.

     

    This article was published earlier in The Sunday Guardian.

    Image Credit: Hindustan Times

     

  • Chief of Defence Staff, a year later: Lack of Clarity and an ambiguous Mandate

    Chief of Defence Staff, a year later: Lack of Clarity and an ambiguous Mandate

    On 31st of Dec 2020 India’s first Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Gen Bipin Rawat, completed one-year in office.  With China recently unveiling its 14th Five Year Plan aiming to bring its military on par with the USA by 2027, it would be interesting to observe if the appointment of CDS has helped the Indian Military spruce up its structure and operational philosophy in any manner.

    Appointment of CDS was put on hold for almost two decades after the Kargil Review Committee made its recommendations.  Opinion among the strategic community has always been divided on the appointment of CDS. Those who argued in favour espoused that CDS would be the panacea for all ills while those who opposed, opined that the time-tested Higher Defence Organisation proposed by Lord Ismay has worked well over the years and hence, the western concept of CDS is unnecessary. Now that the CDS is in place, it is futile to revisit the debate but the functioning of CDS would be a subject of scrutiny for the next few years.

    In the last few months, the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) headed by the CDS came for intense criticism for making proposals about the increase in retirement age and reduction in pensions. Previous proposals such as the closure of CSD canteens at peace stations, opening up of cantonment, doing away with Army Day parade etc, which are believed to have emanated from the DMA have been subjected to ridicule and disdain in the social media. It wasn’t exactly clear as to why the office of CDS was being used for such purely administrative issues, which are counterproductive in enhancing the morale and pride of the forces.

    Men in uniform yearned that CDS would play a vital role in bringing about the true integration of Services HQ with the MoD and expedite the process of defence modernisation. However, after one year, it is indeed of great concern that the office of CDS (read DMA) appears to be focussed on administrative and ceremonial issues with absolutely no strategic significance.

    When CDS assumed charge on 1st Jan 20, it was reported that the CDS would be the Principal Military Advisor to the Government (read Def Minister) and he would head the newly created DMA.  Additionally, he would assume charge of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), serve as the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Head the Tri-Service Commands, and be a member of the Defence Acquisition Council besides the Nuclear Command Authority. Quite a tall order indeed but doesn’t seem to be adequately equipped with a statutory mandate to perform effectively. Men in uniform yearned that CDS would play a vital role in bringing about the true integration of Services HQ with the MoD and expedite the process of defence modernisation. However, after one year, it is indeed of great concern that the office of CDS (read DMA) appears to be focussed on administrative and ceremonial issues with absolutely no strategic significance. One of the first initiatives announced by Gen Rawat was to create an Air Defence Command which is yet to materialise and creation of Theatre Commands seems to be a long haul.

    it is beyond comprehension to fathom what prompted the Government to create a Department of Military Affairs within the MoD when the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) was already functioning since 2001 awaiting the appointment of a CDS.  As Service Chiefs continue to exercise Command over their respective Service, the CDS as the head of IDS would be rightly placed to promote joint training initiatives, validate joint operational plans and act as a catalyst in defence modernisation.  However, for all this to be achieved, the role and functioning of the CDS should be spelt out; particularly the role of CDS as the “Principal Military Advisor” to the Raksha Mantri, vis-à-vis the Defence Secretary who continues to be the “Principal Advisor” to the Defence Minister. Such vital aspects are never left to chance based on an individual’s equations with political leadership but need to be appropriately institutionalised, mandated and published.

    Currently, Defence Secretary functions as head of the Department of Defence and is additionally responsible for coordinating the activities of the five Departments in the Ministry, including the newly created DMA. The Defence Secretary draws his functional powers from the Cabinet Secretariat –Manual of Office Procedures (CS-MoP) which clearly states that the Secretary of the Department “is the principal adviser of the Minister on all matters of policy and administration within his Ministry/Department, and his responsibility is complete and undivided”. If Defence Secretary is coordinating the affairs of all the five departments including DMA as the Principal Advisor, what is the status of the four-star-CDS?

    The Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961 are made by the President of India under Article 77 of the Constitution for the allocation of business of the Government of India. The business of the Government is transacted in the Ministries/Departments, Secretariats and offices (referred to as ‘Department’) as per the distribution of subjects specified in these Rules. Allocation of Business Rules has not been revised since 2017 though DMA has been created one year ago.  As a result, the DMA is not listed in the First Schedule of the Allocation of Business.

    Transaction of Business (Rules) 1961 are made by the President of India for the convenient transaction of the Business of the Government of India. The disposal of business by various ministries, inter-departmental transactions and mandates of various committees are published in these rules. The significance of these rules can be gauged from the fact that the rules have been recently amended to deal with unprecedented challenges posed by Covid 19 pandemic. Cabinet Secretariat has amended Government of India Transaction of Business Rules, 1961 to widen powers of two committees to meet the economic crisis caused by Covid 19, using the powers under the Act. However, Transaction of Business Rules has not been revised clearly defining the role of CDS as the Principal Military Advisor to the Government.

    The organisation chart in the MoD has been removed possibly because it would only be too embarrassing to place the CDS under the Defence Secretary. There is an urgent need for the GoI to create a meaningful role for the CDS and empower him with a statutory mandate.

    A cursory glance at the website of the Ministry of Defence would reveal a lack of any sincerity in assigning specific responsibilities for DMA. It has been casually mentioned that DMA “deals with the armed forces of the Union….. and promotes jointness among the three services”. Were these objectives not met by the MoD in the past? So what value addition has the DMA provided? The organisation chart in the MoD has been removed possibly because it would only be too embarrassing to place the CDS under the Defence Secretary. There is an urgent need for the GoI to create a meaningful role for the CDS and empower him with a statutory mandate.

    Indian Military is not expeditionary. However, if there is a convincing need to create Theatre Commands in pursuit of joint operations and interoperability, replacing the existing 17 Service-specific Commands by fewer Theatre Commands would be the most challenging task for the CDS. If the experience of USA, UK and other major militaries is anything go by, such major military reforms could be pushed through only with steadfast backing from the government, taking all three services into confidence and aligning the entire military leadership with the desired outcomes of this humungous exercise which may eventually need constitutional validity through an Act of the parliament.

    For the appointment of CDS to make a meaningful purpose the following measures are imperative:

    • Abolish the DMA and facilitate the CDS to take complete control of the IDS, keeping its functioning outside the purview of Def Secretary
    • Revise the CS-MOP, Allocation of Business Rules, Transaction of Business rules and the Warrant of Precedence, clearly bringing out the role and responsibilities of CDS as the Principal Military Advisor to the Defence Minister, in contrast to the roles and responsibilities of the Defence Secretary which may also now need to be re-drafted.
    • Make CDS a permanent member of the Cabinet Committee on Security facilitating the single-point military advice to the National Security Council.
    • The cabinet should spell out a Defence Policy Guidance (DPG) with a 12 year to the 15-year horizon in the light of prevailing and forecasted geo-political scenario and assist the CDS in preparing a clear roadmap for Indian Military Modernisation

    To abrogate the stigma of “Attached Offices”, and to integrate the Services HQ with MoD, a beginning needs to be made by augmenting the IDS with officials from the MoD.

    • Currently, the budgeting and procurement plans are made in isolation and subject to scrutiny by the Ministry of Fin (Def) thereby losing time and effort. IDS needs to be adequately empowered by augmenting it with an integral wing of the Ministry of Fin (Def) headed by a Joint Secretary ranked officer.
    • A Defence Production Wing under the charge of an Additional Secretary ranked officer reporting directly to the CDS should be created with the long term objective of achieving complete integration of the department of defence production with IDS. This suggestion would certainly be the most unpopular with the bureaucracy but could turn out to be a game-changer if achieved.

    Kargil Review Committee had recommended the appointment of CDS to integrate the armed forces in their planning, procurement and functioning to transform the Indian Military as a unitary force to reckon with.  In the absence of a clear mandate and constitutional validity for the functioning of the CDS, the entire effort of instituting one, seems to be of little consequence, much less, competent of driving any significant reforms. The current arrangement needs a complete overhaul if that is to be achieved.

  • CDS: A Welcome Reform and the Challenges Ahead

    CDS: A Welcome Reform and the Challenges Ahead

    The Year 2020 ushered in a momentous reform for higher defence management (HDM) in India with the government implementing PM Narendra Modi’s announcement made earlier from the ramparts of the Red Fort on 15th Aug 2019, on establishing the institution of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). Retiring Army Chief General Bipin Rawat, not surprisingly, was appointed as the first CDS of the Indian Armed Forces. The unique honour brings with it myriad challenges lying ahead for the new appointee.

                To those at home and abroad who are accustomed to the working of governments of all political hues in India it should not be a surprise that this  critically vital appointment  took over 18 years to materialise. To recall, as part of the many HDM reforms this appointment was also approved by the NDA led Vajpayee government way back in 2001, after the 1999 Kargil War, based on the recommendations of the Subramanyam led Kargil Review Committee (KRC). Bureaucratic sluggishness, lack of will among different political dispensations as also the fact that there could be indifference on matters of even national security broadly explain the long delay. Thus, the Modi government deserves full credit for institutionalizing the long overdue appointment of the CDS. However, the designated role of CDS, the status and the government charter laying down all the details are still being worked out.

    Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS)

    As promulgated by the government, the CDS will be a ‘four star’ officer and will be considered as the ‘first among equals’ in relation to the chiefs of the Army, Navy and the Air Force. He will be the permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and can serve till 65 years of age. KRC recommended that CDS appropriately should  be a ‘five star officer’ considering his onerous responsibilities and role.

    Now that the government has given the green signal for the CDS to commence functioning to provide the desired levels of integration in all tri-service matters including policy, operational, training, communications, logistical aspects and so on, the CDS will be confronted with myriad challenges in achieving his onerous missions. Apart from an unwavering encouragement support from the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the CDS will require more than a willing assistance from the three services to truly get-off the ground. As is natural and customary, no service likes to shed its resources and time honoured responsibilities to newer organizations. Having raised the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) way back in 2002, as a result of the same KRC recommendations, I am more than aware of the reluctance of the three Services to shed some of their assets and roles which will now be managed by the CDS. Thus, General Rawat will have to orchestrate extracting resources from the three Services for the new organizations, formations and units directly under his command being raised, with tact and sensitivity.

    Re-organisation of MOD: an analysis

                The MOD, till recently,functioned with four departments namely the Departments of Defence (DOD), Defence Production, Defence Research and Development as well as Ex Servicemen Welfare – each headed by a Secretary – ranked officer. On 30th Dec 2019, the government promulgated a gazette notification establishing the fifth department to be called the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) to be headed by the newly appointed CDS. The Rules of Business existing since 1961 and reallocation of certain responsibilities with the Defence Secretary have been modified though this has also invited adverse comments from defence analysts in India on the ground that the desired level of responsibilities had not been given to the CDS.

                In the last many years, right from the acceptance of the KRC and its approval by  LK Advani led Group of Ministers and subsequently by the Vajpayee government in 2001, it had been accepted by all that the CDS was urgently required as a major reform of  India’s higher defence management. The CDS was required to provide single-point professional military advice to the political leadership. However, what apparently has happened now is that the CDS will be providing his advice to the Defence Minister only and not to both the Prime Minister and Defence Minister. Many see in this, a case of bureaucratic play to reduce the importance of the CDS.

                 In the orders recently issued by the government, four key responsibilities have been taken away from the DOD under the Defence Secretary and now put under the DMA which includes the three services and their headquarters, the Territorial Army and works relating to the army, navy and the air force. Non-capital purchases and promoting jointness in procurement, operations, training, communications, logistics (including repairs and maintenance) and encouraging use of indigenous equipment and platforms will be in the CDS charter.

                Entry 1 of the amended charter for the DOD states that “Defence of India and every part thereof including defence policy and preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilization” will be with the Defence Secretary.  This has apparently been done to ensure the primacy of the civil bureaucracy. Why can’t the responsibility of defence policy and the mandate for defence of India not rest with the Defence Minister if this charter, was to be kept away from the CDS?

    Why can’t the responsibility of defence policy and the mandate for defence of India not rest with the Defence Minister if this charter, was to be kept away from the CDS?

                The other amendment is in the field of defence purchases where the earlier formulation of “procurement exclusive to the defence services” has been altered to “capital acquisition exclusive to the defence services.” This means that big-ticket acquisitions will be in the Defence Secretary’s ambit creating an impression of paucity of faith in the CDS in this matter.

    The existing HQ Integrated Defence Staff could have been the backbone for this new integrated structure within the MOD brining about cost-effectiveness as well. 

                The Department of Military Affairs will have a structure that rightly includes civilian bureaucracy as well. The CDS will be assisted by two joint secretaries and a dozen deputy secretary level officers. Ideally not only the CDS but the entire MOD should have seen complete integration of the civil bureaucracy with the military. The existing HQ Integrated Defence Staff could have been the backbone for this new integrated structure within the MOD brining about cost-effectiveness as well.  Military and civil officers should be working in various departments of the MOD in unison. The Defence Secretary could have been retained, as the coordinator of all the departments. The DMA could have been headed by a Secretary level Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) to enable the CDS, in the MOD, to concentrate primarily on critical strategic issues for advising the Prime Minister and Defence Minister on macro-management of defence strategy.

                The Defence Secretary’s charter also includes  military cantonments, veterinary and military farms, land acquisition for defence, Border Roads Organisation, purchasing food items for defence and even the Canteen Stores Department – virtually covering all issues and portfolios related to financial expenditure and management! Surprisingly, even the management of the National Defence College (NDC) and the Institute of Defence Studies has been kept with the Defence Secretary!

    The DMA could have been headed by a Secretary level Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) to enable the CDS, in the MOD, to concentrate primarily on critical strategic issues for advising the Prime Minister and Defence Minister on macro-management of defence strategy.  

    Theatre commands

                One of the critical issues, after the establishment of the CDS system, would be the widely discussed recommendation that integrated inter-service theatre commands should be established to exercise control over all operations in each theatre as practiced in many nations of the world including US and China. Currently the three services have their own operational commands that make for a total of 17 command HQs.  In addition, the Indian Armed Forces through HQ IDS have under their control only one tri-service command headquarters, namely the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). The Strategic Forces Command (SFC), though led, manned and operated primarily  by personnel from the three services have their ultimate command authority  vested in the Nuclear Command Authority directly under the PM/National Security Council.

                The CDS has been tasked with the responsibility of restructuring military commands for optimal utilization of resources by bringing in jointness in operations through the establishment of joint theatre commands. However, many Indian analysts opine that the armed forces should commence this integration after coursing out exhaustive trials initially for one command headquarters. The significant change must be analysed in its entirety and not rushed through. It may be prudent to adopt ‘best practices’ of some other formidable armed forces in the world and suitably adapt them for our own challenges and genius. Theatre commands, once finally agreed to, can be implemented in a graduated manner employing the incremental concept. In the services even with the current structures, far greater jointness in operational doctrines and plans, training, communications and logistics should be ensured first to establish synergy.

    Theatre commands, once finally agreed to, can be implemented in a graduated manner employing the incremental concept.

                The newly appointed CDS at a recently conducted press conference outlined the likely contours of the envisaged theatre commands. He stated that two integrated commands, namely the Air Defence Command and the Peninsular Command respectively will be raised in the coming year while they will endeavour to raise the first theatre command by 2022. Preliminary studies on the geographical and operational spans for five theatre commands along the northern and western borders are underway. In addition, the services are also carrying out an in-depth study to examine if Jammu and Kashmir should have a separate theatre command.

                The Air Defence Command will be integrating all air defence assets including air defence missiles with the three services, coastal guns, air defence radars and air surveillance systems presently held with the three services.  In view of potent air and ballistic missile threats from India’s adversaries, the Air Defence Command, to be headed by an air force officer, will assume critical significance in terms of its efficacy.

                The Peninsular Command which, some naval officers want to call the Indian Ocean Command will look to merging the western and eastern naval commands. This command to be headed by a naval officer would be given dedicated air force assets and army troops. It would work to ensure India’s maritime security interests in the Indian Ocean region, both on the western and eastern sea-boards, and would also acquire the capably of conducting amphibious operations.

    National Security Doctrine

     As one of his top priorities, the CDS must have the Government Issue a National Security Doctrine which lays down a well-conceived and comprehensive strategic policy for the nation in the short, mid and long term perspective. It will be primarily an articulation of the nation’s overall vision and strategic intent. This document should naturally have both the non-classified and classified objectives which can be disseminated on a ‘need to know’ basis among concerned institutions and personalities in the country. The existing HQ IDS have endeavoured in the past to produce perspective plans for the Indian Armed Forces and have the requisite expertise to produce such policy documents for approval by the government.

    HQrs Andaman and Nicobar Command and newer agencies

                As mentioned earlier, the Indian Armed Forces have under their direct ambit only one tri-service command, namely HQ ANC. This Command HQ is of critical significance for its role in dominating the sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean and preventing the ever-assertive PLA Navy from indulging in mischief in these waters.  The CDS would no doubt accord adequate attention to a further strengthening of the strategic combat capabilities of HQ ANC for handling maritime challenges that will only multiply on India’s eastern seaboard and in the entire Indo-Pacific region.

                For CDS challenges emanating from the entire spectrum of warfare encompassing all domains are a priority. The CDS will also be overseeing the establishment of the recently sanctioned Cyber and Special Forces agencies besides the Defence Space Agency. These entities in the years ahead could qualify for being upgraded to the levels of Command HQs. As widely known, the domains of cyber and space are the battlegrounds of the future – and there the foresighted Chinese have stolen a march even over hi-tech western agencies including those of the US. India, despite being an IT super power, has still a long way to go to bridge the gap between itself and China in this aspect.

    CDS: Nuclear Military Adviser   

                The CDS will now be overseeing the functioning of the SFC far more intimately than was done earlier by the COSC as he has also been designated as the Nuclear Military Adviser to the government. The presence of a senior military officer in the Nuclear Command Authority is a step in the right direction for he would be able to provide the necessary expertise and fillip to the nation’s nuclear preparedness. The CDS may wish to advise the government to review its entire Nuclear Doctrine and revisit the policies of “No-First Use” and “Massive Retaliation”. Also, it may be necessary to re-examine whether India should go in for the development of tactical nuclear weapons for limiting a nuclear exchange. India’s two adversaries, China and Pakistan, are both reckonable nuclear powers and India’s nuclear preparedness has, therefore, to match up to them.

    Defence budgets and inter service prioritization

    It is a strategic truism that the Indian Armed Forces have to be prepared to confront a “two-front war”. Mandated to provide integrated “single-point military advice” to the government, the CDS will have to rise above service loyalties and professionally prioritize conflicting inter-service requirements in the larger interests of the nation. This assumes greater significance in the current scenario where the combat capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces have to be accorded substantial accretions in an environment of great financial strain facing the nation. The volatile situation in West Asia will be greatly impacting the energy security of India and this will further tax India’s currently faltering economy. Thus, the first test for the newly appointed CDS will have to be to convince the financially stressed government to make larger allocations in the capital budget for speedy acquisition of much needed modern weapon systems. As is known, India’s depleting fighter aircraft and submarine fleets, other deficiencies in other platforms, various types of ammunition and spares, force-multipliers etc need concerted attention. Last year’s defence budget had been allocated merely 1.49 per cent of the GDP whereas successive parliamentary committees have recommended at least 3 per cent of the GDP to be assigned for defence. Unfortunately, even this year’s recently announced defence budget has been dismal – considering the big-ticket acquisitions required by the armed forces.

    In the current charter issued by the government, any big-ticket acquisitions will remain in the Defence Secretary’s purview and thus final negotiations with foreign collaborators, Indian Defence Public Sector Undertakings or Indian private industry would rest with the DOD and the Defence Secretary. Delays as earlier are likely to occur. With “Make in India” and “Start-up India” initiatives not yet taking off, the government needs to revisit these areas involving the CDS institution.

    Coordination with civil agencies

                One of the tasks that can do with better handling is improving the coordination between the armed forces and other civilian governmental agencies who are, also handling various other aspects of national security. The CDS structure now will be an important institution to improve coordination between the MHA, MOD, NSAB and NSC Real-time information or intelligence sharing between the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the other national intelligence agencies like the Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing, National Technical Research Organisation and other newer intelligence that had come up in the last few years will hopefully improve. However, to start with, the CDS must put the Service Intelligence Directorates of the three services directly under command of the DIA for better effectiveness in the exacting intelligence domain.

    Recommendations: overall mandate for CDS

                The CDS has been formally appointed and his role enunciated and as the appointment matures in the immediate future, a further refinement of his responsibilities should be undertaken. These should include the following: –

    • The CDS should be designated as the Principal Defence Advisor to the Prime Minister (through the Defence Minister) on all matters pertaining to India’s national security.
    • The CDS should provide an overarching ‘strategic vision’ to the government and be responsible for all strategic planning for the armed forces, including all war plans and contingency planning. During peacetime, preparedness for future operations, in the strategic domain, should be one of the prime responsibilities of the CDS. He will have to synergize the mission and assets of the three services in various theatres to achieve the nation’s strategic objectives.
    • The CDS must be made responsible for overall financial planning, budgetary allocations and force structuring for the three services.
    • The CDS should oversee the preparation of the annual Defence Intelligence Estimate which obtains requisite strategic intelligence inputs for overall defence planning.
    • The establishment of theatre commands, the functioning of other tri-service commands like the Strategic Forces Command, Andaman and Nicobar Command and others which may come up in the future like the Air Defence, Cyber, Space and Special Forces Commands must get the utmost attention of the CDS.

    Conclusion

    The coming years in an increasingly troubled world and especially in our volatile neighbourhood portend diverse and formidable challenges to India’s security and economic resurgence. Consequently, an earnest effort must be made to meet them. A major HDM reform like the recent establishment of the CDS edifice goes a long way in the optimal utilization of India’s resources for defence and enhancing its operational preparedness across the entire spectrum of warfare.  All new institutions at their start do face various problems and the office of the CDS will be no exception. But it must get whole-hearted support from the PMO, MOD and the three services themselves in successfully fulfilling the onerous responsibilities and roles assigned to it.

    Views expressed are the author’s own.

    This article was published earlier in Chanakya.

  • Time for Structural Reforms, Modernisation

    Time for Structural Reforms, Modernisation

    The Prime Minister’s announcement on independence day of his decision to appoint Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as the single-point military advisor to the CCS and the PM was received with great enthusiasm. The appointment of CDS, recommended in 2001 by the Kargil Review Committee and endorsed strongly by the Group of Ministers’ headed by the then Deputy Prime Minister Shri L K Advani has been long overdue. Like with every other decision with respect to military reforms, the CDS decision became a victim of bureaucratic manoeuvring, vindictiveness, engineered turf battles, and political indecisiveness. The process of setting up a tri-service integrated headquarters was, however, incorporated with a Vice Chief equivalent, CISC heading it. Major reforms such as integration of service headquarters, appointment of the CDS, and establishment of Indian Defence University – all remained in limbo or with just cosmetic changes. There is no doubt that the Indian military is in crying need of major structural reforms in tune with 21stcentury environment, technologies, strategies, and the primacy of joint operations in the conduct of war. The CDS is more than a single person’s appointment, it is an entire system.  Therefore, it needs to be accompanied by other major structural reforms.

     Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), the joint headquarters structure to assist the CDS is already in place. The current head, CISC, would become the VCDS. It has taken more than a decade for the IDS to establish a mature and optimised acquisition system and processes, develop Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plans, optimise the defence intelligence agency, and address joint operational and training systems. While significant expertise has evolved including coordination with multiple MOD agencies, the CISC has had to depend on the Chairman, COSC for major decisions. This was invariably subordinated to the Chairman’s priority for his role as the Chief of his Service. An integrated approach, driven by the CDS, should ensure speedy and optimal modernisation of individual services towards enhancing our joint warfare capability.

     Currently, Chiefs of respective services are responsible for operational capability, training, and the requisite modernisation plans. Acquisitions and modernisation plans were largely driven by individual service specific interests, and very often these ended up getting delayed or blocked by turf wars and prioritisation battles for share of the defence budget pie. This would change under the CDS, with operational decisions being driven by the CDS system while the Chiefs would be responsible for their service capability development, training, and maintenance in tune with joint strategies. This should speed up the modernisation process.

    This year’s defence budget is barely above the subsistence level. A decade of stalled modernisation has brought all three services to their lowest levels of force structures and capabilities. The Indian Air Force is down to 32 squadrons, and is likely to go down 28 squadrons over the next five years as the older, overdue for phase out aircraft are finally laid off. It would take more than a decade for the IAF to get back to its authorised force strength of 42 squadrons provided its modernisation process is undertaken on a war-footing. If not it would be at least two decades for full recovery. The Army is no better, as a former VCOAS stated – 60% of its weapon systems are vintage. Army’s two major modernisation programs – TCS and BMS, intended to be through ‘make’ route, has been shelved after more than a decade of work with two consortiums of Indian majors. This is bound to have huge adverse impact on its modernisation efforts. One can’t blame the Army though. Repeated delays in routine procurements, and lack of accountability on development programs have cost the Army dearly. Notwithstanding some of the recent decisions such as the joint venture between Kalashnikov and the OFB for small arms manufacture, light-weight howitzer and the fast-track procurement of assault rifles and weaponry for special forces, Army’s overall capability for a two-front war is  of concern. The FICV project continues to be in a limbo. Army Chief’s restructuring efforts towards ‘Integrated Battle Groups’ is a welcome step and would help the cause of jointness.

    Navy modernisation efforts are no better either. The progress of the Indian Aircraft Carrier continues in its slow pace. Very well laid out plans such as 30-year ship building and submarine-building programs have been approved years ago, if not decades ago. These have floundered for lack of timely budget allocation. Effectively the Navy continues to grapple with ageing ships, submarines and weapon systems.

    Much of the modernisation that has accrued over the last 15 years has been largely due to procurements from the US, almost exclusively through the FMS route, that is government-to-government contracts. It does not speak well for all our sloganeering on ‘make in India’, and reflects the lack of a coherent national strategy. This is a domain the CDS will need to address.

    In a recent announcement, the government indicated that it would allocate USD 130 billions over the next five to seven years for modernisation of the three services. The CDS will need to move beyond the current system of work in the IDS, as far as modernisation goes. Currently, the LTIPP is seen as a ‘Desired Capability’ document, which the government is happy to concur. There is no assurance of financial commitment, and so the plans remain wishful thinking. Big headlines are made whenever the DAC approves ‘Acceptance of Necessity’ for thousands of crores worth acquisitions. These turn out to be meaningless as the subsequent processes takes years, more than 50% AONs elapse, and less than 25% of approved AONs fructify into desired inductions. On an average the time taken from AON to contract signing has been about 9-10 years. The flaw lies in the mismatch between various aspects of indigenous development, ‘make in India’ manufacturing and huge import dependency versus the combat capability of the forces.

    It is quite clear that various organs of the government, over the last 70 years, have failed to address effectively the need of a vibrant indigenous defence industry that is export oriented and reduces our forces’ import dependency. The CDS system, if evolved correctly, should integrate different aspects of  integrated operational philosophy, requisite force structures and combat capability with indigenous manufacturing, technology development, and a balanced, accountable, and efficient  acquisition process. The CDS must also be given enough power to take operational and financial decisions to ensure appropriate force structures for India’s defence. The bottom line, however, is to see the wisdom that an allocation of 1.35% of GDP is abysmally low to meet India’s defence needs in the 21stcentury.

    This article was published earlier in Deccan Herald on 22 Sep 2019.

    The author is the Founder-Chairman and President of The Peninsula Foundation. He is a former Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff. The views expressed are author’s own.