“If Sindhudesh is created, the feudal lords will kill us”1.
These were the words of the late veteran Sindhi leader Rasool Baksh Palijo. As a Marxist, he had fully dedicated himself to the popular causes, fighting for the constitutional and legal rights of Bengalis, Balochs, Sindhis and minorities. His almost life-long antagonism to Sindhi Secessionism underlines the structural problems plaguing the province of Sindh, caste being at the centre of it. The problems have manifested themselves politically in numerous instances, beginning with the separation of Sindh from Bombay Province in 1936, and the Pakistan Movement itself. After the Partition, the Ashrafiya-Savarna alliance2 –which views the Sindhi society in terms of non-antagonistic Hindu-Muslim binary, while comfortably brushing casteism under the carpet– has been at the forefront of this. In fact, the alliance is a recent (re)construction, which happened as a result of the marginalisation of Ashraf Sindhis at the hands of Mohajir and Punjabi elites that began immediately after independence. Similarly, Sindh’s turn to Sufism, which mostly took place in the colonial era3, and was later adopted by Sindhi Secessionists as one of the most defining identities of the Sindhi nation, itself has its underpinnings in the caste system. It is then no surprise that a section of Sindhis –mostly of the lower castes– has opposed the idea of Sindhudesh.
For the last few years, Indians have been at the receiving end of the BJP-sponsored narrative of Pakistan being on the brink of breaking up into four or five states, one of them being Sindhudesh. Indian Sindhis (like myself) are thrilled with such conceptions. Little is known about the sociological background of the Sindhi National Movement. A look into that might answer why the movement has not succeeded politically. In this article, I discuss the cases of two communities that have largely stayed out of the nationalist movement: the Haris and Dalits.
Are Sindhis Casteless people?
The vehement assertion, especially by the Sindhi diaspora, of Sindhis being casteless is remotely the truth. Sindhis, both Hindus and Muslims, practise the caste system as religiously as the rest of the Indian society.
The vehement assertion, especially by the Sindhi diaspora, of Sindhis being casteless is remotely the truth. Sindhis, both Hindus and Muslims, practise the caste system as religiously as the rest of the Indian society. In Muslims, the Syeds –who claim to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad– occupy the top-most strata, followed by other Ashrafis belonging to Central Asian, Iranian and Arab descent, as well as the Balochs and Pathans communities. The Pirs or spiritual leaders, who have wielded considerable political power during the colonial period, also largely fall into the upper castes. They are followed by Waderas and Sammats who constitute the landowning class, that has traditionally wielded the socio-economic power in rural Sindh. Then there is the Hari community, composed of landless labourers. Among Hindus, there are, among others, the Brahmins, Rajputs, Amils – the civil servant caste, Bhaibands – the caste of businessmen, and Dalits. While most Amils and Bhaibands migrated to India after the partition, some Brahmins, Rajputs and Dalit pockets remain intact. Some districts –Tharparkar, Tando Allahyar and Mirpurkhas– have a huge population of Dalits.
Around 59 upper castes –both Muslim and Hindu– and 22 feudal families make up the ruling class in rural Sindh.4 Since Pakistan has no custom of caste census, we do not know how much they are over-represented in its political institutions. However, an analysis by Ghulam Hussein in his paper Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism in Sindh, Pakistan states that the Dalit community is highly underrepresented in Sindh Provincial Assembly –with only one out of nine reserved seats for minorities going to a Dalit; though the number is higher in local bodies. After the partition, as analysed by Hussein, the Syeds were the beneficiaries of the Hindu Migration to India as far as representation in the assemblies is concerned, since they occupied most of the seats vacated by Caste Hindus. The number of Scheduled Castes representatives, however, remained the same as that before the partition, despite them becoming the majority within the minority. Similarly, Pasmanda Muslims, that are unacknowledged by Pakistan to be existent, are also under-represented. Furthermore, more than a quarter of Sindh’s Members of Provincial Assembly (MPAs) in the 12th Assembly were professional landlords5.
Casteism makes no appearance in Sindhi nationalist debates. One argument given by the Sindhi nationalists is that being a predominantly Islamic society, caste is non-existent among Sindhis.
Casteism makes no appearance in Sindhi nationalist debates. One argument given by the Sindhi nationalists is that being a predominantly Islamic society, caste is non-existent among Sindhis. Instead, many ‘progressive’ Sindhi writers have displayed sympathy for the working classes instead of the lower castes. For Hindu communities, though they acknowledge the presence of caste, they quickly turn towards the benefits of reservation. Hussein writes, “In the Sindhi nationalist historical imaginary, casteism does not seem as problematic as sectarianism, religious bigotry and ethnolinguistic discord”6. In some instances, the Sindhi community as a whole is presented as Untouchables within Pakistan, thereby drawing a parallel between oppression of the Dalits and state oppression of Sindhi Secessionists/Nationalists7.
The Rural Setting of Sindh: The oppression of the Hari Community
Mohammed Ibrahim Joyo, another Marxist leader of Sindh during the colonial era, in his short book, Save Sind, Save the Continent (From Feudal Lords, Capitalists and their Communalisms), wrote about the exploitative nature of the rural setting dominated by Pirs, Waderas and Syeds. He, much like Palijo, identifies the local Syeds, Pirs, Hindu moneylenders, Zamindars etc., and not the Europeans, as the real enemies of the people of Sindh. For him, the Zamindars and Jagirdars, present themselves as “semi-gods to their peasant slaves”. Their only mission in life is to “vitiate the entire social fabric of life around”. “Periodically, they bestir themselves and make themselves available for snatching votes and forcing consent from the people, so that they could rule over them ‘democratically’”. For the Haris, he writes, ‘‘the only duty they know is to work like bullocks for their landlords and money-lenders, to touch the feet of their Zamindar-Masters and Pirs, and worship them literally as living gods, and lastly to instruct their children to do likewise’’8
Ghulam Murtaza Syed (hereafter referred to as Syed), the Father of Sindhi Nationalism and a product of the ruling class in Sindh, attributes the setting to the administrative measures of the colonisers, which led to coming into “existence [of] a limited new hierarchy of fat landlords, absentee, indifferent, unenlightened and in some cases oppressive and tyrannical”9. “The great community of peasants became a crowd of ‘tenants at will’ without any permanent or substantial stake in its own occupation.” Syed, in his speeches and writings, is heavily critical of the established elite and seems to favour the upliftment of the conditions of the Haris. He places a ‘potentiality for evil’10 upon the Zamindars, who are involved in most of the crimes, some of which include kidnapping the women of the Haris.
Despite the concern shown by Syed in his disquisitions, many Sindhi leaders remained suspicious and mistrustful of him. Though Palijo, Joyo and a few other leftist Sindhi leaders were once his companions, and despite them having some ideological affinities with him, they were largely opposed to his goals. They viewed Islam and the notion of Social Justice it emanates as a panacea of all social ills, as opposed to Syed who detested, at least after 1973, the role of religion in a modern state. They, nonetheless, remained on good personal terms with Syed. Their antipathy to Syed’s ideas stemmed, among others, from his personal conduct. Despite all the sympathetic speeches and writings, Syed continued to behave as an Ashrafiya, wearing white clothes to display his purity and detachment from worldly matters. The peasants who worked for the leader regularly touched his feet to ask for favours11.
Hamida Khuhro, another associate of Syed to later part ways, describes it as ‘Syedism’, which, according to her, was his first and most constant ideology12. It is similar to the politics of patronage that characterises the entire subcontinent, but with some Sindhi blend of reverence of Syeds and Pirs. As per Oskar Vekaaik, author of Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan, Syed was brought up with the idea of Syed as a spiritual hero to the Hari working for him. “Rather than the people of flesh and blood working on his fields, however, he soon took the Hari as an abstract or imagined category including all landless Muslim peasants in Sindh. He saw the Haris as an exploited and backward people, who needed to be freed and uplifted. To him, this was the main task of the Syed”13.
The province of Sindh is (in)famous for being one of the last strongholds of feudalism. During the British conquest of Sindh in 1843, the province had one of the most repressive feudal systems in the entire subcontinent. The British, having no coherent and consistent agrarian policy –they first introduced the ryotwari system only to abandon it later– didn’t endeavour to undo the socio-economic control of Waderas. These Waderas performed, and still do, many functions in rural Sindh, including quasi-judicial and tax collection. The system served the limited purpose of the British to collect taxes and transportation of raw materials. Charles Napier even regarded them as Sindh’s natural aristocracy. Thus, the dovetailed interests of Waderas and the British led the landlord class to flourish14. The power of Waderas grew so much during British rule that at the time of partition, around 80% of the province’s arable land was owned by them.15
To be fair, the concerns of the Hari community did occupy, though didn’t dominate, some mainstream Sindhi political debates. Syed, as one of the proponents of their upliftment, has been a vocal critic of their oppression. Other leaders, such as Hyder Baksh Jatoi, M.A. Khuhro, etc. had built their careers on issues of Haris. However, the social background of Sindhi Nationalist leaders, and their daily actions that go against their words, have prevented the landless labourers from supporting their cause. This is corroborated by what Imdad Qazi, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Pakistan, told Hussein in an interview, “Marxists, both Leninists and Maoists, parted ways with the nationalists in the 1970s. When the barrage-lands were allotted to peasants, Nationalists stood with Marxists, but when Marxists spoke about land reforms, Nationalists left us”16
It is, thus, the rural setting of Sindh which makes leaders like Palijo suspicious of, and even antagonistic to, the intentions of Sindhi secessionists. The Syed-Pir-Wadera alliance which has continuously exploited the Haris for centuries has made them committed, though dissenting, citizens of Pakistan.
Manifestation of Nationalism
The predilection of Sindhi nationalists towards Ashrafiya-Savarna symbolism is conspicuous. For instance, in his book, and otherwise as well, Paigham-e-Latif, G.M. Syed not only declared Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, a Syed, as the national poet of Sindh but went as far as to justify his own genealogical superiority by tracing his lineage to the late mediaeval poet17. Furthermore, in his book A Nation in Chains- Sindhudesh, he first propounded the idea of Raja Dahir, the Brahmin king during the invasion led by Muhammad bin Qasim in 711 AD, as a national hero (which was a response to the state-sponsored narrative of tracing the history of Pakistan to the invasion).18
The issues were taken up by Sindhi nationalists who also represent the Ashrafiya-Savarna bias. Take for instance the issue of religious conversion of Sindhi Hindus. By confining their opposition to conversion under the bracket of religious freedom, they conveniently bypass their Dalit identity –since most of the converted people are Dalits– thereby serving Savarna Hindu causes. Another example is the incursion of Punjabis and Army personnel (Pakistan has a policy of allocating land to retired army men) which is, perhaps, most detested by Sindhi nationalists. Punjabis, who have been migrating and settling in Sindh for more than a century, and have developed agricultural practices that yield more than those employed by Sindhi feudal lords, are seen as a major threat to Ashrafiya domination. Thus, the issue of Punjabis settling in rural Upper Sindh becomes one of the most potent rallying points.
Sufism is perhaps the most defining feature of Sindhi Nationalism. Nationalists project Sindh as a land of Sufi saints, with some figures, such as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, being identified with the Sindhi nation itself. Sufism, however, is used as a soft power by the Syeds to perpetuate their domination.
Sufism is perhaps the most defining feature of Sindhi Nationalism. Nationalists project Sindh as a land of Sufi saints, with some figures, such as Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, being identified with the Sindhi nation itself. Sufism, however, is used as a soft power by the Syeds to perpetuate their domination. The Pirs, most of whom are Syeds and local agents of Sufism, have traditionally had more power than the local Mulla. Their huge following has given them enormous influence over the lives of ordinary people. In fact, to be a be-Pir, or without a Pir, was traditionally seen as tantamount to being a non-believer. With such hegemonic power of Sufism of the local Pirs –described as Political Sufism– renders irrelevant caste one of the most important factors in micropolitics. Sufism, furthermore, augments the power of the Syeds, who already have huge amounts of land gifted to them by successive rulers, including the British.19
Conclusion
Since the death of G.M. Syed in 1995, the Sindhudesh Movement has been dying out. Since then, the movement has suffered blows from the Pakistani Army that, among others, led to the poisoning (most probably by ISI) of Bashir Ahmad Qureshi in 2012. Moreover, it stands divided, with numerous factions of Syed’s Jeay Sindh Mahaz propping up since the 1980s. However, the core support bank of the movement –the rural Syed, Pirs and Waderas remain, more or less, supportive of the movement. Though electorally, they desert the nationalists and vote for Bhutto’s People’s Party of Pakistan. The movement, however, still remains less popular amongst the Haris and Dalits. The latter has been deemed politically absent by the nationalists. The former, though appearing in nationalist discourses, have been disenchanted with their conduct, which contradicts their words. The writers and leaders of the movement have carefully projected their struggle narrowly against the actions of, what they deem as, Punjabi-dominated Pakistan. Their concerns regarding the injustices being done by the state far outweigh the concerns for the injustices they themselves have been unleashing upon their fellow Sindhis for centuries.
References
1. “Biggest problem is structural: Palijo” The Dawn, August 19, 2003
https://www.dawn.com/news/135713/biggest-problem-is-structural-palijo
2. The term is borrowed from Hussain, Ghulam. “Appropriation of Caste Spaces in Pakistan: The Theo-Politics of Short Stories in Sindhi Progressive Literature” Religions 10, no. 11: 627. 2019 https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10110627
3. Boivin, Michel. The Sufi Paradigm and the Makings of a Vernacular Knowledge in Colonial India: The Case of Sindh (1851–1929). Palgrave Macmillan. 2020
4. Hussain, Ghulam. “Understanding Hegemony of Caste in Political Islam and Sufism in Sindh, Pakistan”. Journal of Asian and African Studies Vol 1 Issue 30. 2019
5. Kronstadt K. A. “Pakistan’s Sindh province”. Congressional Research Service. 2015. October 29 https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/sindh.pdf
6. Hussain, Ghulam.. “Appropriation of Caste Spaces in Pakistan: The Theo-Politics of Short Stories in Sindhi Progressive Literature” Religions 10, no. 11: 627. 2019 https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10110627
7. Ibid.
8. Joyo, Ibrahim M. Save Sind, Save the Continent (From Feudal Lords, Capitalists and their Communalisms). Karachi. 1946.
9. Ibid
10. Ibid.
11. Verkaaik, Oskar. “Reforming Mysticism: Sindhi Separatist Intellectuals in Pakistan.” International Review of Social History, vol. 49, 2004, pp. 65–86. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26405524. Accessed 6 Jun. 2022.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid
14. “Sind and Its Pirs up to 1843.” Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947, by Sarah F. D. Ansari, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp. 9–35.
15. Kronstadt K. A. “Pakistan’s Sindh province”. Congressional Research Service. Washington D.C. 2015. October 29. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/sindh.pdf
16. Hussain, Ghulam. “Ethno-Nationality of Caste in Pakistan: Privileged Caste Morality in Sindhi Progressive Literature and Politics”. Critical Sociology. 2021. 48(1):127-149
17. Ibid
18. Syed, Ghulam M. A Nation in Chains- Sindhudesh. 1974.
19. Ansari, Sarah F.D. Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
